No More Learning

cit. p. 185.


## p. 508 (#548) ############################################

508 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
through the medium of the Company's government. The constant
repetition of the clause had marked the importance which was attached
to it. It had been the corner-stone of the Company's policy, and for
many years it remained equally important in the eyes of the repre-
sentatives of the crown. It was deemed essential to keep the states
isolated one from another. Lytton was the first governor-general to
propose the abandonment of these views. It is noteworthy that he was
also the first governor-general to attempt to regulate the vernacular
press. In one of those moments of true insight which from time to
time visited him, he wrote to Lord Salisbury,
I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced
Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good
government. . . . Look at the mistake which Austria made in the government of
her Italian provinces. They were the best governed portions of Italy; she studied
and protected the interests of the native peasantry; but, fcaring the native noblesse,
she snubbed and repressed it. . . . !
He was exceedingly anxious, therefore, to transform the relations
between the states and the Government of India. With this end in view
he pressed for leave to announce, at the durbar in which the queen
was to be proclaimed the Queen Empress, the establishment of an
Indian privy council. This was to be limited, at first at all events, to
the great chiefs, who were to consult with and advise the governor-
general on matters of common interest. But the opposition of the
home authorities proved too strong, and the proposal was cut down
to the bestowal of an empty title, “Councillors of the Empress”, on
some of the leading princes. The effect of Lytton's proposals, had
they been carried into effect, would have been the establishment of
co-operation, not only between the Government of India and the
states individually, but also between the states collectively. This novel
idea, as yet unsupported by the evident development of danger from
within, would, it was still feared, give rise to common understandings
and united pressure such as mightembarrass the Government of India.
In fact it was regarded with the same doleful apprehension as that
with which forty years later distinguished publicists regarded the
creation of the chamber of princes. *
No further step in this direction was taken till the government of
Lord Minto. By then the Indian situation was much more favourable
to a move, for political unrest had reached the point at which it could
not be mistaken. The governor-general consulted the leading states
concerning the spread of anarchist conspiracies; and his reform pro-
posals included the revival of something like Lytton's earlier scheme.
But again the project fell through, largely because in Morley's doc-
trinaire view the only effective remedy for the situation lay in political
concessions.
Lady Betty Balfour, Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 109.
2 Idem, p. 111.
3 Sir Valentine Chirol, ap. The Times, 10 February, 1921.


## p. 509 (#549) ############################################

MINTO'S POLICY
509
The outbreak of war with Germany, however, displayed so strongly
the decision with which the princes held to their position in the British
Empire, that the adoption of the new policy was at last assured.
Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the ruling princes on
matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a
whole". 1 The joint report of Mr Edwin Montagu and Lord Chelms-
ford recommended the establishment of a Chamber of Princes, and
the formation of machinery for joint consultation between the governor-
general and the Indian states on matters of common interest. In 1921
the chamber was inaugurated, bringing to an end a prolonged and
most important phase of the relations between the states and the
Government of India.
The best exposition of the attitude of the governors-general within
the later and formative part of the period is contained in the speech
which Lord Minto delivered at Udaipur in 1909. He fully renounced
the tendency which the practice of the Foreign Department had
exhibited down to the government of Lord Curzon.
“I have. . . made it a rule", he declared, "to avoid as far as possible the issue
of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they
arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions,
antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and
constitutional, of individual principalities. "
This "more sympathetic and therefore more elastic policy" ad-
mitted the existence of more than one type of relationship. Yet Lord
Minto, too, recognised and declared the suzerainty of the crown as
existent quite apart from treaty obligation. “The imperial govern-
ment”, he said, "has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for
the general soundness of [the princes') administration and would not
consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of mis-
rule. ” He maintained the need of interpreting the treaties in the light
of actual fact, of established usage, and indeed of political expediency,
but he drew the line of political expediency far below the level to
which it had been forced by his predecessors. His attitude closely
agrees with that of Lord Reading in 1922. 3
Throughout the whole period, then, neither the claims of the crown
nor the claims of the princes have really depended on the exact
wording of the treaties. Both have fluctuated with the circumstances
of the time. The crown, in two most important points, has receded from
claims which it might have exercised. It has renounced annexation;
it has forgone its right to deal in no other way than individually with
the states. But, as against this, the states have become what they never
were by treaty, parts of an empire. The problem has become con-
stitutional rather than diplomatic. The suzerainty of the crown has
1 Butler Committee Report, p. 20.
* Buchan, Life of Lord Minto, p. 298.
• Parl. Papers, 1926, C. 2621, p. 19


## p. 510 (#550) ############################################

510 RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT WITH STATES
become by the weight of its power greater than the Company's para-
mountcy ever was. But this process has gone on unsupported by
any formal recognition. The contrast between the political facts and
any theory which both parties would agree to draw from the docu-
ments has become more pronounced. Under the pressure of this
suzerainty the administration of the states has been improved and the
position of the princes in a world of change been greatly strengthened.
But this has been achieved by an illogical expansion of political right
by that sense of moral duty which has been at once the strength and
weakness, the inspiration and obsession, of modern British rule in
India.


## p. 511 (#551) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVIII
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
The story of local self-government in British India reveals a long-
drawn-out effort to retain what was good in existing institutions and
to reinforce these wherever necessary by ideas which
had been proved
to be useful in England. As India was and is essentially a country of
villages, places where, thanks to the space and air available and the
cleansing power of the Indian sun and rains, disease in normal circum-
stances remained within reasonable bounds, the indigenous village
customs were left undisturbed, but for congested areas like towns it
was soon necessary to bring in the system of the West. Local self-
government was imported from England and bestowed as a gift, first
on the three presidency towns and later on the district towns, while
the villages were allowed to retain their ancient customs. Yet it is in
these villages, where the great mass of the people live, that there has
existed for centuries a simple system of local self-government on which
all real advance must be based. As the Decentralisation Commission
has said in its report:
The foundation of any stable edifice which shall associate the people with the
administration, must be the village, as being an area of much greater antiquity
than the administrative creations such as tahsils, and one in which people are
known to one another and have interests which converge on well-recognised
objects.
Unfortunately, owing to the general political unsettlement which
preceded the establishment of British rule in India, there had been
a great decay in the life of the village community so that often it was
hard to discern and call to life the various members of what had been
an organic whole. The following pages will show the efforts to utilise
what was left, for it was the business and policy of the government
“to leave as much as possible of the business of the country to be done
by the people themselves". 2
The conditions of life in the towns, however, called for the early
application of English methods of administration, and many attempts
were made to transplant English municipal life into India. But, since
this system was not an indigenous growth but a forced plant of foreign
importation, it developed in India not like the English local govern-
ment but somewhat like that in France, with local authorities looking
rather to the wishes of the central authority than to what was desired
by the local people and with the conduct of local affairs in the hands
a
i Report, p. 239.
2 Resolution of Lord Lawrence, 14 September, 1864.


## p. 512 (#552) ############################################

512
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
of officials criticised and advised by local inhabitants rather than in
the hands of elected representatives of the locality advised and helped
by permanent officials who were their servants. Such a development
was naturally disliked by the British government in England and by
British officials in India, who often attempted to breed a munici-
pal system like that known in England. These did not meet with any
great success, partly because the English system was not suited to the
situation in the country and partly because officials in India did not
realise the real nature of government control in England.
The subject of local self-government in India naturally divides
itself into two main sections, rural and urban. Each section, again, has
two divisions which demand separate treatment. In the rural area
the administration of the villages with their indigenous local self-
government stands apart from that of the rural district, while among
the towns the presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
have a history quite distinct from that of the others.
VILLAGES
The following description of an Indian village taken from the
Imperial Gazetteer gives a picture which is true for large parts of India. 1
The typical Indian village has its central residential site, with an open space
for a pond or cattle stand. Stretching around this nucleus lie the village lands,
consisting of a cultivated area and (very often) grounds for grazing and wood
cutting. The arable lands have their several boundary marks and their little sub-
divisions of earth ridges made for retaining rain or irrigation water. The in-
habitants of such a village pass their life in the midst of these simple surroundings,
welded together in a little community with its own organisation and government,
which differ in character in the various types of villages, its body of customary
rules, and its little staff of functionaries, artisans and traders.
Such a description is not true of certain parts of India such as Bengal
and Assam, and, even where it may be generally true, there is such
an infinite variety of exceptions that the general application of a
statement must be made and received with the greatest caution.
The chief functionaries were the headman, the accountant, the
watchman, the priest and the schoolmaster, while the artisans included
among others the smith, the potter and the washerman. The final
word in the internal affairs of the village lay with the village council
or panchayat, which settled matters by discussion carried on until
general agreement was reached. The idea that the will of the majority
should prevail or that votes should be taken does not appear to have
existed. Formerly the village officers and artisans were paid by
grants of land or a share of the produce, but during Muhammadan
rule, especially in its later phases, the village community greatly
decayed and the remuneration of both officers and artisans, where
1 Imperial Gazetteer, IV, 279.
· Matthai, Village Government in British India, p. 30.


