Under
pressure
of Karboghā's
approach, the leaders had reluctantly assented to his proposal that the
lordship of Antioch should fall to anyone who secured its capture or be-
trayal.
approach, the leaders had reluctantly assented to his proposal that the
lordship of Antioch should fall to anyone who secured its capture or be-
trayal.
Cambridge Medieval History - v5 - Contest of Empire and the Papacy
The result was that before the siege of Antioch began the Latins
had gained a secure footing in Syria and Euphratesia. These preliminary
conquests, and especially the establishment of friendly relations with the
native Christian population, were the essential conditions of further success.
It was perfectly evident soon after the main army reached Antioch
(21 October 1097) that the crusaders were not able to press the siege of
such a strongly fortified city. Lack of siege engines and the moderate
number of efficient fighting men in the army may have been contributory
causes. No attempt was made to undermine the walls or to take the town
by storm. For four or five months the city could not even be said to be
strictly invested. The Latins were encamped together, with the exception
of one small party under Tancred, just on the side where they had reached
the town. The besieged still had almost complete liberty of exit, especi-
ally by the river gate on the north side. The fighting was only a series
of skirmishes on the plains to the north of the Orontes, and on the roads
eastward to Hārim and westward to St Simeon. Although the Turkish
garrison was not more than 5000 strong, and the auxiliary troops cannot
have been numerous', the Latin army was evidently not the overwhelming
force dreamed of by poets and imaginative historians. Still the chief
cause of the weakness of the Latin army was its deficiency in supplies.
In December 1097 and in the earlier months of 1098 the number of
horses, so vital to the strength of the army, was reduced to a dangerously
low figure? The privations of the crusaders themselves would have been
intolerable but for the assistance of their Armenian and other native
Christian allies. As many as could be spared from active service were dis-
persed through the conquered towns and castles of Cilicia along the coast
and the neighbouring country. It was not until fleets from England and
other countries arrived in the spring that the strain of the situation was
Stephen of Blois, Epist. (Hagenmeyer, Epist. et Chart. p. 150): “milites Turci
plusquam v milia. . . exceptis. . . Arabibus, Turcopolitanis. . . aliisque gentibus diversis. ”
Raymond (MPL, p. 598): “duo millia optimi milites et quatuor vel quinque mil-
lia militum gregariorum atque decem millia peditum et eo amplius. " This latter
may be regarded as a genuine attempt at an estimate, but the 10,000 foot can only
represent the whole male population of the city and that at its maximum.
According to the Gesta, not more than 1000 war horses (cf. Albert, 111, 60);
according to Anselm, Epist. (Hag. 157) only 700. The Provençals at this same time
are said to have had no more than 100 horses (Raymond d'Agiles, MPL, p. 602 c).
Compare also infra, p. 290, note.
1
C. MED, H. VOL. V, CH. VII.
19
## p. 290 (#336) ############################################
290
Latın successes
relieved. On the other hand, during the winter the Muslim garrison does
not appear to have suffered much from lack of provisions. A large part
of the non-combatant population, especially Armenian and Syrian Chris-
tians, were dismissed at the beginning of the siege. In early spring the
Muslims were still able to pasture their horses in relays outside the city.
It was only from March or April that the besieged began to suffer
serious privation. Their numbers were then reduced not only by death
but by desertion. Finally, it was the treachery of a discontented soldier
which secured an entrance for the enemy (3 June 1098).
The chief events of the siege were the battles which the crusaders
fought with the relief armies of other Syrian emirs. Yaghi Bassān, the
Turkish governor of Antioch, had no reason to expect cordial assistance
from his neighbours. They did not desert him altogether, but the ease
with which they were repulsed is as much an indication of their lukewarm-
ness as of the superiority of the Latin arms. In November, raiders who
probably came from Hārim, a strong castle on the way to Aleppo, were
ambushed and severely defeated by Bohemond, Robert of Normandy, and
Robert of Flanders. These same leaders were sent out in December to
bring in supplies, and at Al-Bārah they encountered and repulsed troops
from Damascus and Hims which were on their way to relieve Antioch
(31 December 1097). In the beginning of February 1098 the Latins
learned that a Muslim army, consisting chiefly of troops from Aleppo,
was close at hand. It was decided that they should be met a few miles away
at a narrow point on the road by the full force of the Latin cavalry, 700
strong! The foot-soldiers and unmounted men were left to guard the camp.
The Muslims were attacked where they could not employ their customary
enveloping tactics, and their crowded rear increased the confusion rather
than the strength of the ranks in front. The first charge of the crusaders
was checked, but the onset of the reserve under Bohemond was irresistible.
The Latin victory (9 February 1098) was specially welcome because it
secured fresh supplies of provisions and of horses, and was followed im-
mediately by the surrender of the strong castle of Hārim.
1 This number is given by Raymond d'Agiles, Anselm, Albert, and Cafaro.
Possibly Raymond's knights remained with him in the camp. On the other hand
a small number of foot-soldiers may have accompanied the horsemen (Anselm).
As a contribution to the vexed question of the numbers of the crusaders and
their opponents, it may be noted that Raymond in describing the other engage-
ments of this paragraph estimates the Latin knights at 150 and 400 (v. l. 300)
respectively. In December the Latins, including infantry, are said to have numbered
2000 (Gesta) or 5000 men (Hist. Pereg. , Rec. Hist. Cr. ii, 187). Presumably foot-
soldiers were employed in November also, although they are not mentioned by the
sources. The almost exclusive reliance upon the knights in February was quite ex-
ceptional. The Latins probably outnumbered their opponents in November and
December, although not in February. 3000 is a reasonable estimate of the strength
of the Muslim army in February (Cafaro). The Muslim slain, whose heads were
cut off as trophies, are reckoned at 100 (Gesta) or 200 (Anselm, Albert). It is very
unlikely that as many as 400 Muslims were slain in the fight in November (Anselm).
## p. 291 (#337) ############################################
Investment completed
291
As already observed, the investment of Antioch by the crusaders was
not complete until March or even April. The city lay at this time wholly
on the south bank of the Orontes, with its northern wall' running roughly
parallel to the river. The Latin camp was on the same side of the Orontes,
round the north-east corner of the wall. In this position the crusaders
blockaded three of the city gates, which opened here on the northern and
eastern sides. They built a bridge of boats across the river to be a means
of communication with the plain on the other side, in front of the city,
and later a fort on the hill slopes beside them to protect their exposed
flank on the south. Tancred remained separate from the main army in
occupation of a monastery on the west side of the city, no doubt in order
to maintain communication with the sea and the port of St Simeon, ten
miles away. The gate in the centre of the north wall, where it approached
the river most closely, was the principal gate of the city and opened on-
to a bridge over the Orontes. By this the Muslim garrison issued out to
intercept the provision trains, which began to come more frequently in
spring from St Simeon to the Latin camp. In front of the bridge was a
low mound with a mosque and a burying-ground upon it. In order to
frustrate the sallies of the garrison, the crusaders at length determined to
seize and fortify this post. On 1 March? Bohemond and Raymond rode
with a strong escort to St Simeon in order to obtain workers and tools
for the fortification of the mound, and with the intention of escorting a
provision train on its way to the camp. A party of the garrison set an
ambush for them as they marched back (5 March). The knights seem to
have saved themselves at the expense of their companions, many of whom
lost their lives. Meantime Godfrey and the other leaders in the camp
had become aware of what was happening, and prepared to intercept the
victorious Muslims. Bohemond and his horsemen joined the main army
in time to share in this counter-attack. The garrison attempted to rein-
force their comrades, but this only increased the magnitude of their
disaster. Next day the work of fortifying the rising ground in front of
the river gate was begun. The gravestones on the hill supplied welcome
material to the builders. The graves themselves were desecrated, to the
distress and indignation of the Muslim spectators. After the fort was
his
1 More exactly, the wall which faced N. W. Similarly, what is called the western
wall faced rather S. W.
? This date is arrived at by reckoning four days back from the day of the return,
which was 5 March according to Epist
. Lucc. (in Hagenmeyer, Epist
. et Chart.
p. 166). The interval of four days is given by Raymond d’Agiles. Hagenmeyer in
Chronologie makes the day of departure 5 March and the day of return 6 March.
3 The narratives of Raymond and the Gesta here demand special scrutiny because
they indicate how, in this case, the number of the Muslim slain was computed at
1500. The basis of the calculation seems to have been the number of bodies ex-
humed from the burying ground (Raymond). But in spite of the definite assertion of
the Gesta it is extremely improbable that those slain on 5 March had already been
buried in the cemetery, and certainly the bodies exhumed included more than these.
CH. VII.
19-2
## p. 292 (#338) ############################################
292
Surrender of Antioch
completed it was occupied by Raymond's troops. Early in April Tancred's
position was strengthened, and the only other important gate, that on the
western side, was now completely blocked. The garrison was quite un-
able to dislodge the crusaders from their new position, and provisions
could no longer be brought into the beleaguered city.
In May 1098 word reached the crusading chiefs that a great army
under the command of Karboghā of Mosul, with the approval of the
Caliph of Baghdad, was on its way to the relief of Antioch. The Latin
position was now extremely perilous. Fortunately Bohemond was already
in communication with an officer who commanded one of the western
towers, and through him the Latins gained an easy entrance into the city
on the night of 3 June. Although the citadel at the southern extremity
of the town did not surrender, the crusaders were now protected by the
walls of Antioch itself against the army of Karboghā. On 5 June the
Muslim host encamped at the “ Iron Bridge,” eight miles away, and that
same day, or the day before, a party of their horsemen was seen from the
walls of Antioch and skirmished with the Latins. From 8 June to 28
June the crusaders were besieged in Antioch. Some of the nobles lost
heart at once and deserted their comrades. The ships in the harbour of
St Simeon began to set sail, crowded with fugitives. Had Karboghā's
army arrived four days sooner, it is not improbable that the crusading
movement would have been extinguished at the gates of Antioch. As it
was, the Latins endured three weeks of continuous fighting and terrible
privation.
In these circumstances the crusaders took an unprecedented step.
Neither on the march to Antioch nor during the siege had their opera-
tions been controlled by one supreme commander. The current modern
belief that Godfrey of Bouillon was the leader of the whole Crusade has
no foundation in fact. But now it was decided that one chief should take
command and the choice of the leaders fell on Bohemond". Enthusiasm
Reading between the lines it may be concluded : (a) that the Latins found on the
hill some of the recently slain Turks, probably unburied (should Raymond's in vallo
be in valle? ); (b) that some graves were opened during the digging of the ditch of
the fort, and that this led to the deliberate desecration of other graves; (c) that the
cemetery had been used as a burying-ground by the besieged throughout the siege;
(d) that 1500 may have been an estimate of the total losses of the Muslims up to this
time; (e) that if this number was based at all on the number of the bodies exhumed
it included a very liberal allowance for those known to have been slain and not
buried in the cemetery.
1 The choice of the battle-ground and the plan of battle on 9 February were
probably due to Bohemond, and he may, therefore, have exercised the chief com-
mand during that engagement also. But there was probably no formal appointment
then such as there was now. Stephen of Blois in the winter of 1097 is known to
have been appointed provisorem et gubernatorem by the leaders in council. But he
was never distinguished as a military leader; so that his office can hardly have been
that of commander-in-chief. More probably he acted as an executive officer, and
that certain decisions of the leaders were carried out.
saw
## p. 293 (#339) ############################################
Battle with Karbõghā
293
had already been stirred by supernatural visions and by the finding of
the Holy Lance (14 June), and thus encouraged the leaders had decided
to put all to the hazard of a single battle. Bohemond's part was to direct
the preparations, to marshal the army, and to exercise the chief com-
mand during the fight. His supreme authority was to remain intact for
a fortnight beyond the day of battle. It is probably not accidental that
the chosen day (28 June) was a Monday, the second octave of the finding
of the Holy Lance.
The hazardous operation of crossing the bridge into the plain north
of the Orontes, where the Muslims lay, was accomplished without dan-
gerous interference from the enemy. Karboghā's army included the troops
of the brothers Duqāq of Damascus and Ridwān of Aleppo, who were
deadly rivals, and Arab forces upon whom small reliance could be placed.
When it was known that the Latins intended to march out from the city,
there was hot debate regarding how they should be met. Those who
wished that they should be attacked as they issued from the bridge were
overruled, and some in consequence rode away almost before the fight
began. The Latins took up their position in the plain, with their front
to the east, in three divisions, stretching from the river to the hills.
Bohemond with strong forces posted himself in the rear, facing westward.
It is not clear that the Muslims had a well-arranged plan of battle.
Evidently the Syrian, Mesopotamian, and Anatolian troops operated
separately, and their chief attack was from the west and north-west,
although their main strength faced the Latins on the east. The crusaders,
therefore, were able to transfer reinforcements from the east front to the
west, and to rout the enemy in the rear before they began their decisive
movement forward'. Karboghā, who was posted on the right flank of the
Muslim army, remained strangely inactive. When he saw that the attack
from the west had failed, he drew back to his camp, set fire to his tents,
and made off in hasty flight. The number of the Muslim slain does not
seem to have been large. Yet the Latin victory was the turning-point
in the history of the First Crusade and decisive of its ultimate success.
The defenders of the citadel of Antioch now made overtures of surrender,
and the Latins took possession in the beginning of the following week.
It was determined in council that the march on Jerusalem should not be
resumed until 1 November.
The final disposal of Antioch after its capture was complicated by
jealousies and rivalries and doubtful questions of interpretation. Certainly
1 The distribution of the Latin forces is plainly given by Raymond, and the battle
is most fully described by Albert. A large force under Qilij-Arslān threatened the
Latin rear from the N. W. and was opposed by troops taken from the Latin left. A
strong attack on Bohemond was made later by the horsemen of Aleppo and Damascus,
who seem to have crossed from the south side of the river. To repel them it was neces-
sary to bring large reinforcements from the Latin centre and right wing. Oman's Art
of War does not distinguish the two forces operating against the rear of the crusaders.
CH. VII.
## p. 294 (#340) ############################################
294
Bohemond, Prince of Antioch
it had been assigned by treaty to Alexius, but only on condition that he
brought in person a sufficient army to help the crusaders. What period
might he claim for the fulfilment of this promise? In 1097 and 1098 the
naval and military forces of the Empire were chiefly engaged in subduing
Muslim towns in the west of Asia Minor'. But in June 1098 Alexius had
already marched with a considerable army half way to Antioch, following
the road traversed in the previous year by the crusaders themselves. Un-
fortunately for all concerned, he listened at Philomelium to the alarmist
stories of Stephen of Blois and the other fugitives from Antioch who met
him there. They probably told him that the crusading host had been
irretrievably defeated, and that a Turkish army was already marching
against him. He turned back to protect his recent conquests in Asia
Minor. Naturally this action was judged by most to be a surrender of
the Latin cause. At the best Alexius was now in a position hard to
retrieve. There are two accounts of the message which the crusaders
sent him in July. Albert of Aix says that the envoys were instructed
to tell the Emperor that he had been untrue to his promise, and thus
had nullified his treaty. This may have been the opinion of most of the
Latin leaders, but, as their attitude in November shewed, they were not
yet prepared completely to break off relations with the Emperor. The
Gesta Francorum says that the envoys were told to invite Alexius to
fulfil his promise and come to receive possession of Antioch. It may be
that something of this kind was said, with qualifications, setting a limit
to the delay which would be considered reasonable, and referring to the
Emperor's recent retreat. Presumably the envoys were empowered to
adhere in substance to the original treaty, provided the Emperor agreed
to carry out his engagements effectively and quickly. It is not known
what reply Alexius sent to this communication. It may be that he felt
the difficulty of his position so keenly that he sent no immediate reply.
In the spring of 1099 he promised to join the crusaders with an army
on St John's day (24 June), if they would wait for him until then.
Perhaps he was encouraged by the support of Raymond of Toulouse.
But his proposal came too late. The Crusade was nearing a successful
conclusion without the Emperor's assistance. All the leaders except
Raymond now held that the treaty had lapsed, and that the Emperor
had not fulfilled his obligation.
Bohemond, Prince of Antioch as he now became, profited most by the
Emperor's mistake. Before the capture of the city he had manoeuvred
dexterously to establish his claim to it.
Under pressure of Karboghā's
approach, the leaders had reluctantly assented to his proposal that the
lordship of Antioch should fall to anyone who secured its capture or be-
trayal. Before Bohemond made this proposal he had arranged for the
betrayal of the town. Of course the rights of the Emperor were duly
reserved, but after the defeat of Karboghā's army Bohemond was practi-
1 E. g. Smyrna, Sardis, and the towns in the district of the Meander valley.
## p. 295 (#341) ############################################
March to Jerusalem
295
cally ruler of Antioch'. In November he urged that the Emperor's claim
had already lapsed. The other leaders would not yet make the declaration
he desired, but Raymond was the only one to maintain that Alexius'
right was beyond dispute. Provençal troops held strong posts in Antioch
until January 1099. Their ejection in that month marked Bohemond's
final triumph.
The six months that followed Karboghā's defeat were spent by the
crusaders partly in recuperating their strength, partly in extending their
conquests. Baldwin of Edessa gained especially by the help which he
received at this time from Godfrey and other crusaders. Bohemond
strengthened his position in Cilicia. Raymond, and no doubt other leaders
also, sought to occupy the Muslim castles on the way to Aleppo and in
the valley of the Orontes. Plague raged in Antioch and St Simeon for
several months, so that few remained there of choice; its most distin-
guished victim was Ademar, Bishop of Puy. The quarrel between
Bohemond and Raymond regarding the lordship of Antioch further de-
layed the march of the Crusade. At last Raymond in despair yielded to
the clamour of his Provençals and started for Jerusalem, accompanied by
Tancred and Robert of Normandy (13 January 1099). They marched
slowly as far as ‘Arqah near Tripolis
, to which they laid siege (14 Feb-
ruary), and where they were joined by Godfrey and Robert of Flanders a
month later. Here, on 8 April, the unfortunate finder of the Holy Lance,
Peter Bartholomew, submitted himself to an ordeal by fire. When he
died, after twelve days, the nature and cause of his injuries were a matter
of dispute between the believers and the unbelievers. The siege of ‘Arqah
was abandoned in the middle of May (13 May), and the remainder of the
march to Jerusalem by the coast route was accomplished without any
special incident. Ramlah, between Jaffa and Jerusalem, was occupied on
3 June, and on the morning of 7 June the crusading army at length
encamped outside the walls of the Holy City.
