No More Learning

I answer that, As stated above ([3371]Q[24], A[12];[3372] Q[110],
A[4];[3373] Q[112], A[2] ), a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem
to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as
regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In
one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance
when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we
owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou
hast said: I am God," and 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast
not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if
thou hadst not received it? " Or again when a man prefers to God the
temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer.
9:23,24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the
strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his
riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth
and knoweth Me. " Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to
God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (Jn. 12:43):
"For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God. "

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the
one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last
end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to
obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In
this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v,
14) that "this vice," namely the love of human praise, "is so hostile
to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or
loves God, that our Lord said (Jn. 5:44): How can you believe, who
receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone,
you do not seek? "

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not
inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in,
nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but
a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life:
wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it
be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a
mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward
simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act,
vainglory is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory,
desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to
God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not
only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to
grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too
self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
goods.
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Whether vainglory is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice
that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But
vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a
capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for
this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is
not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.

Objection 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But
vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is
not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since
human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man
himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the
seven capital vices.

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some
reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory
among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride
to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate
offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without
reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on ([3374]Q[152],
AA[1],2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good
one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence
therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of
pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the
other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of
vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the
means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive
to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man's
goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore,
just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires honor in
Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he
acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close
connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that
it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate
desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise
from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and
[3375]FS, Q[84], A[2]) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.

Reply to Objection 2: Praise and honor, as stated above [3376](A[2]),
stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so
that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man
loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a
certain renown in the knowledge of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of
desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to
be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital
vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience,
boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of
novelties?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably
reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally
'presumption of novelties']. " For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii)
boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not
arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the
daughters of vainglory.

Objection 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome
chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with
vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of
vainglory.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth. ) that
vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i. e. mercy.
And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.
Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter
of vainglory.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who
there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; [3377]FS,
Q[84], AA[3],4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be
directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own
excellence, as stated above ([3378]AA[1],4): and to this end a man may
tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is
boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for
astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at
most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man
strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior
to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and
thus we have "obstinacy," by which a man is too much attached to his
own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly,
as regards the will, and then we have "discord," whereby a man is
unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as
regards "speech," and then we have "contention," whereby a man quarrels
noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is
"disobedience," whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his
superiors.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3379]Q[112], A[1], ad 2),
boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause,
which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is
directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus
it is the result of vainglory.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention,
except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a
glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with
almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers
vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter
for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to
give alms as though this were something novel.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin
makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a
fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a
fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
does not deem himself worthy of them. " Now no one is worthy of great
goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic.
iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor. " Therefore
the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a
sin.

Objection 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus.
10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud
man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws
from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who
deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted. " Now
sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for
instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin.
Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col. 3:21):
"Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be
discouraged. " Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin,
because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural
inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its
power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or
inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is
proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so
pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his
power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.
Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is
that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from
his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was
punished by his master (Mat. 25; Lk. 19).

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their
neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,
because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what
might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if
"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged
strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they
might have done had they been less retiring. "

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit
from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and
with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a
man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing
certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through
not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,
sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things
in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives
either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from
external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he
becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply to Objection 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result
of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,
whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is
competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in
his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences. " For nothing
hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high
opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of
Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the
leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would
have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator. "

Reply to Objection 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to
which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine
grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,
demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. , 3) that "the fainthearted man knows
not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is
worthy, if he knew himself. " Now ignorance of self seems opposed to
prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.

Objection 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who
through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be
slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of
prudence, as stated above ([3380]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate
fear: hence it is written (Is. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take
courage and fear not. " It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger,
according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to
indignation, lest they be discouraged. " Now inordinate fear is opposed
to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular
virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue.
Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is.
Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that
it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the
saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou? "
Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and
littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little
are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in
itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to
magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in
connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends
to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man
shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may
be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the
intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, and on the part of
the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed
one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its
effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is
worthy. But, as stated above ([3381]Q[132], A[2], ad 3), opposition
between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than
on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to
magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as
proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said
properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause:
because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but
from laziness in considering one's own ability, according to Ethic. iv,
3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the
point of view of its effect.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the point of view of
cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the
dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint
that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we
consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is
roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which
disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby
the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to
pusillanimity.