## p. 513 (#553) ############################################

VILLAGES
513
these remained, largely took the form of cash payments. Sometimes
the village council had disappeared, and in many places little trace of it
could be found. Not that the rulers interfered with village life directly,
for the relation between ruler and village was purely fiscal. So long
as the revenue was paid to the proper official the villages were left to
themselves. There was, however, in the exaction of all the revenue
and perquisites that could be taken from the country, a tremendous
pressure on the peasants which led to the decadence of village life. 1
Accordingly the British administrators had not to deal with a network
of flourishing villages each with a healthy local life, but only with the
remnants of the former system. Such as they were these remnants
were utilised as the foundation of the new rule. Under settled and
peaceful conditions, village life assumed a more normal course, and,
as knowledge was gained with experience, many efforts were made to
revive what was useful in the old village life with reference to educa-
tion, sanitation, watch and ward, administration of justice and poor
relief. In 1814 the court of directors of the East India Company
wrote:
We refer with particular satisfaction upon this occasion to that distinguished
feature of internal polity which prevails in some parts of India, and by which the
instruction of the people is provided for by a certain charge upon the produce
of the soil and by other endowments in favour of the village teachers, who are
thereby rendered public servants of the community.
They urged the government to protect and support these teachers. Sir
Thomas Munro, protesting in 1824 against the proposal to absorb the
village watch of Madras into the regular police, wrote: “No system
for any part of the municipal administration can ever answer that is
not drawn from the ancient institutions or assimilated with them" 3
In 1821 Elphinstone in the Bombay Presidency declared: "Our
principal instrument must continue to be the panchayat and that must
continue to be exempt from all new forms, interference and regula-
tions on our part". 4 Such was the policy laid down at the beginning
of the nineteenth century and followed by later administrators. The
procedure may be illustrated by describing the organisation of the
village watch and ward, an ever-present necessity, and the utilisation
of the village system for special poor relief necessitated every now and
then by the failure of proper rains.
The three original factors of village police organisation were the
headman, the village watchman and the general body of villagers,
all of whom are still utilised for the preservation of law and order. In
Madras the village headman "must maintain law and order in his
village, applying for assistance to higher authorities, if necessary, and
i Moreland, The Agrarian System of Moslem India, chap. viii.
? Howell, Education in British India, p. 6.
: Matthai, op. cit. p. 141.
• Idem, p. 168.
CHI VI
33


## p. 514 (#554) ############################################

514
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
reporting to them the occurrence of crimes and the movement of
criminal gangs". 1 In Bombay the police patel or headman has
like duties to perform, while in the Panjab and the United Provinces
for the reporting of crime use is made of the lambardar or representative
of the landlords of the village. The administrative reports of Burma
commend the police work done not only by the village headmen but
also by their wives, one of whom arrested an armed robber in her
husband's absence. The watchman was in olden times practically a
servant of the headman, usually belonging to one of the menial castes,
who lived on the outskirts of the village, and performed general
service for the community. The importance of his services and position
has been continually recognised by British officials from Lord
Hastings who in 1815 described them as “the foundation of all possible
police in the country”,? right up to the present time. The Police
2
Commission of 1902-3 emphasised the necessity of maintaining the
village watch as part of the village system. 3
It is necessary also from the people's point of view; even if the expensive establish-
ment required could be maintained, it would be vexatious and intolerable to the
people. "Constant interference by the police, constant espionage of village life,'
constant visits of officials of the lowest grades constitute an intolerable burden
to the people.
In spite of frequent attempts on the part of the regular police to get
these watchmen entirely under their control, the policy of the govern-
ment has been, while making them work in harmony with the regular
police, to preserve their connection with the headmen by making
them responsible to the district magistrate through that functionary.
They are paid either by monthly salaries or by the old custom of
assignments of land and grain-fees, and in making new appointments
to this service hereditary claims are always respected. In Bengal
where village headmen did not exist and where the village watchman
was either a servant of the landlord or under the control of the regular
police, continual efforts have been made since 1870 to create a local
village council to collect the pay of the village watchmen and to
control them as village servants. The scheme at first met with little
success, as the council members objected to being responsible for the
pay, and the regular police found that they could get no help from
either council or watchman. Changes were made in the law to give
tl. , magistrate and police more control, but with little improvement
to the system, until finally in 1919 the Village Self-Government Act
gave the council a proper status and dignity and definitely placed the
village watchman in a position subordinate to that authority. Apart
from the headman and the village watchman, whose duties are pre-
scribed by statute, the general body of villagers at times show them-
selves ready for special organised efforts. This readiness has been
utilised by the regular police to form effective bodies to repel the
1 Imperial Gazetteer, iv, 281. 2 Matthai, op. cit. p. 141. • Commission Report, chap. iii.


## p. 515 (#555) ############################################

VILLAGES
515
attacks of bands of robbers. Such village defence parties have func-
tioned in most provinces and proved especially useful in Bengal in
combating and capturing robbers, even when armed with firearms.
The relief of the poor has in normal circumstances been left mainly
to individual charity, which in India is accepted as one of the principal
duties of ordinary people. So universal is the acceptance of this duty
that ordinarily there has not arisen the necessity for state relief of the
poor which is so common a feature of Western countries. At times,
however, owing to the failure of the rains on which the harvests
depend, large masses of the population are faced with unemployment
and there is a sudden and great contraction of private charity. It is
now the accepted policy of the state to intervene to save the people
from starvation and at the same time to preserve in them to the fullest
possible extent the spirit of self-help. This policy has elaborated a
series of famine codes, the product of successive commissions of enquiry
to report on the results of previous famines and to formulate definite
suggestions for prevention and relief. “There are few things in the
history of Indian administration during the last thirty years in which
the growth of scientific knowledge and the power of organisation have
achieved a more conspicuous success than the prevention and relief
of famines. "i Such famines as do now occur are very different from
those mentioned in the chronicles of the seventeenth century which
were food famines in the strictest sense of the word, times when it was
not a question of obtaining the means to pay for food but of getting
food for all; famines accompanied by huge mortality and voluntary
enslavement of the people. 2 At the present day, thanks to the excellent
communications both within India and connecting her with the rest
of the world, the very idea of a food famine has been banished from
all but a few tracts still inaccessible to the merchant. It is necessary,
however, to help large masses of individuals in want, and the old
village organisation is employed to relieve distress throughout the area
affected by the failure of crops. Famine relief is given in villages by
distributing doles of grain, cooked food or money to poor persons
unable to work or by giving wages in payment of work done on village
relief works. For the administration of this relief a village council or
panchayat is appointed, while full use is made of the headman, ac-
countant, and watchman of the village. To these is added the village
g. ain-dealer who is all-important as the local purveyor. Although in
his capacity as money-lender this individual has been fiercely attacked
in all ages, yet as the local storer of grain and the middleman between
the producer and consumer, he is now recognised as one of the
principal combatants of famine whose services should be enlisted by
the state. The headman, aided by the village council, prepares the
list of those eligible for gratuitous relief, while usually some of them
1 Matthai, op. cit. p. 74.
Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, chap. vii.
33-2


## p. 516 (#556) ############################################

516
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
form the agency under which village relief works are carried out. The
accountant keeps systematic records of the persons relieved or em-
ployed, while the watchman informs the needy where food or work
may be had and helps to bring in cases too weak to walk. All through
the period they are supervised, corrected and encouraged by the
government official placed in charge of a circle of many villages, and
under his leadership they have made it possible to give wide and
economical distribution of state aid in times of famine
Similar methods have been adopted to utilise the old village
machinery for the extension of primary education and the dispensing
of justice, but the illustrations given above will suffice to show how
efforts have been made to utilise the self-government that was in-
digenous in the country. When the sphere of administration was
enlarged from the viilage to the district, a new departure had to be
made. Except in the collection of revenue there was nothing in the
old system by which the villages were linked up with the higher
authorities. New construction, not an adaptation of the old, was
necessary. For district self-government ideas were imported, ideas
with which the administrators had been familiar in their own country,
and it was hoped that cqual good would result from their planting in
an Indian soil.
RURAL BOARDS
The present system of rural boards throughout India is the result
of the resolution of Lord Ripon's government of 18 May, 1882, which
was worked out and applied in various ways by the different pro-
vincial governments in India. Such diversity, a natural consequence
of the great differences in the peoples and countries of India, was
accentuated by the necessity of utilising as far as possible the organisa-
tion that already existed for carrying on the various works of local
government, such as the construction and maintenance of roads,
village education, etc. Such work, as is usual in India, had been started
without legislation. In Bengal money was raised by regulations which
decreed that public ferries should be managed by the government for
the safety and convenience of travellers, and that surplus proceeds
should be used for the repair and construction of roads, bridges and
drains. Local committees were appointed, with the district magistrate
as secretary, to advise the government of the needs of each district and
to see that the money allotted was spent properly. Although these
committees had no legal power to raise funds, and their work was in
strict subordination to the local government, they were of considerable
use, not only in helping the local officials to realise what roads were
of prime importance, but also in persuading the local gentry to
subscribe for particular pieces of work. The funds available were so
small, less than £50,000 in 1886 for 200,000 square miles of country,
Regulation xix of 1816 and vi of 1819.


## p. 517 (#557) ############################################

RURAL BOARDS
517
that we find the government urging the committees to encourage local
subscriptions in aid of the work. 1 In other parts of India money was
raised usually by a cess, a small percentage of the land-revenue levied
or paid voluntarily for expenditure on roads and education, this being
the easiest and traditional way of getting any extra money required.
The amounts to be paid were fixed when an assessment of land-
revenue was settled, and, so long as they were used for obvious local
improvements, these levies met with little opposition. In nearly all
cases local committees were appointed, consisting of both officials and
private persons, English and Indian, to help the district officer in
distributing expenditure throughout the area. The needs of various
parts were discussed and the money allotted. It was a type of local
government suited to the conditions of the time that responsibility
should rest on the district magistrate, who got others, interested in the
needs of the district, to help him in the work.
In Madras and Sind proceedings were soon taken to legalise these
cesses and later in 1869 the Bombay Government was armed with a
comprehensive enactment to provide for expenditure on objects of
local public utility and to constitute committees for the proper ad-
ministration of such funds. These bodies were formed not only for the
district as a whole, but also for the taluks or subdivisions of the district,
considerable sums being placed at the disposal of all these bodies.
By
the formation of local committees it was hoped that the people might
become accustomed to take an interest in the administration of their
own affairs and give that assistance of which the government stood so
much in need in regulating and providing for local requirements and
improvements. The director of public instruction had reported that
the educational inspectors continued to make the most encouraging
reports of the working of the local cess, and thought he saw his way
to give primary education to the children of the cultivators. All the
members of the committees were nominated, with the local officials
at their head while their proceedings were subject to review and
control by the government. Local self-government had been put on a
definite footing, not like that in England, but rather akin to that on
the continent of Europe in its strict control by officials.
The next phase was inaugurated by the financial reforms of Lord
Mayo in 1870, whereby each province was to bear a part of the growing
state expenditure, and the need for organising local self-government
was clearly laid down in the resolution of 14 September, 1870.
The operation of this resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford
opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal
institutions, and for the association of natives and Europeans to a greater extent
than heretofore in the administration of affairs.
1 Ferry Fund Resolution, 12 September, 1856.
: Act VI of 1863 (Madras Council), VIII of 1865 (Bombay Council).
: Act III of 1865 (Bombay Council). .
• Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 5 February, 1869.


