Therefore schismatics who are
separated
from the Church, have a
spiritual power.
spiritual power.
Summa Theologica
Now if a man's will holds fast
to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his
own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it
is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds
to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is
reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife
consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should
arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor;
whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills,
which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
"wherefrom," i. e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
the term "whither," i. e. something of our own to which we cling, and in
this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the
term "whither" is more important than the term "wherefrom" (because the
end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a
daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from
both for different reasons, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive,
while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united
a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and
in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it
were a capital vice.
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OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
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Whether contention is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
found in them, according to Lk. 22:24: "And there was also a strife
amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
greatest. " Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): "Some
out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18):
"In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. " Therefore contention
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the
courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a
good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
they are first challenged to dispute. " Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according
to Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily
silenced? " And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord
said of him (Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right
before me, as my servant Job hath. " Therefore contention is not always
a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2
Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words. " Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is
included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21)
"they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. " Now
whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a
precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.
I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just
as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies
contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various
contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully
calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he
says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things,"
for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter
end. "
Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard
to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider
whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or
against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we
must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the
persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy,
hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp
speech suitable for proof and refutation"---or whether it exceeds the
demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is
blameworthy.
Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth
and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss.
Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of
the truth with clamorous confidence. " If, however, contention denote a
disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is
praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together
with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the
contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others.
Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words,"
adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not
with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up
for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not
to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not
spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this
reason Our Lord checked them.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention,"
were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of
faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact
that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
Christ would be made known---since evil is sometimes the occasion of
good results.
Reply to Objection 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when,
in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or
in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i. e. in respect
of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For
Job had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
inordinate in mind or in speech.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men? " Now zeal
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
Objection 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the
voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
Objection 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the
matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge
puffeth up. " Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention
is not a daughter of vainglory.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).
I answer that, As stated above ([2652]Q[37], A[2]), discord is a
daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings
to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is
proper to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as
people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their
hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by
words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for
the same reason as discord.
Reply to Objection 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so
far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or
with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
clings to his own opinion, as stated above ([2653]Q[37], A[2], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a
loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not
the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by
goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so
not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the
"per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result
from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place,
then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether schism is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schism is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat. ),
"denotes a division. " But every sin causes a division, according to Is.
59:: "Your sins have divided between you and your God. " Therefore
schism is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys
the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
disobedience against the heavenly commandments. " Therefore every sin is
a schism.
Objection 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of
faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem
not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4)
distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a "schismatic
is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as
others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community,
whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the
Catholic Church. " Therefore schism is not a generic sin.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name
"from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity.
Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially
opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the
species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the
moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which
results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin
of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the
schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect
of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with
the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of
spirit.
Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and
intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for
this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church,
even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is
subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church
consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion
of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the
members of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19:
"Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from
which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with
nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. " Now this
Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign
Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the
Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the
Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
Reply to Objection 1: The division between man and God that results
from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention
as a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
not schism properly so called.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and
refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this,
wherefore not every sin is a schism.
Reply to Objection 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of
those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For
heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially
opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith
and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever
is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep.
ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism and heresy
to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from
the Church. " Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to
the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i. e.
charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain
babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds
(In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it is possible, in a
certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet
there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it
may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Dt.
25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be. " Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) that
some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down,
and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell,
you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God. " Moreover the
ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of
David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of
schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
opposed, as shown above ([2654]Q[10], A[2];[2655] Q[23], A[6]).
Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else
surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from
something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as
Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.
I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived
from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from
its object, as shown above ([2656]FS, Q[72], A[1]; [2657]FS, Q[73],
A[3]). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in
respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself,
according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded;
whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a
participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is
manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the
sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins
more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his
contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger,
or for some similar reason.
Reply to Objection 1: It had already been declared to that people by
the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no
other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed
among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for
those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known
among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved
those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous
and unwonted manner.
