How does one conceptualize oneself if one could not speak about, let's say,
spiritual
pain by right?
Brett Bourbon - 1996 - Constructing a Replacement for the Soul
oikonomikos, pertaining to the household.
These two possibilities (surveying and the domestic) describe the two aspects o f Wittgenstein's philosophy: surveying ourselves, the world and our language (what Kenny called providing "a clear view of the world" and Wittgenstein in his preface called "sketches of the landscape") and a return to ordinary language (the disappearanceoftheproblemsofphilosophyinordinarylanguage).
Intherealmofthe ordinary, the translation between Latin and Greek is possible.
The world o f sleep is also ordinary, but this thithaways and hithaways (losing control o f the tongue, the "latters slettering down", no one going up and no ladder to throw away since it has already dissolved) requires asking what would be an adequate survey or sketch o f what ordinary world?
, limited how?
seen as what?
, threatened always by the interpretive distortions that allow for the blessing of one among any three brothers (Shem, Japhet, and Ham).
The confusion o f interpretation for truth, the replacability o f people and words and commitments under this confusion, is the problem o f Hamlet ("tham Let" and "Hum Lit.
)
written into the Wake. This is a tragedy accompanying our inheritance o f language, or maybeofpronounswhere"Semetomyplaceandjupetbackagain". Joyceisconstructing the place of my signs (Gr. <rr||ia), or the sign of me, or the place marked or having a mark set or affixed (Gr. crr|no08To<;) or a cemetery place. Wakean writing seems to place me
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? ("Semetomyplace") within the surveyable world and loop it back again into a history of origins and disinheritance, placing me with and as Japhet, the 'non-Semitic' son o f Noah, Jupiter from "tham Let", Hamlet, and Ham, the rejected son o f Noah.
If we read this again, the old Greek signs and the Latin imitations, from them that rise, or from Let Rise (a name, a description and a marker, like "ildiot") until Human Literature Sleeps, ask the question "where in the waste is wisdom? " This is a description of how to read: the unity of Greek and Latin in the text (as an example of the language of the Wake) does not communicate, but asks forjustification. And this request is understood as ordinary, as ordinary as waste is and is our desire for wisdom. If 'let rise' both can mean 'arise' and function as the name 'Let Rise', then the confusion o f verb for name (as in "In the beginning was the Word. And the Word was God") is the way in whichonecanenterorbenamedbylanguage. Consequently,"whereinthewasteis wisdom? " describes a stance toward ourselves, the world and our language that analogizes the relation between mind and world, by placing our humanity at risk by placing our constructions and our world as a world against us.
This is the effect ofJoyce's lists, to place the world enumerated against us and in this offer targets for sense and identification. But once an identification is made, as a result of an interpretation ('"alphybetty verbage' is a version of the Wake, or "am I a whirling dervish? " or "can the world be built outside of logic or as a list of predicates without any subject[s]? '), the meaning remains unclear. No interpretation is ever adequate because interpretation cannot determine meaning. Is the meaning ofFinnegans Wake the following list?
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? My wud! The warped flooring ofthe lair and soundconducting walls thereof. . . were persianly literatured with burst loveletters, telltale stories,. . . doubtful eggshells,. . . alphybettyformed verbage, vivlical viasses, ompiter dictas, visus umbique, ahems and ahahs, imeffible tries as speech unasyllabled, you owe mes, eyoldhyms, fluefoul smul, fallen lucifers,. . . counterfeit franks, best intentions,. . . gloss teeth for a tooth,. . . inversions of all this chambermade music one stands, given a grain of goodwill, a fair chance of actually seeing the whirling dervish, Tumult, son o f Thunder, self exiled in upon his ego, a nightlong a shaking betwixtween white or reddr hawrors, noondayterrorised to skin and bone by an I neluctable phantom . . . writing the mystery o f himself in furniture. (FW183. 08- 184. 10)
Furniture and language both constitute the world as limits to myself. This limit is enacted by or as matter, what Berkeley called "the furniture of earth". What is "the mystery of himself'? He writes while sitting in furniture as a piece of furniture determined and defined by materiality. This "mystery o f himself in furniture" becomes at the end o f the Wake, when the sleeper is awakening, the "fumit o f heupanepi world" (FW611. 18). c[F]umit' containsfait (L. as it was) andfarm s (L. oven, fireplace), and can be read as 'bum it'. "[F]umit' can be translated as 'as it as bums and is a furnace. " This burning is stabilized as a thing when "fumit" puns "the furniture of earth. " Consequently, the being andstabilityofthepastcondensedintofurniturecontainsHeracletianflux. "[H]eupanepi' consistsoftheGreekeu(good),pan(all),andepi(upon). Thus"fumitofheupanepi world" can be translated as 'the furniture o f the flux o f the good upon all the world bums
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? into a furnace. ' (So that's what it means to confuse the mind and the world! ) As the sleeper awakens into consciousness at the end of the Wake, under the sun and in rising color, "that part of it (fumit of heupanepi world) had shown itself. . . unable to absorbere", that part ofthe matter ofcourse, the matter ofa person organized as time, as change, (thefurnitureofthefluxofthegooduponalltheworldbumsintoafurnace)had shown itself unable to absorb light, because there was little light in the night, and because the mind reflects the world, which with the new sun means this it (this "world, mind") becomes another sun. 3 This is a picture of a mind generating and reflecting the light of the world. But this picture is neither a metaphor nor a model nor a theory ofthe mind. It is, instead, a description o f being between things (furniture) and loss (burning) as a limit to them both. Being between matter and time requires a mode o f self-reflection that generates an T as a limit to meaning. What I mean by this is that one cannot get anymore meaning out our own self-reflection than we can out o f this passage in the Wake. And the meaning of this passage is a description of the limit to the meaning of this passage.
The night is a reordering of oneself and the world into the condition betwixtween things, ideas, concepts, clarity, sense, moments. "Yet is no body present here which was nottherebefore. Onlyisorderothered,Noughtisnulled. FuitfiatX"(FW613. 13-14). Asit was, let it be! What is this reothering, where "nought is nulled", but everything is knot and nat? This kind o f riddle, another riddle o f enveloping facts, can be answered by another riddle: "Do you hold yourself then for some god in the manger, Sheholhem, that you will neither serve nor let serve, pray nor let pray? " (FW188. 18-19)
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? Language itself can be used as the form o f resistance to the claims o f the world or ofother people on us (the claims, ifone acknowledges any, ofthe Wake). ALP writes,
"I wrote me hopes and buried the page when I heard Thy voice" (the coming of day or of sense or of a greeting and so on) I asked "So content me now" (FW624. 04-05). Such content appears to be "I pity your oldselfI was used to. Now a younger's there. " (FW627. 06-07). Theoldselfiswhat'I'usedto. . . be,orbecomingwasa "Tobecontinued's tale" (FW626. 18). Being here is also a habit, "I was used to", where the difference between how one describes oneself is not clearly different from how one describes others.
And yet it is exactly the difference between myself and others that allows me to be visibletotheseothers. InInvestigations,Wittgensteinidentifiestwodomainsofknowing: (1) a knowing marked by second and third person claims, and (2) first person claims associatedwithmentalstateslikebeingdepressed,excited,inpain,etc. Thuswecansay 'I know he is in pain,' but not 'I know I am in pain'. Could I doubt this? Or not know that I am in pain?
If we say "'Since yesterday I have understood this word. ' 'Continuously', though? --To be sure, one can speak of an interpretation of understanding, but in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less? " and "when did you stop understanding that word? " (PI p. 59)
I can forget that "wissen"means to know, and then all ofa sudden recall it, maybe by saying to myself "/c/z weiss". It is through experiences like this that we imagine an unconscious somewhere behind, beneath, around, even surrounding our consciousness.
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? But I might never recall the definition without looking it up or asking a German friend. Thus we might think that our unconscious is a dictionary for our consciousness. Forgetting a word seems like losing it, losing something that is mine. In this my world or my language has waned, and the world has shrunk.
One can follow the mineness of knowing a word (which does not mean of course that it is private) into the mineness of pain and enter Wittgenstein's discussion of pain. Can I ask someone if I am still in pain? Since I can't my pain seems private. I can also forgetmypain. Imightgethitagain,harder,sothatwhateverwasbrokenbeforegets maskedbyagreaterpain. Thismightbeafunctionofthelimitationsofmynervous system, but we find the same effect in our emotional distress. This is what drives us into homeopathy. I might listen to Chopin's B flat minor Sonata (with its Funeral March) after my wife has left me. This might seem at the time a tragedy, and at least call for catharsis, as Milton says in the Preface to Samson Agonistes "to purge the mind o f those and such like passions, . . . , by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion: for so Physic things of melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humors. " The passions transformed in tragedy are reduced analogically to a physiologicalprinciple. Weentertheworldthroughthisanalogy. Thesepainsmightbe mine. If I lose this pain have I lost something of mine? Pain, excitement, depression all can be temporally limited to a particular duration. They are contained within time. The mineness of these sensations is my experience, my investment or identification of myself with these mental states. Can I experience the meaning o f the word "wissen"? If not then
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? how is it mine? Should we not construe it, after the model in the Tractatus, as a limit of my experience and thus of my world? We want love to be like understanding a world as myworld,notlike'knowing'transitorypain. Inthissensewewantlovetobeamind. 4
The "between" in Finnegans Wake is marking off in negative space these two uses o f 'knowing,' not as logical distinctions tied to theories about first or third person discourse, but as grammatical distinctions organizing our investments in the forms o f our languageasmeaningful. Thisislikeaestheticizinglogicorlinguistics,notassublime(as in metaphysics), but as I suggested as grammatical jokes. The fragments generated by these jokes form a "monthage stick in the melmelode hawr, I am (twintomine) all thees thing"(FW223. 08-09). Thisislikesaying,"Iamallthesefragmentsincludingthis fragment and that and this 'I'. " In my previous discussion of fragments, this self-reflexive turning expresses a demand forjustification, or a configuration ofthe condition ofbeing human within the world as between what Wittgenstein marks as justifications and rights:
"When I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before myself. " --What does that mean? Does it mean: "If someone else could know what I am calling 'pain', he would admit that I was using the word correctly"?
To use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right. (PI? 289)
This last sentence is either contradictory (an appeal to rights is an appeal to justification) or is a picture of the limit ofjustification. If the latter, justification operates outside first- personclaims: itscriteriaarevisibletoothers. Thusjustification,inthispictureofuse,is not required when expressing pain because how would I be mistaken about my own pain
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? (not my own hurt). But does the concept o f right, describing my statements as without justification but with right, attach itself differently to my first person claims? Justification
functions through an interpretive stance from which judgments can be made. Justification operatesinrelationtonormativecriteria. DerivedfromLius(thatwhichisbinding,right, justice, duty), 'justification' or 'justify' configures something or someone in relation to the
interactive order organizing the domain in which this something or someone operates and exists. But this re-ordering requires a mark to express its success. Such a remark, however, is the prime means by which this reordering can take place, and thus from ius is derived iurare, to pronounce a ritual formula or swear an oath. Justice arises not only as an effect o f our promises and betrayals, but it is constituted as such promises through whichwebecomecapableofjusticebecausewecanbejudged. Justicerequiresspeech, because justice is a form of speaking. This speech, however, must be a speaking of a community, an invocation of the particular (an individual or an expression or a sentence) by requiring that it express the whole (thus the standardization of ritual pronouncements and the strictures of tradition). There is, therefore, at least an isomorphism between language and the function ofjustice: both require that the whole be present in the particular. This relation is marked in the derivation o f L iudex, he who points to or show
the law (from whence our judge). Iudex derives from ius and diet (dex), to speak, say, etc. The collapse in our word judge of the act ofjudging (judge as verb) and the person who judges (noun) recalls the same need for the normative to be expressed fully in a particular,inthiscaseasthegroundofauthority. Andthuswespeakoftherighttojudge ('right' cognate with L. rex).
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? As I suggested earlier, rights can be given, and thus they are not a given, a ground. Ifjustification is the application ofcriteria ofjudgment, rights are gained when these criteria are given as yours to apply to yourself. In giving rights one is giving recognition ofthoserights. Ifwecompare'Ihavetheright'with'Ihavethejustification'wecansee that the appeal to rights is a first person appeal, while the appeal to justification is an appeal to either second person (as if in a monarchy) or third person (as if in a democracy). Thus we can say "I am justified by my right to X". In this case justification is the applicationofaright. Butthisright,especiallyinWittgenstein'sdescription,isan expression whose self-sufficiency is only determined by our judgment that one is speaking by right (and without justification).
How does one conceptualize oneself if one could not speak about, let's say, spiritual pain by right?
This third person appeal underwriting justification reifies rights away from the particularity o f persons and communities. The appeal to right by Wittgenstein is, however, an appeal to the normative usage of language. Normative criteria, whether embedded in language (or any formal structures) or in one's person (through social recognition of self-sufficiency, which therefore involves a self-recognition), erase the differencebetweenfirstpersonandsecondorthirdpersonappeals. Thedifferencewould seem to be the requirements for the application o f the language o f description determined asjustificationofright. Myquestioninghereisnotaboutthefirstpersonstatusofpain (the fact that one could not not know one's own pain), but is about determining what's at stake in Wittgenstein's invocation o f a difference between justification and rights.
