When it had been
converted
into
three against two the business would settle itself.
three against two the business would settle itself.
Robertson - Bismarck
2.
Schleswig-Holstein, the Treaty of Vienna, and the
Convention of Gastein, 1863-1865
The labyrinth of the historical, legal, and ethical con-
troversies buried in the slag-heaps of four centuries has
resulted in a formidable library on Schleswig-Holstein.
Palmerston said with more wit than accuracy that only
three persons in Europe were completely acquainted with
the truth, the Prince Consort who was dead, a German
professor who was in a lunatic asylum, and himself--and he
had forgotten it. Bismarck justly regarded his diplomacy
and achievement in 'the Schleswig-Holstein campaign'
as perhaps his most masterly performance. Genius, mili-
tary, political, scientific, or imaginative, as the judge of
its own efforts is always instructive, though not infal-
lible. But certainly no other episode in Bismarck's career
more convincingly summarises the pith and marrow of
Bismarckian principles and methods, the union of personal
character and intellectual gifts, the fixity of aim, and the
inexhaustible opportunism of means, ending in a dramatic
and unexpected triumph than his conduct of Prussian
J)olicy from November 1863 to August 1865. Working on a
arger scale in a grander manner for greater ends, Bismarck
achieved elsewhere and later grander results. But as a
finished model of Bismarckian statecraft it was and remains
a masterpiece, and in the evolution of his career and the
perfecting of his technique the Schleswig-Holstein cam-
paign was to Bismarck what the Polish campaigns were
to Gustavus Adolphus, the Silesian wars to Frederick
the Great, and the Egyptian campaign to Napoleon--the
apprenticeship of genius in the service of its profession.
Stripped of irrelevant detail, the problem of 1863 was
comparatively simple, but it raised issues of far-reaching
consequences and a baffling complexity. The Duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein had been united since 1460 by a
personal union through the Crown of Denmark with the
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 157
Danish kingdom. . The King of Denmark was the king-
duke who united in his person the hereditary right to the
Danish Crown and the succession to the combined Duchies.
Europe and Denmark had come to regard the Duchies in
fact as an integral part of the Danish kingdom, while re-
cognising, if it was reminded, that the two provinces had
an autonomy and rights arising from an historic existence
independent of Denmark. The dukedom was, in short, a
separate principality contained and governed within a
larger whole. But the prerogative of the king-duke was
conditioned in these Duchies by his authority as duke, and
the Duchies accepted his rule as their duke, not as King of
Denmark. Hence the system of government for Den-
mark was determined by the Crown in the Danish Riksdag,
for the Duchies by the duke in the Estates of the Provinces.
The law of Denmark would only be binding if accepted
by the Provincial Estates.
The desirability of a complete incorporation--the
abolition of the personal union and the fusion of the
Duchies with Denmark under a single ruler and a single
parliament--was obvious. But the Duchies clung to their
historic autonomy with tenacity; the law of succession to
the Danish Crown was not the same as the law of succession
to the dukedom. The underlying cause of this rooted
objection to the extinction of their autonomy was racial.
Holstein was predominantly German, Schleswig probably
(here an insoluble controversy is opened up), though not
so predominantly, Danish. To Holstein incorporation
with Denmark meant de-Germanisation and Danisation,
and, in addition, while the autonomy of Holstein was for
four centuries connected with that of its partner Schleswig
--the two together made the unity of the Duchy--Holstein
had always been part of the Holy Roman Empire of the
German nation, Schleswig had not. This historic anomaly
was confirmed in 1815. The King of Denmark, as Duke
of Schleswig-Holstein was a member of the German Con-
federation for Holstein (but not for Schleswig) over which,
therefore, the Federal Diet had a limited Federal juris-
diction. So long as the dynastic problem was not reopened,
and so long as the Nationalist principle was not inflaming
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? i58
BISMARCK
sentiment, this anomalous tangle of cross purposes and
contradictory allegiances would work, just because it was
customary. Its maintenance turned on the equipoise of
forces, balanced by the inconsistencies of tradition and
habit.
Fate and the developments in Europe after 1815 de-
stroyed the equipoise. Fate decided that the male succes-
sion in the direct line to the Crown of Denmark should
fail; the growth of the principle of nationality steadily
accentuated the ambition of the German and the Dane to
secure the Duchies for the German or the Danish race.
The incorporation of the Duchies, so long associated
with Denmark, was opposed by the German ambition to
sever them from Danish assimilation, and establish them
as an autonomous German principality under a German
duke, and weld them into the unified Germany of the
future. But the ' unredeemed Germany' was also an ' un-
redeemed Denmark. ' The dynastic problem was solved
by the Protocol of 1852. The Duke of Augustenburg, re-
garded by Germany and the Provincial Estates as the heir
de jure to the Duchies, was compelled with the other
claimants to surrender his claims in favour of Christian,
later the ixth, who was chosen by the Powers to maintain
the integrity of the Danish kingdom and continue, as Hng-
duke, the historic association of Schleswig and Holstein
with the Danish Crown. Had the European Powers been
wise, they would have repeated the lesson of Belgium in
1839: severed then and there German Holstein from
Schleswig, and incorporated the former with Germany
and the latter with Denmark. In all probability, when
Christian succeeded in 1863 the fifteen years of separation
would have habituated both Germany and Denmark to
the situation, and there would have been no further trouble.
But it was the age of Nicholas 1. , who regarded the
Schleswig-Holsteiners as rebels; and the severance of
Holstein from its legal duke (who was also the legal King
of Denmark) would have required more unity and greater
prevision in the Concert of Europe than the statesmen of
1852 were endowed with.
The maintenance of the historic integrity of the king-
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 159
dom of Denmark was deemed of the greatest importance in
the balance of European power, and the collapse of the
Revolution of 1848, with the reaction that followed, seemed
to the short-sighted diplomacy of Conservatism to destroy
the forces that had made a crisis out of Schleswig-Holstein.
The Convention of London, by placing the settlement
under the collective guarantee of the European Powers,
was held to provide an indisputable authority for its
maintenance.
But that convention, like the Treaty of Paris of 1856,
had the flaw fatal to all such solemn manifestations of the
public law and will of the Powers. It assumed that the
men and the States responsible for its maintenance would
continue to be of the same disposition as those who origin-
ally made it--a-large and historically unjustifiable assump-
tion. It had also the defect that it was imposed on the
Estates of Holstein and Schleswig, who were not parties
to it; that the German Diet was not a party to it and
retained its Federal rights in Holstein; that the son of the
Duke of Augustenburg was not a party to his father's re-
nunciation of his rights. It made no allowance for a more
Nationalist and Radical Denmark Or a more Nationalist and
Liberal Germany coming into existence; it created no
automatic and effective machinery to prevent provisions,
so solemnly defined, from being broken before the vacancy
to the Danish throne, filled by Christian's succession to
Danish Crown and the Duchies, occurred. It left Den-
mark a sovereign State, yet with a mortgage on its sove-
reignty. It provided neither for the removal of a
Nicholas 1. nor the emergence of a Bismarck.
Two conclusions are fairly clear in 1863. The Conven-
tion of London required Denmark to observe the historic
status quo in the Duchies. Dispassionate examination
cannot avoid the verdict that the acts of the Danish
government from 1852 to 1863 were a breach of the Con-
vention--certainly of its spirit, and probably of its letter.
They constituted a cumulative effort to separate the
Duchies and incorporate one of them in the kingdom, and
to present Europe with a fait accompli before the acces-
sion of Christian ix. This might have succeeded had
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? i6o
BISMARCK
Frederick vn. lived six months longer. Frederick's death
before his signature as the sovereign who was incontestably
dejure king and also dejure duke could be obtained wrecked
the attempt. Secondly, Christian ix. , the new King, had
on the day of his succession to decide at a moment's notice
either to provoke a revolution at Copenhagen or a revo-
lution at Kiel. Had he been wiser, he would have referred
the issue to the concert of the Powers signatory to the
Convention of London, and invited their decision and
their support, if need be, to carry out that decision. He
was their nominee; they were bound either to tear up
their own convention or loyally to see he did not suffer for
being the instrument of their policy. The coercion of
Copenhagen or of Kiel was the moral duty of the concert.
Christian, unhappily for himself and for Europe, did not at
once throw the responsibility on the Powers. In his
excuse it must fairly be said that the rejection by Great
Britain of Napoleon's proposal for a Congress made it very
difficult for him to do so.