The arrival of the crusaders at their destination obviously put fresh
heart into the rank and file and fresh energy into the action of their
leaders. Jerusalem was strongly fortified and well supplied with man-
gonels, and its garrison of 1000 men fought bravely. Perhaps, indeed,
the civilian population was ill-disposed to their Egyptian governor
or was intimidated by the numbers and the reputation of the Latins,
and so did not second the efforts of the garrison. At all events the siege
was quickly brought to a successful issue. The first attempt to storm the
city failed because the besiegers were not equipped with the necessary
ladders and siege-engines (13 June). Two siege-towers, a huge battering-
ram, and a quantity of mangonels were constructed before the next attack
was made. Some Genoese ships which reached Jaffa on 17 June brought
1 In July 1098 he granted by charter to the Genoese a church, a warehouse,
and a number of dwelling-houses. In return they promised to defend the city against
all comers, excepting Raymond of Toulouse, in whose case they were to stand neutral.
CH. VII.
## p. 296 (#342) ############################################
296
Godfrey, Prince of Jerusalem
a welcome supply of provisions and also workers skilled in the construction
of siege material. The scarcity of water was the chief inconvenience from
which the Latins suffered. A solemn procession round the town, when the
preparations were nearly complete (8 July), raised general enthusiasm. The
second assault was begun late on 13 July, was continued next day, and
was finally successful on 15 July. Godfrey's men were the first to storm
the walls, with the help of a siege-tower at the north-east corner. Ray-
mond on the south was less successful, but the great “tower of David,”
in which the Egyptian commandant was stationed, surrendered to him.
The celebration in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, where men wept
together for joy and grief, and the merciless slaughter of the inhabitants,
well express, in combination, the spirit of the Crusade. Raymond,
however, at the cost of some opprobrium, escorted safely on the way
to Ascalon those who had surrendered to him.
A prince to rule Jerusalem and the south of Palestine had now to
be chosen. On 22 July the crusading chiefs met for this purpose. Some
of the clergy thought that a high dignitary of the Church should be the
only ruler in Jerusalem, and Raymond favoured their view. Raymond
himself was the first to be offered the princedom, but declined it because
of his ecclesiastical sympathies. Finally, Godfrey of Bouillon, rather un-
willingly, accepted the distinguished and difficult post, and thus became
Defender of the Holy Sepulchre (Advocatus Sancti Sepulcri). He was
always addressed as dux or princeps, never as king. But his successors
were crowned as kings, and so he may be called the first ruler of the Latin
kingdom of Jerusalem.
The defeat of an Egyptian army near Ascalon on 12 August may
be reckoned as the last achievement of the First Crusade. Palestine
was then governed in part by Turkish emirs and in part by representa-
tives of the Egyptian Caliph'. Jerusalem and Ascalon were subject to
the same Egyptian governor. The Muslim army, which the Latins now
defeated, was probably levied to protect the Holy City when the final
movement of the crusaders from 'Arqah became known in Egypt. The
Egyptians seem to have put forward their full strength, and so may
possibly have mustered an army of 20,000 men. Godfrey's troops may
be reckoned at half that number? By taking the initiative he probably
forced the Egyptians to an engagement before they were quite ready.
The extension of the Latin line from the shore to the hills, in three
divisions, neutralised the numerical superiority of their opponents. The
left wing, which Godfrey commanded, was echeloned behind the other
divisions as a reserve. An attempt of the Muslims to envelope the
2
1 See supra, Chap. vi, p. 264.
Raymond's estimate is not more than 1200 knights and 9000 foot-soldiers. An
official letter of the crusaders (Hagenmeyer's Epistulae, p. 172) gives not more
than 5000 knights and 15,000 foot-soldiers against 500,000 Muslims! Fulcher makes
the numbers 20,000 Latins against 300,000 Muslims.
## p. 297 (#343) ############################################
Numbers in medieval writers
297
Latins from the side of the hills was frustrated. The decisive movement
was the charge of the knights of the Latin centre, which completely
broke the opposing line. The battle was over in less than an hour. The
victors gained great spoil of provisions and animals, especially sheep and
camels. But the prestige of the victory was of much greater value. It
was several years before any considerable movement was again attempted
by the Egyptians against the newly-established state.
The statements of the best contemporary sources regarding the
number of men bearing arms who joined the First Crusade' are quite
irreconcilable. These discrepancies and the estimates of Muslim armies
that the same sources give', which are impossible, make it clear, as
already explained, that all these general estimates are merely pictorial
in character. Even the lowest of them, if that be 60,000, cannot be
admitted to be approximately correct merely because it is the lowest.
60,000 is a stereotyped expression used by writers of the period for a
very large number.
On the other hand, scattered through the sources there is a con-
siderable amount of what may be accepted as approximately accurate
information about the numbers of the crusaders engaged in particular
fights or slain on particular occasions, and about the numbers of the
knights and men who served individual leaders. From such details a
reliable estimate of the military efficiency and numerical strength of the
Crusade may be obtained, and the partial figures when taken in com-
bination indicate a range within which the grand total probably lies.
Raymond d'Agiles supplies more material of this kind than any other
writer, and his general consistency is itself evidence of considerable
value. He uses pictorial numbers occasionally, especially in reports of
rhetorical speeches and in estimates of Muslim armies. But most of his
figures harmonise with their context and present an appearance of
tolerable exactness. His general narrative also is particularly clear and
convincing and full of details. His account of the three battles fought
during the siege of Antioch may be referred to in illustration of the
moderate numerical estimates which are characteristic of him. It must
be remembered that he speaks only of the knights who fought in these
battles, and also that the number of these able to take the field at the
time was greatly reduced by the dearth of horses. Besides, as already
explained, the total strength of the crusaders was never gathered at any
one time in the camp at Antioch. Still, it is noteworthy that the
knights in these engagements are numbered by hundreds and not by
thousands. The scale thus provided is amply confirmed by what we are
1 600,000 (Fulcher and Albert); 300,000 (Ekkehard); 100,000 (Raymond d'Agiles).
? At Dorylaeum: 150,000 (Raymond); 260,000 (Epist. Anselmi); 360,000 (Gesta
and Fulcher); in Karbõghā's army: 100,000 (Cafaro); 200,000 (Albert).
3 For a general estimate and criticism see Clemens Klein.
* See supra, p. 290, note.
CA VII.
## p. 298 (#344) ############################################
298
Numbers in the First Crusade
bound to suppose were the numbers of the Muslims. An expedition
from Aleppo or Damascus might number 500 horsemen or 1000 or 1500,
very rarely more. These figures set a clear upper limit to the numbers
of the Latins on the supposition that the Muslims were superior to them
in number.
Such being the character of Raymond's history, great importance
must attach to his making what may be regarded as a serious attempt
to estimate the number of the crusading army during the siege of
Jerusalem. Excluding non-combatants, his total is 12,000 of whom 1200-
1300 were knights? . Now this implies that the more important leaders
had an average of something like 2000-3000 men including 200-300
knights. This agrees with all the estimates of the forces of these
leaders in which any confidence can be placed. Reference may be made
to one of these. Albert of Aix's narrative, in spite of its defects, con-
tains a great deal of exact information, especially about Godfrey of
Bouillon. Now Albert says that Godfrey commanded 2000 men during
the battle against Karboghā. In this battle there were five or six leaders
whose forces, on an average, would be equal to Godfrey's. Thus the
army of the crusaders at Antioch would be similar in size to Raymond's
estimate of that which besieged Jerusalem. In both cases the estimate
is rather too high than too low. The numbers in Karböghā's army
supply a vague standard of comparison. If it numbered 12,000 it was
a large army for the circumstances of the time. It is unlikely that the
Latins were as numerous. Perhaps at this time the crusaders actually
under arms in Syria, Cilicia, and Edessa numbered 12,000-15,000 men.
In estimating the sum total of those who joined the Crusade, we
have to add such as lost their lives or deserted the cause during the
siege of Antioch and the march through Asia Minor. Non-combatant
priests and women and various ineffectives have also to be allowed for.
But this latter class cannot have been so great as to prejudice the
military effectiveness of the Crusade. Perhaps it is not too great a
venture to suggest that 25,000 or 30,000, all told, marched through
Asia Minor to Antioch ; and it seems to the writer that this estimate is
more likely to be above reality than below it. Of course many left their
homes who never reached Constantinople, and those who accompanied
Walter and Peter suffered heavy loss in Asia Minor before the arrival of
the organised expeditions. Something has been said of their numbers
already. But to attempt an estimate of all the men and women and
even children (? ) who left their homes in Western Europe for the Crusade
would be merely to pile conjecture upon conjecture. Yet perhaps this
may safely be said: that the number, if stated at all, should be in tens
of thousands and not in hundreds of thousands.
