No More Learning

e. Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Asia),
found himself deprived of this post by the suspicious advisers of the
Empress.
The Macedonian dynasty came to an end with Theodora. Michael
Stratioticus, her successor, was appointed heir by the Empress on her
death-bed. Before being chosen, he was obliged to bind himself by a
solemn oath to do nothing against the will and counsel of the ministers
and other advisers of the Empress.
The new Emperor, who was much advanced in years, was not long in
making himself unpopular by the unfortunate measures which he adopted,
and also in raising up powerful enemies for himself, chief among whom
must be placed the Patriarch, Michael Cerularius. The Patriarch, whose
prestige had been enormously increased by the events of 1054, had only
sought in the breach with Rome the means of rendering the Church
independent. He now dreamed of placing the State under the yoke of
the Church. Around him, drawn together by common interests and
forming a powerful party, stood the clergy and the monks. Theodora
had already had reason to dread the secret influence of Cerularius. She
had not dared to attack him openly, but had attempted to destroy his
T
CH. XI.


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320
Revolt of Isaac Comnenus
popularity by throwing suspicion upon his orthodoxy, and by having some
of his most notorious partisans proceeded against for heresy. Michael VI
and his counsellors continued to exclude him from the business of the
state. The Patriarch did not forgive the Emperor for adopting this
attitude, and on a favourable opportunity shortly afterwards presenting
itself, he determined to make his power felt.
The number of the discontented was increased by the fact that men
of senatorial rank found themselves excluded from the greater and more
lucrative financial posts, which were thenceforward reserved for profes-
sional officials. But it was the openly anti-militarist position taken up
by the Emperor and his advisers which brought about the catastrophe
in which his power finally disappeared. Angry at having had no part
in the shower of favours which had followed the accession of the new
sovereign and sore at seeing the palace officials preferred to them in the
distribution of high commands, the leaders of the army, during the
Easter festival of 1057, tried the effect of making united representations
to the Emperor. Chief among them were Catacalon Cecaumenus, the
Duke of Antioch, Isaac Comnenus, Constantine and John Ducas, and
Michael Burtzes. Admitted by the Emperor to an audience, the generals
made their wishes known. The Emperor refused all their requests
and violently denounced Catacalon Cecaumenus. The latter's comrades
having attempted to raise their voices in his defence, the Emperor silenced
them with an intemperance of language in which he spared nobody.
The chief officers of the Byzantine army went out from the interview
with bitterly wounded feelings. Nevertheless, before proceeding to an
open breach, they tried the effect of an application to the Patriarch's
vicar, Leo Paraspondylus, the chief counsellor of Michael VI. This
step had no better success than the former. On this fresh failure the
generals decided upon enforcing their demands by violence and over-
throwing the Emperor. Supported in secret by Michael Cerularius, who
thought the opportunity favourable for attempting to carry out his
ambitious projects, the military leaders met in the church of St Sophia,
and, after the crown had been offered in vain to Catacalon, the choice
of the assembly fell upon Isaac Comnenus. As soon as the final arrange-
ments had been made, the conspirators left Constantinople and crossed
over into Asia Minor. The arrest and execution of one of their number,
Nicephorus Bryennius, after he had been suddenly deprived of his com-
mand in Cappadocia, accelerated the course of events. Hastily, and in
fear lest their conspiracy had been discovered, the plotters gathered their
contingents together and joined Isaac Comnenus, who had fled for refuge
to his estates in Paphlagonia. On 8 June 1057 on the plain of Gunaria
Isaac Comnenus was proclaimed Emperor, and soon after, the rebel forces
having been increased by the arrival of Catacalon and his troops, the
usurper set out on his march towards the Bosphorus. He captured
Nicaea without much difficulty, and his authority was promptly recog-


## p. 321 (#363) ############################################

Fall of Michael VI
321
nised throughout the eastern part of the Empire. The pretender made
steady progress, the discipline and order which he always maintained
among his troops winning him many supporters. The soldiers, though in
revolt, never behaved like revolutionaries, and, as it has been said with
perfect justice, the proclamation of the new Emperor was generally
regarded not as a usurpation but as the setting up of a genuine imperial
government basing itself upon the support of the army in contra-
distinction to the civil elements of the capital.
To make head against the rebels, Michael VI hastily collected all the
troops at his disposal in the European provinces of the Empire, and
despatched them to Asia Minor under the command of the eunuch
Theodore and Aaron the Bulgarian. On 20 August 1057 at Hades,
not far from Nicaea, the imperial troops were defeated by those of Isaac
Comnenus. The news of the disaster soon reached the Sacred Palace,
where it spread terror. Michael VI, panic-stricken, exacted from the
Senators a written promise never to recognise Isaac Comnenus as Emperor.
At the same time he himself opened negotiations with him.
The history of the negotiations is chiefly known to us through the
deliberately obscure account left by one of the ambassadors, Michael
Psellus. One thing alone seems certain, that from the very beginning
of the transaction Michael VI was betrayed. The imperial ambassadors,
who reached Nicomedia, where Isaac Comnenus then was, on 24 August,
were charged to offer him the title of Caesar with the promise of suc-
ceeding to the throne. The better to hoodwink his opponent and give
time for his own partisans to take action in Constantinople, Isaac spun
out the negotiations tediously, and then pretended to accept the pro-
posals of Michael VI, to whom the ambassadors returned to give an
account of their mission. During their stay at Constantinople they
came to an understanding with the partisans of the pretender, among
the most important of whom were the Patriarch and a certain number of
great personages. When Psellus and his colleagues again set out bearing
fresh proposals from their master, the conspiracy had been fully organized.
On 30 August an outbreak took place at Constantinople. The ringleaders
complained of the conduct of Michael VI who, after having forced
them to take the oath not to acknowledge Isaac Comnenus, had turned
them into perjurers by his own offer in the negotiations. They seized
the Patriarch, who in reality was in sympathy with the leaders of the
movement, and demanded that he should reclaim the written oaths
which the Emperor had exacted from the Senators. Then soon after, by
the advice of Cerularius, the rioters burst out in acclamation of Isaac
Comnenus. In a few hours they were masters of the capital. The
Patriarch sent orders to the Emperor to cut off his hair and put on.
the monastic habit. Michael VI made no resistance, and thus, thanks to
the intervention of Cerularius, who had undertaken the direction of the
movement, the capital acknowledged Isaac Comnenus.
C. MED. H. v0L. II. CH. XI.
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## p. 322 (#364) ############################################

