No More Learning

It was wonderful that the Italian communities had not wavered, when Hannibal so palpably showed them the superiority of the Phoenicians and the nullity of Roman aid; but how long could they be expected to bear the burden of a double war, and to allow themselves to be
plundered under the very eyes of the Roman troops and of their own contingents? Finally, it could not be alleged that the condition of the Roman army compelled the general to adopt this mode of warfare. It was composed, as regarded its core, of the capable legions of Ariminum, and, by their side, of militia called out, most of whom were likewise accustomed to service; and, far from being dis couraged by the last defeats, it was indignant " at the but little honourable task which its general, Hannibal's lackey," assigned to and demanded with loud voice to be led against the enemy. In the assemblies of the people the most violent invectives were directed against the obstinate old man. His political opponents, with the former praetor Gaius Terentius Varro at their head, laid hold of the quarrel—for the understanding of which we must not forget that the dictator was practically nominated
the senate, and the office was regarded as the palladium of the conservative party—and, in concert with the dis contented soldiers and the possessors of the plundered estates, they carried an unconstitutional and absurd resolu tion of the people conferring the dictatorship, which was destined to obviate the evils of divided command in times of danger, on Marcus Minucius,1 who had hitherto been the lieutenant of Quintus Fabius, in the same way as
The inscription of the gift devoted by the new dictator on account of his victory at Geranium to Hercules Victor — Hercolei sacrom M. Minuci(uj) C. dictator vovit —was found in the year 862 at Rome, near S. Lorenso.
f.
1
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chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
385
on Fabius himself. Thus the Roman army, after its hazardous division into two separate corps had just been appropriately obviated, was once more divided ; and not only so, but the two sections were placed under leaders who notoriously followed quite opposite plans of war.
Quintus Fabius of course adhered more than ever to his methodical
inaction; Marcus Minucius, compelled to justify in the field of battle his title of dictator, made a hasty attack with inadequate forces, and would have been annihilated had not his colleague averted greater misfortune by the season able interposition of a fresh corps. This last turn of matters justified in some measure the system of passive resistance. But in reality Hannibal had completely attained in this campaign all that arms could attain : not a single material operation had been frustrated either by his impetuous or by his deliberate opponent ; and his foraging, though not unattended with difficulty, had yet been in the main so successful that the army passed the winter without complaint in the camp at Gerunium. It was not the Cunctator that saved Rome, but the compact structure of its confederacy and, not less perhaps, the national hatred with which the Phoenician hero was regarded on the part of Occidentals.
Despite all its misfortunes, Roman pride stood no less New unshaken than the Roman symmachy. The donations paraSom
which were offered by king Hiero of Syracuse and the Greek cities in Italy for the next campaign — the war affected the latter less severely than the other Italian allies of Rome, for they sent no contingents to the land army— were declined with thanks; the chieftains of Illyria were informed that they could not be allowed to neglect pay ment of their tribute; and even the king of Macedonia was once more summoned to surrender Demetrius of Pharos. The majority of the senate, notwithstanding the
semblance of legitimation which recent events had given to the Fabian system of delay, had firmly resolved to depart
■ ■■■*
Pauiius
286 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
from a mode of war that was slowly but certainly ruining the state; if the popular dictator had failed in his more energetic method of warfare, they laid the blame of the failure, and not without reason, on the fact that they had adopted a half-measure and had given him too few troops. This error they determined to avoid and to equip an army, such as Rome had never sent out before—eight legions, each raised a fifth above the normal strength, and a
number of allies — enough to crush an who was not half so strong. Besides this, a legion under the praetor Lucius Postumius was destined
for the valley of the Po, in order, if possible, to draw off the Celts serving in the army of Hannibal to their homes. These resolutions were judicious ; everything depended on their coming to an equally judicious decision respecting the supreme command. The stiff carriage of Quintus
Fabius, and the attacks of the demagogues which it
had rendered the dictatorship and the senate generally more unpopular than ever : amongst the people, not without the connivance of their leaders, the foolish report circulated that the senate was intentionally pro longing the war. As, therefore, the nomination of a dictator was not to be thought of, the senate attempted to procure the election of suitable consuls ; but this only had the effect of thoroughly rousing suspicion and obstinacy. With difficulty the senate carried one of its candidates,
corresponding opponent
provoked,
Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had with judgment con- 219. ducted the Illyrian war in 535 (p. 220); an immense majority of the citizens assigned to him as colleague the
candidate of the popular party, Gaius Terentius Varro, an incapable man, who was known only by his bitter opposition to the senate and more especially as the main author of the proposal to elect Marcus Minucius co-dictator, and who was recommended to the multitude solely by his humble birth and his coarse effrontery.
cha*. T TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
While these preparations for the next campaign were Battle at being made in Rome, the war had already recommenced Cannae- in Apulia. As soon as the season allowed him to leave
his winter quarters, Hannibal, determining as usual the
course of the war and assuming the offensive, set out from Gerunium in a southerly direction, and
Luceria crossed the Aufidus and took the citadel of
Cannae (between Canosa and Barletta) which commanded
the plain of Canusium, and had hitherto served the Romans as their chief magazine. The Roman
which, since Fabius had conformably to the constitution
resigned his dictatorship in the middle of autumn, was now
commanded by Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus, first
as consuls then as proconsuls, had been unable to avert a
loss which they could not but feel. On military as well as
on political grounds, it became more than ever necessary
to arrest the progress of Hannibal by a pitched battle. With definite orders to this effect from the senate, accord ingly, the two new commanders-in-chief, Paullus and Varro, arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer of 538. 219. With the four new legions and a corresponding contingent
of Italians which they brought up, the Roman army rose to 80,000 infantry, half burgesses, half allies, and 6000 cavalry, of whom one-third were burgesses and two-thirds allies; whereas Hannibal's army numbered 1 0,000 cavalry, but only about 40,000 infantry. Hannibal wished nothing so much as a battle, not merely for the general reasons which we have explained above, but specially because the wide Apulian plain allowed him to develop the whole
of his cavalry, and because the providing supplies for his numerous army would soon, in spite of that excellent cavalry, be rendered very difficult by the proximity of an enemy twice as strong and resting on a chain of fortresses. The leaders of the Roman forces also had, as we have said, made up their minds on the general
marching past
army
387
superiority
288 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book ill
question of giving battle, and approached the enemy with that view ; but the more sagacious of them saw the position of Hannibal, and were disposed accordingly to wait in the first instance and simply to station themselves in the vicinity of the enemy, so as to compel him to retire and accept battle on a ground less favourable to him. Hannibal encamped at Cannae on the right bank of the Aufidus. Paullus pitched his camp on both banks of the stream, so that the main force came to be stationed on the left bank, but a strong corps took up a position on the right immedi ately opposite to the enemy, in order to impede his supplies and perhaps also to threaten Cannae. Hannibal, to whom it was all-important to strike a speedy blow, crossed the stream with the bulk of his troops, and offered battle on the left bank, which Paullus did not accept But such military pedantry was disapproved by the democratic consul—so much had been said about men taking the field not to stand guard, but to use their swords—and he gave orders accordingly to attack the enemy, wherever and whenever they found him. According to the old custom foolishly retained, the decisive voice in the council of war alternated between the commanders-in-chief day by day ; it was necessary therefore on the following day to submit, and to let the hero of the pavement have his way. On the left bank, where the wide plain offered full scope to the superior cavalry of the enemy, certainly even he would not fight ; but he determined to unite the whole Roman forces on the right bank, and there, taking up a position between the Carthaginian camp and Cannae and seriously threatening the latter, to offer battle. A division of 10,000 men was left behind in the principal Roman camp, charged to capture the Carthaginian encampment during the conflict and thus to intercept the retreat of the enemy's army across the river. The bulk of the Roman army, at early dawn on the and August according to the uncorrected, perhaps in
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
389
June according to the correct, calendar, crossed the river which at this season was shallow and did not materially hamper the movements of the troops, and took up a position in line near the smaller Roman camp to the west ward of Cannae. The Carthaginian army followed and likewise crossed the stream, on which rested the right Roman as well as the left Carthaginian wing. The Roman cavalry was stationed on the wings : the weaker portion consisting of burgesses, led by Paullus, on the right next the river ; the stronger consisting of the allies, led by Varro, on the left towards the plain. In the centre was stationed the infantry in unusually deep files, under the command of the consul of the previous year Gnaeus Servilius. Opposite to this centre Hannibal arranged his infantry in the form of a crescent, so that the Celtic and Iberian troops in their national armour formed the advanced centre, and the Libyans, armed after the Roman fashion, formed the drawn- back wings on either side. On the side next the river the whole heavy cavalry under Hasdrubal was stationed, on the side towards the plain the light Numidian horse. After a short skirmish between the light troops the whole line was soon engaged. Where the light cavalry of the Carthaginians fought against the heavy cavalry of Varro, the conflict was prolonged, amidst constant charges of the Numidians, without decisive result In the centre, on the other hand, the legions completely overthrew the Spanish and Gallic troops that first encountered them ; eagerly the victors
pressed on and followed up their advantage. But mean while, on the right wing, fortune had turned against the Romans. Hannibal had merely sought to occupy the left cavalry wing of the enemy, that he might bring Hasdrubal with the whole regular cavalry to bear against the weaker right and to overthrow it first. After a brave resistance, the Roman horse gave way, and those that were not cut down were chased up the river and scattered in the plain ;
tol. n
51
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
Paullus, wounded, rode to the centre to turn or, if not, to share the fate of the legions. These, in order the better to follow up the victory over the advanced infantry of the enemy, had changed their front disposition into a column of attack, which, in the shape of a wedge, penetrated the enemy's centre. In this position they were warmly assailed on both sides by the Libyan infantry wheeling inward upon them right and left, and a portion of them were compelled to halt in order to defend themselves against the flank attack ; by this means their advance was checked, and the mass of infantry, which was already too closely crowded, now had no longer room to develop itself at all. Mean while Hasdrubal, after having completed the defeat of the wing of Paullus, had collected and arranged his cavalry anew and led them behind the enemy's centre against the wing of Varro. His Italian cavalry, already sufficiently occupied with the Numidians, was rapidly scattered before the double attack, and Hasdrubal, leaving the pursuit of the fugitives to the Numidians, arranged his squadrons for the third time, to lead them against the rear of the Roman infantry. This last charge proved decisive. Flight was not possible, and quarter was not given. Never, perhaps, was an army of such size annihilated on the field of battle so completely, and with so little loss to its antagonist, as was the Roman army at Cannae. Hannibal had lost not quite 6000 men, and two-thirds of that loss fell upon the Celts, who sustained the first shock of the legions. On the other hand, of the 76,000 Romans who had taken their places in the line of battle 70,000 covered the field, amongst whom were the consul Lucius Paullus, the pro consul Gnaeus Servilius, two-thirds of the staff-officers, and eighty men of senatorial rank. The consul Gaius Varro was saved solely by his quick resolution and his good steed, reached Venusia, and was not ashamed to survive. The garrison also of the Roman camp, 10,000 strong, were for
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
191
the most part made prisoners of war ; only a few thousand men, partly of these troops, partly of the line, escaped to Canusium. Nay, as if in this year an end was to be made with Rome altogether, before its close the legion sent to Gaul fell into an ambush, and was, with its general Lucius Postumius who was nominated as consul for the next year, totally destroyed by the Gauls.
