On the contrary,
Augustine
says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only
of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them.
of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them.
Summa Theologica
Now
the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn.
14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me. " Therefore it seems that
some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.
Objection 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the
same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear
the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away
from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been
given in the Old Law also.
Objection 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2425]Q[3], A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the
confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex.
12:27) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them
the meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were
commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
Objection 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained
in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written
in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found
written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that
fear the Lord, believe Him. " Therefore the Old Law should have
contained precepts of faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law of
works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith. " Therefore the Old
Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who
receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary
subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is. " Hence faith is presupposed to
the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of
faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the
Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
(Dt. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg. : 'our'] God
is one," precede the recording of the precepts.
Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above ([2426]Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows
that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
(Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan. ) that we have received many
precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith
were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their
faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of
spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the
Law.
Reply to Objection 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of
faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God,"
and commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me. "
Reply to Objection 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which
corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as
stated above ([2427]FS, Q[18], A[4], ad 3; [2428]FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1,
A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive
precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned
off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.
Reply to Objection 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith,
rather than to faith itself.
Reply to Objection 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed
whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the
Lord," which is not possible without faith. The words which
follow---"believe Him"---must be referred to certain special articles
of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey
Him, wherefore the passage concludes---"and your reward shall not be
made void. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly
set down in the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge
and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and
directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding should precede the precepts of the Law referring to
action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are those of the
decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and understanding should
have been given a place among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
precepts about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example,
(Dt. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive
precepts, as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word
that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it
seems that man ought to have been given also some precepts directing
him to learn.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary
to a priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at
his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I
will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to
Me. " Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt.
17:18,19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded the
priests to learn the Law.
Objection 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Dt. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising. " Therefore the
precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set
down in the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "That, hearing all these
precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people. "
I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge
and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and
thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or
understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are
prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): "These words which
I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart. " This refers to learning,
since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said,
while the words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy
children"---refer to teaching.
The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the
text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and
they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write
them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house. " Thus the continual
remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible
for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the
notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our
hands, or by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or
to which we are continually returning, for instance, to the house door.
Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): "Forget not the words that thy
eyes have seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy
life. "
We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
apostles.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dt. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations. " By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and
understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the
first place.
Reply to Objection 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not
under any other authority, but were immediately under the law, and to
them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand learning
concerned the people of lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law
have to reach through the learned.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with
the priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it
is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
priests about things pertaining to the law of God.
Reply to Objection 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man
should meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i. e. that
he should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that
we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but that we
should regulate all our actions according to it.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes
ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But
one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other
passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master
(Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect
thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters
of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore
hope is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise. " Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper
measurement. But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have
a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason,
while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every
human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of
hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated
([2429]FS, Q[40], A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope,
the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain.
Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves;
secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so
far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the
Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it
leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a
human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on
right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of
virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use
of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to
make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now,
is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on
[2430](A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the
thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of
grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit
itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from
our merits, but from grace alone.
Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to
that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect,
in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose
help he leans.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every
movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now
eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of
man. " Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is
written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and
He will do it. " Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual,
of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be
delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness.
Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now
many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i. e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i. e.
into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a
gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
happiness.
I answer that, As stated above [2431](A[1]), the hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less
than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His
creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and
principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart
of man perfectly, i. e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know
its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle
says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil,"
because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods,
except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal
happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards
God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to
God, as stated above ([2432]Q[1], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as
compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides
may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in
reference to its principal object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it
unto the day of Jesus Christ. " Now the perfection of that day will be
eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal
happiness.
Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from
Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved. " Therefore we
can hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now
it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else
Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. lxxi)
that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one
can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only
of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them. "
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and
pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good.
Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly
regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him
as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term
which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards
directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if
we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and
desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he
can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by
love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves
God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope,
whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers. "
Therefore one may hope in man.
Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought
not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope
in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any
brother of his. " Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A[2], OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man. "
I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40],
A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain,
and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man
hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by
which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature,
as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary
and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods
that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the
saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this
reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain
from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character
of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as
much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that
has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is
evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes
for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient
cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in
the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these
things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow
the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological
virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and
that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a
theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the
mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have
no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the
things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one
truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or
extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to
trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and
extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as
he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which
he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as
a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make
profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
the life of the world to come. " Now expectation of future happiness
belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not
distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs
properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope
is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His
own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us
is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive perfect goodness, i. e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the
Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under
different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above
([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith,
not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of
hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on
[2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on
Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance
to faith and the beginning of salvation. " But salvation is by faith
whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things
to be hoped for. " Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit. " But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i. e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to
be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to
obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is
ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. " Therefore
it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is
called "the entrance" to faith, i. e. of the thing believed, because by
hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is
called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be
established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the
definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something
not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but
it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
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Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says
on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc. :
"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity. " But faith precedes
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity. " Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i. e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the
perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order
hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above
([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40],
A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he
may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The
first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own
sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes,
intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense
that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed
from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not
every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
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Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject.
For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the
will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in
the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is
the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at
the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
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Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]).
the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn.
14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me. " Therefore it seems that
some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.
Objection 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the
same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear
the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away
from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been
given in the Old Law also.