It is not possible here to write the history of Europe nor
to discuss the policy of all the European States in this com-
plicated controversy. We are concerned primarily with
Bismarck and his policy. But it must not be forgotten
that the Danes and King Christian had a case, for which a
good deal can be urged. In 1852 the Concert of Europe
had decided, on broad grounds, that the integrity of the
historic kingdom of Denmark was an essential element in
the Balance of Power. The severance of the Duchies from
Denmark--apart from the juristic problem in the disputed
succession--was a grave violation of that Balance, for the
strategic position of the Duchies was of immense value.
Schleswig had a large Danish population, and there were
many Danes also in Holstein. If there was a danger that
the Germans might be oppressed by the Danes, there was
no less a danger--which events fully bore out--that the
Danes would be oppressed by the Germans. The forcible
Danisation of Holstein was less likely than the forcible
Germanisation of Schleswig. Schleswig had never beea
part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, and
the attempt to annex it to the Germany of 1863--with
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
the avowed object of Germanising it--was neither histori-
cally defensible, nor racially just, nor politically justifiable.
The claim of the Federal Diet that because it was not a
party to the Convention of 1852 it need not therefore
regard it as binding, was fairly met by the indisputable fact
that the two greatest German States in the Diet--Austria
and Prussia--were solemn parties to the Convention, and
could not therefore support the Diet's repudiation without
violating their signatures and pledges. The Germany there-
fore of the Federal Diet was a Germany minus Austria
and Prussia: a Germany, in short, which claimed to have
a more important voice in overriding the public law of
Europe, to which the two most important German States
had publicly agreed, than Europe and those two great
German States. Moreover, the Federal Act of 1815, which
defined the powers of the Diet, gave it no legal or political
right to interfere in cases of a disputed succession, to decide
questions of succession or enforce a decision, if it illegally
attempted to make one. Yet in virtually supporting the
Duke of Augustenburg the Diet was precisely doing this,
and therefore acting ultra vires. Politically, the claim that
one-third of Germany could override the rest of Germany
and all Europe was absurd.
The succession question had been settled in 1852. In
1863 there was or could be only one lawful successor to the
Danish Crown and the Duchies--Christian IX. Any denial
of this indisputable fact was a declaration that the Con-
vention was no longer binding without having obtained the
prior consent of those who made it and were responsible
for its maintenance. The Federal Diet was not a party
to the Convention, precisely because the Federal Diet was
not legally entitled to have a voice in deciding the succession
in the Duchies, and still less in the kingdom of Denmark.
The Duke of Augustenburg's claim in 1863 was a declara-
tion that the Settlement of 1852, which ruled out his
father and was accepted by him, was a wrong decision to
which he had not been a party, and was therefore not bind-
ing on him. But if the sons of fathers against whom a
decision has been given can always plead that the decision
does not affect the son, no throne in Europe would be safe
B. L
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? 162
BISMARCK
or secure. Bismarck recognised this from the first. And
the subsequent decision of the Prussian Crown lawyers
(p. 184) clearly laid it down that Christian ix. was the
de jure successor both to the Duchies and the Danish
Crown. The Prussian professors argued from the first
that because the Duke of Augustenburg ought to have been
made the heir in 1852, his son was the heir in 1863, all
law and facts notwithstanding. And the argument, that
because conceivably the Constitution of 1863 was
vires the whole Convention of 1852 became invalid, was as
good as an argument that because the Federal Diet in 1863
acted ultra vires the whole Federal Act of 1815 ceased to
be valid.
The Danes made serious mistakes from 1852-64. But
the responsibility for those mistakes was largely that of the
European Powers also. Long before the situation of 1863
arose it was the duty of the Powers in concert to tell Den-
mark that it was not strictly observing the Convention.
That duty the Powers did not perform. Because they did
not perform it, the Danes naturally inferred that the
Powers would accept the Danish policy--a policy which
had the support of probably a majority in Schleswig and a
or Danish blunders may be necessary, but that does not
involve approval of German policy and ambition--as inde-
fensible as the extreme Danish claim. The sequel proved
up to the hilt that the Powers allowed Prussia to commit
a wanton aggression, to crush Denmark, to denationalise
Schleswig, and to disregard even the scanty pledges of
justice and fair treatment laid down in the Treaty of
Prague. The Danish case against Prussia--as distinct
from Germany--is so strong as to be practically irrefutable.
The true gravity of the situation lay in the new forces
at work. Public opinion in Germany repudiated the Con-
vention of 1852. It was universally regarded as the act of
a reactionary coalition to which not even the Federal Diet,
and still less Germany, was a party. The reversal of the
decision of 1849, which had destroyed the unification of
Germany and the demand for German self-government,
carried with it the reversal of the Convention. The
Condemnation of Danish ambition
in
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
163
1 liberation of the duchies' was a very precise item in a
far-reaching programme of Germany for the Germans.
The claims, therefore, of the young Duke of Augusten-
burg combined with a dangerous felicity the demand for
the autonomy and inseparability of Schleswig and Hol-
stein, the principle of hereditary legitimism, the rule of a
German prince, and the new Liberalism of the enlightened
dynasties; and his programme at Kiel in 1863 stood for every-
thing that Germany now passionately demanded for itself.
All this was recognised in the chancelleries of Europe.
But the newest and gravest element in the situation--the
Prussia of 1863--was wholly unappreciated in the autumn
of 1863. The Prussia of 1848 had taken a brave line in
using her leadership of the German cause in the Duchies,
and had then at the first threat of European coercion
collapsed. Here, as in other matters, the impression per-
sisted within and without Germany that Prussia was the
lath painted to look like iron. Bismarck shared the con-
tempt and the indignation. He came into office to prove
what Prussian strength could do when efficiently directed
by a diplomacy that had shed the shibboleths which had
sapped the political and moral efficiency of the kingdom.
The geographical and strategic position of the Duchies
military frontiers to east and west; they, opened a back
door by land to the capital at Berlin; and, more dangerous
still, they provided everything that sea power required for
the effective coercion of Prussia: as a bastion both on the
Baltic and the North Sea they were indispensable to Prus-
sian power and expansion. The silent chief of the General
Staff, the ' library rat,' as men called him, gnawing his way
in prolonged toil to the heart of strategy, the strategy of
the State as Power, could furnish a memorandum con-
vincing in its conciseness of the supreme strategic value of
Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. Bismarck had studied as
hard as Moltke and with as fruitful results. Let the rat
continue to gnaw. When the time came to put in the
rat, the sharper its teeth the better. Instruction in the
truths of strategy and the inseparable union of strategy
and policy, was not needed in the Wilhelmstrasse. But it
was for Prussia unique.
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? 164
BISMARCK
was sorely needed in Downing Street and at the British
Admiralty, at the Qua: d'Orsay, in the Ball-Platz, and the
fly-blown offices of the Federal Diet.
Moreover, Bismarck foresaw the character of the coming
struggle--a real trial of strength between the diplomacy
and methods of the statecraft of power against the old
diplomacy of the State as the champion of right; between
the old system of the Concert of Europe with its' paradox'
of the Balance of Power and the revival of Prussianism
with its doctrine of force. The result must indicate
conclusively the efficacy and superiority of the Bismarckian
system; and Bismarck had this enormous advantage. He
knew the methods of his opponents, but they did not know
his. Obsessed by tradition and misled by ignorance of the
real Germany and Prussia, they were in the position of
generals fighting according to the red-tape of a conven-
tional warfare against a foe who had superior science and
used it to devise high explosives and asphyxiating gas.
The true moral of the Schleswig-Holstein campaign, in
which Europe was signally routed, is not that the state-
craft of blood and iron must always win--men drew that
false conclusion from imperfectly framed premises--but
first, that the State which stands for right (Der Staat als
Recht) in death-grips with the State which stands for
power (Der Staat als Macht) must have better brains and a
clearer mastery of realities; and secondly, it must not mix
a sham copy of its rival's methods with its own, and then
bay the moon because real force, applied by genius, beats
sham force that lets ' I dare not wait upon I would. '
When Christian's action precipitated a crisis several
insist on the withdrawal of the March Constitution as a
condition of upholding the Convention; they might have
decided that the whole situation was so completely altered
as to require a new settlement, and have severed the Duchies
from Denmark and recognised the claims of Augusten-
burg; or they might have severed Holstein from Schles-
wig; or they might have supported Christian and
Denmark at all costs. All these and other courses were
possible and arguable in November 1863. But they all
solutions were possible.
