No More Learning

For the period under review Dorner's History of Protestant Theology is much too meagre. The books of Carl Schwarz and Landerer on Recent Theology, unlike as they are as re gards style, the first being as brilliant as the second is dry, are
very much alike in this, that both have much more to say of men than they allow men to say for themselves. In the survey of English Theology, Dr. Tulloch's Movements of Religious
? has supplied me with useful points of observation, at all events for some parts of my sketch.
OTTO PFLEIDERER. Lichterfelde, near Berlin.
EDITOR'S NOTE.
Thought
Gross
Dr. Pfleidcrer's work is not a translation in the ordinary sense. It lias been written for the Library of Philosophy, and appears first in English. This involves the disadvantage that the reader will not have (as usually in translations) the original to which to refer in case of doubt. For this reason special care has been taken to secure a clear and accurate rendering. The Authors MS. has been translated into English by Mr.
J. Frederick Smith, whose work has been reviscd in proof by Dr. Pfleiderer, by the translator, and by myself.
EDITOR,
GENERAL
? ? ? CONTENTS.
Book I.
THE BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMAN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
Chapter I. Kant
II. Herder
? III. Schleiermacher ? IV. Fichte .
3 21
44
57 62
68
?
? ?
v. Schelling VI. Hegel
? Book II.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
. . . . . . . IV. Eclectic Theologians
Book III.
BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.
Chapter I. The Theology of the School of Kant . . . .
?
S5 II. The Theology of the School of Schleiermacher . . 103
III. Speculative Theology
1; 154
209 252 277
Chapter I. New Testament Criticism and Exegesis. ? II. Old Testament Criticism and Exegesis . ? III. History of the Church and of Dogma .
Book IV.
A SURVEY OF THE PROGRESS OF THEOLOGY IN GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1825.
Chapter I. The Schools of Philosophy in their relation to Theology
? II. Parties and Movements in Theology Index
. . . .
402
303 355
? ? ? ? BOOK I.
THE BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMAN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
G. T.
? ? ? ?
CHAPTER I. KANT.
In the year 1784 Kant wrote an essay upon the question, What is Aufkldrung ? l In it he reviews the tendencies of
his age, and at the same time indicates in what sense he con siders them justifiable and is willing to further them. This
essay may be regarded as the programme of the task to which German philosophy in Kant and his successors has devoted itself.
" Free Thought," says Kant, " is the advance of man beyond the state of voluntary immaturity. By immaturity is meant, inability to use his own understanding except under the guidance of another. The immaturity is voluntary when the cause of it is not want of intelligence, but of resolution and courage to use it without another's guidance. Sapere aude / Dare to use thy own understanding ! is therefore the motto of Free Thought. If the question be asked, ' Do we live in a free-thinking age ? ' the answer No but we live in an age of free-thought. ' As things are at present, men as a whole are very far from possessing, or even from being able to acquire, the power of making a sure and right use of their own understandings in religious matters without the guidance of others. On the other hand, we have clear indications that the field now lies nevertheless open before them, to which they can freely make their way, and that the
hindrances to general Freedom of Thought, or the abandon ment of the state of voluntary immaturity, are gradually be coming less. In this sense the present age the age of Free Thought, or the century of Frederick the Great. "
? Aufklarung. Any translation of this ter? ninus technicus may mislead. From Kant's authoritative definition of the thing, appears that our English
Free-thinking " substantially represents it. --Tr.
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BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
It is only by slow degrees that the people generally can reach Freedom of Thought. It is not by means of a revolu tion, which can never effect a real reform in habits of thought ; a revolution only exchanges old prejudices for new, which then, as much as the old ones, serve as leading-strings to the unthinking crowd. The one proper method is the free use of reason as a public right, whereby the wise are put in a position to diffuse their superior intelligence and render it the common property of all. To check the free public employ ment of reason, in the interests of any existing social institu tions or laws, would, in Kant's view, be " a sin against the nature of man, the primary purpose of which consists in just this advance in Free Thinking. " Moreover, this public use of reason by the learned, Kant argues, involves no danger, inasmuch as it does not seek by any means to put an end to the performance of civil duties or of the obligations imposed on each man by his calling ; it was precisely under the veil of severe civil discipline, as it existed in the State of Frederick, that freedom of mind had more room to spread than is usually the case where there is greater civil liberty. When once however by freedom of thought the mental habits of a nation have been so educated that it is rendered more capable of
freedom in action, this education finally reacts upon the maxims of the government in such a way that it treats men no longer as machines but in a manner suited to their true
dignity.