Objection 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
([2425]Q[3], A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the
confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex.
12:27) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them
the meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were
commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.
Objection 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained
in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written
in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found
written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that
fear the Lord, believe Him. " Therefore the Old Law should have
contained precepts of faith.
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law of
works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith. " Therefore the Old
Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who
receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary
subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is. " Hence faith is presupposed to
the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of
faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the
Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
(Dt. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg. : 'our'] God
is one," precede the recording of the precepts.
Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above ([2426]Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows
that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
(Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan. ) that we have received many
precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith
were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their
faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of
spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the
Law.
Reply to Objection 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of
faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God,"
and commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me. "
Reply to Objection 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which
corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as
stated above ([2427]FS, Q[18], A[4], ad 3; [2428]FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1,
A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive
precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned
off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.
Reply to Objection 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith,
rather than to faith itself.
Reply to Objection 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed
whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the
Lord," which is not possible without faith. The words which
follow---"believe Him"---must be referred to certain special articles
of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey
Him, wherefore the passage concludes---"and your reward shall not be
made void. "
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Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly
set down in the Old Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge
and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and
directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding should precede the precepts of the Law referring to
action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are those of the
decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and understanding should
have been given a place among the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
precepts about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example,
(Dt. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive
precepts, as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word
that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it. " Therefore it
seems that man ought to have been given also some precepts directing
him to learn.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary
to a priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at
his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I
will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to
Me. " Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt.
17:18,19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded the
priests to learn the Law.
Objection 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Dt. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising. " Therefore the
precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set
down in the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "That, hearing all these
precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people. "
I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge
and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and
thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or
understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are
prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): "These words which
I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart. " This refers to learning,
since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said,
while the words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy
children"---refer to teaching.
The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the
text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and
they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write
them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house. " Thus the continual
remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible
for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the
notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our
hands, or by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or
to which we are continually returning, for instance, to the house door.
Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): "Forget not the words that thy
eyes have seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy
life. "
We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
apostles.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Dt. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations. " By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and
understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the
first place.
Reply to Objection 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not
under any other authority, but were immediately under the law, and to
them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand learning
concerned the people of lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law
have to reach through the learned.
Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with
the priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it
is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
priests about things pertaining to the law of God.
Reply to Objection 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man
should meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i. e. that
he should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that
we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but that we
should regulate all our actions according to it.
__________________________________________________________________
OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
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Whether hope is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes
ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But
one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other
passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master
(Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect
thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters
of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore
hope is a virtue.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise. " Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper
measurement. But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have
a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason,
while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every
human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of
hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated
([2429]FS, Q[40], A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope,
the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain.
Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves;
secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so
far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the
Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it
leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a
human act to be good and to attain its due rule.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on
right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of
virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use
of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to
make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now,
is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on
[2430](A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the
thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of
grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit
itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from
our merits, but from grace alone.
Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to
that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect,
in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose
help he leans.
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Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every
movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now
eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of
man. " Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is
written (Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and
He will do it. " Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual,
of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be
delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness.
Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now
many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i. e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i. e.
into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a
gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
happiness.
I answer that, As stated above [2431](A[1]), the hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less
than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His
creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and
principal object of hope is eternal happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart
of man perfectly, i. e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know
its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle
says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil,"
because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods,
except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal
happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards
God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to
God, as stated above ([2432]Q[1], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as
compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides
may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in
reference to its principal object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it
unto the day of Jesus Christ. " Now the perfection of that day will be
eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal
happiness.
Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from
Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved. " Therefore we
can hope for another's eternal happiness.
Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now
it is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else
Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. lxxi)
that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one
can also hope for another's eternal salvation.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only
of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them. "
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and
pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good.
Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly
regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him
as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term
which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards
directly one's own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if
we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and
desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he
can hope for another eternal's life, inasmuch as he is united to him by
love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves
God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope,
whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers. "
Therefore one may hope in man.
Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought
not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope
in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any
brother of his. " Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A[2], OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man. "
I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40],
A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain,
and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man
hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by
which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature,
as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary
and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods
that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the
saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this
reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain
from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character
of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as
much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that
has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is
evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes
for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient
cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in
the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these
things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow
the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological
virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and
that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a
theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the
mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have
no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the
things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one
truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or
extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to
trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and
extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as
he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which
he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as
a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).
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Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make
profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
the life of the world to come. " Now expectation of future happiness
belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not
distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs
properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope
is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His
own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us
is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive perfect goodness, i. e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the
Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under
different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above
([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith,
not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of
hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on
[2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
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Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on
Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance
to faith and the beginning of salvation. " But salvation is by faith
whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things
to be hoped for. " Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit. " But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i. e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to
be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to
obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is
ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. " Therefore
it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is
called "the entrance" to faith, i. e. of the thing believed, because by
hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is
called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be
established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the
definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something
not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but
it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
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Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says
on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc. :
"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity. " But faith precedes
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity. " Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i. e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the
perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order
hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above
([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40],
A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he
may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The
first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own
sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes,
intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense
that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed
from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not
every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
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Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject.
For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the
will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in
the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is
the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at
the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
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Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]).
