In LS Tsongkhapa
subjects
Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism.
Tsongkhapa-s-Qualms-About-Early-Tibetan-Interpretations-of-Madhyamaka-Philosophy
"Tsongkhapa's Qualms about Early Tibetan Interpretations of Madhyamaka Philosophy.
" by Thupten Jinpa.
The Tibet Journal 24, 2 (1999) pgs 3-28
Tsongkhapa's Qualms about Early Tibetan Interpretations of Madhyamaka Philosophy
Thupten Jinpa
This paper aims to contribute towards an assessment of Tsongkhapa (1357- 1419) and his place within the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. It calls for the need for a greater sensitivity on the part of modern scholar- ship on Tibetan Buddhist studies to historical perspectives and also to issues of hel? meneutics. By historical perspective, I am referring to ap- proaches which help us situate the thoughts of someone like Tsongkhapa within the historical and intellectual contexts of his time. This is crucial if we are to develop any accurate picture of the dynamics behind the
works of a historically influential thinker like Tsongkhapa and appreciate his role within the overaH history of Tibetan thought. The second issue, i. e. the need for greater sensitivity to questions of hermeneutics, pertains to the problems involved in reconstructing the thought of someone like Tsongkhapa. I am aware that this is difficult in the case of Tsongkhapa given the canonical stature his writings have acquired within the Tibetan scholarly tradition of the Geluk school. The paper also calls for a better appreciation of the "philosophical" dimension of classical Tibetan works, especially those which explicitly deal with what may be called questions of general philosophical concern. This is particularly vital if we wish to "philosophically" engage with the issues that lie at the heart of these texts. I have addressed the problems of interpretation in Tsongkhapa-exegesis elsewhere. l In this paper, I shall, after briefly situating Tsongkhapa in his historical and intellectual context, identify what I see as Tsongkhapa's key concerns for the fate of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet. I shall endeav- our to undertake this by following a close reading of Tsongkhapa's own writings on Madhyamaka philosophy.
At the popular level, Tsongkhapa is perhaps remembered most as the great reformer of Buddhism in Tibet. His revitalisation of monasticism, systemat- ic reinstitution of critical reasoning as an essential element of the path to enlightenment, his novel interpretation of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka philosophy, his marriage of DharmakIrti's epistemology to Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness as read through Candrakirti, and finally, Tsong- y,. hapa's systematic Madhyamaka reading of Anuttarayogatantra teachings of Vajrayana Buddhism, can all be acknowledged as great contributions to the Tibetan scholarly tradition. Despite all this, Tsongkhapa cannot be construed in any sense as revolutionary. Neither did he aspire nor did he
? 4 THE TIBET JOURNAL
set out to establish any revolutionary school of Buddhism. "Revitalisation" rather than "revolution" may be closer to Tsongkhapa's own description of his task. This is, in a way, comparable to Tsongkhapa's own personal assessment of Nagarjuna (second century CE) and Asan? a (fourth century CE) within the world of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. " He calls both of them shing rta'i srol 'byed chen po, literally meaning the "great initiators of the carriage-ways. " They are so-called because, by founding Madhyamaka (Middle Way)and Cittamatra (Mind Only) schools respectively, Nagarjuna
and Asari. ga are believed to have widened the "great" Mahayana path. In other words, Tsongkhapa sees them as the great revitalisers of the Maha- yana tradition. Perhaps, the notion of "revolution" is inconceivable within what may be called the "tradition text" system.
Of course, much of Tsongkhapa's achievement is related to his time and circumstances in history. With the arrival of Atisa in Tibet in the 11th century, the so-called second dissemination of Buddhism in the country had firmly re-established the predominance of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka school of philosophy. 3 Secondly, with Patshap Nyima Drak's (b. 1045) translation of CandrakIrti's Prasannapadtl and Madhyamakavatara in the 11th century, the philosophical literature of the Prasa11gika-Madhyamaka school became more accessible in Tibet. 4 Until then, the dominant school of Madhyamaka philosophy in the country was that of Santarak;;ita's (ca 740- 810) Madhyamaka-Svatantrika-Yogacara. 5 Furthermore, with the translation of the logical and epistemological works of Dharmakirti in the 11th century and also the composition of the first indigenous textbooks on
logic by Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109-1169)6 and Sakya PaDc,iita (1182-1251), studies of Buddhist logic and epistemology had become well established within the educational curriculum of the great monastic learning centres. We know that by Tsongkhapa's time Sangphu and Sakya monasteries had emerged as two of the most important centres of learning in central Tibet. Thus, Tsongkhapa must have inherited much of his interest in Buddhist scholasticism from his time at these great centres of learning. Perhapsi most important of all the legacies was the editing and standardisation of the Tibetan Buddhist canon-i. e. Kangyur (translations of the scriptures attributed to the Buddha) and Tangyur (translations of primarily Indian commentarial literature)--by the great encyclopedist of Tibet Buton Rinchen Drup (1290-1364) in the mid-14th century. 7
? Arguably, for Tsongkhapa, the most important historical event which had a profound impact upon the intellectual climate in ancient Tibet was a royal debate (or debates) which took place at Samye towards the end of the eighth century. 8 The two sides in the debate were the "simultaneis( (gezg bear ba) school of the Ch/an teacher Hva-shang Mahayana and the "gradualist" (rzm gylS pa)9 school of Indian Mahayana Buddhism
? ? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 5
represented by KamalasIla (ca 760-815). The debate represents a rivalry for dominance in Tibet between two distinct forms of Buddhism. One is the tradition of a non-scholastic and somewhat quietist version of the Chinese Ch'an Buddhism and the other is the scholastically highly developed and monastically organised Buddhism of India. lO According to the early Tibet- an literature dealing with the proceedings of this debate, the Indian school represented by KamalasHa and his Tibetan supporters were de- clared the victor. This resulted in the King Trisong Detsen (730-845? )
issuing a royal decree announcing that from then on that
the people of Tibet should uphold the philosophy of Nagarjuna. They should also engage in the way of life of six perfections and practice the ten virtuous deeds. As regards meditative tradition, they must train their mind in the de- velopment of the three insights and be firmly rooted in a perfect unity of tranquil abiding and special insight, the union of skilful means and wisdom. I I
Given all these historical antecedents, as the 14th century was drawing to a close the stage was set for the entrance of a grand synthesiser. Had it not been for these historical conditions Tsongkhapa's contributions would have had far less impact and significance.
II
One crucial element in my approach in reconstructing Tsongkhapa's key concerns about early Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka is what I would call "listening! ! to Tsongkhapa whenever he says that he is arguing for a certain standpoint. A vital part of this "listening! ! is to appreciate the overall framework of the author's thought. This means, that in addition to the appreciation of the historical contexts, the reader must also be sensitive to the issues that are of greatest concern to the author. Such sensitivity naturally calls for a more "sympathetic! ! reading, thus according certain priority to the author when interpreting his works. This does not however preclude a critical approach. What it does entail is making the key assumption that the aspirations, concerns, and beliefs of the author have an important bearing on the "meai1ing" of his works. In other words, in attempting to "understand! ! the "meaning! ! of a text the reader brings
to bear upon his task the overall ! ! project" of the author. This is especially important when reading an author who is writing within a continuing lineage of thought. Tsongkhapa himself is sensitive to this point. Towards the end of LTC Tsongkhapa makes an important hermeneutical point. He writes that a skilful Mahayana teacher is the one who is ever sensitive to the context and the overall lineage of the thought pertaining to a given text. This way, the teacher will be able, by referring to other works of the author, to draw out what remains implicit and sometimes unexplained in
6 THE TIBET JOURNAL
a particular text. 12 As I see it, there are two elements to this hermeneutical requirement. One is to discern what the author himself feels to be of greatest concern to him, and the other is to appreciate the inherited legacies of the tradition within which the author is writing.
