No More Learning

But if it
were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would
not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would
not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not
identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again
in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be
identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul
to lose its sensitive powers.

Objection 7: Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when
the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the
body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima
i, "if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without
doubt, see as well as a young man. " Therefore neither are the sensitive
powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): "Of two
substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its
reason, and the body with its senses. " Therefore the sensitive powers
belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the
sensitive powers remain not in the soul.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul,
expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): "If, however, anything remain
at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is
not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not
the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is
probably impossible. " Hence it seems that the whole soul is not
separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul,
and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii,
2): "This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the
corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not
separable as some maintain. " Therefore the sensitive powers do not
remain in the separated soul.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some,
holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as
color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes
all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it
would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since
these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid
view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to
do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the
same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as
that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et
Vigil. ) that "where we find power there we find action. " Now it is
evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the
principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul
as united to the body, because they are not performed except through
the medium of the body---such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence
it follows that such like powers belong to the united soul and body as
their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as
the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some
operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily
organ---for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore,
since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the
principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but
also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject
remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted
they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no
bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body,
while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the
body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the
sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a
distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they
are of two kinds---some being acts of organs and emanating from the
soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the
former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes
the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers
remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable:
because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain
other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of
organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it
informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result
naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other
powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the
organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it
would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean
powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if
we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain
in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically,
in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains
in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should
be reunited to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be
anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This
opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be understood as
meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually,
namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated
above [*Cf. [5031]FP, Q[77], A[8], ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1].

Reply to Objection 2: The senses which the soul takes away with it are
not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which
pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called
sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses
we must reply as above to the first objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the sensitive powers are related
to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared
to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 4: The powers of the soul are not called its
integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is
that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the
parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul's energy
is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the
others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the
separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished,
although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the
king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his
authority.

Reply to Objection 5: The body co-operates in merit, as an essential
part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not
co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the
comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be
acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of
those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are.
But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their
proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the
purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically
the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold
of water that has been heated returns not identically the same,
although the water remains the same in identity), so the organs will be
the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.

Reply to Objection 7: The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers
as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that "old
age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,"
namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither
weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain
in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv):
"When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through
being affected with these" (namely the imagination, and the
concupiscible and irascible faculties) "according to its merits. " But
the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive
powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the
sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of
them.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the body
feels not, but the soul through the body," and further on: "The soul
feels certain things, not through the body but without the body. " Now
that which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul
separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel
actually.

Objection 3: Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep,
belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it
happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way
as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "For I see
not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying
senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which many have
related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet
has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place. "
For it is unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its
body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before
of those who lie senseless that "they have a certain image of their own
body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by
means of sensible images to take cognizance of such things as they
see. " Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the
sensitive powers.

Objection 4: Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as
proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated souls will actually
remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the
rich glutton (Lk. 16:25): "Remember that thou didst receive good things
in thy lifetime. " Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of
a sensitive power.

Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9)
the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and
sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which
according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the
irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be
deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in
the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers are
common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no
sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ.
Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the
sensitive powers.

Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that "when the body is
corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves," and the same applies
to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul
does not exercise the act of any sensitive power.

I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive
powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and
these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the
soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This
statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who
held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise
dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing
moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held.
And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved,
and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover
moves itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own
movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul,
one by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by
the soul: so that this act "to see" is first of all in the soul itself
as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the
soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (De
Anima i, 3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it
is nowise moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and
the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only.
We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise
remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some deny that this book is Augustine's: for it
is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine's works and
added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written
there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should be
maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul
is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such
affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that
the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according
to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination
and other like powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are
not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body
the merit of that affection.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is said to feel through the body, not as
though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as
belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say
that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some
things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels
such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place
in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not
occur without any bodily movement.

It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the
opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that
book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is
no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul:
since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein
corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated
soul. Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to
the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective power,
with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions.
Wherefore Augustine's comparison holds in this respect that just as the
images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who
is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated
soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul
imaginatively.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu.
4), memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of
the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and
in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the
body to wit, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not. " In another way
memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains
to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all
differences of time, since it regards not only the past but also the
present, and the future as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking
memory in this sense the separated soul will remember [*Cf. [5032]FP,
Q[77], A[8]; [5033]FP, Q[89], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 5: Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold
signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive
appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in
this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of the
heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the
intellective part: and in this way they will be in the separated soul,
even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in
God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this
sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God's joy is one
simple delight. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a
bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things that
affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not
corporeal but resemble corporeal things. " Therefore the separated soul
is not punished with a bodily fire.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says that "the agent
is always more excellent than the patient. " But it is impossible for
any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it
cannot suffer from a body.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and
Boethius (De Duab. Natur. ) only those things that agree in matter are
active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and
corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common
to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed
into one another, as Boethius says (De Duab. Natur. ). Therefore the
separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.

Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the
agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will
receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is
received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which
is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but
spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul
are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul
suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment,
but rather to its perfection.

Objection 5: Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by
seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). On the
contrary, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by
intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or
imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for
intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there is no
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering," according to the
Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that
vision.

Objection 6: Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the
corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by
the body while living in the body; on the contrary, the soul while
living in the body is held by the body in so far as there results one
thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul
will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be
held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.

Objection 7: Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a
corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is
only between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the
soul suffers not from that fire.

Objection 8: Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object,
except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able
to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at
least the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside
the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this
world: and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the
glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment
of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things
suffer from the fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any
corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action
can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains
suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.

On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is
equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons
suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the
bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which
must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our
Lord (Mat. 25:41), "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,
which was prepared for the devil," etc. Therefore separated souls also
can suffer from that fire.

Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul
subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is
just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing
by suffering therefrom.

Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between
agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature
does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore
neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.

I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called
metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we
must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal
fire, since our Lord said (Mat. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for
the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how
it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.

For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes
the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says:
"The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it. " But this does not
seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is
seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his
punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant
nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as
something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul
sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the
fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.

Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the
soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in
consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in
fulfillment of Ps. 13:5, "They have trembled for fear, where there was
no fear. " Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that "the soul burns
through seeing itself aflame. " But this, again, seems insufficient,
because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in
reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow
or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes
(Gen. ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that
one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that
is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be
more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary
vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of
things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former
results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and
furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are
endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal
fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers
even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv,
29): "We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers
from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it. " They
explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this
corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal
thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as
the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of
Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself
to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now
an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in
virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that
fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on
the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the
sanctification of the soul by the sacraments ([5034]TP, Q[62],
AA[1],4).

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in
acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own
connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the
principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects
the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that
water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the
shape of a house.

Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action
connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of
Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must
say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be
hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some
way united to a body: for thus we observe that "the corruptible body is
a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in
two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there
results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body
both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is
not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal
fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as
a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a
place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place,
being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although
of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal
spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an
incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie
it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is
not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the
corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine
justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it,
by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it
from acting where it will and as it will.

This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how
the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself
as follows: "Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to
fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are
imprisoned in flames? " Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17]
says the same as quoted by the Master (Sent.
iv, D, 44): "If the
incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it
not be held after death by a corporeal fire? " and Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that "just as, although the soul is spiritual and the
body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body
as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love
for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment
therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing. "

Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to
understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as
to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal
spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the
instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it
were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit,
and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is
tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these
in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there as one inquiring:
wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as
quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to
say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul's pain
or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it
apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as
apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the
corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its
distress.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is simply more excellent than
the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so
far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the
action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent.
Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the
argument is not conclusive.

Reply to Objection 4: By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on
it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the
point.

Reply to Objection 5: In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by
the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can
nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the
thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may
be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it
destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual vision may
cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful,
not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter
which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.

Reply to Objection 6: The comparison does not hold in every respect,
but it does in some, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 7: Although there is no bodily contact between the
soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even
as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when
it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful
object is said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of
contact is sufficient for action.

Reply to Objection 8: The souls of the damned are never outside hell,
except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the
trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they
nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their
punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of
their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from
hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer
somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence
just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the
essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be
outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so
the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's
permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James
3:6, "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc. , is in agreement with
this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in the
air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames. " But
the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit
immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there
are fourteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?

(2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

(3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?

(4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?

(5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

(6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?

(7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?

(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?

(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and
almsgiving profit the departed?

(10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?

(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?

(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than
others?

(13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were
offered for each individual?

(14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages
are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together
avail those for whom they are offered?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot
profit others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): "What things a man shall
sow, those also shall he reap. " Now if one person reaped fruit from the
suffrages of another, he would reap from another's sowing. Therefore a
person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God's justice, that each one should
receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says:
"Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. " Now it is
impossible for God's justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for
one man to be assisted by the works of another.

Objection 3: Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is
praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not
praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one
man be meritorious and fruitful for another.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for
good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the
evildoings of another; indeed, according to Ezech. 18:4, "the soul that
sinneth, the same shall die. " Therefore neither does one person profit
by another's good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): "I am a partaker with all
them that fear Thee," etc.

Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the
one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another.
Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.

I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for
acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the
state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus
by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of
punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two
ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the
difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy;
since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the
one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person
nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so
that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I
do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of
the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another's
actions---disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way
of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a
wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain
the first grace for another [*Cf. [5035]FS, Q[114], A[6]]: and since
the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we
pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine
power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or
accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by
way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways.
First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which
root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united
together by charity acquire some benefit from one another's works,
albeit according to the measure of each one's state, since even in
heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that
the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly,
through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for
the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works
become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though
they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them
either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose
that does not change their state.

Reply to Objection 1: This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as
stated in Jn. 4:36, "And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto
life everlasting. " Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man
save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that
he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works,
when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby
he merits eternal life.

Reply to Objection 2: The work that is done for another becomes his for
whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one
with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if
a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him
in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to
human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in
lieu of another's.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is not given to a person save according to
his relation to an act, wherefore praise is "in relation to something"
(Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or
ill-disposed to something by another's deed, it follows that no man is
praised for another's deeds save accidentally in so far as he is
somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance,
inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is
meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but
also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as
evidenced by what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: It is directly contrary to justice to take away
from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not
his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of
justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills
of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently
it is not becoming that one should be punished for another's sins, as
it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of another.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

Objection 1: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the
works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:10): "We
must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every
one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath
done. " Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others,
which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.

Objection 2: Further, this also seems to follow from the words of Apoc.
14:13, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works
follow them. "

Objection 3: Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to
advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer
wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19:8, refer: "He hath
hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass. " Therefore the dead
cannot be assisted by a person's suffrages.

Objection 4: Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless
there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community
between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i,
11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.

On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: "It is . . . a holy and
wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from
sins. " But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them.
Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): "Of no small weight is
the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom
whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the
priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar. " This custom was
established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a
sermon on suffrages for the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3],
where he expresses himself thus: "Realizing the nature of the Mysteries
the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a
commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the
awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries. " This is also confirmed by the
authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl. ), where he mentions the rite of the
Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the
suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this
without any doubt.

I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the
Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in
charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is
the life of the body, has no end: "Charity never falleth away" (1 Cor.
13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore
the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the
suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit
the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of
the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe
that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their
state from unhappiness to happiness or "vice versa"; but they avail for
the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no
change in the state of the dead.

Reply to Objection 1: Man while living in the body merited that such
things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted
thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the
things he has done in the body.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted
above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at
the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then
each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the
body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the
living.

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of
eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: "Blessed are
the dead," etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are
somewhat their own, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls
are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are
still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance
towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is
hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works
in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is
not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter
of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in
this respect they are still wayfarers.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the
Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living,
because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the
spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on
charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not
profit the dead. For, according to Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear
sinners. " Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray,
they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them
do not profit the dead.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that "when an
offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party
is provoked to harsher measures. " Now every sinner is offensive to God.
Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and
consequently their suffrages are of no avail.

Objection 3: Further, a person's deed would seem to be more fruitful to
the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his
deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

Objection 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work,
that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are
dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted
thereby.

Objection 5: On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another
man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore,
only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in
a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his
dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.

Objection 6: Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by
suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after
death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the
disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it
would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or
by wicked persons.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed
by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the
altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves
independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by
whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the
wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the
doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner
who offers suffrage may be considered---in one way in so far as it is
his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself
or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and
this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages,
represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the
burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead
a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts
(Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest,
albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the
instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to
the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument
of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on
account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin
do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity.
Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for
him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those
suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they
are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those
persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious
on two counts.

Reply to Objection 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not
his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be
heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit,
they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods
not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Mat. 5:45), not indeed
on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss
on Jn. 9:31, "God doth not hear sinners," says that "he speaks as one
unanointed and as not seeing clearly. "

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in
so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of
another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these
suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of
profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated
above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the sinner's deed is not living in so
far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another's, as
stated above.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil
persons, we must reply to them also.

Reply to Objection 5: Although one cannot know for certain about
another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with
probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known
by its fruit (Mat. 7:16).

Reply to Objection 6: In order that suffrage avail another, it is
requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing
by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he
did in his life-time. This is what Augustine means to say.
Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and
this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but
rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them
or by commanding them.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer
them?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the
dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice
a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another
man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason
that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he
offered them.

Objection 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he
can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by
suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own
debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but
always for another.

Objection 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for
another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will
likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the
same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy
for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps.