No More Learning

MAN IN SOCIETY.
293-
Well-Meant Dissimulation. —In intercourse
with men a well-meant dissimulation is often
necessary, as if we did not see through the motives
of their actions.
294.
Copies. —We not unfrequently meet with copies
of prominent persons; and as in the case of
pictures, so also here, the copies please more than
the originals.
295.
The Public Speaker. —One may speak with
the greatest appropriateness, and yet so that every-
body cries out to the contrary,—that is to say,
when one does not speak to everybody.
296.
Want of Confidence. —Want of confidence
among friends is a fault that cannot be censured
without becoming incurable.


## p. 268 (#388) ############################################


268
HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
297.
The Art of Giving. —To have to refuse a
gift, merely because it has not been offered in the
right way, provokes animosity against the giver.
298.
The most Dangerous Partisan. —In every
party there is one who, by his far too dogmatic
expression of the party-principles, excites defec-
tion among the others.
299.
Advisers of the Sick. — Whoever gives
advice to a sick person acquires a feeling of
superiority over him, whether the advice be ac-
cepted or rejected. Hence proud and sensitive sick
persons hate advisers more than their sickness.
300.
Double Nature of Equality. —The rage
for equality may so manifest itself that we seek
either to draw all others down to ourselves (by
belittling, disregarding, and tripping up), or our-
selves and all others upwards (by recognition,
assistance, and congratulation).
301.
Against Embarrassment. —The best way
to relieve and calm very embarrassed people is to
give them decided praise.
V


## p. 269 (#389) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. X7I
\ .
\
\
302.
Preference for Certain Virtues. —We
set no special value on the possession of a virtue
until we perceive that it is entirely lacking in our
adversary.
303-
Why we Contradict. —We often contradict
an opinion when it is really only the tone in
which it is expressed that is unsympathetic to us.
304-
/ Confidence and Intimacy. —Whoever pro-
poses to command the intimacy of a person is
usually uncertain of possessing his confidence.
Whoever is sure of a person's confidence attaches
little value to intimacy with him. i
305.
The Equilibrium of Friendship. — The
right equilibrium of friendship in our relation to
other men is sometimes restored when we put a
few grains of wrong on our own side of the scales.
306.
The most Dangerous Physicians. —The
most dangerous physicians are those who, like born
actors, imitate the born physician with the perfect
art of imposture.


## p. 270 (#390) ############################################


2(,9 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
307.
When Paradoxes are Permissible. —In
order to interest clever persons in a theory, it is
sometimes only necessary to put it before them
in the form of a prodigious paradox.
308.
How Courageous People are Won Over.
—Courageous people are persuaded to a course of
action by representing it as more dangerous than
it really is.
309.
Courtesies. —We regard the courtesies shown
us by unpopular persons as offences.
310.
Keeping People Waiting. —A sure way of
exasperating people and of putting bad thoughts
into their heads is to keep them waiting long.
That makes them immoral.
3ii-
Against the Confidential. —Persons who
give us their full confidence think they have
thereby a right to ours. That is a mistake;
people acquire no rights through gifts.
312.
A Mode of Settlement. —It often suffices
to give a person whom we have injured an
opportunity to make a joke about us to give him


## p. 271 (#391) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 271
personal satisfaction, and even to make him favour-
ably disposed to us.
313-
The Vanity of the Tongue. —Whether man
conceals his bad qualities and vices, or frankly
acknowledges them, his vanity in either case seeks
its advantage thereby,—only let it be observed_/
how nicely he distinguishes those from whom he
conceals such qualities from those with whom he
is frank and honest.
314-
Considerate. —To have no wish to offend or
injure any one may as well be the sign of a just
as of a timid nature.
315-
Requisite for Disputation. —He who can-
not put his thoughts on ice should not enter into
the heat of dispute.
316.
Intercourse and Pretension. —We forget
our pretensions when we are always conscious of
being amongst meritorious people; being alone
implants presumption in us. The young are
pretentious, for they associate with their equals,
who are all ciphers but would fain have a great
significance.
317-
Motives of an Attack. —One does not attack J
a person merely to hurt and conquer him, but
perhaps merely to become conscious of one's own
strength.


## p. 272 (#392) ############################################

272 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
3*i 8.
Flattery. —Persons who try by means of
flattery to put us off our guard in intercourse
with them, employ a dangerous expedient, like
a sleeping-draught, which, when it does not send
the patient to sleep, keeps him all the wider
awake.
319-
A Good Letter-Writer. —A person who
does not write books, thinks much, and lives in
unsatisfying society, will usually be a good letter-
writer.
320.
The Ugliest of All. —It may be doubted
whether a person who has travelled much has
found anywhere in the world uglier places than
those to be met with in the human face.
321.
The Sympathetic Ones. — Sympathetic
natures, ever ready to help in misfortune, are
seldom those that participate in joy; in the
happiness of others they have nothing to occupy
them, they are superfluous, they do not feel them-
selves in possession of their superiority, and hence
readily show their displeasure.
322.
The Relatives of a Suicide. —The relatives
of a suicide take it in ill part that he did not
remain alive out of consideration for their reputation.


## p. 273 (#393) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 273
323.
Ingratitude Foreseen. —He who makes a
large gift gets no gratitude; for the recipient is
already overburdened by the acceptance of the gift.
324-
In Dull Society. —Nobody thanks a witty
man for politeness when he puts himself on a par
with a society in which it would not be polite to
show one's wit.
325-
The Presence of Witnesses. — We are
doubly willing to jump into the water after some
one who has fallen in, if there are people present
who have not the courage to do so.
326.
Being Silent. —For both parties in a con-
troversy, the most disagreeable way of retaliating
is to be vexed and silent; for the aggressor
usually regards the silence as a sign of contempt.
327-
Friends' Secrets. —Few people will not
expose the private affairs of their friends when
at a loss for a subject of conversation.
328.
Humanity. —The humanity of intellectual
celebrities consists in courteously submitting to
vol. 1. S


## p. 274 (#394) ############################################


274 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
unfairness in intercourse with those who are
not celebrated.
329-
The Embarrassed. —People who do not feel
sure of themselves in society seize every oppor-
tunity of publicly showing their superiority to
close friends, for instance by teasing them.
330.
THANKS. —A refined nature is vexed by know-
ing that some one owes it thanks, a coarse nature
by knowing that it owes thanks to some one.
331-
A Sign of Estrangement. —The surest sign
of the estrangement of the opinions of two persons
is when they both say something ironical to each
other and neither of them feels the irony.
332.
Presumption in Connection with Merit.
—Presumption in connection with merit offends
us even more than presumption in persons devoid
of merit, for merit in itself offends us.
333-
Danger in the Voice. —In conversation we
are sometimes confused by the tone of our own
voice, and misled to make assertions that do not
at all correspond to our opinions.


## p. 275 (#395) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 275
334-
In Conversation. —Whether in conversation
with others we mostly agree or mostly disagree
with them is a matter of habit; there is sense in
both cases.
335-
Fear of Our Neighbour. —We are afraid of
the animosity of our neighbour, because we are
apprehensive that he may thereby discover our
secrets.
336.
Distinguishing by Blaming. —Highly re-
spected persons distribute even their blame in
such fashion that they try to distinguish us there-
with. It is intended to remind us of their serious
interest in us. We misunderstand them entirely
when we take their blame literally and protest
against it; we thereby offend them and estrange
ourselves from them.
337-
Indignation at the Goodwill of Others.
—We are mistaken as to the extent to which we
think we are hated or feared; because, though
we ourselves know very well the extent of our
divergence from a person, tendency, or party, those
others know us only superficially, and can, there-
fore, only hate us superficially. We often meet
with goodwill which is inexplicable to us; but
when we comprehend it, it shocks us, because it
shows that we are not considered with sufficient
seriousness or importance.