Reply to Objection 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is
a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good
things, which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption,
however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride whence it
proceeds.
__________________________________________________________________

OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) What is its matter?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether magnificence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever
has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above ([3382]FS, Q[65],
A[1]). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:
because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man
is magnificent. " Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for
it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are
opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as
stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the
extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination,
but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above ([3383]Q[108],
A[2];[3384] Q[117], A[1], OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and
this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after
oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act
is right reason about things to be made. " Now magnificence is about
things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna
facere---i. e. to make great things].
Therefore it is an act rather than
a virtue.

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But
magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps.
47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds. " Therefore
magnificence is a virtue.

I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in
relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the
limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very
notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards
his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also ([3385]FS, Q[65], A[1])
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes
the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls
short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity
([3386]Q[129], A[3], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great.
But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be
lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but
because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding
himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it
magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a
wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it
belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable
dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there
must needs be a virtue of act," i. e. a moral virtue, whereby the
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is
what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether magnificence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may
belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as
in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a
great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special
virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same
as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above ([3387]Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it
belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it
is written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary. " Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above
([3388]Q[81], A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as
religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the
others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues
(Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something
great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere---i. e. to make
great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict
sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something
in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the
kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action,
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in
the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is
then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use
of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness,
namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great,
namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something
great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not
a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be
taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is
proper to magnificence.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to
something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either
by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv,
3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of
great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something
great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to
that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something
great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to
tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De
Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and
administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and
noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention,
and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as
magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that
magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in
external matter [factibili].

Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
is directed to religion or holiness.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ([3389]Q[117], A[2]).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

Objection 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv,
2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about
gifts.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.

Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure.
But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence
does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but
only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale. "
Therefore it is only about great expenditure.

I answer that, As stated above [3390](A[2]), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to
spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a
magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i. e.
proportionate, "expenditure. " Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of
money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love
money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both
this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a
great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great
expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent
man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3391]Q[129], A[2]), those
virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty
arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is
concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of
that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money
and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use
of money.

Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one
way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money;
wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the
obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to
liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in
relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is
impossible without expenditure or outlay.

Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents,
as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather
under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some
work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.

Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and
a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says
(De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid. ).
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Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For
magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
[3392](A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of
justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to
pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science. " Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn.
Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above ([3393]Q[80]). The one is that the
secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in
some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated,
like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of
fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives
its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the
arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from
the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of
fortitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as
viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and
magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of
the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure
in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other
hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a
determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like
magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

Reply to Objection 2: Although magnificence does not agree with
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter:
since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure,
even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something
great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This
is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those
things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the
risk of a great loss.
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OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES) [*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as
"magnificentia" is doing great things. ]

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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Whether meanness is a vice?

Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence
is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a
vice.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean. " But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean
man is loth to spend money. " But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.

I answer that, As stated above ([3394]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3395]FS, Q[18],
A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many
cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to
be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little
[parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid. ) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another
as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends
principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the
greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may
produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4)
that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more
magnificent result. " On the other hand, the mean man intends
principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
2) that "he seeks how he may spend least. " As a result of this he
intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from
producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he is
unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to
observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and
work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what
is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a
vice.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the
rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
things: hence meanness is a vice.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear
makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his
reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods,
even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy,
but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his
reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common
with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with
pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous
man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that
illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great
expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore
meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "although meanness and its contrary vice are
sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm
one's neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful. "
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Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
above [3396](A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness,
it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend
much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought
to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something
of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
stated above [3397](A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in
order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But
this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q[131], A[2] ). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic.
ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are
relative terms, as stated above [3398](A[1]). Now just as expenditure
may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason
requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest
that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his
work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his
expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man
exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to
his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the
Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes
everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i. e. lacking good fire,
since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose.