But in order to
include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special
characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God created
great whales," etc.
include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special
characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God created
great whales," etc.
Summa Theologica
In the first
work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but
as yet without form. In the second, or work of "distinction," the
heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form
to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by
giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers
suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is
distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth
regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but
the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a
man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing
or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most
evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the
work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having
movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated
above ([585]Q[69], A[1]), that three things are recorded as created,
namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received
their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was
formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated;
and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So
also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work,
which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the
heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds
and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate
element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;
while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth,
to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that
Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is
not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that
they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament
has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing
plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce
lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb. "
Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty
here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so
there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another
form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the
heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be
said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals
and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly
bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally
incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially
created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless,
is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a
determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not
mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the
fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen. ) explains this by the need of
guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are
proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in
holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made
on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first
day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have
been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the
fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate
effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect,
those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a
determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's
light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are
not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the
movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen. )
that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed
them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He
placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle,
however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no
other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the
movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii,
text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of
condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said
([586]Q[67], A[4]; [587]Q[68], A[3]). The objection, however, falls to
the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having
a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even
though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of
which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For
although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a
higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on
the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher
firmament.
Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem. ), plants
were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,
since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that
plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom
remarks (Hom. vi in Gen. ), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the
work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by
his labor.
Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called
great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their
influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the
moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses
in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its
apparent size is greater.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production
of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not
afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear. " Therefore the
heavenly lights were not made to be signs.
Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the
lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they
are not signs.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from
the first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and
days, and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is
inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic.
iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not
made "to enlighten it. "
Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night. "
But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from
the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night. "
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As we have said above ([588]Q[65], A[2]), a corporeal
creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper
act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the
glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the
usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order
to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19):
"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the
moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou
adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of
all nations. " Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis
as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to
sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for
perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in
the firmament and give life to the earth. " Secondly, as regards the
changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and
provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be
secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years. " Thirdly, as
regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights
are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable
to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for
signs. "
Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of
changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which
depend upon the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of
hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence
nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says
"signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.
Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night
took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is
common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that
first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and
years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than
another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular
movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on
the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of
man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies.
Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake
of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of
the universe.
Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in
the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and
it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding
seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is
developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must
exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit.
ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God
made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings.
For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a
body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with
fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of
heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its
form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or
animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all
forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence
Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands
higher in the order of nature than one that has not life. " The lights
of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,
moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the
case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from
the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly
bodies a living soul.
Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly
bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is
from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the
heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as
the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).
Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the
heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all
things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is
proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself
precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move
themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the
heavenly bodies are living beings.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem
the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have
neither life nor sense. "
I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras,
for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was
condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass
of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being. " On the other
hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was
there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was
the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were
alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles.
1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about. " But
Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem. ) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the
matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he
goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living
beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of
opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul
and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the
form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now
the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation,
which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations,
as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence
it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a
body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however,
operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of
the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production.
The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the
bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable
of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the
functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the
nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for
such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible.
Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can
appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the
sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs
of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of
elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental.
It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left
to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and
moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual
perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the
intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as
their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot
be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul
to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the
intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of
the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the
soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter
as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that
which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after
showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and
the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two
parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both
are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other
not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way,
as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato
holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else
but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as
their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the
direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like
bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas
nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this
does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows
that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears
to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all
corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin.
iii, 4).
From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are
not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if
they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen
that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who
deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of
words.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the
universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the
heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment,
for they are moved by a living substance.
Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely,
but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that
the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals
absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with
regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a
soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves
the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is
of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and
therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can
impart life in virtue of that agent.
Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural,
not on account of their active principle, but on account of their
passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for
being moved by an intelligent power.
Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it
is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect
to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is
natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to
produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of
every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are
generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth
the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the
earth," do not fittingly describe this work.
Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water
only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition,
as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth
and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are
produced from water.
Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air.
If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be
produced from the air, and not from the waters.
Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for
some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of
fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters
bring forth the creeping creature having life. "
Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and
fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs,
and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,
whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has
precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not
to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As said above, ([589]Q[70], A[1]), the order of the work
of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.
Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the
middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water,
which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of
adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the
adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and
fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on
the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first
day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day
he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the
fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that
Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the
production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of
plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the
fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced
them on that day potentially.
Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all
kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and
naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to
the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and
consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed
cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather
to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are
generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power
of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly
bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either
kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the
elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle
was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements,
either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine
teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of
producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as
Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of
producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the
influence of the stars.
Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered
from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be
evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element
that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in
quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of
the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with
certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the
bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their
generation is described.
Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses,
is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the
water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery
exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds
move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly "beneath the
firmament," even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of
clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through
the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type
between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something
in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class
to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in
common with that class, rather than with the other.
But in order to
include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special
characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God created
great whales," etc.
Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these
animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they
are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals
themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached
through the less perfect.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.
But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words,
"Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather have
been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures. "
Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species.
But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to
be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and
species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of
his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said
about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said
"according to its genus" and "in its species. "
Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is
recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and
fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much
more reason, of the other animals as well.
Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,
which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first
founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been
produced at that time.
Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to
man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man
sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at
all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had
sinned.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by
the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the
earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers
that it was actual.
Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in
different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in
which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem. ).
The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to
discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of
their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in
generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition
and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown
later on ([590]Q[78], A[2]). But amongst animals, those that live on
land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not
because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in
Hexaem. ) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their
limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet
some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in
certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes "living
creatures," but "creeping creatures having life"; whereas it does call
land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life,
and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them
something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of
their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them.
But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be
produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but
immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified,
which in any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals
such as bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those
animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the
earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far
from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals,
as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word
"quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first as
being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even
some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.
Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made
of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But
it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already
been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals
and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to
signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas
man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God. "
Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by
generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the
making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the
earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is
repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a
special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad
lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin
whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they
experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating,
they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.
Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation
of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more
perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the
corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated
then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have
been produced then otherwise than potentially.
Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr.
Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer
he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,
and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.
Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself
with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the
things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,
laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with
many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their
existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,
these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe. " And,
since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world
conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have
injured him.
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ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) About the completion of the works;
(2) About the resting of God;
(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
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Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the
seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works
ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are
done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of
the world will be at the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover,
the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it
is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg. : 'the fulness of time']" (Gal.
4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is
consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does
not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But
we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather
that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works
does not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many
things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is
called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess.
But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of
many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are
frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the
Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): "The Lord
hath created a new thing upon the earth. " Miracles also are new works,
of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and work new
miracles. " Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are
glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on the throne
said: Behold I make all things new. " Therefore the completion of the
Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "On the seventh day God ended
His work which He had made. "
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that
according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this
perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole
having its parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end,
which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the
harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the
builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first
perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the
principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of
the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the
consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness
of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to
the seventh day.
Reply to Objection 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second,
as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are
required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of
beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation
existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding
of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace
and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh
day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the
consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the
consummation of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating
new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work
proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second"
perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though
according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,
however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the
completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion
as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that
in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible,
movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest
denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other
creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by
the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on
that day to have consummated His work.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God,
but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the
work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience
materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed
Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes,
as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the
first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear,
existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and
perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by
the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.
Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of
individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the
offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in
their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed
beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work
of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil.
2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men. " And again, the
glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of
similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the
empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is
new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us. "
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Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day
from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), "My Father worketh until
now, and I work. " God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all
His work.
Objection 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which
movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and
without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from
His work.
Objection 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh
day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is
set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God created"
or "made" this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He
made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God
cannot be explained as His making man to rest.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh day
from all the work which He had done. "
I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to
move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense
meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.
Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.
First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,
as said above (A[1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not
existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,
because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was
happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He
is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for
His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting
in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And
even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in
Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest
which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the
meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and
providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new
ones.
Reply to Objection 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement,
but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an
external object.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy
in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the
enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both
from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that
God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be
set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal
explanation.
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Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to
the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for
that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But
whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost
to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the
seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
than the day on which He ceased producing them.
Objection 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as
upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good. " Therefore it
was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day
should be blessed.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh day
and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work. "
I answer that, As said above [591](A[2]), God's rest on the seventh day
is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new
works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has
made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.
According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh
day, since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the
increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures
which He blessed: "Increase and multiply. " Now, this increase is
effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the
generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it
is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the
special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God.
For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.
Reply to Objection 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not
because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because
something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their
resting in God.
Reply to Objection 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in
their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied
and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And
the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge
that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its
fruition.
Reply to Objection 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day
belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached
to the seventh day, to its propagation.
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ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
the works of the six days.
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Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently
enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works
of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another.
But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and
therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.
Objection 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and
water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another
to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be
devoted to the distinction of fire and air.
Objection 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ
from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other
animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day
is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the
beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
production of birds and another to that of man.
Objection 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of
these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the
luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is
produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and
the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different
days.
Objection 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting
of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that
day ought not to be enumerated with the others.
I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made
clear by what has been said above ([592]Q[70], A[1]), namely, that the
parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part
adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the
parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according
to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part,
the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the
Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the
beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is
distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle
part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the
third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth.
But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last
three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,
spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the
two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days,
and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine
works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum
of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the
forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and
three to the work of adornment.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation
belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless
spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says
(Confess. xii, 12).
work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but
as yet without form. In the second, or work of "distinction," the
heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form
to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by
giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers
suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is
distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth
regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but
the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a
man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing
or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most
evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the
work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having
movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated
above ([585]Q[69], A[1]), that three things are recorded as created,
namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received
their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was
formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated;
and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So
also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work,
which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the
heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds
and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate
element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;
while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth,
to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that
Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is
not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that
they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament
has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing
plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce
lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb. "
Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty
here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so
there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another
form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the
heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be
said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals
and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly
bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally
incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially
created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless,
is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a
determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not
mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the
fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen. ) explains this by the need of
guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are
proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the
beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in
holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made
on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first
day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have
been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the
fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate
effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect,
those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a
determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's
light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are
not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the
movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen. )
that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed
them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He
placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle,
however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no
other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the
movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii,
text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of
condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said
([586]Q[67], A[4]; [587]Q[68], A[3]). The objection, however, falls to
the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having
a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even
though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of
which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For
although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a
higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on
the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher
firmament.
Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem. ), plants
were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,
since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that
plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom
remarks (Hom. vi in Gen. ), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the
work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by
his labor.
Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called
great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their
influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the
moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses
in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its
apparent size is greater.
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Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production
of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not
afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear. " Therefore the
heavenly lights were not made to be signs.
Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the
lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they
are not signs.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from
the first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and
days, and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is
inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic.
iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not
made "to enlighten it. "
Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night. "
But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from
the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night. "
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As we have said above ([588]Q[65], A[2]), a corporeal
creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper
act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the
glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the
usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order
to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19):
"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the
moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou
adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of
all nations. " Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis
as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to
sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for
perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in
the firmament and give life to the earth. " Secondly, as regards the
changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and
provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be
secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years. " Thirdly, as
regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights
are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable
to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for
signs. "
Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of
changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which
depend upon the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of
hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence
nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says
"signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.
Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night
took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is
common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that
first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and
years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than
another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular
movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on
the fourth day.
Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of
man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies.
Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake
of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of
the universe.
Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in
the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and
it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding
seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is
developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must
exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit.
ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God
made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.
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Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings.
For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a
body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with
fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of
heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its
form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or
animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all
forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence
Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands
higher in the order of nature than one that has not life. " The lights
of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,
moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the
case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from
the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly
bodies a living soul.
Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly
bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is
from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the
heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as
the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).
Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the
heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all
things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is
proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself
precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move
themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the
heavenly bodies are living beings.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem
the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have
neither life nor sense. "
I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras,
for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was
condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass
of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being. " On the other
hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was
there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was
the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were
alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles.
1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about. " But
Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem. ) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the
matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he
goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living
beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of
opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul
and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the
form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now
the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation,
which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations,
as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence
it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a
body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however,
operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of
the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production.
The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the
bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable
of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the
functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the
nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for
such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible.
Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can
appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the
sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs
of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of
elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental.
It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left
to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and
moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual
perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the
intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as
their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot
be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul
to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the
intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of
the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the
soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter
as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that
which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after
showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and
the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two
parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both
are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other
not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way,
as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato
holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else
but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as
their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the
direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like
bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas
nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this
does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows
that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears
to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all
corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin.
iii, 4).
From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are
not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if
they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen
that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who
deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of
words.
Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the
universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the
heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment,
for they are moved by a living substance.
Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely,
but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that
the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals
absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with
regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a
soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves
the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is
of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and
therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can
impart life in virtue of that agent.
Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural,
not on account of their active principle, but on account of their
passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for
being moved by an intelligent power.
Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it
is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect
to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is
natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to
produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of
every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are
generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth
the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the
earth," do not fittingly describe this work.
Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water
only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition,
as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth
and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are
produced from water.
Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air.
If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be
produced from the air, and not from the waters.
Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for
some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of
fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters
bring forth the creeping creature having life. "
Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and
fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs,
and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,
whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has
precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not
to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As said above, ([589]Q[70], A[1]), the order of the work
of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.
Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the
middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water,
which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of
adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the
adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and
fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on
the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first
day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day
he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the
fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that
Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the
production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of
plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the
fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced
them on that day potentially.
Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all
kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and
naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to
the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and
consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed
cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather
to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are
generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power
of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly
bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either
kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the
elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle
was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements,
either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine
teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of
producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as
Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of
producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the
influence of the stars.
Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered
from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be
evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element
that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in
quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of
the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with
certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the
bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their
generation is described.
Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses,
is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the
water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery
exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds
move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly "beneath the
firmament," even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of
clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.
Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through
the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type
between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something
in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class
to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in
common with that class, rather than with the other.