? . . . i rLi j
Powers might at once
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 165
implied that the Concert of Europe responsible for the
Convention of London would act as a concert, and would
act promptly; and that was precisely what Bismarck guessed
they would not do, or intended to prevent. Bismarck
started with Russia practically on his side--Russia that in
1852 was responsible for the coercion of Schleswig-Holstein
and the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Four against
one--Prussia against the other European Powers--in 1852
was a hopeless position; but two against three raised a
practicable issue.
When it had been converted into
three against two the business would settle itself.
The two fatal blunders for the Powers to commit were,
first: to allow an isolated and excited Denmark to be en-
tangled in a war with one or more members of the Concert
of Europe which were the guarantors of the integrity of the
Danish kingdom; and, secondly, to delude Denmark into
resistance by encouraging her belief that she would have
allies in the last resort, when no ally was prepared to give
more than the ' moral' support of diplomacy. Such moral
support is generally a euphemism for truly moral cowardice
and selfishness, and always an insulting travesty of the real
strength of the moral element in human affairs. Both
these blunders were committed. And there was a third.
In diplomacy, as in war, the statesman who trifles with
time is a criminal; doubly so, if he is pitted against an ad-
versary who puts time on his side. Throughout Bismarck
reckoned that while Lord John Russell's pen would be black-
ening many sheets of paper, and Napoleon was flickering
from one Napoleonic idea to another, the Prussian army
could cover a good many miles into Holstein, and it would
not meet the British fleet at Kiel. Both King William
and Queen Victoria had consciences which made them
obstinate, but it was easier to deceive King William than
Queen Victoria, and to prove to the royal satisfaction
of Prussia that black was white. The Queen of Great
Britain had an alternative to the ministers in office, who
were also not united. King William had no alternative
to Bismarck (who had really no colleagues) but surrender
to the opposition. So manifold in Bismarck's view were
the advantages of being the Prussian minister of a Prussian
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? i66
BISMARCK
long, who governed as well as reigned. The appeal of the
Congress of London in May, 1864, to Prussian good feeling
when the Prussian army had fleshed a victorious sword on
the obstinate Danes was as helpful as an appeal to the good
feelings of a terrier with a live rabbit in its mouth. The
Congress simply enabled Great Britain and France to
desert Denmark with all the phylacteries of diplomatic
Pharisaism unsoiled: it justly incurred the impotent
contempt of Denmark and the very potent contempt of
Bismarck. Worst of all, it taught Europe that right only
differed from might in the inefficiency of its State-egoism
and selfishness. The nadir of British moral power in
Europe was foreshadowed in the action of our Foreign
Office; the bankruptcy of the Second Empire was first pro-
claimed not at Queretaro nor by the guns of Koniggratz,
but at London in 1864. For us British it is tragic that
the Power which in i860 by a single dispatch silenced
Austria and enabled Cavour to complete the work of Gari-
baldi should have denounced, defied, and deserted in 1864.
Bismarck and Gortschakov took the hint, and enforced the
initial lesson in 1870. Dry powder and disbelief in God,
said Europe, is a better creed than belief in God and no
powder at all; and Providence, said the cynics, thought
with them. Were the cynics really so wrong?
The one solution that no one in November 1863 con-
templated was the annexation of the Duchies by Prussia:
for Prussia, apart from 'the folly' of crediting her with
the power to defy Europe, had no better title in law or
history to the Duchies than the President of the United
States or the Negus of Abyssinia. One title she could
create, the title of Frederick the Great to Silesia or Polish
Prussia--the title of the invincible sword, accepted by
Europe because it disbelieved in its capacity to invalidate
it. We know that Bismarck from the very first, perhaps
before he took office in 1862, steadily kept annexation
before bis eyes as the most satisfactory solution. Indeed,
his diplomacy is inexplicable otherwise. But prudently
recognising that the ideal is not always the attainable he
was determined to prevent a settlement that would block
the greater ends, to which the annexation was at best only
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 167
a stepping-stone. The worst that could happen would
be the severance of the Duchies from Denmark and their
incorporation under their 'lawful' duke, the Augusten-
burger, in the tessellated mosaic of Federal Germany.
Another petty State under a Liberal prince, hand in glove
with 'the Coburg gang,' voting in the Diet against
Prussia, and working in Germany as a perpetual balsam of
Liberalism and a mustard-plaster on the back of Prussia,
was intolerable. The enthusiasm of Austria, the dynasties,
and the National Liberals for the Augustenburger--the
ominous conjunction of everything and everybody anti-
Prussian--was quite sufficient to condemn that solution in
Bismarck's eyes. Better the complete incorporation with
Denmark than that.
Yet what easier and more tempting than to proclaim the
leadership of Prussia in a great German affair, and employ
the Prussian army to rip the Convention of London to tatters,
in the sacred name of nationalism and Germany? Why not
liberate the Duchies from ' Danish degradation,' and end
the constitutional conflict in Prussia with a demand that
the Prussian Parliament should expunge its votes and ex-
piate its rebellion by a doubled grant to a doubled army,
henceforward wholly to be at the uncontrolled disposi-
tion of the Crown for Germany and Prussia's needs?
William 1. would have kissed his minister on both cheeks,
the Crown Prince would have begged his pardon, the
opposition would have voted sackcloth and ashes for them-
selves and a laurel wreath for the minister, and Germany,
now burning Bismarck in effigy, would have kneeled at
his feet, had he announced such a policy. Bismarck de-
liberately rejected the temptation, for it meant an alliance
with National Liberalism in which he would be the horse
and the popular forces the rider. Instead, he embarked
on a course bristling with difficulties, and exposed to the
gravest perils, which drew upon himself a concentration
of hatred and indignation from Conservatives outside
Prussia and Liberals within it. He defied a passionate
public opinion and ran the serious risk of uniting Europe
against Prussia. Every one in Germany was against him
--the leaders of the Federal Diet, the Prussian Landtag,
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? i68
BISMARCK
the Duke oi Augustenburg, the Germans of the Duchies
themselves, the Crown Prince and his circle, the princes of
the middle and petty States. The Prussian Landtag re-
fused the special grant demanded, whereupon Bismarck
replied that he would take the money where he could find
it. The Prussian Liberals had concentrated on three
points--the desire to act legally and in support of Augus-
tenburg's' lawful' claims, the absolute identity of Prussia's
interest with that of all Germany, and the fear that Bis-
marck's opposition to German Liberalism and Nationalism
would isolate Prussia and repeat the humiliation of 1849. His
royal master, on whom everything turned, was an Augus-
tenburger, gravely perturbed by his minister's tortuous,
halting, and dubious proceedings, and by the arguments
of Bismarck's critics to which he had no satisfying answer.
Yet he could not dismiss Bismarck and face the cyclonic
onset of the popular forces, concentrated in a Landtag
that regarded the constitution as doubly violated by the
treason to Germany and Prussia expressed in the minister's
foreign policy. Bismarck did not dare to tell his royal
master the truth. Until the inexorable drip of one accom-
plished fact after another wore away William's conscience
it was better he should doubt his minister's sanity than be
convinced of his iniquity.
Bismarck's extreme caution at every stage is remarkable.
More than once he clearly was in grave perplexity as to
the next move, and his own simile of the method of stalk-
ing woodcock in marshy ground is illuminating in its
appositeness. Every step must be tested before the next
is taken. If the ground gives, or a stone waggles, wait
until a better foothold is found by patient exploration.
Do not fire until you have both feet on firm ground;
otherwise you will miss your shot, scare the game, and be
bogged into the bargain.
The successive moves of the next few months, viewed as
a whole, present very clearly the general framework of
Bismarck's strategy. The Danes must put themselves in
the wrong, and be manoeuvred into remaining in the
wrong: driven to resist and then defeated. Once Prus-
sian blood had been spilt, a claim for Prussian compen-
1 n1 1
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 169
sation could be set up. Germany as far as possible must
be kept out of it. The Convention of London was an
international document. It was easier to manipulate the
European than the German situation, and to drive wedges
between the Powers than to create discord in Germany.
Hence the controversy must be pinned down to the Con-
vention of London. Once that was torn up, the Powers
resumed--delicious phrase--their individual liberty of
action, and Bismarck guessed that none of the Powers was
prepared to make a European war on behalf of Denmark.
Why should they? They could not annex the Duchies.
Prussia could. She had a definite and material gain for
which to fight, in the last resort. Hence, combined action
with Austria was essential. That broke the unity of the
Concert, and the alliance of Vienna with the middle and
petty States. It left the Federal Diet practically helpless.
