No More Learning

Because ignorance excuses from sin
either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins
through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he
that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of
ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is
ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which
is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse
for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through
passion.

Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less
grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown
headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through
certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger
than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous
than to sin through passion.

Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through
choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain
malice.

On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath
struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on
purpose, have revolted from Him. " Now punishment is not increased
except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being
done on purpose, i. e. through certain malice.

I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a
sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as
sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other
things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the
movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is
committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will,
which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is
committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by
something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the
very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the
more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being
committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is
stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin,
soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to
his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a
permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in
his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the
intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers
from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins
through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he
who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end
itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect
is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion,
whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted
on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all
defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin
committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through
passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection
refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above
([1797]Q[76], A[4]). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the
kind make a sin to be less grave.

Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due
to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is
inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and
another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins
while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not
for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the
passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the
passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice,
chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained
([1798]AA[2],3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is
the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin
"through" choosing.
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OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of
God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?

(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?

(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
heart?

(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are
blinded or hardened?
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Whether God is a cause of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle
says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a reprobate
sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient'],"
and a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts,
by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to
evil. " Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a
will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of God
are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men. "
But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore
creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the [1799]FP,
Q[44], A[1], it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to
sin.

Objection 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the
effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the
cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

Objection 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not
contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment;
since of this evil it is written (Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and
(Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg. : 'the
Lord'] hath not done? " Therefore it is not incompatible with God's
goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou . . . hatest none of
the things which Thou hast made. " Now God hates sin, according to Wis.
14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful. " Therefore God
is not a cause of sin.

I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of
another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's
will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone
from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If thou
say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg. : "If, when I say
to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him. "] .
. . I will require his blood at thy hand. " Now God cannot be directly
the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a
departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God
inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should
be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the
order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of
sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens
that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin,
which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all
this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself
is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to
Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not
said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship,
unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore
evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is
clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense,
it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what
was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate
sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that
reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we
do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi,
whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines
men's wills to good and evil," is to be understood as meaning that He
inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does
not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being
deserved through a previous sin.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are turned
'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the
preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made
clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem"
admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might
imply causality. ]; for God did not make the creatures that they might
be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the
text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to
wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for
which they were made.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause,
according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that
first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it
goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that
first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's
orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause
thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the
commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.

Reply to Objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person
punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is
opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly
opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison
between fault and punishment.
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Whether the act of sin is from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For
Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a
thing. " Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin
is not from God.

Objection 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except
because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending
evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of
sin, as stated above [1800](A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of
the act of sin.

Objection 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their
species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause
of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If
therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin,
which is false, as was proved above [1801](A[1]). Therefore God is not
the cause of the act of sin.

On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now
"the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares
(De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of
sin.

I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both
respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its
being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in
act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act;
and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its
cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every
action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an
action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz.
the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz.
God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but
to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked
leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless
causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is
the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin,
because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

Reply to Objection 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of
"thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this
sense the act of sin is not a thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced
to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to
Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally.
Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the
act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect
accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1802]Q[72], A[1]), acts and
habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein
consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that
privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being
from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a
specific difference.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual
blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is
made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God
is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Objection 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God
does not punish what He causes. " Now God punishes the hardened heart,
according to Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last. "
Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.

Objection 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary
causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice
of man, according to Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them,"
and again, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: "The god of this world hath blinded
the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God.
Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of
heart.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): "Blind the heart of this
people, and make their ears heavy," and Rom. 9:18: "He hath mercy on
whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth. "

I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two
things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and
turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the
cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not
the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the
result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see
aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards
this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the
enlightening of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: "That was the true light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the
sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in
the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas
God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the
sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be
encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as
happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun
is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not
act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house;
and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the
other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in
whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is
not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His
own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of
spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.

These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which
both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the
affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in
rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which
the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is
that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the
ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.

Reply to Objection 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the
withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect,
they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin
that he incurs them, even as other punishments.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far
as it is a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness,
just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil
is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of
those who are blinded and hardened?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are
always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He
would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from
every evil. " Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the
evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of
blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above [1803](A[3]).
Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded
and hardened.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no
pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg. : 'God made not
death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living. ']. "
Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not
turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to
take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal
the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God
turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.

Objection 3: Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34).
Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case
of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ,
and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized
with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest.
Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare
of those who are blinded.

Objection 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not
be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God
does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.

I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a
twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's
damnation---to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz.
that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall
into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and
converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore
blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those
who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of
reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed
medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This
mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but
only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good"
(Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their
healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says
(De Quaest. Evang. iii).
Reply to Objection 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done,
is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom
the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole
universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the
martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as
regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good
that ensues from the loss.

Reply to Objection 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their
spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of
others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He
vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a
respecter of persons, as explained in the [1804]FP, Q[23], A[5], ad 3.

Reply to Objection 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may
ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?

(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?

(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?

(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of
man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends
with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the
devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono
ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret lusts. "
Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is
the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil. " But God
is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the
cause of our sins.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein
Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of
human counsel. " Now human counsel is not only about good things but
also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good
counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take
evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing
else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire. " Now
man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin.
Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will
alone.

I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the
cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper
principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the
will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be
directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.

Now the will, as stated above ([1805]Q[9], AA[3],4,6), can be moved by
two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible
is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the
will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or
God, as was shown above ([1806]Q[9], AA[3],4,6). Now God cannot be the
cause of sin, as stated above ([1807]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore it follows
that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his
sin.

As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in
three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will:
thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that
proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will
that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a
fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent
good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things,
which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second
and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by
offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the
reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct
cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any
object except the last end, as stated above ([1808]Q[10], AA[1],2).
Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that
proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin.
Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly
nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of
appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet
with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man
to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him
objects of appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is
somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the
cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of
causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will
inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.

Reply to Objection 3: God is the universal principle of all inward
movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil
counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as
persuading or offering the object of appetite.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by
internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are
vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an
intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the
lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to
evil through his internal movements.

Objection 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the
external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God
alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the
[1809]FP, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in
man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are
perceived by the external senses.

Objection 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand
and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either
of these, because, as stated in the [1810]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2,
the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it
seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary
forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in
sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce,
as is clear from what we have said in the [1811]FP, Q[110], A[2];
[1812]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through
man's internal movements induce him to sin.

On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless
he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.

I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and
sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the
will. As regards the will, we have already stated [1813](A[1];
[1814]FP, Q[111], A[1]) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the
intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in
the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in
man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent
to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive
appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined
to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he
can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting
certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the
sensitive appetite to some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the [1815]FP, Q[110], A[3],
the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the
spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which
can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be
restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the
imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher
says (De Somno et Vigil. ) [*De Insomn. iii, iv. ] that "when an animal
sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and
the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action
of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of
sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so
that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being
affected by them at the time. " Hence such a local movement of the vital
spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or
wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions
according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital
spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through
certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is
that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is
brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle,
since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil. : De Insomn.
iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an
apprehension of the beloved. " It also happens, through the rousing of a
passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being
something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion,
whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil
induces man inwardly to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Although vital functions are always from an
intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them,
even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal
soul, that food may be more easily digested.

Reply to Objection 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not
altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command
alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.

Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these
forms are received originally from the senses.
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Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of
necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of
the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare
with him. " Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the
earth.

Objection 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of
things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to
the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and
we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39).
Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above [1816](A[2]);
and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12)
that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends
gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to
shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor. "
Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there
is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit. " Now the devil
can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the
way explained above [1817](A[2]). Therefore he can induce man to sin of
necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the devil,
as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour. " Now it
would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under
the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce
man to sin of necessity.

Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God,
but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said
neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any
way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist
him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel
to sin.

I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by
God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but
he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from
the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except
by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether,
by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case
with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered,
whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however,
the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free,
it can resist sin, as stated above ([1818]Q[77], A[7]). It is
consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can
move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ([1819]Q[9],
A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the
imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has
the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the
reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when
the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the
exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's
power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
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Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the
devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd
of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to
others. "

Objection 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the
devil, according to Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave
[Douay: 'servant'] of sin. " Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same
also he is the slave" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin,
has been overcome by the devil.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil
is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore,
if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion
from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly
false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our
evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a
movement of the free-will. "

I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all
our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of
whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin:
even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the
wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the
direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of
his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact
that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire
for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be
inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is
subject to the free-will.

Reply to Objection 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our
evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being
overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously:
it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of
the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only
because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was
not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be
said of no sin of man.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while
man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward
suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of
origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration
of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its
essence; (3) of its subject.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his
descendants?

(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other
parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?

(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of
Adam by way of seminal generation?

(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from
some part of the human body?

(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and
not the man, had sinned?
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Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants,
by way of origin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is
not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech.
18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father. " But he
would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one
contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.

Objection 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin,
unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass
from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject
of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the
[1820]FP, Q[118], A[2]. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by
way of origin.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin,
is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it
lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin.
Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.

Objection 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more
powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to
it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it
is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the
soul.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one
finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are
so through want of exercise and through carelessness. " Now those are
said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore
nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered
into this world, and by sin death. " Nor can this be understood as
denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): "By
the envy of the devil, death came into this world. " It follows
therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the
world.

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold
that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants,
by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized
soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some
uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear
from Augustine in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De
Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi,
xii. ]

In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be
transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have
gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject
of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is
transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to
produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous,
endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be
transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted,
from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to
child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the
father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although
this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is
proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into
the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect
of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the
semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.

But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some
bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child,
and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in
consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case
of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by
the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is
essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational
soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's
soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding
its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him. "

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men
born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one
common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in
civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one
body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says
(Praedic. , De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are
one man. " Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many
members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the
hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by
the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a
murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the
hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it
as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving
principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of
Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first
parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate
from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their
actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to
his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from
the soul into the bodily members is called "actual. " And just as the
actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of
that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for
which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin
of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from
his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature,"
according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath. "

Reply to Objection 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his
father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he
share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is
transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin
is transmitted through being imitated.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the
power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless
the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the
rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human
nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which
infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in
his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a
kind of movement which is that of generation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen,
yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.