## p. 518 (#558) ############################################

518
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Within the next year there was great activity in the various provinces
to place local government on a proper local footing, acts being
passed which legalised existing cesses, adding to them in some cases
and in Bengal even bringing them into existence. As Bengal had so
far escaped all cesses, it raised a cry of indignation at the proposal thus
to raise funds for roads and education. So great was this that the
secretary of state directeda that the cess should raise only what was
needed for roads and thus a great opportunity for finding funds for
primary education was lost. Even so there were protests by Indian
members of the legislative council that no more roads were necessary,
although the famine in Orissa had recently shown the absolute
necessity of extending the means of moving food from one part of the
country to another. The result was that the proceeds of the cess could
bé utilised only for roads, while in the other provinces expenditure
was distributed over communications, education, public health, and
general improvements in the districts. Committees similar in con-
stitution to those in the Bombay Presidency were formed for the
districts throughout India, but nothing was done to develop self-
government in smaller areas. There was thus by 1881 throughout
British India (except Burma) local government by nominated district
committees, consisting both of officials and private persons, controlled
in all matters by the government and with an official president or chair-
man. Much was done by these bodies to improve communications,
construct schools, dispensaries, etc. , and the districts reaped con-
siderable benefit. The system, however, had no connection with any
previous Indian system of administration, but was the work of official
hands. Local funds were raised to supplement what was given by the
central government, and proceedings were controlled by persons who
looked to that government for orders rather than seeking to carry out
the wishes of the people of the district. The vitality of such bodies
depended almost entirely on the officials who, although in a minority
on the committees, practically controlled their proceedings. In
co-operation with these officials private persons in several instances
did excellent work but in many cases meetings were poorly attended,
and the administration of affairs rested with the district officer aided
by his official staff. The hope of relieving that officer in his work of
local administration had not been fulfilled, while the extra funds
available had greatly increased the scope of his activities.
In 1881-2 a determined effort was made to turn these district
committees into something more consonant with English ideas. It
was proposed at first that the local administration should be concen-
trated in the hands of one committee for each district with subordinate
committees for the subdivisions, the district or subdivisional officer
1 XVII, XVIII, XX of 1871, IV of 1871 (Madras).
Proceedings, Bengal Legis. Council, 25 March, 1871.
• Idem, 3 June, 1871.


## p. 519 (#559) ############################################

RURAL BOARDS
519
presiding and being responsible for the executive side of the work. At
least one-half of the members of these committees were to be private
persons nominated or elected as might seem best. This did not repre-
sent much advance on the state of affairs then existing, but by the
resolution u. May, 1882, a further step was made towards more liberal
ideas, and it was recognised that the districts were too large for
effective supervision by private persons. It was suggested that the
new boards should have a large preponderance of non-official mem-
bers, chosen wherever practicable by some system of election, and
where possible the chairmanship and control of the executive should
vest in the hands of private persons and not of government officials.
It was desired that the smallest administrative unit-the subdivision
-should ordinarily form the maximum area to be placed under a
local board. The jurisdiction of the primary boards was to be so
limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest
on the part of each of the members. Internal control by officials over
the boards was to be relaxed, but outside control was to be main-
tained by requiring sanction for certain actions and by retaining the
power of intervention in case of neglect or default, this power ex-
tending in the last resort to the suspension of the delinquent board.
It is curious and significant that control by an auditor empowered to
surcharge was not mentioned, although this had been definitely
provided in the English Public Health Act of 1875 (s. 248).
The legislation that followed in the train of this resolution showed
the greatest div; rsity with only a partial observance of the instructions
issued. The new proposals were too drastic a change from existing
conditions to be accepted with confidence, and the various provinces,
while acting on the resolution, were nowhere prepared to follow it
completely. All, except Burma, accepted the principle, but all asked
that its fulfilment might be gradual. Some attempts were made to
base the system on the existing indigenous self-government in the
villages, and this at first obtained the fullest support from the higher
authorities. In addressing his council on the Local Rates Bill for the
Central Provinces in November, 1882, the governor-general remarked:
"I think it very desirable that here as elsewhere, where there may
still remain indigenous institutions of local self-government, that they
should be made use of to the utmost possible extent". 1 By this bill
the basic electorate was composed of the village headmen who were
grouped together to elect members to the subordinate local boards
which in their turn elected the majority of the district council. The
district officer was carefully excluded from the chairman's office but
the ordinary district remained as the main unit of administration, an
area much too large to be known or even interesting to the private
members of the board, a defect that was to prove fatal to genuine
local self-government on the English model. A little later the same
1 Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 2 November, 1882.
· I of 1883.


