It may even happen that laws
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law.
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law.
Thomas Carlyle
, Q.
90) nihil est aliud lex,
quam dictamen practicse rationis in
principe, qui gubernat aliquam com-
munitatem perfectam. Manifestum est
autem, supposito quod mundus divina
providentia regatur, ut in I. habitum
est (i. 22, 1 and 2) quod tota com-
munitas universi gubernatur ratione
divina; et ideo ipsa ratio guberna-
tionis re rum in Deo, sicut in principe
universitatis existens, legis habet ratio-
nem ; et quia divina ratio nihil con-
cipit ex tempore, sed habet seternum
conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. viii. , inde
est, quod hujusmodi legem oportet
dice re ai tern am. . . . Ad tertium dicen-
dum, quod lex importat ordinem ad
finem active . . . sed finis divinse
gubernationis est ipse Deus ; nee ejus
lex est aliud ab ipso, inde lex seterna
? ? non ordinatur in alium finem. "
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? CHAP. IV. ]
39
THE NATURE OF LAW.
pression of the divine light in us. The natural law is, there-
fore, the participation of the rational creature in the eternal
law. 1 St Thomas was indeed aware of the fact that the term
natural law had been and might be used in more than one
sense,2 but his own conception is perfectly clear.
In order, however, to understand the full significance of
this conception, we must observe another distinction of great
importance, which St Thomas makes in another place--that
is, the distinction between natural law and positive law, a
distinction which applies both to human and divine law.
Men can, by a common agreement, establish a law as just,
in matters otherwise indifferent, so long as it is not contrary
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 2: " Inde cum
omnia, quse divinse providentise sub-
duntur, a lege eterna regulentur et
mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet, mani-
festum est, quod omnia participant
aliqualiter legem eternam ; in quantum
scilicet, ex impressione ejus habent
inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.
Inter csetera autem, rationalis creatura
eccellentiore quodam modo divinse
providentise subjacet, in quantum et
ipsa fit providentise particips, sibi ipsi
et aliis providens: unde et in ipsa
participator ratio eterna per quam
habet naturalem inclinationem ad
debitum actum et Qnem: et talis
participatio legis setenue in rationali
creatura lex naturalis dicitur : unde
quam pesimista dixisset (Ps. iv. ).
' Sacrificate sacrificium justitise,' quasi
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ? '
Cui queetioni respondene, dicit, ' Signa-
tum est super nos lumen vultus tui,
Domine. '* Quasi lumen rationis natu-
ralis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum,
et quid malum, quod pertinet ad
naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam
impressio divini luminis in nobis:
unde patet, quod lex naturalis nihil
aliud est, quam participatio legis eternse
in rationali creatura. "
Cf. the treatment of Natural Law
by the Canonists, vol. ii. part ii.
chap. iii.
2 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 2 : " Inest, enim,
primo inclinatio homini ad bonum
secundum naturam, in qua communicat
omnibus substantiis; prout scilicet,
qselibet substantia appetit conserva-
tionem sui esse secundum suam na-
turam, et secundum hanc inclinationem,
pertinent ad legem naturalem ea, per
quse vita hominis conservatur, et con-
trarium impeditur. Sec undo, inest
homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis
specialia secundum naturam, in qua
communicat cum ceteris animalibus:
et secundum hoo dicuntur ea esse de
legi naturali, quse natura omnia ani-
malia docuit; ut est commixtio maris
et fcenrinse, educatio et liberorum et
similia. Tertio modo inest homini
? ? inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam
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? 40
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural justice, and this is positive law ; and there is a
positive divine law as well as a natural. 1
The term Divine law is used by St Thomas to describe
that twofold law of God which is revealed in the Old and
New Testaments. It was needed for various reasons, because
the final end of man is beyond human reason, because of the
uncertainty of men's judgments, because human law can
only deal with the external actions of men, because human
law cannot prohibit or punish all evil actions, lest it should
do more harm than good. The divine law does not indeed
contradict or annul the natural law, but it was added that
men might participate in the " eternal law" in a higher
manner. 2
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 2 : "Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas humana ex
communi condicto potest aliquid face re
justum in his, qusi secundum se non
habent aliquam repugnantiam ad natu-
ralem justitiam : et in his habet locum
jus positivum: undo Philos dicit in
T. Ethic (cap. 7) quod ' legale justum
est, quod ex principio nihil differt sic
vel alitor; quando autem ponitur
differt. ' Sed si aliquid de se repug-
nantiam habeat ad jus naturale, non
potest voluntate humana fieri justum ;
puta si statuatur, quod liceat furari,
vel adulterium committere; unde
dicitur Isa. 10. ' Vbs qui condunt
leges iniquss. '
Ad tertium dicendum, quod jus
divinum dicitur, quod divinitus pro-
mulgatur : et hoc quidem partim est
de his, quse sunt naturalitcr justa, sed
tamen eorum justitia homines latet;
partim autem de his qus? fiunt justa
institutione divina; unde etiam jus
divinum per haec duo distingui potest,
sicut et jus humanum: sunt enim
in lege divina qusdam prsecepta quia
bona ; et prohibita quia mala: quse-
dam vero bona quia precepta, et mala
quia prohibita. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, S1, 4: " Bespondeo
dicendum, quod prsetcr legem natu-
ralem, et legem humanam, necessarium
fuit ad directionem humanse viti
o
habere legem divinum. Et hoc propter
quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia
per legem dirigitur homo ad actus
proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem :
. . . sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem
beatitudmis seternse, quse exoedit pro-
portionem naturalis facultatis humanse
. . . ideo neoessarium fuit, ut supra
legem naturalem et humanam, diri-
geretur etiam ad sum finem lege divi-
nitus data. Secundo, quia propter
incertitudinem humani iudicii . . .
contingit de actibus humanis diverso-
rum esse diversa iudicia ex quibus
etiam diversse ct contrarise leges pro-
oedunt . . . necessarium fuit, ut in
actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem
divinitus datum, de qua constat, quod
? ? non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his
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? ChAF. IV. ]
41
THE NATURE OF LAW.
