Reply to
Objection
3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his
love, for God is man's entire good.
love, for God is man's entire good.
Summa Theologica
" Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact.
et Dict.
Memor.
iv 7):
"The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties
of blood. " Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the
latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former
by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to
love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace. " Surely we
ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
Objection 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states
(Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others
than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather
than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
all.
On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special
precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we
ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of
blood.
I answer that, As stated above [2562](A[7]), we ought out of charity to
love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons
according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved
in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is
loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one
union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood
relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the
friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the
friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of
battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our
kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we
should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our
fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is
our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural
and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to
act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be
a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to
honor them. "
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Reply to Objection 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades
originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence
of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose,
for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is
more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
the providing of necessaries.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he
has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he
is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his
officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less,
not simply relatively, i. e. as regards the love which is based on
fellowship in battle.
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Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his
father?
Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom
we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our
children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14):
"Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents
for the children. " Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
ought to love our children more than our parents.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant. ] says: "We ought to
love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those
of our household. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love
may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object.
In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the
more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father
more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his
principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like
God.
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love
of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself.
Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child
than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents,
as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they
stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have
loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas
the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the
longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14:
"Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him. "
Reply to Objection 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of
respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence
and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly
in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
care.
Reply to Objection 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his
children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but
if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves
his father more.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God
loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the
father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be
provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in
cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to
provide for his parents before all.
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Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
20), "the female produces the body in generation. " Now man receives his
soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the
[2563]FP, Q[90], A[2]; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his
mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more
than him.
Objection 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
knows more surely than the father who are her children. "
Objection 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
labored much among you. " Now the mother labors more than the father in
giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother. " Therefore a
man ought to love his mother more than his father.
On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to love
God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the
mother afterwards.
I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the
father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The
reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like
matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii
in Cant. ] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children. "
Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
father is to be loved more.
Reply to Objection 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this
power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of
the body to receive that form.
Reply to Objection 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
through being begotten of them.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
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Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than
his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he
love the latter more. Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that "a man shell
leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought
to love his wife more than his father and mother.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband
should "love his wife as himself. " Now a man ought to love himself more
than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more
reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the
friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
viii, 12) that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility,
pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous. "
Therefore a man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love
for his parents.
On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their wives
as their own bodies. " Now a man ought to love his body less than his
neighbor, as stated above [2564](A[5]): and among his neighbors he
should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
more than his wife.
I answer that, As stated above [2565](A[9]), the degrees of love may be
taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
his principles and considered as a more exalted good.
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because
she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Mat. 19:6:
"Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. " Consequently a man
loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
Reply to Objection 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father
and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought
to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
connection and co-habitation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man
ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
him.
Reply to Objection 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love
for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards
good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife;
although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the
union.
As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
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Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more
than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv):
"Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him
first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to
love, but declines to return love already given. " Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we
ought to love our benefactors above all.
Objection 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a
man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is
a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to
whom we are kind.
Objection 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most,
and then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors
seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2566]AA[9],11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of
good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father
[2567](A[9]).
In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four
arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork
of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by
so and so. " Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is
to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that
we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our
"action. " Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see
our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his
in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the
benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient,
while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it
gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good,
both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and
the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of
having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous
goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is
it the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult
to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which
have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to
us.
Reply to Objection 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites
the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
through another.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is
more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
Reply to Objection 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and
parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not
follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any
of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our
parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on
whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
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Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in
heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity
consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less. " Now
charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who
are better more than either himself or those who are connected with
him.
Objection 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good.
Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will:
and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each
one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others
more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one
who is.
Objection 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake,
for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
all in all. " Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that
a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not
connected with him, more than one who is.
On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now
the order of charity given above ([2568]AA[2],3,4) is derived from
nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.
I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above ([2569]AA[7],9), the degrees of
love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect
conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will
desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice.
Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet
greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire
both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will
of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the
second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors,
because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the
person who loves, as stated above ([2570]AA[7],9). Moreover it is for
this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely,
that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a
man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish
other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end
according to his capacity.
As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer
to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer
succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man
has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than
those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress:
hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity,
loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a
greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will
however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who
is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be
banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are
incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument should be granted as to those who
are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the order of charity in
respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
Reply to Objection 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his
love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason
for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love
himself more than all else after God.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?
(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? (8)
Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
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Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who
are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved.
Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
Objection 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems
to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
than love, and lovers of flattery always abound. " Therefore it is
better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping
with charity.