In identifying what I perceive as the key philosophical issues pertaining to the interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet which were of greatest concern to Tsongkhapa, I shall use primarily two principal sources, both written by Tsongkhapa as he first embarked on his new mission following his reported mystic encounter with Mafijusrl. The first is an eloquent open letter which is addressed to "the great meditators of Tibet" (bod kyi sgom chen pa rnams). Entitled Queries from a Pure Heart Calling Attention to Crucial Religious Issues,l3 this succinct work reflects the deep passion and concern which Tsongkhapa felt concerning the fate of Buddhist philosophy and practice in Tibet at the time. The work, running into less than 20 folios, primarily consists of a series of rhetorical quest- ions related to both'the practical and philosophical aspects of Buddhism as it was understood and followed in Tibet. My second source is the section on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness known as "Special
Insight" in Tsongkhapa's' monumental work Lam rim chen mo. 14 Given that my primary concern here is to underline Tsongkhapa's qualms I shall not address the question of the identity of his objects of criticism and also the issue of whether or not his characterisation of their views is accurate. This is a methodological choice I am compelled to adopt as such an enterprise lies beyond the scope of my paper. Tsongkhapa very rarely mentions his objects of critique by name and a correct identification of the proponents of these views would inevitably involve an extensive detective work
Although the first source, Queries is found in the standard collection of Tsongkhapa's works, doubts have been raised by some Tibetan scholars about its authorship, notably the Sakya scholar Jhampa Lingpa Sonam Namgyal (1400-1475). 15 However, noted scholars like Shakya Chogden (1428-1507)16 of Sakya, Perna Karpo (1527-1592t of the Kagyu school, Gomchen Ngagwang Drakpa (1418-1496)18 and Panchen Lobsang ChOgyen (1570-1662)19 of Tsongkhapa's own Geluk lineage have accepted the letter's authenticity and have responded to the questions posed in the letter. The Tibetan doxographer Thllken Chokyi Nyima (1737-1802), after drawing attention to this divergence of opinion among Tibetan scholars on the authorship of the letter, states that he finds it difficult to make any cate- gorical judgement on the matter? O According to Thtiken, the following
seem to be the key objections of those who dispute Tsongkhapa's author- ship of the letter. First, they maintain not only that the letter contains certain colloquial expressions that are untypical of Tsongkhapa's general written work, but that the overall style of the writing is very different
? TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 7 f om the mainstream works of Tsongkhapa. Secondly, they argue that in
e colophon, the author writes his name as "the one known to be under ? nknown. Thirdly, there is no mention of the work in any writings of the
So where does this leave us witil the question of the letter's authentic? ? ity? My own view is that none of these objections appears to be persuas- ive enough to question the inclusion of this work in Tsongkhapa's col- lected writings. Since the letter is an extemporaneous statement, its col- loquial style is not surprising. The main intent of the letter is to draw immediate attention to critical religious and philosophical issues of Tsong- khapa's time so that linguistic and philosophical rigour was not an im- portant concern for the author. What better here than to adopt a rhetor-
ical tone that allows the author a certain licence to caricature his op- ponents' views? As for the epithet "the one known to be under the care of Guru Manjugho:? a," I do not think that it is that untypical as suggested by those who dispute Tsongkhapa's authorship of the letter. In fact, the epithet can be read as an early indication of Tsongkhapa's own acknowl- edgement of the purported mystical experience that all his biographies refer to. It is also not surprising if there is no mention of the letter in the writings of Tsongkhapa's immediate students. From the perspective of later traditional Tibetan scholarship, the letter has greater value for a historian than for a phiiosopher. Predictably, religious historians such as Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa (1504-1566) and the regent Sangye Gyatso (1652- 1705) have made significant references to the letter. "3 If this letter is conclusively shown to be not by Tsongkhapa, then doubts can be raised
about the authorship of a few other significant works as well, especially A Reply to je Rendawa2-l and A Scroll for je Rendawa on the Essential Points of Instruction of Mafijusrt,25 both found in Tsongkhapa's collected works. Space prevents me from going more deeply into this. Nevertheless, I would like to state that the validity of my attempt to discern Tsong- khapa's key religious and philosophical concerns about early Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka does not hinge entirely on the authentic- ity of the ascription of this letter to Tsongkhapa. Regardless of the validity of this attribution, its significance for both historians and religious schol- ars working in the field of Tibetan studies cannot be disputed. From a historical point of view, this letter provides us much insight into the central points of doctrinal disputes between the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism around the 14th century. 26 Furthermore, the work appears to occupy an important place within the genre of Tibetan polemical litera- ture. It is surprising that no one among the contemporary scholars on Tibetan Buddhism seems to have paid any serious attention to this
?
? ? ? the care of Guru Manjughoi? a,"21 an epithet that is, in their opinion, totally
immediate disciples of Tsongkhapa. 22
8 THE TIBET JOURNAL
seminal work. To date, there is not even a reference to the work in any modern Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, let alone a translation of the text! 27 The work, if accepted as written by Tsongkhapa as the Tibetan editors of Tsongkhapa's collected works seem to think, represents a first pUblic acknowledgement on Tsongkhapa's part of a deep dissatisfaction with the current intellectual and philosophical climate and the felt need for its revitalisation. It can be seen as representing an official announcement of Tsongkhapa's departure from many of the established Tibetan readings of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness. It also seems to bridge a critical gap in our historical understanding of the processes and evolution of Tsongkhapa's thought. Perhaps more importantly, the work gives us an early intimation of the issues which were to occupy Tsongkhapa's mind for a long time to come. . Without this letter, we would have to assume that there is nothing to herald Tsongkhapa's departure from his con- temporary Tibetan scholarship on Madhyamaka philosophy before writing the extensive section on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness in LRC. 28 I find this hard to accept. Therefore, I shall, at least for the time
being, assume the validity of this letter's ascription to Tsongkhapa.
Let us now return to the main thread of our discussion, i. e. to underline Tsongkhapa's key philosophical concerns regarding Tibetan interpreta- tions of Madhyamaka philosophy. In the language of Tibetan scholastic- ism, we can summarise Tsongkhapa's concerns about the fate of Madhya- maka in Tibet under three categories. First is what Tsongkhapa sees as the nihilistic reading of Prasanglka-Madhyamaka that, according to him, deni- grates the validity of our everyday world of experience. Secondly, Tsong- khapa vehemently opposes what is known as the Shentong Madhyamaka view of the Jonang school. He sees this reading of Madhyamaka as absolutist. In doing so, Tsongkhapa is following in the footsteps of think- ers like Sakya Pal). Q. ita, Buton, and Tsongkhapa's own teacher Rendawa. Tsongkhapa's critical views on the so-called Shentong Madhyamaka of the Jonang school appear to have been established even during the "earlier" period of his intellectual life. In LS Tsongkhapa subjects Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism. 29 The thrust of his critique seems to be to demonstrate the absence'of Indian Madhyamaka literary source for the Shentong view. Tsongkhapa argues that there are only three possible Indian Madhyamaka sources30 for the Jonangpa's central claim that the ultimate truth must be understood as an absolute, but concludes that none of these sources actually support the Shentong standpoint. Tsongkhapa concludes his criticlue by exhorting others to discard this view as one would spit out a particle of dust! 3l Finally, Tsongkhapa appears to be deeply concerned about what he sees as harmful legacies of Hva-shang in the tenets of some of the Tibetan Madhyamika thinkers. The first two
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
In LS Tsongkhapa subjects Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism. 29 The thrust of his critique seems to be to demonstrate the absence'of Indian Madhyamaka literary source for the Shentong view. Tsongkhapa argues that there are only three possible Indian Madhyamaka sources30 for the Jonangpa's central claim that the ultimate truth must be understood as an absolute, but concludes that none of these sources actually support the Shentong standpoint. Tsongkhapa concludes his criticlue by exhorting others to discard this view as one would spit out a particle of dust! 3l Finally, Tsongkhapa appears to be deeply concerned about what he sees as harmful legacies of Hva-shang in the tenets of some of the Tibetan Madhyamika thinkers. The first two
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
Tsongkhapa's refutation of the various strands of the "no-thesis" view is too complex to be dea)t with here; also there exists substantial con- temporary literature on the general debates about whether or not the Madhyamikas have views of their own. 42 Suffice here to underline that the crux of Tsongkhapa's critique pertains to what he understands to be the Prasangika's unique reading of the principle of dependent origination. He argues that since dependent origination is the content (don) of "empti- ness", by denigrating the world of dependent origination, the proponents of the "no-thesis" view are rejecting what is perhaps the heart of the Prasangika's philosophy of emptiness. 43 Not only is it possible for empti- ness of intrinsic being and dependent origination to co-exist in a common locus, the very fact of dependence is, to Tsongkhapa's mind, the highest proof of the absence of intrinsic being. 44 To conceive otherwise, i. e. to hold that dependent origination entails intrinsic being, is to turn every- thing topsy-turvy. In Tsongkhapa's own words, this is like a god himself turning into a devil, a Tibetan equivalent of Nagarjuna's metaphor of medicine becoming the poison! 45
Furthermore, from Tsongkhapa's point of view, the denial of even the conventional existence of the world of dependent origination stems from ? metaphysical assumption that is shared also by all essentialist schools, I. e. existence (yod pn) is equivalent to existence-by-means-of-intrinsic-being (rang ngos nas yod pa). For example, in LTC, Tsongkhapa writes that
? 12 THE TIBET JOURNAL
If one asserts that so long as phenomena such as sprouts etc. exist (yod pal they do so by means of their intrinsic being (rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i yod pal, and that if they do not exist by means of their intrinsic being [then] they do not exist [at all], one is bound to fall into either of the two extremes [i. e. nihil- ism and absolutism]. This way of understanding [the mode of being of pheno- mena] is not different from the essentialists. 46
Tsongkhapa argues that, so far as the definition of nihilism is concern_ ed, there is no substantial difference between both the Prasangika and the essentialist; both agree that repudiation of causality lies at the heart of nihilism. The point of departure between the two parties is this: while the Prasangika does not reject causality, the realist assumes that by rejecting any notion of intrinsic being the Prasangika is rejecting causality as well. This is the principal reason why the Prasangika has been an object of such vehement criticism from the Buddhist essentialists. 47 So, according to Tsongkhapa, Prasangikas do have theses and views of their own, but no theses adhering to any notions of intrinsic being. The Prasangika rejects intrinsic being (svabhava), and emptiness of intrinsic being is their position. Similarly, Prasangikas accept the nominal existence of things and persons; and this is their standpoint. More importantly, as Buddhists, Prasangikas
must maintain that insight into "no-self" (anatman) is the sole path to liberation. Thus, Tsongkhapa concludes:
Therefore, the root cause of all problems is the reifying avidyii (ignorance) that apprehends intrinsic being. The insight into "no-self" or absence of intrinsic being alone is that which eliminates this [reifying consciousness] by means of direct opposition48 .
In effect, Tsongkhapa is rejecting the "no-thesis" view on the grounds that it is essentially nihilistic. In LTC Tsongkhapa cites extensively from Candrakirti to demonstrate a categorical difference between the Prasang-i ka and Carvaka's (Indian materialist's) similar assertions that the laws of karma do not exist intrinsically. 49 According to Tsongkhapa and Candra- kirti, the Carvaka's assertion constitutes nihilism, while the Prasangika's does not. This is because the first denies even the conventional reality of karma, while the latter does not. For Tsongkhapa, Candrakirti's insistence on appreciating this distinction implies his acceptance of the nominal existence of the laws of karma, a view which in Tsongkhapa's mind contradicts the claims of the "no-thesis" view. From a methodological perspective, Tsongkhapa sees the "no-thesis" view as reflecting a serious inability to appreciate the significance of the Prasangika's use of the unique prasajya form of negation. This is a form of negation that is abso- lute and does not commit the protagonist to any existential implication. Yet, to be effective in its application, even such a form of negation must
? pres
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 13
'uppose the acceptance of the law of excluded middle. Tsongkhapa
cites the passage from Vigrahavyavartanf in his support: If the absence of intrinsic being (svabhrJ. va) is reversed,
[its opposite] intrinsic being becomes established 50
? Without subscribing to the fundamental principles of logic, according to Tsongkhapa, one can only result in a state of indecision. Perhaps Tsong- khapa's criticism of this view is ultimately soteriological, at least in its intent. For if the proponents of the nno-thesis" view are right, then the insight into the middle way becomes essentially a state of mind that is a withdrawal of all cognitive activity rather than an active state of nknow- ing". This, for Tsongkhapa, is nothing but the ghost of Hva-shang's pernicious no-thought view, albeit in a new guise. 5l
All of this touch upon the problem of nihilism. For Tsongkhapa, the trouble with the "no-thesis" view is that, when pushed to its logical end, it slides into a form of ontological nihilism. The strategy Tsongkhapa adopts to ensure that the Madhyamaka philosophy does not remain open to the charge of nihilism involves two principal approaches. One is primarily a negative approach in that Tsongkhapa stipulates the para- meters of the Madhyamaka dialectics so that the de-constructive argu- ments of emptiness philosophy cannot and do not undermine the validity of ethics and religious activity. In other words, Tsongkhapa attempts to delineate reason's scope for negation so that the Madhyamaka reasoning does not negate the reality of the conventional world. 52 The second element of Tsongkhapa's strategy involves a constructive approach in that it entails developing a systematic and logically coherent account of con- ventional existence. 53 The primary motive here is to ensure that a clear distinction is maintained between the conventional reality of things and events on the one hand, and metaphysical speculations about their onto- logical status on the other. Tsongkhapa rejects the latter, and argues that existence equals conventional existence.
To summarise, in developing his philosophy of the middle way Tsong- khapa can be seen as nre-claiming" Nagarjuna in Tibet through a close reading of Candraklrti. This does not by any means entail that Tsongkha- pa's thought consists of mere re-presentation of CandrakIrti. As is clear from his works many of Tsongkhapa's substantive contributions are genuinely original by any intellectual standard. However, given Tsong- khapa's such close identification with Candrakirti's works it does seem to be the case that if Candrakirti's reading of Nagarjuna is flawed, serious doubts can also be raised about Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhya- maka philosophy. Perhaps Tsongkhapa's greatest contribution to Madhya- maka thought lies in the depth and the breadth of his exammation of the
? 14 THE TIBET JOURNAL
philosophical implications of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness in key areas of philosophy and soteriology. For example, Tsongkhapa lists what he sees as the "eight distinctive features of the Prasangik a_ Madhyamaka" all of which he takes to be direct consequences of the Prasangika's central thesis, namely the rejection of svabhtiva (intrinsic being). In identifying these features, Tsongkhapa writes
In interpreting the treatise of Arya [Naga? una] there exists a unique approach whereby the text is read in such a way so that all functionality (bya byed thams cad) can be maintained although not even an atom exists (rdul tsam yang) by means of self-defining characteristics. Because of this, this system [Prasali. gika] has many flawless tenets Crnam par dag pa'i grub mthaj that distinguish it from the other interpreters ('grel byed gzhan). "What are they? " [Answer:] For the time being, I shall state the principal ones: (i) The rejection of iilayavijftiirul (foundational consciousness) that is separate from the six categories of con-
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself. However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet.
The Tibet Journal 24, 2 (1999) pgs 3-28
Tsongkhapa's Qualms about Early Tibetan Interpretations of Madhyamaka Philosophy
Thupten Jinpa
This paper aims to contribute towards an assessment of Tsongkhapa (1357- 1419) and his place within the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought. It calls for the need for a greater sensitivity on the part of modern scholar- ship on Tibetan Buddhist studies to historical perspectives and also to issues of hel? meneutics. By historical perspective, I am referring to ap- proaches which help us situate the thoughts of someone like Tsongkhapa within the historical and intellectual contexts of his time. This is crucial if we are to develop any accurate picture of the dynamics behind the
works of a historically influential thinker like Tsongkhapa and appreciate his role within the overaH history of Tibetan thought. The second issue, i. e. the need for greater sensitivity to questions of hermeneutics, pertains to the problems involved in reconstructing the thought of someone like Tsongkhapa. I am aware that this is difficult in the case of Tsongkhapa given the canonical stature his writings have acquired within the Tibetan scholarly tradition of the Geluk school. The paper also calls for a better appreciation of the "philosophical" dimension of classical Tibetan works, especially those which explicitly deal with what may be called questions of general philosophical concern. This is particularly vital if we wish to "philosophically" engage with the issues that lie at the heart of these texts. I have addressed the problems of interpretation in Tsongkhapa-exegesis elsewhere. l In this paper, I shall, after briefly situating Tsongkhapa in his historical and intellectual context, identify what I see as Tsongkhapa's key concerns for the fate of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet. I shall endeav- our to undertake this by following a close reading of Tsongkhapa's own writings on Madhyamaka philosophy.
At the popular level, Tsongkhapa is perhaps remembered most as the great reformer of Buddhism in Tibet. His revitalisation of monasticism, systemat- ic reinstitution of critical reasoning as an essential element of the path to enlightenment, his novel interpretation of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka philosophy, his marriage of DharmakIrti's epistemology to Nagarjuna's philosophy of emptiness as read through Candrakirti, and finally, Tsong- y,. hapa's systematic Madhyamaka reading of Anuttarayogatantra teachings of Vajrayana Buddhism, can all be acknowledged as great contributions to the Tibetan scholarly tradition. Despite all this, Tsongkhapa cannot be construed in any sense as revolutionary. Neither did he aspire nor did he
? 4 THE TIBET JOURNAL
set out to establish any revolutionary school of Buddhism. "Revitalisation" rather than "revolution" may be closer to Tsongkhapa's own description of his task. This is, in a way, comparable to Tsongkhapa's own personal assessment of Nagarjuna (second century CE) and Asan? a (fourth century CE) within the world of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. " He calls both of them shing rta'i srol 'byed chen po, literally meaning the "great initiators of the carriage-ways. " They are so-called because, by founding Madhyamaka (Middle Way)and Cittamatra (Mind Only) schools respectively, Nagarjuna
and Asari. ga are believed to have widened the "great" Mahayana path. In other words, Tsongkhapa sees them as the great revitalisers of the Maha- yana tradition. Perhaps, the notion of "revolution" is inconceivable within what may be called the "tradition text" system.
Of course, much of Tsongkhapa's achievement is related to his time and circumstances in history. With the arrival of Atisa in Tibet in the 11th century, the so-called second dissemination of Buddhism in the country had firmly re-established the predominance of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka school of philosophy. 3 Secondly, with Patshap Nyima Drak's (b. 1045) translation of CandrakIrti's Prasannapadtl and Madhyamakavatara in the 11th century, the philosophical literature of the Prasa11gika-Madhyamaka school became more accessible in Tibet. 4 Until then, the dominant school of Madhyamaka philosophy in the country was that of Santarak;;ita's (ca 740- 810) Madhyamaka-Svatantrika-Yogacara. 5 Furthermore, with the translation of the logical and epistemological works of Dharmakirti in the 11th century and also the composition of the first indigenous textbooks on
logic by Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109-1169)6 and Sakya PaDc,iita (1182-1251), studies of Buddhist logic and epistemology had become well established within the educational curriculum of the great monastic learning centres. We know that by Tsongkhapa's time Sangphu and Sakya monasteries had emerged as two of the most important centres of learning in central Tibet. Thus, Tsongkhapa must have inherited much of his interest in Buddhist scholasticism from his time at these great centres of learning. Perhapsi most important of all the legacies was the editing and standardisation of the Tibetan Buddhist canon-i. e. Kangyur (translations of the scriptures attributed to the Buddha) and Tangyur (translations of primarily Indian commentarial literature)--by the great encyclopedist of Tibet Buton Rinchen Drup (1290-1364) in the mid-14th century. 7
? Arguably, for Tsongkhapa, the most important historical event which had a profound impact upon the intellectual climate in ancient Tibet was a royal debate (or debates) which took place at Samye towards the end of the eighth century. 8 The two sides in the debate were the "simultaneis( (gezg bear ba) school of the Ch/an teacher Hva-shang Mahayana and the "gradualist" (rzm gylS pa)9 school of Indian Mahayana Buddhism
? ? TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 5
represented by KamalasIla (ca 760-815). The debate represents a rivalry for dominance in Tibet between two distinct forms of Buddhism. One is the tradition of a non-scholastic and somewhat quietist version of the Chinese Ch'an Buddhism and the other is the scholastically highly developed and monastically organised Buddhism of India. lO According to the early Tibet- an literature dealing with the proceedings of this debate, the Indian school represented by KamalasHa and his Tibetan supporters were de- clared the victor. This resulted in the King Trisong Detsen (730-845? )
issuing a royal decree announcing that from then on that
the people of Tibet should uphold the philosophy of Nagarjuna. They should also engage in the way of life of six perfections and practice the ten virtuous deeds. As regards meditative tradition, they must train their mind in the de- velopment of the three insights and be firmly rooted in a perfect unity of tranquil abiding and special insight, the union of skilful means and wisdom. I I
Given all these historical antecedents, as the 14th century was drawing to a close the stage was set for the entrance of a grand synthesiser. Had it not been for these historical conditions Tsongkhapa's contributions would have had far less impact and significance.
II
One crucial element in my approach in reconstructing Tsongkhapa's key concerns about early Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka is what I would call "listening! ! to Tsongkhapa whenever he says that he is arguing for a certain standpoint. A vital part of this "listening! ! is to appreciate the overall framework of the author's thought. This means, that in addition to the appreciation of the historical contexts, the reader must also be sensitive to the issues that are of greatest concern to the author. Such sensitivity naturally calls for a more "sympathetic! ! reading, thus according certain priority to the author when interpreting his works. This does not however preclude a critical approach. What it does entail is making the key assumption that the aspirations, concerns, and beliefs of the author have an important bearing on the "meai1ing" of his works. In other words, in attempting to "understand! ! the "meaning! ! of a text the reader brings
to bear upon his task the overall ! ! project" of the author. This is especially important when reading an author who is writing within a continuing lineage of thought. Tsongkhapa himself is sensitive to this point. Towards the end of LTC Tsongkhapa makes an important hermeneutical point. He writes that a skilful Mahayana teacher is the one who is ever sensitive to the context and the overall lineage of the thought pertaining to a given text. This way, the teacher will be able, by referring to other works of the author, to draw out what remains implicit and sometimes unexplained in
6 THE TIBET JOURNAL
a particular text. 12 As I see it, there are two elements to this hermeneutical requirement. One is to discern what the author himself feels to be of greatest concern to him, and the other is to appreciate the inherited legacies of the tradition within which the author is writing.
In identifying what I perceive as the key philosophical issues pertaining to the interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet which were of greatest concern to Tsongkhapa, I shall use primarily two principal sources, both written by Tsongkhapa as he first embarked on his new mission following his reported mystic encounter with Mafijusrl. The first is an eloquent open letter which is addressed to "the great meditators of Tibet" (bod kyi sgom chen pa rnams). Entitled Queries from a Pure Heart Calling Attention to Crucial Religious Issues,l3 this succinct work reflects the deep passion and concern which Tsongkhapa felt concerning the fate of Buddhist philosophy and practice in Tibet at the time. The work, running into less than 20 folios, primarily consists of a series of rhetorical quest- ions related to both'the practical and philosophical aspects of Buddhism as it was understood and followed in Tibet. My second source is the section on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness known as "Special
Insight" in Tsongkhapa's' monumental work Lam rim chen mo. 14 Given that my primary concern here is to underline Tsongkhapa's qualms I shall not address the question of the identity of his objects of criticism and also the issue of whether or not his characterisation of their views is accurate. This is a methodological choice I am compelled to adopt as such an enterprise lies beyond the scope of my paper. Tsongkhapa very rarely mentions his objects of critique by name and a correct identification of the proponents of these views would inevitably involve an extensive detective work
Although the first source, Queries is found in the standard collection of Tsongkhapa's works, doubts have been raised by some Tibetan scholars about its authorship, notably the Sakya scholar Jhampa Lingpa Sonam Namgyal (1400-1475). 15 However, noted scholars like Shakya Chogden (1428-1507)16 of Sakya, Perna Karpo (1527-1592t of the Kagyu school, Gomchen Ngagwang Drakpa (1418-1496)18 and Panchen Lobsang ChOgyen (1570-1662)19 of Tsongkhapa's own Geluk lineage have accepted the letter's authenticity and have responded to the questions posed in the letter. The Tibetan doxographer Thllken Chokyi Nyima (1737-1802), after drawing attention to this divergence of opinion among Tibetan scholars on the authorship of the letter, states that he finds it difficult to make any cate- gorical judgement on the matter? O According to Thtiken, the following
seem to be the key objections of those who dispute Tsongkhapa's author- ship of the letter. First, they maintain not only that the letter contains certain colloquial expressions that are untypical of Tsongkhapa's general written work, but that the overall style of the writing is very different
? TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 7 f om the mainstream works of Tsongkhapa. Secondly, they argue that in
e colophon, the author writes his name as "the one known to be under ? nknown. Thirdly, there is no mention of the work in any writings of the
So where does this leave us witil the question of the letter's authentic? ? ity? My own view is that none of these objections appears to be persuas- ive enough to question the inclusion of this work in Tsongkhapa's col- lected writings. Since the letter is an extemporaneous statement, its col- loquial style is not surprising. The main intent of the letter is to draw immediate attention to critical religious and philosophical issues of Tsong- khapa's time so that linguistic and philosophical rigour was not an im- portant concern for the author. What better here than to adopt a rhetor-
ical tone that allows the author a certain licence to caricature his op- ponents' views? As for the epithet "the one known to be under the care of Guru Manjugho:? a," I do not think that it is that untypical as suggested by those who dispute Tsongkhapa's authorship of the letter. In fact, the epithet can be read as an early indication of Tsongkhapa's own acknowl- edgement of the purported mystical experience that all his biographies refer to. It is also not surprising if there is no mention of the letter in the writings of Tsongkhapa's immediate students. From the perspective of later traditional Tibetan scholarship, the letter has greater value for a historian than for a phiiosopher. Predictably, religious historians such as Pawo Tsuglak Trengwa (1504-1566) and the regent Sangye Gyatso (1652- 1705) have made significant references to the letter. "3 If this letter is conclusively shown to be not by Tsongkhapa, then doubts can be raised
about the authorship of a few other significant works as well, especially A Reply to je Rendawa2-l and A Scroll for je Rendawa on the Essential Points of Instruction of Mafijusrt,25 both found in Tsongkhapa's collected works. Space prevents me from going more deeply into this. Nevertheless, I would like to state that the validity of my attempt to discern Tsong- khapa's key religious and philosophical concerns about early Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka does not hinge entirely on the authentic- ity of the ascription of this letter to Tsongkhapa. Regardless of the validity of this attribution, its significance for both historians and religious schol- ars working in the field of Tibetan studies cannot be disputed. From a historical point of view, this letter provides us much insight into the central points of doctrinal disputes between the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism around the 14th century. 26 Furthermore, the work appears to occupy an important place within the genre of Tibetan polemical litera- ture. It is surprising that no one among the contemporary scholars on Tibetan Buddhism seems to have paid any serious attention to this
?
? ? ? the care of Guru Manjughoi? a,"21 an epithet that is, in their opinion, totally
immediate disciples of Tsongkhapa. 22
8 THE TIBET JOURNAL
seminal work. To date, there is not even a reference to the work in any modern Tibetan Buddhist scholarship, let alone a translation of the text! 27 The work, if accepted as written by Tsongkhapa as the Tibetan editors of Tsongkhapa's collected works seem to think, represents a first pUblic acknowledgement on Tsongkhapa's part of a deep dissatisfaction with the current intellectual and philosophical climate and the felt need for its revitalisation. It can be seen as representing an official announcement of Tsongkhapa's departure from many of the established Tibetan readings of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness. It also seems to bridge a critical gap in our historical understanding of the processes and evolution of Tsongkhapa's thought. Perhaps more importantly, the work gives us an early intimation of the issues which were to occupy Tsongkhapa's mind for a long time to come. . Without this letter, we would have to assume that there is nothing to herald Tsongkhapa's departure from his con- temporary Tibetan scholarship on Madhyamaka philosophy before writing the extensive section on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness in LRC. 28 I find this hard to accept. Therefore, I shall, at least for the time
being, assume the validity of this letter's ascription to Tsongkhapa.
Let us now return to the main thread of our discussion, i. e. to underline Tsongkhapa's key philosophical concerns regarding Tibetan interpreta- tions of Madhyamaka philosophy. In the language of Tibetan scholastic- ism, we can summarise Tsongkhapa's concerns about the fate of Madhya- maka in Tibet under three categories. First is what Tsongkhapa sees as the nihilistic reading of Prasanglka-Madhyamaka that, according to him, deni- grates the validity of our everyday world of experience. Secondly, Tsong- khapa vehemently opposes what is known as the Shentong Madhyamaka view of the Jonang school. He sees this reading of Madhyamaka as absolutist. In doing so, Tsongkhapa is following in the footsteps of think- ers like Sakya Pal). Q. ita, Buton, and Tsongkhapa's own teacher Rendawa. Tsongkhapa's critical views on the so-called Shentong Madhyamaka of the Jonang school appear to have been established even during the "earlier" period of his intellectual life. In LS Tsongkhapa subjects Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism. 29 The thrust of his critique seems to be to demonstrate the absence'of Indian Madhyamaka literary source for the Shentong view. Tsongkhapa argues that there are only three possible Indian Madhyamaka sources30 for the Jonangpa's central claim that the ultimate truth must be understood as an absolute, but concludes that none of these sources actually support the Shentong standpoint. Tsongkhapa concludes his criticlue by exhorting others to discard this view as one would spit out a particle of dust! 3l Finally, Tsongkhapa appears to be deeply concerned about what he sees as harmful legacies of Hva-shang in the tenets of some of the Tibetan Madhyamika thinkers. The first two
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
In LS Tsongkhapa subjects Shentong abso- lutism to severe criticism. 29 The thrust of his critique seems to be to demonstrate the absence'of Indian Madhyamaka literary source for the Shentong view. Tsongkhapa argues that there are only three possible Indian Madhyamaka sources30 for the Jonangpa's central claim that the ultimate truth must be understood as an absolute, but concludes that none of these sources actually support the Shentong standpoint. Tsongkhapa concludes his criticlue by exhorting others to discard this view as one would spit out a particle of dust! 3l Finally, Tsongkhapa appears to be deeply concerned about what he sees as harmful legacies of Hva-shang in the tenets of some of the Tibetan Madhyamika thinkers. The first two
? From a contemporary philosopher's perspective, one can say that first and foremost Tsongkhapa is deeply concerned by what he saw as a general lac? of philosophical and anal? tical rigour in Tibetan thinking. This, he beheved, was not only contradictory to the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism towards which most schools of Tibetan Buddhism claimed a strict adherence, but also went against the basic spirit of the Buddhist path. There was, in his view, a pervasive sense of philosophical
"naivety" and a dangerous trend towards a form of anti-rationalism in Tibet which were integrally connected. According to Tsongkhapa, this combination of philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism had profound religious and ethical consequences.