## p. 520 (#560) ############################################

520
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
council legislating for the Panjab and the North-Western Provinces and
Oudh departed still further from the principle of utilising indigenous
materials and practically retained the system already in vogue in the
provinces, save that a certain elective element was introduced. The
district officer remained in charge of the administration of the district
council or board, while the subordinate bodies for the subdivisions
had no independent power, little money to use, and only the most
uninteresting routine work to supervise.
As has been noted above, the Bombay Presidency led the way in
the attempt to stimulate local interest in rural improvement, but,
owing to the necessity of concentrating on the construction of good
roads throughout the districts, administration was completely cen-
tralised and the local bodies had little if any power over expenditure.
New legislation, however, in 1884 established again the subdivisional
boards with an electorate somewhat on the lines of that in the Central
Provinces, and placed at their disposal a portion of the cess and certain
fees. The chairmen remained official, but owing to the powers given
to the subordinate boards there was a greater diffusion of work in the
different parts of the districts. Madras went a step further on the
path towards decentralisation by taking for its primary boards com-
mittees or panchayats for the larger and more prosperous villages, in
many of which voluntary sanitary associations already existed. The
duties of the panchayats were to clean up the village and in some cases
to maintain roads and provide a water supply. Their funds were
found from a house-rate, which could in the last resort be imposed by
the governor if the villagers themselves insisted on preferring in-
sanitary conditions to the payment of rates. The subdivisional or
taluk boards were armed with considerable powers and funds, while
the district board exercised administration over the whole district.
There was thus a real association of the people with the work in
connection with communications, education and sanitation at all
stages, but the chairmen of the taluk and district boards remained
official, so that, except in the village unions, executive power re-
mained that of the local government and control was exercised from
within rather than from without.
More striking is the story of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act,
by which a provincial government started to carry out the principles
of the 1882 resolution but was thwarted by the secretary of state.
Mr Macaulay in introducing the bill in January, 1883, referred to the
great progress that had been made in the last twelve years in educa-
tion, the making of roads, etc. , but admitted that little had been done
to develop local self-government. The district committees established
a
1 XIV and XX of 1883.
: Proceedings, Bombay Legis. Council, 25 August, 1883.
3 Act 1 of 1884 (Bombay Council).
• Act V of 1884 (Madras Council).


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RURAL BOARDS
521
in 1871 had not proved satisfactory, as the areas were too large for
such bodies to manage. It was therefore proposed to utilise to
the utmost existing and well-established institutions and base local
self-government on village committees which would form the
“executive hands” of a local board constituted for an area not greater
than a subdivision. He urged that there was no necessity for a district
board, but the necessary supervision could be provided by a central
board for the whole of Bengal. While the sanction of the secretary
of state to these proposals was awaited, some test elections for village
committees were held, and found to give excellent results, as the mode
of election, viz. calling the villagers together and letting them choose
their own representatives after discussion and not by silent votes,
suited the genius of the country. These interesting and bold proposals,
however, were vetoed by the secretary of state, who desired that the
powers of control should be conferred on a district committee pre-
sided over by the district magistrate. ? Both the local government and
the Government of India urged that the proper position of the magis-
trate as the controlling authority of the district was outside these
boards, and again put up a scheme of subdivisional boards with
control by the divisional commissioner. But the secretary of state
would have none of it and insisted on the establishment of district
boards. He wrote:3
If the plan which I have sketched out were adopted, the government would
be able with due regard to the public interest to leave even more in the hands
of the local bodies than it could with safety when trusting only to the supervision
of the magistrate acting apart and without the advantage of constant intercourse
with the members of a district committee.
The result was the act of 1885 and a system by which the district
magistrate controlled the work throughout the district, the needs of
which were known to him better than to any other member of the
board, as his duties took him all over the countryside. The district
board fulfilled the secretary of state's desire for efficiency, for it was
efficient in getting work done, but there was little if any development
of the English form of local self-government and no utilisation of the
existing and old institutions in the villages”. Great was the change
from the spirit of the 1882 resolution, in which Lord Ripon had
declared:
it is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that the measure
is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as a measure of political and
popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that in course
of time as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely
on local administration improved efficiency will in fact follow.
These high hopes were hardly justified by the actual working of the
various systems of local government which they had inspired. The
1 Proceedings, Bengal Legis. Council, 20 January, 1883.
; Idem, 9 February, 1884.
3 Idem, 14 March, 1885.
a


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522
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
!
boards were neither local nor popular, and the machinery of an
election system inspired no enthusiasm. A popular will outside the
village was unknown, and inside was accustomed to find expression
in discussion until a unanimous decision was reached. The hope that
it would be generated by polling booths was disappointed, for the
elected representatives could hardly be said to embody a popular will.
Generally the elections excited little interest and a large proportion
of the vacant seats were filled without contest. Even when sitting on
the board, the representatives of the people were mainly apathetic and
prepared to leave such matters to the disposal of the presiding district
magistrate. Further the districts were units much too large to be
managed by any single representative body. The elected repre-
sentatives knew the immediate vicinity of their respective villages
and the headquarters of the district but were ignorant of the rest of
the area. The subdivision itself was too large an area for an elected
body to manage. The result was that the work of the local bodies was
not spontaneous but actuated by the directing energy and know-
ledge of the district officer who was known to men from all parts of
the district. In the circumstances it was essential that he should
remain in control of these large local bodies, and, even after they had
been working for a quarter of a century, the Decentralisation Com-
mission was of opinion that the district officer should remain at the
head of the board. 1 Even if the outside control of the local bodies had
been increased by giving the auditors, as in England, the power to
surcharge individuals for the misapplication of funds, it is doubtful
whether the services of the district officer could have been dispensed
with, as there was so little vitality in the new bodies.
An example of this lack of vitality may be found in the fact that
these bodies showed little enthusiasm for any attempts to increase
their incomes from those sources which were under their own control,
such as public ferries, cattle-pounds, tolls, etc. The greater part of
their funds came from local cesses assessed and realised by govern-
ment officials. Had it been their duty to collect this money for them-
selves, their income would have been much more attenuated and very
little could have been done to improve life in the districts. As it was,
the district boards, with the exception of those in Madras, kept the
lion's share of the funds for their own work and starved the subordinate
boards, leaving them only enough to carry out works of a petty and
routine nature. It was little wonder that these bodies became com-
pletely apathetic and in most parts of India were condemned as useless.
The contrasting progress of the subdivisional boards armed with
substantial powers and funds, and of the village unions in Madras
realising their own rates, showed clearly that the system elsewhere
was at fault, as it had not been built up from the bottom. A com-
prehensive overhaul was necessary, for the attempt to transplant from
1 Report (1909), para. 795.