We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
wars were raised therein [*Vulg. : 'This city is a rebellious city, and
hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein
of old']. " Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an
habitual sin (as stated above, [2658]FS, Q[105], A[2], ad 9), because
punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that
where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought
to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only
for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the
passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than
the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in
the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is
less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal
object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object
and is our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our
neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good,
which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so
these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred
of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed
by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the
greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schismatics have any power?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
return after being ordained, are not ordained again. " Now Order is a
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain
their Orders.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he
can have it. " But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great
power.
Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a
spiritual power.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the
Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman
Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be
acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided
they be of commendable life and knowledge. " But this would not be so,
unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore
schismatics have spiritual power.
On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1,
can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and
from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or
honor. "
I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is
not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a
power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received
it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or
heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the
Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power
ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the
higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows
that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful
for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in
sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God's instrument, so
that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault
whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.
On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred
by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to
the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and
schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate,
nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it
is invalid.
Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power,
or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the
essence of the power, but to its lawful use.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with
excommunication?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that
"Baptism can be received from a schismatic. " Therefore it seems that
excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
Objection 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not brought
again, neither have you sought that which was lost. " Now schismatics
are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.
Objection 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and
the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same
twice" [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment
for the sin of schism, according to[2659] Q[23], A[5], where it is
stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are
severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be
punished by the secular power. " Therefore they ought not to be punished
with excommunication.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents of
these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and touch
nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins. "
I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man sinneth,
by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg. : 'he is tormented']. Now
a schismatic, as shown above [2660](A[1]), commits a twofold sin: first
by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church,
and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they
be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the
Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the
Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by
the secular power.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a
schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man
to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom
he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse
whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments of the present life are
medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel
a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body
medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the
compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices,
another should not be employed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage
war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat.
26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword. " Therefore
all wars are unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a
sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat.
5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath. "
Therefore war is always sinful.
Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful,
as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore
it seems that war is a sin in itself.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion
[*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war
altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather
have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up
soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to
no man . . . and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded
them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering. "
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual
to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the
tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in
wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who
are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of
the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful
for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal
against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according
to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in
vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the
sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies.
Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the
poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for
this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order
conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and
counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme
authority. "
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked,
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.
Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. , qu. x, super Jos. ): "A just war
is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or
state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs
inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly. "
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars
that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with
the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting
the good. " For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate
authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a
wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The
passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of
power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war. "
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To
take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority. " On
the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by
the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person)
through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is
not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another,
wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make
sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they
always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they
are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of
mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain
from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin.
cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is
necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are
stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be
vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of
sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an
internal enemy. "
Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so
they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord
"came not to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep.
ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to
the prosperity of peace. "
Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not
all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect:
cf. Veget. , De Re Milit. i].
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Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
For, as stated above [2661](A[1]), wars are lawful and just in so far
as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the
sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was
not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt
him, and dares not stand up against his injustice. " Therefore it is
lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur):
"As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some
said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together,
and ordered them to go down to the seashore. " Therefore it is lawful
for bishops to fight.
Objection 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man
does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another,
according to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death,
and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that
do them. " Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country,
or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward. "
Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Mat. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg. :
'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in Jn. 18:11]. " Therefore it
is not lawful for them to fight.
I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number
of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1),
while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that
they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those
who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves
with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers
who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce
[*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit. ].
Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they
hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the
praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties
of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to
clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike
pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God,
entangleth himself with secular business. " The second reason is a
special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to
the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is
represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you
shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death
of the Lord, until He come. " Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to
slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to
shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they
portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that
those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man
who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders
him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for
clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.
Reply to Objection 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. " Such are salutary
warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the
sentence of excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of
their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly,
by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to
sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that
bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an
abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every
power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is
directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be
considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which
clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to
take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an
occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
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Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war.
For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that
which is just. " But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem
to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even
in a just war.
Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra
Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy,
as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is
unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to
be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by
laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ.
to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his
own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it
is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds
to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is
reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.
Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife
consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should
arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor;
whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills,
which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.