Human law is described by St Thomas in another article
of the same question under the terms of its relation to reason.
Law is a command of the practical reason, for the human
reason must draw out and apply to particular circumstances
the general precepts of the natural law. 1 St Thomas, however,
also points out that this general conception of the nature of
human law requires a further analysis. The term human law
includes two different kinds of law, the " ius gentium " and
the "ius civile. " The first is derived from the natural
law, as conclusions are derived from premisses, and forms
that body of laws without which men could not live together.
The second is derived from the natural law, " per modum
particularis determinationis," and is that which any State
establishes as being suitable to its own conditions. 2
Law, then, in all its forms is the expression of reason, but
it is also, in the judgment of St Thomas, the expression of
justice, and we must briefly consider this. He accepts the
definition of justice, given by Ulpian in the ' Digest,' " Justitia
est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi "
quod est necessarium ad conservationcm
humanam; ut ergo nullum malum
improhibitum, et impunitum remaneat,
neceesarium fuit supervenire legem
divinam, per quss omnia pecoata pro-
bibentur .
Ad prinum ergo dicendum, quod per
naturulcm legem partioipatur lex
seterna secundem proportionem capaci-
taiis humane nature: sed oportet,
ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in
ultimum finem supernaturalem; et
ideo superadditur lex divinitus data,
per quam lex eterna participatur altiori
modo. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 3 : " Kespondeo
dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum
est lex est quod dam dictamen practicse
rationis . . . ita etiam ex praceptis
legis naturalibus, quasi ex quibusdam
principiis communibus, et indemonstra-
bilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana
procedat ad aliqua magia partiru-
lariter diaponenda: et istae particu-
lars dispositiones adinventse secundum
rationem humanam dicuntur leges
humanse. "
" Id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 4 : " Est enim
primo de ratione legis humanse, quod
sit derivata a lego naturse, ut ex dictis
patet (Art. ii. , hujus Q. ); et secundum
hoc dividitur jus positivum, in jus
gentium et jus civile, secundum duos
modos, quibus aliquid derivatur a lege
nature, ut supra dictum est: nam
ad jus gentium pertinent ea quse
derivantur ex lego natura? , sicut con-
clusiones ex principiis: ut justrc
emptiones, veuditiones et alia hujus-
modi, sine quibus homines ad invicem
convivere non possent: quod est de
lege nature : quia homo est naturaliter
animae sociabile, ut probatur in I.
Polit. (c. 2): quse vero derivantur
a lege nature per modum particularis
determinationis, pertinent ad jus civile,
secundum quod qusslibet civitaa aliquid
? ? sibi aocommode determinat. "
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? 42 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PART ?
('Dig. ,'i. 10) if it is properly understood. 1 Inalater "Quaestio"
indeed, he discusses the various parts or aspects of justice,
and accepts the Aristotelian distinction between " distribu-
tive " and " commutative " justice. 2 It does not, however,
appear that in St Thomas' judgment this interferes with the
general truth of Ulpian's definition.
The whole system of law, and here St Thomas uses the
word "jus," is so called, according to St Isidore, because
it is just (justum), and the just and "jus " are the " objec-
tion " of justice,3 and St Thomas gives his considered and
emphatic assent. *
He therefore goes on to describe " judicium," which is
the action of the judge, as being the definition or determina-
tion of that which is just or lawful, and this belongs to justice ;
this is what Aristotle meant when he said that men go to the
judge as to a living justice. 5 Perhaps the most emphatic
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 58, 1 : "Ad Primum
sic prooeditur. Videtur quod incon-
venienter definiatur a jurisperitis,
quod justitia est ' perpetua et constans
voluntas jus suum uniouique tri-
buendi' . . . Respondeo dicendum,
quod predicta justitise definitio con-
veniens est, si recto intelligatur . . .
et si quia vellet eam in debitam formam
definitionis reducere, posset sic dicere,
quod justitia est habitus, secundum
quem aliquis constant! et perpetua
voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit;
et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea,
quam Philos ponit in v. Ethic (cap. v. )
dicens, ' Quod justia est habitus,
secundum quem aliquis dicitur opera-
tivus, secundum electionem justi. ' "
* Id. id. , 2. 2, 61, 1: " Sed contra
est quod Philos in v. Ethic (c. 2) ponit
duas partes justitise, et dicit, quod
una est directiva in distributionibus,
alia in commutationibus.
Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut
dictum est, justitia particularis ordina-
tur ad aliquam privatam personam :
quio comparatur ad communitatem,
sicut pars ad totum: potest autem
ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi:
unus quidem partis ad partem ; qui
similis est ordo unius privatse personse
ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit
commutative justitia, quse consistit
in his quse mutuo fiunt inter duas
personas ad invicem; alius ordo
attenditur totius ad partes: et huio
ordini assimilatur ejus quod est com-
mune ad singular personas: quem
quidem ordinem dirigit justitia dis-
tributiva, quse est distributiva com-
munium secundum proportionalitatem :
et ideo duse sunt justitise species:
scilicet -. distributiva, et commutativa. "
s Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 1: "Sed contra
est quod laid. : dicit in eodem libro
(' Etym. ,' v. 3), quod jus dictum est
quia est justum: sed justum est
objectum justitise: dicit enim Philos
in v. Ethic (cap. i. ) quod ' omnes
talem habitum volunt dicere justum
a quo operativi justorum sunt'; ergo
jus est objectum justitise. "
? ? 4 Id. id. id. , Resp.
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? CHAP. IV. ]
43
THE NATURE OF LAW.
assertion by St Thomas of the relation between law and
justice may be found in another " Article " of the same " Ques-
tion," where he asks whether the judgment of the judge must
always be in accordance with the law. He decides that
while normally this must be so, this will only hold if the
law is just. Laws which are contrary to the natural law
are unjust, and have no force.