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PRESIDENCY TOWNS
523
England rural self-government had not been a success. It is now to
be seen how similar efforts fared in connection with the presidency
towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.
PRESIDENCY TOWNS
In the presidency towns the Western ideas of local self-government
have had a comparatively long trial, as they were introduced by a
statute of George III which gave authority to the governor-general
to appoint justices of the peace in these towns and empowered these
justices to appoint scavengers and watchmen and to levy a rate to
pay them on owners and occupiers of houses and ground. Earlier
English law was followed, a previous statute of the same monarch
being cited as a precedent. It is significant that although the English
statute is closely followed in constituting the local body, the clause
appointing a person to collect the rates and keep accounts, and pro-
viding punishment in the event of his negligence, is omitted. This
omission to provide for the strict supervision of public money, the
backbone of English local self-government, occurs again and again
in the history of Indian municipal government. It is one of the facts
that help to explain the lack of success in transplanting this English
institution to the soil of an oriental country.
The statute was passed none too soon, for Grandpré could write of
Calcutta in 1790 that the public drains were regarded as the natural
receptacles for all refuse and filth, that carcasse: were left to rot and
putrefy in the streets, and that jackals had for two nights preyed on
a human corpse thrown down at his gate. Little change was made
in the next thirty or forty years, but gradually regular establishments
grew up. The body of justices was supposed to control the staff for
the collection of the rates and an engineer in charge of the roads and
conservancy. In all cases, however, the money collected was inade-
quate for the work to be done and the sanitation of the rapidly growing
presidency towns was indescribably bad.
Between 1817 and 1830 spasmodic attempts were made in Madras
and Calcutta to undertake special works paid out of the lottery funds,
and much was done with this money in laying out these towns, the
roads or drains on completion being handed over to the justices to
maintain out of their assessments. Even for the maintenance work
the funds never sufficed, and the provincial governments supplied the
balances required. In Bombay alone was an additional tax-that
on carriages and carts—successfully levied, the proceeds of which
were spent on the roads. The justices as a body did not take much
interest in their work, and their power was gradually concentrated
in the hands of the chief magistrate, who was helped in Calcutta by
1
33
Geo. III, c. 52.
7 Geo. III, c. 42.
: 8. W. Goode, Municipal Calcutta, p. 10.


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524
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
1
1
the superintendent of police to collect the taxes and to supervise the
work of conservancy-a Herculean task. No trace of popular govern-
ment is apparent, while there was a general fear of imposing taxation
adequate for the work required and of realising rigorously the rates
imposed.
The first comprehensive attempt to tackle the situation was made
by “The Fever Hospital and Municipal Improvement Committee”,
which from 1836 to 1849 overhauled all the departments of Calcutta,
laying bare the noisome defects in conservancy, and even extracting
Rs. 14,000 from a highly placed official who could not explain a
deficiency in the accounts. During this period began some efforts to
get the residents to take more interest in the work of the town, as their
co-operation was found essential. Accordingly the acts, XXIV of
1840 for Calcutta and XXII of 1841 for Madras, while widening the
purposes to which the municipal assessment might be applied, gave
powers to the inhabitants of the different divisions of the towns to ask
for the control of the assessment and the collection of taxes. This first
attempt to induce co-operation failed, as the residents had no desire
to participate in the disagreeable tasks of collecting and administering
public funds.
Bombay found its own solution in Act XI of 1845 which concen-
trated the administrative power in the hands of a Conservancy Board,
on which were two European and three Indian justices, elected by
the body of justices, with the senior magistrate of police as chairman.
In Calcutta, however, experiments continued to be made to enlist the
help of the people by direct election, but the elections were a farce
and gave opportunity for the grossest abuses. The result was to dis-
credit completely the elective system for years to come and to put a
stop to the efforts of the government to make the public partners in
the management of the town.
A fresh attempt to grapple with the sanitation of the presidency
towns was made in 1856 when Act XIV (for the conservancy and
improvement of the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay) and
Act XXV (for the better assessment and collection of rates) were
passed. The proceedings of the council show that the various points
in the bills were fully debated, the members always referring to the
English statutes for guidance, but also again and again deferring to
such Indian opinion as was expressed. Some change had to be made,
as it was admitted on all hands that the existing system had failed
and that the election of the commissioners could not be entrusted to
a direct vote. Thus Sir James Colville did not suppose there was any
town in the world of equal size and opulence in such a disgraceful
state of darkness as Calcutta, 1 while Mr Peacock emphasised the
importance of drinking water and drainage compared with lighting. ”
1 Proceedings, India Legis. Council, 6 December, 1856.
Idem, 13 December, 1856.
.