Reply to Objection 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
"wherefrom," i. e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
the term "whither," i. e. something of our own to which we cling, and in
this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the
term "whither" is more important than the term "wherefrom" (because the
end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a
daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from
both for different reasons, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive,
while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united
a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and
in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it
were a capital vice.
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OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?
(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
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Whether contention is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
found in them, according to Lk. 22:24: "And there was also a strife
amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
greatest. " Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): "Some
out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18):
"In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice. " Therefore contention
is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the
courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a
good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
they are first challenged to dispute. " Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according
to Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily
silenced? " And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord
said of him (Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right
before me, as my servant Job hath. " Therefore contention is not always
a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2
Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words. " Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is
included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21)
"they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. " Now
whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a
precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.
I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just
as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies
contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various
contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully
calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he
says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things,"
for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter
end. "
Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard
to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider
whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or
against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we
must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the
persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy,
hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp
speech suitable for proof and refutation"---or whether it exceeds the
demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is
blameworthy.
Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth
and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss.
Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of
the truth with clamorous confidence. " If, however, contention denote a
disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is
praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together
with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the
contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others.
Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words,"
adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not
with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up
for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not
to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not
spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this
reason Our Lord checked them.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention,"
were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of
faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact
that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
Christ would be made known---since evil is sometimes the occasion of
good results.
Reply to Objection 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when,
in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or
in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i. e. in respect
of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For
Job had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
inordinate in mind or in speech.
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Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?
Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men? " Now zeal
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.
Objection 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the
voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.
Objection 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the
matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge
puffeth up. " Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention
is not a daughter of vainglory.
On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).
I answer that, As stated above ([2652]Q[37], A[2]), discord is a
daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings
to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is
proper to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as
people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their
hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by
words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for
the same reason as discord.
Reply to Objection 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so
far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or
with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
clings to his own opinion, as stated above ([2653]Q[37], A[2], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a
loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not
the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.
Reply to Objection 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by
goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so
not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the
"per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result
from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.
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OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place,
then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether schism is a special sin?
(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?
(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;
(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
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Whether schism is a special sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat. ),
"denotes a division. " But every sin causes a division, according to Is.
59:: "Your sins have divided between you and your God. " Therefore
schism is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys
the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
disobedience against the heavenly commandments. " Therefore every sin is
a schism.
Objection 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of
faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem
not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.
On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4)
distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a "schismatic
is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as
others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community,
whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the
Catholic Church. " Therefore schism is not a generic sin.
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name
"from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to unity.
Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially
opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the
species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the
moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which
results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin
of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the
schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect
of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with
the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of
spirit.
Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and
intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for
this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church,
even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is
subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church
consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion
of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the
members of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19:
"Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from
which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with
nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God. " Now this
Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign
Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the
Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the
Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
Reply to Objection 1: The division between man and God that results
from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention
as a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
not schism properly so called.
Reply to Objection 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and
refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this,
wherefore not every sin is a schism.
Reply to Objection 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of
those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For
heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially
opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith
and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever
is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what
Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep.
ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism and heresy
to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from
the Church. " Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to
the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i. e.
charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain
babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds
(In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it is possible, in a
certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet
there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it
may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Dt.
25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be. " Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) that
some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down,
and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell,
you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God. " Moreover the
ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of
David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of
schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.
Objection 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
Objection 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
opposed, as shown above ([2654]Q[10], A[2];[2655] Q[23], A[6]).
Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else
surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from
something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as
Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.
I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its
circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived
from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from
its object, as shown above ([2656]FS, Q[72], A[1]; [2657]FS, Q[73],
A[3]). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in
respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself,
according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded;
whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a
participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is
manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the
sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins
more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his
contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger,
or for some similar reason.
Reply to Objection 1: It had already been declared to that people by
the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no
other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed
among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for
those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known
among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved
those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous
and unwonted manner.