It may even happen that laws
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law. In such circumstances men must not judge according
to the letter of the law, but must recur to that equity which
the legislator desired to attain. 1
est: judex autem dicitur, quasi jus
dicens : jus autem est objectum justi-
tise, ut supra babitum est: et ideo
judicium importat, secundum prim am
nominis impositionem, definitionem vel
determinationem justi, sive juris:
quod autem aliquis bene defmiat
aliquid in operibus virtuosis, proprie
procedit ex habitu virtutis: sicut
cast us recto determinat ea, quse perti-
nent ad cartitatem ; et ideo judicium,
quod importat rectum determinationem
ejus, quod est justum, proprie pertinet
ad justitiam: propter quod Philos, in
v. Ethic (cap. 4) dicit, quod homines
ad judicem confugiunt, sicut ad quan-
dam justitiam animatam. "
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 60, 5: " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut diotum est,
judicium nihil aliud est quam qusedam
definitio, vel determinatio ejus quod
justum est: fit autem aliquid justum
dupliciter, uno modo ex ipsa natura
rei quod dicitur jus naturale: alio
modo ex quodam condicto inter ho-
mines ; quod dicitur jus positivum
ut supra habitum est (Q. 57, 2): leges
autem scribuntur ad utriusque juris
declarationem : alitor tamon, et alitor :
nam legis scriptura jus quidem natu-
rale continet, sed non instituit: non
enim - ha bet robin- ex lege, sed ex
natura : jus autem positivum scriptura
legis et continet, et instituit, dans ei
auctoritatis robur; et ideo necesse
est, quod judicium fiat secundum legis
scripturam, aloquim judicium deficeret
vel a justo naturali vel a justo positivo.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
lex scripta sicut non dat robur juri
naturali, ita nec potest ejus robur
minuere, vel auferre : quia nec volun-
tas hominis potest immutare naturam :
et ideo si scriptura legis oontineat
aliquid contra jus naturale, injusta
est, nec habet vim obligandi; ibi enim
jus positivum locum habet, ubi quan-
tum ad jus naturale nihil difiert, utrum
sic vel aliter fiat, sicut supra habitum
est (Q. 57, 2); et ideo nec tales scrip-
ture leges dicuntur, sed potius legis
corruptiones, ut supra dictum est
(1. 2, 95, 2): et ideo secundum eas
non est judicandum.
? ? Ad secundum dicendum, quod
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? 44
[PABT (.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
St Thomas' conception of the nature of law is, then,
founded upon two principles, that it is the expression of
reason, and that its purpose is justice. It is interesting to
compare his conception with that of the mediseval Jurists,
with which we have dealt especially in the second and third
volumes of this work. 1 His treatment represents a very im-
portant development of the significance of the rational element
in law, while it also brings out very emphatically the funda-
mental mediseval conception of its moral or ethical nature.
ea nos duriore interpretatione contra Cf. id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 2, Resp,
ipsorum commodum producamus ad 1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chaps. 1 and 2 ;
severitatem': et in talibus etiam legia- part ii. chap. 3 ; vol. iii. part i. chap. 2 ;
lator alitor judicaret; et si conside- part ii. chap. 5.
russet, lege determiuasset. "
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? 45
CHAPTER V.
THE SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I.
We have so far considered the mediseval conceptions of the
nature of law as representing the principles of reason and
justice, or, to put it into the other terms of that time, human
law as limited and controlled by the law of nature. We
must now consider the more immediate source of the law of
the State, the authority from which it proceeded, and upon
which it rested. In this chapter and the following, we shall
endeavour to set out what we venture to think were the
normal mediseval conceptions upon the subject, and to trace
the beginnings of another mode of thought.
We have in previous volumes set out what appears to us
the first and in some sense the most fundamental aspect of
the mediseval conception of the nature and source of the law
of the State--that is, that it was custom. We have seen that
this was the conception of the feudal jurists,1 and that this
was also the first principle of the Canon Law. 2 We shall
have presently to deal with the question of the relation of
the Civilians of Bologna and the revived study of the Eoman
law to the question of the source of law ; but for the moment
it is enough to observe that the Civilians also were clear that
custom had once been its source. 3 The principle is admirably
expressed by Beaumanoir for France, when he says that all
pleas are determined by custom, and by Bracton for England,
when he asserts that England is governed by unwritten law
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chap. 3. 8 Vol. ii. part i. chaps. 6 and 7.
* Cf. vol. ii. part ii. chap. 8.
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? 40
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
and custom. It is no doubt true that Bracton thought that
this was peculiar to England--a curiously inaccurate judg-
ment, probably due to an impression that the other European
countries lived under Eoman law. 1 What is thus affirmed
for their own countries by Beaumanoir and Bracton became
a sweeping and all-including generalisation in Gratian, when
he opened his ' Decretum' with the famous words, founded
upon Isidore of Seville, " The race of mankind is ruled by two
things, by natural law and by custom. " 2
We venture to urge that it is quite impossible to under-
stand the political structure of mediseval society and the
nature of mediseval government unless we begin by taking
account of this conception. We are so much and so naturally,
if not very intelligently, influenced by the belief in the
existence of a conscious sovereign authority, of which law
is the expression, that we find it difficult to understand
the state of mind of those ages when the conception of
the sovereign, in the modern sense of the word, hardly
existed.
The first question to which we must here address ourselves
is how far this conception of law, as proceeding from or con-
trolled by custom, was maintained in the thirteenth century
by writers with whom we have not yet dealt, or in countries
whose laws we have not yet examined.
And first, we may observe the careful and yet confident
mode in which St Thomas Aquinas sets out the principle of
the authority of custom. In a discussion of the question
whether law can be changed, he considers the question whether
custom has the force of law. He cites various objections
which could be alleged, and then states his own conclusion.