We see from this essay that Kant participated to the full
in the movement of his age towards Aufkldrung, but that he gauged its meaning otherwise and more profoundly than did his contemporaries. He is no less opposed to the complacent vanity of the German popular philosophers, who thought that they already possessed Aufkldrung --the truth in religion and morals, -- than he is to the radicalism of the French party of progress, who imagined that they could reach the goal by means of revolution, by abjuring in theory and practice all
? beliefs and institutions. Of course, according to Kant, mankind is bound to be rationally free and enlightened, but they are not so as yet ; and will not"become so by merely
discarding old prejudices, but only by a true reform in habits of thought," whereby they will be enabled to " make a sure and right use " of their own understandings. To educate mankind for this true employment of the understanding is
existing
? ? ? Ch. KANT.
the vocation of men of letters, and more especially of philo sophers, task which was made possible in Frederick's State.
therefore not enough for men to learn to use their own understanding they must also learn to use rightly to help
them to do this the primary and essential vocation of philo sophy as Kant understood it. But we wish to ensure the true use of the understanding by a method which univer sally valid, we must first critically examine the laws which are involved in the very nature of the understanding itself. For the knowledge of a truth which valid for every one possible only when based on laws which are involved in the nature of the human mind as such, and have not been im ported into from without through facts of experience which must always be accidental and conditional. Kant con- vinced of the existence of such primary laws, involved the very constitution of the human mind. He looks upon them as laws which do not arise from experience, but which are rather prior to all experience, and, as determining its form, lie at the root of all theoretical, practical, and aesthetic judgments
out of which the world of consciousness built up. He has thrown this conviction into a scientific shape in the three critiques, namely of the Pure and of the Practical Reason, and of the Faculty of Judgment. On the one hand, Em- pirical Philosophy had held that all knowledge arises purely from without, from experienced perceptions, but had not been able to explain the fact that experience always conforms to law. Rationalistic Philosophy, again, had sought to derive all
from the constitution of the mind itself, from its innate ideas, but had left out of consideration its dependence upon experience, and had confounded the empty creations of thought with reality. Once more, both the rival schools of Empirical and Rationalistic philosophers had agreed at least in regarding all knowledge as something given--whether from without or from within -- and the knowing mind as only its passive recipient. Kant, on the contrary, taught that all cogni tion rests upon the union of the mind's activity and receptivity inasmuch as the material given us the multiformity of our perceptions, sensations, and sense-affections but the formation of this material into a system of knowledge the work of our own activity, this activity, in accordance with its own laws, giving to the material the form of rationality, which consti tutes the truth of our cognition. In opposition, therefore, to
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Rationalistic philosophy, Kant taught the dependence of the act of cognition on the material supplied in experience in space and time, and the impossibility of knowing the reality (das Ding an sich) lying behind these facts of experience. In opposition to Empirical philosophy, he taught that it is the subject which, by means of its characteristic perception of things under the forms of space and time and of the categories, converts this chaotic material into the regular orderly world called "experience"; and that in this respect the under standing itself is to be regarded as imposing laws on nature.