322
Isaac Comnenus
The news of the success of the rising was brought by messengers to the
camp of the rebels. Isaac Comnenus, who had reached Chrysopolis,
made his solemn entry into Constantinople and at St Sophia received the
imperial crown from the hands of the Patriarch (1 September 1057).
Born early in the eleventh century (c. 1005), the new Emperor was
about fifty years old when he mounted the throne. By his marriage with
Catherine, daughter of the Bulgarian prince, John Vladislav, he had had
two children who died before him.
There is little to be said as to the foreign policy of Isaac Comnenus ;
an attack by the Turks upon Melitene and Sebastea, uninterrupted pro-
gress made by the Normans in Italy, an attack by the Hungarians, a
Patzinak invasion which required the Emperor's presence on the Danubian
frontier (1059)---such are the principal external events of the reign, the
chief interest of which centres in home policy.
The reign of Isaac Comnenus, raised to the throne as he was by the
army, was a period of reaction against the reigns that had gone before it.
From his first reception of the great officials the Emperor treated them
with marked coldness, and instead of making them the usual speech
conveyed his orders to them by his secretaries. The army was hand-
somely rewarded for the help it had afforded the Emperor, who, however,
was careful to avoid committing affairs of state to his soldiers, and
hastened to send them back to their garrisons. To shew plainly the char-
acter which he intended to impress on his government, the Emperor
caused himself to be represented on the gold coinage holding in his hand
not the labarum (the imperial standard) but a drawn sword. Isaac Com-
nenus was not wanting in the qualities which go to make a ruler. “He
was prudent in conception” says an anonymous chronicler, “but more
prompt in action; he was devoid of credulity and desired to judge of
men rather by experience than by their flatteries. ” Psellus writes of him:
“Like a lofty and unshakeable column he, in a fashion hitherto unknown,
bore on his shoulders the burden of power committed to him.
Isaac brought to the business of State administration the military
methods to which he was accustomed. The situation of the Empire, the
treasury being exhausted by the preceding reigns, necessitated financial
measures of such a character that universal clamour quickly arose against
the new sovereign. The payment of taxes was exacted with merciless
rigour. The allowances attached to official posts were cut off, the
donations bestowed by the last Emperors were re-examined, and many
confiscations decreed. Finally, the convents were deprived of a large part
of their property. All these measures gave offence to so many
different
interests that they made the new Emperor thoroughly unpopular and
created a large body of disaffected subjects. These soon found a leader
in the Patriarch.
Michael Cerularius had taken a decisive part in the revolution which
raised Isaac Comnenus to the throne. The latter shewed himself grateful,
יי


## p. 323 (#365) ############################################

Michael Cerularius
323
and made an important concession to the Patriarch, giving up to him
the nomination of all the officials of St Sophia, which up to this time
the Emperors had kept in their own hands. By so doing the Emperor,
as Michael of Attalia expresses it, “ renounced all rights over the ecclesi-
astical affairs which up to then had come within the imperial province.
From thenceforth the Palace was completely excluded from ecclesiastical
administration. Neither the post of treasurer, nor the care and expenditure
of the Church's landed property, came for the future within the juris-
diction of the imperial agents; they depended on the will of the Patriarch,
who now obtained the right both of the nomination of persons and of
the administration of affairs. ” It would be impossible to lay too much
stress on the importance of these measures, for it was by means of them
that the Patriarch, " already the Emperor's superior from the spiritual
point of view, attained to temporal independence. ”
These advantages did not satisfy the Patriarch, who dreamed of uniting
the spiritual and temporal power in his own hands, of being at once
Patriarch and Emperor. The more Cerularius saw his position grow in
importance, the more he sought to interfere in the business of the State,
and the less he concealed his pretensions. Before long he openly pro-
claimed them by adopting the purple buskins which at Constantinople
formed a part of the imperial costume.
Isaac Comnenus was not a man to allow his rights to be encroached
upon and he pushed matters to the point of an open struggle with the
Patriarch. The relations between them soon became so strained that the
Emperor saw that he would risk his crown if he did not reduce Cerularius
to impotence. He therefore decided on the arrest of the Patriarch-a
measure not easy to carry out, for Michael had the support of a strong
party and was besides very popular. The Emperor was taxed with
ingratitude in thus persecuting the man to whom he owed his crown. It
was to be feared that the Patriarch's arrest would be the signal for a riot.
Isaac Comnenus accordingly waited until Cerularius had gone into
retreat in November 1058 at the convent of the Nine Orders, situated
outside the capital close to the gate of the Holy Angels, and then
caused him to be arrested by the Varangians of his body-guard. Michael
was at once imprisoned at Proconnesus in the Propontis and thence was
transferred to the island of Imbros. Despite his captivity he was still the
rightful Patriarch. A rising of the people of Constantinople in his favour
was always to be dreaded. Comnenus therefore endeavoured to induce
his adversary to abdicate. He failed, and Michael remained unshakable.
Isaac then determined to procure his deposition. Psellus was charged
with drawing up his indictment, which was to be read at a synod con-
voked to meet at a town in Thrace. The Patriarch was accused of the
heresies of Hellenism and Chaldaïsm, of tyranny, sacrilege, and finally of
unworthiness for his office. Michael never appeared before his judges,
for he died on the way at Madytus. The Emperor thus found himself
CH. XI.
21-2


