"
[*The words in brackets are not in the text of St.
[*The words in brackets are not in the text of St.
Summa Theologica
"
Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this;
hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is
there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us? " And he
afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten
to love in return. " Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He
set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp. ):
"Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that
He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man. " Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the
Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a
sermon (xiii de Temp. ): "God was made man, that man might be made God. "
So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil. " First, because
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor
him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17):
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they
have no bodies. " Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is
man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human
nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a
true man. " And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature,
refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. " Thirdly,
because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God
is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride,
which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the
same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin,
which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such
a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus
Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man
could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not
bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and
man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by
strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that
one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in
the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He
would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
have set an example. "
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of
necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human
nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or
persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole
of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind
of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for
condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one
satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man.
Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly---i. e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty;
and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which
is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still
have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution
from sin"; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if
man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power
to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested
in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are
united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in
this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch
as the last creature---viz. man---is united to the first
principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of
grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which
is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from
human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not
sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said
of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power. "
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to
the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even
if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and
to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the
Son of Man would not have come. " And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. "
I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent
ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy
for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have
been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not
sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in
order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on
deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that
God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the
remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals
thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode
of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God
in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human
nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is
always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its
natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine
power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is
false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace
did more abound. " Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we
say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! "
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of
future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to
be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to
one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than
to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the
lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed
to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but
merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But
Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction
for sins---and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii,
3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though
they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and
delivered Himself for me. '" But our individual sins are actual sins;
for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this
conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg. : 'sin'] of the world. "
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do
not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into
the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because
He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is
written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . .
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
offenses unto justification. "
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of
the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than
any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect
Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be
meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original
sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and
the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6):
"The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does
it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are
as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than
yourself? " And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as
given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to
others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of
the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the
nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him
alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to
all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of
the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ. " But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I
will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. " Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners. " But more would have been saved had
God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their
sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the
work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to
have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the
Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "The
Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace and
truth. " Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of the
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law":
upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was
decreed by God the Father to send His Son. " But God decreed everything
by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time;
and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally
ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it
is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to
the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): "They that are in
health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not
come to call the just, but sinners. "
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be
humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
words in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that the
Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first
of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his
will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he
failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the
law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having
recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech
the aid of grace. "
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor.
15:46,47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which
is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was
of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. "
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss
says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the
band of heralds who ought to have preceded him. "
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time,
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence
(Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh,
shall He find think you, faith on earth? "
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a
friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state
of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt
rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human
race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should
despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their
disease.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan. ,
Ep. cii), saying ([3855]Q[2]) that "Christ wished to appear to man and
to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were
who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel
was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so
bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His
corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead. " But the same
Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia
ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would
not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness
that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of
Divine power had been wrought in their midst? " And he adds in answer
(De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), 'it is
not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw,
would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others)
He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet
justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with
those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.
"
[*The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time
and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same,
imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the
eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of
human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God
follows.
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Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.
91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"---i. e. "in the last days," as a
gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of
mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it. "
Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of
the world.
Objection 2: Further, as has been said (A[5], ad 3), in the same
subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore,
what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest
perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in
Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
Objection 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by
two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was
sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not
necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the years
Thou shalt make it known. " Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation
which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till
the end of the world.
I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the
Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is
shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it
has been said (A[5], ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in
one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes
perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect,
imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the
efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in
time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the
Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in
this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at
the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the
efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to Jn.
1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received"; and hence the work of the
Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.
But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally
raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet
et Nov. Test. , qu. 83, "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity
when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the
feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim
and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of
the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when
reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because
the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and
they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God
sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them,
justified, to God the Father. " But if this remedy had been put off till
the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power,
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which
leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown
the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age---i. e. the
sixth age---on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in
the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a
body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says
elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the
Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth. " But
in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came
in the sixth age---i. e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not
as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not
His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are
two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the
second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. "
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy
till the end of the world.