By "philosophical naivety," I am referring to all the variants of Tibetan interpretation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, which appear to deny in one form or another the reality of the empirical world. In its most extreme form, Tsongkhapa believed, this denial is the view which is based on a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and asserts that "things are neither existent nor non-existent. " "Naivists" also include those who conceived emptiness to be a mere nothingness. On this view, the empirical world becomes nothing but a mere illusion. Tn a broad sense, Madhyamikas do accept that our lived world of empirical experience is like an illusion. However( the difference is that according to Tsongkhapa, the objects of everyday world are illusion-like and not illusions as many Tibetan Madhyamikas appear to claim. 32
Such philosophical "naivety" is also closely related to epistemological scepticism, one of the two principal sources of anti-rationalism in Tibet (the other being the over-emphasis on the mystical perspectives of Tantra). Again, accordil! g to Tsongkhapa, this stems from a false understanding of the Madhyamaka view of epistemology in general, and in particular its position on the nature of prajna, insight, into the ultimate nature of reality. In actual fact, the sceptic rejects the very possibility of the valid means to knowledge (pramaIJa), especially with relation to emptiness. From the linguistic perspective this viewpoint "upholds the doctrine of in- effability, that nothing can be predicated of anything else, that any de- scription of emptiness is useless, all being equally distant from the ulti- mate. ,,33 All of this then naturally ties up with the position that the Madhyamaka has no views of its own. 34 For Tsongkhapa such standpoints reflect a certain naivety if not an intellectual laziness towards the prob- lematic of reconciling the empirical reality of all things and events and their essential emptiness or the lack of intrinsic existence and identity. According to Tsongkhapa, this problem of reconciliation is the crux of
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 9
concerns pertain to philosophical issues, while the third relates more to
meditative praxis.
10 THE TIBET JOURNAL
Madhyamaka philosophical endeavour. He argues that the confusions of the Tibetan thinkers stem from a deep misunderstanding pertaining to the very meaning of the name Prasangika-Madhyamaka (the proponent of the reductio ad absurdum argument) and its contrasts with the Svatantrika_ Madhyamaka school (the proponent of autonomous syllogism). Tsong_ khapa, in LTC, schematically lists four such positions and enters into a detailed critique of these standpoints. 35
According to Tsongkhapa the first position which is attributed to the Indian Jayananda (12th century CE) reflects an epistemological scepticism concerning the validation of the "tri-modal" character of a logical argu- ment. This is the standard post-Dharmakirti convention of Buddhist lOgic. The second is a universal scepticism that rejects the very possibility of "valid means to knowledge" (prarna1! a) and contends that, when engaged in philosophical argumentation, all that we have and indeed what we need is a verbal consent from the opponent. Tsongkhapa attributes this
position to what he calls "certain Tibetan translators who are students of Jayananda" (Dza ya anan ta'i slob rna bod kyi lo tsa ba dag). Baso Ch6kyi Gyaltshen (1402-1473) identifies Khu Lotsawa (12th century CE), a disciple of Jayananda, as one of them. 36 The third is the position that Tsongkhapa attributes to "those professing to be present-day Prasangikas" (da ita dbu rna thaI 'gyur bar 'dod pa). 37 This position maintains that a Prasangika does not have any thesis of his own both in the conventional and the ultimate sense. Tsongkhapa attributes the fourth position to "someone who claims to be a follower of Candrakirti" (Zla ba grags pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i bod kyi
rnkhas pa kha cig), possibly a reference to Majha Jhangchup Tsondrii (d. 1285) and other followers (possibly Zhang Thangsakpa) of Patshap Lotsawa, the translator of Candrakirti's works. 38 According to Tsongkhapa, the proponents of this position fail to appreciate the subtlety of the Prasangika's critique of the concept of autonomy of reason. The above viewpoints, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, are at best agnostic, and at worst nihilistic, points of view which are furthermost from the tenets of the Madhyamaka school, and especially the tradition of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. For Tsongkhapa, the middle way of Madhyamaka philo- sophy cannot be characterised as nihilism, agnosticism, or even as mere
relativism.
In the parlance of Tibetan scholasticism, this I'agnosticl' interpretation
of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness is known as the "Madhya- maka's (alleged) thesislessness. " Based on a literal reading of certain passages from Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and Candrakirti/9 many of the earlier Tibetan Madhyamikas have consistently argued that the Prasangika literally does not have any positions of his own. According to this read- ing, it is suggested that the Prasangika is concerned only with the
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 11
refutation of other's views. Needless to say, the "no-thesis" view is a complex position containing several components. 40 As a literal reading of the Madhyamaka's catu! }koti argument appears to suggest, for the pro- ponents of this view, ontologically speaking reality literally cannot be said to be any of the following possibilities: "is", "is not", both "is and is not", and "neither is nor is not". Reality though absolute, is ineffable and indeterminate, for it is beyond language and thought. The phenomenal world is merely an illusion, the perception of which will disappear with- out any trace at the stage of final enlightenment. Epistemologically, the p roponents of this view maintain a thorough-going scepticism concerning the possibility of any valid means to knowledge, especially with regard to the absolute. The "real" is, in their view, only intuited in a state of n011- conceptuality. From the linguistic point of view, one could say that the proponents of the "no-thesis" view hold that language has no real bearing on reality, let alone any objective referentiality. Similarly, logic too cannot lead to any genuine inferential knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Arguments are at best ad hominen or reductio ad absurdum, or what the Buddhists would call prasaftga. So, on their view, the true middle
course (madhyama) is this absence of commitment to any position of one's own. 4! Tsongkhapa vehemently rejects all of this.
Tsongkhapa's refutation of the various strands of the "no-thesis" view is too complex to be dea)t with here; also there exists substantial con- temporary literature on the general debates about whether or not the Madhyamikas have views of their own. 42 Suffice here to underline that the crux of Tsongkhapa's critique pertains to what he understands to be the Prasangika's unique reading of the principle of dependent origination. He argues that since dependent origination is the content (don) of "empti- ness", by denigrating the world of dependent origination, the proponents of the "no-thesis" view are rejecting what is perhaps the heart of the Prasangika's philosophy of emptiness. 43 Not only is it possible for empti- ness of intrinsic being and dependent origination to co-exist in a common locus, the very fact of dependence is, to Tsongkhapa's mind, the highest proof of the absence of intrinsic being. 44 To conceive otherwise, i. e. to hold that dependent origination entails intrinsic being, is to turn every- thing topsy-turvy. In Tsongkhapa's own words, this is like a god himself turning into a devil, a Tibetan equivalent of Nagarjuna's metaphor of medicine becoming the poison! 45
Furthermore, from Tsongkhapa's point of view, the denial of even the conventional existence of the world of dependent origination stems from ? metaphysical assumption that is shared also by all essentialist schools, I. e. existence (yod pn) is equivalent to existence-by-means-of-intrinsic-being (rang ngos nas yod pa). For example, in LTC, Tsongkhapa writes that
? 12 THE TIBET JOURNAL
If one asserts that so long as phenomena such as sprouts etc. exist (yod pal they do so by means of their intrinsic being (rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i yod pal, and that if they do not exist by means of their intrinsic being [then] they do not exist [at all], one is bound to fall into either of the two extremes [i. e. nihil- ism and absolutism]. This way of understanding [the mode of being of pheno- mena] is not different from the essentialists. 46
Tsongkhapa argues that, so far as the definition of nihilism is concern_ ed, there is no substantial difference between both the Prasangika and the essentialist; both agree that repudiation of causality lies at the heart of nihilism. The point of departure between the two parties is this: while the Prasangika does not reject causality, the realist assumes that by rejecting any notion of intrinsic being the Prasangika is rejecting causality as well. This is the principal reason why the Prasangika has been an object of such vehement criticism from the Buddhist essentialists. 47 So, according to Tsongkhapa, Prasangikas do have theses and views of their own, but no theses adhering to any notions of intrinsic being. The Prasangika rejects intrinsic being (svabhava), and emptiness of intrinsic being is their position. Similarly, Prasangikas accept the nominal existence of things and persons; and this is their standpoint. More importantly, as Buddhists, Prasangikas
must maintain that insight into "no-self" (anatman) is the sole path to liberation. Thus, Tsongkhapa concludes:
Therefore, the root cause of all problems is the reifying avidyii (ignorance) that apprehends intrinsic being. The insight into "no-self" or absence of intrinsic being alone is that which eliminates this [reifying consciousness] by means of direct opposition48 .
