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(3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?

(4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known
to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession?

(5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other
sources besides?
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Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows
under the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case
to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For, as
Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), "that which is instituted
for the sake of charity does not militate against charity. " Now the
secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases:
for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a
heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people;
or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain
people who wish to marry are related to one another. Therefore such
ought to reveal what they know through confession.

Objection 2: Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a
precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be
changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced
solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to
prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must
make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would
be bound to speak.

Objection 3: Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather
than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now
it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own
conscience---for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a
sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to
swear to tell the truth---or when an abbot knows through confession the
sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of
ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship,
wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral
charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of
confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to
reveal a confession.

Objection 4: Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a
man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of
ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the
promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising
an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the
confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge
a confession.

On the contrary, The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss. , Cap. Omnis
utriusque): "Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word,
or sign, or in any other way whatever. "

Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he
is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made known to Him in
confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest
reveal them.

I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments
are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession,
whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward
submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those
who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified
in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands
that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a
confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are
other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more
attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater
simplicity.

Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal
of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the
penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who
can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous,
since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though
the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and
there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account,
so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that
confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding,
it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate
against charity on that account, because charity does not require a man
to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known
in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as
man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should
apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging
the confession, e. g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over
the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the
prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither
word nor sign to betray the penitent.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept concerning the secret of confession
follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of
making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human
dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can
be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of
confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of
excommunication to be incurred "ipso facto," to say whether he knows
anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he
should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus,
was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were
expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor
would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his
superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God
knows it.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is not called upon to witness except as a
man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he
knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a
superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished
which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a
remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it
comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to
his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy,
as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the
abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter
refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion,
yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.

Reply to Objection 4: A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical
preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of
knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does
not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.
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Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which
have reference to confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other
matters besides those which have reference to confession. For sins
alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other
matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore,
since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the
seal of confession extends to them also.

Objection 2: Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret,
which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the
seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.

On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental
confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do
not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of
confession does not extend to matters other than those which have
reference to sacramental confession.

I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other
matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet
indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental
confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance,
which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin.
Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on
account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their
becoming familiar with it.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in
this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way
promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not
through the seal of confession.
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Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the
seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through
an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems
that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore
one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.

Objection 2: Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for
a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with regard
to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only
the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest,
so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience: and
it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession.
Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But
the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore the
priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.

Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in
confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them.
But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to
secrecy.

I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of
this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of
keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of
absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a
kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a
case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the
seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking,
he is not bound by the seal of confession.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin
which he knows under the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's
permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of
confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now
the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he
knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him
such a permission.

Objection 2: Further, that which is instituted for the common good of
the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the
secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church,
in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the
confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge
his confession.

Objection 3: Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this
would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might
pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with
impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the
penitent cannot grant this permission.

Objection 4: Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not
know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a
sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this
permission cannot be granted.

On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by
letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the
penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.

Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it
through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his
sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.

I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to
keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is
essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as
it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in
order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a
man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he
allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does
not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of
giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken
the seal.

Reply to Objection 1: The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin,
because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has
confessed it, can.

Reply to Objection 2: When that is told which was known through another
source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away
with, because the seal of confession is not broken.

Reply to Objection 3: This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests,
because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the
penitent's permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of
the contrary.

Reply to Objection 4: He that is informed of a sin through the priest
with the penitent's consent, shares in an act of the priest's, so that
the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the
penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.
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Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through
some other source besides?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows
through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal
of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through
confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through
confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the
seal.

Objection 2: Further, whoever hears someone's confession, is under
obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise
someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if
he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep
secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it
otherwise.

Objection 3: Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to
itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it, is
stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin
as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man
cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as
God knows it.

Objection 4: Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order
to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession.
But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew
it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can
nowise say what he has heard.

On the contrary, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless
he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a
sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that
confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an
obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.

Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order
to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some
sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who
has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a
precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he
has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.

I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some
say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in
confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or
after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars
him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he
knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by
exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and
to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to
sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that
he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most
prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which
he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it
matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it
secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already
been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished,
divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made him free to
divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that
what a man knows through another source either before or after
confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as
a man, for he can say: "I know so end so since I saw it. " But he is
bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for
he cannot say: "I heard so and so in confession. " Nevertheless, on
account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless
there is an urgent reason.

Reply to Objection 1: If a man says that he has seen what he has heard
in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession,
save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and
seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says
he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he
incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.

Reply to Objection 2: The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin
simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he
allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.

Reply to Objection 3: This is true of things that are in opposition to
one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as
man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves
nothing.

Reply to Objection 4: It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to
desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of
scandal. Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man
should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging
what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other
source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is
able.
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OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be
considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3) Its quality; (4)
The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?

(2) Whether it is an act of justice?

(3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is
suitable?
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Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an
act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas,
seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while
satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of
virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a
man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when
anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another.
Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13):
"Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue. " But satisfaction is not
an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is
not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a
virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.

Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin,
for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys
sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways.
First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect
of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue
can make use of any such act for its end, e. g. to walk, to speak, and
so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally,
because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to
suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in
every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act
that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And
since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a
thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to
something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of
virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Although to make satisfaction is due in itself,
yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers
satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent,
so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit
through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if
the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not
forfeited.

Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the
patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on
whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as
regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary
not in him but in the judge as agent.

Reply to Objection 3: The chief element of virtue can be understood in
two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and
thus the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature
of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts
hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue
may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and
such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its
determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined
by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues,
becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such
and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in
certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.
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Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice.
Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to
the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs
to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of
justice.

Objection 2: Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the
soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about
operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of
sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not
an act of justice.

Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of
justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to
satisfaction, "to give no opening to the suggestions of sin" [*Cf.
XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.