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OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
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Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and
the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form
a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the
other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the
Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other;
for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon. ) that the human nature is "deified,"
as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not
having been taken away by the union. " Therefore the union did not take
place in the nature.
I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature. " Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura. " Afterwards
this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this
begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is
an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to
signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it
is essentially and not accidentally. " Now this principle is either form
or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter.
And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated,
is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this
essence of the species is called the "nature. " And thus Boethius
defines nature (De Duab. Nat. ): "Nature is what informs a thing with
its specific difference,"---i. e. which perfects the specific
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the
essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of
two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain
in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and
a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to
a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of
confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration
(which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental;
and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not
essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on
[3856](A[6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute
unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually.
Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the
form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed,
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is
altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence
neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot
be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species
with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its
elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling
of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed,
e. g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence,
since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there
could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i. e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor
after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be
the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would
follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to
several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because
Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature:
since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth
Synod (i. e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results,
but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of
the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema. " Hence
the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of
nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as
the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine
Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3],
A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is
an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not
by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still
remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it
becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not
take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from
His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take
place in the person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than
ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above
([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its
proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should
have its proper personality.
Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its
personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the
person.
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5):
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into
two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of
God. " Therefore the union took place in the person.
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature. " For
nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which
is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles,
which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence
in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not
indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum
includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the
notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently
in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But
if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or
its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called
"nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting.
And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in
rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than
"an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius.
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person,
whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is
not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and
Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine
Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word,
and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch
as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And
because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists
in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or
change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God
took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity
of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity
and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of
Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us,
being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it
exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs
to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of
its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more
noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although
it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist
by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual
substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a
substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of
individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality,
because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect,
viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
person.
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Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or
hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not
take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man. " And Pope Leo says in
his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with
miracles, the other succumbs under injuries. " But "one" [aliud] and
"the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz.
Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this;
hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is
there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us? " And he
afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten
to love in return. " Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He
set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp. ):
"Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that
He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man. " Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the
Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a
sermon (xiii de Temp. ): "God was made man, that man might be made God. "
So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil. " First, because
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor
him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17):
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they
have no bodies. " Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is
man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human
nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a
true man. " And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature,
refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. " Thirdly,
because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God
is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride,
which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the
same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin,
which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such
a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus
Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man
could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not
bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and
man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by
strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that
one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in
the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He
would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
have set an example. "
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of
necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human
nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or
persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole
of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind
of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for
condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one
satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man.
Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly---i. e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty;
and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which
is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
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Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still
have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution
from sin"; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if
man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power
to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested
in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are
united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in
this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch
as the last creature---viz. man---is united to the first
principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of
grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which
is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from
human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not
sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said
of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power. "
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to
the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even
if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and
to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the
Son of Man would not have come. " And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. "
I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent
ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy
for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have
been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not
sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in
order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on
deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that
God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the
remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals
thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode
of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God
in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human
nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is
always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its
natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine
power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is
false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace
did more abound. " Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we
say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! "
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of
future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to
be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to
one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than
to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the
lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed
to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but
merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But
Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction
for sins---and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii,
3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though
they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and
delivered Himself for me. '" But our individual sins are actual sins;
for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this
conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg. : 'sin'] of the world. "
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do
not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into
the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because
He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is
written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . .
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
offenses unto justification. "
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of
the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than
any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect
Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be
meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original
sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and
the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6):
"The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does
it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are
as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than
yourself? " And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as
given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to
others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of
the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the
nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him
alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to
all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of
the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ. " But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I
will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. " Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners. " But more would have been saved had
God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their
sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the
work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to
have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the
Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "The
Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace and
truth. " Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of the
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law":
upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was
decreed by God the Father to send His Son. " But God decreed everything
by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time;
and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally
ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it
is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to
the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): "They that are in
health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not
come to call the just, but sinners. "
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be
humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
words in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that the
Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first
of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his
will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he
failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the
law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having
recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech
the aid of grace. "
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor.