This unexampled success appeared at length to mature the conse-
I"8"0" °* great political combination, for the sake of which Hannibal the battle
0r'
had come to Italy. He had, no doubt, based his plan of Cannae.
primarily upon his army; but with accurate knowledge of the power opposed to him he designed that army to be
merely the vanguard, in support of which the powers of the
west and east were gradually to unite their forces, so as to
prepare destruction for the proud city. That support how- Prevention ever, which seemed the most secure, namely the sending of jrJ^V reinforcements from Spain, had been frustrated by the bold- from
pa^n"
ness and firmness of the Roman general sent thither, Gnaeus Scipio. After Hannibal's passage of the Rhone Scipio had sailed for Emporiae, and had made himself master first of the coast between the Pyrenees and the Ebro,
and then, after conquering Hanno, of the interior also (536). 218. In the following year (537) he had completely defeated the 217. Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro, and after his brother Publius, the brave defender of the valley of the Po,
had joined him with a reinforcement of 8000 men, he had even crossed the Ebro, and advanced as far as Saguntum. Hasdrubal had indeed in the succeeding year (538), after 216. obtaining reinforcements from Africa, made an attempt in accordance with his brother's orders to conduct an army over the Pyrenees ; but the Scipios opposed his passage of
the Ebro, and totally defeated him, nearly at the same time that Hannibal conquered at Cannae. The powerful tribe of the Celtiberians and numerous other Spanish tribes had joined the Scipios ; they commanded the sea, the passes of
292
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
the Pyrenees, and, by means of the trusty Massiliots, the Gallic coast also. Now therefore support to Hannibal was less than ever to be looked for from Spain.
On the part of Carthage as much had hitherto been done in support of her general in Italy as could be expected.
Phoenician squadrons threatened the coasts of Italy and of the Roman islands and guarded Africa from a Roman land ing, and there the matter ended. More substantial assist ance was prevented not so much by the uncertainty as to where Hannibal was to be found and the want of a port of disembarkation in Italy, as by the fact that for many years the Spanish army had been accustomed to be self- sustaining, and above all by the murmurs of the peace party.
Hannibal severely felt the consequences of this unpardon able inaction ; in spite of all his saving of his money and of the soldiers whom he had brought with him, his chests were gradually emptied, the pay fell into arrear, and the ranks of his veterans began to thin. But now the news of the victory of Cannae reduced even the factious opposition at home to silence. The Carthaginian senate resolved to place at the disposal of the general considerable assistance in money and men, partly from Africa, partly from Spain, including 4000 Numidian horse and 40 elephants, and to
prosecute the war with energy in Spain as well as in Italy. The long-discussed offensive alliance between Carthage and Macedonia had been delayed, first by the sudden death
of Antigonus, and then by the indecision of his successor Philip and the unseasonable war waged by him and his 220-217. Hellenic allies against the Aetolians (534-537). It was
only now, after the battle of Cannae, that Demetrius of Pharos found Philip disposed to listen to his proposal to cede to Macedonia his Illyrian possessions—which it was necessary, no doubt, to wrest in the first place from the Romans—and it was only now that the court of Pella came to terms with Carthage. Macedonia undertook to land an
Reinforce ments from Africa.
Alliance between Carthage and Mace donia.
chap, V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
293
invading army on the east coast of Italy, in return for which she received an assurance that the Roman possessions in Epirus should be restored to her.
In Sicily king Hiero had during the years of peace main- Alliance tained a policy of neutrality, so far as he could do so with ^! ^en safety, and he had shown a disposition to accommodate the and Carthaginians during the perilous crises after the peace with syracuso- Rome, particularly by sending supplies of corn. There is
no doubt that he saw with the utmost regret a renewed breach between Carthage and Rome ; but he had no power to avert and when occurred he adhered with well- calculated fidelity to Rome. But soon afterwards (in the autumn of 538) death removed the old man after reign
216.
The grandson and successor of the veteran, the young and incapable Hieronymus,
of fifty-four years.
prudent
entered at once into negotiations with the Carthaginian
and, as they made no difficulty in consenting to secure to him treaty, first, Sicily as far as the old
diplomatists
frontier, and then, when he rose in the arrogance of his demands, the possession even of the whole island, he entered into alliance with Carthage, and ordered the Syracusan fleet to unite with the Carthaginian which
had come to threaten Syracuse. The position of the Roman fleet at Lilybaeum, which already had to deal with second Carthaginian squadron stationed near the Aegates, became all at once very critical, while at the same time the force that was in readiness at Rome for embarkation to
Sicily had, in consequence of the defeat at Cannae, to be diverted to other and more urgent objects.
Carthagino-Sicilian
Above all came the decisive fact, that now at length the
Capua and fabric of the Roman confederacy began to be unhinged, ""muni. 8
after had survived unshaken the shocks of two severe ties of
years of war. There passed over to the side of Hannibal lilMV Ital ^^
Arpi in Apulia, and Uzentum Messapia, two old towns over to which had been greatly injured the Roman colonies of
by in
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a
it,
it
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book in
Luceria and Brundisium ; all the towns of the Bruttii—who took the lead—with the exception of the Petelini and the Consentini who had to be besieged before yielding; the greater portion of the Lucanians ; the Picentes transplanted into the region of Salernum; the Hirpini; the Sam- nites with the exception of the Pentri ; lastly and chiefly, Capua the second city of Italy, which was able to bring into the field 30,000 infantry and 4000 horse, and whose secession determined that of the neighbouring towns Atella and Calatia. The aristocratic party, indeed, attached by many ties to the interest of Rome everywhere, and more especially in Capua, very earnestly opposed this change of sides, and the obstinate internal conflicts which arose re garding it diminished not a little the advantage which Hannibal derived from these accessions. He found him self obliged, for instance, to have one of the leaders of the aristocratic party in Capua, Decius Magius, who even after the entrance of the Phoenicians obstinately contended for the Roman alliance, seized and conveyed to Carthage ; thus furnishing a demonstration, very inconvenient for himself, of the small value of the liberty and sovereignty which had just been solemnly assured to the Campanians by the Carthaginian general. On the other hand, the south Italian Greeks adhered to the Roman alliance — a result to which the Roman garrisons no doubt contributed, but which was still more due to the very decided dislike of the Hellenes towards the Phoenicians themselves and towards their new Lucanian and Bruttian allies, and their attach ment on the other hand to Rome, which had zealously em braced every opportunity of manifesting its Hellenism, and had exhibited towards the Greeks in Italy an unwonted gentleness. Thus the Campanian Greeks, particularly Neapolis, courageously withstood the attack of Hannibal in person: in Magna Graecia Rhegium, Thurii, Meta- pontum, and Tarentum did the same notwithstanding their
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
295
very perilous position. Croton and Locri on the other hand were partly carried by storm, partly forced to capitulate, by the united Phoenicians and Bruttians ; and the citizens of Croton were conducted to Locri, while Bruttian colonists occupied that important naval station. The Latin colonies in southern Italy, such as Brundisium, Venusia, Paestum, Cosa, and Cales, of course maintained unshaken fidelity to Rome. They were the strongholds by which the con querors held in check a foreign land, settled on the soil of the surrounding population, and at feud with their neigh bours ; they, too, would be the first to be affected, if Hanni bal should keep his word and restore to every Italian com munity its ancient boundaries. This was likewise the case with all central Italy, the earliest seat of the Roman rule, where Latin manners and language already everywhere pre ponderated, and the people felt themselves to be the com rades rather than the subjects of their rulers. The opponents of Hannibal in the Carthaginian senate did not fail to appeal to the fact that not one Roman citizen or one Latin community had cast itself into the arms of Carthage. This groundwork of the Roman power could only be broken
up, like the Cyclopean walls, stone by stone.
