264 Vedand has been
explained
114, ii.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
The Abhidhamma (for example the Papisambhiddmagga, i. 21) recognizes the visuddhi of sila,
citta, and ditphi.
234. Vydkhyd: kalpandmdtram etad dgamanirapeksam iti katbayati. Fa-pao and P'u-kuang do not agree whether Vasubandhu here takes the part of the Vaibhasikas against the Sautrantikas. In other words, whether Vasubandhu says, as his personal opinion, "Who can stop a master in his imaginations? ", or if he gives these words to the Vaibhasikas. The Vydkhyd accepts the first hypothesis. But Sarhghabhadra says, "The Sautrantikas say that good prajnd can be mixed. . . ", and
we know that he always mentions and quotes Vasubandhu as "the Sautrantika. " The Chinese
? commentators think that Vasubandhu rejects the theory of the mixing of good prajnd with defiled prajfld; nevertheless, he does not admit that avidyd is a separate dharma.
235. Hsiian-tsang: "There is a separate thing, avidyd, which differs from prajnd, as rdga differs from the mind This master is correct. "
236. BhadantaSrilSbhasays,"Avidydisthegeneraldesignationofallofthekiefas;thereisrioavidyd separate from craving and the other kief as (avidyeti sarvaklefdndm tyarh sdmdnyasarhjnd / na rdgddiklefavyatiriktdvidyd ndmdsti). According to the Sutra, "Oh Mahalcau&hila, he does not rightly discern (na prajdndti), and as a consequence we say avidyd" (Sammyutta, iii. 172: Mahakotthito (or Mahakotthiko). . . avoca / avtjjdavijjdtidvuso Sdriputta vuccati. . . ). In faa all the kief as are by their nature non-knowledge (ajtidnasvarupa), for they grasp things as they are not (vipaf&agrabanatas).
This is the thesis of Harivarman in TD 32, no 1646. According toSaeki, here Vasubandhu refers to Harivarman.
237. Aboveiii. p. ,Samyukta,TD2,p. 85al6,p. 126c5:purvdnteJndnamapardnte. . . madhydnte. . . (buddbadharmasamgharatnesv. . . duhkbasamudayanirodhamdrgesv. . . kufaldkufaldvydkrtesv. . . ddbydimika. . . bdhye'jndnam /yat kimcidtatra tatrajnanam tama dvaranam. . . ) See Kofa, ii. 26a-c, where we have avidyd, ajnana and "non-clarity. "
Vibhanga, S5:yaman"ttnamadassanamanabhisamayo. . . (asampakkhdna is missing from the bng list of synonyms).
One will find in Rhys Davids-Stede (avijjd) and in Tbeorie des douze causes, 6-9, a good number of references.
238. The Vydkbyd has mayand, mayandndm, and in the Dbdtupdtba, migatau: thus sattvamayand Paramartha has simply leiM (" maya).
Hsiian-tsang: yu cb'ing shib (to depend upon, to support) wo lei hsing ^ffrNfftlStt =
sattva-dtmdifita-maya-td: lei gives maya and bsmg - -to, SH4 .
P'u-kuang explains: lei-bsing (mayatd) = abammdna.
Samghabhadra explains maya in the sense of "to gp (to the realms of rebirth)"; that which is the
nature of maya is mayatd. (We would have sattva mayatd - "the quality of going of beings . . . ").
239. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 245c21.
240. Abamkdramamakdramdndrws'aya, Samyutta, iii. 80, etc; asmimdna, asmUi mana, iii. 155.
241. Nifcbdya corresponds to nicchdta of the Pali sources. On this word, Rhys Davids and Stede. Often accompanying nibbuta, sttibbuta, etc: however see Anguttara, v. 65.
242. Here it would be more fitting to explain the samskdras and vijUdna; see iil36a.
243. Vibbdfd, TD 27, p. 73al8, Tbe*orie des douze causes, p. 16-18. See ii. 47.
244. It is by reason of a name that the non-material skandhas are active (pravartante) with respect to objects not immediately perceived {apratyaksesv arthesu): "Such is the object (or the meaning), artha, of this noun. " By reason of the organs, the non-material skandhas arise (utpadyante) with respect to the objects perceived By reason of the object, the non-material skandhas are active with respect to names: "Such is the name of this object. "
Compare Attbasalim, 392, Expositor, 500-501. Buddhaghosa, on the origin of names; Vibbdsd, TD27,p. 73al8.
245. On this subject the Vydkbyd quotes a Sutra which presents together, with the Mahdndmasutta of the Samyutta, v. 369, some interesting variants: mrtasya khalu kdlagatasya jndtaya imam pUtikakdyam agnind vd dihanti udake vd pldvayanti bbumau vd nikhananti vdtdtapdbhydm vd pariiosam pariksayam pafydddnam gacchati / yat punar idam ucyate cittam iti vd mana iti vd vijiidnam iti vd hadddparibhdvitam sllatydgafrutaprajnaparibbdvitam tad urdhvagdmi bhavati vihsagdmy dyatydm svargopagam.
Footnotes 519
? 520 Chapter Three
In Samyutta, mention only of the body cut to pieces and eaten by animals and birds, etc; as Digha, ii. 295. See Nariman, RHR, 1912, i. 85.
246. On sparia, see Koia, ii. 24, iii. note 160. Theoriedes douze causes, 22, Mrs Rhys Davids, intro. to the trans, of the Dhammasangani, 63, Compendium, 12, 14 (awareness of the objective presentation).
Majjhima, i. 190; Atthasdlmi, 109, 141-2; Visuddhimagga, 46$y 595; Madhyamakavrtti, 554 (important); Vijnanakaya (analyzed in Etudes Asiatiques, 1925, i. 370).
Here the kdrikd defines the position of the Sarvastivadins: whereas, according to the Sautrantikas, spuria is the "coming together of the three", according to the Sarvastivadins (and according to Buddhaghos^Atthasdlinf, 109), sparia is not the "coming together of the three", but the effect of this coming together, a mental {castasika) dharma, Koia, ii. 24.
The "three" are the eye, the object and the vijfidna. The vijHdna is produced by the eye and the object (plus an intellectual element, the samanvdhdra), Majjhima, i. 190, Madhyamakavrtti, 1554. The Sarvastivadin thesis is that the vtjndna (=citta)t "the mind," knows "the thing only" (arthamdtra)t whereas the "mental states" (caitta, castasika) (namely sparia, vedand, etc) know the "particulars of the thing" (arthaviiesa). Th. Stcherbatski {Central Conception, 15,17,55) defines vijHdna as "the mind viewed as a receptive faculty, pure consciousness (which renders well the idea of manodhdtu), pure sensation without any content," and sparia as "sensation," "real sensation". To not depart from the definitions furnished by our texts (Koia, ii. 34, note 178), vtjndna grasps the upalabhyatdrupa: this is the most rudimentary of the "gnosis" (as psychologists say), the idea that one perceives something; but, on the other hand, caksurvijrldnam nilam vijdndti, "the visual consciousness knows the blue" (One should explain that without doubt one should understand by caksurvijfidna the vijfiana with the caktas, sparia, etc, which necessarily accompany it).
Maung Tin recounts the definition of sparia of the Atthasdlins: tikasamnipdtasamkhdtassa pana attano kdranassa vasena paveditattd samnipdtapaccupatphdno (phasso) = Contact has coinciding as its manifestation, because it is revealed through its own cause, known as the coinciding
of the three (i. e. , the basis [that is to say, the organ], the object and consciousness). The meaning of
this appears to be: Contact appears, arises (paccupafphdti) by reason of the conjunction (literally:
has for its immediate cause this conjunction: yasya samnipdtah pratyupasthdnam sa sarhni- pdtapratyupasthdna iti), because it is sensed ("experienced") by reason of (and in conformity with)
its cause, which is what is called the conjunction of the three. " From another point of view phassa is vedandpaccupatthdna (=yo vedandydh pratyupasthdnam sa vedandpratyupasthdna iti) because it causes the vedand or agreeable impression to arise (paccapapfhdpeti = uppddett).
247. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 18al6: in the Pali sources, we need not read tmnam samgatiphasso, as does the Samyutta Index, but like Samyutta, iv. 68, and Majjhima, 1111: yd . . . hnesam tinnarh dhammdnam samgati samnipdto samavdyo ayarh vuccati cakkhusamphasso. Nettippaharana, 28: cakkhurupaviHn^nasamnipdtalakkhano phasso. Theorie des douze causes, p. 20.
248. Atthasdlmi, 109: na samgatimattam eva phasso.
249. fatfatka dharmaparydya, Majjhima, iii. 180 (Chachakkasutta) Digha, iii. 243.
250. See iv. 4a-b.
251. They readya esdm dharmdndm samgateh samnipdtdt samavaydt sa spariah. And not:. . . samgatih samnipdtah samavdyah . . .