## p. 324 (#366) ############################################

324
Constantine Ducas
delivered from the most formidable of his adversaries. Yet in spite of
all, the popularity of Cerularius still remained so great that Comnenus,
fearing an outbreak at Constantinople, expressed the profoundest venera-
tion for the dead man, going to weep before his tomb and to implore his
pardon for the rigorous measures which had been taken against him. The
successor of Cerularius was a creature of Isaac, Constantine Lichudes
(February 1059).
The victory of Isaac Comnenus over Cerularius led to no results, and
a few months after his adversary's death the Emperor was to lay down
his power under circumstances which have always remained full of
mystery.
In the early months of 1059 Isaac had set out on a march to drive
back the Hungarians who had invaded the imperial territory. Having
reached Sardica, he found their ambassadors there and peace was ar-
ranged. In the course of the summer he marched to the Danube to
fight against the Patzinaks who had crossed the river. The expedition
was not a fortunate one, and Isaac was obliged to return precipitately
to Constantinople on a false alarm that the Turks had made an attack
in Asia Minor. During November he fell ill after a hunting-party, and,
in spite of the Empress, resolved to abdicate in order to take the monastic
habit and retire to the convent of Studion. After having vainly offered
the crown to his brother John Comnenus, he named as his successor one
of his brother-officers, Constantine Ducas, President of the Senate.
Whatever were the reasons for this decision, we are absolutely
ignorant of them. Psellus, who had a considerable share in these oc-
currences, has thought fit not to leave us too precise information.
There is some reason to think that the opposition which Isaac Com-
nenus encountered did not come to an end on the disappearance of
Cerularius, and that the Emperor must have found himself unable to
cope successfully with the obstacles raised up against him. As has been
very truly said, “the situation was such that the different parties, ap-
plying pressure in different directions, paralysed one another and stopped
the wheels of the chariot of state. ” Seeing no way out of the difficulties
with which he was struggling, Comnenus preferred placing the imperial
power in other hands and succumbed to the opposition of the bureaucracy.
On the accession of Constantine Ducas (1059–1067) the civil element
regained all its old influence. The enterprise of Isaac Comnenus had laid
the army more than ever open to suspicion. Thus it became the policy
of the government systematically to diminish the military forces of the
Empire. The “army estimates ” were considerably reduced, the number
of effective troops was cut down, and it was soon known that a military
career no longer offered a man any chance of attaining to the higher
administrative posts. Under this régime the military system broke down,
and the army was soon thoroughly disorganised. The result of this
egregious experiment in statesmanship was quickly apparent, and under


## p. 325 (#367) ############################################

Situation of the Empire
325
Constantine Ducas and his successors, Romanus Diogenes (1067-1071),
Michael VII (1071-1078), and Nicephorus Botaniates (1078–1081), the
Empire, attacked all along its frontiers, was everywhere obliged to fall
back before its enemies.
In Italy, the Normans put a complete end to Byzantine influence.
With the fall of Bari in 1071 the Empire was to lose its last foothold
there, and before long Guiscard was to be powerful enough to meditate
the subjugation of Constantinople. On the other side of the Adriatic,
Croatia succeeded in gaining her independence, which was formally con-
secrated on the day when the legates of Gregory VII set the crown upon
the head of Svinimir. Dalmatia, too, profited by the course of events to
secure practical independence, while soon afterwards the town of Ragusa
was to ally itself with Robert Guiscard.
Serbia was endeavouring to shake off Byzantine suzerainty, and the
great rising of 1071 reduced Greek authority there to a very precarious
position. In Bulgaria, which was only half subdued, the Greeks and the
natives were violently at enmity. Here again the Normans were to find
support in their attempt to conquer the Empire.
On the Northern frontier, the Hungarians took advantage of the
difficulties with which the Emperors had to struggle, to begin those
profitable incursions into Greek territory whence they used to return
loaded with spoil. The wandering tribes along the Danube also went
back to their old custom of making expeditions across the river, and their
undisciplined bands even advanced as far as the suburbs of the capital.
The Uzes and the Patzinaks took their share of the spoils of the Empire,
which, in order to purchase peace, was forced to pay them a tribute.
In Asia, the situation was far more seriously compromised by the
conquests of the Turks. From 1062 onwards, the Musulmans made steady
progress. The Byzantine Empire lost Armenia and the Eastern provinces,
while Syria was threatened. The Turks, already masters of Ani, Melitene,
and Sebastea, ravaged the region about Antioch. To attempt to check
their advance, Eudocia Macrembolitissa, widow of Constantine Ducas, sent
against them her co-regent Romanus Diogenes, whom she had just
married. Despite the low level to which the Byzantine army had sunk,
the Emperor at first succeeded in driving back the enemy, but the Turks
retaliated, and in the disastrous battle of Manzikert (1071) his forces were
destroyed. Thereupon, from all quarters arose pretenders to the imperial
purple. Eudocia, who had shared her office with her son Michael VII,
looked on helplessly at the ruin of the Empire. The forward movement
of the Muslims became irresistible, and soon the conquerors reached the
western shores of Asia Minor.
Nor was the situation within the Empire any more hopeful. The
army, neglected by the government, was discontented; the aristocracy
bore with impatience its exclusion from power. Thence arose a whole
series of outbreaks. Never, perhaps, were attempts at a pronunciamento
CH. XI.


