No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Macc
3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because
of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their
souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil. " If, therefore, nothing but evil
be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is
commendable: and this is clearly false.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good
and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different
subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.

On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love
is good, as stated above ([1246]Q[26], A[1];[1247] Q[27], A[1]).
Therefore the object of hatred is evil.

I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension
(though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural
appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural
appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from
an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ([1248]Q[26],
A[1]). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that
just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is
suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural
dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural
hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual
appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is
apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite
from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as
whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is
repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as
good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.

Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance
but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But
being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of
repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is
hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by
comparison with something else.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when
it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it
is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of
evil nor love of good is good.

Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable
or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the
same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally
unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to
water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same
thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether love is a cause of hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the
opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic.
x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they
are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the
other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the
cause of hatred.

Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which
precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a
turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all
emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an
emotion of the soul, is caused by love.

I answer that, As stated above [1249](A[1]), love consists in a certain
agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in
a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each
thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing
disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which
agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and
nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which
is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.

Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes
naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e. g. two species of
animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous
logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e. g.
the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not
simultaneous either really or logically; e. g. substance and accident;
for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is
predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a
priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except
inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are
naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing
hinders love from being the cause of hatred.

Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in
respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they
are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it
amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its
contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its
contrary.

Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from
one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the
case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the
reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement
belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.
Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether hatred is stronger than love?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee
from pain, more than he desires pleasure. " But flight from pain
pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love
is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into
hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their
effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on
seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from
pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36).
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing
except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred
and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore
love is stronger than hatred.

I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its
cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above
stated [1250](A[2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be
stronger than love absolutely.

But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than
hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the
means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining
of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect
of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.

Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two
reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For,
since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression;
when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as
in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though
greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever;
because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second
nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the
object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt
more keenly when we lack what we love. " And for the same reason, the
unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the
becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is
made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding.
Because, according to different degrees of good there are different
degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred.
Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more
than a lesser love.

Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of
pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which
corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we
love pleasure.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can hate himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is
written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul. " But
many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.

Objection 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But
sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e. g. a man who kills
himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes
a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But
some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated
his own flesh. "

I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate
himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire
anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is
outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now
to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ([1251]Q[26],
A[4]). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is
impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.

But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two
ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For
it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular
respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil
to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to
whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it;
wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king
were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind
of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being
principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature.
Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves
to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is
contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity
hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.

Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he
apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill
themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an
end to some unhappiness or pain.

Reply to Objection 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself,
but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his
sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that
avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is
caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires
temporal goods for himself more than he should.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can hate the truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good,
true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither,
therefore, can he hate the truth.

Objection 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge is only
of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that
which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can
hate the truth.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love
those who are straightforward. " But there can be no other motive for
this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he
cannot hate it.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy
because I tell you the truth? " [*St. Thomas quotes the passage,
probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: "I am become,"
etc. ]

I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ
as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of
something desirable, while being and true are not so considered:
because good is "what all things seek. " Wherefore good, as such, cannot
be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being
and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because
disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of
love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing
hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object
of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant;
since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion
of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.

Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant
or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things
as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular
truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly,
according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from
gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not to
know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it
is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. "
Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as
it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man
wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know
the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x,
23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it
reproves. " This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself:
hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But
accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as
it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we love those who are
straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of
the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the
senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an
object of universal hatred.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there
is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the
object of universal hatred.

Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in
things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the
universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the
particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a
thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter. "

I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first,
as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered
in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider
the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore,
we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of
apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the
universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which
every sensitive power is based.

Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of
appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the
object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is
cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is
cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this
particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in
the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this
thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual,
is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep.
Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is
always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some
action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals.
For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed
to a thing in general. "

But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises
from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the
universal in both ways.

Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as
such: but they apprehend something to which the character of
universality is given by abstraction.

Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of
hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at
variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under the
aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive
apprehension or appetite.
__________________________________________________________________

OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according
to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth
to the everlasting kingdom. " But the sensitive appetite can have no
tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the
sensitive appetite.

Objection 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in
the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "There
dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. "
But desire for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence, according
to Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy
justifications. " Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
appetite.

Objection 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of
concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul,
and not only in the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided
into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational
part of the soul, passive and appetitive. " Therefore concupiscence is
in the sensitive appetite.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is
a craving for that which is pleasant. " Now pleasure is twofold, as we
shall state later on ([1252]Q[31], AA[3],4): one is in the intelligible
good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to
the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas
the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power
seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the
whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this
latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is
implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia. " Therefore, properly
speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the
concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

Reply to Objection 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods,
is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain
likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul
being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that
the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following
the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself
renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: "My
heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God. "

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the
lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply
fellowship in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement
towards the thing desired.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its
proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from
apprehension. But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which
arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to
crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses,
wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible
power.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion
of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by their
objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something
delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence,
as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is
not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that
"covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not
distinct from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one
another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the
concupiscible faculty.

Objection 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty
there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above
([1253]Q[23], A[4]). But no specific passion of the concupiscible
faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when
present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes us
fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": from which we gather that
as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence.
But fear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part.
Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible
faculty.

On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to
pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a
specific passion.

I answer that, As stated above [1254](A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good
which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the
concupiscible faculty. Hence the various concupiscible passions are
distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the
diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the object,
or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from
the nature of the active object, causes a material difference of
passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a
formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the passions differ
specifically.

Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs
according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as it
is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas,
according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards
it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as,
so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes
concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to
itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the
faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion
differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences
of this or that pleasurable object differ "in number. "

Reply to Objection 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence,
not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible,
considered as past, is the object of memory. For these particular
conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of
the sensitive part, which regards particular things.

Reply to Objection 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not
essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an
effect of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness
in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to
come: so that it includes both love and hope.

Reply to Objection 3: The passion which is directly contrary to
concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as
concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the
absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is
sometimes called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as
though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite
in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and
evil as arduous.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into
those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence
belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the
natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no
concupiscence is natural.

Objection 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of
species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside
the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and
some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts
to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore
concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and
those that are not.

Objection 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in
Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not
natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because,
since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite,
and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there
are no concupiscences which are not natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11)
distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.

I answer that, As stated above [1255](A[1]), concupiscence is the
craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways.
First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example,
food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things
is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is
apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something
as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and
concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and
is more wont to be called "cupidity. "

Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural
concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is
there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in
these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls
them "common" and "necessary. " But concupiscences of the second kind
are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and
suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the
latter, "rational. " And because different men reason differently,
therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and
acquired," i. e. in addition to those that are natural.

Reply to Objection 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural
appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is
apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of
food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: The difference between those concupiscences that
are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material
difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a
difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the
apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from
diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as
suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural
concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11);
or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those
concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the
Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, 11).

Reply to Objection 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to
the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the
sensitive faculty, as stated in the [1256]FP, Q[78], A[4]; [1257]FP,
Q[81], A[3]: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the
sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the
universal reason also, through the medium of the particular
imagination.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether concupiscence is infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the
object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But
where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore
concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it
proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and
therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and
thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of
concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term.
Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since
concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things. "

I answer that, As stated above [1258](A[3]), concupiscence is twofold;
one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot
be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and
nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never
desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there
is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be
infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man
may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature
requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for
ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13):
"Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again. "

But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as
stated above [1259](A[3]), it follows from the reason, and it belongs
to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may
desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich
as possible.

Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i,
3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite.
Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is
desired for its own sake, e. g. health: and thus greater health is more
desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself
dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. On the
other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the
concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end.
Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite
concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of
the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient
for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The
same applies to the concupiscence of any other things.

Reply to Objection 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as
something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once
actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot
be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from which,
however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken"
(Phys. iii, 6).

Reply to Objection 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a
certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as
appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the
infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact
the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense,
inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.

Reply to Objection 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no
need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the
realization of each object of his concupiscence.
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OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four
things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of
delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether delight is a passion?

(2) Whether delight is subject to time?

(3) Whether it differs from joy?

(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?

(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of
the lower;

(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;

(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?

(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?
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Whether delight is a passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says
that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a
movement contrary to nature. " But delight is an operation, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a
passion.

Objection 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in
Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in
having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore
delight is not a passion.

Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who
is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. x,
4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being
altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore
delight is not a passion.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.

I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly
called passions, as stated above ([1260]Q[22], A[3]). Now every emotion
arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive
appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the
soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with
the nature of the thing. "

In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this
happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not
occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur
all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other
natural things, that when these latter are established in the state
becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And
from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the
sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by
saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its
genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with the
thing's nature," i. e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign
the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying
that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing
is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in
the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it
were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33]
maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly,
by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the
perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is
therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal
appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the
soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a
second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a
thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation,
delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed
above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we
designate, not its essence, but its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an
animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to
the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs
to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases,
by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive
faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it
had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For
though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the
presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite,
nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its
object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate
to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as
bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some
passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above
([1261]Q[23], AA[1],4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
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Whether delight is in time?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a
kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in
respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
pleasure is in time.