No More Learning

Feud, in xiii. col. : 'Quod in principe
est plenitudo potestatis et postquam
? liquid vult ex certa scientia nemo
potest ei dieere, cur facie ista. . . .
Alibi dicit Baldus, quod Papa et Prin-
ce ps ex certa scientia super jus et contra
jus et extra jus omnia possunt. '"
Id. , Comm. on Cod. I. 19, 1 (fol. 40,
>>. ): "Licet servilis. . . quinto . . .
confirmo quia quum princeps iiliquid
facit ex certa scientia, tollit omne ob-
staculum juris, secundum Bartolum,
in consilio quod incipit Civitati Cam-
erini. "
? Id. , Comm. on Code 1. 19, 7: "Re-
scripta. . . . No. primo regulam,
quod rescripta, contra jus impetrata,
non debent per judices observari. . . .
Sed numquid ista regula procedat ex
defectu potestatis principis, quia non
possit, vel ex defectu voluntatis.
Baldus . . . et Paulus . . . dicunt
quia ex defectu voluntatis, quia non
preeumitur principem aliquid velle,
quod sit contra jus; et si aliquid con-
cessit, presumitur per importunitatsm
concessisse et ideo si princeps vellet,
posset rescribere contra jus, adiecta
clausula non obstante. ''
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? 150
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
another citation which Ja>son makes from Baldus: it is sacri-
legious to dispute about the authority of the Prince, but it is
lawful to discuss his knowledge and intention, for the Prince
sometimes errs; it is always to be presumed that the Prince
desires what is just and true, and he wishes his actions to be
controlled by the justice of heaven and the Courts of Law
(poli et fori). 1 It would seem then that these Civilians were
clear that the Eoman people had no longer any legislative
authority in the formal sense, while the Emperor had an abso-
lute and unconditional authority in relation to positive law.
There are, however, certain aspects of the relation of the
Prince to Law, which require a separate treatment and
first, we must consider his relation to Custom, and here we
must take account of the Canonists as well as of the Civilians.
John of Imola, who was both Civilian and Canonist, says first
that "Consuetudo " may be called that form of law which is
established by the "mores" of him who has the power of
making law, and that it does not require the knowledge or
consent of the Prince; but he adds that this was so because the
Pope permitted the development of a custom even if contrary
to the law, if it were reasonable, and had a sufficient prescrip-
tion, and he refers to the terms of the Decretal of Gregory IX.
on which he is commenting. He adds that the Emperor had
also permitted this by the law " omnes populi " (Digest i. 1, 9),
and, therefore, custom did not require the knowledge or consent
of either Pope or Emperor, in order to be valid. 2
1 Id. , Comm. on Digest i. 4, 1 (fol.
25): "Tamen adverte quod licet de
potestnte principie sacrilegium ait ut
dixi, disputare, de scientia et voluntate
principis licitum est disputare. quia
princeps quandoque errat, 1. 2. ft.
De Sup. leg. secundum Baldum hie:
qui etiam subdit quod in principe nun-
quam aliquid preeumitur place re, nisi
quod justum et verum sit: et princeps
vult actus suos regulari a justitia poli
et fori. "
1 John of Imola: Comm. on Decre-
tals i. 4, 11: "Potest dicere ut hie
Jo, quod consuetudo est jus quoddam
moribus illius inductum qui jus con-
dere potest, habens vim legis. . . .
Nam non videtur requiri conscusua
vel scientia principis. Nam Papa hie
permittit consuetudinem induci etiam
contra jus, dummodo sit rationabilis et
prescripta, et sic non requiritur alitor
consensus vel scientia ejus. Et simi-
liter imperator concedit potestatem
condendi statuta, et consequenter
consuetudines in 1. omnes populi
(Dig. i. I, 9) et ideo non requiritur ejus
consensus vel scientia. "
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? chap, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
151
Bertachinus, in his 'Eepertorium' or Dictionary of Law,
of the later fifteenth century, cites various emphatic phrases
about the authority of custom. Custom and statute have
equal authority, a general custom creates the " Jus Commune,"
a custom of such antiquity, that there is no memory to the
contrary, has the force of a "Privilegium" of the Prince;
the Emperor is "solutus legibus," but he is not "solutus
moribus et ratione," he is bound to maintain the "con-
suetudines. " 1
That great Canonist of the early fifteenth century, Zabarella
(generally referred to as "the Cardinal") treats the subject
of the source and authority of Custom at some length, but
with such caution that it is difficult to arrive at any certain
conclusion. He is commenting upon the Decretal of Pope
Gregory IX. (Decretals i. 4, 11). Some people had maintained
that it was only in former times that custom could make or
abrogate law, while others maintained that it did not follow
because the people could not now make " law " that they could
not make custom. He cites Gul. de Cuneo as maintaining that
while the power of making " law " had been transferred to the
Prince, the power of making custom neither had been, nor
could be transferred. Zabarella does not indeed agree with
this last contention, but he is convinced that at least in the
c ase of Canon Law, custom would in some cases prevail against
a canon without the consent of the Prince (i. e. the Pope). 2
1 Bertachinus,' Repertorium Juris,' habebat hano auotoritatem olim quum
vol. i. fol. 471, v. : "Consuotudo et populus condebat legem . . . nam cum
Htatutum aequiparantur. . . . Con- legislatoris suffragio leges scribantur,
euetudo generalis facit jus commune. ejus etiam tacito consensu abrogantur.
. . . Consuetudo tanti temporis quod . . . Hanc opinionem aliqui improbant,
non sit memoria in contrarium habet quia etiam, praesupposita ilia opinione,
vim privilegii principis. . . . Con- quod hodie populus Romanus non
suetndo habet vim constitutionis. " possit legem condore, non per hoc
Vol. iii. fol. 10, r. : "Imperator est infertur, idem esse de consuetudine,
solutus legibus . . . sed do equitate nam de permissione legis procodit, quod
debet vivere legibus . . . non tamen consuetudo valeat etiam ad tollendam
eat solutus moribus et ratione. " . . . legem, si consuetudo est rationabilia
Fol. 12, r. : "Imperator tenetur ser- et prescripta, ut bic inde dicit Gul. do
vare consuetudines suas. " Cuneo in 1. de quibus (Dig. i. 3, 32)
* F. Zabarella: Comm. on Deere- quod lioet in principem sit tranalata
tals I. iv. 11 (fol. 86): "Quidam ergo, potestas condendi legem, non est
ut refert Inno. dicunt quod consuetudo translate potestas inducendi con-
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? 152
[PABT II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Another great Canonist of the fifteenth century, Nicolas de
Tudeschis, who is generally known as Panormitanus, sets out
very clearly the superiority of custom over Positive Law,
if it has prescription and is " rational," while it is invalid if it
lacks " reason. " He maintains that it was thought (by some)
that custom could only be created with the knowledge of him
who can make law, but he cites the opinion of John (? ) as main-
taining that the knowledge or counsel of the Pope was not
necessary for the creation of custom, otherwise it would rarely
or never come into being. 1
Yet another very important Canonist of the same century,
Turrecremata, deals in considerable detail with the whole
question of the nature and authority of law, in his Commentary
on the Decretals of Gratian. It is natural that his treatment
of the nature of law has something of the breadth and scope
of Gratian's treatment of the subject. He was also greatly
suetudinem: nec transferri potuit,
quum surgit ex tacito consensu, quod
tenet Bart. 1. quae sit longa consue-
tudo, 1. secunda in repetitione (Cod. %'iii.
52).
Haec ratio non urget, quoniam
poterit hodie induci consuetudo, inter-
veniente tacito consensu principis;
nec potest esse translata jurisdictio
in principom, quin etiam sit translata
potestes consuetudinis inducendae,
quum sit jus ex quo legantur subditi,
et pro lege servare ut in diffinitione
consuetudinis. . . .
Secundo, solvit Inno, quia leges,
quae dicunt quod consuetudo est abro-
gatrix legum ete. loquuntur de legibus
municipalibus, quas sibi quisque popu-
lus statuit, quas etiam contraria lege
vel consuetudine potest tollere; secus in
lege imperiali quae solum lege imperiali
tollitur. . . . Tertio solvit Inno quod
leges primae loquuntur de consuetudine
generali, quae ex certa scientia legis-
latoris s. principis inducitur. . . .
Quinto, solvit Inno, distinguendo, an
consuetudo praeceeserit legem, et tuno
lex ei derogat, an e contrario, et tunc
ipsa derogat legi, nisi lex consuetu-
dinem prohibeat, ut in usuris et re-
verentia. . . . (fol. 87). Ex hoo
infertur quod consuetudo ecclesiastics
non potest induci contra legem canoni-
cam, sine tacito consensu Papae, sicut
et nemo citra Papam potest statuere
contra canones. . . .
Die verius quod
aliquo casu contra canonem potest
valere consuetudo, sine consensu tacito
principis. "
'Panormitanus: Comm. on Decre-
tals I. iv. 11 (vol. i. fol. 103): "Note
in ? licet, quod consuetudo praevalet
juri positivo, si est rationabilis et
praescripta, e contrario consuetudo
rat iuno carens non derogat juri, et
ratio est quia consuetudo, cum sit
quoddam lex, debet habere rationem
in se, alias non est lex. . . . Si ergo
amittit substantialia legis, non potest
praejudicare legi. . . . (fol. 105).
? ? Quarto, requiritur, quod consuetudo
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? CHAP, n. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS. 153
influenced by the profound treatment of the subject by St
Thomas Aquinas. We shall discuss his general conception of
political authority in another place, here we are concerned
with an important passage in which he treats the relation of
law to custom.
We may, he says, consider the authority of law from two
points of view, the " firmitas authoritatis " and the " firmitas
8tabilitatis. " Laws derive the first from the authority of the
legislator, the second from its correspondence with the con-
ditions and customs of those who are subject to it; and laws
are therefore void unless are confirmed by their custom. 1
We must, however, observe that in a later passage he seems
to maintain that, even when the multitude has not the power
of making law, its custom obtains the force of law, but subject
to the condition that this is allowed by those who have the
authority of imposing laws on the multitude. 2
We have considered these references to the relation of law
and custom, because the subject is one of great importance, but
we think that while the jurists are conscious of the great
importance of the question it is not easy to derive from
them clear and complete conclusions.
There is, however, another conception of the relation of the
Prince to the Law, of which we must take account, and with
regard to which there is a general agreement among the
1 Turrecremata: Comm. on Gratian
Decretum D. iv. part iii. (p. 64):
"Leges instituuntur . . . Rospondeo
notaudum, quod duplieiter possum us
de firmitate legum loqui, aut de
firmitato auctoritatis, aut de firmitate
stabilitatis. Si de firmitate auctori-
tatis, istam ha bet lox ab instituente,
a quo robur et auctoritatem susoipit. Si
vero loquamur de firmitate stabilitatis,
istam habet lex ex convenientia et
aptatione ad mores subditorum. Quia
enim ut dictum est in C. ent autem lex.
(Gratian Decretum D. iv. 2. ); oportet
quod lex sit possibilis secundum
loco temporiquo conveniens; dicimus
quod leges fiimantur firmitate stabili-
tatis et permanenciae, quum moribus
utentium approbantur, sive cum
moribus subditorum leges adapt ant in-.
Deficiunt autem, tolluntur et abro-
gantur quum utentium moribus non
conformantur. "
1 Td. id. , D. xi. 1 (p. 121): "Si
vero multitudo non habeat liberam
potestatem condendi sibi legem . . .
nihilominus tamen ipsa consuetudo in
tali multitudine prevalens optinet vim
legis, in quantum tolleratur per eos ad
quos pertinet multitudini legem im-
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? 154
[PART II.
FIFTEENTH CENTURY.
Civilians. This is the conception that the Prince is bound
by any contract which he has made with his subjects. We have
dealt with this as it appears in the Civilians of the fourteenth
century, but it has also an important place in the fifteenth
century.
John of Imola, in one place, says that while the Emperor and
the Pope are not bound by "positive" laws, they are bound by
the divine and natural law, and therefore by their " Contract. "
for this is founded upon natural law. And in another place
the Prince is bound by a contract with his subjects, "natur-
aliter," though not " civiliter. " 1
Paulus de Castro, also, sets out the same general principle,
and cites Cynus as having said that if the Prince makes any
contract with his subjects he is bound to keep it, just like any
private person, and that this also applies to his successor;
and he also cites Bartolus as having said that when a Statute
passes into a contract, it cannot be revoked by those who
made it. 2
Franciscus Accoltis, while asserting in the same way that
the Prince was bound by his contract with his subjects, re-
pudiates emphatically the opinion which he attributes to the
"Doctors" (we have just seen that it was held by John of
Imola) that the Prince was only bound "naturaliter" and not
"civiliter," and he cites Baldus as having maintained the
same opinion as himself. 3
1 John of Imola: Commentary on
Decretals i. 2, 2 (fol. 13): "Item
adverte quia licet Papa t Imperator
non ligantur suis legibus positivis . . .
