Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity;
the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not
be done by another, that there is no such thing as
equivalence (except in those very select circles
where one actually has one's equal, inter pares),
that in a really profound sense a man never re-
quites because he is something unique in himself
and can only do unique things,—this fundamental
conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof-
·ness from the mob, because the latter believes in
equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equiva-
lence and “reciprocity.
the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not
be done by another, that there is no such thing as
equivalence (except in those very select circles
where one actually has one's equal, inter pares),
that in a really profound sense a man never re-
quites because he is something unique in himself
and can only do unique things,—this fundamental
conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof-
·ness from the mob, because the latter believes in
equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equiva-
lence and “reciprocity.
Nietzsche - v15 - Will to Power - b
He who has
understood the nature of man and the origin of
mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man
and takes flight from all action: this is the result
of inherited valuations ! !
My consolation is, that the nature of man is evil,
and this guarantees his strength!
909.
The typical forms of self-development, or the
eight principal questions :
I. Do we want to be more multifarious or more
simple than we are?
2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or
more indifferent to both happiness and un-
happiness?
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THE ORDER OF RANK.
333
3. Do we want to be more satisfied with our-
selves,or moreexactingand moreinexorable?
4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and
more human than we are, or more in-
human ?
5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are,
or more daring?
6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want
to avoid all goals (like the philosopher, for
instance, who scents a boundary, a cul-de-
sac, a prison, a piece of foolishness in every
goal)?
7. Do we want to become more respected, or
more feared, or more despised?
8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers,
or do we want to become shepherds and
gregarious animals ?
910.
The type of my disciples. —To such men as con-
cern me in any way I wish suffering, desolation,
sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I
wish them to be acquainted with profound self-
contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with
the misery of the defeated : I have no pity for
them; because I wish them to have the only thing
which to-day proves whether a man has any value
or not, namely, the capacity of sticking to his guns.
9II.
The happiness and self-contentedness of the
lazzaroni, or the blessedness of “beautiful souls,"
## p. 334 (#364) ############################################
334
THE WILL TO POWER.
or the consumptive love of Puritan pietists,
proves nothing in regard to the order of rank
among men. As a great educator one ought in-
exorably to thrash a race of such blissful creatures
into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and
of a slackening of powers follows immediately-
I am opposed to happiness à la Spinoza or à la
Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of contemplative
states. But when virtue is the means to such
happiness, well then, one must master even virtue.
912.
I cannot see how any one can make up for
having missed going to a good school at the proper
time. Such a person does not know himself; he
walks through life without ever having learned to
walk. His soft muscles betray themselves at every
step. Occasionally life itself is merciful enough to
make a man recover this lost and severe schooling:
by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which
exact the utmost will-power and self-controi; or
by means of a sudden state of poverty, which
threatens his wife and child, and which may force
a man to such activity as will restore energy to his
slackened tendons, and a tough spirit to his will to
life. The most desirable thing of all, however, is,
under all circumstances to have severe discipline at
the right time, i. e. at that age when it makes us
proud that people should expect great things from
us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling,
as good schooling, from every other schooling,
namely, that a good deal is demanded, that a good
## p. 335 (#365) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
335
deal is severely exacted; that goodness, nay even
excellence itself, is required as if it were normal;
that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent;
that blame is sharp, practical, and without reprieve,
and has no regard to talent and antecedents. We
are in every way in need of such a school : and
ị this holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual
things; it would be fatal to draw distinctions here!
The same discipline makes the soldier and the
scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there
is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a
true soldier in his veins. To be able to command
and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep
one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready
at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to
comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and
what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be
more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism
than to wickedness. What is it that one learns in
a hard school to obey and to command.
913.
We should repudiate merit—and do only that
which stands above all praise and above all under-
standing.
914.
one
The new forms of morality :
Faithful vows concerning that which
wishes to do or to leave undone; complete and
definite abstention from many things. . Test
Tests as
to whether one is ripe for such discipline.
## p. 336 (#366) ############################################
336
THE WILL TO POWER.
915.
It is my desire to naturalise asceticism: I would
substitute the old intention of asceticism, “self-
denial,” by my own intention,“ self-strengthening":
a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence
and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things
intellectual; a casuistry in deeds, in regard to the
opinions which we derive from our powers; we
should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate
dangers. (Dîners chez Magny: all intellectual
gourmets with spoilt stomachs. ) Tests ought also
to be devised for discovering a man's power in
keeping his word.
916.
The things which have become spoilt through
having been abused by the Church :
(1) Asceticism. —People have scarcely got the
courage yet to bring to light the natural utility
and necessity of asceticism for the purpose of the
education of the will. Our ridiculous world of
education, before whose eyes the useful State
official hovers as an ideal to be striven for, believes
that it has completed its duty when it has in-
structed or trained the brain; it never
suspects that something else is first of all necessary
--the education of will-power; tests are devised for
everything except for the most important thing
of all: whether a man can will, whether he can
promise; the young man completes his education
without a question or an inquiry having been
even
## p. 337 (#367) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
337
made concerning the problem of the highest value
of his nature.
(2) Fasting:-In every sense- even as a means
of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in
all good things (for instance, to give up reading
for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease
from being amiable for a while: one ought also
to have fast days for one's virtues).
(3) The monastery. —Temporary isolation with
severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a
kind of profound introspection and self-recovery,
which does not go out of the way of “temptations,"
but out of the way of “duties”; a stepping out
of the daily round of one's environment; a detach-
ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external
influences, which condemns us to expend our
power only in reactions, and does not allow it to
gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous
activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely :
they only think reflexively, i. e. they must first
read before they can think).
(4) Feasts. —A man must be very coarse in order
not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian
values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all
festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under-
stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of
all kinds of seriousness and Philistinism ; a divine
saying of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical
plenitude and perfection--all states to which the
Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a
pagan thing par excellence,
(5) The courage of one's own nature : dressing-
up in morality. -To be able to call one's passions
Y
-
VOL. II.
## p. 338 (#368) ############################################
338
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
good without the help of a moral formula: this is
the standard which measures the extent to which
a man is able to say Yea to his own nature,
namely, how much or how little he has to have
recourse to morality.
(6) Death. —The foolish physiological fact must
be converted into a moral necessity. One should
live in such a way that one may have the will to
die at the right time !
917.
To feel one's self stronger-or, expressed other-
wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison
(not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in
the midst of a state of growth, and without being
conscious that one is comparing).