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? If one can separate the application of criteria from the criteria themselves, then criteria are inadequate to describe the relation between personhood (to which are attached rights) and any totality determining normative standards (towards which justification operates). Becausetheappealtorightswantstoconceptualizepersonhood(or particularity) as a totality determining normative standards personhood is both stabilized (as a ground) and destabilized (as normative). Thus the questions "when does something mean" or 'when do I know how to play chess? " arise when we view ourselves as simultaneously a particular and a universal, as a fragment or at night, or in our attempts to conceptualize both the language games we use to describe dreams and the language games about our self-loss at night. .
The following is another version ofthe Wake which is another version ofthis self- loss:
"Yet it is but an old story, the tale of a Treestone with one Ysold, of a Mons held by tentpegs and his pal whatholoosed on the run . . . drop this jiggerypokery and talk straight turkey meet to mate, for while the ear, be we mikealls or
nicholists, may sometimes by inclined to believe others the eye, whether browned or nolensed, find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself. (FW113. 18-29)
The elm and stone are telling a tale of ALP as Isolde (compare this story with Eliot's telling of this story) and of HCE as Gulliver, where the Lilliputians tentpeg him down like sleep and its fragments and details. Someone asks (the text or the reader) to speak "straight turkey", but even in this request a metaphor for plan speaking can become the
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? plainfleshof"turkeymeet"(meat). Whynotbuildachurchonthispuninsteadofthepun onSt. Peter? Ordinarylanguagepausesthe"jiggerypokery"ofthisnight,likethelove potion Isolde drank, so that to meet is to mate. Do we believe the evidence of our ears over that of our eyes? Language of the eye or the ear cannot establish certainty. It is a fact about ordinary language just as it is a fact about ordinary life that we might "find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself', where this itself might be language animated into the form of our understanding or ourselves as bodies unsure of our status as animate beings.
In justification the criteria used, the totality invoked (society, language, law), functions as a limit to the particular. In rights the particular (individual, sentence, claim) functions as a limit to the totality. Epistemological justification is therefore an application ofcriteria. Aestheticjustification,likewhenepistemologicalbecomesontological
justification, when knowing ifthe bird is a goldfinch becomes the skeptical problem of determining if the bird is a hallucination, cannot be satisfied by any criteria because these criteria are missing or themselves require justification.
Ifanylinedidjustifythewholewritingwouldcease. Thedemandforjustification is not necessarily met by success. To use it by right opens up the complexity in the use of possession as a justification for freedom, an appeal to citizenship, the community, in this case the community of speakers, the normative conventionalism determining the criteria of language (games) expressed as personhood. The appeal to right here pretends to undercut the demand for justification, but the appeal to right rests on the collapse ofjustification into personhood. Personhood is not something that can be denied; by this I mean even the
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? denial of the right to personhood that defined American slavery or describes ethnic and religious conflicts are tacit recognitions ofwhat is being denied. Wittgenstein's arguments that we respond to the pain in another as if to their human physiognomy is true in these cases as well. But is not the case that a right is an expression of personhood? It can only function as such an expression through a logic ofjustification that attaches the right to personhood and not to the land or to gods or to power. (What is a right? Is it like an arm? Do I have the right to my own body? Who says? Why them? Because they have power? what legitimates their power? Their power? And yet the stability o f communities is a function ofthe recognition ofthe legitimacy ofpower). To say that 'rights are human' can be answered by 'so are justifications'. Human rights are nonsensical: 'human rights' would not be called rights at all. All rights proceed through the inclusion within a community where these rights can be acknowledged. Rights, therefore, in their ambiguous relation to justification, describe a way in which we attach our interpretations (about what isjust) to what we are.
What does the demand to justify our words entail, demand, require? Modernism might require that the words themselves justify their sense, answering questions: does this mean? should I read this? is this art? which is to ask what value do these words have? At any point in the Wake none of these questions can be answered. Thus nothing within the textcancountasajustificationbeforethesequestionshavealreadybeenanswered. Thus if the text could offer a justification that would count as a justification it would have already been justified.
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? The demand for justification before this text requires the interpretation o f what it means to justify in this case. Every text demands and performs its own justification. If we canjustify the Wake as art, we assume that we have criteria determining what art is, in the way we use criteria in evaluating knowledge claims. But this determination of art is exactlywhatjustificationissupposetoprovide. Soagainthedemandseemsnottomake sense because we do not know what the demand means. Y et without justification art seems vague, blind or pointless.
You say to me, 'You are not justified in thinking that. ' 'Thinking' here means something like 'believing'. The criteria for justification here will be partly dependent on what'that'refersto. Thelegitimacyofmythinking,likemyknowledge,seemsdependent on justified true belief. This justification describes a rationale adequate to the facts or logic or the rules o f discourse or of evidence. Although I cannot make the truth o f any particular claim transparent, I should be able to articulate the facts and reasons that would
justify my belief. I can even show how a belief, my own or someone else's, is a prejudice (of course again this does not make my belief either true or false, just not justified except as a prejudice).
Compare this use o f 'justify' (knowledge) with Milton's self-purported, putative 'motive' in writing Paradise Lost
what in me is dark
Illumine, what is low raise and support;
I may assert Eternal Providence, AndjustifythewaysofGodtomen. (1. 22-26)
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? Do we read "And justify the ways of God to men" as a promise to show that God is right? To give God his due? To recognize or establish his rights? No. Is this instead a promise to show that the form ofthe world and ofhumanity is correct? By what standard? How does one determine the criteria by which to judge God and the world (if one already questions God's ways and, therefore, his word)? This goal I think, therefore, should be understoodironically. TheironyofthisgoalrestsonthehumansubsumptionofGod's right tojudge: the human ascension to the possession or the creation ofthe criteria of
judgment. Miltonmusttransformwhatitmeanstojudge(andjustify)sothatwe understand our lives (our very humanity) as a manifestation of God's demand that we
justify our ways to God. Such ajustification, however, requires the acceptance of God's criteria o f evaluation, even though these criteria remain unknown by human beings.
Justification goes through the request that our education be a form of purification. Milton did use justify like this in Areopagitica:
This justifies the high providence of God, who, though he command us temperance, justice, continence, yet pours out before us, even to a profiiseness, all desirable things, and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety. (733)
Thisjustification ofthe ways ofgod is meant to suggest that we must act against these temptations in order to make ourselves (or express ourselves as) virtuous: "that which purifiesusistrial,andtrialisbywhatiscontrary"(728). Thispurification,however,isan attempt to justify ourselves before God.