1 De nostris ad arma valentes, in quantum nos existimamus, numerum duodecim
millium non transcendebant sed habebamus multos debiles atque pauperes. Et erant
in exercitu nostro mille ducenti vel trecenti milites, ut ego arbitror, non amplius.
## p. 299 (#345) ############################################
Peter the Hermit
299
As Peter the Hermit still plays an important part in the popular
accounts of the origin of the First Crusade, some additional observations
regarding him may be permitted in conclusion. His actual rôle as an
early and successful preacher of the Crusade has already been indicated.
His legendary history originated, we must suppose, amongst those who
were stirred by his preaching, and who knew him as the originator of
their crusade. Along with other legends it was elaborated in the popular
songs of the period, the chansons de geste. From there it made a partial
entrance into the narrative of Albert of Aix, and in a more developed
form entered the history of William of Tyre. Through William of
Tyre it has so fixed itself in modern literature that no historian of mere
fact seems able to root it out.
According to legend Peter stirred the Pope and all Western Europe
to the First Crusade. The four writers who were present at the Council
of Clermont report Pope Urban's words in terms which are quite incon-
sistent with this representation. Besides, the chief authorities for the
history of the Crusade make it clear that Peter began his preaching
after the council and in consequence of it. His journey as far as Con-
stantinople has already been related. In the later stages of the Crusade
he appears as a personage of some influence among the poorer classes,
but not as one whom the leaders particularly respected. His volunteering,
with a comrade, to take a message to Karboghā in July 1098, has no
clear significance. Perhaps it was simply a reaction from his failure in
the beginning of the year, when for a time he was a deserter. In March
1099 the duty of distributing alms to the Provençal poor was entrusted
to him. In August 1099 he was one of those who organised processions
and services of intercession for the victory of the Latins before their
battle with the Egyptians. Between Nicaea and Jerusalem he plays a
recorded part five times in all. This minor figure is not even
appropriate symbol or representation of the mighty forces, religious,
political, and economic, that created the First Crusade.
an
CH. VII.
## p. 300 (#346) ############################################
300
CHAPTER VIII.
THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM, 1099–1291.
When, a week after the fall of Jerusalem, the crusaders met to choose
a king for the new kingdom, one after another of the greater princes
refused the proffer of a barren and laborious honour. Godfrey of
Bouillon, upon whom the choice at last fell, had been foremost in the
capture of the Holy City; but otherwise there was little in his early
career in the West or as a leader of the Crusade to mark him out. His
selection was indeed rather in the nature of a compromise, as that of
one who was equally acceptable to French and Germans. Nevertheless,
in the piety with which he refused the royal title and desired to be
styled only Baron of the Holy Sepulchre, and in the high purpose
which he shewed in his brief reign, there was much to justify the glamour
which has gathered about his name. From the next generation onwards
he was linked with Arthur and Charlemagne as one of the three Christian
heroes who made up the number of the nine noblest. Romance has con-
verted History to find in Godfrey the typical hero of the Crusade.
Had Godfrey presumed to style himself King of Jerusalem his title
would have been no more than an empty show, for as yet the crusaders
held little but the Holy City and the places which they had captured
on their way thither. Still, his victory over the Egyptian invaders at
Ascalon in the first months of his reign secured for the moment the
southern frontier of the intended kingdom. This was followed by at
least the show of submission from Acre and other cities of the coast,
and immediately before his death, on 18 July 1100, Godfrey had secured
the Christians in the possession of Jaffa, a necessary port for the Italian
traders, upon whom the fighting Franks in Syria were always in great
measure to depend. Thus early do we find the religious enthusiasm
of the crusader interwoven with commercial enterprise. Godfrey's en-
deavours had, however, been hampered by the ambitions of other
crusading nobles, and in particular of Raymond of Saint Gilles. Com-
mercial rivalry and princely jealousies were to be the bane of the Frankish
settlers in Palestine, and already they began to cast their shadow on the
infant kingdom.
Later historians and lawyers found in Godfrey the creator alike of
the material kingdom and of its theoretical institutions. But the
actual conquest of the land was the work of his first three successors,
and it was only by a slow process that the institutions of the kingdom
## p. 301 (#347) ############################################
Limits of the kingdom
301
grew to something like the theoretical perfection with which the jurists
of the next age invested them. At its widest extent the kingdom of
Jerusalem properly so called reached from Al--Arīsh on the south to
the Nahr-Ibrāhīm just beyond Beyrout on the north. For the most
part its eastern boundary was formed by the valley of Jordan; but in
the extreme north the small district of Banias lay beyond the river
Lițanī, and on the south an extensive territory on the east of the Dead
Sea reached for a brief time to Elim on the Gulf of 'Aqabah. The
whole region of Frankish rule was, however, much greater. Immediately
to the north the county of Tripolis formed a narrow strip along the
coast as far as the Wādi Mahik, near the modern Bulunyās. Beyond it
the principality of Antioch reached to the confines of Cilicia, and at
one time even included the city of Tarsus; on the east at its greatest
extension its territory came within a few miles of Aleppo; it was the
earliest and on the whole the most permanent conquest of the Franks,
who held the city of Antioch for 170 years. Finally, in the extreme
north-east was the county of Edessa, the capital of which was the
modern Urfah; the eastern limits of the county were never well defined,
and here a small body of Frankish lords held rule for less than half a
century over a mixed population of Armenians and Syrians.
Edessa had been conquered by Godfrey's brother Baldwin in 1097.
When Baldwin was called to the throne of Jerusalem, he gave his county
to his kinsman and namesake Baldwin du Bourg. Baldwin II in his
turn succeeded to the kingdom in 1118, and gave Edessa to Joscelin of
Courtenay, after whom his son Joscelin II maintained a precarious rule
till 1144. But if the hold of the Franks on Edessa was precarious it was
none the less important, for the county formed a strong outpost against
the Muslims of Mesopotamia, and its loss meant a serious weakening of
the defensive strength of the Frankish dominion.
Antioch was secured as a principality by Bohemond at the time of
its capture in 1097. In July 1100 Bohemond was taken prisoner by the
Turks near Maríash. After over two years' captivity he was released early
in 1103, only to suffer a disastrous defeat at Harrān in the following
year. He then crossed the sea to seek aid in the West, and never returned
to his principality. Bohemond's nephew Tancred governed Antioch
during his uncle's captivity, and again for eight years from 1104 to 1112.
He was one of the foremost of the early crusaders, and the virtual
creator of his principality by constant warfare against the Greeks on
the north and the Muslims on the south. Tancred's successor was his
nephew Roger Fitz-Richard, a less vigorous ruler, who was slain in battle
with Il-Ghāzi near Athārib in 1119. The government of Antioch was
then assumed by Baldwin II of Jerusalem during the minority of the son
of Bohemond. When Bohemond II came from Italy in 1126, he married
Baldwin's second daughter Alice, but reigned only four years ; after
his death Antioch was again in the king's hands till a husband was found
CH. VIII.
## p. 302 (#348) ############################################
302
The great fiefs
in 1136 for Bohemond's daughter Constance in the person of Raymond
of Poitou.
Tripolis had been marked out as a county for Raymond of Saint Gilles;
but when he died in 1103 only a beginning of conquest had been made.
The city of Tripolis was not captured till 1109, when the county was
secured to Raymond's son Bertram. Three years later Bertram was
succeeded by his son Pons, whose reign lasted five and twenty years.
Some brief account of the three great fiefs has seemed needful before
we could discuss the relation of their rulers to their nominal overlord at
Jerusalem. In theory the Prince of Antioch, the Counts of Edessa and
Tripolis, all owed fealty to the king at Jerusalem as their suzerain.
The king on his part had to give them his aid and protection in case of
need. Thus Baldwin I went to the aid of Baldwin of Edessa against the
Turks in 1110, and Baldwin II was called in by Roger of Antioch when
hard pressed by Il-Ghāzī in 1119. Also it was the king who had to inter-
vene in the disputes of his feudatories, as for instance between Bertram
of Tripolis and Tancred in 1109, and again between Tancred and the
Count of Edessa next year. The reality of the royal authority was shewn
even more clearly when Baldwin II intervened in the affairs of Antioch
after the death of Roger, and Fulk after the death of Bohemond II.
But though Baldwin and Fulk both assumed for a time the government
of the principality as part of their kingly duty, neither desired to find
an opportunity for an extension of their personal power, and they were
glad when the choice of a new prince relieved them of an onerous charge.
Geographical conditions did not favour the concentration of power under
a central authority. The long and narrow territory of the Franks was
affected by a diversity of interests between the component parts, and
this was shewn not only in the disputes of the great feudatories between
themselves but also in their attitude to their suzerain. If it served their
own advantage the Frankish princes were ready to seek Musulman aid
against their Christian rivals, and even against the king himself. How-
ever incontestable the king's rights might be in theory, in practice his
authority was under normal conditions limited. The Prince of Antioch
and the Counts of Edessa and Tripolis were virtually sovereigns in their
own states.