## p. 326 (#368) ############################################

326
Anna Dalassena
more numerous, but the nobility of Europe and that of Asia Minor,
between whom was a deadly hatred, so neutralised each other as to
hinder the majority of these attempts from coming to any result.
It was at this moment, when the whole structure of the State seemed
to be cracking in every direction and on the point of falling in ruins,
that Alexius, nephew of Isaac Comnenus, acquired supreme power.
After the abdication of his brother, John Comnenus had retired into
obscurity. By his prudent conduct he was able to avoid the perils which
in Constantinople usually threatened the members of a family which had
occupied the throne. He died about 1067, leaving five sons and three
daughters by his marriage with Anna Dalassena. This lady had seen
with regret her husband's refusal of the crown, and when the responsibility
for the family interests fell upon her she used every effort to obtain a
repetition of the lost opportunity. In her eyes the Ducas family, who had
profited by the retirement of Isaac Comnenus, were the enemies of her
house; her hatred of them dictated her political attitude. A friend and
relation of the Empress Eudocia Macrembolitissa, Anna Dalassena
attached herself to the fortunes of Romanus Diogenes, whose son Con-
stantine married her daughter Theodora. Manuel, the eldest of the
children of John Comnenus, received a command in the army. On the
fall of Romanus Anna's position was shaken, and she was for a short
time exiled; but she regained favour under Michael VII, who perhaps
stood in dread of the support which the Comneni, with their large estates in
Asia Minor, might furnish to the Turks. Her son Isaac, now become the
eldest by the death of his brother Manuel, married an Alan princess, a
cousin of the Empress Maria, wife of Michael VII. The Comneni then
found themselves supported in their position by the eunuch Nicephoritza,
who relied upon their help to destroy the influence of the Caesar John
Ducas, uncle of Michael VII. Isaac was employed in the war against the
Turks and in suppressing the insurrection raised by the Norman leader,
Roussel de Bailleul. His brother Alexius made his first essay in war
under his command, winning great distinction. Being charged a little
later with the task of resisting Roussel, Alexius succeeded in making him
prisoner. The fortunes of the Comneni rose steadily; honours and dignities
fell to their share. The Caesar John Ducas, by this time fallen into dis-
grace and become a monk, realising the advantages which an alliance
with this powerful family would procure for his house, arranged a marriage
between his grand-daughter Irene and Alexius Comnenus. The court
opposed the match, which by uniting two of the most powerful families
of the aristocracy would make their interests thenceforth identical. The
marriage nevertheless took place about the end of 1077 or the beginning
of 1078.
On the abdication of Michael VIÍ, Alexius Comnenus, being charged
with the defence of the capital, made his submission to the new Emperor,
Nicephorus Botaniates, who rewarded him by appointing him Domestic


## p. 327 (#369) ############################################

Accession of Alexius Comnenus
327
of the Scholae and by entrusting him with the suppression of the revolts
of Bryennius and Basilaces.
The methods of government employed by the two ministers, Borilus
and Germanus, to whom Nicephorus handed over the exercise of power,
aroused general discontent. The treasury was empty; the Varangian
guard, being unpaid, mutinied; the army was dissatisfied and protested
against having the eunuchs of the palace set over it. Among the people
the Emperor was unpopular, for he had come into collision with the
generally accepted ideas of legitimism by not associating with himself in
his office Constantine, the son of Michael VII. Besides this he caused
great scandal by contracting a third marriage with Maria, wife of Michael
VII who was still alive.
Alexius Comnenus, who had become popular on account of his suc-
cesses, was exposed to the dislike and distrust of the party in power. On
the other hand, besides his own family connexions, he had the support
of the Ducas family, which brought with it that of the clergy. He him-
self had contrived to gain the favour of the Empress, who was perhaps
in love with him. In her eyes he appeared as the champion of Michael
VII's son Constantine, and he succeeded in persuading her to adopt him.
Thenceforward his rights and Constantine's were merged.
It was not without disquiet that the Court watched the progress made
by the Comnenian party. The situation became more and more strained,
and soon it was apparent to everyone that the breaking-point must before
long be reached. Alexius determined to be first in the field, and under the
pretext of repelling the Turks, who were occupying Cyzicus, he assembled
troops at Chorlu (Tzurulum) on the road to Hadrianople. Divining the
intentions of the Comneni, the ministers of Botaniates resolved on their
arrest. Alexius, informed of their design through the Empress, hastily
fled from the capital (14 February 1081). At Chorlu he was joined by
his partisans, chief among them the Caesar John Ducas, who had quitted
his monastery. Once assembled, the rebels seem to have been doubtful
as to what their course should be. It is almost certain that rivalries arose,
and that a party among them wished to proclaim, not Alexius but his
brother Isaac. If, finally, Alexius carried the day, he owed it to the
intervention of the Ducas family in his favour.
Alexius, having been proclaimed by the army, marched upon Con-
stantinople, the gates of which were opened to him by treachery. The
victorious army pillaged the capital, while Nicephorus Botaniates, not
seeking to prolong a useless struggle, divested himself of the imperial
robes and put on the monastic habit. Soon after, an agreement made
between the new Emperor and Nicephorus Melissenus, who had been
proclaimed by the troops in Asia Minor, left Alexius sole occupant of
the throne.
The early days of the new reign were taken up with intrigues which
are only imperfectly known to us. The Ducas family, to whom Alexius
cH. K.