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? In his discussion ofthe theology ofLuther, Barth argues that "the center ofthis theology, then, is the demand for faith as naked trust that casts itselfinto the arms of God's mercy; faith that is the last word that can be said about the possibility of
justification before God" (Calvin 46). Calvin followed Luther in this even more strongly, tying justification to obedience to God by virtue of God's sovereignty (expressed through predestination). Bydescribingjustificationasakindofeducation(orpurification),Milton forces justification from an interpretation into an act. But we must be careful about what this means. A human life becomes itself an interpretation towards God's criteria of
judgment. Interpretation is embedded within a meaning which emerges through the act of transforming oneselftowards God (the totalizing form ofmeaning). Ajustification, as an interpretation,gainsmeaning(andadeterminingscope)initsuse. Thisusemustalsobe
justified in acting toward the good. This may mean nothing to us if we do not imagine ourselves inhabiting moral totalities (in the way we might imagine inhabiting linguistic totalities).
I think my sketch ofMilton's use ofjustification is cognate with Wittgenstein's description o f the grammar o f shame. First, Wittgenstein describes an expression o f hate and derives its meaning as an interpretation o f the total scene:
"At that moment I hated him. " --What happened here? Didn't it consist in thoughts, feelings, and actions? And if I were to rehearse that moment to myself I should assume a particular expression, I think of certain happenings, breathe in a particular way, arouse certain feelings in myself. I might think up a conversation, a whole scene in which that hatred flared up. And I might play this scene through
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? with feelings approximating to those of a real occasion. That I have actually
experienced something ofthe sort will naturally help me to do so. (PI? 642)
This is clear enough for my purposes. It is important to see that the sentence "At that moment I hated him" is a judgment or interpretation. It's meaning is, therefore, part of thatinterpretation(meaningisnotalwayslikethis). Therecognitionofthishatredandthe fact ofthis hatred can be interpreted further: "IfI now become ashamed ofthis incident, I am ashamed of the whole thing: of the words, of the poisonous tone, etc. " (PI? 643). Wittgensteinthenaskshowdoesthisshameattachtothishatred. WhatexactlyamI ashamed of? "I am not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention which I had. " -- And didn't the intention lie also in what I did? What justifies the shame? The whole historyoftheincident. "(PI? 644;underlineadded). Whatisincludedinthis"whole history" changes and shifts according to how it is embedded in our lives when we remember this incident. Our moral education might be learning how to describe the limits o f our "whole history" as a manifestation o f a set o f values.
Wittgenstein suggests that what we call our intentions are rather interpretations of what we remember o f our "thoughts, feelings, movements, and also connexions with earlier situations" (PI? 645). Learning the correct interpretation not o f our intentions alone but o f how we figure ourselves with intentions, with shames, with hatreds does not entailremakingourlanguage. Itentailsremakingourselveswithinourordinarylanguage figured within organizing limits (for Wittgenstein often normative limits). One might still expect a battle over what these limits are, for example, over what the limits of the ordinary are or over how we learn or use particular language games. This debate (one o f the
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? debates inFinnegans Wake,or rather the pressure deforming language in the Wake, describesalanguagenotyetformedaroundaparticularhumanbeing. Ourreadingofthe Wake puts on these words as ours directed at the limits formed by nonsense, negation, materiality, causation, interpretation, sense, substance, and so on. Seeing the world as consisting o f these limits [and at times as nothing more than these limits] means thinking theologically).
The figure which Milton uses to describe how interpretation and meaning are embedded in each other, how we manifest ourselves in the interpretive histories we use to describe the totalities we inhabit, is animation. Milton animates books: "For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction o f that living intellect that bred them" (720). These books are not to be judged by men, who have invented "new limbos and new hells wherein they might include our bookswithinthenumberofthedamned"(725). Thejustificationofbooks,liketheir meaning, is a function of their use, for even bad books may allow "the judicious reader. . . to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate" (727). Such a use is a justification o f the books and the reader, but a justification different from the judgment about someone'sorsomething'snatureasgoodorbad. SuchjudgmentisreservedforGod. Books are animated through their potential use as manifest inhabitations (a "vial") of our moral stances. Is this a version o f a use by right without justification?
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? Can we find ourselves within a community in which what counts as a justification becomes unclear? I f the Wake continually requires justification, is it the justification like that which James meditated upon for America?
"Oh, yes; we were awfully dear, for what we are and for what we do"-- it was proud, but it was rather rueful; with the odd appearance everywhere as of florid creations waiting, a little bewilderingly, for their justification, waiting for the next clause in the sequence, waiting in short for life, for time, for interest, for character, for identity itselfto come to them, quite as large spread tables or superfluous shops may wait for guests and customers" (American Scene, 90)
James diagnoses this demand for justification as a waiting for completion in which Americans are thingified as spread tables or superfluous shops, which are then animated by their waiting, by an intentionality directed toward this future completion. Justification, itselfj is enacted as "the next clause in the sequence," life, time, interest, character, and identity. This is a kind o f picture o f being-within. The analogic reduction o f justification to the continuation of the linguistic context within which meaning emerges (a model of James' style) is further analogized back into a psycho-philosophical description of a human being bordered by "life" and "identity". The terms connecting these limits o f soul and mind are well chosen. Life, both the principle of animation (something like energy here)
and the totality o f a life, is in the following "time" abstracted and specialized as the form ofthisdynamismandasthelimitonanyparticularlife. Thisdynamismandlimitisrefined in 'interest', an intentional stance expressing value (priorities) and possibility (a moving toward). Thecontentofthispotentialdynamismandvaluationonesuspectsconstitutes
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? character,bothasapsychologicaltermandamoraljudgment. Thispsychologyis stabilized into metaphysics by Identity: I am. This T am' describes the formal limits o f a particular, and is, therefore, in relation to the generality of life stabilized as a mind. In this model justification requires and is constituted by a model of the relation between the limit described by the soul and that described by the mind.
Aestheticjustification means not ajustification ofany particular word, but that each word justifies the whole. Consequently, it is not that each sentence o f the Wake is a microcosm of the Wake, a holographic reflection as are the heterocosoms of romantic art or Schlegels romantic fragments. The appearance ofmimicry is a way ofjustifying the Wake by offering an interpretation of a particular moment, character, or set of words as an interpretation of the entire book (or let's say of an entire life). Projecting forward towards our death means within the logic ofthe Wake projecting ajustification toward that end, the dreamers, ours, or the books. These justifications are all limited and incomplete, but not because of a limit to our knowledge or understanding. The limitation is a function of
justification proceeding through interpretation. Ajustification is never simply an interpretation that simulates the text. W. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley's are wrong when they claim that "judging a poem is likejudging a pudding of a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention o f an artificer" (4). Thispictureassumesapoemworksandexistsasanartifact,asamechanism. Howdoesa poem work separate from its interpretation? What is the output of a poem that can be
judged. Forbothapuddingandamachinewecanclearlyarticulatethecriteriabywhich
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?
written into the Wake. This is a tragedy accompanying our inheritance o f language, or maybeofpronounswhere"Semetomyplaceandjupetbackagain". Joyceisconstructing the place of my signs (Gr. <rr||ia), or the sign of me, or the place marked or having a mark set or affixed (Gr. crr|no08To<;) or a cemetery place. Wakean writing seems to place me
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? ("Semetomyplace") within the surveyable world and loop it back again into a history of origins and disinheritance, placing me with and as Japhet, the 'non-Semitic' son o f Noah, Jupiter from "tham Let", Hamlet, and Ham, the rejected son o f Noah.
If we read this again, the old Greek signs and the Latin imitations, from them that rise, or from Let Rise (a name, a description and a marker, like "ildiot") until Human Literature Sleeps, ask the question "where in the waste is wisdom? " This is a description of how to read: the unity of Greek and Latin in the text (as an example of the language of the Wake) does not communicate, but asks forjustification. And this request is understood as ordinary, as ordinary as waste is and is our desire for wisdom. If 'let rise' both can mean 'arise' and function as the name 'Let Rise', then the confusion o f verb for name (as in "In the beginning was the Word. And the Word was God") is the way in whichonecanenterorbenamedbylanguage. Consequently,"whereinthewasteis wisdom? " describes a stance toward ourselves, the world and our language that analogizes the relation between mind and world, by placing our humanity at risk by placing our constructions and our world as a world against us.
This is the effect ofJoyce's lists, to place the world enumerated against us and in this offer targets for sense and identification. But once an identification is made, as a result of an interpretation ('"alphybetty verbage' is a version of the Wake, or "am I a whirling dervish? " or "can the world be built outside of logic or as a list of predicates without any subject[s]? '), the meaning remains unclear. No interpretation is ever adequate because interpretation cannot determine meaning. Is the meaning ofFinnegans Wake the following list?
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? My wud! The warped flooring ofthe lair and soundconducting walls thereof. . . were persianly literatured with burst loveletters, telltale stories,. . . doubtful eggshells,. . . alphybettyformed verbage, vivlical viasses, ompiter dictas, visus umbique, ahems and ahahs, imeffible tries as speech unasyllabled, you owe mes, eyoldhyms, fluefoul smul, fallen lucifers,. . . counterfeit franks, best intentions,. . . gloss teeth for a tooth,. . . inversions of all this chambermade music one stands, given a grain of goodwill, a fair chance of actually seeing the whirling dervish, Tumult, son o f Thunder, self exiled in upon his ego, a nightlong a shaking betwixtween white or reddr hawrors, noondayterrorised to skin and bone by an I neluctable phantom . . . writing the mystery o f himself in furniture. (FW183. 08- 184. 10)
Furniture and language both constitute the world as limits to myself. This limit is enacted by or as matter, what Berkeley called "the furniture of earth". What is "the mystery of himself'? He writes while sitting in furniture as a piece of furniture determined and defined by materiality. This "mystery o f himself in furniture" becomes at the end o f the Wake, when the sleeper is awakening, the "fumit o f heupanepi world" (FW611. 18). c[F]umit' containsfait (L. as it was) andfarm s (L. oven, fireplace), and can be read as 'bum it'. "[F]umit' can be translated as 'as it as bums and is a furnace. " This burning is stabilized as a thing when "fumit" puns "the furniture of earth. " Consequently, the being andstabilityofthepastcondensedintofurniturecontainsHeracletianflux. "[H]eupanepi' consistsoftheGreekeu(good),pan(all),andepi(upon). Thus"fumitofheupanepi world" can be translated as 'the furniture o f the flux o f the good upon all the world bums
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? into a furnace. ' (So that's what it means to confuse the mind and the world! ) As the sleeper awakens into consciousness at the end of the Wake, under the sun and in rising color, "that part of it (fumit of heupanepi world) had shown itself. . . unable to absorbere", that part ofthe matter ofcourse, the matter ofa person organized as time, as change, (thefurnitureofthefluxofthegooduponalltheworldbumsintoafurnace)had shown itself unable to absorb light, because there was little light in the night, and because the mind reflects the world, which with the new sun means this it (this "world, mind") becomes another sun. 3 This is a picture of a mind generating and reflecting the light of the world. But this picture is neither a metaphor nor a model nor a theory ofthe mind. It is, instead, a description o f being between things (furniture) and loss (burning) as a limit to them both. Being between matter and time requires a mode o f self-reflection that generates an T as a limit to meaning. What I mean by this is that one cannot get anymore meaning out our own self-reflection than we can out o f this passage in the Wake. And the meaning of this passage is a description of the limit to the meaning of this passage.
The night is a reordering of oneself and the world into the condition betwixtween things, ideas, concepts, clarity, sense, moments. "Yet is no body present here which was nottherebefore. Onlyisorderothered,Noughtisnulled. FuitfiatX"(FW613. 13-14). Asit was, let it be! What is this reothering, where "nought is nulled", but everything is knot and nat? This kind o f riddle, another riddle o f enveloping facts, can be answered by another riddle: "Do you hold yourself then for some god in the manger, Sheholhem, that you will neither serve nor let serve, pray nor let pray? " (FW188. 18-19)
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? Language itself can be used as the form o f resistance to the claims o f the world or ofother people on us (the claims, ifone acknowledges any, ofthe Wake). ALP writes,
"I wrote me hopes and buried the page when I heard Thy voice" (the coming of day or of sense or of a greeting and so on) I asked "So content me now" (FW624. 04-05). Such content appears to be "I pity your oldselfI was used to. Now a younger's there. " (FW627. 06-07). Theoldselfiswhat'I'usedto. . . be,orbecomingwasa "Tobecontinued's tale" (FW626. 18). Being here is also a habit, "I was used to", where the difference between how one describes oneself is not clearly different from how one describes others.
And yet it is exactly the difference between myself and others that allows me to be visibletotheseothers. InInvestigations,Wittgensteinidentifiestwodomainsofknowing: (1) a knowing marked by second and third person claims, and (2) first person claims associatedwithmentalstateslikebeingdepressed,excited,inpain,etc. Thuswecansay 'I know he is in pain,' but not 'I know I am in pain'. Could I doubt this? Or not know that I am in pain?
If we say "'Since yesterday I have understood this word. ' 'Continuously', though? --To be sure, one can speak of an interpretation of understanding, but in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less? " and "when did you stop understanding that word? " (PI p. 59)
I can forget that "wissen"means to know, and then all ofa sudden recall it, maybe by saying to myself "/c/z weiss". It is through experiences like this that we imagine an unconscious somewhere behind, beneath, around, even surrounding our consciousness.
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? But I might never recall the definition without looking it up or asking a German friend. Thus we might think that our unconscious is a dictionary for our consciousness. Forgetting a word seems like losing it, losing something that is mine. In this my world or my language has waned, and the world has shrunk.
One can follow the mineness of knowing a word (which does not mean of course that it is private) into the mineness of pain and enter Wittgenstein's discussion of pain. Can I ask someone if I am still in pain? Since I can't my pain seems private. I can also forgetmypain. Imightgethitagain,harder,sothatwhateverwasbrokenbeforegets maskedbyagreaterpain. Thismightbeafunctionofthelimitationsofmynervous system, but we find the same effect in our emotional distress. This is what drives us into homeopathy. I might listen to Chopin's B flat minor Sonata (with its Funeral March) after my wife has left me. This might seem at the time a tragedy, and at least call for catharsis, as Milton says in the Preface to Samson Agonistes "to purge the mind o f those and such like passions, . . . , by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion: for so Physic things of melancholic hue and quality are us'd against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humors. " The passions transformed in tragedy are reduced analogically to a physiologicalprinciple. Weentertheworldthroughthisanalogy. Thesepainsmightbe mine. If I lose this pain have I lost something of mine? Pain, excitement, depression all can be temporally limited to a particular duration. They are contained within time. The mineness of these sensations is my experience, my investment or identification of myself with these mental states. Can I experience the meaning o f the word "wissen"? If not then
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? how is it mine? Should we not construe it, after the model in the Tractatus, as a limit of my experience and thus of my world? We want love to be like understanding a world as myworld,notlike'knowing'transitorypain. Inthissensewewantlovetobeamind. 4
The "between" in Finnegans Wake is marking off in negative space these two uses o f 'knowing,' not as logical distinctions tied to theories about first or third person discourse, but as grammatical distinctions organizing our investments in the forms o f our languageasmeaningful. Thisislikeaestheticizinglogicorlinguistics,notassublime(as in metaphysics), but as I suggested as grammatical jokes. The fragments generated by these jokes form a "monthage stick in the melmelode hawr, I am (twintomine) all thees thing"(FW223. 08-09). Thisislikesaying,"Iamallthesefragmentsincludingthis fragment and that and this 'I'. " In my previous discussion of fragments, this self-reflexive turning expresses a demand forjustification, or a configuration ofthe condition ofbeing human within the world as between what Wittgenstein marks as justifications and rights:
"When I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before myself. " --What does that mean? Does it mean: "If someone else could know what I am calling 'pain', he would admit that I was using the word correctly"?
To use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right. (PI? 289)
This last sentence is either contradictory (an appeal to rights is an appeal to justification) or is a picture of the limit ofjustification. If the latter, justification operates outside first- personclaims: itscriteriaarevisibletoothers. Thusjustification,inthispictureofuse,is not required when expressing pain because how would I be mistaken about my own pain
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? (not my own hurt). But does the concept o f right, describing my statements as without justification but with right, attach itself differently to my first person claims? Justification
functions through an interpretive stance from which judgments can be made. Justification operatesinrelationtonormativecriteria. DerivedfromLius(thatwhichisbinding,right, justice, duty), 'justification' or 'justify' configures something or someone in relation to the
interactive order organizing the domain in which this something or someone operates and exists. But this re-ordering requires a mark to express its success. Such a remark, however, is the prime means by which this reordering can take place, and thus from ius is derived iurare, to pronounce a ritual formula or swear an oath. Justice arises not only as an effect o f our promises and betrayals, but it is constituted as such promises through whichwebecomecapableofjusticebecausewecanbejudged. Justicerequiresspeech, because justice is a form of speaking. This speech, however, must be a speaking of a community, an invocation of the particular (an individual or an expression or a sentence) by requiring that it express the whole (thus the standardization of ritual pronouncements and the strictures of tradition). There is, therefore, at least an isomorphism between language and the function ofjustice: both require that the whole be present in the particular. This relation is marked in the derivation o f L iudex, he who points to or show
the law (from whence our judge). Iudex derives from ius and diet (dex), to speak, say, etc. The collapse in our word judge of the act ofjudging (judge as verb) and the person who judges (noun) recalls the same need for the normative to be expressed fully in a particular,inthiscaseasthegroundofauthority. Andthuswespeakoftherighttojudge ('right' cognate with L. rex).
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? As I suggested earlier, rights can be given, and thus they are not a given, a ground. Ifjustification is the application ofcriteria ofjudgment, rights are gained when these criteria are given as yours to apply to yourself. In giving rights one is giving recognition ofthoserights. Ifwecompare'Ihavetheright'with'Ihavethejustification'wecansee that the appeal to rights is a first person appeal, while the appeal to justification is an appeal to either second person (as if in a monarchy) or third person (as if in a democracy). Thus we can say "I am justified by my right to X". In this case justification is the applicationofaright. Butthisright,especiallyinWittgenstein'sdescription,isan expression whose self-sufficiency is only determined by our judgment that one is speaking by right (and without justification).
How does one conceptualize oneself if one could not speak about, let's say, spiritual pain by right?
This third person appeal underwriting justification reifies rights away from the particularity o f persons and communities. The appeal to right by Wittgenstein is, however, an appeal to the normative usage of language. Normative criteria, whether embedded in language (or any formal structures) or in one's person (through social recognition of self-sufficiency, which therefore involves a self-recognition), erase the differencebetweenfirstpersonandsecondorthirdpersonappeals. Thedifferencewould seem to be the requirements for the application o f the language o f description determined asjustificationofright. Myquestioninghereisnotaboutthefirstpersonstatusofpain (the fact that one could not not know one's own pain), but is about determining what's at stake in Wittgenstein's invocation o f a difference between justification and rights.
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? If one can separate the application of criteria from the criteria themselves, then criteria are inadequate to describe the relation between personhood (to which are attached rights) and any totality determining normative standards (towards which justification operates). Becausetheappealtorightswantstoconceptualizepersonhood(or particularity) as a totality determining normative standards personhood is both stabilized (as a ground) and destabilized (as normative). Thus the questions "when does something mean" or 'when do I know how to play chess? " arise when we view ourselves as simultaneously a particular and a universal, as a fragment or at night, or in our attempts to conceptualize both the language games we use to describe dreams and the language games about our self-loss at night. .