A skilful diplomacy working on the strained relations re-
sulting from the Polish fiasco, could probably separate
England and France. On a calculation of forces, England
and Denmark were not strong enough to win. England
would not risk it. The Duchies would be severed from
Denmark. The final disposition of them opened up a
much bigger problem--the settlement with Austria and
the settlement of the German question.
Behind this diplomacy throughout stood silent and
obedient'--the Prussian army. The crude Junkertum of
Roon, conscious of Prussian strength, grew very impatient
with Bismarck's finesse and haggling with politicians
armed only with a pen and phrases. 'The question of the
Duchies,' he pronounced, 'is not one of right or law, but
of force, and we have it. ' Roon and all his school, who
saw in history nothing but the blessing of Providence on
the big battalions, failed to penetrate the secrets of the
real statecraft of power, Bismarckian or otherwise. Moltke
and Treitschke saw deeper. The big battalions must
first range themselves on the side of Providence, before
they can hope to extort the blessing. The maximum of
effort can only be secured from the monarchical State as
Force when sovereigns and subjects have a good con-
science, convinced that their cause is lawful and right.
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? 170
BISMARCK
Bismarck undertook the apparently impossible task of con-
vincing his sovereign and countrymen that in 1864, 1866,
and in 1870 they were fighting, not an aggressive, but a
defensive, war. Neither Moltke nor he himself believed
that--quite the contrary. But it was essential that the
King and Prussia--the professors, the lawyers, the bour-
geois at his desk and the peasant in the fields--should
believe it. And they did--in the end. The professors,
who backed Augustenburg to a man, were the first and the
most easily converted. For the disciplined and patriotic
intellect must harmonise appetite with reason, and the
carnal appetites of intellectuals are generally as irrational
as their minds are rational. Bismarck relied on ranging
the moral forces in Germany behind the strength of the
Prussian army. But the moral forces must first be chained
up in the ^Eolus cellar of the Foreign Office, and only let
loose at the right moment. The key of the cellars and
of the barracks must not be in the keeping of the Landtag,
but in the pocket of the Prussian monarch, i. e. of his
Minister-President.
How could this Bismarckian plan of campaign have been
met? Only by first keeping Denmark in the right;
secondly, by a complete understanding between France
and Great Britain; thirdly, by making an Anglo-French
entente the basis for a complete understanding with
Germany other than Prussia. The isolation of Prussia was
the true diplomatic objective, as clearly as for Bismarck was
the isolation of Great Britain. It was essential to inform
Denmark categorically and at once that she must withdraw
from an untenable position, and place her cause unreser-
vedly in the hands of her friends, or face Germany by her-
self. Nor was it enough to maintain the Convention of
London and the status quo. The ambitions of the Danish
Radicals were a grave danger for the future. The German
demand had to be met frankly and with sympathy; for
the German population in the Duchies had genuine
grievances; and effective guarantees must be provided
that the Schleswig-Holstein question did not continue to
poison the situation in Europe. The distinction between
Germany and Prussia (under the control of Bismarck) was
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 171
real and deep. A true alliance with Germany other than
Prussia, and with the powerful anti-Bismarckian forces in
Prussia, was well within the scope of diplomacy, which could
thus have divided Prussia and isolated her in Germany.
But such a policy implied the sympathy and comprehension
that only knowledge and mastery of the realities could
give. The one thing needful was the one thing con-
spicuously wanting. English public opinion condemned
Germany no less than Prussia, just because the Liberals
in Germany were dead against the Convention of 1852/
It broke the hearts of the few Englishmen and the many
Germans who recognised the gravity of the issues at stake
for England and for Germany to see the blindness, apathy,
and ignorance on our side, and the squandering by our
ministers of opportunity after opportunity. Great Britain
deserted much more than Denmark. The alienation from
Great Britain of Nationalist and Liberal Germany and
Prussia--the commencement of the estrangement that
was to deepen into opposition and solidify into an irre-
concilable hostility--dates from 1864. Our policy, skil-
fully exploited by Bismarck, was the foundation of the
conversion of Prussia and Germany to Bismarckianism.
Yet if ever there was a British cause, the defeat of
Bismarckian statecraft in 1864 was that cause.
British statesmanship had gravely handicapped itself.
The rejection by the British government in November
1863 of Napoleon's proposal for a Congress was a criminal
blunder which had greatly angered the Emperor. -The
rooted distrust of Napoleon in. , and the exaggerated
estimate of his ability and strength, which Bismarck had
long ago abandoned, prevented a sincere Anglo-French
union. Napoleon, as usual, wandered in the twilight of
phrases which he mistook for principles. He was heavily
committed in Mexico, he was not prepared for war, and he
had had one damaging lesson from Poland in the blunder
of empty threats. When Great Britain proposed in June
1864 that France should join with her in an agreed line of
partition in Schleswig and make it an ultimatum, Drouyn
de Lhuys replied that with Poland before their eyes such
a step was, as Napoleon said, to invite another gros souffiet,
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? BISMARCK
and unless Great Britain were ready to go to the bitter end,
i. e. make refusal to accept the ultimatum a casus belli,
France would not join in the proposal. Great Britain was
not ready for that, and the proposal came to nothing.
The conception of Prussia as a representative of national-
ism, strengthened in the north to make an equipoise to
Austria in the south, fascinated Napoleon's ebbing imagi-
nation. He has received sympathy because Bismarck
blackmailed him deliberately. But the truth is that
Napoleon, like the gambler who fears the honest banker
and borrows from an unscrupulous moneylender, hoped
to get the money and evade the sixty per cent. He de-
sired to win an imposing success without striking a blow or
risking a French life. The Danes blew up their bridges
and burnt their boats, and then expected Great Britain
single-handed to intervene in their behalf.
The British Court, as has been revealed, had much
sympathy with the Augustenburg claims; and the Queen
was absolutely determined that her country should not be
involved in war to save the Duchies for Denmark. 1 But the
real cause of the mischief and the real responsibility for our
failure lay with the nation and its leaders. The ignorance
of ministers throughout the whole business was equalled
by the ignorance of the organs of public opinion and of
the nation they claimed to instruct. The newspapers--
The Times, in particular--surpassed themselves in the
winter of 1863-4 by the insufficiency of their knowledge
and the self-sufficiency of the lectures they poured out on
Germany and Prussia. 2 We were quite unprepared for
war. The nation was not willing to go to war, for it
1 Yet, curiously enough, in 1866 Queen Victoria desired 'to interfere by
force against Prussian designs in the Duchies' (Clarendon's Lift, ii. p. 311)--
a pretty clear proof of sympathy with Austria and the Augustenburg claims.
The ministers wee wholly against the Queen.
1 This is a deliberate judgment based on a careful study of the files of Tie
Times, and other British newspapers for 1863 and 1864: the cumulative im-
pression of such a study cannot be verified from a single reference. But I will
cite three examples of knowledge, political judgment, and prescience as
samples: 'The grievances of her (Denmark's) German subjects seem puerile
or groundless' (Times, November 16, 1863): 'We have ourselves as a nation
little interest in the question' (November 24, 1863): 'We believe that even
now (February 6, 1864) Prussia is anxious to leave the Danish state un-
touched. ' How Bismarck must have enjoyed reading that divination of
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
173
scarcely knew where Schleswig-Holstein could be found
on the map, but we were ready to threaten what we had
no intention of performing, and we hectored every one
with the complacent superiority that deserves the title of
insular. The gravity of the German and European situa-
tion was quite unappreciated, because there are none so
blind as those who do not wish to see. The language of
responsible public men, and not merely of Palmerston, of
politicians, and of ' Society,' naturally misled the Danes,
who made the pardonable mistake of supposing that
England meant what she said, and of interpreting ignorant
bluster as moral conviction. 'I wasted several years of
my life,' Bismarck remarked, 'by the supposition that
England was a great nation. ' The price that we paid then
and subsequently was the price that we deserved to pay.
A nation with responsible parliamentary government is
not the victim but the author of its government's blunders;
and if it seeks to transfer the responsibility to politicians
and a party system, or some other scapegoat, it is guilty
of the lie in the soul.
Bismarck's first step was to secure Austria. It did not
escape his attention that Austria, compared with Prussia,
was in a very unfavourable position for effective military
and political action in the Duchies. Austria, humiliated
by the Polish fiasco and the failure of the Congress of
Princes, was only too ready to listen to the Prussian over-
tures. The rejection by the Federal Diet (January 14)
of the Prussian proposal, that Austria and Prussia, in virtue
of their international position, should occupy Schleswig
in order to secure the observance of the Convention, was
tantamount to a declaration that the Diet repudiated the
his policy and aims.
Convention of Gastein, 1863-1865
The labyrinth of the historical, legal, and ethical con-
troversies buried in the slag-heaps of four centuries has
resulted in a formidable library on Schleswig-Holstein.
Palmerston said with more wit than accuracy that only
three persons in Europe were completely acquainted with
the truth, the Prince Consort who was dead, a German
professor who was in a lunatic asylum, and himself--and he
had forgotten it. Bismarck justly regarded his diplomacy
and achievement in 'the Schleswig-Holstein campaign'
as perhaps his most masterly performance. Genius, mili-
tary, political, scientific, or imaginative, as the judge of
its own efforts is always instructive, though not infal-
lible. But certainly no other episode in Bismarck's career
more convincingly summarises the pith and marrow of
Bismarckian principles and methods, the union of personal
character and intellectual gifts, the fixity of aim, and the
inexhaustible opportunism of means, ending in a dramatic
and unexpected triumph than his conduct of Prussian
J)olicy from November 1863 to August 1865. Working on a
arger scale in a grander manner for greater ends, Bismarck
achieved elsewhere and later grander results. But as a
finished model of Bismarckian statecraft it was and remains
a masterpiece, and in the evolution of his career and the
perfecting of his technique the Schleswig-Holstein cam-
paign was to Bismarck what the Polish campaigns were
to Gustavus Adolphus, the Silesian wars to Frederick
the Great, and the Egyptian campaign to Napoleon--the
apprenticeship of genius in the service of its profession.
Stripped of irrelevant detail, the problem of 1863 was
comparatively simple, but it raised issues of far-reaching
consequences and a baffling complexity. The Duchies of
Schleswig and Holstein had been united since 1460 by a
personal union through the Crown of Denmark with the
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 157
Danish kingdom. . The King of Denmark was the king-
duke who united in his person the hereditary right to the
Danish Crown and the succession to the combined Duchies.
Europe and Denmark had come to regard the Duchies in
fact as an integral part of the Danish kingdom, while re-
cognising, if it was reminded, that the two provinces had
an autonomy and rights arising from an historic existence
independent of Denmark. The dukedom was, in short, a
separate principality contained and governed within a
larger whole. But the prerogative of the king-duke was
conditioned in these Duchies by his authority as duke, and
the Duchies accepted his rule as their duke, not as King of
Denmark. Hence the system of government for Den-
mark was determined by the Crown in the Danish Riksdag,
for the Duchies by the duke in the Estates of the Provinces.
The law of Denmark would only be binding if accepted
by the Provincial Estates.
The desirability of a complete incorporation--the
abolition of the personal union and the fusion of the
Duchies with Denmark under a single ruler and a single
parliament--was obvious. But the Duchies clung to their
historic autonomy with tenacity; the law of succession to
the Danish Crown was not the same as the law of succession
to the dukedom. The underlying cause of this rooted
objection to the extinction of their autonomy was racial.
Holstein was predominantly German, Schleswig probably
(here an insoluble controversy is opened up), though not
so predominantly, Danish. To Holstein incorporation
with Denmark meant de-Germanisation and Danisation,
and, in addition, while the autonomy of Holstein was for
four centuries connected with that of its partner Schleswig
--the two together made the unity of the Duchy--Holstein
had always been part of the Holy Roman Empire of the
German nation, Schleswig had not. This historic anomaly
was confirmed in 1815. The King of Denmark, as Duke
of Schleswig-Holstein was a member of the German Con-
federation for Holstein (but not for Schleswig) over which,
therefore, the Federal Diet had a limited Federal juris-
diction. So long as the dynastic problem was not reopened,
and so long as the Nationalist principle was not inflaming
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? i58
BISMARCK
sentiment, this anomalous tangle of cross purposes and
contradictory allegiances would work, just because it was
customary. Its maintenance turned on the equipoise of
forces, balanced by the inconsistencies of tradition and
habit.
Fate and the developments in Europe after 1815 de-
stroyed the equipoise. Fate decided that the male succes-
sion in the direct line to the Crown of Denmark should
fail; the growth of the principle of nationality steadily
accentuated the ambition of the German and the Dane to
secure the Duchies for the German or the Danish race.
The incorporation of the Duchies, so long associated
with Denmark, was opposed by the German ambition to
sever them from Danish assimilation, and establish them
as an autonomous German principality under a German
duke, and weld them into the unified Germany of the
future. But the ' unredeemed Germany' was also an ' un-
redeemed Denmark. ' The dynastic problem was solved
by the Protocol of 1852. The Duke of Augustenburg, re-
garded by Germany and the Provincial Estates as the heir
de jure to the Duchies, was compelled with the other
claimants to surrender his claims in favour of Christian,
later the ixth, who was chosen by the Powers to maintain
the integrity of the Danish kingdom and continue, as Hng-
duke, the historic association of Schleswig and Holstein
with the Danish Crown. Had the European Powers been
wise, they would have repeated the lesson of Belgium in
1839: severed then and there German Holstein from
Schleswig, and incorporated the former with Germany
and the latter with Denmark. In all probability, when
Christian succeeded in 1863 the fifteen years of separation
would have habituated both Germany and Denmark to
the situation, and there would have been no further trouble.
But it was the age of Nicholas 1. , who regarded the
Schleswig-Holsteiners as rebels; and the severance of
Holstein from its legal duke (who was also the legal King
of Denmark) would have required more unity and greater
prevision in the Concert of Europe than the statesmen of
1852 were endowed with.
The maintenance of the historic integrity of the king-
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 159
dom of Denmark was deemed of the greatest importance in
the balance of European power, and the collapse of the
Revolution of 1848, with the reaction that followed, seemed
to the short-sighted diplomacy of Conservatism to destroy
the forces that had made a crisis out of Schleswig-Holstein.
The Convention of London, by placing the settlement
under the collective guarantee of the European Powers,
was held to provide an indisputable authority for its
maintenance.
But that convention, like the Treaty of Paris of 1856,
had the flaw fatal to all such solemn manifestations of the
public law and will of the Powers. It assumed that the
men and the States responsible for its maintenance would
continue to be of the same disposition as those who origin-
ally made it--a-large and historically unjustifiable assump-
tion. It had also the defect that it was imposed on the
Estates of Holstein and Schleswig, who were not parties
to it; that the German Diet was not a party to it and
retained its Federal rights in Holstein; that the son of the
Duke of Augustenburg was not a party to his father's re-
nunciation of his rights. It made no allowance for a more
Nationalist and Radical Denmark Or a more Nationalist and
Liberal Germany coming into existence; it created no
automatic and effective machinery to prevent provisions,
so solemnly defined, from being broken before the vacancy
to the Danish throne, filled by Christian's succession to
Danish Crown and the Duchies, occurred. It left Den-
mark a sovereign State, yet with a mortgage on its sove-
reignty. It provided neither for the removal of a
Nicholas 1. nor the emergence of a Bismarck.
Two conclusions are fairly clear in 1863. The Conven-
tion of London required Denmark to observe the historic
status quo in the Duchies. Dispassionate examination
cannot avoid the verdict that the acts of the Danish
government from 1852 to 1863 were a breach of the Con-
vention--certainly of its spirit, and probably of its letter.
They constituted a cumulative effort to separate the
Duchies and incorporate one of them in the kingdom, and
to present Europe with a fait accompli before the acces-
sion of Christian ix. This might have succeeded had
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? i6o
BISMARCK
Frederick vn. lived six months longer. Frederick's death
before his signature as the sovereign who was incontestably
dejure king and also dejure duke could be obtained wrecked
the attempt. Secondly, Christian ix. , the new King, had
on the day of his succession to decide at a moment's notice
either to provoke a revolution at Copenhagen or a revo-
lution at Kiel. Had he been wiser, he would have referred
the issue to the concert of the Powers signatory to the
Convention of London, and invited their decision and
their support, if need be, to carry out that decision. He
was their nominee; they were bound either to tear up
their own convention or loyally to see he did not suffer for
being the instrument of their policy. The coercion of
Copenhagen or of Kiel was the moral duty of the concert.
Christian, unhappily for himself and for Europe, did not at
once throw the responsibility on the Powers. In his
excuse it must fairly be said that the rejection by Great
Britain of Napoleon's proposal for a Congress made it very
difficult for him to do so.