## p. 276 (#396) ############################################


276 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
338.
Thwarting Vanities. —When two persons
meet whose vanity is equally great, they have
afterwards a bad impression of each other;
because each has been so occupied with the
impression he wished to produce on the other
that the other has made no impression upon him;
at last it becomes clear to them both that their
efforts have been in vain, and each puts the blame
on the other.
339-
Improper Behaviour as a Good Sign. —A
superior mind takes pleasure in the tactlessness,
pretentiousness, and even hostility of ambitious
youths; it is the vicious habit of fiery horses
which have not yet carried a rider, but, in a short
time, will be so proud to carry one. . t»»
340.
When it is Advisable to Suffer Wrong.
—It is well to put up with accusations without
refutation, even when they injure us, when the
accuser would see a still greater fault on our part
if we contradicted and perhaps even refuted him.
In this way, certainly, a person may always be
wronged and always have right on his side, and
may eventually, with the best conscience in the
world, become the most intolerable tyrant and
tormentor; and what happens in the individual
may also take place in whole classes of society.


## p. 277 (#397) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 277
341-
Too Little Honoured. —Very conceited
persons, who have received less consideration than
they expected, attempt for a long time to
deceive themselves and others with regard to it,
and become subtle psychologists in order to make
out that they have been amply honoured. Should
they not attain their aim, should the veil of
deception be torn, they give way to all the greater
fury.
342.
Primitive* Conditions Re - echoing in
Speech. —By the manner in which people make
assertions in their intercourse we often recognise
an echo of the times when they were more con-
versant with weapons than anything else; some-
times they handle their assertions like sharp-
shooters using their arms, sometimes we think we
hear the whizz and clash of swords, and with
some men an assertion crashes down like a stout
cudgel. Women, on the contrary, speak like
beings who for thousands of years have sat at the
loom, plied the needle, or played the child with
children.
343-
The Narrator. —He who gives an account
of something readily betrays whether it is because
the fact interests him, or because he wishes to
excite interest by the narration. In the latter
case he will exaggerate, employ superlatives, and
such like. He then does not usually tell his story


## p. 278 (#398) ############################################

278 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
so well, because he does not think so much about
his subject as about himself.
344-
The RECITER. —He who recites dramatic
works makes discoveries about his own character;
he finds his voice more natural in certain moods
and scenes than in others, say in the pathetic or
in the scurrilous, while in ordinary life, perhaps,
he has not had the opportunity to exhibit pathos
or scurrility.
345-
A Comedy Scene in Real Life. —Some one
conceives an ingenious idea on a theme in order
to express it in society. Now in a comedy we
should hear and see how he sets all sail for that
point, and tries to land the company at the place
where he can make his remark, how he con-
tinuously pushes the conversation towards the one
goal, sometimes losing the way, finding it again,
and finally arriving at the moment: he is almost
breathless—and then one of the company takes
the remark itself out of his mouth! What will
he do? Oppose his own opinion?
346.
Unintentionally Discourteous. — When
a person treats another with unintentional dis-
courtesy,—for instance, not greeting him because
not recognising him,—he is vexed by it, although
he cannot reproach his own sentiments; he is
hurt by the bad opinion which he has produced


## p. 279 (#399) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 279
in the other person, or fears the consequences of
his bad humour, or is pained by the thought of
having injured him,—vanity, fear, or pity may
therefore be aroused; perhaps all three together.
347-
A Masterpiece of Treachery. —To express
a tantalising distrust of a fellow-conspirator, lest
he should betray one, and this at the very moment
when one is practising treachery one's self, is a
masterpiece of wickedness; because it absorbs the
other's attention and compels him for a time to act
very unsuspiciously and openly, so that the real
traitor has thus acquired a free hand.
348.
To Injure and to be Injured. —It is far
pleasanter to injure and afterwards beg for forgive-
ness than to be injured and grant forgiveness.
He who does the former gives evidence of power
and afterwards of kindness of character. The
person injured, however, if he does not wish to be
considered inhuman, must forgive; his enjoyment
of the other's humiliation is insignificant on
account of this constraint.
349-
IN A Dispute. —When we contradict another's
opinion and at the same time develop our own,
the constant consideration of the other opinion
usually disturbs the natural attitude of our own,