The following is another version ofthe Wake which is another version ofthis self- loss:
"Yet it is but an old story, the tale of a Treestone with one Ysold, of a Mons held by tentpegs and his pal whatholoosed on the run . . . drop this jiggerypokery and talk straight turkey meet to mate, for while the ear, be we mikealls or
nicholists, may sometimes by inclined to believe others the eye, whether browned or nolensed, find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself. (FW113. 18-29)
The elm and stone are telling a tale of ALP as Isolde (compare this story with Eliot's telling of this story) and of HCE as Gulliver, where the Lilliputians tentpeg him down like sleep and its fragments and details. Someone asks (the text or the reader) to speak "straight turkey", but even in this request a metaphor for plan speaking can become the
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? plainfleshof"turkeymeet"(meat). Whynotbuildachurchonthispuninsteadofthepun onSt. Peter? Ordinarylanguagepausesthe"jiggerypokery"ofthisnight,likethelove potion Isolde drank, so that to meet is to mate. Do we believe the evidence of our ears over that of our eyes? Language of the eye or the ear cannot establish certainty. It is a fact about ordinary language just as it is a fact about ordinary life that we might "find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself', where this itself might be language animated into the form of our understanding or ourselves as bodies unsure of our status as animate beings.
In justification the criteria used, the totality invoked (society, language, law), functions as a limit to the particular. In rights the particular (individual, sentence, claim) functions as a limit to the totality. Epistemological justification is therefore an application ofcriteria. Aestheticjustification,likewhenepistemologicalbecomesontological
justification, when knowing ifthe bird is a goldfinch becomes the skeptical problem of determining if the bird is a hallucination, cannot be satisfied by any criteria because these criteria are missing or themselves require justification.
Ifanylinedidjustifythewholewritingwouldcease. Thedemandforjustification is not necessarily met by success. To use it by right opens up the complexity in the use of possession as a justification for freedom, an appeal to citizenship, the community, in this case the community of speakers, the normative conventionalism determining the criteria of language (games) expressed as personhood. The appeal to right here pretends to undercut the demand for justification, but the appeal to right rests on the collapse ofjustification into personhood. Personhood is not something that can be denied; by this I mean even the
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? denial of the right to personhood that defined American slavery or describes ethnic and religious conflicts are tacit recognitions ofwhat is being denied. Wittgenstein's arguments that we respond to the pain in another as if to their human physiognomy is true in these cases as well. But is not the case that a right is an expression of personhood? It can only function as such an expression through a logic ofjustification that attaches the right to personhood and not to the land or to gods or to power. (What is a right? Is it like an arm? Do I have the right to my own body? Who says? Why them? Because they have power? what legitimates their power? Their power? And yet the stability o f communities is a function ofthe recognition ofthe legitimacy ofpower). To say that 'rights are human' can be answered by 'so are justifications'. Human rights are nonsensical: 'human rights' would not be called rights at all. All rights proceed through the inclusion within a community where these rights can be acknowledged. Rights, therefore, in their ambiguous relation to justification, describe a way in which we attach our interpretations (about what isjust) to what we are.
What does the demand to justify our words entail, demand, require? Modernism might require that the words themselves justify their sense, answering questions: does this mean? should I read this? is this art? which is to ask what value do these words have? At any point in the Wake none of these questions can be answered. Thus nothing within the textcancountasajustificationbeforethesequestionshavealreadybeenanswered. Thus if the text could offer a justification that would count as a justification it would have already been justified.
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? The demand for justification before this text requires the interpretation o f what it means to justify in this case. Every text demands and performs its own justification. If we canjustify the Wake as art, we assume that we have criteria determining what art is, in the way we use criteria in evaluating knowledge claims. But this determination of art is exactlywhatjustificationissupposetoprovide. Soagainthedemandseemsnottomake sense because we do not know what the demand means. Y et without justification art seems vague, blind or pointless.
You say to me, 'You are not justified in thinking that. ' 'Thinking' here means something like 'believing'. The criteria for justification here will be partly dependent on what'that'refersto. Thelegitimacyofmythinking,likemyknowledge,seemsdependent on justified true belief. This justification describes a rationale adequate to the facts or logic or the rules o f discourse or of evidence. Although I cannot make the truth o f any particular claim transparent, I should be able to articulate the facts and reasons that would
justify my belief. I can even show how a belief, my own or someone else's, is a prejudice (of course again this does not make my belief either true or false, just not justified except as a prejudice).
Compare this use o f 'justify' (knowledge) with Milton's self-purported, putative 'motive' in writing Paradise Lost
what in me is dark
Illumine, what is low raise and support;
I may assert Eternal Providence, AndjustifythewaysofGodtomen. (1. 22-26)
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? Do we read "And justify the ways of God to men" as a promise to show that God is right? To give God his due? To recognize or establish his rights? No. Is this instead a promise to show that the form ofthe world and ofhumanity is correct? By what standard? How does one determine the criteria by which to judge God and the world (if one already questions God's ways and, therefore, his word)? This goal I think, therefore, should be understoodironically. TheironyofthisgoalrestsonthehumansubsumptionofGod's right tojudge: the human ascension to the possession or the creation ofthe criteria of
judgment. Miltonmusttransformwhatitmeanstojudge(andjustify)sothatwe understand our lives (our very humanity) as a manifestation of God's demand that we
justify our ways to God. Such ajustification, however, requires the acceptance of God's criteria o f evaluation, even though these criteria remain unknown by human beings.
Justification goes through the request that our education be a form of purification. Milton did use justify like this in Areopagitica:
This justifies the high providence of God, who, though he command us temperance, justice, continence, yet pours out before us, even to a profiiseness, all desirable things, and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety. (733)
Thisjustification ofthe ways ofgod is meant to suggest that we must act against these temptations in order to make ourselves (or express ourselves as) virtuous: "that which purifiesusistrial,andtrialisbywhatiscontrary"(728). Thispurification,however,isan attempt to justify ourselves before God.