It is not possible here to write the history of Europe nor
to discuss the policy of all the European States in this com-
plicated controversy. We are concerned primarily with
Bismarck and his policy. But it must not be forgotten
that the Danes and King Christian had a case, for which a
good deal can be urged. In 1852 the Concert of Europe
had decided, on broad grounds, that the integrity of the
historic kingdom of Denmark was an essential element in
the Balance of Power. The severance of the Duchies from
Denmark--apart from the juristic problem in the disputed
succession--was a grave violation of that Balance, for the
strategic position of the Duchies was of immense value.
Schleswig had a large Danish population, and there were
many Danes also in Holstein. If there was a danger that
the Germans might be oppressed by the Danes, there was
no less a danger--which events fully bore out--that the
Danes would be oppressed by the Germans. The forcible
Danisation of Holstein was less likely than the forcible
Germanisation of Schleswig. Schleswig had never beea
part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, and
the attempt to annex it to the Germany of 1863--with
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
the avowed object of Germanising it--was neither histori-
cally defensible, nor racially just, nor politically justifiable.
The claim of the Federal Diet that because it was not a
party to the Convention of 1852 it need not therefore
regard it as binding, was fairly met by the indisputable fact
that the two greatest German States in the Diet--Austria
and Prussia--were solemn parties to the Convention, and
could not therefore support the Diet's repudiation without
violating their signatures and pledges. The Germany there-
fore of the Federal Diet was a Germany minus Austria
and Prussia: a Germany, in short, which claimed to have
a more important voice in overriding the public law of
Europe, to which the two most important German States
had publicly agreed, than Europe and those two great
German States. Moreover, the Federal Act of 1815, which
defined the powers of the Diet, gave it no legal or political
right to interfere in cases of a disputed succession, to decide
questions of succession or enforce a decision, if it illegally
attempted to make one. Yet in virtually supporting the
Duke of Augustenburg the Diet was precisely doing this,
and therefore acting ultra vires. Politically, the claim that
one-third of Germany could override the rest of Germany
and all Europe was absurd.
The succession question had been settled in 1852. In
1863 there was or could be only one lawful successor to the
Danish Crown and the Duchies--Christian IX. Any denial
of this indisputable fact was a declaration that the Con-
vention was no longer binding without having obtained the
prior consent of those who made it and were responsible
for its maintenance. The Federal Diet was not a party
to the Convention, precisely because the Federal Diet was
not legally entitled to have a voice in deciding the succession
in the Duchies, and still less in the kingdom of Denmark.
The Duke of Augustenburg's claim in 1863 was a declara-
tion that the Settlement of 1852, which ruled out his
father and was accepted by him, was a wrong decision to
which he had not been a party, and was therefore not bind-
ing on him. But if the sons of fathers against whom a
decision has been given can always plead that the decision
does not affect the son, no throne in Europe would be safe
B. L
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? 162
BISMARCK
or secure. Bismarck recognised this from the first. And
the subsequent decision of the Prussian Crown lawyers
(p. 184) clearly laid it down that Christian ix. was the
de jure successor both to the Duchies and the Danish
Crown. The Prussian professors argued from the first
that because the Duke of Augustenburg ought to have been
made the heir in 1852, his son was the heir in 1863, all
law and facts notwithstanding. And the argument, that
because conceivably the Constitution of 1863 was
vires the whole Convention of 1852 became invalid, was as
good as an argument that because the Federal Diet in 1863
acted ultra vires the whole Federal Act of 1815 ceased to
be valid.
The Danes made serious mistakes from 1852-64. But
the responsibility for those mistakes was largely that of the
European Powers also. Long before the situation of 1863
arose it was the duty of the Powers in concert to tell Den-
mark that it was not strictly observing the Convention.
That duty the Powers did not perform. Because they did
not perform it, the Danes naturally inferred that the
Powers would accept the Danish policy--a policy which
had the support of probably a majority in Schleswig and a
or Danish blunders may be necessary, but that does not
involve approval of German policy and ambition--as inde-
fensible as the extreme Danish claim. The sequel proved
up to the hilt that the Powers allowed Prussia to commit
a wanton aggression, to crush Denmark, to denationalise
Schleswig, and to disregard even the scanty pledges of
justice and fair treatment laid down in the Treaty of
Prague. The Danish case against Prussia--as distinct
from Germany--is so strong as to be practically irrefutable.
The true gravity of the situation lay in the new forces
at work. Public opinion in Germany repudiated the Con-
vention of 1852. It was universally regarded as the act of
a reactionary coalition to which not even the Federal Diet,
and still less Germany, was a party. The reversal of the
decision of 1849, which had destroyed the unification of
Germany and the demand for German self-government,
carried with it the reversal of the Convention. The
Condemnation of Danish ambition
in
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
163
1 liberation of the duchies' was a very precise item in a
far-reaching programme of Germany for the Germans.
The claims, therefore, of the young Duke of Augusten-
burg combined with a dangerous felicity the demand for
the autonomy and inseparability of Schleswig and Hol-
stein, the principle of hereditary legitimism, the rule of a
German prince, and the new Liberalism of the enlightened
dynasties; and his programme at Kiel in 1863 stood for every-
thing that Germany now passionately demanded for itself.
All this was recognised in the chancelleries of Europe.
But the newest and gravest element in the situation--the
Prussia of 1863--was wholly unappreciated in the autumn
of 1863. The Prussia of 1848 had taken a brave line in
using her leadership of the German cause in the Duchies,
and had then at the first threat of European coercion
collapsed. Here, as in other matters, the impression per-
sisted within and without Germany that Prussia was the
lath painted to look like iron. Bismarck shared the con-
tempt and the indignation. He came into office to prove
what Prussian strength could do when efficiently directed
by a diplomacy that had shed the shibboleths which had
sapped the political and moral efficiency of the kingdom.
The geographical and strategic position of the Duchies
military frontiers to east and west; they, opened a back
door by land to the capital at Berlin; and, more dangerous
still, they provided everything that sea power required for
the effective coercion of Prussia: as a bastion both on the
Baltic and the North Sea they were indispensable to Prus-
sian power and expansion. The silent chief of the General
Staff, the ' library rat,' as men called him, gnawing his way
in prolonged toil to the heart of strategy, the strategy of
the State as Power, could furnish a memorandum con-
vincing in its conciseness of the supreme strategic value of
Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. Bismarck had studied as
hard as Moltke and with as fruitful results. Let the rat
continue to gnaw. When the time came to put in the
rat, the sharper its teeth the better. Instruction in the
truths of strategy and the inseparable union of strategy
and policy, was not needed in the Wilhelmstrasse. But it
was for Prussia unique.
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? 164
BISMARCK
was sorely needed in Downing Street and at the British
Admiralty, at the Qua: d'Orsay, in the Ball-Platz, and the
fly-blown offices of the Federal Diet.
Moreover, Bismarck foresaw the character of the coming
struggle--a real trial of strength between the diplomacy
and methods of the statecraft of power against the old
diplomacy of the State as the champion of right; between
the old system of the Concert of Europe with its' paradox'
of the Balance of Power and the revival of Prussianism
with its doctrine of force. The result must indicate
conclusively the efficacy and superiority of the Bismarckian
system; and Bismarck had this enormous advantage. He
knew the methods of his opponents, but they did not know
his. Obsessed by tradition and misled by ignorance of the
real Germany and Prussia, they were in the position of
generals fighting according to the red-tape of a conven-
tional warfare against a foe who had superior science and
used it to devise high explosives and asphyxiating gas.
The true moral of the Schleswig-Holstein campaign, in
which Europe was signally routed, is not that the state-
craft of blood and iron must always win--men drew that
false conclusion from imperfectly framed premises--but
first, that the State which stands for right (Der Staat als
Recht) in death-grips with the State which stands for
power (Der Staat als Macht) must have better brains and a
clearer mastery of realities; and secondly, it must not mix
a sham copy of its rival's methods with its own, and then
bay the moon because real force, applied by genius, beats
sham force that lets ' I dare not wait upon I would. '
When Christian's action precipitated a crisis several
insist on the withdrawal of the March Constitution as a
condition of upholding the Convention; they might have
decided that the whole situation was so completely altered
as to require a new settlement, and have severed the Duchies
from Denmark and recognised the claims of Augusten-
burg; or they might have severed Holstein from Schles-
wig; or they might have supported Christian and
Denmark at all costs. All these and other courses were
possible and arguable in November 1863. But they all
solutions were possible.
? . . . i rLi j
Powers might at once
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 165
implied that the Concert of Europe responsible for the
Convention of London would act as a concert, and would
act promptly; and that was precisely what Bismarck guessed
they would not do, or intended to prevent. Bismarck
started with Russia practically on his side--Russia that in
1852 was responsible for the coercion of Schleswig-Holstein
and the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Four against
one--Prussia against the other European Powers--in 1852
was a hopeless position; but two against three raised a
practicable issue.
When it had been converted into
three against two the business would settle itself.
The two fatal blunders for the Powers to commit were,
first: to allow an isolated and excited Denmark to be en-
tangled in a war with one or more members of the Concert
of Europe which were the guarantors of the integrity of the
Danish kingdom; and, secondly, to delude Denmark into
resistance by encouraging her belief that she would have
allies in the last resort, when no ally was prepared to give
more than the ' moral' support of diplomacy. Such moral
support is generally a euphemism for truly moral cowardice
and selfishness, and always an insulting travesty of the real
strength of the moral element in human affairs. Both
these blunders were committed. And there was a third.
In diplomacy, as in war, the statesman who trifles with
time is a criminal; doubly so, if he is pitted against an ad-
versary who puts time on his side. Throughout Bismarck
reckoned that while Lord John Russell's pen would be black-
ening many sheets of paper, and Napoleon was flickering
from one Napoleonic idea to another, the Prussian army
could cover a good many miles into Holstein, and it would
not meet the British fleet at Kiel. Both King William
and Queen Victoria had consciences which made them
obstinate, but it was easier to deceive King William than
Queen Victoria, and to prove to the royal satisfaction
of Prussia that black was white. The Queen of Great
Britain had an alternative to the ministers in office, who
were also not united. King William had no alternative
to Bismarck (who had really no colleagues) but surrender
to the opposition. So manifold in Bismarck's view were
the advantages of being the Prussian minister of a Prussian
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? i66
BISMARCK
long, who governed as well as reigned. The appeal of the
Congress of London in May, 1864, to Prussian good feeling
when the Prussian army had fleshed a victorious sword on
the obstinate Danes was as helpful as an appeal to the good
feelings of a terrier with a live rabbit in its mouth. The
Congress simply enabled Great Britain and France to
desert Denmark with all the phylacteries of diplomatic
Pharisaism unsoiled: it justly incurred the impotent
contempt of Denmark and the very potent contempt of
Bismarck. Worst of all, it taught Europe that right only
differed from might in the inefficiency of its State-egoism
and selfishness. The nadir of British moral power in
Europe was foreshadowed in the action of our Foreign
Office; the bankruptcy of the Second Empire was first pro-
claimed not at Queretaro nor by the guns of Koniggratz,
but at London in 1864. For us British it is tragic that
the Power which in i860 by a single dispatch silenced
Austria and enabled Cavour to complete the work of Gari-
baldi should have denounced, defied, and deserted in 1864.
Bismarck and Gortschakov took the hint, and enforced the
initial lesson in 1870. Dry powder and disbelief in God,
said Europe, is a better creed than belief in God and no
powder at all; and Providence, said the cynics, thought
with them. Were the cynics really so wrong?
The one solution that no one in November 1863 con-
templated was the annexation of the Duchies by Prussia:
for Prussia, apart from 'the folly' of crediting her with
the power to defy Europe, had no better title in law or
history to the Duchies than the President of the United
States or the Negus of Abyssinia. One title she could
create, the title of Frederick the Great to Silesia or Polish
Prussia--the title of the invincible sword, accepted by
Europe because it disbelieved in its capacity to invalidate
it. We know that Bismarck from the very first, perhaps
before he took office in 1862, steadily kept annexation
before bis eyes as the most satisfactory solution. Indeed,
his diplomacy is inexplicable otherwise. But prudently
recognising that the ideal is not always the attainable he
was determined to prevent a settlement that would block
the greater ends, to which the annexation was at best only
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 167
a stepping-stone. The worst that could happen would
be the severance of the Duchies from Denmark and their
incorporation under their 'lawful' duke, the Augusten-
burger, in the tessellated mosaic of Federal Germany.
Another petty State under a Liberal prince, hand in glove
with 'the Coburg gang,' voting in the Diet against
Prussia, and working in Germany as a perpetual balsam of
Liberalism and a mustard-plaster on the back of Prussia,
was intolerable. The enthusiasm of Austria, the dynasties,
and the National Liberals for the Augustenburger--the
ominous conjunction of everything and everybody anti-
Prussian--was quite sufficient to condemn that solution in
Bismarck's eyes. Better the complete incorporation with
Denmark than that.
Yet what easier and more tempting than to proclaim the
leadership of Prussia in a great German affair, and employ
the Prussian army to rip the Convention of London to tatters,
in the sacred name of nationalism and Germany? Why not
liberate the Duchies from ' Danish degradation,' and end
the constitutional conflict in Prussia with a demand that
the Prussian Parliament should expunge its votes and ex-
piate its rebellion by a doubled grant to a doubled army,
henceforward wholly to be at the uncontrolled disposi-
tion of the Crown for Germany and Prussia's needs?
William 1. would have kissed his minister on both cheeks,
the Crown Prince would have begged his pardon, the
opposition would have voted sackcloth and ashes for them-
selves and a laurel wreath for the minister, and Germany,
now burning Bismarck in effigy, would have kneeled at
his feet, had he announced such a policy. Bismarck de-
liberately rejected the temptation, for it meant an alliance
with National Liberalism in which he would be the horse
and the popular forces the rider. Instead, he embarked
on a course bristling with difficulties, and exposed to the
gravest perils, which drew upon himself a concentration
of hatred and indignation from Conservatives outside
Prussia and Liberals within it. He defied a passionate
public opinion and ran the serious risk of uniting Europe
against Prussia. Every one in Germany was against him
--the leaders of the Federal Diet, the Prussian Landtag,
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? i68
BISMARCK
the Duke oi Augustenburg, the Germans of the Duchies
themselves, the Crown Prince and his circle, the princes of
the middle and petty States. The Prussian Landtag re-
fused the special grant demanded, whereupon Bismarck
replied that he would take the money where he could find
it. The Prussian Liberals had concentrated on three
points--the desire to act legally and in support of Augus-
tenburg's' lawful' claims, the absolute identity of Prussia's
interest with that of all Germany, and the fear that Bis-
marck's opposition to German Liberalism and Nationalism
would isolate Prussia and repeat the humiliation of 1849. His
royal master, on whom everything turned, was an Augus-
tenburger, gravely perturbed by his minister's tortuous,
halting, and dubious proceedings, and by the arguments
of Bismarck's critics to which he had no satisfying answer.
Yet he could not dismiss Bismarck and face the cyclonic
onset of the popular forces, concentrated in a Landtag
that regarded the constitution as doubly violated by the
treason to Germany and Prussia expressed in the minister's
foreign policy. Bismarck did not dare to tell his royal
master the truth. Until the inexorable drip of one accom-
plished fact after another wore away William's conscience
it was better he should doubt his minister's sanity than be
convinced of his iniquity.
Bismarck's extreme caution at every stage is remarkable.
More than once he clearly was in grave perplexity as to
the next move, and his own simile of the method of stalk-
ing woodcock in marshy ground is illuminating in its
appositeness. Every step must be tested before the next
is taken. If the ground gives, or a stone waggles, wait
until a better foothold is found by patient exploration.
Do not fire until you have both feet on firm ground;
otherwise you will miss your shot, scare the game, and be
bogged into the bargain.
The successive moves of the next few months, viewed as
a whole, present very clearly the general framework of
Bismarck's strategy. The Danes must put themselves in
the wrong, and be manoeuvred into remaining in the
wrong: driven to resist and then defeated. Once Prus-
sian blood had been spilt, a claim for Prussian compen-
1 n1 1
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 169
sation could be set up. Germany as far as possible must
be kept out of it. The Convention of London was an
international document. It was easier to manipulate the
European than the German situation, and to drive wedges
between the Powers than to create discord in Germany.
Hence the controversy must be pinned down to the Con-
vention of London. Once that was torn up, the Powers
resumed--delicious phrase--their individual liberty of
action, and Bismarck guessed that none of the Powers was
prepared to make a European war on behalf of Denmark.
Why should they? They could not annex the Duchies.
Prussia could. She had a definite and material gain for
which to fight, in the last resort. Hence, combined action
with Austria was essential. That broke the unity of the
Concert, and the alliance of Vienna with the middle and
petty States. It left the Federal Diet practically helpless.