He first cites the famous words of St Augustine that the
custom of the people of God and the institutions of men's
ancestors are to be accepted as law, and then proceeds to
say that law is the expression of the reason and will of the
legislator, but these are declared as plainly by men's actions
as by their words, and therefore the frequently repeated
1 Cf. vol. iii. pp. 41, 42. * Cf. vol. ii. p. 98.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 47
actions of men which constitute custom can change or estab-
lish or interpret law. 1
He goes on to contend that, as human laws may not cover
all cases, it may be right sometimes to take action which is
outside of the law, and when such cases are multiplied owing
to some change in men, custom shows that the law is
no longer useful. And he even adds that, while normally,
if the conditions remain the same, the law founded upon
these conditions will prevail over custom, there may be
cases where the law is useless, simply because it is contrary
to the custom of the country, for this is one of the conditions
of law--it is difficult to change the custom of the multitude. 3
It is clear that while St Thomas recognises other forms
of law besides the custom of the people, he does substantially
represent the conception of custom as a main source of
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 1. 2, 97, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit in Epistola
ad Casulanum : ' mos populi Dei et
instituta ma jorum pro lege sunt
tenenda ; et siout prevaricatores legum
divinarum. ita et contemptores con-
suetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi
sunt. ' Respondeo dioendum, quod
omnia lex proficiscitur a rations, et
voluntate legislatoris: lex quidem
divina, et naturalis, a rationabili Dei
voluntate, lex autem humana a volun-
tate hominis ratione regulata: sicut
autem ratio et voluntas hominis mani-
festantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita
etiam manifestantur facto : hoc enim
unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum,
quod ope re implet. Manifest :t est
autem, quod verbo humano potest et
mut&ri lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum
manifestat interiorem motum, et con-
ceptum rationis humanse ; unde etiam
ct per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui
consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest
lex, et exponi et etiam, aliquid causari,
quod legis virtu tem obtineat; inquan-
tum scilicet per exteriores actus multi-
plicatas interior voluntatis motus, et
rationis conceptus efficacissimo decla-
ratur: quum enim aliquid multoties
fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis
judicio proveniri: et secundum hoc
consuetudo et habet vim legis, et
legem abolet, et est legum inter-
pretatrix. "
Cf. Julianus in * Dig. ,' i. 3, 32, and
vol. i. p. 64.
2 Id. id. id. : " Ad secundum di-
cendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est,
leges human se in aliquibus casibus
deficiunt; unde possibile est quando-
que prater legem agere, in casu scilicet
in quo deficit lex; et tamen actus
non erit malus : et cum tales casus
multiplicantur propter aliquam muta-
tionem hominum, tunc manifestatur
per consuetudinem, quod lex ulterius
non est utilis ; sicut etiam manifesta-
retur, si lex contraria verbo promul-
garetur. Si autem adhuc maneat
ratio eadem, propter quam prima lex
utilis erat, non consuetudo legem sed
? ? lex consuetudinem vincit: nisi forte
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? 48
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
law. It is, however, clear that St Thomas Aquinas implies
that there were other forms of law besides custom, and we
shall presently deal with these. The important point of the
passages which we have just considered is that, whatever
other forms of law there might be, he was clear that custom
lay behind them, and was still paramount over them.
This is also the position of some other very important
writers of the later thirteenth century. Vincent of Beauvais,
in his ' Speculum,' cites the significant words of Gratian, in
which he laid down the principle that even when laws were
instituted by a competent authority, they needed to be con-
firmed by the custom of those who were concerned. 1 Albert
the Great seems also to refer to the same doctrine when he
says that the edict of the Prince which is maintained by
custom has the force of written law. 2 What is, however,
much more significant is the treatment of the authority of
custom by the most important Canonist, and the most authori-
tative Civilian of the second half of the century.
Hostiensis, in his ' Commentary on the Decretals,' describes
the nature and the authority of custom, and clearly accepts
the judgment of Gregory IX. that custom if it is " rationabilis
et legitime prsescripta," prevails over other forms of positive
law. 3 Odofridus, in his ' Commentary on the Digest,' draws
attention to the divergence between this judgment of Gregory
and the passage in the ' Code ' (viii. 52 (53)), in which Con-
stantine had apparently maintained that custom could not
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
it 7. 35. Cf. vol. ii. pp. 155, 166,
186.
2 Albert the Great, ' Ethica,' x. iii.
2: " Sin autem illse (leges) scriptse
aint vel non scriptse, nihil videtur
differre ad prsesens: edictum enim
principia consuetudine servatum script:! !
legis habet vigorem. "
* Hostiensis, ' In Primum Librum
Decretalium Commentaria,' i. * De
Consuetudine,' 8, 9: " Ad quod
sciendum quod quatuor sunt species
consuetudinis, scilicet generalissima, ut
est consuetudo inter omnes Catholicos,
versus orientem orare. . . . "
Id. id. , 10 : " Item est consuetudo
genoralis, quando scilicet nedum civitas
sed tota provincia ita generaliter
servat. "
Id. id. , 8, 11 : " Et hae duo species
derogant juri, sive in provincia, sive
in loco in quo obtinct hoc, si post
legem introducta sit consuetudo. "
Id. id. , 10, 9: " Quid est consue-
tudo. . . . TJsus rationabilis competente
tempore confirmatus. . . . "
Id. id. , 11: " TJtrum autem ait
rationabilis vel non, relinquo judici,
cum non regula posset tradi. "
Cf. ' Decretals,' i. 4, 11. Cf. vol. ii.
p. 158.