Artificial accentuation : whether by means of
exciting chemicals or exciting errors (“halluci-
nations. ")
Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of
security; he feels himself strong in his confidence,
in his patience, and his resignation : this artificial
accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro-
tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority,
for instance : as when the Caliph of Morocco sees
only globes on which his three united kingdoms
cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling
of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European
imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone,
and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged
cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes
all existence revolve round the “ Salvation of man. "
The question is, where does one begin to feel the
## p. 339 (#369) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
339
pressure of constraint: it is thus that different
degrees are ascertained. A philosopher, for instance,
in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane
feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its
element: while colours and tones oppress him;
not to speak of those dumb desires-of that which
others call “ the ideal. ”
918.
>
A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up
sarcastically if he be asked: “Wilt thou become
virtuous ? ”—but he immediately becomes eager if
he be asked: “Wilt thou become stronger than
thy comrades ? "
*
How does one become stronger ? —By deciding
slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision
once it is made. Everything else follows of itself.
Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species
of the weak. We must not confound ourselves
with them; we must feel distance betimes !
Beware of good-natured people! Dealings with
them make one torpid. All environment is good
which makes one exercise those defensive and
aggressive powers which are instinctive in man.
All one's inventiveness should apply itself to
putting one's power of will to the test. . . . Here
the determining factor must be recognised as
something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or
wit.
One must learn to command betimes,-likewise
to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in
## p. 340 (#370) ############################################
340
THE WILL TO POWER.
modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to
honour where modesty is displayed; he must like-
wise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows
bis confidence.
What does one repent most? One's modesty;
the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most
individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken
one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self
low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of
hearing in regard to one's instincts. —This want of
reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all
sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being,
pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, cour-
age. A man never forgives himself, later on, for
this want of genuine egoism : he regards it as an
objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his
real ego. .
919.
I should like man to begin by respecting himself:
everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man
ceases from being anything to others in this way:
for this is precisely what they are least likely to
forgive. “What? a man who respects himself ? " *
This is something quite different from the blind
instinct to love one's self. Nothing is more common
in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is
* Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: “Self-respect, too, is a super.
stition of past ages. •
It is not suited to these times ; it is
much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No
one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays”
(book iii. chap. v. ). -TR.
"
## p. 341 (#371) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
341
called ego, than a certain contempt for that which
is loved : the fatalism of love,
920.
(
"I will have this or that"; " I would that this
or that were so ”; “I know that this or that is
so "—the degrees of power: the man of will, the
man of desire, the man of fate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains
itself :
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions,
as a test of the power of self-control and
of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is
not allowed to be anything else than a
barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every
kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it
is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedi-
ence provides a test of self-maintenance.
Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in
regard to points of honour.
It never argues,
“What is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander,”—but conversely !
it regards reward, and the ability to repay,
as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet other people's virtues.
## p. 342 (#372) ############################################
342
THE WILL TO POWER
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages
and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous
methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when one
is transplanted, with all one's European pampering,
to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else
where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery
over barbarians.
923.
Warlike and peaceful people. —Art thou a man
who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood ?
If this be so, another question must be put. Do
thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend ?
The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are
not warlike, desire peace, concord, "freedom,"
“equal rights”: these things are but names and
steps for one and the same thing. Such men only
wish to go where it is not necessary for them to
defend themselves, such men become discon-
tented with themselves when they are obliged to
offer resistance: they would fain create circum-
stances in which war is no longer necessary.
If
the worst came to the worst, they would resign
themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are
better than waging war-thus does the Christian's
instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born
warrior's character there is something of armour,
likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in
the development of every one of his qualities :
weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields
are best devised by the former.
## p. 343 (#373) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
343
What expedients and what virtues do the un-
armed and the undefended require in order to
survive and even to conquer ?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has
any reasons for either defence or attack ? What
will remain of his passions when he has lost those
which form his defence and his weapons ?
925.
A marginal note to a niaiserie anglaise: “Do
not to others that which you would not that they
should do unto you. ” This stands for wisdom;
this stands for prudence; this stands as the very
basis of morality-as “a golden maxim. " John
Stuart Mill believes in it and what Englishman
does not ? ). . . . But the maxim does not bear
investigation. The argument, “Do not as you
would not be done by," forbids action which pro-
duce harmful results; the thought behind always
is that an action is invariably requited. What if
some one came forward with the “ Principe" in his
hands, and said: “We must do those actions alone
which enable us to steal a march on others,
and which deprive others of the power of doing
the same to us”? -On the other hand, let us re-
member the Corsican who pledges his honour to
vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet
through him; but the prospect of one, the proba-
bility of getting one, does not deter him from
i
## p. 344 (#374) ############################################
344
THE WILL TO POWER,
vindicating his honour. . . . And in all really de-
cent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as
to what result they will bring ? To avoid an action
which might have harmful results,—that would be
tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in
general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable
because it betrays a certain type of man: it is the
instinct of the herd which formulates itself through
him, -we are equal, we regard each other as equal :
as I am to thee so art thou to me. - In this com-
munity equivalence of actions is really believed in
an equivalence which never under any circum-
stances manifests itself in real conditions. It is
impossible to requite every action : among real
individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently
there can be no such thing as "requital. "
When I do anything, I am very far from thinking
that any man is able to do anything at all like
it: the action belongs to me. . . . Nobody can
pay me back for anything I do; the most that can
be done is to make me the victim of another
action.
.
926.
Against John Stuart Mill. -I abhor the man's
vulgarity when he says: "What is right for one
man is right for another"; "Do not to others that
which you would not that they should do unto
you. ” Such principles would fain establish the
whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so
that every action would appear to be a cash pay-
ment for something done to us. The hypothesis
## p. 345 (#375) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
345
66
>
here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for
granted that there is some sort of equivalence in
value between my actions and thine ; the most per-
sonal value of an action is simply cancelled in this
manner (that part of an action which has no
equivalent and which cannot be remunerated).
Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity;
the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not
be done by another, that there is no such thing as
equivalence (except in those very select circles
where one actually has one's equal, inter pares),
that in a really profound sense a man never re-
quites because he is something unique in himself
and can only do unique things,—this fundamental
conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof-
·ness from the mob, because the latter believes in
equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equiva-
lence and “reciprocity. ”
>
927.
9
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations
and of its concepts “ useful” and “harmful” is well
founded; it is the necessary point of view of a
community which is only able to see and survey
immediate and proximate consequences.
The State and the political man are already in
need of a more super-moral attitude of mind :
because they have to calculate concerning a much
more complicated tissue of consequences. An eco-
nomic policy for the whole world should be possible
which could look at things in such broad perspec-
tive that all its isolated demands would seem for
the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.