## p. 328 (#370) ############################################

328
Alexius and the Ducas family
largely owed his success, were fearful for a moment that the Emperor
would repudiate his wife. And indeed it appears that for a short time
he entertained this project, and had decided to marry the Empress Maria.
The firmness of Cosmas, the Patriarch, prevented the Emperor from
carrying out his purpose. In her hostility to the house of Ducas, Anna
Dalassena urged his resignation, in order that Eustratius Garidas might be
chosen in his place. Cosmas refused to retire until he had crowned Irene.
It was found impossible to overcome his resistance, and Irene was crowned
seven days later than her husband. There is no doubt that Alexius' in-
clinations were all in favour of Maria, but from the point of view of
policy it would have been ill-judged to alienate a faction so powerful as
that of the Ducas. Cosmas prevented Alexius from committing this
blunder. The Empress Maria was obliged to leave the palace. She took
care first to have her son Constantine appointed joint Emperor. The
young prince, who was betrothed later on to Anna Comnena, daughter
of Alexius, remained heir presumptive until in 1088 the birth of the
Emperor's son John enabled Alexius to set him aside.
At the time of his accession Alexius was about thirty-three years old.
In person he was short and rather stout, deep-chested and broad-
shouldered. Of cultivated mind and supple intellect, he had been very
thoroughly educated. Passionately fond of philosophy and theology, he
enjoyed taking part in the discussions on these subjects which were so
frequent during his reign. Accustomed to court life from his youth, he
was well acquainted with men and knew how to make use of them. Very
steady in pursuing his ends, he gave all possible care to elaborating his
plans and made a point of never leaving anything to chance. Of a mild
disposition, his reign was not stained by cruelties. With regard to religion,
the Emperor looked upon himself as entrusted with the duty of safeguard-
ing the orthodox faith handed down to him, which he felt bound to hand
on intact to his successors, and more than once he personally took a share
in the conversion of heretics. Comnenus was perfectly aware of the general
decadence of the Empire. He exerted himself to remedy it by reforming
the clergy, secular and regular, by founding and encouraging schools, and
by re-organising the army and the fleet. In addition to this, it must be
said that Alexius was a diplomatist of the first order. Thoroughly con-
versant with the political state of the surrounding countries, he knew how
to profit by their divisions, and had a peculiar gift for inducing the
enemies of his enemies to enter into alliance with him.
Immediately upon his accession Alexius had to meet a formidable
danger, even more pressing than the Turkish peril. The Normans of Italy
were preparing to invade the imperial territory, and the Duke of Apulia,
Robert Guiscard, meditated no less an enterprise than an advance upon
Constantinople itself. As early as the capture of Bari, which marked
the definitive expulsion of the Byzantines from Italy, Guiscard had con-
ceived the idea of assuming the imperial crown. Amid the dangers that


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War with the Normans of Italy
329
threatened the Empire, Michael VII had thought of a Norman alliance,
and a daughter of Guiscard had been sent to Constantinople to marry
Constantine, the heir to the throne. When Botaniates became Emperor,
Guiscard took up the role of champion of the deposed ruler, and in order
to win the goodwill of the Greek populations he spread abroad the
rumour that Michael had come to seek help of him. A Greek named
Rector posed as the dethroned Emperor. At the same time the Duke
of Apulia was seeking to win over supporters, even in Constantinople.
The invaders were already at work when Alexius ascended the throne, and
Bohemond, Guiscard's son, had occupied Avlona, Canina, and Hiericho.
In May 1081 the bulk of the Norman army crossed the Adriatic and
concentrated at Avlona. Guiscard began by reducing Corfù, and thence
proceeded to the siege of Durazzo.
Though without money or troops, Alexius contrived to meet the
danger. He came to an understanding with certain Norman lords, who
had been driven from Italy by Guiscard and had taken refuge at Con-
stantinople, and sent them to Italy to re-kindle the spirit of revolt
among the vassals of the Duke of Apulia. At the same time Alexius
tried, but in vain, to treat with Gregory VII, and entered into negotia-
tions with Henry IV of Germany. To the latter he promised enormous
subsidies if he would make a descent upon Apulia and attack Guiscard.
The support of the Venetian fleet was secured by a commercial treaty,
opening a long series of Greek ports to the merchants of the republic.
Finally, a treaty of peace was concluded with Sulaimān, who in the name
of the Seljūq Sultan, Malik Shāh, was leading the Musulman troops to
the conquest of Asia Minor, and had obtained possession of Nicaea. This
allowed the Emperor to devote his whole attention to the war with the
Normans.
The campaign began with a victory won by the Venetian fleet over the
Normans at Cape Palli, but the Greek army under the Emperor's command
was beaten before Durazzo (Oct. 1081), and Guiscard shortly afterwards
became master of the whole of Illyria, for Durazzo fell into his hands.
Recalled to Italy in the spring of 1082 by a revolt among his vassals,
engineered by the agents of Alexius, Guiscard handed over the command
of the expeditionary force to his son Bohemond, who occupied Castoria,
besieged Joannina, and defeated Alexius. Ochrida, Scopia (Skoplje), Veria,
Servia, Vodena, Moglena, and Trikala thus fell into the hands of the
Normans, who pushed on into Thessaly as far as Larissa.
Reduced to the necessity of confiscating Church treasure in order
to raise money, Alexius with indefatigable patience got together a new
army, and while his allies the Venetians were retaking Durazzo, he suc-
ceeded in driving the enemy from Thessaly, and recaptured Castoria
(October or November 1083). Negotiations with Bohemond, begun
through the mediation of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Euthymius, led to
no result.
cH. XI.


## p. 330 (#372) ############################################

330
The Patzinaks and Cumans
The year 1084 brought a fresh endeavour on the part of the Duke of
Apulia, who, having restored order in his own dominions, renewed opera-
tions against Constantinople. He completely defeated the Venetian fleet
off Corfù, and in the beginning of 1085 despatched his son Robert to
take Cephalonia. He himself was about to take the field, when he was
suddenly overtaken by death. The disturbances which consequently broke
out in Italy for a time diverted the Norman danger from the Byzantine
frontier.
Hardly was the Empire freed from the presence of the Normans, when
a new peril arose in the neighbourhood of the Danube. The military
contingents supplied by the Manichaean colony of Philippopolis having
proved treacherous during the campaign against Guiscard, Alexius had
attempted to punish the offenders. A mutiny had broken out, the leader
of which, Traulus, appealed for help to the Patzinak tribes. Though at
first repulsed (1086), the Patzinaks returned to the charge the following
year. Again defeated, they were pursued by the Greek army, which, how-
ever, they put to rout near Dristra (Silistria). It was only by a war
which broke out between the Cumans and the Patzinaks that the latter
were prevented from profiting by their victory to invade the imperial
territory. And, in fact, the struggle was merely postponed. During the
years 1088–1090 the Patzinaks settled down on Greek territory and
occupied the country between the Danube and the Balkans. Thence they
spread into the region around Philippopolis and Hadrianople. It took
Alexius several years before he could set on foot an army capable, with
any chance of success, of undertaking the struggle with the barbarous
tribes which threatened Constantinople. Finally, in the spring of 1091,
the Emperor, having called in the help of the Cumans, inflicted a severe
defeat upon the Patzinaks by the river Leburnium, which for a time
freed the Empire from barbarian incursions (29 April 1091).
However, Alexius had not done with the nomad tribes living to the
north of the Danube, and in 1094-1095 he was obliged to repel an attack
by his late allies the Cumans, who under the command of a self-styled son
of Romanus Diogenes named Leo, had advanced as far as Hadrianople.
Leo was taken prisoner and blinded.
A little before the time of the Cuman invasion, Alexius had suc-
ceeded in asserting his authority over the Serbs. Theoretically these
were vassals of the Empire, to which they were obliged to furnish certain
military contingents. At the time of Guiscard's expedition, the Serbian
prince, Constantine Bodin, had deserted Alexius, and had drawn off with
his troops just as battle was joined. Since that date he had made use of
the difficulties with which the Emperor had to struggle to extend his
borders and make himself independent. His example had been followed
by Bolkan, the Župan of Rascia. In 1091 and 1094 Alexius was
obliged to interfere in Serbia, but the mountainous character of the country
made military operations difficult, and the Emperor, having taken hos-


## p. 331 (#373) ############################################

The Empire and the Turks in Asia Minor
331
tages, contented himself with a submission which was rather apparent
than real.
In Europe Alexius had successfully beaten off the attacks of the
enemies of the Empire. In Asia Minor the state of things was also im-
proved, although the last remnants of the Byzantine possessions in the
Antioch province had fallen into the hands of Malik Shāh. The death
of Sulaimān (1085) left Asia Minor divided between a number of emirs,
whose rivalries made them likely to play into the Emperor's hands.
Sulaimān's dominions had been partitioned between Abu'ī-Qāsim, Emir
of Nicaea, Tzachas, Emir of Smyrna, formerly a favourite of Nicephorus
Botaniates, and Pulchas, Emir of Cappadocia. Alexius tried to profit by
the internal dissensions of the Mohammedan rulers to re-open the struggle
in Asia, and to protect the last remaining possessions of the Empire.
He built the fortress of Civitot on the gulf of Nicomedia, placing in it
as garrison a body of soldiers of English origin. At some unspecified
period Nicomedia again fell into the power of the Greeks.
The relations between Constantinople and the Turkish emirs are very
confusing. It appears that a common fear of Tzachas, Emir of Smyrna,
drew together Alexius and Abu'l-Qāsim. As to Tzachas, who had suc-
ceeded in creating a fleet, he dreamt of no less an enterprise than the
conquest of Constantinople, and with this end in view had allied himself
with the Patzinaks. The battle on the Leburnium destroyed his hopes,
and he was himself defeated by Constantine Dalassenus, an officer of
Alexius. When Malik Shāh sent his captain, Būzhān, to reduce the
emirs of Asia Minor to obedience, this general began negotiations with
Alexius. The Emperor, while continuing the discussions till they were
interrupted by the death of Malik Shāh, remained constant to his alliance
with Abu'l-Qāsim. When the latter had been defeated and slain by Būzhān,
Alexius allied himself with his successor, Qilij Arslān, son of Sulaiman,
and together they fought against Tzachas. The Emperor profited by the
general scramble which took place among all the vassals of Sulaimān to
attempt the recapture of Apollonia and Cyzicus, which the Greek general
Opus succeeded in taking. At this time, with the exception of the coast
towns, Alexius possessed nothing in Asia Minor besides the region lying
between the Sangarius, the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and the Propontis.
Towards the south a natural frontier was supplied by Lake Sophon and by
a wide fortified fosse which supplied Nicomedia with water from the lake.
While he was still fighting with the Turks, Alexius was called on to
suppress a dangerous insurrection. Fiscal burdens had led to simultaneous
revolts in Cyprus and in Crete, and two chiefs, Charices and Rapsomates,
declared their independence. Order was restored by the Grand Drun-
garius Ducas, and Alexius formed in Cyprus a base of operations for the
Greek fleets. The Stratopedarch Eumathius Philocales was entrusted
with the carrying out of the Emperor's plans.
For the first eighteen years of his reign, Alexius had been obliged to
CH, x.