? ?
quam dictamen practicse rationis in
principe, qui gubernat aliquam com-
munitatem perfectam. Manifestum est
autem, supposito quod mundus divina
providentia regatur, ut in I. habitum
est (i. 22, 1 and 2) quod tota com-
munitas universi gubernatur ratione
divina; et ideo ipsa ratio guberna-
tionis re rum in Deo, sicut in principe
universitatis existens, legis habet ratio-
nem ; et quia divina ratio nihil con-
cipit ex tempore, sed habet seternum
conceptum, ut dicitur Prov. viii. , inde
est, quod hujusmodi legem oportet
dice re ai tern am. . . . Ad tertium dicen-
dum, quod lex importat ordinem ad
finem active . . . sed finis divinse
gubernationis est ipse Deus ; nee ejus
lex est aliud ab ipso, inde lex seterna
? ? non ordinatur in alium finem. "
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? CHAP. IV. ]
39
THE NATURE OF LAW.
pression of the divine light in us. The natural law is, there-
fore, the participation of the rational creature in the eternal
law. 1 St Thomas was indeed aware of the fact that the term
natural law had been and might be used in more than one
sense,2 but his own conception is perfectly clear.
In order, however, to understand the full significance of
this conception, we must observe another distinction of great
importance, which St Thomas makes in another place--that
is, the distinction between natural law and positive law, a
distinction which applies both to human and divine law.
Men can, by a common agreement, establish a law as just,
in matters otherwise indifferent, so long as it is not contrary
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 2: " Inde cum
omnia, quse divinse providentise sub-
duntur, a lege eterna regulentur et
mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet, mani-
festum est, quod omnia participant
aliqualiter legem eternam ; in quantum
scilicet, ex impressione ejus habent
inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.
Inter csetera autem, rationalis creatura
eccellentiore quodam modo divinse
providentise subjacet, in quantum et
ipsa fit providentise particips, sibi ipsi
et aliis providens: unde et in ipsa
participator ratio eterna per quam
habet naturalem inclinationem ad
debitum actum et Qnem: et talis
participatio legis setenue in rationali
creatura lex naturalis dicitur : unde
quam pesimista dixisset (Ps. iv. ).
' Sacrificate sacrificium justitise,' quasi
quibusdam quserentibus, quie sunt
justitise opera subjungit: * Multi di-
cunt: quia ostendit nobis bona ? '
Cui queetioni respondene, dicit, ' Signa-
tum est super nos lumen vultus tui,
Domine. '* Quasi lumen rationis natu-
ralis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum,
et quid malum, quod pertinet ad
naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam
impressio divini luminis in nobis:
unde patet, quod lex naturalis nihil
aliud est, quam participatio legis eternse
in rationali creatura. "
Cf. the treatment of Natural Law
by the Canonists, vol. ii. part ii.
chap. iii.
2 Id. id. , 1. 2, 94, 2 : " Inest, enim,
primo inclinatio homini ad bonum
secundum naturam, in qua communicat
omnibus substantiis; prout scilicet,
qselibet substantia appetit conserva-
tionem sui esse secundum suam na-
turam, et secundum hanc inclinationem,
pertinent ad legem naturalem ea, per
quse vita hominis conservatur, et con-
trarium impeditur. Sec undo, inest
homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis
specialia secundum naturam, in qua
communicat cum ceteris animalibus:
et secundum hoo dicuntur ea esse de
legi naturali, quse natura omnia ani-
malia docuit; ut est commixtio maris
et fcenrinse, educatio et liberorum et
similia. Tertio modo inest homini
? ? inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam
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? 40
[FAST I.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
to natural justice, and this is positive law ; and there is a
positive divine law as well as a natural. 1
The term Divine law is used by St Thomas to describe
that twofold law of God which is revealed in the Old and
New Testaments. It was needed for various reasons, because
the final end of man is beyond human reason, because of the
uncertainty of men's judgments, because human law can
only deal with the external actions of men, because human
law cannot prohibit or punish all evil actions, lest it should
do more harm than good. The divine law does not indeed
contradict or annul the natural law, but it was added that
men might participate in the " eternal law" in a higher
manner. 2
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 2 : "Ad secundum
dicendum quod voluntas humana ex
communi condicto potest aliquid face re
justum in his, qusi secundum se non
habent aliquam repugnantiam ad natu-
ralem justitiam : et in his habet locum
jus positivum: undo Philos dicit in
T. Ethic (cap. 7) quod ' legale justum
est, quod ex principio nihil differt sic
vel alitor; quando autem ponitur
differt. ' Sed si aliquid de se repug-
nantiam habeat ad jus naturale, non
potest voluntate humana fieri justum ;
puta si statuatur, quod liceat furari,
vel adulterium committere; unde
dicitur Isa. 10. ' Vbs qui condunt
leges iniquss. '
Ad tertium dicendum, quod jus
divinum dicitur, quod divinitus pro-
mulgatur : et hoc quidem partim est
de his, quse sunt naturalitcr justa, sed
tamen eorum justitia homines latet;
partim autem de his qus? fiunt justa
institutione divina; unde etiam jus
divinum per haec duo distingui potest,
sicut et jus humanum: sunt enim
in lege divina qusdam prsecepta quia
bona ; et prohibita quia mala: quse-
dam vero bona quia precepta, et mala
quia prohibita. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, S1, 4: " Bespondeo
dicendum, quod prsetcr legem natu-
ralem, et legem humanam, necessarium
fuit ad directionem humanse viti
o
habere legem divinum. Et hoc propter
quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia
per legem dirigitur homo ad actus
proprios in ordine ad ultimum finem :
. . . sed quia homo ordinatur ad finem
beatitudmis seternse, quse exoedit pro-
portionem naturalis facultatis humanse
. . . ideo neoessarium fuit, ut supra
legem naturalem et humanam, diri-
geretur etiam ad sum finem lege divi-
nitus data. Secundo, quia propter
incertitudinem humani iudicii . . .
contingit de actibus humanis diverso-
rum esse diversa iudicia ex quibus
etiam diversse ct contrarise leges pro-
oedunt . . . necessarium fuit, ut in
actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem
divinitus datum, de qua constat, quod
? ? non potest errare. Tertio, quia de his
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? ChAF. IV. ]
41
THE NATURE OF LAW.
Human law is described by St Thomas in another article
of the same question under the terms of its relation to reason.