It was this latter conception, viz. , of reason, both in theoreti
cal knowledge and in practical judgments, imposing laws upon itself, which was the essence of Kant's thought and the open ing of a new era of philosophy. Of this there can be no doubt in the mind of any one who recognises the connexion between the different parts of the system, and its relation to the theories which preceded and followed it. It has, how ever, been widely supposed for some time, and particularly in theological circles, that the main point in Kant's philosophy is the limitation of human knowledge to phenomena, and the proof that we cannot know anything of the region lying beyond them. Nor can it be denied that Kant himself laid great emphasis upon this side of his teaching, inasmuch as this limitation of the speculative reason seemed to him the preliminary basis of the unconditional character of the prac tical reason. Nevertheless this view is obviously erroneous ; were it true, it would be impossible to say what claim to originality Kant's philosophy possessed, and how it could lay down the lines for future development. For a glance at
English philosophy prior to Kant shows that Locke, Berkeley, and especially Hume, had limited our knowledge to the phe nomena of consciousness, and had pronounced the reference of these phenomena to a trans-subjective reality a supposition incapable of proof, and likewise valueless, on account of the incognisability of the problematical external object. In the case of Hume this was the necessary consequence of his scep tical dissolution of the idea of causation, in which he saw only the expression of the customary transition of imagination from one idea to another, a subjective fiction which could not possibly carry us from the phenomena of consciousness to trans-subjective reality. therefore, this negative side of
? Kant's philosophy -- the limitation of our knowledge to ex
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perience--were the important part of would have been
a repetition of that of his predecessor, Hume. Indeed, we
should be compelled to allow that, in point of consistency, Kant was inferior to Hume, since he admittedly broke through
this limitation several respects he made
selves the causes of sensations or experience the freedom of man's intelligible character the cause of actions in time God the cause of the existence of the highest good, or of the unity
;of the natural and moral worlds. He thus indisputably ex tended the category of causation to transcendental objects, in spite of its presupposed limitation to the world of experience. Such inconsistency would be quite incomprehensible as
ordinarily supposed, this sceptical doctrine were the gist and real object of Kant's theory of knowledge. The real state of the case as follows Kant had been impressed by the imposing character of Hume's sceptical philosophy, and had adopted its doctrine of the incognisability of things-in-them- selves this principle he had accepted prior to his own critical inquiry into the forms of cognition inherent in the human mind, but afterwards regarded as the result of this inquiry, though, he had undertaken the inquiry independently of this preconceived opinion, he would have come to the oppo site conclusion. This timidity, which hesitated to leap, with the aid of the idea of causality, the confines of the pheno mena of consciousness, and to lay hold of things-in-themselves, was a legacy from the scepticism of Hume, from which Kant was unable completely to free himself, even when, in oppo sition to Hume, he reasserted for the idea of causation its
things-in-them-
? as one of the fundamental a priori forms of judgment. was, therefore, net the desertion of Kant's philosophy, but simply the true and necessary carrying out of
its speculative principle and most characteristic position, when his successors rejected this sceptical limitation of our know" ledge, and credited thought with the power of theoretically
conceiving Being, as well as of practically moulding when, in other words, they put an end to the Kantian dualism of the Theoretical Reason, limited to the world of phenomena, and the Practical Reason, dwelling the world the intelligible.
The Practical Philosophy of Kant partly the complement, partly the antithesis of his theoretical philosophy. his theory of knowledge he had aimed at proving that cognition governed by the a priori forms existing the understanding,
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independently of experience, but for that very reason limited the action of the mind in cognition to merely the formal work-
ing-up of given conceptions. Similarly, in order that the law of moral action may possess unconditional and universal vali
dity, it must, in Kant's view, be independent of experience, and belong to the reason a priori, i. e. , must be autonomous ; it is as much the province of Reason as Practical to lay down laws for action, as of the Speculative Reason to do this for cognition ; but at the same time, if this practical law is to be a priori, it must be limited to the. form of action merely, and must not include any object of desire since the will can be influenced by an object of desire, only by the expectation of pleasure, a motive which acts differently in different individuals, and belongs to the lower sense-faculty of desire and hence can never claim universal or unconditional validity. All material principles, whatever their contents, are, according to Kant, equally eudaemonistic; they depend upon self-love, or the lower faculty of desire, and have only a subjective and empiri cally conditioned validity ; they are therefore merely pruden tial maxims, not pure laws of reason. The autonomous law, characteristic of reason, must accordingly relate solely to the general form of action, without the slightest admixture of material motives, which would only sully its purity ; its com
? mand as the " Categorical Imperative " is :
Act so that the rule governing thy will may also always serve as the principle
of a universal legislation.