But in order to
include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special
characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the
creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God created
great whales," etc.
Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these
animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they
are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals
themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached
through the less perfect.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.
But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words,
"Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather have
been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures. "
Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species.
But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to
be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and
species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of
his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said
about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said
"according to its genus" and "in its species. "
Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is
recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and
fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much
more reason, of the other animals as well.
Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,
which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first
founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been
produced at that time.
Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to
man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man
sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at
all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had
sinned.
On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by
the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the
earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers
that it was actual.
Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in
different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in
which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem. ).
The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to
discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of
their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in
generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition
and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown
later on ([590]Q[78], A[2]). But amongst animals, those that live on
land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not
because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in
Hexaem. ) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their
limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet
some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in
certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes "living
creatures," but "creeping creatures having life"; whereas it does call
land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life,
and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them
something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of
their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them.
But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be
produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but
immediately by God.
Reply to Objection 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified,
which in any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals
such as bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those
animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the
earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far
from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals,
as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word
"quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first as
being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even
some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.
Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made
of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But
it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already
been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals
and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to
signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas
man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God. "
Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by
generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the
making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the
earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is
repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a
special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad
lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin
whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they
experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating,
they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.
Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation
of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more
perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the
corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated
then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have
been produced then otherwise than potentially.
Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr.
Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer
he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,
and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.
Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself
with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the
things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,
laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with
many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their
existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,
these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe. " And,
since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world
conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have
injured him.
__________________________________________________________________
ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) About the completion of the works;
(2) About the resting of God;
(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the
seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works
ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are
done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of
the world will be at the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover,
the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it
is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg. : 'the fulness of time']" (Gal.
4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is
consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does
not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But
we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather
that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works
does not belong to the seventh day.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many
things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is
called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess.
But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of
many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are
frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the
Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): "The Lord
hath created a new thing upon the earth. " Miracles also are new works,
of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and work new
miracles. " Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are
glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on the throne
said: Behold I make all things new. " Therefore the completion of the
Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "On the seventh day God ended
His work which He had made. "
I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that
according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this
perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole
having its parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end,
which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the
harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the
builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first
perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the
principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of
the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the
consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness
of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to
the seventh day.
Reply to Objection 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second,
as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are
required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of
beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation
existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding
of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace
and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh
day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the
consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the
consummation of glory.
Reply to Objection 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating
new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work
proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second"
perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though
according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,
however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the
completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion
as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that
in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible,
movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest
denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other
creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by
the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on
that day to have consummated His work.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God,
but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the
work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience
materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed
Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes,
as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the
first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear,
existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and
perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by
the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.
Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of
individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the
offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in
their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed
beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work
of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil.
2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men. " And again, the
glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of
similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the
empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is
new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day
from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), "My Father worketh until
now, and I work. " God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all
His work.
Objection 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which
movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and
without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from
His work.
Objection 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh
day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is
set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God created"
or "made" this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He
made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God
cannot be explained as His making man to rest.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh day
from all the work which He had done. "
I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to
move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense
meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.
Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.
First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,
as said above (A[1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not
existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,
because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was
happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He
is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for
His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting
in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And
even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in
Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest
which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the
meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and
providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new
ones.
Reply to Objection 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement,
but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an
external object.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy
in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the
enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both
from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that
God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be
set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal
explanation.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to
the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for
that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But
whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost
to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the
seventh day.
Objection 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
than the day on which He ceased producing them.
Objection 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as
upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good. " Therefore it
was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day
should be blessed.
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh day
and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work. "
I answer that, As said above [591](A[2]), God's rest on the seventh day
is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new
works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has
made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.
According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh
day, since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the
increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures
which He blessed: "Increase and multiply. " Now, this increase is
effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the
generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it
is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the
special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God.
For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.
Reply to Objection 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not
because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because
something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their
resting in God.
Reply to Objection 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in
their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied
and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And
the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge
that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its
fruition.
Reply to Objection 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day
belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached
to the seventh day, to its propagation.
__________________________________________________________________
ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)
We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
the works of the six days.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently
enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works
of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another.
But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and
therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.
Objection 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and
water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another
to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be
devoted to the distinction of fire and air.
Objection 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ
from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other
animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day
is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the
beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
production of birds and another to that of man.
Objection 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of
these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the
luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is
produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and
the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different
days.
Objection 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting
of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that
day ought not to be enumerated with the others.
I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made
clear by what has been said above ([592]Q[70], A[1]), namely, that the
parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part
adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the
parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according
to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part,
the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the
Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the
beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is
distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle
part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the
third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth.
But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last
three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,
spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the
two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days,
and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine
works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum
of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the
forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and
three to the work of adornment.
Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation
belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless
spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says
(Confess. xii, 12).