## p. 332 (#374) ############################################

332
Unpopularity of Alexius
?
maintain incessant warfare, and during the same period the situation in
the interior had also presented great difficulties.
Alexius, being held responsible for the complications bequeathed him
by his predecessors, was for a time extremely unpopular. A large section
of the clergy, in spite of the penance afterwards imposed on him, had
never forgiven him the pillage of the churches which had followed the
capture of the metropolis at the time of the fall of Botaniates. While
the Norman war was in progress, Anna Dalassena, who acted as regent
during the absence of Alexius with the army, had, in order to replenish
the imperial treasury, confiscated the wealth of the churches. This
measure caused universal discontent, which was utilised by the enemies of
the dynasty for their own purposes. In order to pacify public opinion,
Alexius was obliged to pledge himself to make reparation, and assured to
the churches a certain sum of money, to be a yearly charge upon the
revenue. In 1086, at the time of the struggle with the Patzinaks, Alexius
attempted to have recourse to a similar measure to relieve the pressure on
the imperial exchequer. But a considerable body of the clergy, strong in
the support of public opinion, with Leo the Metropolitan of Chalcedon
at their head, prevented the Emperor from carrying out his project.
Alexius never forgave the leader of the resistance, and soon afterwards
contrived to have him deposed. However, the affair did not end there,
and in 1089, at a time when the exterior enemies of the Empire were
becoming bolder than ever, the Emperor was obliged in some sort to
make the amende honorable for the way in which he had dealt with
Church property. He promulgated a Novel forbidding his successors
to dip their hands into the Church treasuries. It is probable that the
Emperor's action was dictated not only by genuine scruples but also by
the necessity of satisfying public opinion, which looked upon the Byzan-
tine defeats as a chastisement from Heaven for the sacrilegious acts which
had been committed.
Persons with their own interests to serve attempted to profit by the
unpopularity of Alexius to overthrow him, and the Emperor had a whole
series of plots to circumvent. Among the conspirators we find generals
like the Armenian Ariebes and the Norman leader Humbertopulus
(c. 1090), besides members of the imperial family such as the Emperor's
nephew John Connenus, son of the Sebastocrator Isaac and governor
of Durazzo, who engaged in an intrigue with the Serbs (c. 1092). But
soon a much more serious conspiracy came to light. Alexius, after the
birth of his son in 1088, had gradually deprived the young Constantine
Ducas of his prerogatives, and had finally forbidden him to wear the
purple buskins which were an essential part of the imperial costume. For
some time Alexius remained sole Emperor, and it was only in 1092, after
his victories over the Patzinaks, that he felt strong enough to associate
his son John with him in the imperial dignity, and to have him recog-
nised as heir to the throne. These measures greatly irritated the Ducas


## p. 333 (#375) ############################################

The First Crusade
333
family and their supporters. The discontented drew together round the
Empress Maria, mother of Constantine, and a plot was formed with the
object of assassinating the Emperor. The conspirators occupied the
highest posts about the Court. Their leaders were Nicephorus, a son of
the Emperor Romanus Diogenes, Catacalon Cecaumenus, and Michael
Taronites, brother-in-law of Alexius. The Emperor escaped on several
occasions when attempts were made upon his life, and in February 1094,
during his expedition against the Serbs, he decided to have Nicephorus
Diogenes, Catacalon, and Taronites arrested at his camp at Seres. As
to the other culprits, he chose to ignore them, whether because he was
unwilling to compromise the Empress Maria, or because they were too
highly placed for him to touch them without endangering himself.
It was just when the victories won by Alexius over domestic as well
as foreign enemies seemed to promise a breathing-space to the Empire,
that the First Crusade came to plunge it into fresh uncertainties, by the
complete change which it brought about in the position of the states of
the East.
For long years historians have indulged in cheap denunciations of the
ingratitude and perfidy of Alexius Connenus, who, after having (par-
ticularly by a letter addressed to Robert, Count of Flanders) solicited
help from the Western nations against the Turks, ceased not, throughout
the Crusade, to throw all kinds of obstacles in their way, so that his false
and treacherous conduct was the cause of all the evils which fell upon
the first crusaders. A closer examination of the sources allows us, par-
tially at least, to acquit the Emperor of the charges brought against
him, and to assert that Urban II in preaching the Crusade by no means
did so in response to a desire expressed by Alexius Comnenus. The Pope's
action, in fact, had not been suggested to him by anyone, and had been
inspired solely by a wish to secure the safety of Christianity in the East.
It is no doubt true that during the early part of his reign Alexius
had sought for allies in the West. At the time of the Norman invasion
he had entered into diplomatic relations with Gregory VII; later, in
1089, in connexion with the measures taken against the Latin inhabitants
of Constantinople, Pope Urban II had had some correspondence with
the Emperor. The relations between Rome and Constantinople had
been becoming less strained, as is proved by the “Discourse upon the
Errors of the Latins” by Theophylact, Archbishop of Bulgaria, which
was composed about this time. Embassies had been exchanged, the re-
union of the Churches had been discussed, the Pope had relieved the
Emperor from the sentence of excommunication, so that in 1090 or 1091,
during the struggle with the Patzinaks, Alexius begged Urban II to help
him to raise mercenaries in Italy. About the same time he addressed a
similar request to Robert, Count of Flanders, praying him to despatch to
Constantinople the corps of cavalry which Robert had promised to send
him when, on his way back from the Holy Land in 1087, he had had a
сн. XI.