On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that
which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states
(Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external
things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality
between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is
an act of justice.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean
of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and
thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name
of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb
"satis" [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that
satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by
one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an
act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice
between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another,
the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done
between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has
suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the
agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to
another.
Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and
passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to
another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And
since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so
far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies,
properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly
points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for
the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal,
wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which
inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a
previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense,
except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently,
whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone
punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes
another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same
applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it
is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that
penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that
satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a
previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called
penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said,
is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted
entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an
inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly
equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since
an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately
directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed
ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded
by charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet
it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of
operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust
injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another's marriage
right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.

Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence,
because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue,
since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of
prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic.
ii, 6.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in
the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius
Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable---viz. that
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening
to the suggestions thereof. " For the cause of actual sin is the fomes.
[*"Fomes" signifies literally "fuel," and metaphorically, "incentive. "
As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and
effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of
"concupiscence," Cf. [4851]FS, Q[82], A[3]. ] But we cannot remove the
"fomes" in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in
removing the causes of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But
man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the
cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it
regards the past and not the future. Now "to give no opening to the
suggestions of sin" regards the future. Therefore it should not be put
in the definition of satisfaction.

Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no
mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is
unsuitable.

Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo
i): "Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor," wherein no
reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius,
OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.

Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God:
whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore
Anselm's definition is faulty.

I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding
equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 3) "punishments are medicinal. " Wherefore satisfaction which is the
act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins
and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes
satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes
heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two
ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making
compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted
injury according to the equality of justice. " The definition of Anselm
amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving
God due honor"; where duty is considered in respect of the sin
committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as
preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines
it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the
causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the
sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for
the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their
causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be
incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things
in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to
the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the proximate
causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through
the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of
sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed
by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes," which is the remote
cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this
life though it is weakened.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation
(according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good,
and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows
that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to
remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good,
as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the
aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of
necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again
can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible
without charity, as we shall state further on ([4852]Q[14], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted and
intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the
future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies
to satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl.
Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality,
nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes
something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for
future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence
Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is
possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for
the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but
in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the
causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the
starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed
of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may
avoid sins the more easily.

Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should not
be described in different ways according to the various things found in
it: and such is the case here, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason
of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as
stated above [4853](A[2]).
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head
there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?

(2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether man can make satisfaction to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God.
For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above
([4854]Q[12], AA[2],3). But an offense against God is infinite, since
it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a
greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no
action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make
satisfaction to God.

Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt,
since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God,
and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is
compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to
God.

Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one
debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can
do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the
blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that "the
wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg. :
'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a
burnt offering']. " Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for
the debt resulting from the offense committed.

Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service
of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca
observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous
matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same
conclusion follows as before.

Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original
sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God
and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.

On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says:
"Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man,
let him be anathema. " But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring
forth . . . fruits worthy of penance. " Therefore it is possible to make
satisfaction to God.

Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make
satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to
God.

Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the
fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the
Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]].
Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed.
Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason
of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as
thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors
received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in
giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher
says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for
measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for
friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible.
Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as
the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do,
in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice
is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man
cannot make satisfaction to God if "satis" [enough] denotes
quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality,
as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it
suffice for satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity
from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a
certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is
quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes
acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as
regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously,
but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it
is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point,
since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense
against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of
turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the
aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of
Christ's merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the
same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through
faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise,
satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God's image, has a certain
share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his
free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make
satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was
bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he
might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to
make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to
make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that
he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that
he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is
impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put
forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be
heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain
measure, viz. the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above
which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past,
he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should
have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the
fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).

Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin
than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an
infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could
not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory
punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction.
Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written
(Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. "
Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and
confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another.
Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for
oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he
satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man
satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he
takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his
debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after
the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else,
if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for
the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by
him who is punished in Purgatory.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): "Bear ye one another's
burdens. " Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment
laid upon another.

Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before
man, one can pay another's debt for love of him. Much more, therefore,
can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.
Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one
does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by
another's fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing,
through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a
man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another,
since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin.
But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other
hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for
another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may
avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for
another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would
have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by
his own punishment than by another's), because punishment derives its
power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And
since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than
for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for
another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the
Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin
which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity
his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it
necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable
to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be
released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this
is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so
that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there
be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he
is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo
it.

Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man
according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God
will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just
as one man is not disposed thereto by another's act, so one man does
not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has
infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to
eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal
punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured
according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since
sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment.
Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from
punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity
whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).

Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which
affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is
not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by
confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one
man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace
is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no
comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the
measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is
charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at
least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for
another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the
punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by
satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release
from punishment, viz. eternal life.

Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain
punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it:
wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other
makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are
debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin
committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that
one sin is twice punished.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head
there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for
another?

(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his
sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins
which were pardoned him through his contrition?

(3) Whether a man's previous satisfaction begins to avail when he
recovers charity?

(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?

(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without
satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected
together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not
connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore
one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts
the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God
accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15),
"satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to
the suggestions thereof. " Now this can be done with regard to one sin
and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in
covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without
satisfying for another.

On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted "for debates and strifes"
(Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of
satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are
acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot
make satisfaction to God.

Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for
preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But
without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin
excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and
not for another.

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction
for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D,
15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be
removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be
consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is
renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the
renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore,
every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the
friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make
satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither
would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing
himself at his feet he were to give him another.

Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single
one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins
are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of
various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot
be made for one and not for another.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by
reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is
opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required
than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be
done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is
based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also
of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction,
not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a
punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship
must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to
friendship remains.

Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another,
as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he
does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for
which he was previously contrite?

Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being
contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity,
satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his
contrition.