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PRESIDENCY TOWNS
525
Special acts were passed for the appointment of three commissioners
in each town and the difference in development of each begins to
appear. In the Calcutta act? were special provisions for gas-lighting
and for the construction of sewers. In Bombaya power was given to
levy town-dues, a profitable source of income, while the town was
made to pay part of the cost of the police force and to set aside money
to repay the government the cost of constructing the Vehar waterworks.
For the first time an attempt was made to deal with the conservancy
of the large towns on the lines that had proved successful in England,
but with this fundamental difference that the scheme was not a
natural growth as in England, but an importation, which could be
worked only by the help of officials appointed by the government.
However, many defects soon became evident. For example,
responsibility was divided among the three commissioners; residents
were not associated in any way with the administration; there was no
power to raise the necessu. y funds, while proper audit control was
completely lacking. The towns remained filthy, and the complicated
conservancy system of Act XIV existed only on paper. Each province,
now armed with legislative powers, sought its own solution of the
problem.
In Calcutta the justices were again' vested with the general control
of municipal expenditure while executive power was concentrated in
the hands of their chairman appointed by the government, his position
being further strengthened by his being commissioner of police.
Provided with funds by the raising of the house- and water-rates, Sir
Stewart Hogg seized the opportunity of taking up on a proper scale the
combined system of drainage and water supply, which made possible
the vast strides in sanitation apparent at this time. But the hundred
and twenty justices formed a clumsy body to supervise a strong and
active commissioner, and there were many wrangles between the two
parties. Still the improvements effected made them averse to any
constitutional change till ten years later.
Although Bombay had larger available funds than Calcutta, the
three commissioners had been unable to work together and financial
chaos had been the result. There was no check on accounts, no con-
tracts for works, while three and a half lakhs were unaccoun. ed for by
one officer. The condition of the sanitation of the town was dreadful
and the death-rate was rising rapidly. By the act of 1865 the justices
were constituted a body corporate, with control over the budget, but
all executive power was concentrated in the hands of a highly paid
government official. In view of the financial scandals of the late
régime, a special controller of accounts was appointed, who was to be
independent of the chairman and whose signature was necessary for
any expenditure. With the appointment of Mr Arthur Crawford as
1 XXVIII of 1856.
? XXV of 1858.
· VI of 1863 (Bengal Council). • Bombay Municipal Act of 1865.


## p. 526 (#566) ############################################

526
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
municipal commissioner and Dr Hewlett as health officer, the work
of sanitation was pushed on vigorously, and the whole administration
tightened up
Madras at first did not alter its constitution, as the justices had been
found to take little interest in municipal work, and they could not
afford to appoint a highly paid official as in Bombay. Even with
fresh taxation they could only maintain the existing services and no
drainage scheme could be attempted. Later on, however, legislation?
was passed to associate the people with the administration by dividing
the town into eight wards, with four councillors appointed by the
government for each. Executive power was concentrated in the
hands of the president and fresh sources of income were found in
liquor-licence fees and tolls on goods entering the port.
In the decade 1865–74 great improvements were made in Calcutta
and Bombay, thanks to the funds available and the vigorous per-
sonalities of the executive heads, but many flaws existed in the con-
stitutions of the towns. Improvements were effected in the legislation
of the next decade, when financial control over the executive was
strengthened and the modern system of election of representatives
directly by ratepayers came at last to stay. In each of the towns half
the councillors were elected, but the executive remained in the hands
of an official nominated by the government. Control over this official
was financial, steps being taken to introduce some sort of continuous
audit or supervision either by paid auditors or by representatives of
the corporation.
A start was made in Bombay, where there had been great popular
agitation against the commissioner on account of his enforcement of
taxation and of pushing on the works necessary for conservancy
without having the full support of the justices. The controller of
expenditure appointed under the act of 1865 did not control, 2 as he
had in practice become a subordinate of the commissioner, while the
justices, five hundred in number, were much too numerous to con-
stitute any detailed check of finance. After much controversy the
corporation was reduced to sixty-four members, sixteen nominated
by the government, sixteen elected by the resident justices, and thirty-
two elected directly by the ratepayers. The executive power was
concentrated in the hands of the commissioner, but provision was
made for the weekly audit of the accounts by the town council, a
standing committee of the corporation, and for a monthly audit
by paid auditors. This constitution stood the test of experience and
remained in force with some additions and improvements till the end
of the period under review. Bombay was thus the first to solve satis-
factorily the problem of successful local self-government, not on a
1 Act IX of 1867 (Madras Council).
2 Proceedings, Bombay Legis.