Objection 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more
so. " Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De
Catech. Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than
that you love him first. " Therefore charity consists in being loved
rather than in loving.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship
consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of
friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person
loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as
coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends
towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love
is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a
thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than
that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be
exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more
commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and
yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love
is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some
women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their
children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved
in return, if they happen not to be loved. "
Reply to Objection 1: A better man, through being better, is more
lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves
more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man
does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as
he ought to be loved.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men
wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored. " For just as
honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which
is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since
good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be
honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good
which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity
seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the
good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
loved.
Reply to Objection 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that
to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
leading a man to love.
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Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill.
Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
Objection 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
([2571]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish
his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live;
the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth,
that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he
should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to
goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is
neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship. " Now
charity is friendship, as stated above ([2572]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which
is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs
from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between
the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him.
On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we
wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of
the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that
"goodwill is a beginning of friendship. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does
not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to
the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong
to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. "
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mat.
1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his
commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God,
while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it
seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or
some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz. , final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect
of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in
respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to
wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in
respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for
instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect
of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause,
we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it,
e. g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we
have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we
love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of
all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be
good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the
exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth
way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are
disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by
favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or
even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love
what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason
for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy
saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed
the Saviour of the world. "
Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19],
AA[4],7,10).
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Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this
life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now
through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore,
do we love Him immediately.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man
cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. " Now sin
is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able
to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]),
the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in
the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows
the mode of the knower.
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of
knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with
regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
[2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to
know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest
in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins
there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to
speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love
begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin,
is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
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Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because
"God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
loved wholly.
Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be
loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved
by a creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification
"wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love
God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God,
according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart. "
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion
to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is
infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
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Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving
God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the
best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things,
have charity. " Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought. " But it would be
useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the
measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode. " Now the measure
of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure. "
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way.
"The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties
of blood. " Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the
latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former
by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to
love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace. " Surely we
ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
Objection 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states
(Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others
than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather
than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
all.
On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special
precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we
ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of
blood.
I answer that, As stated above [2562](A[7]), we ought out of charity to
love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons
according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved
in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is
loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one
union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood
relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the
friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the
friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of
battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our
kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we
should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our
fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is
our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural
and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to
act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be
a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to
honor them. "
The same applies to other kinds of friendship.
If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
Reply to Objection 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades
originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence
of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose,
for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is
more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
the providing of necessaries.
Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he
has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he
is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his
officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less,
not simply relatively, i. e. as regards the love which is based on
fellowship in battle.
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Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his
father?
Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom
we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our
children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14):
"Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents
for the children. " Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than
his parents.
Objection 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
ought to love our children more than our parents.
On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant. ] says: "We ought to
love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those
of our household. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love
may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object.
In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the
more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father
more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his
principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like
God.
Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love
of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself.
Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child
than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents,
as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they
stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have
loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas
the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the
longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14:
"Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him. "
Reply to Objection 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of
respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence
and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly
in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
care.
Reply to Objection 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his
children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but
if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves
his father more.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God
loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the
father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be
provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in
cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to
provide for his parents before all.
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Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
20), "the female produces the body in generation. " Now man receives his
soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the
[2563]FP, Q[90], A[2]; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his
mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more
than him.
Objection 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
knows more surely than the father who are her children. "
Objection 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
labored much among you. " Now the mother labors more than the father in
giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother. " Therefore a
man ought to love his mother more than his father.
On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to love
God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the
mother afterwards.
I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the
father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The
reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like
matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii
in Cant. ] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children. "
Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
father is to be loved more.
Reply to Objection 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this
power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of
the body to receive that form.
Reply to Objection 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
through being begotten of them.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than
his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he
love the latter more. Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that "a man shell
leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought
to love his wife more than his father and mother.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband
should "love his wife as himself. " Now a man ought to love himself more
than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than
his parents.
Objection 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more
reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the
friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
viii, 12) that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility,
pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous. "
Therefore a man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love
for his parents.
On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their wives
as their own bodies. " Now a man ought to love his body less than his
neighbor, as stated above [2564](A[5]): and among his neighbors he
should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
more than his wife.
I answer that, As stated above [2565](A[9]), the degrees of love may be
taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
his principles and considered as a more exalted good.
But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because
she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Mat. 19:6:
"Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. " Consequently a man
loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
Reply to Objection 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father
and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought
to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
connection and co-habitation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man
ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
him.