Such were the consequences of the day of Cannae, in which Attitude
the flower of the soldiers and officers of the confederacy, a £ seventh of the whole number of Italians capable of bearing arms, perished. It was a cruel but righteous punishment for the grave political errors with which not merely some foolish or miserable individuals, but the Roman people them selves, were justly chargeable. A constitution adapted for
a small country town was no longer suitable for a great power ; it was simply impossible that the question as to the leadership of the armies of the city in such a war should be left year after year to be decided by the Pandora's box of the balloting-urn. As a fundamental revision of the constitution, if practicable at all, could not at least be
396 THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
undertaken now, the practical superintendence of the war, and in particular the bestowal and prolongation of the command, should have been at once left to the only authority which was in a position to undertake it—the senate —and there should have been reserved for the comitia the mere formality of confirmation. The brilliant successes of the Scipios in the difficult arena of Spanish warfare showed what might in this way be achieved. But political demagogism, which was already gnawing at the aristocratic foundations of the constitution, had seized on the management of the Italian war. The absurd accusa tion, that the nobles were conspiring with the enemy without, had made an impression on the "people. " The
saviours to whom political superstition looked "for deliver" ance, Gaius Flaminius and Gaius Varro, both new men and friends of the people of the purest dye, had accordingly been empowered by the multitude itself to execute the plans of operations which, amidst the approbation of that multitude, they had unfolded in the Forum ; and the results were the battles on the Trasimene lake and at Cannae. Duty required that the senate, which now of course understood its task better than when it recalled half the army of Regulus from Africa, should take into its hands the management of affairs, and should oppose such mis chievous proceedings ; but when the first of those two defeats had for the moment placed the rudder in its hands, it too had hardly acted in a manner unbiassed by the interests of party. Little as Quintus Fabius may be com pared with these Roman Cleons, he had yet conducted the war not as a mere military leader, but had adhered to his rigid attitude of defence specially as the political opponent of Gaius Flaminius ; and in the treatment of the quarrel
with his subordinate, had done what he could to exasperate at a time when unity was needed. The consequence was, first, that the most important instrument which the wisdom
chap, V TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
397
of their ancestors had placed in the hands of the senate just for such cases —the dictatorship —broke down in his hands ; and, secondly —at least indirectly —the battle of Cannae. But the headlong fall of the Roman power was owing not to the fault of Quintus Fabius or Gaius Varro, but to the distrust between the government and the governed—to the variance between the senate and the burgesses. If the deliverance and revival of the state were still possible, the work had to begin at home with the re- establishment of unity and of confidence. To have per ceived this and, what is of more importance, to have done
and done with an abstinence from all recriminations however just, constitutes the glorious and imperishable honour of the Roman senate. When Varro—alone of all the generals who had command in the battle—returned to Rome, and the Roman senators met him at the gate and thanked him that he had not despaired of the salvation of his country, this was no empty phraseology veiling the disaster under sounding words, nor was bitter mockery over poor wretch was the conclusion of peace between the government and the governed. In presence of the gravity of the time and the gravity of such an appeal, the chattering of demagogues was silent; henceforth the only thought of the Romans was how they might be able jointly to avert the common peril. Quintus Fabius, whose tenacious courage at this decisive moment was of more service to the state than all his feats of war, and the other senators of note took the lead in every movement, and restored to the citizens confidence in themselves and in the future. The senate preserved its firm and
unbending attitude, while messengers from all sides hastened to Rome to report the loss of battles, the secession of allies, the
capture of posts and magazines, and to ask reinforcements for the valley of the Po and for Sicily at time when Italy
was abandoned and Rome was almost without
garrison.
a a
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK ill
Assemblages of the multitude at the gates were forbidden ; onlookers and women were sent to their houses ; the time of mourning for the fallen was restricted to thirty days that the service of the gods of joy, from which those clad in mourning attire were excluded, might not be too long interrupted —for so great was the number of the fallen, that there was scarcely a family which had not to lament its dead. Meanwhile the remnant saved from the field of battle had been assembled by two able military tribunes, Appius Claudius and Publius Scipio the younger, at Canusium. The latter managed, by his lofty spirit and by the brandished swords of his faithful comrades, to change the views of those genteel young lords who, in indolent despair of the salvation of their country, were thinking of escape beyond the sea. The consul Gaius Varro joined them with a handful of men ; about two legions were gradually collected there ; the senate gave orders that they should be reorganized and reduced to serve in disgrace and without pay. The incapable general was on a suitable pretext recalled to Rome ; the praetor Marcus Claudius Marcellus, experienced in the Gallic wars, who had been destined to depart for Sicily with the fleet from Ostia, assumed the chief command. The utmost exertions were made to organize an army capable of taking the field. The Latins were summoned to render aid in the common peril. Rome itself set the example, and called to arms all the men above boyhood, armed the debtor-serfs and criminals, and even incorporated in the army eight thousand slaves purchased by
the state. As there was a want of arms, they took the old spoils from the temples, and everywhere set the workshops and artisans in action. The senate was completed, not as timid patriots urged, from the Latins, but from the Roman burgesses who had the best title. Hannibal offered a release of captives at the expense of the Roman treasury ; it was declined, and the Carthaginian envoy who had
chap, v TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE
299
arrived with the deputation of captives was not admitted into the city : nothing should look as if the senate thought of peace. Not only were the allies to be prevented from
that Rome was disposed to enter into negotia tions, but even the meanest citizen was to be made to understand that for him as for all there was no peace, and that safety lay only in victory.
believing
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
CHAPTER VI
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
The crisis. The aim of Hannibal in his expedition to Italy had been to break up the Italian confederacy : after three campaigns that aim had been attained, so far as it was at all attain able. It was clear that the Greek and Latin or Latinized communities of Italy, since they had not been shaken in their allegiance by the day of Cannae, would not yield to terror, but only to force ; and the desperate courage with which even in Southern Italy isolated little country towns, such as the Bruttian Petelia, maintained their forlorn defence against the Phoenicians, showed very plainly what awaited them among the Marsians and Latins. If Hannibal had expected to accomplish more in this way and to be able to lead even the Latins against Rome, these hopes had proved vain. But it appears as if even in other respects the Italian coalition had by no means produced the results which Hannibal hoped for. Capua had at once stipulated that Hannibal should not have the right to call Campanian citizens compulsorily to arms ; the citizens had not forgotten how Pyrrhus had acted in Tarentum, and they foolishly imagined that they should be able to withdraw at once from the Roman and from the Phoenician rule. Samnium and Luceria were no longer what they had been, when king Pyrrhus had thought of inarching into Rome at the head of the Sabellian youth.
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
301
Not only did the chain of Roman fortresses everywhere cut the nerves and sinews of the land, but the Roman rule, continued for many years, had rendered the inhabitants unused to arms —they furnished only a moderate contingent to the Roman armies — had appeased their ancient hatred, and had gained over a number of individuals everywhere to the interest of the ruling community. They joined the conqueror of the Romans, indeed, after the cause of Rome seemed fairly lost, but they felt that the question was no longer one of liberty ; it was simply the exchange of an Italian for a Phoenician master, and it was not enthusiasm, but despair that threw the Sabellian communities into the arms of the victor. Under such circumstances the war in Italy flagged. Hannibal, who commanded the southern part of the peninsula as far up as the Volturnus and
Garganus, and who could not simply abandon these lands again as he had abandoned that of the Celts, had now likewise a frontier to protect, which could not be left un covered with impunity ; and for the purpose of defending the districts that he had gained against the fortresses which everywhere defied him and the armies advancing from the north, and at the same time of resuming the difficult offensive against central Italy, his forces—an army of about 40,000 men, without reckoning the Italian contingents— were far from sufficient.
Above all, he found that other antagonists were opposed Maredlna. to him. Taught by fearful experience, the Romans
adopted a more judicious system of conducting the war,
placed none but experienced officers at the head of their
armies, and left them, at least where it was necessary, for a longer period in command. These generals neither looked down on the enemy's movements from the mountains, nor did they throw themselves on their adversary wherever they found him ; but, keeping the true mean between in action and precipitation, they took up their positions in
3oa
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
Hannibal
entrenched camps under the walls of fortresses, and accepted battle where victory would lead to results and defeat would not be destruction. The soul of this new mode of warfare was Marcus Claudius Marcellus. With true instinct, after the disastrous day of Cannae, the senate and people had turned their eyes to this brave and ex perienced officer, and entrusted him at once with the actual supreme command. He had received his training in the troublesome warfare against Hamilcar in Sicily, and had given brilliant evidence of his talents as a leader as well as of his personal valour in the last campaigns against the Celts. Although far above fifty, he still glowed with all the ardour of the most youthful soldier, and only a few years before this he had, as general, cut down the mounted general of the enemy 228) — the first and only Roman consul who achieved that feat of arms. His life was consecrated to the two divinities, to whom he erected the splendid double temple at the Capene Gate—to Honour and to Valour; and, while the merit of rescuing Rome from this extremity of danger belonged to no single in dividual, but pertained to the Roman citizens collectively and pre-eminently to the senate, yet no single man contri buted more towards the success of the common enterprise
than Marcus Marcellus.
From the field of battle Hannibal had turned his steps
Siinpania! > to Campania. He knew Rome better than the simpletons, who in ancient and modern times have fancied that he might have terminated the struggle march on the
Modern warfare, true, decides war on the field of battle; but in ancient times, when the system of attacking fortresses was far less developed than the system of defence, the most complete success in the field was on numberless occasions neutralized by the resistance of the walls of the capitals. The council and citizens of Carthage were not at all to be compared to the
enemy's capital.
it
is by a
a
(p.
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
303
senate and people of Rome ; the peril of Carthage after the first campaign of Regulus was infinitely more urgent than that of Rome after the battle of Cannae ; yet Carthage had made a stand and been completely victorious. With what colour could it be expected that Rome would now deliver her keys to the victor, or even accept an equitable peace ? Instead therefore of sacrificing practicable and important successes for the sake of such empty demonstrations, or losing time in the besieging of the two thousand Roman fugitives enclosed within the walls of Canusium, Hannibal had immediately proceeded to Capua before the Romans could throw in a garrison, and by his advance had induced this second city of Italy after long hesitation to join him. He might hope that, in possession of Capua, he would be able to seize one of the Campanian ports, where he might disembark the reinforcements which his great victories had wrung from the opposition at home.
When the Romans learned whither Hannibal had gone, Renewal of
the war in Campania*
they also left Apulia, where only a weak division was re tained, and collected their remaining forces on the right bank of the Volturnus. With the two legions saved from Cannae Marcus Marcellus marched to Teanum Sidicinum, where he was joined by such troops as were at the moment disposable from Rome and Ostia, and advanced — while the dictator Marcus Junius slowly followed with the main army which had been hastily formed — as far as the Volturnus at Casilinum, with a view if possible to save Capua. That city he found already in the power of the enemy ; but on the other hand the attempts of the enemy on Neapolis had been thwarted by the courageous resistance of the citizens, and the Romans were still in good time to throw a garrison into that important port. With equal fidelity the two other large coast towns, Cumae and Nuceria, adhered to Rome. In Nola the struggle between
the popular and senatorial parties as to whether they should
304
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book ill
attach themselves to the Carthaginians or to the Romans, was still undecided. Informed that the former were gain ing the superiority, Marcellus crossed the river at Caiatia, and marching along the heights of Suessula so as to evade the enemy's army, he reached Nola in sufficient time to hold it against the foes without and within. In a sally he even repulsed Hannibal in person with considerable loss ; a success which, as the first defeat sustained by Hannibal, was of far more importance from its moral effect than from its material results. In Campania indeed, Nuceria, Acerrae, and, after an obstinate siege prolonged into the following
SIB. year (539), Casilinum also, the key of the Volturnus, were conquered by Hannibal, and the severest punishments were inflicted on the senates of these towns which had adhered to Rome. But terror is a bad weapon of proselytism ; the Romans succeeded, with comparatively trifling loss, in surmounting the perilous moment of their first weakness. The war in Campania came to a standstill ; then winter came on, and Hannibal took up his quarters in Capua, the luxury of which was by no means fraught with benefit to his troops who for three years had not been
315. under a roof. In the next year (539) the war acquired another aspect. The tried general Marcus Marcellus, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus who had distinguished himself in the campaign of the previous year as master of the horse to the dictator, and the veteran Quintus Fabius Maximus, took—Marcellus as proconsul, the two others as consuls —the command of the three Roman armies which
were destined to surround Capua and Hannibal ; Marcellus resting on Nola and Suessula, Maximus taking a position on the right bank of the Volturnus near Cales, and Gracchus on the coast near Liternum,
covering Neapolis and Cumae. The Campanians, who marched to Hamae
three miles from Cumae with a view to
Cumaeans, were thoroughly defeated by Gracchus ; Han
surprise the
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
joS
nibal, who had appeared before Cumae to wipe out the
stain, was himself worsted in a combat, and when the
pitched battle offered by him was declined, retreated in ill
humour to Capua. While the Romans in Campania thus
not only maintained what they possessed, but also recovered Compulteria and other smaller places, loud complaints
were heard from the eastern allies of Hannibal. A Roman The war in army under the praetor Marcus Valerius had taken position APuli«'
at Luceria, partly that it might, in connection with the Roman fleet, watch the east coast and the movements of the Macedonians ; partly that it might, in connection with the army of Nola, levy contributions on the revolted Samnites, Lucanians, and Hirpini. To give relief to these, Hannibal turned first against his most active opponent, Marcus Marcellus ; but the latter achieved under the walls of Nola no inconsiderable victory over the Phoenician army, and it was obliged to depart, without having cleared off the stain, from Campania for Arpi, in order at length to check the progress of the enemy's army in Apulia. Tiberius Gracchus followed it with his corps, while the two other Roman armies in Campania made arrangements to proceed next spring to the attack of Capua.
The clear vision of Hannibal had not been dazzled by
his victories. It became every day more evident that he
was not thus gaining his object Those rapid marches, defensive, that adventurous shifting of the war to and fro, to which Hannibal was mainly indebted for his successes, were at
an end ; the enemy had become wiser ; further enterprises
were rendered almost impossible by the inevitable necessity
of defending what had been gained. The offensive was
not to be thought of; the defensive was difficult, and threatened every year to become more so. He could not
conceal from himself that the second half of his great
task, the subjugation of the Latins and the conquest of
Rome, could not be accomplished with his own forces and
VOL. II
52
Hannibal Jr5"? "
u'toreio-
3o6
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book III
Hii those of his Italian allies alone. Its accomplishment
depended on the council at Carthage, on the head-quarters forcements. at Cartagena, on the courts of Pella and of Syracuse. If
all the energies of Africa, Spain, Sicily, and Macedonia should now be exerted in common against the common enemy ; if Lower Italy should become the great rendezvous for the armies and fleets of the west, south, and east ; he might hope successfully to finish what the vanguard under his leadership had so brilliantly begun. The most natural and easy course would have been to send to him adequate support from home ; and the Carthaginian state, which had remained almost untouched by the war and had been brought from deep decline so near to complete victory by a small band of resolute patriots acting of their own accord and at their own risk, could beyond doubt have done this. That it would have been possible for a Phoenician fleet of any desired strength to effect a landing at Locri or Croton, especially as long as the port of Syracuse remained open
to the Carthaginians and the fleet at Brundisium was kept in check by Macedonia, is shown by the unopposed dis embarkation at Locri of 4000 Africans, whom Bomilcar about this time brought over from Carthage to Hannibal, and still more by Hannibal's undisturbed embarkation, when all had been already lost But after the first impression of the victory of Cannae had died away, the peace party in Carthage, which was at all times ready to purchase the downfall of its political opponents at the expense of its country, and which found faithful allies in the shortsightedness and indolence of the citizens, refused the entreaties of the general for more decided support with the half- simple, half- malicious reply, that he in fact
needed no help inasmuch as he was really victor; and thus contributed not much less than the Roman senate to save Rome. Hannibal, reared in the camp and a stranger to the machinery of civic factions, found no popular leader
cftAP.
vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
307
on whose support he could rely, such as his father had found in Hasdrubal ; and he was obliged to seek abroad the means of saving his native country — means which itself possessed in rich abundance at home.
For this purpose he might, at least with more prospect of success, reckon on the leaders of the Spanish patriot army, on the connections which he had formed in Syracuse, and on the intervention of Philip. Everything depended on bringing new forces into the Italian field of war against Rome from Spain, Syracuse, or Macedonia; and for the attainment or for the prevention of this object wars were carried on in Spain, Sicily, and Greece. All of these were but means to an end, and historians have often erred in accounting them of greater importance. So far as the
Romans were concerned, they were essentially defensive wars, the proper objects of which were to hold the passes of the Pyrenees, to detain the Macedonian army in Greece, to defend Messana and to bar the communication between Italy and Sicily. Of course this defensive warfare was, wherever it was possible, waged by offensive methods ; and, should circumstances be favourable, it might develop into the dislodging of the Phoenicians from Spain and Sicily, and into the dissolution of Hannibal's alliances with Syra cuse and with Philip. The Italian war in itself fell for the time being into the shade, and resolved itself into con flicts about fortresses and razzias, which had no decisive effect on the main issue. Nevertheless, so long as the Phoenicians retained the offensive at all, Italy always re mained the central aim of operations ; and all efforts were directed towards, as all interest centred in, the doing away, or perpetuating, of Hannibal's isolation in southern
Italy.
Had it been possible, immediately after the battle of
Cannae, to bring into play all the resources on which Han nibal thought that he might reckon, he might have been
308
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book iii
The send- tolerably certain of success. But the position of Hasdrubal
at tIlat time in SPain after thc battle 0n the Ebr0 WaS S0 temporarily critical, that the supplies of money and men, which the
victory of Cannae had roused the Carthaginian citizens to furnish, were for the most part expended on Spain, without
fofcele^te ^utra
much improvement in the position of affairs there. The Scipios transferred the theatre of war in the SIB. following campaign (539) from the Ebro to the Guadalquivir;
and in Andalusia, in the very centre of the proper Cartha ginian territory, they achieved at Illiturgi and Intibili two brilliant victories. In Sardinia communications entered into with the natives led the Carthaginians to hope that they should be able to master the island, which would have been of importance as an intermediate station between Spain and Italy. But Titus Manlius Torquatus, who was sent with a Roman army to Sardinia, completely destroyed the Carthaginian landing force, and reassured to
115. the Romans the undisputed possession of the island (539). The legions from Cannae sent to Sicily held their ground in the north and east of the island with courage and success against the Carthaginians and Hieronymus; the
S15. latter met his death towards the end of 539 by the hand of an assassin. Even in the case of Macedonia the ratification of the alliance was delayed, principally because the Macedonian envoys sent to Hannibal were captured on their homeward journey by the Roman vessels of war. Thus the dreaded invasion of the east coast was temporarily suspended; and the Romans gained time to secure the very important station of Brundisium first by their fleet and then by the land army which before the arrival of Gracchus was employed for the protection of Apulia, and even to make preparations for an invasion of Macedonia in the event of war being declared. While in Italy the war thus came to a stand, out of Italy nothing was done on the part of Carthage to accelerate the movement of
producing
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
309
new armies or fleets towards the seat of war. The Romans, again, had everywhere with the greatest energy
put themselves in a state of defence, and in that defensive attitude had fought for the most part with good results wherever the genius of Hannibal was absent Thereupon
the short-lived patriotism, which the victory of Cannae
had awakened in Carthage, evaporated ; the not inconsider
able forces which had been organized there were, either through factious opposition or merely through unskilful attempts to conciliate the different opinions expressed in
the council, so frittered away that they were nowhere of
any real service, and but a very small portion arrived at
the spot where they would have been most useful. At the close of 539 the reflecting Roman statesman might assure 215. himself that the urgency of the danger was past, and that
the resistance so heroically begun had but to persevere in its exertions at all points in order to achieve its object
First of all the war in Sicily came to an end. It had War la
' y'
formed no part of Hannibal's original plan to excite a war
on the island ; but partly through accident, chiefly through
the boyish vanity of the imprudent Hieronymus, a land
war had broken out there, which — doubtless because Hannibal had not planned it — the Carthaginian council
took up with especial zeal. After Hieronymus was killed
at the close of 539, it seemed more than doubtful whether 216. the citizens would persevere in the policy which he had pursued. If any city had reason to adhere to Rome, that Siegt of
city was Syracuse ; for the victory of the Carthaginians over the Romans could not but give to the former, at any rate, the sovereignty of all Sicily, and no one could seriously believe that the promises made by Carthage to the Syra- cusans would be really kept Partly induced by this consideration, partly terrified by the threatening pre parations of the Romans —who made every effort to bring once more under their complete control that important
^raoae.
Carthagi nian expedition to Sicily.
3io
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
island, the bridge between Italy and Africa, and now for 914. the campaign of 540 sent their best general, Marcus
Marcellus, to Sicily—the Syracusan citizens showed a
to obtain oblivion of the past by a timely return to the Roman alliance. But, amidst the dreadful confusion in the city—which after the death of Hieronymus was agitated alternately by endeavours to re-establish the ancient freedom of the people and by the coups de main of the numerous pretenders to the vacant throne, while the captains of the foreign mercenary troops were the real masters of the place — Hannibal's dexterous emissaries,
and Epicydes, found opportunity to frustrate the projects of peace. They stirred up the multitude in the name of liberty; descriptions, exaggerated beyond measure, of the fearful punishment that the Romans were said to have inflicted on the Leontines, who had just been re-conquered, awakened doubts even among the better portion of the citizens whether it was not too late to restore
their old relations with Rome ; while the numerous Roman deserters among the mercenaries, mostly runaway rowers from the fleet, were easily persuaded that a peace on the part of the citizens with Rome would be their death- warrant. So the chief magistrates were put to death, the armistice was broken, and Hippocrates and Epicydes under took the government of the city. No course was left to the consul except to undertake a siege ; but the skilful conduct of the defence, in which the Syracusan engineer Archimedes, celebrated as a learned mathematician, especi ally distinguished himself, compelled the Romans after besieging the city for eight months to convert the siege
into a blockade by sea and land.
In the meanwhile Carthage, which hitherto had only sup
ported the Syracusans with her fleets, on receiving news of their renewed rising in arms against the Romans had de spatched a strong land army under Himilco to Sicily, which
disposition
Hippocrates
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 31 1
landed without interruption at Heraclea Minoa and imme diately occupied the important town of Agrigentum. To effect a junction with Himilco, the bold and able Hippocrates marched forth from Syracuse with an army : the position of Marcellus between the garrison of Syracuse and the two hostile armies began to be critical. With the help of some reinforcements, however, which arrived from Italy, he main tained his position in the island and continued the blockade
of Syracuse. On the other hand, the greater portion of
the small inland towns were driven to the armies of the Carthaginians not so much by the armies of the enemy, as by
the fearful severity of the Roman proceedings in the island, more especially the slaughter of the citizens of Enna, suspected of a design to revolt, by the Roman garrison which was stationed there. In 542 the besiegers of Syracuse 212. during a festival in the city succeeded in scaling a portion
of the extensive outer walls that had been deserted by the
guard, and in penetrating into the suburbs which stretched
from the "island" and the city proper on the shore (Achradina) towards the interior. The fortress of Euryalus,
which, situated at the extreme western end of the suburbs, protected these and the principal road leading from the
interior to Syracuse, was thus cut off and fell not long after
wards. When the siege of the city thus began to assume The Car- a turn favourable to the Romans, the two armies under ^*^*n Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to its relief, and destroyed, attempted a simultaneous attack on the Roman positions, combined with an attempt at landing on the part of the Carthaginian fleet and a sally of the Syracusan garrison ; but
the attack was repulsed on all sides, and the two relieving armies were obliged to content themselves with encamping before the city, in the low marshy grounds along the Anapus, which in the height of summer and autumn engender pesti lences fatal to those that tarry in them. These pestilences had often saved the city, oftener even than the valour of its
Conquest Syracuse
mercy was to be shown in any case, might, even according t0 ^e ^ar ^rom 'audable principles of Roman public law as to the treatment of perfidious communities, have been ex tended to this city, which manifestly had not been at liberty to act for itself, and which had repeatedly made the most earnest attempts to get rid of the tyranny of the foreign soldiers. Nevertheless, not only did Marcellus stain his
3H
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
citizens ; in the times of the first Dionysius, two Phoenician armies in the act of besieging the city had been in this way destroyed under its very walls. Now fate turned the special defence of the city into the means of its destruc tion ; while the army of Marcellus quartered in the suburbs suffered but little, fevers desolated the Phoenician and Syracusan bivouacs. Hippocrates died ; Himilco and most of the Africans died also ; the survivors of the two armies, mostly native Siceli, dispersed into the neighbouring cities. The Carthaginians made a further attempt to save the city from the sea side ; but the admiral Bomilcar withdrew, when the Roman fleet offered him battle. Epicydes himself, who commanded in the city, now abandoned it as lost, and made his escape to Agrigentum. Syracuse would gladly have sur rendered to the Romans ; negotiations had already begun. But for the second time they were thwarted by the deserters : in another mutiny of the soldiers the chief magistrates and a number of respectable citizens were slain, and the govern ment and the defence of the city were entrusted by the foreign troops to their captains. Marcellus now entered into a negotiation with one of these, which gave into his hands one of the two portions of the city that were still free, the " island " ; upon which the citizens voluntarily opened to him
212. the gates of Achradina also the autumn of 542). If
honour permitting general pillage of the wealthy mercantile city, in the course of which Archimedes and many other citizens were put to death, but the Roman senate lent deaf ear to the complaints which the Syracusans
military
a
by
a
(in it
chap, Yl FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
313
afterwards presented regarding the celebrated general, and neither returned to individuals their pillaged property nor restored to the city its freedom. Syracuse and the towns that had been previously dependent on it were classed among the communities tributary to Rome — Tauromenium and Neetum alone obtained the same privileges as Messana, while the territory of Leontini became Roman domain and its former proprietors Roman lessees —and no Syracusan citizen was henceforth allowed to reside in the " island," the portion of the city that commanded the harbour.