In the kingdom of Jerusalem properly so called there were four greater
baronies, the county of Jaffa and Ascalon (which in later times was an
appanage of the royal house), the lordship of Karak and Montreal, the
principality of Galilee, and the lordship of Sidon. In addition there
were a dozen lesser lords, some of whom, like the lords of Toron, were
important enough to play a great part in the history of the kingdom.
had gained a secure footing in Syria and Euphratesia. These preliminary
conquests, and especially the establishment of friendly relations with the
native Christian population, were the essential conditions of further success.
It was perfectly evident soon after the main army reached Antioch
(21 October 1097) that the crusaders were not able to press the siege of
such a strongly fortified city. Lack of siege engines and the moderate
number of efficient fighting men in the army may have been contributory
causes. No attempt was made to undermine the walls or to take the town
by storm. For four or five months the city could not even be said to be
strictly invested. The Latins were encamped together, with the exception
of one small party under Tancred, just on the side where they had reached
the town. The besieged still had almost complete liberty of exit, especi-
ally by the river gate on the north side. The fighting was only a series
of skirmishes on the plains to the north of the Orontes, and on the roads
eastward to Hārim and westward to St Simeon. Although the Turkish
garrison was not more than 5000 strong, and the auxiliary troops cannot
have been numerous', the Latin army was evidently not the overwhelming
force dreamed of by poets and imaginative historians. Still the chief
cause of the weakness of the Latin army was its deficiency in supplies.
In December 1097 and in the earlier months of 1098 the number of
horses, so vital to the strength of the army, was reduced to a dangerously
low figure? The privations of the crusaders themselves would have been
intolerable but for the assistance of their Armenian and other native
Christian allies. As many as could be spared from active service were dis-
persed through the conquered towns and castles of Cilicia along the coast
and the neighbouring country. It was not until fleets from England and
other countries arrived in the spring that the strain of the situation was
Stephen of Blois, Epist. (Hagenmeyer, Epist. et Chart. p. 150): “milites Turci
plusquam v milia. . . exceptis. . . Arabibus, Turcopolitanis. . . aliisque gentibus diversis. ”
Raymond (MPL, p. 598): “duo millia optimi milites et quatuor vel quinque mil-
lia militum gregariorum atque decem millia peditum et eo amplius. " This latter
may be regarded as a genuine attempt at an estimate, but the 10,000 foot can only
represent the whole male population of the city and that at its maximum.
According to the Gesta, not more than 1000 war horses (cf. Albert, 111, 60);
according to Anselm, Epist. (Hag. 157) only 700. The Provençals at this same time
are said to have had no more than 100 horses (Raymond d'Agiles, MPL, p. 602 c).
Compare also infra, p. 290, note.
1
C. MED, H. VOL. V, CH. VII.
19
## p. 290 (#336) ############################################
290
Latın successes
relieved. On the other hand, during the winter the Muslim garrison does
not appear to have suffered much from lack of provisions. A large part
of the non-combatant population, especially Armenian and Syrian Chris-
tians, were dismissed at the beginning of the siege. In early spring the
Muslims were still able to pasture their horses in relays outside the city.
It was only from March or April that the besieged began to suffer
serious privation. Their numbers were then reduced not only by death
but by desertion. Finally, it was the treachery of a discontented soldier
which secured an entrance for the enemy (3 June 1098).
The chief events of the siege were the battles which the crusaders
fought with the relief armies of other Syrian emirs. Yaghi Bassān, the
Turkish governor of Antioch, had no reason to expect cordial assistance
from his neighbours. They did not desert him altogether, but the ease
with which they were repulsed is as much an indication of their lukewarm-
ness as of the superiority of the Latin arms. In November, raiders who
probably came from Hārim, a strong castle on the way to Aleppo, were
ambushed and severely defeated by Bohemond, Robert of Normandy, and
Robert of Flanders. These same leaders were sent out in December to
bring in supplies, and at Al-Bārah they encountered and repulsed troops
from Damascus and Hims which were on their way to relieve Antioch
(31 December 1097). In the beginning of February 1098 the Latins
learned that a Muslim army, consisting chiefly of troops from Aleppo,
was close at hand. It was decided that they should be met a few miles away
at a narrow point on the road by the full force of the Latin cavalry, 700
strong! The foot-soldiers and unmounted men were left to guard the camp.
The Muslims were attacked where they could not employ their customary
enveloping tactics, and their crowded rear increased the confusion rather
than the strength of the ranks in front. The first charge of the crusaders
was checked, but the onset of the reserve under Bohemond was irresistible.
The Latin victory (9 February 1098) was specially welcome because it
secured fresh supplies of provisions and of horses, and was followed im-
mediately by the surrender of the strong castle of Hārim.
1 This number is given by Raymond d'Agiles, Anselm, Albert, and Cafaro.
Possibly Raymond's knights remained with him in the camp. On the other hand
a small number of foot-soldiers may have accompanied the horsemen (Anselm).
As a contribution to the vexed question of the numbers of the crusaders and
their opponents, it may be noted that Raymond in describing the other engage-
ments of this paragraph estimates the Latin knights at 150 and 400 (v. l. 300)
respectively. In December the Latins, including infantry, are said to have numbered
2000 (Gesta) or 5000 men (Hist. Pereg. , Rec. Hist. Cr. ii, 187). Presumably foot-
soldiers were employed in November also, although they are not mentioned by the
sources. The almost exclusive reliance upon the knights in February was quite ex-
ceptional. The Latins probably outnumbered their opponents in November and
December, although not in February. 3000 is a reasonable estimate of the strength
of the Muslim army in February (Cafaro). The Muslim slain, whose heads were
cut off as trophies, are reckoned at 100 (Gesta) or 200 (Anselm, Albert). It is very
unlikely that as many as 400 Muslims were slain in the fight in November (Anselm).
## p. 291 (#337) ############################################
Investment completed
291
As already observed, the investment of Antioch by the crusaders was
not complete until March or even April. The city lay at this time wholly
on the south bank of the Orontes, with its northern wall' running roughly
parallel to the river. The Latin camp was on the same side of the Orontes,
round the north-east corner of the wall. In this position the crusaders
blockaded three of the city gates, which opened here on the northern and
eastern sides. They built a bridge of boats across the river to be a means
of communication with the plain on the other side, in front of the city,
and later a fort on the hill slopes beside them to protect their exposed
flank on the south. Tancred remained separate from the main army in
occupation of a monastery on the west side of the city, no doubt in order
to maintain communication with the sea and the port of St Simeon, ten
miles away. The gate in the centre of the north wall, where it approached
the river most closely, was the principal gate of the city and opened on-
to a bridge over the Orontes. By this the Muslim garrison issued out to
intercept the provision trains, which began to come more frequently in
spring from St Simeon to the Latin camp. In front of the bridge was a
low mound with a mosque and a burying-ground upon it. In order to
frustrate the sallies of the garrison, the crusaders at length determined to
seize and fortify this post. On 1 March? Bohemond and Raymond rode
with a strong escort to St Simeon in order to obtain workers and tools
for the fortification of the mound, and with the intention of escorting a
provision train on its way to the camp. A party of the garrison set an
ambush for them as they marched back (5 March). The knights seem to
have saved themselves at the expense of their companions, many of whom
lost their lives. Meantime Godfrey and the other leaders in the camp
had become aware of what was happening, and prepared to intercept the
victorious Muslims. Bohemond and his horsemen joined the main army
in time to share in this counter-attack. The garrison attempted to rein-
force their comrades, but this only increased the magnitude of their
disaster. Next day the work of fortifying the rising ground in front of
the river gate was begun. The gravestones on the hill supplied welcome
material to the builders. The graves themselves were desecrated, to the
distress and indignation of the Muslim spectators. After the fort was
his
1 More exactly, the wall which faced N. W. Similarly, what is called the western
wall faced rather S. W.
? This date is arrived at by reckoning four days back from the day of the return,
which was 5 March according to Epist
. Lucc. (in Hagenmeyer, Epist
. et Chart.
p. 166). The interval of four days is given by Raymond d’Agiles. Hagenmeyer in
Chronologie makes the day of departure 5 March and the day of return 6 March.
3 The narratives of Raymond and the Gesta here demand special scrutiny because
they indicate how, in this case, the number of the Muslim slain was computed at
1500. The basis of the calculation seems to have been the number of bodies ex-
humed from the burying ground (Raymond). But in spite of the definite assertion of
the Gesta it is extremely improbable that those slain on 5 March had already been
buried in the cemetery, and certainly the bodies exhumed included more than these.
CH. VII.
19-2
## p. 292 (#338) ############################################
292
Surrender of Antioch
completed it was occupied by Raymond's troops. Early in April Tancred's
position was strengthened, and the only other important gate, that on the
western side, was now completely blocked. The garrison was quite un-
able to dislodge the crusaders from their new position, and provisions
could no longer be brought into the beleaguered city.