## p. 334 (#376) ############################################

334
Relations between Latins and Greeks
meeting with Alexius at Eski-Sagra? . It was in these requests that the
legend originated according to which the Crusade was preached in
response to the demands for help made to the Western princes by Alexius
Comnenus. The letter supposed to have been addressed with this object
to the Count of Flanders is admittedly to a great extent apocryphal. It
was very possibly composed with the help of the letter written by Alexius
to Robert about 1089, at a time when no Crusade was in contemplation.
The legend circulated rapidly. The fact is that when the Western
peoples came to know the difficulties of every kind which the crusaders
had had to overcome, when they saw how few returned of those who had
gone forth in such numbers, when they learned how large a proportion
had left their bones strewn along the road to Palestine, they refused to be-
lieve that incapacity and rivalry on the part of the leaders and total lack
of generalship had been the cause of all the evils encountered by the
army, and preferred to cast the whole responsibility on the head of the
Greek Emperor. The relations between the Latins and the Greeks, having
been on the whole unfriendly, contributed to the growth of a tradition
damaging to the Emperor. This notion of Byzantine perfidy fitted in
quite easily with all that was known of what had passed between the
Emperor and the Westerns, and of the support lent him by the Pope
and the Count of Flanders in previous years. From thence to the idea of
ingratitude there was but a step, and it was soon taken.
From the very beginning violent disputes took place between the
Latins and the Greeks, and it may fairly be said that neither side was
blameless. The undisciplined masses of crusaders, above all those who
accompanied Peter the Hermit, behaved on their journey through the
imperial territory like mere brigands, plundering, burning, and sacking
wherever they went. Thus the Greeks looked upon them much as they
did upon the Patzinaks or the Cumans who, a few years before, had
devastated the European provinces. The object of the expedition and its
character as a religious undertaking were completely overlooked by the
Byzantines, who only saw its political side. To them it seemed an attempt
at conquest much like that of Guiscard. The crusaders themselves went
out of their way to justify this estimate. “There were two parties among
the crusaders, that of the religiously-minded, and that of the politicians. ”
This statement of Kugler's” is absolutely true. There is no denying that
religious feeling played a large part in the First Crusade, but it was to be
found chiefly among the rank and file, among humbler knights, among
the less important leaders. If the principal barons were concerned for
the interests of religion at the outset, such feelings had disappeared as
1 According to H. Pirenne, A propos de la lettre d'Alexis Comnène à Robert le
Frison, comte de Flandre, in the Revue de l'instruction publique en Belgique, Vol. L.
(Brussels, 1907, p. 224), this interview did not take place before 1089.
Kugler, Kaiser Alexius und Albert von Aachen, Forsch. z. deutsch. Geschicht.
XXII. p. 486.
2


## p. 335 (#377) ############################################

Alexius Comnenus and the crusaders
335
soon as the various bands of crusaders were united. Then Bohemond
as well as Baldwin, the Count of Toulouse and Godfrey of Bouillon alike,
forgot the religious side of their enterprise to dwell solely on their private
interests. One idea alone remained in their minds, that of carving out
principalities for themselves. One need only recall Baldwin's settlement
at Edessa and Tancred's at Tarsus, the rivalries of Bohemond and
Raymond of Toulouse at Antioch, and finally Godfrey's refusal to con-
tinue the march upon Jerusalem, "conduct very little deserving of the
laurels that have been wreathed for him. ”
Face to face with the powerful forces which from every side streamed
in upon the territories of the Empire, Alexius found the part he had to
play all the more difficult, inasmuch as at that moment the Greek troops
were dispersed along the frontiers and could not be recalled without
danger. Constantinople was absolutely ungarrisoned. Moreover, the
whole Byzantine army would have been quite unable to make head
against the innumerable multitude of crusaders. Thus incapable of re-
pelling the Latins by force, Alexius sought to turn them to account as
mercenaries for the recovery of the Asiatic provinces which the Empire
had lost. He made no difference between the Latin princes and those
barons who had come on various occasions to serve with their troops in
his army. It was natural that this should be his opinion of them, when
he found Bohemond, one of the chief leaders of the Crusade, asking for
the office of Grand Domestic of the Scholae.
Alexius shared with his subjects the belief that anything might be
obtained of the Latins by plying them with money, their obedience
being merely a matter of barter and sale. He had greatly at heart the
recovery of the former provinces of the Empire in Asia, and the restora-
tion of Byzantine authority as far as Antioch. Chance had supplied him
with an army the like of which the Empire had never seen; the only
question was, by what means he could attach it to his service. To induce
the Latins to acknowledge him as their lord, and to make use of them as
mercenaries, such was the Emperor's plan. In order to bind the Latins
more closely to him, the Emperor adopted their customs and caused
them to take the oath of fealty to him. It is fair to state, besides, that
Alexius believed that by the considerable sums which he disbursed for
the crusaders he had acquired certain rights over them, and the be-
haviour of the leaders encouraged him in this belief. The haughtiest
of the chiefs gave an eager welcome to Byzantine gold, which soon over-
came their early reluctance to comply with the Emperor's wishes. Their
submission was rendered the easier by the conviction which very soon
took possession of them, that their undertaking could not possibly
succeed unless by the help of the Emperor.
In order to carry out his designs, Alexius employed all his skill as a
politician; to attain his ends he took advantage of all the faults and
weaknesses of the Latins; and to bring them over to his views he spared
сн. XI.
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## p. 336 (#378) ############################################

336
The first crusaders at Constantinople
neither money nor promises. But once the treaty was concluded, by
which he promised his support and a supply of provisions, on condition
that the leaders of the Crusade did homage and swore fealty to him
and engaged to restore to the Empire any towns which had formerly
belonged to it, Alexius observed his engagements. The Latins made
it a special reproach against him that he did not follow up the Crusade
with an army as he had pledged himself to do. This complaint is not
justified ; Alexius did march upon Antioch, and if he stopped short
it was because he had been dissuaded from continuing his advance by
those crusaders who, thinking all lost at the time of the attack on the
town by the Turks, had shamefully taken to flight and informed the
Emperor that the Christian army had been wiped out. On looking into
the question more closely, we find that all the difficulties arose from
Bohemond's refusal to restore Antioch to the Emperor as he had
promised. Bohemond was the only crusader with whom Alexius broke
off friendly relations; we can see that he remained on the best of terms
with others of the leaders, notably with Raymond of Toulouse. But
the purely political dispute which Alexius carried on with the Prince
of Antioch resulted in the Emperor appearing to Western eyes as the
enemy of the crusaders in general, for it was thus that Bohemond,
on his visit to France in 1106, represented him to the knights who
thronged to take service under him. By making out the Greek Emperor
to be the enemy of all Latins, instead of what he really was, his own
private enemy, Bohemond, more than anyone else, helped to create a
tradition adverse to Alexius.
The first of the crusaders to reach Greek territory were the com-
panions of Peter the Hermit.