## p. 346 (#376) ############################################
346
THE WILL TO POWER.
928.
Should one follow one's feelings ? ”—To set
one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment,
and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth,
and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is
alike in being capable of this—and in behaving in
this way with determination, the criminal, the
bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the
honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to over-
come this impulse, and to refrain from performing
an heroic deed at its bidding, and to remain cold,
raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of
concomitant sensations of delight. . . . The same
holds good of pity: it must first be sifted through
reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous
as any other passion.
The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be
generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the
greatest evil. Greatness of character does not
consist in not possessing these passions-on the
contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible
degree: but he should lead them by the bridle . . .
and even this he should not do out of love of con-
trol, but merely because.
.
.
929.
“ To give up one's life for a cause "-very effec-
tive. But there are many things for which one
gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will
be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to
pity, to anger, or to revenge-it matters not from
## p. 347 (#377) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
347
the point of view of value. How many have not
sacrificed their lives for pretty girls—and even
what is worse, their health! When one has
temperament, one instinctively chooses the most
dangerous things : if one is a philosopher, for in-
stance, one chooses the adventures of speculation;
if one is virtuous, one chooses immorality. One
kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will
risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On
the contrary, what we seek is life raised to a
higher power, life in danger. . . . But, let me re-
peat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more
virtuous than others. Pascal, for instance, wished
to risk nothing, and remained a Christian. That
perhaps was virtuous. --A man always sacrifices
something.
930.
How many advantages does not a man sacrifice!
To how small an extent does he seek his own
profit! All his emotions and passions wish to
assert their rights, and how remote a passion is
from that cautious utility which consists in
personal profit !
A man does not strive after “happiness"; one
must be an Englishman to be able to believe that
a man is always seeking his own advantage.
Our desires long to violate things with passion-
their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931.
All passions are generally useful, some directly,
others indirectly; in regard to utility it is abso-
1
## p. 348 (#378) ############################################
348
THE WILL TO POWER.
lutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of
values,-however certainly the forces of nature in
general may be regarded as good (i. e. useful),
from an economic point of view, they are still
the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might
say would be, that the mightiest passions are the
most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources
of power exist.
932.
!
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes
of mind have not come to be honoured on account
of their usefulness: but because they are the
conditions peculiar to rich souls who are able to
bestow and whose value consists in their vital
exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent
man! In them you will see the exact reverse
of self-denial, of hatred of self, of “ Pascalism. "
933
In short, what we require is to dominate the
passions and not to weaken or to extirpate
them ! —The greater the dominating power of the
will, the greater the freedom that may be given to
the passions.
The “great man" is so, owing to the free scope
which he gives to his desires, and to the still
greater power which knows how to enlist these
magnificent monsters into its service.
The "good man " in every stage of civilisation
is at one and the same time the least dangerous
## p. 349 (#379) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK
349
and the most useful: a sort of medium ; the idea
formed of such a man by the common mind is
that he is some one whom one has no reason to fear,
but whom one must not therefore despise.
Education : essentially a means of ruining ex-
ceptions in favour of the rule. Culture : essenti-
ally the means of directing taste against the
exceptions in favour of the mediocre.
Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow
of force, is it capable of being a hothouse for the
luxurious culture of the exception, of the experi-
ment, of the danger, of the nuance: this is the
tendency of every aristocratic culture.
1
934.
All questions of strength: to what extent ought
one to try and prevail against the preservative
measures of society and the latter's prejudices ?
to what extent ought one to unfetter one's terrible
qualities, through which so many go to the dogs —
to what extent ought one to run counter to truth,
and take up sides with its most questionable
aspects ? —to what extent ought one to oppose
suffering, self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when
it is always open to question whether one can
ever master them (what does not kill us makes
us stronger . ) ? -and, finally, to what extent
ought one to acknowledge the rights of the rule,
of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, of
the upright, in fact of the average man, without
thereby allowing one's self to become vulgar? . . .
The strongest test of character is to resist being
)
܀
## p. 350 (#380) ############################################
350
THE WILL TO POWER.
ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. Good-
ness must be regarded as a luxury, as a refine-
ment, as a vice.
3. THE NOBLE MAN.
935.
Type : real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul,
as the result of vital wealth: which does not give
in order to receive—and which has no desire to
elevate itself by being good ;-squandering is
typical of genuine goodness; vital personal wealth
is its prerequisite.
936.
Aristocracy. -Gregarious ideals—at present
culminating in the highest standard of value for
society. It has been attempted to give them a
cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value. --I
defend aristocracy against them.
Any society which would of itself preserve a
feeling of respect and délicatesse in regard to
freedom, must consider itself as an exception, and
have a force against it from which it distinguishes
itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.
The more rights I surrender and the more I
level myself down to others, the more deeply do
I sink into the average and ultimately into the
greatest number, The first condition which an
aristocratic society must have in order to maintain
a high degree of freedom among its members, is
that extreme tension which arises from the pres-
## p. 351 (#381) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
351
ence of the most antagonistic instincts in all its
units : from their will to dominate. . . .
If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts
and differences of rank, ye will also abolish
strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the feeling
of individuality.
*
Concerning the actual psychology of societies
based upon freedom and equality. What is it that
tends to diminish in such a society?
The will to be responsible for one's self (the loss
of this is a sign of the decline of autonomy); the
ability to defend and to attack, even in spiritual
matters; the power of command; the sense of
reverence, of subservience, the ability to be silent;
great passion, great achievements, tragedy and
cheerfulness.
937.
In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Mont-
losier had said in his work, De la Monarchie fran-
çaise: he answered with a cry of indignation, and
set himself to his task. That emigrant had said:
“ Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos
mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous
fut octroyée d'être libres, et non pas à nous d'être
nobles ; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout
est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre com-
munauté ; nous sommes un tout par nous mêmes. "
938.
How constantly the aristocratic world shears
and weakens itself ever more and more! By
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352
THE WILL TO POWER.
means of its noble instincts it abandons its
privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive
culture, it takes an interest in the people, the
weak, the poor, and the poetry of the lowly, etc.
939.
1
There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous
form of carelessness, which allows of profound
conclusions and insight: the carelessness of the
self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never
troubled itself about friends, but which knows only
hospitality and knows how to practise it; whose
heart and house are open to all who will enter-
beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability :
he who is capable of it has hundreds of " friends,"
but probably not one friend.
»
940.
?
-
The teaching undèv ärav applies to men with
overflowing strength,—not to the mediocre. éry-
κράτεια and άσκησις are only steps to higher
things. Above them stands "golden Nature. "
“ Thou shalt"-unconditional obedience in
Stoics, in Christian and Arabian Orders, in Kant's
philosophy (it is immaterial whether this obedience
is shown to a superior or to a concept).