Law is a command of the practical reason, for the human
reason must draw out and apply to particular circumstances
the general precepts of the natural law. 1 St Thomas, however,
also points out that this general conception of the nature of
human law requires a further analysis. The term human law
includes two different kinds of law, the " ius gentium " and
the "ius civile. " The first is derived from the natural
law, as conclusions are derived from premisses, and forms
that body of laws without which men could not live together.
The second is derived from the natural law, " per modum
particularis determinationis," and is that which any State
establishes as being suitable to its own conditions. 2
Law, then, in all its forms is the expression of reason, but
it is also, in the judgment of St Thomas, the expression of
justice, and we must briefly consider this. He accepts the
definition of justice, given by Ulpian in the ' Digest,' " Justitia
est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi "
quod est necessarium ad conservationcm
humanam; ut ergo nullum malum
improhibitum, et impunitum remaneat,
neceesarium fuit supervenire legem
divinam, per quss omnia pecoata pro-
bibentur .
Ad prinum ergo dicendum, quod per
naturulcm legem partioipatur lex
seterna secundem proportionem capaci-
taiis humane nature: sed oportet,
ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in
ultimum finem supernaturalem; et
ideo superadditur lex divinitus data,
per quam lex eterna participatur altiori
modo. "
1 Id. id. , 1. 2, 91, 3 : " Kespondeo
dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum
est lex est quod dam dictamen practicse
rationis . . . ita etiam ex praceptis
legis naturalibus, quasi ex quibusdam
principiis communibus, et indemonstra-
bilibus, necesse est quod ratio humana
procedat ad aliqua magia partiru-
lariter diaponenda: et istae particu-
lars dispositiones adinventse secundum
rationem humanam dicuntur leges
humanse. "
" Id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 4 : " Est enim
primo de ratione legis humanse, quod
sit derivata a lego naturse, ut ex dictis
patet (Art. ii. , hujus Q. ); et secundum
hoc dividitur jus positivum, in jus
gentium et jus civile, secundum duos
modos, quibus aliquid derivatur a lege
nature, ut supra dictum est: nam
ad jus gentium pertinent ea quse
derivantur ex lego natura? , sicut con-
clusiones ex principiis: ut justrc
emptiones, veuditiones et alia hujus-
modi, sine quibus homines ad invicem
convivere non possent: quod est de
lege nature : quia homo est naturaliter
animae sociabile, ut probatur in I.
Polit. (c. 2): quse vero derivantur
a lege nature per modum particularis
determinationis, pertinent ad jus civile,
secundum quod qusslibet civitaa aliquid
? ? sibi aocommode determinat. "
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? 42 POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. [PART ?
('Dig. ,'i. 10) if it is properly understood. 1 Inalater "Quaestio"
indeed, he discusses the various parts or aspects of justice,
and accepts the Aristotelian distinction between " distribu-
tive " and " commutative " justice. 2 It does not, however,
appear that in St Thomas' judgment this interferes with the
general truth of Ulpian's definition.
The whole system of law, and here St Thomas uses the
word "jus," is so called, according to St Isidore, because
it is just (justum), and the just and "jus " are the " objec-
tion " of justice,3 and St Thomas gives his considered and
emphatic assent. *
He therefore goes on to describe " judicium," which is
the action of the judge, as being the definition or determina-
tion of that which is just or lawful, and this belongs to justice ;
this is what Aristotle meant when he said that men go to the
judge as to a living justice. 5 Perhaps the most emphatic
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 58, 1 : "Ad Primum
sic prooeditur. Videtur quod incon-
venienter definiatur a jurisperitis,
quod justitia est ' perpetua et constans
voluntas jus suum uniouique tri-
buendi' . . . Respondeo dicendum,
quod predicta justitise definitio con-
veniens est, si recto intelligatur . . .
et si quia vellet eam in debitam formam
definitionis reducere, posset sic dicere,
quod justitia est habitus, secundum
quem aliquis constant! et perpetua
voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit;
et quasi est eadem definitio cum ea,
quam Philos ponit in v. Ethic (cap. v. )
dicens, ' Quod justia est habitus,
secundum quem aliquis dicitur opera-
tivus, secundum electionem justi. ' "
* Id. id. , 2. 2, 61, 1: " Sed contra
est quod Philos in v. Ethic (c. 2) ponit
duas partes justitise, et dicit, quod
una est directiva in distributionibus,
alia in commutationibus.
Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut
dictum est, justitia particularis ordina-
tur ad aliquam privatam personam :
quio comparatur ad communitatem,
sicut pars ad totum: potest autem
ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi:
unus quidem partis ad partem ; qui
similis est ordo unius privatse personse
ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit
commutative justitia, quse consistit
in his quse mutuo fiunt inter duas
personas ad invicem; alius ordo
attenditur totius ad partes: et huio
ordini assimilatur ejus quod est com-
mune ad singular personas: quem
quidem ordinem dirigit justitia dis-
tributiva, quse est distributiva com-
munium secundum proportionalitatem :
et ideo duse sunt justitise species:
scilicet -. distributiva, et commutativa. "
s Id. id. , 2. 2, 57, 1: "Sed contra
est quod laid. : dicit in eodem libro
(' Etym. ,' v. 3), quod jus dictum est
quia est justum: sed justum est
objectum justitise: dicit enim Philos
in v. Ethic (cap. i. ) quod ' omnes
talem habitum volunt dicere justum
a quo operativi justorum sunt'; ergo
jus est objectum justitise. "
? ? 4 Id. id. id. , Resp.
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? CHAP. IV. ]
43
THE NATURE OF LAW.
assertion by St Thomas of the relation between law and
justice may be found in another " Article " of the same " Ques-
tion," where he asks whether the judgment of the judge must
always be in accordance with the law. He decides that
while normally this must be so, this will only hold if the
law is just. Laws which are contrary to the natural law
are unjust, and have no force.