In May 1098 word reached the crusading chiefs that a great army
under the command of Karboghā of Mosul, with the approval of the
Caliph of Baghdad, was on its way to the relief of Antioch. The Latin
position was now extremely perilous. Fortunately Bohemond was already
in communication with an officer who commanded one of the western
towers, and through him the Latins gained an easy entrance into the city
on the night of 3 June. Although the citadel at the southern extremity
of the town did not surrender, the crusaders were now protected by the
walls of Antioch itself against the army of Karboghā. On 5 June the
Muslim host encamped at the “ Iron Bridge,” eight miles away, and that
same day, or the day before, a party of their horsemen was seen from the
walls of Antioch and skirmished with the Latins. From 8 June to 28
June the crusaders were besieged in Antioch. Some of the nobles lost
heart at once and deserted their comrades. The ships in the harbour of
St Simeon began to set sail, crowded with fugitives. Had Karboghā's
army arrived four days sooner, it is not improbable that the crusading
movement would have been extinguished at the gates of Antioch. As it
was, the Latins endured three weeks of continuous fighting and terrible
privation.
In these circumstances the crusaders took an unprecedented step.
Neither on the march to Antioch nor during the siege had their opera-
tions been controlled by one supreme commander. The current modern
belief that Godfrey of Bouillon was the leader of the whole Crusade has
no foundation in fact. But now it was decided that one chief should take
command and the choice of the leaders fell on Bohemond". Enthusiasm
Reading between the lines it may be concluded : (a) that the Latins found on the
hill some of the recently slain Turks, probably unburied (should Raymond's in vallo
be in valle? ); (b) that some graves were opened during the digging of the ditch of
the fort, and that this led to the deliberate desecration of other graves; (c) that the
cemetery had been used as a burying-ground by the besieged throughout the siege;
(d) that 1500 may have been an estimate of the total losses of the Muslims up to this
time; (e) that if this number was based at all on the number of the bodies exhumed
it included a very liberal allowance for those known to have been slain and not
buried in the cemetery.
1 The choice of the battle-ground and the plan of battle on 9 February were
probably due to Bohemond, and he may, therefore, have exercised the chief com-
mand during that engagement also. But there was probably no formal appointment
then such as there was now. Stephen of Blois in the winter of 1097 is known to
have been appointed provisorem et gubernatorem by the leaders in council. But he
was never distinguished as a military leader; so that his office can hardly have been
that of commander-in-chief. More probably he acted as an executive officer, and
that certain decisions of the leaders were carried out.
saw
## p. 293 (#339) ############################################
Battle with Karbõghā
293
had already been stirred by supernatural visions and by the finding of
the Holy Lance (14 June), and thus encouraged the leaders had decided
to put all to the hazard of a single battle. Bohemond's part was to direct
the preparations, to marshal the army, and to exercise the chief com-
mand during the fight. His supreme authority was to remain intact for
a fortnight beyond the day of battle. It is probably not accidental that
the chosen day (28 June) was a Monday, the second octave of the finding
of the Holy Lance.
The hazardous operation of crossing the bridge into the plain north
of the Orontes, where the Muslims lay, was accomplished without dan-
gerous interference from the enemy. Karboghā's army included the troops
of the brothers Duqāq of Damascus and Ridwān of Aleppo, who were
deadly rivals, and Arab forces upon whom small reliance could be placed.
When it was known that the Latins intended to march out from the city,
there was hot debate regarding how they should be met. Those who
wished that they should be attacked as they issued from the bridge were
overruled, and some in consequence rode away almost before the fight
began. The Latins took up their position in the plain, with their front
to the east, in three divisions, stretching from the river to the hills.
Bohemond with strong forces posted himself in the rear, facing westward.
It is not clear that the Muslims had a well-arranged plan of battle.
Evidently the Syrian, Mesopotamian, and Anatolian troops operated
separately, and their chief attack was from the west and north-west,
although their main strength faced the Latins on the east. The crusaders,
therefore, were able to transfer reinforcements from the east front to the
west, and to rout the enemy in the rear before they began their decisive
movement forward'. Karboghā, who was posted on the right flank of the
Muslim army, remained strangely inactive. When he saw that the attack
from the west had failed, he drew back to his camp, set fire to his tents,
and made off in hasty flight. The number of the Muslim slain does not
seem to have been large. Yet the Latin victory was the turning-point
in the history of the First Crusade and decisive of its ultimate success.
The defenders of the citadel of Antioch now made overtures of surrender,
and the Latins took possession in the beginning of the following week.
It was determined in council that the march on Jerusalem should not be
resumed until 1 November.
The final disposal of Antioch after its capture was complicated by
jealousies and rivalries and doubtful questions of interpretation. Certainly
1 The distribution of the Latin forces is plainly given by Raymond, and the battle
is most fully described by Albert. A large force under Qilij-Arslān threatened the
Latin rear from the N. W. and was opposed by troops taken from the Latin left. A
strong attack on Bohemond was made later by the horsemen of Aleppo and Damascus,
who seem to have crossed from the south side of the river. To repel them it was neces-
sary to bring large reinforcements from the Latin centre and right wing. Oman's Art
of War does not distinguish the two forces operating against the rear of the crusaders.
CH. VII.
## p. 294 (#340) ############################################
294
Bohemond, Prince of Antioch
it had been assigned by treaty to Alexius, but only on condition that he
brought in person a sufficient army to help the crusaders. What period
might he claim for the fulfilment of this promise? In 1097 and 1098 the
naval and military forces of the Empire were chiefly engaged in subduing
Muslim towns in the west of Asia Minor'. But in June 1098 Alexius had
already marched with a considerable army half way to Antioch, following
the road traversed in the previous year by the crusaders themselves. Un-
fortunately for all concerned, he listened at Philomelium to the alarmist
stories of Stephen of Blois and the other fugitives from Antioch who met
him there. They probably told him that the crusading host had been
irretrievably defeated, and that a Turkish army was already marching
against him. He turned back to protect his recent conquests in Asia
Minor. Naturally this action was judged by most to be a surrender of
the Latin cause. At the best Alexius was now in a position hard to
retrieve. There are two accounts of the message which the crusaders
sent him in July. Albert of Aix says that the envoys were instructed
to tell the Emperor that he had been untrue to his promise, and thus
had nullified his treaty. This may have been the opinion of most of the
Latin leaders, but, as their attitude in November shewed, they were not
yet prepared completely to break off relations with the Emperor. The
Gesta Francorum says that the envoys were told to invite Alexius to
fulfil his promise and come to receive possession of Antioch. It may be
that something of this kind was said, with qualifications, setting a limit
to the delay which would be considered reasonable, and referring to the
Emperor's recent retreat. Presumably the envoys were empowered to
adhere in substance to the original treaty, provided the Emperor agreed
to carry out his engagements effectively and quickly. It is not known
what reply Alexius sent to this communication. It may be that he felt
the difficulty of his position so keenly that he sent no immediate reply.
In the spring of 1099 he promised to join the crusaders with an army
on St John's day (24 June), if they would wait for him until then.
Perhaps he was encouraged by the support of Raymond of Toulouse.
But his proposal came too late. The Crusade was nearing a successful
conclusion without the Emperor's assistance. All the leaders except
Raymond now held that the treaty had lapsed, and that the Emperor
had not fulfilled his obligation.
Bohemond, Prince of Antioch as he now became, profited most by the
Emperor's mistake. Before the capture of the city he had manoeuvred
dexterously to establish his claim to it.
Under pressure of Karboghā's
approach, the leaders had reluctantly assented to his proposal that the
lordship of Antioch should fall to anyone who secured its capture or be-
trayal. Before Bohemond made this proposal he had arranged for the
betrayal of the town. Of course the rights of the Emperor were duly
reserved, but after the defeat of Karboghā's army Bohemond was practi-
1 E. g. Smyrna, Sardis, and the towns in the district of the Meander valley.
## p. 295 (#341) ############################################
March to Jerusalem
295
cally ruler of Antioch'. In November he urged that the Emperor's claim
had already lapsed. The other leaders would not yet make the declaration
he desired, but Raymond was the only one to maintain that Alexius'
right was beyond dispute. Provençal troops held strong posts in Antioch
until January 1099. Their ejection in that month marked Bohemond's
final triumph.
The six months that followed Karboghā's defeat were spent by the
crusaders partly in recuperating their strength, partly in extending their
conquests. Baldwin of Edessa gained especially by the help which he
received at this time from Godfrey and other crusaders. Bohemond
strengthened his position in Cilicia. Raymond, and no doubt other leaders
also, sought to occupy the Muslim castles on the way to Aleppo and in
the valley of the Orontes. Plague raged in Antioch and St Simeon for
several months, so that few remained there of choice; its most distin-
guished victim was Ademar, Bishop of Puy. The quarrel between
Bohemond and Raymond regarding the lordship of Antioch further de-
layed the march of the Crusade. At last Raymond in despair yielded to
the clamour of his Provençals and started for Jerusalem, accompanied by
Tancred and Robert of Normandy (13 January 1099). They marched
slowly as far as ‘Arqah near Tripolis
, to which they laid siege (14 Feb-
ruary), and where they were joined by Godfrey and Robert of Flanders a
month later. Here, on 8 April, the unfortunate finder of the Holy Lance,
Peter Bartholomew, submitted himself to an ordeal by fire. When he
died, after twelve days, the nature and cause of his injuries were a matter
of dispute between the believers and the unbelievers. The siege of ‘Arqah
was abandoned in the middle of May (13 May), and the remainder of the
march to Jerusalem by the coast route was accomplished without any
special incident. Ramlah, between Jaffa and Jerusalem, was occupied on
3 June, and on the morning of 7 June the crusading army at length
encamped outside the walls of the Holy City.