Higher than “Thou shalt" stands “I will ”
(the heroes); higher than “ I will ” stands “I am'
(the gods of the Greeks).
Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure
of restraint,—they are neither simple, nor light-
hearted, nor moderate.
»
1
## p. 353 (#383) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
353
941.
The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to
the same extent the essence of all yearning after
riches) is the desire to rid the eye of disorder ana
vulgarity, and to build a home for our souls nobility.
The majority of people certainly believe that
they will develop higher natures when those
beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon
them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travel-
ling, etc. , and all reading and visits to theatres.
People want to be formed—that is the kernel of
their labours for culture ! But the strong, the
mighty, would themselves have a hand in the form-
ing, and would fain have nothing strange about them!
It is for this reason, too, that men go to open
Nature, not to find themselves, but to lose them-
selves and to forget themselves. The desire “ to get
away from one's self” is proper to all weaklings, and
to all those who are discontented with themselves.
942.
The only nobility is that of birth and blood.
(I do not refer here to the prefix “Lord” and
L'almanac de Gotha: this is a parenthesis for
donkeys. ) Wherever people speak of the “ aristo-
cracy of intellect," reasons are generally not
lacking for concealing something; it is known to
be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect
alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, some-
thing is always needed to ennoble intellect. What
then is needed P-Blood.
z
VOL. II.
## p. 354 (#384) ############################################
354
THE WILL TO POWER.
943.
What is noble ?
-External punctiliousness; because this punc-
tiliousness hedges a man about, keeps him at a
distance, saves him from being confounded with
somebody else.
A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and
bearing, with which stoical hardness and self-
control protect themselves from all prying inquisi-
tiveness or curiosity.
-A slow step and a slow glance. There are
not too many valuable things on earth : and these
come and wish to come of themselves to him who
has value. We are not quick to admire.
-We know how to bear poverty, want, and
even illness.
-We avoid small honours owing to our mis-
trust of all who are over-ready to praise : for the
man who praises believes he understands what he
praises : but to understand-Balzac, that typical
man of ambition, betrayed the fact-comprendre
c'est égaler.
-Our doubt concerning the communicativeness
of our hearts goes very deep; to us, loneliness is
not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon us.
-We are convinced that we only have duties to
our equals, to others we do as we think best: we
know that justice is only to be expected among
equals (alas ! this will not be realised for some
time to come).
-We are ironical towards the “gifted ”; we
hold the belief that no morality is possible with-
out good birth.
## p. 355 (#385) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
355
}
-We always feel as if we were those who had
to dispense honours : while he is not found too
frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.
-We are always disguised: the higher a man's
nature the more is he in need of remaining incog-
nito. If there be a God, then out of sheer decency
He ought only to show Himself on earth in the
form of a man.
-We are capable of otium, of the uncondi-
tional conviction that although a handicraft does
not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces
one's rank. However much we may respect “in-
dustry," and know how to give it its due, we do
not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, or after the
of those insatiable and cackling artists who,
like hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.
-We protect artists and poets and any one
who happens to be a master in something; but as
creatures of a higher order than those, who only
know how to do something, who are only “pro-
ductive men," we do not confound ourselves with
them.
-We find joy in all forms and ceremonies;
we would fain foster everything formal, and we
are convinced that courtesy is one of the greatest
virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of laisser
aller, including the freedom of the press and of
thought; because, under such conditions, the intel-
lect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches
its limbs.
-We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps
daintier, more delicate, and more ethereal kind of
creature. What a treat it is to meet creatures
## p. 356 (#386) ############################################
356
THE WILL TO POWER.
who have only dancing and nonsense and finery
in their minds! They have always been the de-
light of every tense and profound male soul, whose
life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.
-We take pleasure in princes and in priests,
because in big things, as in small, they actually up-
hold the belief in the difference of human values,
even in the estimation of the past, and at least
symbolically.
-We are able to keep silence: but we do not
breathe a word of this in the presence of listeners.
-We are able to endure long enmities : we
lack the power of easy reconciliations.
-We have a loathing of demagogism, of en-
lightenment, of amiability, and plebeian familiarity.
-We collect precious things, the needs of
higher and fastidious souls; we wish to possess
nothing in common. We want to have our own
books, our own landscapes.
-We protest against evil and fine experiences,
and take care not to generalise too quickly. The
individual case: how ironically we regard it when
it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule !
-We love that which is naif, and naïf people,
but as spectators and higher creatures; we think
Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.
-We have a low estimation of good people,
because they are gregarious animals: we know
how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness
lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most
malicious, and the hardest exterior, and that this -
single grain outweighs all the mere goody-goodi-
ness of milk-and-watery souls.
## p. 357 (#387) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
357
>
-We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted
by his vices, nor by his tomfooleries. We are well
aware that we are not recognised with ease, and
that we have every reason to make our foreground
very prominent.
944.
What is noble ? — The fact that one is constantly
forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly
searching for situations in which one is forced
to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the
greatest number: the happiness which consists of
inner peacefulness, of virtue, of comfort, and of
Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness,à la Spencer.
That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsi-
bilities. That one knows how to create enemies
everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one
contradicts the greatest number, not in words at
all, but by continually behaving differently from
them.
945.
Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is our most
noble and most dangerous luxury. We must not
decline the disadvantages which it brings in its
train.
946.
We refuse to be praised: we do what serves our
purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we are
obliged to do.
947.
What is chastity in a man? It means that his
taste in sex has remained noble; that in eroticis
## p. 358 (#388) ############################################
358
THE WILL TO POWER
he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor the
clever,
948.
1
The concept of honour is founded upon the
belief in select society, in knightly excellences, in
the obligation of having continually to play a part.
In essentials it means that one does not take one's
life too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally
to the most dignified manners in one's dealings
with everybody (at least in so far as they do not
belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor
good-natured, nor hearty, nor modest, except inter
pares; that one is always playing a part.
949.
The fact that one sets one's life, one's health,
and one's honour at stake, is the result of high
spirits and of an overflowing and spendthrift will :
it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact
that every danger kindles our curiosity concern-
ing the measure of our strength, and provokes our
courage.
understood the nature of man and the origin of
mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man
and takes flight from all action: this is the result
of inherited valuations ! !
My consolation is, that the nature of man is evil,
and this guarantees his strength!
909.
The typical forms of self-development, or the
eight principal questions :
I. Do we want to be more multifarious or more
simple than we are?
2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or
more indifferent to both happiness and un-
happiness?