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? In his discussion ofthe theology ofLuther, Barth argues that "the center ofthis theology, then, is the demand for faith as naked trust that casts itselfinto the arms of God's mercy; faith that is the last word that can be said about the possibility of
justification before God" (Calvin 46). Calvin followed Luther in this even more strongly, tying justification to obedience to God by virtue of God's sovereignty (expressed through predestination). Bydescribingjustificationasakindofeducation(orpurification),Milton forces justification from an interpretation into an act. But we must be careful about what this means. A human life becomes itself an interpretation towards God's criteria of
judgment. Interpretation is embedded within a meaning which emerges through the act of transforming oneselftowards God (the totalizing form ofmeaning). Ajustification, as an interpretation,gainsmeaning(andadeterminingscope)initsuse. Thisusemustalsobe
justified in acting toward the good. This may mean nothing to us if we do not imagine ourselves inhabiting moral totalities (in the way we might imagine inhabiting linguistic totalities).
I think my sketch ofMilton's use ofjustification is cognate with Wittgenstein's description o f the grammar o f shame. First, Wittgenstein describes an expression o f hate and derives its meaning as an interpretation o f the total scene:
"At that moment I hated him. " --What happened here? Didn't it consist in thoughts, feelings, and actions? And if I were to rehearse that moment to myself I should assume a particular expression, I think of certain happenings, breathe in a particular way, arouse certain feelings in myself. I might think up a conversation, a whole scene in which that hatred flared up. And I might play this scene through
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? with feelings approximating to those of a real occasion. That I have actually
experienced something ofthe sort will naturally help me to do so. (PI? 642)
This is clear enough for my purposes. It is important to see that the sentence "At that moment I hated him" is a judgment or interpretation. It's meaning is, therefore, part of thatinterpretation(meaningisnotalwayslikethis). Therecognitionofthishatredandthe fact ofthis hatred can be interpreted further: "IfI now become ashamed ofthis incident, I am ashamed of the whole thing: of the words, of the poisonous tone, etc. " (PI? 643). Wittgensteinthenaskshowdoesthisshameattachtothishatred. WhatexactlyamI ashamed of? "I am not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention which I had. " -- And didn't the intention lie also in what I did? What justifies the shame? The whole historyoftheincident. "(PI? 644;underlineadded). Whatisincludedinthis"whole history" changes and shifts according to how it is embedded in our lives when we remember this incident. Our moral education might be learning how to describe the limits o f our "whole history" as a manifestation o f a set o f values.
Wittgenstein suggests that what we call our intentions are rather interpretations of what we remember o f our "thoughts, feelings, movements, and also connexions with earlier situations" (PI? 645). Learning the correct interpretation not o f our intentions alone but o f how we figure ourselves with intentions, with shames, with hatreds does not entailremakingourlanguage. Itentailsremakingourselveswithinourordinarylanguage figured within organizing limits (for Wittgenstein often normative limits). One might still expect a battle over what these limits are, for example, over what the limits of the ordinary are or over how we learn or use particular language games. This debate (one o f the
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? debates inFinnegans Wake,or rather the pressure deforming language in the Wake, describesalanguagenotyetformedaroundaparticularhumanbeing. Ourreadingofthe Wake puts on these words as ours directed at the limits formed by nonsense, negation, materiality, causation, interpretation, sense, substance, and so on. Seeing the world as consisting o f these limits [and at times as nothing more than these limits] means thinking theologically).
The figure which Milton uses to describe how interpretation and meaning are embedded in each other, how we manifest ourselves in the interpretive histories we use to describe the totalities we inhabit, is animation. Milton animates books: "For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction o f that living intellect that bred them" (720). These books are not to be judged by men, who have invented "new limbos and new hells wherein they might include our bookswithinthenumberofthedamned"(725). Thejustificationofbooks,liketheir meaning, is a function of their use, for even bad books may allow "the judicious reader. . . to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate" (727). Such a use is a justification o f the books and the reader, but a justification different from the judgment about someone'sorsomething'snatureasgoodorbad. SuchjudgmentisreservedforGod. Books are animated through their potential use as manifest inhabitations (a "vial") of our moral stances. Is this a version o f a use by right without justification?
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? Can we find ourselves within a community in which what counts as a justification becomes unclear? I f the Wake continually requires justification, is it the justification like that which James meditated upon for America?
"Oh, yes; we were awfully dear, for what we are and for what we do"-- it was proud, but it was rather rueful; with the odd appearance everywhere as of florid creations waiting, a little bewilderingly, for their justification, waiting for the next clause in the sequence, waiting in short for life, for time, for interest, for character, for identity itselfto come to them, quite as large spread tables or superfluous shops may wait for guests and customers" (American Scene, 90)
James diagnoses this demand for justification as a waiting for completion in which Americans are thingified as spread tables or superfluous shops, which are then animated by their waiting, by an intentionality directed toward this future completion. Justification, itselfj is enacted as "the next clause in the sequence," life, time, interest, character, and identity. This is a kind o f picture o f being-within. The analogic reduction o f justification to the continuation of the linguistic context within which meaning emerges (a model of James' style) is further analogized back into a psycho-philosophical description of a human being bordered by "life" and "identity". The terms connecting these limits o f soul and mind are well chosen. Life, both the principle of animation (something like energy here)
and the totality o f a life, is in the following "time" abstracted and specialized as the form ofthisdynamismandasthelimitonanyparticularlife. Thisdynamismandlimitisrefined in 'interest', an intentional stance expressing value (priorities) and possibility (a moving toward). Thecontentofthispotentialdynamismandvaluationonesuspectsconstitutes
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? character,bothasapsychologicaltermandamoraljudgment. Thispsychologyis stabilized into metaphysics by Identity: I am. This T am' describes the formal limits o f a particular, and is, therefore, in relation to the generality of life stabilized as a mind. In this model justification requires and is constituted by a model of the relation between the limit described by the soul and that described by the mind.
Aestheticjustification means not ajustification ofany particular word, but that each word justifies the whole. Consequently, it is not that each sentence o f the Wake is a microcosm of the Wake, a holographic reflection as are the heterocosoms of romantic art or Schlegels romantic fragments. The appearance ofmimicry is a way ofjustifying the Wake by offering an interpretation of a particular moment, character, or set of words as an interpretation of the entire book (or let's say of an entire life). Projecting forward towards our death means within the logic ofthe Wake projecting ajustification toward that end, the dreamers, ours, or the books. These justifications are all limited and incomplete, but not because of a limit to our knowledge or understanding. The limitation is a function of
justification proceeding through interpretation. Ajustification is never simply an interpretation that simulates the text. W. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley's are wrong when they claim that "judging a poem is likejudging a pudding of a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention o f an artificer" (4). Thispictureassumesapoemworksandexistsasanartifact,asamechanism. Howdoesa poem work separate from its interpretation? What is the output of a poem that can be
judged. Forbothapuddingandamachinewecanclearlyarticulatethecriteriabywhich
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?