The arrival of the crusaders at their destination obviously put fresh
heart into the rank and file and fresh energy into the action of their
leaders. Jerusalem was strongly fortified and well supplied with man-
gonels, and its garrison of 1000 men fought bravely. Perhaps, indeed,
the civilian population was ill-disposed to their Egyptian governor
or was intimidated by the numbers and the reputation of the Latins,
and so did not second the efforts of the garrison. At all events the siege
was quickly brought to a successful issue. The first attempt to storm the
city failed because the besiegers were not equipped with the necessary
ladders and siege-engines (13 June). Two siege-towers, a huge battering-
ram, and a quantity of mangonels were constructed before the next attack
was made. Some Genoese ships which reached Jaffa on 17 June brought
1 In July 1098 he granted by charter to the Genoese a church, a warehouse,
and a number of dwelling-houses. In return they promised to defend the city against
all comers, excepting Raymond of Toulouse, in whose case they were to stand neutral.
CH. VII.
## p. 296 (#342) ############################################
296
Godfrey, Prince of Jerusalem
a welcome supply of provisions and also workers skilled in the construction
of siege material. The scarcity of water was the chief inconvenience from
which the Latins suffered. A solemn procession round the town, when the
preparations were nearly complete (8 July), raised general enthusiasm. The
second assault was begun late on 13 July, was continued next day, and
was finally successful on 15 July. Godfrey's men were the first to storm
the walls, with the help of a siege-tower at the north-east corner. Ray-
mond on the south was less successful, but the great “tower of David,”
in which the Egyptian commandant was stationed, surrendered to him.
The celebration in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, where men wept
together for joy and grief, and the merciless slaughter of the inhabitants,
well express, in combination, the spirit of the Crusade. Raymond,
however, at the cost of some opprobrium, escorted safely on the way
to Ascalon those who had surrendered to him.
A prince to rule Jerusalem and the south of Palestine had now to
be chosen. On 22 July the crusading chiefs met for this purpose. Some
of the clergy thought that a high dignitary of the Church should be the
only ruler in Jerusalem, and Raymond favoured their view. Raymond
himself was the first to be offered the princedom, but declined it because
of his ecclesiastical sympathies. Finally, Godfrey of Bouillon, rather un-
willingly, accepted the distinguished and difficult post, and thus became
Defender of the Holy Sepulchre (Advocatus Sancti Sepulcri). He was
always addressed as dux or princeps, never as king. But his successors
were crowned as kings, and so he may be called the first ruler of the Latin
kingdom of Jerusalem.
The defeat of an Egyptian army near Ascalon on 12 August may
be reckoned as the last achievement of the First Crusade. Palestine
was then governed in part by Turkish emirs and in part by representa-
tives of the Egyptian Caliph'. Jerusalem and Ascalon were subject to
the same Egyptian governor. The Muslim army, which the Latins now
defeated, was probably levied to protect the Holy City when the final
movement of the crusaders from 'Arqah became known in Egypt. The
Egyptians seem to have put forward their full strength, and so may
possibly have mustered an army of 20,000 men. Godfrey's troops may
be reckoned at half that number? By taking the initiative he probably
forced the Egyptians to an engagement before they were quite ready.
The extension of the Latin line from the shore to the hills, in three
divisions, neutralised the numerical superiority of their opponents. The
left wing, which Godfrey commanded, was echeloned behind the other
divisions as a reserve. An attempt of the Muslims to envelope the
2
1 See supra, Chap. vi, p. 264.
Raymond's estimate is not more than 1200 knights and 9000 foot-soldiers. An
official letter of the crusaders (Hagenmeyer's Epistulae, p. 172) gives not more
than 5000 knights and 15,000 foot-soldiers against 500,000 Muslims! Fulcher makes
the numbers 20,000 Latins against 300,000 Muslims.
## p. 297 (#343) ############################################
Numbers in medieval writers
297
Latins from the side of the hills was frustrated. The decisive movement
was the charge of the knights of the Latin centre, which completely
broke the opposing line. The battle was over in less than an hour. The
victors gained great spoil of provisions and animals, especially sheep and
camels. But the prestige of the victory was of much greater value. It
was several years before any considerable movement was again attempted
by the Egyptians against the newly-established state.
The statements of the best contemporary sources regarding the
number of men bearing arms who joined the First Crusade' are quite
irreconcilable. These discrepancies and the estimates of Muslim armies
that the same sources give', which are impossible, make it clear, as
already explained, that all these general estimates are merely pictorial
in character. Even the lowest of them, if that be 60,000, cannot be
admitted to be approximately correct merely because it is the lowest.
60,000 is a stereotyped expression used by writers of the period for a
very large number.
On the other hand, scattered through the sources there is a con-
siderable amount of what may be accepted as approximately accurate
information about the numbers of the crusaders engaged in particular
fights or slain on particular occasions, and about the numbers of the
knights and men who served individual leaders. From such details a
reliable estimate of the military efficiency and numerical strength of the
Crusade may be obtained, and the partial figures when taken in com-
bination indicate a range within which the grand total probably lies.
Raymond d'Agiles supplies more material of this kind than any other
writer, and his general consistency is itself evidence of considerable
value. He uses pictorial numbers occasionally, especially in reports of
rhetorical speeches and in estimates of Muslim armies. But most of his
figures harmonise with their context and present an appearance of
tolerable exactness. His general narrative also is particularly clear and
convincing and full of details. His account of the three battles fought
during the siege of Antioch may be referred to in illustration of the
moderate numerical estimates which are characteristic of him. It must
be remembered that he speaks only of the knights who fought in these
battles, and also that the number of these able to take the field at the
time was greatly reduced by the dearth of horses. Besides, as already
explained, the total strength of the crusaders was never gathered at any
one time in the camp at Antioch. Still, it is noteworthy that the
knights in these engagements are numbered by hundreds and not by
thousands. The scale thus provided is amply confirmed by what we are
1 600,000 (Fulcher and Albert); 300,000 (Ekkehard); 100,000 (Raymond d'Agiles).
? At Dorylaeum: 150,000 (Raymond); 260,000 (Epist. Anselmi); 360,000 (Gesta
and Fulcher); in Karbõghā's army: 100,000 (Cafaro); 200,000 (Albert).
3 For a general estimate and criticism see Clemens Klein.
* See supra, p. 290, note.
CA VII.
## p. 298 (#344) ############################################
298
Numbers in the First Crusade
bound to suppose were the numbers of the Muslims. An expedition
from Aleppo or Damascus might number 500 horsemen or 1000 or 1500,
very rarely more. These figures set a clear upper limit to the numbers
of the Latins on the supposition that the Muslims were superior to them
in number.
Such being the character of Raymond's history, great importance
must attach to his making what may be regarded as a serious attempt
to estimate the number of the crusading army during the siege of
Jerusalem. Excluding non-combatants, his total is 12,000 of whom 1200-
1300 were knights? . Now this implies that the more important leaders
had an average of something like 2000-3000 men including 200-300
knights. This agrees with all the estimates of the forces of these
leaders in which any confidence can be placed. Reference may be made
to one of these. Albert of Aix's narrative, in spite of its defects, con-
tains a great deal of exact information, especially about Godfrey of
Bouillon. Now Albert says that Godfrey commanded 2000 men during
the battle against Karboghā. In this battle there were five or six leaders
whose forces, on an average, would be equal to Godfrey's. Thus the
army of the crusaders at Antioch would be similar in size to Raymond's
estimate of that which besieged Jerusalem. In both cases the estimate
is rather too high than too low. The numbers in Karböghā's army
supply a vague standard of comparison. If it numbered 12,000 it was
a large army for the circumstances of the time. It is unlikely that the
Latins were as numerous. Perhaps at this time the crusaders actually
under arms in Syria, Cilicia, and Edessa numbered 12,000-15,000 men.
In estimating the sum total of those who joined the Crusade, we
have to add such as lost their lives or deserted the cause during the
siege of Antioch and the march through Asia Minor. Non-combatant
priests and women and various ineffectives have also to be allowed for.
But this latter class cannot have been so great as to prejudice the
military effectiveness of the Crusade. Perhaps it is not too great a
venture to suggest that 25,000 or 30,000, all told, marched through
Asia Minor to Antioch ; and it seems to the writer that this estimate is
more likely to be above reality than below it. Of course many left their
homes who never reached Constantinople, and those who accompanied
Walter and Peter suffered heavy loss in Asia Minor before the arrival of
the organised expeditions. Something has been said of their numbers
already. But to attempt an estimate of all the men and women and
even children (? ) who left their homes in Western Europe for the Crusade
would be merely to pile conjecture upon conjecture. Yet perhaps this
may safely be said: that the number, if stated at all, should be in tens
of thousands and not in hundreds of thousands.
1 De nostris ad arma valentes, in quantum nos existimamus, numerum duodecim
millium non transcendebant sed habebamus multos debiles atque pauperes. Et erant
in exercitu nostro mille ducenti vel trecenti milites, ut ego arbitror, non amplius.