## p. 333 (#363) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
333
3. Do we want to be more satisfied with our-
selves,or moreexactingand moreinexorable?
4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and
more human than we are, or more in-
human ?
5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are,
or more daring?
6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want
to avoid all goals (like the philosopher, for
instance, who scents a boundary, a cul-de-
sac, a prison, a piece of foolishness in every
goal)?
7. Do we want to become more respected, or
more feared, or more despised?
8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers,
or do we want to become shepherds and
gregarious animals ?
910.
The type of my disciples. —To such men as con-
cern me in any way I wish suffering, desolation,
sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I
wish them to be acquainted with profound self-
contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with
the misery of the defeated : I have no pity for
them; because I wish them to have the only thing
which to-day proves whether a man has any value
or not, namely, the capacity of sticking to his guns.
9II.
The happiness and self-contentedness of the
lazzaroni, or the blessedness of “beautiful souls,"
## p. 334 (#364) ############################################
334
THE WILL TO POWER.
or the consumptive love of Puritan pietists,
proves nothing in regard to the order of rank
among men. As a great educator one ought in-
exorably to thrash a race of such blissful creatures
into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and
of a slackening of powers follows immediately-
I am opposed to happiness à la Spinoza or à la
Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of contemplative
states. But when virtue is the means to such
happiness, well then, one must master even virtue.
912.
I cannot see how any one can make up for
having missed going to a good school at the proper
time. Such a person does not know himself; he
walks through life without ever having learned to
walk. His soft muscles betray themselves at every
step. Occasionally life itself is merciful enough to
make a man recover this lost and severe schooling:
by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which
exact the utmost will-power and self-controi; or
by means of a sudden state of poverty, which
threatens his wife and child, and which may force
a man to such activity as will restore energy to his
slackened tendons, and a tough spirit to his will to
life. The most desirable thing of all, however, is,
under all circumstances to have severe discipline at
the right time, i. e. at that age when it makes us
proud that people should expect great things from
us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling,
as good schooling, from every other schooling,
namely, that a good deal is demanded, that a good
## p. 335 (#365) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
335
deal is severely exacted; that goodness, nay even
excellence itself, is required as if it were normal;
that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent;
that blame is sharp, practical, and without reprieve,
and has no regard to talent and antecedents. We
are in every way in need of such a school : and
ị this holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual
things; it would be fatal to draw distinctions here!
The same discipline makes the soldier and the
scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there
is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a
true soldier in his veins. To be able to command
and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep
one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready
at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to
comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and
what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be
more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism
than to wickedness. What is it that one learns in
a hard school to obey and to command.
913.
We should repudiate merit—and do only that
which stands above all praise and above all under-
standing.
914.
one
The new forms of morality :
Faithful vows concerning that which
wishes to do or to leave undone; complete and
definite abstention from many things. . Test
Tests as
to whether one is ripe for such discipline.
## p. 336 (#366) ############################################
336
THE WILL TO POWER.
915.
It is my desire to naturalise asceticism: I would
substitute the old intention of asceticism, “self-
denial,” by my own intention,“ self-strengthening":
a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence
and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things
intellectual; a casuistry in deeds, in regard to the
opinions which we derive from our powers; we
should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate
dangers. (Dîners chez Magny: all intellectual
gourmets with spoilt stomachs. ) Tests ought also
to be devised for discovering a man's power in
keeping his word.
916.
The things which have become spoilt through
having been abused by the Church :
(1) Asceticism. —People have scarcely got the
courage yet to bring to light the natural utility
and necessity of asceticism for the purpose of the
education of the will. Our ridiculous world of
education, before whose eyes the useful State
official hovers as an ideal to be striven for, believes
that it has completed its duty when it has in-
structed or trained the brain; it never
suspects that something else is first of all necessary
--the education of will-power; tests are devised for
everything except for the most important thing
of all: whether a man can will, whether he can
promise; the young man completes his education
without a question or an inquiry having been
even
## p. 337 (#367) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
337
made concerning the problem of the highest value
of his nature.
(2) Fasting:-In every sense- even as a means
of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in
all good things (for instance, to give up reading
for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease
from being amiable for a while: one ought also
to have fast days for one's virtues).
(3) The monastery. —Temporary isolation with
severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a
kind of profound introspection and self-recovery,
which does not go out of the way of “temptations,"
but out of the way of “duties”; a stepping out
of the daily round of one's environment; a detach-
ment from the tyranny of stimuli and external
influences, which condemns us to expend our
power only in reactions, and does not allow it to
gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous
activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely :
they only think reflexively, i. e. they must first
read before they can think).
(4) Feasts. —A man must be very coarse in order
not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian
values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all
festive moods to the devil. By feasts we under-
stand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of
all kinds of seriousness and Philistinism ; a divine
saying of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical
plenitude and perfection--all states to which the
Christian cannot honestly say Yea. A feast is a
pagan thing par excellence,
(5) The courage of one's own nature : dressing-
up in morality. -To be able to call one's passions
Y
-
VOL. II.
## p. 338 (#368) ############################################
338
THE WILL TO POWER.
1
good without the help of a moral formula: this is
the standard which measures the extent to which
a man is able to say Yea to his own nature,
namely, how much or how little he has to have
recourse to morality.
(6) Death. —The foolish physiological fact must
be converted into a moral necessity. One should
live in such a way that one may have the will to
die at the right time !
917.
To feel one's self stronger-or, expressed other-
wise: happiness always presupposes a comparison
(not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in
the midst of a state of growth, and without being
conscious that one is comparing).
Artificial accentuation : whether by means of
exciting chemicals or exciting errors (“halluci-
nations. ")
Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of
security; he feels himself strong in his confidence,
in his patience, and his resignation : this artificial
accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is pro-
tected by a God. Take the feeling of superiority,
for instance : as when the Caliph of Morocco sees
only globes on which his three united kingdoms
cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling
of uniqueness, for instance: as when the European
imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone,
and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged
cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes
all existence revolve round the “ Salvation of man. "
The question is, where does one begin to feel the
## p. 339 (#369) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
339
pressure of constraint: it is thus that different
degrees are ascertained. A philosopher, for instance,
in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane
feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its
element: while colours and tones oppress him;
not to speak of those dumb desires-of that which
others call “ the ideal. ”
918.
>
A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up
sarcastically if he be asked: “Wilt thou become
virtuous ? ”—but he immediately becomes eager if
he be asked: “Wilt thou become stronger than
thy comrades ? "
*
How does one become stronger ? —By deciding
slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision
once it is made. Everything else follows of itself.
Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species
of the weak. We must not confound ourselves
with them; we must feel distance betimes !
Beware of good-natured people! Dealings with
them make one torpid. All environment is good
which makes one exercise those defensive and
aggressive powers which are instinctive in man.
All one's inventiveness should apply itself to
putting one's power of will to the test. . . . Here
the determining factor must be recognised as
something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or
wit.
One must learn to command betimes,-likewise
to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in
## p. 340 (#370) ############################################
340
THE WILL TO POWER.
modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to
honour where modesty is displayed; he must like-
wise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows
bis confidence.
What does one repent most? One's modesty;
the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most
individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken
one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self
low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of
hearing in regard to one's instincts. —This want of
reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all
sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being,
pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, cour-
age. A man never forgives himself, later on, for
this want of genuine egoism : he regards it as an
objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his
real ego. .
919.
I should like man to begin by respecting himself:
everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man
ceases from being anything to others in this way:
for this is precisely what they are least likely to
forgive. “What? a man who respects himself ? " *
This is something quite different from the blind
instinct to love one's self. Nothing is more common
in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is
* Cf. Disraeli in Tancred: “Self-respect, too, is a super.
stition of past ages. •
It is not suited to these times ; it is
much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No
one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays”
(book iii. chap. v. ). -TR.
"
## p. 341 (#371) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
341
called ego, than a certain contempt for that which
is loved : the fatalism of love,
920.
(
"I will have this or that"; " I would that this
or that were so ”; “I know that this or that is
so "—the degrees of power: the man of will, the
man of desire, the man of fate.
921.
The means by which a strong species maintains
itself :
It grants itself the right of exceptional actions,
as a test of the power of self-control and
of freedom.
It abandons itself to states in which a man is
not allowed to be anything else than a
barbarian.
It tries to acquire strength of will by every
kind of asceticism.
It is not expansive; it practises silence; it
is cautious in regard to all charms.
It learns to obey in such a way that obedi-
ence provides a test of self-maintenance.
Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in
regard to points of honour.
It never argues,
“What is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander,”—but conversely !
it regards reward, and the ability to repay,
as a privilege, as a distinction.
It does not covet other people's virtues.
## p. 342 (#372) ############################################
342
THE WILL TO POWER
922.
The way in which one has to treat raw savages
and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous
methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when one
is transplanted, with all one's European pampering,
to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else
where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery
over barbarians.
923.
Warlike and peaceful people. —Art thou a man
who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood ?
If this be so, another question must be put. Do
thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend ?
The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are
not warlike, desire peace, concord, "freedom,"
“equal rights”: these things are but names and
steps for one and the same thing. Such men only
wish to go where it is not necessary for them to
defend themselves, such men become discon-
tented with themselves when they are obliged to
offer resistance: they would fain create circum-
stances in which war is no longer necessary.
If
the worst came to the worst, they would resign
themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are
better than waging war-thus does the Christian's
instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born
warrior's character there is something of armour,
likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in
the development of every one of his qualities :
weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields
are best devised by the former.
## p. 343 (#373) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
343
What expedients and what virtues do the un-
armed and the undefended require in order to
survive and even to conquer ?
924.
What will become of a man who no longer has
any reasons for either defence or attack ? What
will remain of his passions when he has lost those
which form his defence and his weapons ?
925.
A marginal note to a niaiserie anglaise: “Do
not to others that which you would not that they
should do unto you. ” This stands for wisdom;
this stands for prudence; this stands as the very
basis of morality-as “a golden maxim. " John
Stuart Mill believes in it and what Englishman
does not ? ). . . . But the maxim does not bear
investigation. The argument, “Do not as you
would not be done by," forbids action which pro-
duce harmful results; the thought behind always
is that an action is invariably requited. What if
some one came forward with the “ Principe" in his
hands, and said: “We must do those actions alone
which enable us to steal a march on others,
and which deprive others of the power of doing
the same to us”? -On the other hand, let us re-
member the Corsican who pledges his honour to
vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet
through him; but the prospect of one, the proba-
bility of getting one, does not deter him from
i
## p. 344 (#374) ############################################
344
THE WILL TO POWER,
vindicating his honour. . . . And in all really de-
cent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as
to what result they will bring ? To avoid an action
which might have harmful results,—that would be
tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in
general.
Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable
because it betrays a certain type of man: it is the
instinct of the herd which formulates itself through
him, -we are equal, we regard each other as equal :
as I am to thee so art thou to me. - In this com-
munity equivalence of actions is really believed in
an equivalence which never under any circum-
stances manifests itself in real conditions. It is
impossible to requite every action : among real
individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently
there can be no such thing as "requital. "
When I do anything, I am very far from thinking
that any man is able to do anything at all like
it: the action belongs to me. . . . Nobody can
pay me back for anything I do; the most that can
be done is to make me the victim of another
action.
.
926.
Against John Stuart Mill. -I abhor the man's
vulgarity when he says: "What is right for one
man is right for another"; "Do not to others that
which you would not that they should do unto
you. ” Such principles would fain establish the
whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so
that every action would appear to be a cash pay-
ment for something done to us. The hypothesis
## p. 345 (#375) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
345
66
>
here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for
granted that there is some sort of equivalence in
value between my actions and thine ; the most per-
sonal value of an action is simply cancelled in this
manner (that part of an action which has no
equivalent and which cannot be remunerated).
Reciprocity” is a piece of egregious vulgarity;
the mere fact that what I do cannot and may not
be done by another, that there is no such thing as
equivalence (except in those very select circles
where one actually has one's equal, inter pares),
that in a really profound sense a man never re-
quites because he is something unique in himself
and can only do unique things,—this fundamental
conviction contains the cause of aristocratic aloof-
·ness from the mob, because the latter believes in
equality, and consequently in the feasibility of equiva-
lence and “reciprocity. ”
>
927.
9
The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations
and of its concepts “ useful” and “harmful” is well
founded; it is the necessary point of view of a
community which is only able to see and survey
immediate and proximate consequences.
The State and the political man are already in
need of a more super-moral attitude of mind :
because they have to calculate concerning a much
more complicated tissue of consequences. An eco-
nomic policy for the whole world should be possible
which could look at things in such broad perspec-
tive that all its isolated demands would seem for
the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.
## p. 346 (#376) ############################################
346
THE WILL TO POWER.
928.
Should one follow one's feelings ? ”—To set
one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment,
and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth,
and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is
alike in being capable of this—and in behaving in
this way with determination, the criminal, the
bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the
honest man.