It may even happen that laws
which are in themselves right may not be adequate to certain
cases, and would, in such cases, be contrary to the natural
law. In such circumstances men must not judge according
to the letter of the law, but must recur to that equity which
the legislator desired to attain. 1
est: judex autem dicitur, quasi jus
dicens : jus autem est objectum justi-
tise, ut supra babitum est: et ideo
judicium importat, secundum prim am
nominis impositionem, definitionem vel
determinationem justi, sive juris:
quod autem aliquis bene defmiat
aliquid in operibus virtuosis, proprie
procedit ex habitu virtutis: sicut
cast us recto determinat ea, quse perti-
nent ad cartitatem ; et ideo judicium,
quod importat rectum determinationem
ejus, quod est justum, proprie pertinet
ad justitiam: propter quod Philos, in
v. Ethic (cap. 4) dicit, quod homines
ad judicem confugiunt, sicut ad quan-
dam justitiam animatam. "
1 Id. id. , 2. 2, 60, 5: " Respondeo
dicendum, quod sicut diotum est,
judicium nihil aliud est quam qusedam
definitio, vel determinatio ejus quod
justum est: fit autem aliquid justum
dupliciter, uno modo ex ipsa natura
rei quod dicitur jus naturale: alio
modo ex quodam condicto inter ho-
mines ; quod dicitur jus positivum
ut supra habitum est (Q. 57, 2): leges
autem scribuntur ad utriusque juris
declarationem : alitor tamon, et alitor :
nam legis scriptura jus quidem natu-
rale continet, sed non instituit: non
enim - ha bet robin- ex lege, sed ex
natura : jus autem positivum scriptura
legis et continet, et instituit, dans ei
auctoritatis robur; et ideo necesse
est, quod judicium fiat secundum legis
scripturam, aloquim judicium deficeret
vel a justo naturali vel a justo positivo.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod
lex scripta sicut non dat robur juri
naturali, ita nec potest ejus robur
minuere, vel auferre : quia nec volun-
tas hominis potest immutare naturam :
et ideo si scriptura legis oontineat
aliquid contra jus naturale, injusta
est, nec habet vim obligandi; ibi enim
jus positivum locum habet, ubi quan-
tum ad jus naturale nihil difiert, utrum
sic vel aliter fiat, sicut supra habitum
est (Q. 57, 2); et ideo nec tales scrip-
ture leges dicuntur, sed potius legis
corruptiones, ut supra dictum est
(1. 2, 95, 2): et ideo secundum eas
non est judicandum.
? ? Ad secundum dicendum, quod
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? 44
[PABT (.
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
St Thomas' conception of the nature of law is, then,
founded upon two principles, that it is the expression of
reason, and that its purpose is justice. It is interesting to
compare his conception with that of the mediseval Jurists,
with which we have dealt especially in the second and third
volumes of this work. 1 His treatment represents a very im-
portant development of the significance of the rational element
in law, while it also brings out very emphatically the funda-
mental mediseval conception of its moral or ethical nature.
ea nos duriore interpretatione contra Cf. id. id. , 1. 2, 95, 2, Resp,
ipsorum commodum producamus ad 1 Cf. vol. ii. part i. chaps. 1 and 2 ;
severitatem': et in talibus etiam legia- part ii. chap. 3 ; vol. iii. part i. chap. 2 ;
lator alitor judicaret; et si conside- part ii. chap. 5.
russet, lege determiuasset. "
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? 45
CHAPTER V.
THE SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I.
We have so far considered the mediseval conceptions of the
nature of law as representing the principles of reason and
justice, or, to put it into the other terms of that time, human
law as limited and controlled by the law of nature. We
must now consider the more immediate source of the law of
the State, the authority from which it proceeded, and upon
which it rested. In this chapter and the following, we shall
endeavour to set out what we venture to think were the
normal mediseval conceptions upon the subject, and to trace
the beginnings of another mode of thought.
We have in previous volumes set out what appears to us
the first and in some sense the most fundamental aspect of
the mediseval conception of the nature and source of the law
of the State--that is, that it was custom. We have seen that
this was the conception of the feudal jurists,1 and that this
was also the first principle of the Canon Law. 2 We shall
have presently to deal with the question of the relation of
the Civilians of Bologna and the revived study of the Eoman
law to the question of the source of law ; but for the moment
it is enough to observe that the Civilians also were clear that
custom had once been its source. 3 The principle is admirably
expressed by Beaumanoir for France, when he says that all
pleas are determined by custom, and by Bracton for England,
when he asserts that England is governed by unwritten law
1 Cf. vol. iii. part i. chap. 3. 8 Vol. ii. part i. chaps. 6 and 7.
* Cf. vol. ii. part ii. chap. 8.
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? 40
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
and custom. It is no doubt true that Bracton thought that
this was peculiar to England--a curiously inaccurate judg-
ment, probably due to an impression that the other European
countries lived under Eoman law. 1 What is thus affirmed
for their own countries by Beaumanoir and Bracton became
a sweeping and all-including generalisation in Gratian, when
he opened his ' Decretum' with the famous words, founded
upon Isidore of Seville, " The race of mankind is ruled by two
things, by natural law and by custom. " 2
We venture to urge that it is quite impossible to under-
stand the political structure of mediseval society and the
nature of mediseval government unless we begin by taking
account of this conception. We are so much and so naturally,
if not very intelligently, influenced by the belief in the
existence of a conscious sovereign authority, of which law
is the expression, that we find it difficult to understand
the state of mind of those ages when the conception of
the sovereign, in the modern sense of the word, hardly
existed.
The first question to which we must here address ourselves
is how far this conception of law, as proceeding from or con-
trolled by custom, was maintained in the thirteenth century
by writers with whom we have not yet dealt, or in countries
whose laws we have not yet examined.
And first, we may observe the careful and yet confident
mode in which St Thomas Aquinas sets out the principle of
the authority of custom. In a discussion of the question
whether law can be changed, he considers the question whether
custom has the force of law. He cites various objections
which could be alleged, and then states his own conclusion.