Sicily thus appeared lost to the Carthaginians ; but the
Guerilla genius of Hannibal exercised even from a distance its influ- ^i'n
ence there. He despatched to the Carthaginian army, which remained at. Agrigentum in perplexity and inaction under Hanno and Epicydes, a Libyan cavalry officer Muttines, who took the command of the Numidian cavalry, and with his flying squadrons, fanning into an open flame the bitter hatred which the despotic rule of the Romans had excited over all the island, commenced a guerilla war fare on the most extensive scale and with the happiest results ; so that he even, when the Carthaginian and Roman armies met on the river Himera, sustained some conflicts with Marcellus himself successfully. The relations, however, which prevailed between Hannibal and the Carthaginian council, were here repeated on a small scale. The general appointed by the council pursued with jealous envy the officer sent by Hannibal, and insisted upon giving battle to the proconsul without Muttines and the Numidians. The wish of Hanno was carried out, and he was completely beaten. Muttines was not induced to deviate from his course ; he maintained himself in the interior of the country, occupied several small towns, and was enabled by the not inconsiderable reinforcements which joined him from Carthage gradually to extend his operations. His successes were so brilliant, that at length the commander-in-chief,
Agrlgcu- tum occupied by the Romans.
310. 21*.
Sicily tranquil lized.
who could not otherwise prevent the cavalry officer from eclipsing him, deprived him summarily of the command of the light cavalry, and entrusted it to his own son. The Numidian, who had now for two years preserved the island for his Phoenician masters, had the measure of his patience exhausted by this treatment. He and his horsemen who refused to follow the younger Hanno entered into negotia tions with the Roman general Marcus Valerius Laevinus, and delivered to him Agrigentum. Hanno escaped in a boat, and went to Carthage to report to his superiors the disgraceful high treason of Hannibal's officer ; the Phoeni cian garrison in the town was put to death by the Romans, and the citizens were sold into slavery (544). To secure the island from such surprises as the landing of 540, the city received a new body of inhabitants selected from Sicilians well disposed towards Rome; the old glorious Akragas was no more. After the whole of Sicily was thus subdued, the Romans exerted themselves to restore some sort of tranquillity and order to the distracted island. The pack of banditti that haunted the interior were driven together en masse and conveyed to Italy, that from their
head-quarters at Rhegium they might burn and destroy in the territories of Hannibal's allies. The government did its utmost to promote the restoration of agriculture which had been totally neglected in the island. The Carthaginian council more than once talked of sending a fleet to Sicily and renewing the war there ; but the project went no further.
Macedonia might have exercised an influence over the course of events more decisive than that of Syracuse. From the Eastern powers neither furtherance nor hindrance was for the moment to be expected. Antiochus the Great, the natural ally of Philip, had, after the decisive victory of
Philip of Macedonia and hii delay.
3«4
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
217. the Egyptians at Raphia in 537, to deem himself fortunate in obtaining peace from the indolent Philopator on the
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
315
basis of the status quo ante. The rivalry of the Lagidae and the constant apprehension of a renewed outbreak of the war on the one hand, and insurrections of pretenders in the interior and enterprises of all sorts in Asia Minor, Bactria, and the eastern satrapies on the other, prevented him from joining that great anti- Roman alliance which Hannibal had in view. The Egyptian court was decidedly on the side of Rome, with which it renewed alliance in
544 ; but it was not to be expected of Ptolemy Philopator, 210. that he would support otherwise than by corn-ships. Accordingly there was nothing to prevent Greece and Macedonia from throwing a decisive weight into the great Italian struggle except their own discord ; they might save
the Hellenic name, if they had the self-control to stand by each other for but a few years against the common foe. Such sentiments doubtless were current in Greece. The prophetic saying of Agelaus of Naupactus, that he was afraid
that the prize-fights in which the Hellenes now indulged at home might soon be over; his earnest warning to direct their eyes to the west, and not to allow a stronger power to impose on all the parties now contending a peace of equal servitude —such sayings had essentially contributed to bring about the peace between Philip and the Aetolians (537), 217. and it was a significant proof of the tendency of that peace
that the Aetolian league immediately nominated Agelaus as its strategus.
National patriotism was bestirring itself in Greece as in Carthage : for a moment it seemed possible to kindle a Hellenic national war against Rome. But the general in such a crusade could only be Philip of Macedonia ; and he lacked the enthusiasm and the faith in the nation, without which such a war could not be waged. He knew not how to solve the arduous problem of transforming himself from the oppressor into the champion of Greece. His very delay in the conclusion of the alliance with Hannibal
316
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL rook til
damped the first and best zeal of the Greek patriots ; and when he did enter into the conflict with Rome, his mode of conducting war was still less fitted to awaken sympathy and confidence. His first attempt, which was made in the
416. very year of the battle of Cannae (538), to obtain possession of the city of Apollonia, failed in a way almost ridiculous, for Philip turned back in all haste on receiving the totally groundless report that a Roman fleet was steering for the Adriatic. This took place before there was a formal breach with Rome ; when the breach at length ensued, friend and foe expected a Macedonian landing in Lower Italy. Since
■15. 539 a Roman fleet and army had been stationed at Brundisium to meet it ; Philip, who was without vessels of war, was constructing a flotilla of light Illyrian barks to convey his army across. But when the endeavour had to be made in earnest, his courage failed to encounter the dreaded quinqueremes at sea ; he broke the promise which he had given to his ally Hannibal to attempt a landing, and with the view of still doing something he resolved to make an attack on his own share of the spoil, the Roman
114. possessions in Epirus (540). Nothing would have come of this even at the best ; but the Romans, who well knew that offensive was preferable to defensive protection, were by no means content to remain —as Philip may have hoped — spectators of the attack from the opposite shore. The Roman fleet conveyed a division of the army from Brundi sium to Epirus ; Oricum was recaptured from the king, a garrison was thrown into Apollonia, and the Macedonian camp was stormed. Thereupon Philip passed from partial action to total inaction, and notwithstanding all the com plaints of Hannibal, who vainly tried to breathe into such a halting and shortsighted policy his own fire and clearness of decision, he allowed some years to elapse in armed in activity.