A skilful diplomacy working on the strained relations re-
sulting from the Polish fiasco, could probably separate
England and France. On a calculation of forces, England
and Denmark were not strong enough to win. England
would not risk it. The Duchies would be severed from
Denmark. The final disposition of them opened up a
much bigger problem--the settlement with Austria and
the settlement of the German question.
Behind this diplomacy throughout stood silent and
obedient'--the Prussian army. The crude Junkertum of
Roon, conscious of Prussian strength, grew very impatient
with Bismarck's finesse and haggling with politicians
armed only with a pen and phrases. 'The question of the
Duchies,' he pronounced, 'is not one of right or law, but
of force, and we have it. ' Roon and all his school, who
saw in history nothing but the blessing of Providence on
the big battalions, failed to penetrate the secrets of the
real statecraft of power, Bismarckian or otherwise. Moltke
and Treitschke saw deeper. The big battalions must
first range themselves on the side of Providence, before
they can hope to extort the blessing. The maximum of
effort can only be secured from the monarchical State as
Force when sovereigns and subjects have a good con-
science, convinced that their cause is lawful and right.
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? 170
BISMARCK
Bismarck undertook the apparently impossible task of con-
vincing his sovereign and countrymen that in 1864, 1866,
and in 1870 they were fighting, not an aggressive, but a
defensive, war. Neither Moltke nor he himself believed
that--quite the contrary. But it was essential that the
King and Prussia--the professors, the lawyers, the bour-
geois at his desk and the peasant in the fields--should
believe it. And they did--in the end. The professors,
who backed Augustenburg to a man, were the first and the
most easily converted. For the disciplined and patriotic
intellect must harmonise appetite with reason, and the
carnal appetites of intellectuals are generally as irrational
as their minds are rational. Bismarck relied on ranging
the moral forces in Germany behind the strength of the
Prussian army. But the moral forces must first be chained
up in the ^Eolus cellar of the Foreign Office, and only let
loose at the right moment. The key of the cellars and
of the barracks must not be in the keeping of the Landtag,
but in the pocket of the Prussian monarch, i. e. of his
Minister-President.
How could this Bismarckian plan of campaign have been
met? Only by first keeping Denmark in the right;
secondly, by a complete understanding between France
and Great Britain; thirdly, by making an Anglo-French
entente the basis for a complete understanding with
Germany other than Prussia. The isolation of Prussia was
the true diplomatic objective, as clearly as for Bismarck was
the isolation of Great Britain. It was essential to inform
Denmark categorically and at once that she must withdraw
from an untenable position, and place her cause unreser-
vedly in the hands of her friends, or face Germany by her-
self. Nor was it enough to maintain the Convention of
London and the status quo. The ambitions of the Danish
Radicals were a grave danger for the future. The German
demand had to be met frankly and with sympathy; for
the German population in the Duchies had genuine
grievances; and effective guarantees must be provided
that the Schleswig-Holstein question did not continue to
poison the situation in Europe. The distinction between
Germany and Prussia (under the control of Bismarck) was
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 171
real and deep. A true alliance with Germany other than
Prussia, and with the powerful anti-Bismarckian forces in
Prussia, was well within the scope of diplomacy, which could
thus have divided Prussia and isolated her in Germany.
But such a policy implied the sympathy and comprehension
that only knowledge and mastery of the realities could
give. The one thing needful was the one thing con-
spicuously wanting. English public opinion condemned
Germany no less than Prussia, just because the Liberals
in Germany were dead against the Convention of 1852/
It broke the hearts of the few Englishmen and the many
Germans who recognised the gravity of the issues at stake
for England and for Germany to see the blindness, apathy,
and ignorance on our side, and the squandering by our
ministers of opportunity after opportunity. Great Britain
deserted much more than Denmark. The alienation from
Great Britain of Nationalist and Liberal Germany and
Prussia--the commencement of the estrangement that
was to deepen into opposition and solidify into an irre-
concilable hostility--dates from 1864. Our policy, skil-
fully exploited by Bismarck, was the foundation of the
conversion of Prussia and Germany to Bismarckianism.
Yet if ever there was a British cause, the defeat of
Bismarckian statecraft in 1864 was that cause.
British statesmanship had gravely handicapped itself.
The rejection by the British government in November
1863 of Napoleon's proposal for a Congress was a criminal
blunder which had greatly angered the Emperor. -The
rooted distrust of Napoleon in. , and the exaggerated
estimate of his ability and strength, which Bismarck had
long ago abandoned, prevented a sincere Anglo-French
union. Napoleon, as usual, wandered in the twilight of
phrases which he mistook for principles. He was heavily
committed in Mexico, he was not prepared for war, and he
had had one damaging lesson from Poland in the blunder
of empty threats. When Great Britain proposed in June
1864 that France should join with her in an agreed line of
partition in Schleswig and make it an ultimatum, Drouyn
de Lhuys replied that with Poland before their eyes such
a step was, as Napoleon said, to invite another gros souffiet,
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? BISMARCK
and unless Great Britain were ready to go to the bitter end,
i. e. make refusal to accept the ultimatum a casus belli,
France would not join in the proposal. Great Britain was
not ready for that, and the proposal came to nothing.
The conception of Prussia as a representative of national-
ism, strengthened in the north to make an equipoise to
Austria in the south, fascinated Napoleon's ebbing imagi-
nation. He has received sympathy because Bismarck
blackmailed him deliberately. But the truth is that
Napoleon, like the gambler who fears the honest banker
and borrows from an unscrupulous moneylender, hoped
to get the money and evade the sixty per cent. He de-
sired to win an imposing success without striking a blow or
risking a French life. The Danes blew up their bridges
and burnt their boats, and then expected Great Britain
single-handed to intervene in their behalf.
The British Court, as has been revealed, had much
sympathy with the Augustenburg claims; and the Queen
was absolutely determined that her country should not be
involved in war to save the Duchies for Denmark. 1 But the
real cause of the mischief and the real responsibility for our
failure lay with the nation and its leaders. The ignorance
of ministers throughout the whole business was equalled
by the ignorance of the organs of public opinion and of
the nation they claimed to instruct. The newspapers--
The Times, in particular--surpassed themselves in the
winter of 1863-4 by the insufficiency of their knowledge
and the self-sufficiency of the lectures they poured out on
Germany and Prussia. 2 We were quite unprepared for
war. The nation was not willing to go to war, for it
1 Yet, curiously enough, in 1866 Queen Victoria desired 'to interfere by
force against Prussian designs in the Duchies' (Clarendon's Lift, ii. p. 311)--
a pretty clear proof of sympathy with Austria and the Augustenburg claims.
The ministers wee wholly against the Queen.
1 This is a deliberate judgment based on a careful study of the files of Tie
Times, and other British newspapers for 1863 and 1864: the cumulative im-
pression of such a study cannot be verified from a single reference. But I will
cite three examples of knowledge, political judgment, and prescience as
samples: 'The grievances of her (Denmark's) German subjects seem puerile
or groundless' (Times, November 16, 1863): 'We have ourselves as a nation
little interest in the question' (November 24, 1863): 'We believe that even
now (February 6, 1864) Prussia is anxious to leave the Danish state un-
touched. ' How Bismarck must have enjoyed reading that divination of
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
173
scarcely knew where Schleswig-Holstein could be found
on the map, but we were ready to threaten what we had
no intention of performing, and we hectored every one
with the complacent superiority that deserves the title of
insular. The gravity of the German and European situa-
tion was quite unappreciated, because there are none so
blind as those who do not wish to see. The language of
responsible public men, and not merely of Palmerston, of
politicians, and of ' Society,' naturally misled the Danes,
who made the pardonable mistake of supposing that
England meant what she said, and of interpreting ignorant
bluster as moral conviction. 'I wasted several years of
my life,' Bismarck remarked, 'by the supposition that
England was a great nation. ' The price that we paid then
and subsequently was the price that we deserved to pay.
A nation with responsible parliamentary government is
not the victim but the author of its government's blunders;
and if it seeks to transfer the responsibility to politicians
and a party system, or some other scapegoat, it is guilty
of the lie in the soul.
Bismarck's first step was to secure Austria. It did not
escape his attention that Austria, compared with Prussia,
was in a very unfavourable position for effective military
and political action in the Duchies. Austria, humiliated
by the Polish fiasco and the failure of the Congress of
Princes, was only too ready to listen to the Prussian over-
tures. The rejection by the Federal Diet (January 14)
of the Prussian proposal, that Austria and Prussia, in virtue
of their international position, should occupy Schleswig
in order to secure the observance of the Convention, was
tantamount to a declaration that the Diet repudiated the
his policy and aims.