15:46,47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which
is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was
of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. "
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss
says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the
band of heralds who ought to have preceded him. "
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time,
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence
(Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh,
shall He find think you, faith on earth? "
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a
friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state
of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt
rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human
race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should
despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their
disease.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan. ,
Ep. cii), saying ([3855]Q[2]) that "Christ wished to appear to man and
to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were
who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel
was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so
bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His
corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead. " But the same
Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia
ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would
not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness
that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of
Divine power had been wrought in their midst? " And he adds in answer
(De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), 'it is
not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that
showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw,
would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others)
He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet
justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with
those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.
"
[*The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine].
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time
and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same,
imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the
eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of
human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God
follows.
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Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the
world?
Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.
91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"---i. e. "in the last days," as a
gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of
mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it. "
Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of
the world.
Objection 2: Further, as has been said (A[5], ad 3), in the same
subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore,
what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest
perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in
Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
Objection 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by
two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was
sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not
necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the years
Thou shalt make it known. " Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation
which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till
the end of the world.
I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the
Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is
shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it
has been said (A[5], ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in
one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes
perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect,
imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the
efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in
time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the
Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in
this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at
the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the
efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to Jn.
1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received"; and hence the work of the
Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.
But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally
raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet
et Nov. Test. , qu. 83, "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity
when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the
feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim
and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of
the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when
reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because
the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and
they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God
sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them,
justified, to God the Father. " But if this remedy had been put off till
the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all
uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power,
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which
leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown
the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age---i. e. the
sixth age---on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in
the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a
body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of
quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says
elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the
Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth. " But
in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came
in the sixth age---i. e. in the old age---of the human race.
Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not
as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not
His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are
two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the
second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. "
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy
till the end of the world.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
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Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and
the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form
a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the
other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the
Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other;
for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part
ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory
Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon. ) that the human nature is "deified,"
as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not
having been taken away by the union. " Therefore the union did not take
place in the nature.
I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature. " Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura. " Afterwards
this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of this
begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is
an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further employed to
signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion in that in which it
is essentially and not accidentally. " Now this principle is either form
or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter.
And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated,
is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this
essence of the species is called the "nature. " And thus Boethius
defines nature (De Duab. Nat. ): "Nature is what informs a thing with
its specific difference,"---i. e. which perfects the specific
definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the
essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of
two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain
in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and
a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to
a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of
confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration
(which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither
composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental;
and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not
essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on
[3856](A[6]). Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute
unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually.
Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the
form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in
Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed,
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is
altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence
neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot
be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species
with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its
elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His
Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling
of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed,
e. g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence,
since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there
could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i. e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor
after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be
the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would
follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to
several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because
Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature:
since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is
said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth
Synod (i. e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results,
but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of
the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema. " Hence
the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature
of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.
Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of
nature and person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as
the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter
and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine
Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3],
A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is
an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not
by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still
remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it
becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not
take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from
His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take
place in the person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than
ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above
([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its
proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ's should
have its proper personality.
Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its
personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the
person.
On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5):
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into
two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of
God. " Therefore the union took place in the person.
I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature. " For
nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which
is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles,
which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence
in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not
indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum
includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the
notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole
which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently
in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But
if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or
its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called
"nature" as it is an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting.
And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in
rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than
"an individual substance of rational nature," according to Boethius.
Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person,
whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is
not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and
thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and
Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has
a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine
Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word,
and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch
as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And
because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists
in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or
change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God
took place in the person, and not in the nature.
Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity
of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity
and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of
Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us,
being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it
exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs
to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of
its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more
noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.
Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although
it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist
by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence,
too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual
substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a
substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of
individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality,
because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect,
viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the
person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or
hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not
take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word
and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man. " And Pope Leo says in
his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with
miracles, the other succumbs under injuries. " But "one" [aliud] and
"the other" [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the
Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz.