252. Classic example: yathd buddhdndm sukha utpaddh (Dhammapada, 194), Visuddhimagga, in Warren, 194, Madhyamakavrtti, 70.
253. This discussion is atibahuvistaraprakdravisdrini.
254. Sparia = samsparia (Vydkhya).
255. Pratighasamsparia, so called because its diraya (the organ) is sapratigha (first opinion of the Vibhdfd, TD 27,p. 760cl3, which follows TD 28, no 1552 and Vasubandhu), because its diraya and
? its object (dlambana) are sapratigha (secondopinion of the Vibbdsd, which follows TD 28, number 1550 and Samghabhadra).
256. Adhwacanasarhphassa, Digha, ii. 62 (Warren, 206, Dialogues, ii. 59, and an attempt at translation in Theorie des dome causes, p. 19, a 2), Vibhanga, 6. Adhivacana in Dhammasangani 1306.
257. Vydkhya: adhyucyate' nenety adhivacanam / van ndmni pravartate ndmdrtham dyotayatity adhwacanam noma.
258. caksurvijfldnena nilam vijdndti no tu nilam iti / manovijndnena nilam nilam iti ca vijdndti (variant: caksurvijnanasamangi. . . manovijndnasamangi. . . ). On this text, which is without doubt excepted from the Abhidharma (Nydyabmdupu'rvapaksasamksepa, Mdo 111, foL 108b), see KoU, Ll4c, Madhyamakavrtti, p. 74, note.
259. This is the opinion of Fa-sheng in the Abhidharmahrdaya (6. 18), TD 28, number 1550. Fa-sheng jgjfjhas been reconstructed as Dharmakirti, Dharmajina (Nanjio), or Dharmottara (Takakusu); Peri, "Datede Vasubandhu," 25, mentions the transcription dha-ma-sli-ti (=? ).
260. Hsiian-tsang translates: with the vacana for its adhipati [pratyaya].
261. Vibbdsd, TD 27, p. 760b25. Two spar/as: sdsrava and andsrava; three sparSas: kuiala, akuial and avydkrta; four spars'as: traidhatuka and adhdtuparydpanna; etc From the point of view of nivarana and of its pratipaksa (the hindrance and its opposition): spar/as of avidyd and vidyd; from the point of view of the same nature of the sparia: spar/a of nebher-vufyd-tior-avidyd; from the point of view of what is pleasing and what is displeasing: sparias of sympathy and antipathy; from the point of view of association (samprayoga): agreeable sparfa, etc; from the point of view of its support: sparias of the eye, of the ear, etc
262. Abhiksnasamuddcdrin = nityasamuddcdrin (Vydkhya).
263. How sparia is vedantya, iv. 49.
Sukhavedya is explained: sukhasya vedah sukbavedab / sukhavede sddhuh sukhavedyah /
sukharh vd vedyam asmmn iti sukhavedyah.
264 Vedand has been explained 114, ii. 24; here the author does not explain the characteristics (laksana) of vedand, but its type (prakdra).
On adukkhdsukhd, Majjhima, i. 397.
265. The Sautrantika does not reply, because the problem of shade has already been discussed ii. 50c
266. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 698cl0.
267. Samyukta, 8. 4. Saeki quotes TD 24, number 1451 (the Vinayaksudrakavastu, see S. Levi, Seize Arhats, p. 37) where the Bhagavat explains to Ananda the four principles of Anguttara, it 167.
268. The Vaibhasika theory of the mahdbhUmikas is presented ii23c and following; one should replace adhimukti with adhimoksa, p. 189,190.
269. The asarhskrtas are unconnected with cause, since they refer to the caittas.
270. Paramartha translates: "in the first three bhUmis"; Hsiian-tsang: "in the first bhUmis"; the
Vydkhya glosses: in the savitarka-savicdra bhUmi.
271. This is the thesis presented il trans, p. 192-3,204.
Here the Vydkhya quotes several definitions of the Parlcaskandhaka (of Vasubandhu) (Mdo,
58) whictfwe have reproduced ii trans, p. 189-190. (There is a Pancaskandhaka by Gmdrakirti, Mdo, 24).
272. The Prakaranapdda in effect arranges the "mental states" into four categories: mahdbhUmikas, ku/alamahdbhumikas, kUiainahdhhUmikas,parUtakleiabhUmikas (see ii trans, p. 195-6 and no 109).