Nor was Philip the first to renew the hostilities. The
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
317
fall of Tarentum (542), by which Hannibal acquired an Rome[212. excellent port on the coast which was the most convenient Greek
for the landing of a Macedonian army, induced the Romans coalition
to parry the blow from a distance and to give the Mace Macedonia, donians so much employment at home that they could not
think of an attempt on Italy. The national enthusiasm in Greece had of course evaporated long ago. With the help of the old antagonism to Macedonia, and of the fresh acts of imprudence and injustice of wlm. h Philip had been guilty, the Roman admiral Laevinus found no difficulty in organiz ing against Macedonia a coalition of the intermediate and minor powers under the protectorate of Rome. It was headed by the Aetolians, at whose diet Laevinus had person ally appeared and had gained its support by a promise of the
Acarnanian territory which the Aetolians had long coveted. They concluded with Rome a modest agreement to rob the other Greeks of men and land on the joint account, so that the land should belong to the Aetolians, the men and moveables to the Romans. They were joined by the states of anti-Macedonian, or rather primarily of anti-Achaean, tendencies in Greece proper ; in Attica by Athens, in the Peloponnesus by Elis and Messene and especially by Sparta, the antiquated constitution of which had been just about this time overthrown by a daring soldier Machanidas, in order that he might himself exercise despotic power under the name of king Pelops, a minor, and might establish a government of adventurers sustained by bands of mercen aries. The coalition was joined moreover by those constant
of Macedonia, the chieftains of the half- barbarous Thracian and Illyrian tribes, and lastly by Attalus king of Pergamus, who followed out his own interest with sagacity and energy amidst the ruin of the two great Greek states which surrounded him, and had the acuteness even now to attach himself as a client to Rome when his assist ance was still of some value.
antagonists
318
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book iii
It is neither agreeable nor necessary to follow the vicissitudes of this aimless struggle. Philip, although he was superior to each one of his opponents and repelled their attacks on all sides with energy and personal valour, yet consumed his time and strength in that profitless defensive. Now he had to turn against the Aetolians, who in concert with the Roman fleet annihilated the unfortunate Acarnanians and threatened Locris and Thessaly ; now an invasion of barbarians summoned him to the northern provinces ; now the Achaeans solicited his help against the predatory expeditions of Aetolians and Spartans ; now king
Attalus of Pergamus and the Roman admiral Publius Sulpicius with their combined fleets threatened the east coast or landed troops in Euboea. The want of a war fleet paralyzed Philip in all his movements ; he even went so far as to beg vessels of war from his ally Prusias of Bithynia, and even from Hannibal. It was only towards the close of the war that he resolved—as he should have done at first—to order the construction of ioo ships of war ; of these however no use was made, if the order was
executed at all. All who understood the position of
Greece and sympathized with it lamented the unhappy war, the Greeks, in which the last energies of Greece preyed upon them selves and the prosperity of the land was destroyed ; re
peatedly the commercial states, Rhodes, Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium, Athens, and even Egypt itself had attempted a mediation. In fact both parties had an interest in coming to terms. The Aetolians, to whom their Roman allies attached the chief importance, had, like the Macedonians, much to suffer from the war; especially after the petty king of the Athamanes had been gained by Philip, and the interior of Aetolia had thus been laid open to Macedonian incursions. Many Aetolians too had their eyes gradually opened to the dishonourable and pernicious part which the Roman alliance condemned them to play ; a cry of horror
Resaltlen
Peace
Phm""" d
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pervaded the whole Greek nation when the Aetolians in concert with the Romans sold whole bodies of Hellenic citizens, such as those of Anticyra, Oreus, Dyme, and Aegina, into slavery. But the Aetolians were no longer free; they ran a great risk if of their own accord they concluded peace with Philip, and they found the Romans by no means disposed, especially after the favourable turn which matters were taking in Spain and in Italy, to desist from a war, which on their part was carried on with merely a few ships, and the burden and injury of which fell mainly on the Aetolians. At length however the Aetolians
resolved to listen to the mediating cities : and, notwith
standing the counter-efforts of the Romans, a peace was
arranged in the winter of 548-9 between the Greek powers. 206-205. Aetolia had converted an over-powerful ally into a dangerous Pw<* enemy ; but the Roman senate, which just at that time was phiiip and summoning all the resources of the exhausted state for the R°n* decisive expedition to Africa, did not deem it a fitting
moment to resent the breach of the alliance. The war
with Philip could not, after the withdrawal of the Aetolians,
have been carried on by the Romans without considerable
exertions of their own ; and it appeared to them more
convenient to terminate it also by a peace, whereby the state of things before the war was substantially restored and Rome in particular retained all her possessions on the coast of Epirus except the worthless territory of the Atintanes. Under the circumstances Philip had to deem himself fortunate in obtaining such terms; but the fact proclaimed —what could not indeed be longer concealed —that all the unspeakable misery which ten years of a warfare waged with revolting inhumanity had brought upon Greece had been endured in vain, and that the grand and just combination, which Hannibal had projected and all Greece had for a moment joined, was shattered
irretrievably.
Spanish
In Spain, where the spirit of Hamilcar and Hannibal was powerful, the struggle was more earnest Its progress was marked by the singular vicissitudes incidental to the peculiar nature of the country and the habits of the people.
The farmers and shepherds, who inhabited the beautiful valley of the Ebro and the luxuriantly fertile Andalusia as well as the rough intervening highland region traversed by numerous wooded mountain - ranges, could easily be assembled in arms as a general levy ; but it was difficult to lead them against the enemy or even to keep them together at all. The towns could just as little be com bined for steady and united action, obstinately as in each case they bade defiance to the oppressor behind their walls. They all appear to have made little distinction between the Romans and the Carthaginians ; whether the troublesome guests who had established themselves in the valley of the Ebro, or those who had established themselves on the Guadalquivir, possessed a larger or smaller portion of the peninsula, was probably to the natives very much a matter of indifference ; and for that reason the tenacity of partisan ship so characteristic of Spain was but little prominent in this war, with isolated exceptions such as Saguntum on the Roman and Astapa on the Carthaginian side. But, as neither the Romans nor the Africans had brought with them sufficient forces of their own, the war necessarily became on both sides a struggle to gain partisans, which was decided rarely by solid attachment, more usually by fear, money, or accident, and which, when it seemed about to end, resolved itself into an endless series of fortress- sieges and guerilla conflicts, whence it soon revived with fresh fury. Armies appeared and disappeared like sand hills on the sea-shore; on the spot where a hill stood yesterday, not a trace of it remains to-day. In general the superiority was on the side of the Romans, partly because they at first appeared in Spain as the deliverers of the land
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from Phoenician despotism, partly because of the fortunate selection of their leaders and of the stronger nucleus of trustworthy troops which these brought along with them. It is hardly possible, however, with the very imperfect and— in point of chronology especially—very confused accounts which have been handed down to us, to give a satisfactory view of a war so conducted.
The two lieutenant-governors of the Romans in the Successes peninsula, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio —both of them, but ^^ especially Gnaeus, good generals and excellent adminis trators—accomplished their task with the most brilliant
success. Not only was the barrier of the Pyrenees stead
fastly maintained, and the attempt to re-establish the inter rupted communication by land between the commander-in- chief of the enemy and his head-quarters sternly repulsed ;
not only had a Spanish New Rome been created, after the model of the Spanish New Carthage, by means of the com prehensive fortifications and harbour works of Tarraco, but
the Roman armies had already in 539 fought with success 215. in Andalusia 308). Their expedition thither was repeated in the following year (540) with still greater 214. success. The Romans carried their arms almost to the Pillars of Hercules, extended their protectorate in South Spain, and lastly regaining and restoring Saguntum secured for themselves an important station on the line from the Ebro to Cartagena, repaying at the same time as
far as possible an old debt which the nation owed. While
the Scipios thus almost dislodged the Carthaginians from
Spain, they knew how to raise up dangerous enemy to
them in western Africa itself in the person of the powerful
west African prince Syphax, ruling the modern provinces Syphax of Oran and Algiers, who entered into connections with earth*** the Romans (about 541). Had been possible to supply 213.
him with Roman army, great results might have been expected but at that time not man could be spared from
vou n
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in
a
(p. by
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TheScipios
f^HfcmL 211.
218 212.
Italy, and the Spanish army was too weak to be divided. Nevertheless the troops belonging to Syphax himself, trained and led by Roman officers, excited so serious a ferment among the Libyan subjects of Carthage that the lieutenant -commander of Spain and Africa, Hasdrubal Barcas, went in person to Africa with the flower of his Spanish troops. His arrival in all likelihood gave another turn to the matter; the king Gala—in what is now the province of Constantine —who had long been the rival of Syphax, declared for Carthage, and his brave son Massinissa defeated Syphax, and compelled him to make peace. Little more is related of this Libyan war than the story of the cruel vengeance which Carthage, according to her wont, inflicted on the rebels after the victory of Massinissa.