He first cites the famous words of St Augustine that the
custom of the people of God and the institutions of men's
ancestors are to be accepted as law, and then proceeds to
say that law is the expression of the reason and will of the
legislator, but these are declared as plainly by men's actions
as by their words, and therefore the frequently repeated
1 Cf. vol. iii. pp. 41, 42. * Cf. vol. ii. p. 98.
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? CHAP. V. ] SOURCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE--I. 47
actions of men which constitute custom can change or estab-
lish or interpret law. 1
He goes on to contend that, as human laws may not cover
all cases, it may be right sometimes to take action which is
outside of the law, and when such cases are multiplied owing
to some change in men, custom shows that the law is
no longer useful. And he even adds that, while normally,
if the conditions remain the same, the law founded upon
these conditions will prevail over custom, there may be
cases where the law is useless, simply because it is contrary
to the custom of the country, for this is one of the conditions
of law--it is difficult to change the custom of the multitude. 3
It is clear that while St Thomas recognises other forms
of law besides the custom of the people, he does substantially
represent the conception of custom as a main source of
1 St Thomas Aquinas, ' Summa
Theologica,' 1. 2, 97, 3 : " Sed contra
est quod Augustinus dicit in Epistola
ad Casulanum : ' mos populi Dei et
instituta ma jorum pro lege sunt
tenenda ; et siout prevaricatores legum
divinarum. ita et contemptores con-
suetudinum ecclesiasticarum coercendi
sunt. ' Respondeo dioendum, quod
omnia lex proficiscitur a rations, et
voluntate legislatoris: lex quidem
divina, et naturalis, a rationabili Dei
voluntate, lex autem humana a volun-
tate hominis ratione regulata: sicut
autem ratio et voluntas hominis mani-
festantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita
etiam manifestantur facto : hoc enim
unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum,
quod ope re implet. Manifest :t est
autem, quod verbo humano potest et
mut&ri lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum
manifestat interiorem motum, et con-
ceptum rationis humanse ; unde etiam
ct per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui
consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest
lex, et exponi et etiam, aliquid causari,
quod legis virtu tem obtineat; inquan-
tum scilicet per exteriores actus multi-
plicatas interior voluntatis motus, et
rationis conceptus efficacissimo decla-
ratur: quum enim aliquid multoties
fit, videtur ex deliberato rationis
judicio proveniri: et secundum hoc
consuetudo et habet vim legis, et
legem abolet, et est legum inter-
pretatrix. "
Cf. Julianus in * Dig. ,' i. 3, 32, and
vol. i. p. 64.
2 Id. id. id. : " Ad secundum di-
cendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est,
leges human se in aliquibus casibus
deficiunt; unde possibile est quando-
que prater legem agere, in casu scilicet
in quo deficit lex; et tamen actus
non erit malus : et cum tales casus
multiplicantur propter aliquam muta-
tionem hominum, tunc manifestatur
per consuetudinem, quod lex ulterius
non est utilis ; sicut etiam manifesta-
retur, si lex contraria verbo promul-
garetur. Si autem adhuc maneat
ratio eadem, propter quam prima lex
utilis erat, non consuetudo legem sed
? ? lex consuetudinem vincit: nisi forte
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3318617 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 48
[PABT L
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
law. It is, however, clear that St Thomas Aquinas implies
that there were other forms of law besides custom, and we
shall presently deal with these. The important point of the
passages which we have just considered is that, whatever
other forms of law there might be, he was clear that custom
lay behind them, and was still paramount over them.
This is also the position of some other very important
writers of the later thirteenth century. Vincent of Beauvais,
in his ' Speculum,' cites the significant words of Gratian, in
which he laid down the principle that even when laws were
instituted by a competent authority, they needed to be con-
firmed by the custom of those who were concerned. 1 Albert
the Great seems also to refer to the same doctrine when he
says that the edict of the Prince which is maintained by
custom has the force of written law. 2 What is, however,
much more significant is the treatment of the authority of
custom by the most important Canonist, and the most authori-
tative Civilian of the second half of the century.
Hostiensis, in his ' Commentary on the Decretals,' describes
the nature and the authority of custom, and clearly accepts
the judgment of Gregory IX. that custom if it is " rationabilis
et legitime prsescripta," prevails over other forms of positive
law. 3 Odofridus, in his ' Commentary on the Digest,' draws
attention to the divergence between this judgment of Gregory
and the passage in the ' Code ' (viii. 52 (53)), in which Con-
stantine had apparently maintained that custom could not
1 Vincent of Beauvais, ' Speculum,'
it 7. 35. Cf. vol. ii. pp. 155, 166,
186.
2 Albert the Great, ' Ethica,' x. iii.
2: " Sin autem illse (leges) scriptse
aint vel non scriptse, nihil videtur
differre ad prsesens: edictum enim
principia consuetudine servatum script:! !
legis habet vigorem. "
* Hostiensis, ' In Primum Librum
Decretalium Commentaria,' i. * De
Consuetudine,' 8, 9: " Ad quod
sciendum quod quatuor sunt species
consuetudinis, scilicet generalissima, ut
est consuetudo inter omnes Catholicos,
versus orientem orare. . . . "
Id. id. , 10 : " Item est consuetudo
genoralis, quando scilicet nedum civitas
sed tota provincia ita generaliter
servat. "
Id. id. , 8, 11 : " Et hae duo species
derogant juri, sive in provincia, sive
in loco in quo obtinct hoc, si post
legem introducta sit consuetudo. "
Id. id. , 10, 9: " Quid est consue-
tudo. . . . TJsus rationabilis competente
tempore confirmatus. . . . "
Id. id. , 11: " TJtrum autem ait
rationabilis vel non, relinquo judici,
cum non regula posset tradi. "
Cf. ' Decretals,' i. 4, 11. Cf. vol. ii.
p. 158.
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