Footnotes 521
? 522 Chapter Three
273. The Sutra opposes akusala to ku/ala.
214. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 72c9, p. 87c26.
We have Samyutta ii. 72, iv. 33 and passim: cakkhum ca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhu-
vin~n~dnam/ tiHhamsamgatiphasso/ phassapaccaydvedand/ vedandpaccaydtanhd/ ayamkho dukkhassa samudayo.
Our Sutra, most probably, has: caksuh pratitya rupani cotpadyate caksurvi/fidnam / traydndmsamnipdtah sparfah / sahajdtd vedand samjHd cetand.
Vijfidnakdya in Etudes Asiatiques (BEFEO, 1925), i. 370.
275. The meaning of sahajata is not specified; we can understand it as parasparasahajdta, "arisen
one from the other. "
276. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 197cl8: maitrisahagatam smrtisambodhyangam bhdvayati.
Til. Madhyama, TD, p. 19lb\. yd vedandyd ca samjndfydca cetandyacca vijfidnam] samsrspdfime dharmd na visamsfspdh]. Saeki quotes this Sutra which has for its protagpnist Great-ko-thi-la (the same person to whom the Bhagavat teaches that dyus and usmaka are "mixed," below note 281): the Pali edition, Majjhima, 1293 (Mahdvedallasutta, where the protagonists are Mahakottita and Sariputta), omits the words yd ca cetand.
It is the doctrine of the Dhammasangannni, 1193, that the skandhas of vedandd, saflrid and samkhdra {-cetand) are cittasamsappha [that is, united to the mind from their origins to their end, Atthasdlmi, 49).
On samsrspa, villld.
278. This means, according to the Vydkhyd, in the same Sutra where we read: "vedand, samjfid,
cetand. . . "
279. Majjhima, i293 omits yam ceteti. . .
Compare Samyutta, iv. 68: phuppho vedeti phuppho ceteti phupppho samjdndti. 280. According to the Vydkhyd, this is a reply of Vasubandhu: dcdrya aha.
281. The Sutra is quoted viii. 3c, note 26. The formula is lacking in Majjhima, 1295. On dyus and usman (usmaka), ii. trans, p. 233.
282. The Pali sources know of six somanassupavicdras, domanassupavicdras, and upekkhupavicdras (Digha, iii. 244, Majjhima, iii. 218, Vibhanga, 381,etc): cakkhundrupamdisvd somanassatthdniyarh mpam upavicarati. . . manasddhammam vm'ntyasomanassapphdnryamdhammam upavicarati; but they ignore the word mana-upavicdra, as does the Mahdvyutpatti.
The Sanskrit text: caksusd rupani drspvd saumanasyasthdnrydni rupdny upavicarati. . . manasd dharmdn vijfldya saumanasyasthdntydn dharmdn upavicarati.
This grammatical explanation disappears in all the translations, but the Vydkhyd partially reproduces it. (We have manasa upavicdrah = mana-upavicdra - manopavicdra).
283. This thing (dravya) which is the mental vedand, of one single type by its being associated with the mental consciousness, is threefold by the triple variety of its nature, satisfaction, etc; and each one of these three is sixfold by the variety of its object, visibles, etc Thus we have 1 x 3 x 6 = 18.
284. The Bhdsyam says simply: trayo dharmopavicdrd uhhayathd, but we have translated the Vydkhydhere. ThesourceistheVibhdsd,TD21tp. 7l6c3. Whenthedharmamanopavicdrahasfor its object seven types oidharmas--the six internal dyatanas (eye. . . manadyatana) and the external dharmdyatana--either together, or not together, its object is not mixed; when it has for its object these seven dharmas (either together, or not together) plus one, two,. . . five of the external objects (visible things, etc), its object is mixed. Same doctrine on the subject of the smrtyupasthdnas: kdyasmrtyupasthdna is of an unmixed object, bearing only on the body; dharmasmrtyupasthdna can be of unmixed object, or mixed (sambhmna, miira), or universal (samasta) object, vi. ! 5c
285. The word kila indicates that Vasubandhu does not accept this etymology.
? 286. The prefix upa has the sense of repetition (punah punah).
287. Problem discussed in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 716b6. The upavicara are proper to mental sensation:
there is thus saumanasya-upavicdra, not sukha-upavicdra.
288. Problem discussed in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 715a3.
289. Madbyama, TD 1, p. 690c4. caksusd rupdnidrspva saumanasyasthdmydm rupdny upavkarati
290. According to the Lotsava: "The word ga signifies 'taking for an object', as in the expression: How does he go? He goes thus. " This gloss is omitted by Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang.
291. Hsiian-tsang adds: "The same in the prefatory absorptions of the Second, Third, and Fourth Arupya. "
292. According to the Vydkhyd, Vasubandhu; according to P'u-kuang, the Sautrantikas (TD 41, p. 179cl2).
293. Satatambava=satafa, vthdra-yogaviiesa.
Digha, iii. 250 (variants: satata, sattha, sassata), 281, Anguttara, iL198, iii. 279. SamgUfparydya
15. 6; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 189al8 (so called because the Arhats always cultivate it).
294. Upeksako viharati, Attbasdlim, 172.
293. When the Arhat thinks of the dharmas which constitute the Buddha, buddbasamtdnika dharmas, he experiences a good satisfaction. Such a satisfaction is not forbidden, nor is it to be fought.
296. Anantavarman does not accept this theory: This is not correct, for, in the Sutra, the Bhagavat does not say that the satisfactions, etc, are upavicara solely when they are defiled (sdmklehka). He says in fact, "Oh Bhiksus, take support on the six upavicdras of satisfaction, abandon the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion; take support on the six upavicdras of equanimity, abandon the upavicdras of satisfaction. There are, Oh Bhiksus, two equanimities, the equanimity resting on unity (ekatvasamnis'rita), and equanimity resting on variety (ndndtvasamnis'rita): take support on the first, but abandon the second" (yaimesopsaumanasyopavicdrdstdnds'rityatdnadh daurmanasyopavicdrdstdnprajahUa. . . ). Majjhima,I364,inanothercontext:yd'yamupekhd ndnattdndttasitdtornabhimvajjetvdyd'yamupekhdekattdekattasitd. . . tornevupekhdmbhdveti.
But, says Ya? omitra, this Sutra does not prove that the satisfactions, etc, can be upavicara without being sdmkletika. One supports oneself on light (laghu) defilement in order to abandon heavy (guru) defilement; as he said, "Mdna or pride, is to be abandoned by supporting oneself on mono. " The text referred to in Nettippakarana, 87: "The mdna, supported on which one abandons mdna, is good (ku/ala). " According to this same work, thirst ("desire) can also be good, see below note 297. (We know the Tantric thesis of rdga expelled by raga, Cittavi/uddhiprakarana, JASB. ,
1898, p. 175.
To be sure, mdna is never purification (vydvaddnika). Nanda (who expelled desire for women
by desire for goddesses) is an example. The Bhagavat also teaches that one abandons the upavicdras of equanimity by the upavicdras of equanimity.
297. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 715bl: five explanations of the expression idstrpada; Vasubandhu adopts the first. (In taking into consideration the three time periods, 108 upavicdras. Vac chattimsa saUpadd of Majjhima, iii. 217.
AccordingtotheVydkhyd:taevdspadaiopavicdrab. . . "Theseeighteenupavicdras,throughthe distinction of those which have for their principle craving and naiskramya, make up the thirty-six points of the Master. " Understood in this way, the argument goes to prove that some of the upavicdras are good, others bad
Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang understand: "On the other hand, the satisfactions, etc (tony eva saumanasyddmi). . . "
Naiskramya is explained as "leaving" (niskrama) the samkle/as or getting out of the suffering
Footnotes 523
? 524 Chapter Three
of samsdra.
On gredbafrita, naifkramydfrita, Kola, it trans, p. 155, iv. 77b-c; Mahdvyutpatti, 245. 1145,
Samyutta, iv. 232, Vibhanga, 381, MUmda, gehanissha and nekkhammanissita (thirty-six vedands); Nettippakarana, 87, how good desire gets one out of dissatisfaction, nekkhammasita. Rhys Davids- Stede, nekkhamma, geha, gedha (confused with the words kdma and grha).
Somanassa, domanassa, upekkbd are sevkabba, asevitabba, Digha, ii. 278.
298. Same comparison, grain and husk, Vyasa ad Yogasutra, ii. 13.
299. This thesis is demonstrated in Chapter IX (page 297 of the French translation).
300. The term kle/a is to be understood as both the kle/as and the upaklefas, v. 46.
301. Cittacaittasamuddcdrddyapafutvdt. As we shall see, iil42d, upeksdydm cyutodbhavau.
302. See Chapter DC, French trans, p. 296-7.
303. It appears indeed that this is not exactly correct: the first moment of antardbhava is necessarily defiled
304.