Reply to Objection 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love
for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards
good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife;
although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the
union.
As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
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Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more
than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv):
"Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him
first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to
love, but declines to return love already given. " Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we
ought to love our benefactors above all.
Objection 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a
man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is
a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to
whom we are kind.
Objection 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most,
and then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors
seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2566]AA[9],11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of
good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father
[2567](A[9]).
In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four
arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork
of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by
so and so. " Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is
to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that
we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our
"action. " Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see
our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his
in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the
benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient,
while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it
gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good,
both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and
the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of
having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous
goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is
it the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult
to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which
have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to
us.
Reply to Objection 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites
the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
through another.
Reply to Objection 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is
more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
Reply to Objection 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and
parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not
follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any
of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our
parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on
whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
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Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in
heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity
consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less. " Now
charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who
are better more than either himself or those who are connected with
him.
Objection 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good.
Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will:
and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each
one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others
more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one
who is.
Objection 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake,
for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
all in all. " Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that
a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not
connected with him, more than one who is.
On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now
the order of charity given above ([2568]AA[2],3,4) is derived from
nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.
I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above ([2569]AA[7],9), the degrees of
love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect
conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will
desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice.
Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet
greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire
both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will
of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the
second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors,
because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the
person who loves, as stated above ([2570]AA[7],9). Moreover it is for
this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely,
that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a
man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish
other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end
according to his capacity.
As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer
to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer
succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man
has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than
those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress:
hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity,
loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a
greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will
however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who
is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be
banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are
incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument should be granted as to those who
are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the order of charity in
respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
Reply to Objection 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his
love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason
for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love
himself more than all else after God.
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OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?
(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?
(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?
(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?
(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?
(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? (8)
Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
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Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who
are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved.
Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
Objection 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems
to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
than love, and lovers of flattery always abound. " Therefore it is
better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping
with charity.
Objection 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more
so. " Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De
Catech. Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than
that you love him first. " Therefore charity consists in being loved
rather than in loving.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship
consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of
friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person
loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as
coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends
towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love
is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a
thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than
that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be
exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more
commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and
yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love
is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some
women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their
children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved
in return, if they happen not to be loved. "
Reply to Objection 1: A better man, through being better, is more
lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves
more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man
does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as
he ought to be loved.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men
wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored. " For just as
honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which
is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since
good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be
honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good
which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity
seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the
good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
loved.
Reply to Objection 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that
to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
leading a man to love.
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Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill.
Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
Objection 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
([2571]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish
his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live;
the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth,
that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he
should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to
goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is
neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship. " Now
charity is friendship, as stated above ([2572]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from
actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but
also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which
is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its
object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused
suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved;
wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and
the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not
imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager
inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one
man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous
acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to
us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to
win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs
from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between
the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him.
On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we
wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of
the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of
charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of
affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that
"goodwill is a beginning of friendship. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does
not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to
the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong
to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. "
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Objection 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Mat.
1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his
commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon.
Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God,
while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it
seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or
some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy
is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed"
as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality.
Now there are four kinds of cause, viz. , final, formal, efficient, and
material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though
it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four
different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect
of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in
respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to
wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in
respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for
instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect
of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause,
we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it,
e. g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we
have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors,
but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we
love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not
directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of
all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be
good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the
exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to
Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth
way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are
disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by
favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or
even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love
what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason
for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.
Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but
through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy
saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed
the Saviour of the world. "
Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19],
AA[4],7,10).
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Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this
life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x,
1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now
through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore,
do we love Him immediately.
Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But man
cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.
Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. " Now sin
is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able
to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be
"enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But
charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Cor.
13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]),
the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in
the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect
of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows
the mode of the knower.
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are
knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of
knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.
Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God
immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with
regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other
things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of
pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
[2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).
Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to
know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest
in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins
there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to
speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love
begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin,
is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
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Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.
Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because
"God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be
loved wholly.
Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be
loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved
by a creature.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover
and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question
may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification
"wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved
wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.
Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover:
and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love
God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God,
according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart. "
Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the
thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing
loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion
to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is
infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of
creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
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Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving
God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as
Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the
best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things,
have charity. " Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought. " But it would be
useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one.
Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the
measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode. " Now the measure
of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause
of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure. "
I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ
3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to
be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the
same way.