In effect, Tsongkhapa is rejecting the "no-thesis" view on the grounds that it is essentially nihilistic. In LTC Tsongkhapa cites extensively from Candrakirti to demonstrate a categorical difference between the Prasang-i ka and Carvaka's (Indian materialist's) similar assertions that the laws of karma do not exist intrinsically. 49 According to Tsongkhapa and Candra- kirti, the Carvaka's assertion constitutes nihilism, while the Prasangika's does not. This is because the first denies even the conventional reality of karma, while the latter does not. For Tsongkhapa, Candrakirti's insistence on appreciating this distinction implies his acceptance of the nominal existence of the laws of karma, a view which in Tsongkhapa's mind contradicts the claims of the "no-thesis" view. From a methodological perspective, Tsongkhapa sees the "no-thesis" view as reflecting a serious inability to appreciate the significance of the Prasangika's use of the unique prasajya form of negation. This is a form of negation that is abso- lute and does not commit the protagonist to any existential implication. Yet, to be effective in its application, even such a form of negation must
? pres
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 13
'uppose the acceptance of the law of excluded middle. Tsongkhapa
cites the passage from Vigrahavyavartanf in his support: If the absence of intrinsic being (svabhrJ. va) is reversed,
[its opposite] intrinsic being becomes established 50
? Without subscribing to the fundamental principles of logic, according to Tsongkhapa, one can only result in a state of indecision. Perhaps Tsong- khapa's criticism of this view is ultimately soteriological, at least in its intent. For if the proponents of the nno-thesis" view are right, then the insight into the middle way becomes essentially a state of mind that is a withdrawal of all cognitive activity rather than an active state of nknow- ing". This, for Tsongkhapa, is nothing but the ghost of Hva-shang's pernicious no-thought view, albeit in a new guise. 5l
All of this touch upon the problem of nihilism. For Tsongkhapa, the trouble with the "no-thesis" view is that, when pushed to its logical end, it slides into a form of ontological nihilism. The strategy Tsongkhapa adopts to ensure that the Madhyamaka philosophy does not remain open to the charge of nihilism involves two principal approaches. One is primarily a negative approach in that Tsongkhapa stipulates the para- meters of the Madhyamaka dialectics so that the de-constructive argu- ments of emptiness philosophy cannot and do not undermine the validity of ethics and religious activity. In other words, Tsongkhapa attempts to delineate reason's scope for negation so that the Madhyamaka reasoning does not negate the reality of the conventional world. 52 The second element of Tsongkhapa's strategy involves a constructive approach in that it entails developing a systematic and logically coherent account of con- ventional existence. 53 The primary motive here is to ensure that a clear distinction is maintained between the conventional reality of things and events on the one hand, and metaphysical speculations about their onto- logical status on the other. Tsongkhapa rejects the latter, and argues that existence equals conventional existence.
To summarise, in developing his philosophy of the middle way Tsong- khapa can be seen as nre-claiming" Nagarjuna in Tibet through a close reading of Candraklrti. This does not by any means entail that Tsongkha- pa's thought consists of mere re-presentation of CandrakIrti. As is clear from his works many of Tsongkhapa's substantive contributions are genuinely original by any intellectual standard. However, given Tsong- khapa's such close identification with Candrakirti's works it does seem to be the case that if Candrakirti's reading of Nagarjuna is flawed, serious doubts can also be raised about Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Madhya- maka philosophy. Perhaps Tsongkhapa's greatest contribution to Madhya- maka thought lies in the depth and the breadth of his exammation of the
? 14 THE TIBET JOURNAL
philosophical implications of Madhyamaka's central doctrine of emptiness in key areas of philosophy and soteriology. For example, Tsongkhapa lists what he sees as the "eight distinctive features of the Prasangik a_ Madhyamaka" all of which he takes to be direct consequences of the Prasangika's central thesis, namely the rejection of svabhtiva (intrinsic being). In identifying these features, Tsongkhapa writes
In interpreting the treatise of Arya [Naga? una] there exists a unique approach whereby the text is read in such a way so that all functionality (bya byed thams cad) can be maintained although not even an atom exists (rdul tsam yang) by means of self-defining characteristics. Because of this, this system [Prasali. gika] has many flawless tenets Crnam par dag pa'i grub mthaj that distinguish it from the other interpreters ('grel byed gzhan). "What are they? " [Answer:] For the time being, I shall state the principal ones: (i) The rejection of iilayavijftiirul (foundational consciousness) that is separate from the six categories of con-
cognising, apperceptive faculty of consciousness); and (iii) the rejection of autonomous syllogism as a means of generating insight into the nature of re<llity, thus three negative tenets. (iv) The need to accept the reality of ex- ternal objects as much as the reality of [the world of] consciousness; (v) that the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas cognise the absence of intrinsic being of phenomena; (vi) maintaining that grasping at the self-existen? e of phenomena is an afflictive obstruction; (vii) the cessation [of empirical things] is a conditioned phenomenon; and (viii) because of this, there is a unique presentation of the nature of the three tenses of time. 54
This list should not be confused with another list of eight attributed to Tsongkhapa known as the "eight difficult points (dka' gnad brgyad) of the MUlaktlriktl" found in Gyaltshap Dharma Rinchen's (1364-1438) notes dBu ma rtsa ba'i dka'gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang. 55 In the second list, (vii) and (viii) are omitted and in their place are: rejection of the notion of svabhtlva (rang mtshan khas mi len pa), and a unique way of understanding the Buddha's perception of the relative worid of multiplicity (sangs rgyas kyis ji snyed pa mkhyen tshul). 56 Subsequent Tibetan Madhyamikas have attacked Tsongkhapa for suggesting that Prasangika-Madhyamaka has unique tenets, especially such constructive theories as the acceptance of the cessation of empirical things as a conditioned phenomenon. For example, Gowo Rabjampa (1429-1496) has argued that the acceptance of such a conditioned phenomenon (zhig pa 'dus byas yin pa) is a Vaise$ika tenet thus the view of a tradition outside the fold of the Buddhist
schools. 57 Furthermore, he has rejected Tsongkhapa's claim that Prasallgika-Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of tllayavijfitina (foundational consciousness) and svasamvedana (reflexive awareness). 58 The later Nyingma thinker Ju Mipham Gelek Namgyal (1846-1911) too has
sciousness; (ii) a unique system of refuting the [concept of] svasamvedana (self
-
TSONGKHAPA'S QUALMS 15
argued that the Prasangika need not reject conventional existence of both foundational consciousness and reflexive awareness. 59 In contrast, Tak- tshang agrees with Tsongkhapa that Prasangikas do reject reflexive aware- nesS but maintains that Candrakirti does not negate foundational con- sciousness. 60 Regardless of who is right in these debates, the fact remains that Tsongkhapa seriously attempted to draw out all philosophical and soteriological implications of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka's rejection of
intrinsic being (svabhtiva).