Thus far Kant's doctrine of the legislation of the practical
reason seems to form a complete parallel to that of the specu lative reason ; but as soon as we look more closely at the rela tion of form and contents, an essential distinction becomes apparent. In the sphere of knowledge, form and contents, in spite of their different origin, are in no way really opposed, but only exist for, and with each other ; we are compelled to bring every object of sense-experience under the a priori forms of intuition and of thought, and our sense-perceptions, instead of being antagonistic to these forms, can only be apprehended by their means. It is quite otherwise in the sphere of action. The moral law is indeed the form of a
priori validity, which we can and ought to apply as a criterion to every object of sense-desire -- i. e. , to our empirical inclina tions and actions ; but we are by no means compelled to do this ; we are able to follow the natural inclinations
produced
? ? ? Ch. KANT.
the contents of our sense-experience, which so little submit without resistance to this a priori form, that, Kant's view, they are invariably opposed to the law of reason, and so produce a never-ending struggle between duty and inclination.
Hence the moral law the form which, on the one hand, has need of the contents supplied by the empirical desires, since without them would not reach action at all, and so the law find no application but, on the other hand, this form also represented as involved in ceaseless opposition and conflict with their contents. This conception plainly unrealisable we cannot see how moral law without contents, and simply
by
to all empirical inclinations could ever become a motive of action, or how definite obligatory actions could be deduced from it. is, no doubt, true that there often a conflict between duty and inclination, and that in this conflict the claims of duty are the higher, and the only absolute ones
the great merit of Kant's moral philosophy to have brought out this truth with all possible emphasis. But equally certain that the letter of his theory untenable. His mistake lay thinking that the law of reason must be made purely formal to have unconditional validity, and in attributing all actual motives of action, all inclinations, to sense-desire, thus representing them as hostile to reason. In this way his moral system acquired a harsh, ascetic character, exceeding in rigour even that of the Stoics. The ground of this was
opposed
? the same both cases the absolute dualism between reason and sensation, between man as an "intelligible" being, endowed with freedom and reason, and man as a being of sense endowed with natural desire. If the two are so com
essentially
as abstract anti-natural Idealism, which still influenced Kant, maintained, we cannot understand how the commands of reason could ever coincide with man's actual wishes and actions. In order that anything may be a motive,
must be possible object of desire the moral law accor dingly can be a higher motive than single accidental inclina tions only by including a higher object, which, as uncondition ally valuable, superior to all merely conditional ends. however, the moral law includes a concrete end, no longer purely formal no longer opposed to all inclinations, but can itself become the object of reasonable inclination in that case there no longer the absolute dualism, asserted by Kant, between man as desiring and man as thinking, and finally,
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there is from the first an inner connection between the sense- world of experience and the "intelligible world," which warrants the hope of the synthesis of both in human action and cog nition.
In Kant himself we find several hints of this correction of the purely formal and dualistic character of his moral philosophy ; and these hints only need working out in order to render the rational principle of this philosophy supreme in the sphere of ethics. Kant was at bottom really held back here only by the same want of courage in working out his speculative principle as is traceable in his theory of know ledge ; the hindrance there was the influence of the scepti cism of Hume, here it was the dread of sullying the purity of idealistic ethical principles, by a compromise with empirical principles. His demand of a purely formal ethical principle was violated by Kant himself even in the definition of moral philosophy as the science of the ends of pure reason, and by the deduction of the supreme, unconditionally desirable end from the dignity of man as a rational being ; whence he derived the formula of his First Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics : " Act so as to use humanity, both in thine own person and in the person of every other man, always as an end, never solely as a means. " To treat humanity in each
individual as an end in itself, clearly means the recognition of a general end of humanity, and making its realisation in each man our object. Thus the moral law acquires as its contents a definite material end, from which the particular moral ends also may be deduced. This deduction can, how ever, only be made by means of empirical observation, both of the capacities and faculties involved in the natures of man, and of their employment and development as gathered from history. From the admission of this empirical observation Kant was deterred for the reasons given above, and was thus prevented from utilising in science this pregnant formula. In his theory of virtue he did, indeed, try to deduce the neces sity of our own personal perfection and of the happiness of others as the two main divisions of the virtues. But it is clear that he could not do this consistently with his own premises. as he elsewhere never tired of insisting, any appeal to empirical motives derived from the desire for happi ness a pollution of morality, difficult to see how to seek the happiness of others can be reasonably made a duty
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for happiness in no respect a desirable moral end, the happiness of others can no more than our own be such an end while, conversely, the happiness of others to be sought, not easy to see why our own should not be so also, more especially in view of the Kantian principle of the universal applicability of the moral rule -- " what right for the one must also be fair for the other. " When we add that Kant, in the explanatory justification of his principle, has already emphasised the evil effects which every one would feel his selfish conduct were made into a universal
prin ciple, we can hardly dissent from those who consider that in working out his moral system he did not remain true to the
rigour of his primary principle, but fell back into that utili tarianism which he so greatly abhors. This inconsistency was only the natural result of the excessive rigour with which he insisted on his a priori principle, until became a system of forms without contents, the defects of which necessitated a recourse to alien points of view.