## p. 299 (#345) ############################################
Peter the Hermit
299
As Peter the Hermit still plays an important part in the popular
accounts of the origin of the First Crusade, some additional observations
regarding him may be permitted in conclusion. His actual rôle as an
early and successful preacher of the Crusade has already been indicated.
His legendary history originated, we must suppose, amongst those who
were stirred by his preaching, and who knew him as the originator of
their crusade. Along with other legends it was elaborated in the popular
songs of the period, the chansons de geste. From there it made a partial
entrance into the narrative of Albert of Aix, and in a more developed
form entered the history of William of Tyre. Through William of
Tyre it has so fixed itself in modern literature that no historian of mere
fact seems able to root it out.
According to legend Peter stirred the Pope and all Western Europe
to the First Crusade. The four writers who were present at the Council
of Clermont report Pope Urban's words in terms which are quite incon-
sistent with this representation. Besides, the chief authorities for the
history of the Crusade make it clear that Peter began his preaching
after the council and in consequence of it. His journey as far as Con-
stantinople has already been related. In the later stages of the Crusade
he appears as a personage of some influence among the poorer classes,
but not as one whom the leaders particularly respected. His volunteering,
with a comrade, to take a message to Karboghā in July 1098, has no
clear significance. Perhaps it was simply a reaction from his failure in
the beginning of the year, when for a time he was a deserter. In March
1099 the duty of distributing alms to the Provençal poor was entrusted
to him. In August 1099 he was one of those who organised processions
and services of intercession for the victory of the Latins before their
battle with the Egyptians. Between Nicaea and Jerusalem he plays a
recorded part five times in all. This minor figure is not even
appropriate symbol or representation of the mighty forces, religious,
political, and economic, that created the First Crusade.
an
CH. VII.
## p. 300 (#346) ############################################
300
CHAPTER VIII.
THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM, 1099–1291.
When, a week after the fall of Jerusalem, the crusaders met to choose
a king for the new kingdom, one after another of the greater princes
refused the proffer of a barren and laborious honour. Godfrey of
Bouillon, upon whom the choice at last fell, had been foremost in the
capture of the Holy City; but otherwise there was little in his early
career in the West or as a leader of the Crusade to mark him out. His
selection was indeed rather in the nature of a compromise, as that of
one who was equally acceptable to French and Germans. Nevertheless,
in the piety with which he refused the royal title and desired to be
styled only Baron of the Holy Sepulchre, and in the high purpose
which he shewed in his brief reign, there was much to justify the glamour
which has gathered about his name. From the next generation onwards
he was linked with Arthur and Charlemagne as one of the three Christian
heroes who made up the number of the nine noblest. Romance has con-
verted History to find in Godfrey the typical hero of the Crusade.
Had Godfrey presumed to style himself King of Jerusalem his title
would have been no more than an empty show, for as yet the crusaders
held little but the Holy City and the places which they had captured
on their way thither. Still, his victory over the Egyptian invaders at
Ascalon in the first months of his reign secured for the moment the
southern frontier of the intended kingdom. This was followed by at
least the show of submission from Acre and other cities of the coast,
and immediately before his death, on 18 July 1100, Godfrey had secured
the Christians in the possession of Jaffa, a necessary port for the Italian
traders, upon whom the fighting Franks in Syria were always in great
measure to depend. Thus early do we find the religious enthusiasm
of the crusader interwoven with commercial enterprise. Godfrey's en-
deavours had, however, been hampered by the ambitions of other
crusading nobles, and in particular of Raymond of Saint Gilles. Com-
mercial rivalry and princely jealousies were to be the bane of the Frankish
settlers in Palestine, and already they began to cast their shadow on the
infant kingdom.
Later historians and lawyers found in Godfrey the creator alike of
the material kingdom and of its theoretical institutions. But the
actual conquest of the land was the work of his first three successors,
and it was only by a slow process that the institutions of the kingdom
## p. 301 (#347) ############################################
Limits of the kingdom
301
grew to something like the theoretical perfection with which the jurists
of the next age invested them. At its widest extent the kingdom of
Jerusalem properly so called reached from Al--Arīsh on the south to
the Nahr-Ibrāhīm just beyond Beyrout on the north. For the most
part its eastern boundary was formed by the valley of Jordan; but in
the extreme north the small district of Banias lay beyond the river
Lițanī, and on the south an extensive territory on the east of the Dead
Sea reached for a brief time to Elim on the Gulf of 'Aqabah. The
whole region of Frankish rule was, however, much greater. Immediately
to the north the county of Tripolis formed a narrow strip along the
coast as far as the Wādi Mahik, near the modern Bulunyās. Beyond it
the principality of Antioch reached to the confines of Cilicia, and at
one time even included the city of Tarsus; on the east at its greatest
extension its territory came within a few miles of Aleppo; it was the
earliest and on the whole the most permanent conquest of the Franks,
who held the city of Antioch for 170 years. Finally, in the extreme
north-east was the county of Edessa, the capital of which was the
modern Urfah; the eastern limits of the county were never well defined,
and here a small body of Frankish lords held rule for less than half a
century over a mixed population of Armenians and Syrians.
Edessa had been conquered by Godfrey's brother Baldwin in 1097.
When Baldwin was called to the throne of Jerusalem, he gave his county
to his kinsman and namesake Baldwin du Bourg. Baldwin II in his
turn succeeded to the kingdom in 1118, and gave Edessa to Joscelin of
Courtenay, after whom his son Joscelin II maintained a precarious rule
till 1144. But if the hold of the Franks on Edessa was precarious it was
none the less important, for the county formed a strong outpost against
the Muslims of Mesopotamia, and its loss meant a serious weakening of
the defensive strength of the Frankish dominion.
Antioch was secured as a principality by Bohemond at the time of
its capture in 1097. In July 1100 Bohemond was taken prisoner by the
Turks near Maríash. After over two years' captivity he was released early
in 1103, only to suffer a disastrous defeat at Harrān in the following
year. He then crossed the sea to seek aid in the West, and never returned
to his principality. Bohemond's nephew Tancred governed Antioch
during his uncle's captivity, and again for eight years from 1104 to 1112.
He was one of the foremost of the early crusaders, and the virtual
creator of his principality by constant warfare against the Greeks on
the north and the Muslims on the south. Tancred's successor was his
nephew Roger Fitz-Richard, a less vigorous ruler, who was slain in battle
with Il-Ghāzi near Athārib in 1119. The government of Antioch was
then assumed by Baldwin II of Jerusalem during the minority of the son
of Bohemond. When Bohemond II came from Italy in 1126, he married
Baldwin's second daughter Alice, but reigned only four years ; after
his death Antioch was again in the king's hands till a husband was found
CH. VIII.
## p. 302 (#348) ############################################
302
The great fiefs
in 1136 for Bohemond's daughter Constance in the person of Raymond
of Poitou.
Tripolis had been marked out as a county for Raymond of Saint Gilles;
but when he died in 1103 only a beginning of conquest had been made.
The city of Tripolis was not captured till 1109, when the county was
secured to Raymond's son Bertram. Three years later Bertram was
succeeded by his son Pons, whose reign lasted five and twenty years.
Some brief account of the three great fiefs has seemed needful before
we could discuss the relation of their rulers to their nominal overlord at
Jerusalem. In theory the Prince of Antioch, the Counts of Edessa and
Tripolis, all owed fealty to the king at Jerusalem as their suzerain.
The king on his part had to give them his aid and protection in case of
need. Thus Baldwin I went to the aid of Baldwin of Edessa against the
Turks in 1110, and Baldwin II was called in by Roger of Antioch when
hard pressed by Il-Ghāzī in 1119. Also it was the king who had to inter-
vene in the disputes of his feudatories, as for instance between Bertram
of Tripolis and Tancred in 1109, and again between Tancred and the
Count of Edessa next year. The reality of the royal authority was shewn
even more clearly when Baldwin II intervened in the affairs of Antioch
after the death of Roger, and Fulk after the death of Bohemond II.
But though Baldwin and Fulk both assumed for a time the government
of the principality as part of their kingly duty, neither desired to find
an opportunity for an extension of their personal power, and they were
glad when the choice of a new prince relieved them of an onerous charge.
Geographical conditions did not favour the concentration of power under
a central authority. The long and narrow territory of the Franks was
affected by a diversity of interests between the component parts, and
this was shewn not only in the disputes of the great feudatories between
themselves but also in their attitude to their suzerain. If it served their
own advantage the Frankish princes were ready to seek Musulman aid
against their Christian rivals, and even against the king himself. How-
ever incontestable the king's rights might be in theory, in practice his
authority was under normal conditions limited. The Prince of Antioch
and the Counts of Edessa and Tripolis were virtually sovereigns in their
own states.
In the kingdom of Jerusalem properly so called there were four greater
baronies, the county of Jaffa and Ascalon (which in later times was an
appanage of the royal house), the lordship of Karak and Montreal, the
principality of Galilee, and the lordship of Sidon. In addition there
were a dozen lesser lords, some of whom, like the lords of Toron, were
important enough to play a great part in the history of the kingdom.