III
According to Tsongkhapa, the agnostic and nihilistic tendency can also permeate one's understanding of the nature of the path, and even affect the very conception of "enlightenment". In his Queries, Tsongkhapa points to some opposing trends prevalent in the Tibet of his time concerning the
understanding of the nature of enlightenment. He writes:
Generally speaking, there seem to be many diverse opinions concerning the way in which the "view" [of emptiness] (Ita ba) is perceived as arising. 61 One group of opinions maintains that all forms of conceptuality (mam rtog), be they positive or negative, are to be discarded. Yet others hold the directly opposing view that not only are all forms of conceptuality not to be discarded, but the greater the proliferation ofconcepts the more enhanced one's spiritual realisa- tion (nyams rtog) will become. [They maintain that) this is analogous to fact that the more fuel you bum the larger the size of the flame.
Again, another group of opinions contends that conceptualisation itself is the fundamental ignorance, ma rig pa (avidyti). This view is p rimarily based on
the quote "e_onceptua1I'sab"an 15 m.
deed the great I .
,62
gnorance. , But athers
? maintain the opposite view, that conceptualisation is in actual fact pristine dharmaktiya. These two views represent two opposing sides of the same spec- trum.
Again, some characterise Buddhahood or nirvti1J1l as the state of mind when the mmd abides in natural equilibrium free of distraction (yid 'di ma 'phros par tsm ne gnas pa'i tshe). [And they maintain that] the moment the mind wavers it is in the state of ordinary existence or sarrzsara. Yet others contend that even when conceptual thought-processes occur, no matter how long the processes last, if you observe with a single-pointed mind, dharmaktiya appears vividly. These two views are exact opposites.
Then again, some argue that an emptied vision of nothingness (mthong snang ban bun) arising through a combination of certain conditions, e. g. being situated in a dark room, adopting a specific bodily posture of meditation, and stopping all forms of thought, is the actual dharmaktiya. It is also the "empti- ness endowed with all aspects" (rNam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid), hence even ordinary people can experience direct recognition of dharmakaya. Yet others hold that such expenence does not constitute the totality of dharmaktiya vision but only a partial'glimpse of it. Some contend that this cannot be
? ? ? 16 THE TIBET JOURNAL
understood even as experiencing a partial glimpse of dharmakiiya; rather it represents an experience of mere vacuity or emptiness. Moreover, [they argue that] within emptiness this is not the negative intrinsic emptiness (chad /ta'i rang stong) of Candrakirti and Haribhadra, etc. , but it is the extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong) as accepted by Asanga, the master of great Madhyamaka63 Some assert, however, that it is indeed the intrinsic emptiness. These two views are directly opposite. Some maintain that it is not even a genuine emptiness but only a form (gzugs brnyan tsam) or a reflection of emptiness. Therefore, [accord_ ing to them] it is not dharmakiiya, but a manifestation of it, as the perception of smoke can be indicative of the presence of fire. 64
Tsongkhapa's principal concerns here are actually the soteriological implications of these views. According to him not only do these positions lead to a kind of soteriological dead-end but more importantly, when combined with the anti-rationalist tendencies of certain Tibetan interpreta- tions of Vajrayana, their ramifications in the realm of ethics are deeply disturbing. He saw the moral decline, or moral laxity to be more precise, believed to be rampant at a particular point of history in Tibet as being a natural consequence of many of the philosophical views prevalent at the time. In his view, the various strands of the standpoints which he was arguing against are clearly, and dangerously, a residual legacy from the Chinese master Hva-shang Mahayana whose tenets were, according to Tsongkhapa, comprehensively demonstrated as unsound by the Indian
? master Kamalasila. In fact, Tsongkhapa often uses the term "Hva-shang's view" as a typological label when criticising a host of theories. For example, when criticising one of the positions in his Queries, Tsongkhapa states that IIAs far as I am concerned, I cannot see any difference between your style of meditation and that of Hva-shang's system! ,,65 Note the tone of finality in Tsongkhapa's criticism. Similarly, in LTC, Tsongkhapa criticises a form of meditative quietism on the grounds that by claiming that between Hva-shang and one's own position there is a difference in that their own standpoi? lt puts emphasis on meritorious deeds one is implicitly admitting that so far as philosophy and meditative system are concerned there is no substantial difference between the twO. 6 This, according to Tsongkhapa, is clearly at fault.
A related but distinct concern was what Tsongkhapa saw as a form of meditative quietism. This, he felt, results from an incorrect understanding of the nature of and the relationship between two principal elements in Buddhist meditative praxis, namely tranquil abiding (samatha) and special or penetrative insight (vipasyana). In its extreme form, meditative quietism is best illustrated by the system of Hva-shang Mahayana. The problem directly concerns the role of discursive thought in the soteriological process of the Buddhist path to enlightenment. This is the corollary of
TSONGKHAPA' S QUALMS 17
anti-rationalism in the realm of meditative practice. Drawing heavily from a pivotal s? ripture Smpdhinirmocanasutra, ? nd also the. three. Bhiivantikran:a of Kamaiaslia, Tsongkhapa argues extensively that discursive thought is as crucial in a spiritual aspirant's path to enlightenment as its counterpart, i. e. deep single-pointedness. 67 If mere quietude, no matter how sophisti- cated, constitutes the core of the process towards enlightenment, not "knowing" but "unknowing" becomes the key towards true awakening. Without discursive analysis no fresh insights can be gained nor can any
awareness of the ultimate nature of reality arise within the individual. Tsongkhapa sees no qualitative difference between such a form of quietude and the naturally occurring states of non-mentation (sems mi 'phro ba) like deep sleep, fainting, or stupor. 68
Tsongkhapa's solution for this problem was to re-emphasise the need for a healthy balance between the important Buddhist trio: study (thos pa), discursive thinking (bsam pa), and meditation (sgom pa). According to him the problem arises from the following situation. Many of those who are inclined towards a single-pointed life of meditative practice perceive study and discursive thinking to be an obstacle on the path to enlightenment; on the other hand, those with scholarly interests seem to be lacking in serious motivation to apply their intellectual understanding to meditative practice, instead they appear to be more keen to expand their scholarly reputation. 69 In other words, one group fails to appreciate fully the signi- ficance of learning while the other neglects the crucially important element, i. e. the meditative praxis.
Underlying the above issues is the crucial question of the exact nature of the relationship between the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (sunyatti) and the ultimate standpoint of Vajrayana Buddhism. Like many of his Tibetan predecessors Tsongkhapa shared the view that Tantra represents the pinnacle of spiritual awakening in Mahayana Buddhism. This is true also of great Tibetan masters like Marpa Lotsawa, Sakya Paw;iita, Buton, and of course many of the Kadam teachers including the Indian master Atisa himself. However, what seriously concerned Tsong- khapa was the widespread misconceptions associated with Tantra which he believed to be pervasive at his time in Tibet. Among these was the widespread relegation-in some cases leading to eventual negation-of ethics on the grounds that the Tantra proposes a standpoint which is non- jUdgmental, and beyond all forms of dichotomy and polarities. Ethics was perceived to be relevant only to those of weak mind, whereas a true spiritual aspirant whose mind was receptive to the mysteries of Tantra could and should transcend the strictures of conventional morality. Such attitudes, according to Tsongkhapa, led to a climate of moral decline in ancient Tibet.