A higher degree of excellence would be to over-
come this impulse, and to refrain from performing
an heroic deed at its bidding, and to remain cold,
raisonnable, free from the tempestuous surging of
concomitant sensations of delight. . . . The same
holds good of pity: it must first be sifted through
reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous
as any other passion.
The blind yielding to a passion, whether it be
generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the
greatest evil. Greatness of character does not
consist in not possessing these passions-on the
contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible
degree: but he should lead them by the bridle . . .
and even this he should not do out of love of con-
trol, but merely because.
.
.
929.
“ To give up one's life for a cause "-very effec-
tive. But there are many things for which one
gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will
be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to
pity, to anger, or to revenge-it matters not from
## p. 347 (#377) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
347
the point of view of value. How many have not
sacrificed their lives for pretty girls—and even
what is worse, their health! When one has
temperament, one instinctively chooses the most
dangerous things : if one is a philosopher, for in-
stance, one chooses the adventures of speculation;
if one is virtuous, one chooses immorality. One
kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will
risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On
the contrary, what we seek is life raised to a
higher power, life in danger. . . . But, let me re-
peat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more
virtuous than others. Pascal, for instance, wished
to risk nothing, and remained a Christian. That
perhaps was virtuous. --A man always sacrifices
something.
930.
How many advantages does not a man sacrifice!
To how small an extent does he seek his own
profit! All his emotions and passions wish to
assert their rights, and how remote a passion is
from that cautious utility which consists in
personal profit !
A man does not strive after “happiness"; one
must be an Englishman to be able to believe that
a man is always seeking his own advantage.
Our desires long to violate things with passion-
their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.
931.
All passions are generally useful, some directly,
others indirectly; in regard to utility it is abso-
1
## p. 348 (#378) ############################################
348
THE WILL TO POWER.
lutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of
values,-however certainly the forces of nature in
general may be regarded as good (i. e. useful),
from an economic point of view, they are still
the sources of much that is terrible and much
that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might
say would be, that the mightiest passions are the
most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources
of power exist.
932.
!
All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes
of mind have not come to be honoured on account
of their usefulness: but because they are the
conditions peculiar to rich souls who are able to
bestow and whose value consists in their vital
exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent
man! In them you will see the exact reverse
of self-denial, of hatred of self, of “ Pascalism. "
933
In short, what we require is to dominate the
passions and not to weaken or to extirpate
them ! —The greater the dominating power of the
will, the greater the freedom that may be given to
the passions.
The “great man" is so, owing to the free scope
which he gives to his desires, and to the still
greater power which knows how to enlist these
magnificent monsters into its service.
The "good man " in every stage of civilisation
is at one and the same time the least dangerous
## p. 349 (#379) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK
349
and the most useful: a sort of medium ; the idea
formed of such a man by the common mind is
that he is some one whom one has no reason to fear,
but whom one must not therefore despise.
Education : essentially a means of ruining ex-
ceptions in favour of the rule. Culture : essenti-
ally the means of directing taste against the
exceptions in favour of the mediocre.
Only when a culture can dispose of an overflow
of force, is it capable of being a hothouse for the
luxurious culture of the exception, of the experi-
ment, of the danger, of the nuance: this is the
tendency of every aristocratic culture.
1
934.
All questions of strength: to what extent ought
one to try and prevail against the preservative
measures of society and the latter's prejudices ?
to what extent ought one to unfetter one's terrible
qualities, through which so many go to the dogs —
to what extent ought one to run counter to truth,
and take up sides with its most questionable
aspects ? —to what extent ought one to oppose
suffering, self-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when
it is always open to question whether one can
ever master them (what does not kill us makes
us stronger . ) ? -and, finally, to what extent
ought one to acknowledge the rights of the rule,
of the common-place, of the petty, of the good, of
the upright, in fact of the average man, without
thereby allowing one's self to become vulgar? . . .
The strongest test of character is to resist being
)
܀
## p. 350 (#380) ############################################
350
THE WILL TO POWER.
ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. Good-
ness must be regarded as a luxury, as a refine-
ment, as a vice.
3. THE NOBLE MAN.
935.
Type : real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul,
as the result of vital wealth: which does not give
in order to receive—and which has no desire to
elevate itself by being good ;-squandering is
typical of genuine goodness; vital personal wealth
is its prerequisite.
936.
Aristocracy. -Gregarious ideals—at present
culminating in the highest standard of value for
society. It has been attempted to give them a
cosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value. --I
defend aristocracy against them.
Any society which would of itself preserve a
feeling of respect and délicatesse in regard to
freedom, must consider itself as an exception, and
have a force against it from which it distinguishes
itself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.
The more rights I surrender and the more I
level myself down to others, the more deeply do
I sink into the average and ultimately into the
greatest number, The first condition which an
aristocratic society must have in order to maintain
a high degree of freedom among its members, is
that extreme tension which arises from the pres-
## p. 351 (#381) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
351
ence of the most antagonistic instincts in all its
units : from their will to dominate. . . .
If ye would fain do away with strong contrasts
and differences of rank, ye will also abolish
strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the feeling
of individuality.
*
Concerning the actual psychology of societies
based upon freedom and equality. What is it that
tends to diminish in such a society?
The will to be responsible for one's self (the loss
of this is a sign of the decline of autonomy); the
ability to defend and to attack, even in spiritual
matters; the power of command; the sense of
reverence, of subservience, the ability to be silent;
great passion, great achievements, tragedy and
cheerfulness.
937.
In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Mont-
losier had said in his work, De la Monarchie fran-
çaise: he answered with a cry of indignation, and
set himself to his task. That emigrant had said:
“ Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos
mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous
fut octroyée d'être libres, et non pas à nous d'être
nobles ; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout
est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre com-
munauté ; nous sommes un tout par nous mêmes. "
938.
How constantly the aristocratic world shears
and weakens itself ever more and more! By
## p. 352 (#382) ############################################
352
THE WILL TO POWER.
means of its noble instincts it abandons its
privileges, and owing to its refined and excessive
culture, it takes an interest in the people, the
weak, the poor, and the poetry of the lowly, etc.
939.
1
There is such a thing as a noble and dangerous
form of carelessness, which allows of profound
conclusions and insight: the carelessness of the
self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never
troubled itself about friends, but which knows only
hospitality and knows how to practise it; whose
heart and house are open to all who will enter-
beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability :
he who is capable of it has hundreds of " friends,"
but probably not one friend.
»
940.
?
-
The teaching undèv ärav applies to men with
overflowing strength,—not to the mediocre. éry-
κράτεια and άσκησις are only steps to higher
things. Above them stands "golden Nature. "
“ Thou shalt"-unconditional obedience in
Stoics, in Christian and Arabian Orders, in Kant's
philosophy (it is immaterial whether this obedience
is shown to a superior or to a concept).