(amen ligantur lege Divina et naturali.
. . . Et per predicta patet quod Papa
et Imperator etiam suo contractu
ligantur: quia etiam jure naturali id
proceditur. "
Id. id. , ii. 19,1 (Ex Epistola), fol. 54:
"Nota quod ex contractu principis cum
subjecto, princcps obligatur saltim
naturaliter. Civiliter eum obligari
non videtur quum ilia deeoendat ex
legibus qui bus est sol tit us. "
>> Paulus de Castro: Comm. on
Cod. i. 14, 4 (fol. 26): '' Ultimo, per
istam legem determinantur duo. Primo
secundum Cynum quod si prinoeps f arit
aliquem contractum cum subditis,
debet illud obeervare et non rumpcrc,
vel frangere, vel contravenire, sicut
quilibet alius privatus, et eodem modo
eius successor observare tenetur, quum
afficit ipeam dignitatem cujus ipse est
administrator.
Per hoc etiam determinat Bartolus
in 1. omnes populi (Dig. i. 1, 9) quod
quum statutum transit io contractu
non potest a statuentibus revocari. "
Cf. pp. 15 and 19.
1 Franciscus Accoltis: Comm. on
Decretals ii. 19 (fol. 49): "Ex Epis-
tola. Nota primo secundum Doc. :
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? CHAP. II. ] THE LAW: CIVILIANS AND CANONISTS.
155
Bertachinus says simply, the Emperor can revoke a " Privi-
legium " given by his predecessors, unless he received money
for it, bat he cannot revoke his contract, and cites Cynus and
Bartolns. 1
Jason de Mayno sets out the same principle with some
important distinctions. He treats the making of a con-
tract by the Prince as one of the modes of legislation, for
his contract has the force of law; and he cites Bartolus and
Paulus, as holding that it has even more force than the Law,
for though the Prince is not bound by the Law, he is bound
by agreement and contract, which belong to the "jus gen-
tium "; and he cites Baldus as saying that the Pope and the
Emperor are bound by the agreements (pacta) which they have
made with the " Civitates. " He then cites Bartolus as main-
taining that while contracts are binding on the Prince who
made them, they do not bind his successors, unless they
belonged to the nature and custom of his office, as in feudal
matters. He himself distinguishes, he agrees with Bartolus
in the case of the Emperor and Pope, for they succeeded by
election and not by inheritance, but when the King, or other
Prince, succeeded by inheritance the successor was bound
to maintain all the contracts of his predecessors. 2
quod imperator faciens contractum cum 1 Bertachinus, 'Repertorium Juris,'
subdito, obligatur saltem naturaliter vol. iii. fol. 10, r. : "Imperator potest
ad observantium pacti, et sic sentiunt revocare privilegum sui antecessors . . .
in dictis suis, quod princeps subdito nisi receperit pecuniam pro eo; sed
non obligatur civiliter, sed naturaliter contractum suum non potest revocare. "
tantum per 1. digna vox (Code i. 14, 4). Id. id. id. , fol. 12, r. : "Imperator
. . . Nam quum obligatio civilis oriatur tenetur servare conventiones et pacta
a lege civili . . . si lex civilis non bgat et contracta. Cy. et Bar. in D. 1.
principem, ergo non potest obligari digna vox " (Cod. i. 14, 4).
civiliter; naturaliter autem obligatur s Jason do Mayno: Comm. on
quia ipsa naturnalis obligatio sumit Digest i. iv. 1 (fol. 25 v. ): "Adde
originem a jure naturali. . . . Jus quint um modum (of making laws by the
autem naturale non potest tolli per Prince); s. per viam contractus, quia
principem, nee limitari sine causa. . . . contractus principis habent vim legis.
Tu, autem, adverte, ad primum dictum, . . . Imo fortius secundum Baldum et
quia Baldus in 1. princeps fl. De Legibus Paulum hie, licet princeps non ligetur
(Dig. i. 3, 31) dicit quod princeps obli- lego . . . tamon ligatur lege conven-
gatur non solum naturaliter sed civiliter tionis et contractus quae sunt de jure
ex contractu. . . . Ego autem dico gentium. . . . Ubi Baldus de natura
indubitanter quod princeps contra- Feudi, ubi etiam per eum, an princeps
hendo obligatur civiliter et naturaliter. " teneatur suas eonsuetudines observare,
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? 156
[PART II.