This turn of affairs in Africa had an important effect on the war in Spain. Hasdrubal was able once more to turn to that country (543), whither he was soon followed by considerable reinforcements and by Massinissa himself. The Scipios, who during the absence of the
general (541, 542) had continued to plunder and to gain partisans in the Carthaginian territory, found themselves unexpectedly assailed by forces so superior that they were under the necessity of either retreating behind the Ebro or
out the Spaniards. They chose the latter course, and took into their pay 20,000 Celtiberians ; and then, in order the better to encounter the three armies of the enemy under Hasdrubal Barcas, Hasdrubal the son of Gisgo, and Mago, they divided their army and did not even keep their Roman troops together. They thus prepared the way for their own destruction. While Gnaeus with his corps, containing a third of the Roman and all the Spanish troops, lay encamped opposite to Hasdrubal Barcas, the latter had no difficulty in inducing the Spaniards in the Roman army by means of a sum of money to withdraw —which perhaps to their free-lance ideas
calling
enemy's
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of morals did not even seem a breach of fidelity, seeing that they did not pass over to the enemies of their pay master. Nothing was left to the Roman general but hastily to begin his retreat, in which the enemy closely followed him. Meanwhile the second Roman corps under Publius found itself vigorously assailed by the two other Phoenician armies under Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago, and the daring squadrons of Massinissa's horse gave to the Cartha ginians a decided advantage. The Roman camp was almost surrounded ; when the Spanish auxiliaries already on the way should arrive, the Romans would be completely hemmed in. The bold resolve of the proconsul to encounter with his best troops the advancing Spaniards, before their appearance should fill up the gap in the blockade, ended unfortunately. The Romans indeed had at first the advantage ; but the Numidian horse, who were rapidly despatched in pursuit, soon overtook them and prevented them both from following up the victory which
they had already half gained, and from marching back, until the Phoenician infantry came up and at length the fall of the general converted the lost battle into a defeat After Publius had thus fallen, Gnaeus, who slowly retreating had with difficulty defended himself against the one Carthaginian army, found himself suddenly assailed at once by three, and all retreat cut off by the Numidian cavalry. Hemmed in upon a bare hill, which did not even afford the possibility of pitching a camp, the whole corps were cut down or taken prisoners. As to the fate of the general himself no certain information was ever obtained. A small division alone was conducted by Gaius Marcius, an excellent officer of the school of Gnaeus, in safety to the other bank of the Ebro; and thither the legate Titus Fonteius also succeeded in bringing safely the portion of the corps of Publius that had been left in the camp ; most even of the Roman garrisons scattered in the south of
Spain south of the Ebro lost to the Romans.
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Spain were enabled to flee thither. In all Spain south of the Ebro the Phoenicians ruled undisturbed; and the moment seemed not far distant, when the river would be crossed, the Pyrenees would be open, and the communica tion with Italy would be restored. But the emergency in the Roman camp called the right man to the command. The choice of the soldiers, passing over older and not incapable officers, summoned that Gaius Marcius to become leader of the army; and his dexterous management and, quite as much perhaps, the envy and discord among the three Carthaginian generals, wrested from these the further fruits of their important victory. Such of the Carthaginians as had crossed the river were driven back, and the line of the Ebro was held in the meanwhile, till Rome gained time to send a new army and a new general.
the balance of arms. An expedition to Andalusia in the 810. following year (544) was most successful ; Hasdrubal Barcas was beset and surrounded, and escaped a capitulation only by ignoble stratagem and open perfidy. But Nero was not
Nero sent to Spain.
Fortunately the turn of the war in Italy, where Capua had just fallen, allowed this to be done. A strong legion — 12,000 men — arriving under the propraetor Gaius Claudius Nero, restored
Publius Scipio.
the right general for the Spanish war. He was an able officer, but a harsh, irritable, unpopular man, who had little skill in the art of renewing old connections or of forming new ones, or in taking advantage of the injustice and arrogance with which the Carthaginians after the death of the Scipios had treated friend and foe in Further Spain, and had exasperated all against them.
The senate, which formed a correct judgment as to the importance and the peculiar character of the Spanish war, and had learned from the Uticenses brought in as prisoners by the Roman fleet the great exertions which were making in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa with a numerous army over the Pyrenees, resolved to
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despatch to Spain new reinforcements and an extraordinary general of higher rank, the nomination of whom they deemed it expedient to leave to the people. For long— so runs the story—nobody announced himself as ready to take in hand the complicated and perilous business ; but at last a young officer of twenty-seven, Publius Scipio (son of the general of the same name that had fallen in Spain), who had held the offices of military tribune and aedile, came forward to solicit it It is incredible that the Roman senate should have left to accident an election of such importance in this meeting of the Comitia which it had itself suggested, and equally incredible that ambition and
should have so died out in Rome that no tried officer presented himself for the important post. If on the other hand the eyes of the senate turned to the young, talented, and experienced officer, who had brilliantly distinguished himself in the hotly- contested days on the Ticinus and at Cannae, but who still had not the rank requisite for his coming forward as the successor of men who had been praetors and consuls, it was very natural to adopt this course, which compelled the people out of good nature to admit the only candidate notwithstanding his defective qualification, and which could not but bring both him and the Spanish expedition, which was doubtless very unpopular, into favour with the multitude. If the effect of this ostensibly unpremeditated candidature was thus calculated, it was perfectly successful. The son, who went to avenge the death of a father whose life he had saved nine years before on the Ticinus ; the young man of manly beauty and long locks, who with modest blushes offered himself in the absence of a better for the post of danger ; the mere military tribune, whom the votes of the centuries now raised at once to the roll of the highest magistracies— all this made a wonderful and indelible impression on the citizens and farmers of Rome. And in truth Publius
patriotism
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was one, who was himself enthusiastic, and who inspired enthusiasm. He was not one of the few who by their energy and iron will constrain the world to adopt and to move in new paths for centuries, or who at any rate grasp the reins of destiny for years till its wheels roll over them. Publius Scipio gained battles and conquered countries under the instructions of the senate ; with the aid of his military laurels he took also a prominent position in Rome as a statesman; but a wide interval separates such a man from an Alexander or a Caesar. As an officer, he rendered at least no greater service to his country than Marcus Marcellus; and as a politician, although not
himself fully conscious of the unpatriotic and personal character of his policy, he injured his country at least as much, as he benefited it by his military skill. Yet a special charm lingers around the form of that graceful hero; it is surrounded, as with a dazzling halo, by the atmosphere of serene and confident inspiration, in which Scipio with mingled credulity and adroitness always moved. With quite enough of enthusiasm to warm men's hearts, and enough of calculation to follow in every case the dictates of intelligence, while not leaving out of account the vulgar; not naive enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly
that he was a man specially favoured of the gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature ; raised above the people, and not less aloof from them ; a man of stead fast word and kingly spirit, who thought that he would humble himself by adopting the ordinary title of a king, but could never understand how the constitution of the republic should in his case be binding ; so confident in his own greatness that he knew nothing of envy or of hatred,
courteously acknowledged other men's merits, and com passionately forgave other men's faults ; an excellent officer
Scipio
perhaps
persuaded
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and a refined diplomatist without the repellent
impress of either calling, uniting Hellenic culture with the fullest national feeling of a Roman, an accomplished speaker and of graceful manners — Publius Scipio won the hearts of soldiers and of women, of his countrymen and of the Spaniards, of his rivals in the senate and of his greater Carthaginian antagonist. His name was soon on every one's lips, and his was the star which seemed destined to bring victory and peace to his country.
Publius Scipio went to Spain in 544—5, accompanied by Scipio goe§ the propraetor Marcus Silanus, who was to succeed Nero 2°io20o' and to serve as assistant and counsellor to the young commander-in-chief, and by his intimate friend Gaius
Laelius as admiral, and furnished with a legion exceeding
the usual strength and a well-filled chest His appearance
on the scene was at once signalized by one of the boldest
and most fortunate coups de main that are known in history.
Of the three Carthaginian generals Hasdrubal Barcas was
stationed at the sources, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at
the mouth, of the Tagus, and Mago at the Pillars of
Hercules ; the nearest of them was ten days' march from
special
the Phoenician capital New Carthage. Suddenly in the spring of 545, before the enemy's armies began to move, Scipio set out with his whole army of nearly 30,000 men and the fleet for this town, which he could reach from the mouth of the Ebro by the coast route in a few days, and surprised the Phoenician garrison, not above 1000 men strong, by a combined attack by sea and land. The town, situated on a tongue of land projecting into the harbour, found itself threatened at once on three sides by the Roman fleet, and on the fourth by the legions; and all help was far distant Nevertheless the commandant Mago defended himself with resolution and armed the citizens, as the soldiers did not suffice to man the walls. A sortie was attempted ; but the Romans repelled it with ease and,
Capture
? . ^w 209.
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without taking time to open a regular siege, began the assault on the landward side. Eagerly the assailants pushed their advance along the narrow land approach to the town ; new columns constantly relieved those that were fatigued; the weak garrison was utterly exhausted; but the Romans had gained no advantage. Scipio had not expected any ; the assault was merely designed to draw away the garrison from the side next to the harbour, where, having been informed that part of the latter was left dry at ebb-tide, he meditated a second attack. While the assault was raging on the landward side, Scipio sent a division with ladders over the shallow bank "where Neptune himself showed them the way," and they had actually the good fortune to find the walls at that point undefended. Thus the city was won on the first day;
whereupon Mago in the citadel capitulated. With the Carthaginian capital there fell into the hands of the Romans 18 dismantled vessels of war and 63 transports, the whole war-stores, considerable supplies of corn, the war- chest of 600 talents (more than ,£140,000), ten thousand captives, among whom were eighteen Carthaginian geru- siasts or judges, and the hostages of all the Spanish allies of Carthage. Scipio promised the hostages permission to return home so soon as their respective communities should have entered into alliance with Rome, and employed the resources which the city afforded to reinforce and improve the condition of his army.