Higher than “Thou shalt" stands “I will ”
(the heroes); higher than “ I will ” stands “I am'
(the gods of the Greeks).
Barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure
of restraint,—they are neither simple, nor light-
hearted, nor moderate.
»
1
## p. 353 (#383) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
353
941.
The essence of our gardens and palaces (and to
the same extent the essence of all yearning after
riches) is the desire to rid the eye of disorder ana
vulgarity, and to build a home for our souls nobility.
The majority of people certainly believe that
they will develop higher natures when those
beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon
them: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travel-
ling, etc. , and all reading and visits to theatres.
People want to be formed—that is the kernel of
their labours for culture ! But the strong, the
mighty, would themselves have a hand in the form-
ing, and would fain have nothing strange about them!
It is for this reason, too, that men go to open
Nature, not to find themselves, but to lose them-
selves and to forget themselves. The desire “ to get
away from one's self” is proper to all weaklings, and
to all those who are discontented with themselves.
942.
The only nobility is that of birth and blood.
(I do not refer here to the prefix “Lord” and
L'almanac de Gotha: this is a parenthesis for
donkeys. ) Wherever people speak of the “ aristo-
cracy of intellect," reasons are generally not
lacking for concealing something; it is known to
be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect
alone does not ennoble; on the contrary, some-
thing is always needed to ennoble intellect. What
then is needed P-Blood.
z
VOL. II.
## p. 354 (#384) ############################################
354
THE WILL TO POWER.
943.
What is noble ?
-External punctiliousness; because this punc-
tiliousness hedges a man about, keeps him at a
distance, saves him from being confounded with
somebody else.
A frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and
bearing, with which stoical hardness and self-
control protect themselves from all prying inquisi-
tiveness or curiosity.
-A slow step and a slow glance. There are
not too many valuable things on earth : and these
come and wish to come of themselves to him who
has value. We are not quick to admire.
-We know how to bear poverty, want, and
even illness.
-We avoid small honours owing to our mis-
trust of all who are over-ready to praise : for the
man who praises believes he understands what he
praises : but to understand-Balzac, that typical
man of ambition, betrayed the fact-comprendre
c'est égaler.
-Our doubt concerning the communicativeness
of our hearts goes very deep; to us, loneliness is
not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon us.
-We are convinced that we only have duties to
our equals, to others we do as we think best: we
know that justice is only to be expected among
equals (alas ! this will not be realised for some
time to come).
-We are ironical towards the “gifted ”; we
hold the belief that no morality is possible with-
out good birth.
## p. 355 (#385) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
355
}
-We always feel as if we were those who had
to dispense honours : while he is not found too
frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.
-We are always disguised: the higher a man's
nature the more is he in need of remaining incog-
nito. If there be a God, then out of sheer decency
He ought only to show Himself on earth in the
form of a man.
-We are capable of otium, of the uncondi-
tional conviction that although a handicraft does
not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces
one's rank. However much we may respect “in-
dustry," and know how to give it its due, we do
not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense, or after the
of those insatiable and cackling artists who,
like hens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.
-We protect artists and poets and any one
who happens to be a master in something; but as
creatures of a higher order than those, who only
know how to do something, who are only “pro-
ductive men," we do not confound ourselves with
them.
-We find joy in all forms and ceremonies;
we would fain foster everything formal, and we
are convinced that courtesy is one of the greatest
virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of laisser
aller, including the freedom of the press and of
thought; because, under such conditions, the intel-
lect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches
its limbs.
-We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps
daintier, more delicate, and more ethereal kind of
creature. What a treat it is to meet creatures
## p. 356 (#386) ############################################
356
THE WILL TO POWER.
who have only dancing and nonsense and finery
in their minds! They have always been the de-
light of every tense and profound male soul, whose
life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.
-We take pleasure in princes and in priests,
because in big things, as in small, they actually up-
hold the belief in the difference of human values,
even in the estimation of the past, and at least
symbolically.
-We are able to keep silence: but we do not
breathe a word of this in the presence of listeners.
-We are able to endure long enmities : we
lack the power of easy reconciliations.
-We have a loathing of demagogism, of en-
lightenment, of amiability, and plebeian familiarity.
-We collect precious things, the needs of
higher and fastidious souls; we wish to possess
nothing in common. We want to have our own
books, our own landscapes.
-We protest against evil and fine experiences,
and take care not to generalise too quickly. The
individual case: how ironically we regard it when
it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule !
-We love that which is naif, and naïf people,
but as spectators and higher creatures; we think
Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.
-We have a low estimation of good people,
because they are gregarious animals: we know
how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness
lies concealed beneath the most evil, the most
malicious, and the hardest exterior, and that this -
single grain outweighs all the mere goody-goodi-
ness of milk-and-watery souls.
## p. 357 (#387) ############################################
THE ORDER OF RANK.
357
>
-We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted
by his vices, nor by his tomfooleries. We are well
aware that we are not recognised with ease, and
that we have every reason to make our foreground
very prominent.
944.
What is noble ? — The fact that one is constantly
forced to be playing a part. That one is constantly
searching for situations in which one is forced
to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the
greatest number: the happiness which consists of
inner peacefulness, of virtue, of comfort, and of
Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness,à la Spencer.
That one instinctively seeks for heavy responsi-
bilities. That one knows how to create enemies
everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That one
contradicts the greatest number, not in words at
all, but by continually behaving differently from
them.
945.
Virtue (for instance, truthfulness) is our most
noble and most dangerous luxury. We must not
decline the disadvantages which it brings in its
train.
946.
We refuse to be praised: we do what serves our
purpose, what gives us pleasure, or what we are
obliged to do.
947.
What is chastity in a man? It means that his
taste in sex has remained noble; that in eroticis
## p. 358 (#388) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER
he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor the
clever,
948.
1
The concept of honour is founded upon the
belief in select society, in knightly excellences, in
the obligation of having continually to play a part.
In essentials it means that one does not take one's
life too seriously, that one adheres unconditionally
to the most dignified manners in one's dealings
with everybody (at least in so far as they do not
belong to "us"); that one is neither familiar, nor
good-natured, nor hearty, nor modest, except inter
pares; that one is always playing a part.
949.
The fact that one sets one's life, one's health,
and one's honour at stake, is the result of high
spirits and of an overflowing and spendthrift will :
it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact
that every danger kindles our curiosity concern-
ing the measure of our strength, and provokes our
courage.