Kant exhibits, however, surprising points of agreement, not only with the strictly philosophical, but also with the theological utilitarianism of his time. In the Critique Pure Reason he had shown that the ideas of Freedom, Immor tality (soul), and God could not be objects of theoretical knowledge, inasmuch as insoluble contradictions arise when ever a proof of them attempted. But what denied to the speculative, can, he maintains, be grasped by the practical reason. Though to the former the world of noumena lying behind phenomena closed, to the latter directly re vealed in the moral law, which makes man a citizen of the "intelligible world" of freedom. From this position the above ideas may be established as " Postulates," i. e. , as pre suppositions which we feel compelled to make, not in order to enlarge our knowledge, but order to render possible the realisation of the moral law. In the first place, we thus gain the postulate of freedom as the basis of the reality of moral law, just as this law the basis of the cognisability of freedom for, inasmuch as we ought to do the good, follows that we can do it. Nevertheless the moral law
obstructed by the motives of sense-desire. These obstructions
able and bound to overcome more and more but can never do this so completely that the law will be fully realised in finite time hence its realisation demands the infinite
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duration of the individual, or immortality. Finally, reason as a legislative faculty demands the realisation of an absolute
or supreme good, which must embrace both perfect virtue and a corresponding state of happiness, and happiness not included in virtue, but dependent upon natural conditions beyond our control. Hence arises the demand for a supreme Cause, capable of bringing nature into harmony with the moral law of rational beings, or of connecting happiness with the virtue that deserves it ; in other words, the supreme good proposed by reason demands the existence of God as the condition of its possibility. Thus the transcendental ideas are the objects of a " moral faith " rooted in reason. It is true that by this faith the speculative reason receives no addition to its knowledge, but by its critical precautions it can render at least the negative service of keeping these ideas free from
anthropomorphic impurities and superstitious abuse. It has indeed always been with good reason maintained that this mode of establishing belief in the existence of God can with difficulty be harmonized with the main principle of Kant's ethics. If the moral law is throughout to have nothing to do with sense-desire or happiness, it is hard to see how, on the other hand, happiness can be pronounced an integral part of the supreme good aimed at by reason and a divine cause be demanded to produce The affinity of this train of thought to theological utilitarianism so obvious, that many have not unreasonably seen in a retrogression on the part of Kant to the eudaemonistic point of view of the popular philosophy,1 and that Kant's philosophical successors pre ferred to work out his speculative principle to its logical results without his theological postulates.
Still, fully justified as these objections to the literal form of Kant's postulate undoubtedly are, we cannot deny that underneath lay a true idea, which appears in purer form in the Critique of Judgment. Kant here tries to find some connecting link between the intelligible and sensible worlds, between freedom and nature, in the idea of a teleology common to both. In order to explain nature we find our
Jacobi, Fichte, Herder, Schleiermacher, unanimously rejected Kant's line of argument, sometimes in very strong terms. Of more recent authors, compare the criticisms of Dilthey (Leben Schleiermachcrs, 127, seq. ), Bieder- mann (Deutschland im 18 Jahrh. , II. 902), Wundt (Et/iik, 319, seq. ).
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selves compelled to combine the pr1nciple of teleology with the mechanical principle or causality for in organic nature we see that the parts are determined by their relation to the whole, are means to the inner end of the organism. To the question, how the teleological explanation can be harmonised
with that of causality, Kant's answer
that the conception of ends in nature
to add to our knowledge of facts, but
principle for our reflective judgment
the structure of our subjective understanding merely that we cannot help regarding nature as governed by final causes. But Kant cannot rest in this sceptical subjectivity he teaches that the two principles are to be harmonised, they must be combined under one supreme common principle, viz. , in a super-sensible substratum, or actual cause of nature of this cause we must form a corresponding intellectual intuition, that to say, we conceive as not merely causal, but as at the same time the primal intellect, whose thought not like ours discursive, but necessarily intuitive (thinking the whole simultaneously with its parts). true he does, at the same time, again sceptically confess that objectively we can neither assert nor deny the proposition that a Being, acting with view to ends, as the cause of the universe, behind what we rightly call the ends of nature but he considers certain that, we are to form judgments according to the conditions of our reason, we are absolutely compelled to regard a rational Being as the condition of the possibility of ends nature. But the observation of nature's ends not sufficient to enable us to further define this intelligent
First Cause we must under the guidance of teleology go beyond Nature. Nature presents not only individual pro ducts adapted to ends, but forms system of ends which point to a supreme or final end. This final end can only be man, who alone acts with conscious purpose and uses all creatures as means to his ends. But man not a final end, for in so far as man part of Nature, his sensuous, pleasure- seeking ends, are again dependent upon natural conditions, and are no way the object of Nature's special regard. On the contrary, man a final end only as a moral subject, as proposing to himself unconditional ends by his supersensible freedom of volition. His existence involves the supreme end, to which all Nature subordinate as means. from this
in the first instance, not of such value as
only a regulative primarily owing to
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? I'4 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
conception of man's moral nature, as constituting the supreme
end of creation, that the study of Nature's ends must be
supplemented, whereby the greater validity and definiteness of the argument for a supreme First Cause are secured, inas much as we must now think of this supreme Cause not only as Intelligence, and as a legislator for Nature, but also as the supreme Law-giver of a moral kingdom of ends. It is evident that this inductive method of arriving at the idea of God contrasts favourably with that given above ; whilst by the first, God was postulated only for the dubious object of adding
to our autonomous morality, by the latter, His existence is inferred from a comprehensive survey of external and internal experience as the necessary condition of a teleo- logical system of things, uniting the natural and moral worlds as means and end. This is a clear speculative conception, which, shadowed forth by Leibnitz, in various forms runs like a golden thread through the whole of Post-Kantian philo sophy. A corollary of this thought that man, not only as
natural, but also as moral being, dependent upon the Divine Cause of the universe, and that his autonomy must
therefore at the same time be an actual (not merely sub
jectively conceived) theonomy. But of this inference, affecting the very foundations of his philosophy, Kant would know
nothing however obviously suggested by the above line of induction, he refused to recognise through fear of im pairing his idea of freedom and instead of he finally gave to his ethico-theological proof the form in which we find in the Critique the Practical Reason (viz. , that God neces sary for the attainment of happiness, or in order to supple ment our inadequate power over sensible nature), and which
open to the most serious objections. Here again we are expressly reminded that God the object only of moral faith, which must not be confounded with theoretical know ledge, nor made the basis of morality upon which really rests.
Morality becomes religion when what shows to be the
end of man conceived as also the end of the supreme Law
giver and Creator, or God. Religion thus the recognition of all our duties as divine commands. The distinction be tween revealed and natural religion stated by Kant to be, that in the former, must know a thing to be a divine com mand before can recognise as my duty in the latter,
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as my duty before can consider a command If a man holds revealed religion to be necessary,
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he a Supernaturalist unnecessary, a Rationalist impossible, a Naturalist. As a fourth possibility, a religion
might conceivably be objectively natural and yet subjectively revealed this would be the case were such that man might have arrived at by the unaided use of reason, but at a later period hence revelation might be useful, or even necessary for certain times and places, without being per manent guarantee for the truth of the religion. The last Kant's supposition with regard to Christianity, as had been
that of Lessing. But whence comes this, only relative, necessity for revelation And how are its contents to be understood as in unison with reason These questions were discussed by Kant in the works, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (1793), and Ueber den Streit der Fakultdten (1798), in a style, whatever our opinion may be in other respects, which at all events far superior in
depth to the Aufkldrung of the popular philosophy.
What made Kant capable of a truer appreciation of the doctrines of Christianity, was his deep moral earnestness. The self-complacent optimism of the philosophy of the
Aufkldrung had lacked the recognition of evil as a serious
power human life, while Kant made the starting-point of
his religious philosophy. He considered as incontestably a fact of experience, that in our race there inherent a " radical evil," or an original tendency to evil, viz. , the pre ponderance of self-love over pure reverence for law. This wrong bias cannot be the result of inheritance from our first parents, since moral qualities cannot be thus transmitted, but
are inseparable from the person. The source of this radical evil, according to Kant, rather to be sought in an " intelli gible act of freedom," which not to be further explained. The question, then, how this evil disposition can be changed into a good one, Kant answers, Not by a gradual reformation, but by a fundamental revolution of the man's whole habit of thought, by a new birth. The problem to awaken in the mind the idea of the moral perfection for which
we are from the first made. For this purpose, nothing more effectual than the contemplation of this idea in an his torical example of of such surpassing moral grandeur as can be beheld Jesus. For this reason, we may look upon
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him as if the ideal of goodness had been presented in him in flesh and blood, though we have not on that account any reason to regard him as other than a man born in the course of nature. The question, too, whether his historical per
to the eternal ideal, is one which we neither can nor need answer ; for, in any case, the real object of our religious faith is not this historic man, but the ideal of a humanity well-pleasing to God ; and since this
ideal is not our own creation, but given us in our super sensible nature, it may be conceived as the Son of God come down from heaven. Whoever believes in this ideal Son of God, to whom Jesus holds the relation of the representative example -- that whoever receives into his heart the moral idea of a humanity pleasing to God, and lets govern his life-- may believe that he justified in the eyes of the Searcher of
Hearts, since the fundamental Tightness of his disposition covers the imperfection of the details of his life. Nor need he have any anxiety with regard to the guilt of the past for
although the conception of the vicarious suffering of Christ as a satisfaction for sinners taken literally, untrue, inasmuch as such a substitution cannot take place the sphere of morality, still the conception may be regarded as the sym bolical expression of the true idea, that in the daily pain of self-discipline, obedience, and patience, the new man in us suffers as were vicariously for the old. Kant thus interprets the Church's doctrine of the Atonement, as once for all made by Christ, on the lines of Protestant mysticism, treating as a continual ethical process the heart of the religious man -- an interpretation, the germs of which may be traced to the Apostle Paul. But while the Christian doctrine of salvation thus becomes an inward subjective experience of the heart,
by no means Kant's intention to depreciate, from an abstract subjective point of view, the importance of the community. He sees very clearly that the supremacy of the good principle
in the individual can only be assured when maintained in the community around him. But this can be accomplished only by the establishment and spread of society having the laws of virtue both as its basis and its end. Such an ethical community, or " Kingdom of God," distinguished from all civil States, by being founded, not upon the laws of civil justice, but upon the laws of personal virtue, and by having for its sovereign, not human potentate, but the Searcher of Hearts
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and again by not being limited to definite nation or country, but embracing in principle the whole of mankind. Moreover, this ideal ethical community by no means identical with historic ecclesiastical communities, for while can be based upon the faith of the reason alone, which open to all alike, the ecclesiastical societies are founded upon positive creeds, which everywhere take different forms.
Having thus stated his view of religion, as may be ascertained within the limits of reason, Kant proceeds to the critical investigation of the historical, or "statutory" forms of religion. He here shows that he fully shared the unhis- torical way of looking at things characteristic of the age of the Aufkldrung. The only explanation of the rise of the positive religions he can give the false notion of mankind, that God demands special acts of ceremonial worship in addition to the worship of a morally good life. This was the origin of statutory religious regulations, which may for a time, in proportion to their association with moral ideas, be useful and even necessary as the means of inaugurating purely moral
? but in the end become hindrances to progress, and are therefore destined gradually to give place to the pure religion of reason. In Kant's view, the abolition of
this servile belief, with the establishment of the sole authority of moral faith, was inaugurated by Jesus but the real purpose of Jesus was often misunderstood in the Church, and what he originally intended to be simply preparatory means, was later times made fundamental whence arose much bigotry and fanaticism. was not until his own time, Kant thinks, that the light at length fully shone forth after centuries of darkness and he interprets the Christian hope of a final consummation, when God shall be all in all, of this develop ment, then actually begun, of the true faith of reason out of the wrappings of the historic faith. the duty of religious teachers, Kant declared, to help on this development means of the interpretation of the Bible and fresh inter pretation of the dogmas of the Church. At the end, he turns to the criticism of special points, in which he thought the danger of fanatical religious error and false worship
religious teaching,
serious. The notion of divine "operations of grace " he classes among those incomprehensible ideas of which reason disputes neither the possibility, nor the reality, nor even the necessity, but of which can make no use
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either in speculation, owing to the impossibility of determin ing their characteristics, or in practice, since we can do nothing to produce them. Elsewhere, however, he indicates in what sense he is willing to accept the idea of divine grace, viz. , if it is understood to mean the supersensible principle of good existing in our moral nature, which may be regarded as a divinely imparted impulse towards the good, the capacity for which has not been produced by our own effort, and which can be thought of as grace. Similarly he distinguishes in the means of grace between the true moral kernel and the ruder husk. Prayer, regarded as a formal act of worship and the statement of our wishes to a Being who needs no such state ment, he considers a vain superstition and fetishism ; but as the expression of our heart's desire to be well-pleasing to God,
it is a valuable means of quickening good dispositions, and especially as public prayer is an effective ethical observance, calculated to awaken moral impulses in the members of a community. In the same way, Baptism and the Lord's Supper may be looked upon as ethical observances for the public confession and quickening of the feelings of duty and brotherly love in a community ; but to regard them as means of grace in the sense that by these ceremonies the divine favour might be flattered and won, would be a heathenish superstition, and could only lead to contempt for virtue and the greater influence of the priesthood as the dispensers of
grace.
In these utterances we cannot but recognise the lofty
moral earnestness which was the soul of the Kantian philosophy and the main cause of its great and salutary effect upon its time. But the same defects are here observable as mark his moral philosophy : the onesidedness and inflexibility of his speculative principle prevented him from being just to those sides of man's nature which, while different from the intellect, are not wholly irrational, and must on no account be simply assigned to the lower sense-nature. I refer to the emotions and the imagination. The religious life originates and specially manifests itself in these very faculties of the soul as its domain ; and we can therefore readily understand why Kant could not take an impartial view of its natural and characteristic phenomena. He was still held back by the abstract intellectualism which was a universal failing of the Aufkldrung. To correct this error and supply what was
? ? ? ? "Ch- Q KANT.
19
lacking was the work of that party which had already protested, on the lines of Rousseau, against this worship of the intellect, and had proclaimed the rights of nature, of the heart, of the unfettered imagination, and of passionate enthusiasm. The party consisted of those allies in the " Storm and Stress " movement whose youthful excesses of enthusiasm were so modified and transformed in Herder and Goethe as to become a new and richer ideal of humanity.
Moreover, Kant's religious philosophy was unsatisfactory on account of the indefiniteness and uncertainty of its attitude towards the decisive question of man's relation to God. If religion consists, as it teaches, in regarding our duties as divine commands, the question at once arises, whether this is a purely subjective conception, or whether it is based upon an objective truth. In the former case, we have the anthropo logical theory of religion, since developed by Feuerbach and recent Positivism and Agnosticism ; in the latter, there arises the further question, How can we arrive at a knowledge of the divine will ? Now, the idea of revelation remains in Kant a non liquet ; he concedes its possibility, perhaps even its necessity, and yet really leaves no room for it. If it is ad mitted, in the sense of an external announcement on the part of God, as the theological Kantians wished, the fate of Kant's fundamental principle of the autonomy of reason is at once sealed. on the other hand, the divine revelation con
ceived as taking place within the human spirit, as in post- Kantian speculation, cannot reasonably be limited to the
and denied to the theoretical reason the human spirit must then be conceived as standing generally as such so close a relation to the divine that the eternal nature of the divine Reason must express and reveal itself the regular course of the mind's own activity. But this carries us not only beyond the dualism of Kant's theory of knowledge, but also beyond the moral abstraction of his merely rational faith, and we are brought to an evolutionary idealism, as conceived by Herder and Hegel, which the manifold moral and religious ideals of mankind take their place as integral mem bers in the process of the development of divine revelation.
Thus, in the Kantian philosophy there lay side by side the germs of various tendencies of thought, which afterwards took widely different directions. And was precisely this wealth of suggestions, which might be developed into totally distinct
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