We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
wars were raised therein [*Vulg. : 'This city is a rebellious city, and
hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein
of old']. " Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an
habitual sin (as stated above, [2658]FS, Q[105], A[2], ad 9), because
punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that
where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought
to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only
for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the
passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than
the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in
the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is
less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal
object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object
and is our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our
neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good,
which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so
these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred
of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins committed
by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the
greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.
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Whether schismatics have any power?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
return after being ordained, are not ordained again. " Now Order is a
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain
their Orders.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he
can have it. " But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great
power.
Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a
spiritual power.
Objection 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the
Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman
Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be
acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided
they be of commendable life and knowledge. " But this would not be so,
unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore
schismatics have spiritual power.
On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1,
can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and
from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or
honor. "
I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is
not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a
power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received
it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or
heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the
Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power
ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the
higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows
that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful
for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in
sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God's instrument, so
that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault
whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.
On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred
by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to
the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and
schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate,
nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it
is invalid.
Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power,
or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the
essence of the power, but to its lawful use.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with
excommunication?
Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that
"Baptism can be received from a schismatic. " Therefore it seems that
excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.
Objection 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not brought
again, neither have you sought that which was lost. " Now schismatics
are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them.
Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.
Objection 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and
the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same
twice" [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment
for the sin of schism, according to[2659] Q[23], A[5], where it is
stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are
severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be
punished by the secular power. " Therefore they ought not to be punished
with excommunication.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents of
these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and touch
nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins. "
I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man sinneth,
by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg. : 'he is tormented']. Now
a schismatic, as shown above [2660](A[1]), commits a twofold sin: first
by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church,
and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they
be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the
Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the
Church's spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by
the secular power.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a
schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man
to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom
he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.
Reply to Objection 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse
whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance
Reply to Objection 3: The punishments of the present life are
medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel
a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body
medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the
compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices,
another should not be employed.
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OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
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Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage
war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat.
26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword. " Therefore
all wars are unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a
sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat.
5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath. "
Therefore war is always sinful.
Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful,
as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore
it seems that war is a sin in itself.
On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion
[*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war
altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather
have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up
soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to
no man . . . and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded
them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering. "
I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual
to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the
tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private
individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in
wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who
are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of
the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful
for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal
against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according
to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in
vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him
that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the
sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies.
Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the
poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for
this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order
conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and
counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme
authority. "
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked,
should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.
Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. , qu. x, super Jos. ): "A just war
is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or
state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs
inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly. "
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars
that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with
the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting
the good. " For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate
authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a
wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The
passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of
power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war. "
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To
take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority. " On
the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by
the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person)
through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is
not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another,
wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make
sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they
always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they
are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of
mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain
from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin.
cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is
necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are
stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be
vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of
sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an
internal enemy. "
Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so
they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord
"came not to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep.
ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to
the prosperity of peace. "
Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not
all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect:
cf. Veget. , De Re Milit. i].
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Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
For, as stated above [2661](A[1]), wars are lawful and just in so far
as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the
sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was
not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt
him, and dares not stand up against his injustice. " Therefore it is
lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur):
"As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some
said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together,
and ordered them to go down to the seashore. " Therefore it is lawful
for bishops to fight.
Objection 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man
does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another,
according to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death,
and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that
do them. " Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
Objection 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country,
or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward. "
Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Mat. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg. :
'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in Jn. 18:11]. " Therefore it
is not lawful for them to fight.
I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number
of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1),
while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that
they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those
who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves
with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers
who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce
[*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit. ].
Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they
hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the
praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties
of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to
clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike
pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God,
entangleth himself with secular business. " The second reason is a
special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to
the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is
represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you
shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death
of the Lord, until He come. " Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to
slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to
shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they
portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that
those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man
who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders
him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for
clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.
Reply to Objection 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God. " Such are salutary
warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the
sentence of excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of
their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly,
by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps.
Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to
sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that
bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an
abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every
power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is
directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be
considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which
clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and
counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to
take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an
occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have
vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
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Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war.
For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that
which is just. " But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem
to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even
in a just war.
Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra
Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy,
as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is
unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to
be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by
laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ.