## p. 280 (#400) ############################################

280 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
which appears more intentional, more distinct, and
perhaps somewhat exaggerated.
350.
An Artifice. —He who wants to get another
to do something difficult must on no account
treat the matter as a problem, but must set forth
his plan plainly as the only one possible; and
when the adversary's eye betrays objection and
opposition he must understand how to break off
quickly, and allow him no time to put in a word.
3Si-
Pricks of Conscience after Social
Gatherings. —Why does our conscience prick
us after ordinary social gatherings?
Because we
have treated serious things lightly, because in
talking of persons we have not spoken quite justly
or have been silent when we should have spoken,
because, sometimes, we have not jumped up and
run away,—in short, because we have behaved in
society as if we belonged to it.
352.
We are Misjudged. —He who always listens
to hear how he is judged is always vexed. For
we are misjudged even by those who are nearest
to us (" who know us best"). Even good friends
sometimes vent their ill-humour in a spiteful
word; and would they be our friends if they knew
us rightly? The judgments of the indifferent


## p. 281 (#401) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 281
wound us deeply, because they sound so impartial,
so objective almost. But when we see that
some one hostile to us knows us in a concealed
point as well as we know ourselves, how great is
then our vexation!
353-
The Tyranny of the Portrait. —Artists
and statesmen, who out of particular features
quickly construct the whole picture of a man or
an event, are mostly unjust in demanding that
the event or person should afterwards be actually
as they have painted it; they demand straightway
that a man should be just as gifted, cunning, and
unjust as he is in their representation of him.
354-
Relatives as the Best Friends. —The
Greeks, who knew so well what a friend was,
they alone of all peoples have a profound and
largely philosophical discussion of friendship; so
that it is by them firstly (and as yet lastly) that
the problem of the friend has been recognised
as worthy of solution,—these same Greeks have
designated relatives by an expression which is
the superlative of the word "friend. " This is
inexplicable to me.
355-
Misunderstood Honesty. —When any one
quotes himself in conversation (" I then said," " I
am accustomed to say"), it gives the impression
of presumption; whereas it often proceeds from


## p. 282 (#402) ############################################


282 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
quite an opposite source ; or at least from honesty,
which does not wish to deck and adorn the
present moment with wit which belongs to an
earlier moment.
356.
The Parasite. —It denotes entire absence of
a noble disposition when a person prefers to live
in dependence at the expense of others, usually
with a secret bitterness against them, in order only
that he may not be obliged to work. Such a
disposition is far more frequent in women than
in men, also far more pardonable (for historical
reasons).
357-
On the Altar of Reconciliation. —There
are circumstances under which one can only gain
a point from a person by wounding him and
becoming hostile; the feeling of having a foe
torments him so much that he gladly seizes the
first indication of a milder disposition to effect
a reconciliation, and offers on the altar of this
reconciliation what was formerly of such im-
portance to him that he would not give it up
at any price.
358.
Presumption in Demanding Pity. —There
are people who, when they have been in a rage
and have insulted others, demand, firstly, that
it shall all be taken in good part; and, secondly,
that they shall be pitied because they are subject
to such violent paroxysms. So far does human
presumption extend.


## p. 283 (#403) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 283
359-
BAIT. —" Every man has his price "—that is
not true. But perhaps every one can be found
a bait of one kind or other at which he will
snap. Thus, in order to gain some supporters
for a cause, it is only necessary to give it the
glamour of being philanthropic, noble, charitable,
and self-denying—and to what cause could this
glamour not be given! It is the sweetmeat and
dainty of their soul; others have different ones.
360.
The Attitude in Praising. —When good
friends praise a gifted person he often appears
to be delighted with them out of politeness and
goodwill, but in reality he feels indifferent.
His real nature is quite unmoved towards them,
and will not budge a step on that account out
of the sun or shade in which it lies; but people
wish to please by praise, and it would grieve
them if one did not rejoice when they praise
a person.
361.
The Experience of Socrates. —If one has
become a master in one thing, one has generally
remained, precisely thereby, a complete dunce
in most other things; but one forms the very
reverse opinion, as was already experienced by
Socrates. This is the annoyance which makes
association with masters disagreeable.


## p. 284 (#404) ############################################

284 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
362.
A Means of Defence. —In warring against
stupidity, the most just and gentle of men at
last become brutal. They are thereby, perhaps,
taking the proper course for defence; for the
most appropriate argument for a stupid brain
is the clenched fist. But because, as has been
said, their character is just and gentle, they suffer
more by this means of protection than they injure
their opponents by it.
363-
CURIOSITY. —If curiosity did not exist, very
little would be done for the good of our
neighbour. But curiosity creeps into the houses
of the unfortunate and the needy under the
name of duty or of pity. Perhaps there is a
good deal of curiosity even in the much-vaunted
maternal love.
364-
Disappointment in Society. — One man
wishes to be interesting for his opinions, another
for his likes and dislikes, a third for his ac-
quaintances, and a fourth for his solitariness—
and they all meet with disappointment. For he
before whom the play is performed thinks himself
the only play that is to be taken into account.
365.
The Duel. —It may be said in favour of duels
and all affairs of honour that if a man has such


## p. 285 (#405) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 285
susceptible feelings that he does not care to live
when So-and-so says or thinks this or that about ^
him; he has a TTgTfpto make it a question of the'
death of the one or the other. With regard to the ^ \ ■\^~{
fact that he is so susceptible, it is not at all to
be remonstrated with, in that matter we are the *' ^ j^l ft
heirs of the past, of its greatness as well as of
its exaggerations, without which no greatness
ever existed. So when there exists a code of
honour which lets blood stand in place of death,
so that the mind is relieved after a regular duel,
it is a great blessing, because otherwise many
human lives would be in danger. Such an
institution, moreover, teaches men to be cautious
in their utterances and makes intercourse with
them possible.
366.
Nobleness and Gratitude. —A noble soul
will be pleased to owe gratitude, and will not
anxiously avoid opportunities of coming under
obligation; it will also be moderate afterwards
in the expression of its gratitude; baser souls,
on the other hand, are unwilling to be under any
obligation, or are afterwards immoderate in their
expressions of thanks and altogether too devoted.
The latter is, moreover, also the case with persons
of mean origin or depressed circumstances; to
show them a favour seems to them a miracle of
grace.
367.
Occasions of Eloquence. —In order to talk
well one man needs a person who is decidedly and


## p. 286 (#406) ############################################



286
HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
avowedly his superior to talk to, while another
can only find absolute freedom of speech and
happy turns of eloquence before one who is his
inferior. In both cases the cause is the same;
each of them talks well only when he talks sans
gine—the one because in the presence of something
higher he does not feel the impulse of rivalry
and competition, the other because he also lacks
the same impulse in the presence of something
lower. Now there is quite another type of men,
who talk well only when debating, with the
intention of conquering. Which of the two types
is the more aspiring: the one that talks well from
excited ambition, or the one that talks badly
or not at all from precisely the same motive?
368.
The Talent for Friendship. —Two types
are distinguished amongst people who have a
special faculty for friendship. The one is ever on
the ascent, and for every phase of his development
he finds a friend exactly suited to him. The series
of friends which he thus acquires is seldom a con-
sistent one, and is sometimes at variance and in
contradiction, entirely in accordance with the fact
that the later phases of his development neutralise
or prejudice the earlier phases. Such a man may
jestingly be called a ladder. The other type is
represented by him who exercises an attractive in-
fluence on very different characters and endowments,
so that he wins a whole circle of friends; these,
however, are thereby brought voluntarily into


## p. 287 (#407) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 287
friendly relations with one another in spite of all
differences. Such a man may be called a circle, for
this homogeneousness of such different tempera-
ments and natures must somehow be typified in
him. Furthermore, the faculty for having good
friends is greater in many people than the faculty
for being a good friend.
369-
Tactics in Conversation. —After a conver-
sation with a person one is best pleased with him
when one has had an opportunity of exhibiting
one's intelligence and amiability in all its glory.
Shrewd people who wish to impress a person favour-
ably make use of this circumstance, they provide
him with the best opportunities for making a good
joke, and so on in conversation. An amusing
conversation might be imagined between two
very shrewd persons, each wishing to impress the
other favourably, and therefore each throwing to
the other the finest chances in conversation, which
neither of them accepted, so that the conversation
on the whole might turn out spiritless and unat-
tractive because each assigned to the other the
opportunity of being witty and charming.
370.
Discharge of Indignation. — The man
who meets with a failure attributes this failure
rather to the ill-will of another than to fate.


## p. 287 (#408) ############################################

286 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
avowedly his superior to talk to, while another
can only find absolute freedom of speech and
happy turns of eloquence before one who is his
inferior. In both cases the cause is the same;
each of them talks well only when he talks sans
gene—the one because in the presence of something
higher he does not feel the impulse of rivalry
and competition, the other because he also lacks
the same impulse in the presence of something
lower. Now there is quite another type of men,
who talk well only when debating, with the
intention of conquering. Which of the two types
is the more aspiring: the one that talks well from
excited ambition, or the one that talks badly
or not at all from precisely the same motive?
368.
The Talent for Friendship. —Two types
are distinguished amongst people who have a
special faculty for friendship. The one is ever on
the ascent, and for every phase of his development
he finds a friend exactly suited to him. The series
of friends which he thus acquires is seldom a con-
sistent one, and is sometimes at variance and in
contradiction, entirely in accordance with the fact
that the later phases of his development neutralise
or prejudice the earlier phases. Such a man may
jestingly be called a ladder. The other type is
represented by him who exercises an attractive in-
fluence on very different charactersand endowments,
so that he wins a whole circle of friends; these,
however, are thereby brought voluntarily into



## p. 287 (#409) ############################################

MAN IN SOCIETY. 287
friendly relations with one another in spite of all
differences. Such a man may be called ^circle, for
this homogeneousness of such different tempera-
ments and natures must somehow be typified in
him. Furthermore, the faculty for having good
friends is greater in many people than the faculty
for being a good friend.
369.
Tactics in Conversation. —After a conver-
sation with a person one is best pleased with him
when one has had an opportunity of exhibiting
one's intelligence and amiability in all its glory.
Shrewd people who wish to impress a person favour-
ably make use of this circumstance, they provide
him with the best opportunities for making a good
joke, and so on in conversation. An amusing
conversation might be imagined between two
very shrewd persons, each wishing to impress the
other favourably, and therefore each throwing to
the other the finest chances in conversation, which
neither of them accepted, so that the conversation
on the whole might turn out spiritless and unat-
tractive because each assigned to the other the
opportunity of being witty and charming.
370.
Discharge of Indignation. — The man
who meets with a failure attributes this failure
rather to the ill-will of another than to fate.


## p. 288 (#410) ############################################

288 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.

His irritated feelings are alleviated by think-
ing that a person and not a thing is the cause
of his failure; for he can revenge himself on
persons, but is obliged to swallow down the injuries
of fate. Therefore when anything has miscarried
with a prince, those about him are accustomed to
point out some individual as the ostensible cause,
who is sacrificed in the interests of all the courtiers;
for otherwise the prince's indignation would, vent
itself on them all, as he can take no revenge on
the Goddess of Destiny herself.
371-
Assuming the Colours of the Environ-
ment. —Why are likes and dislikes so contagious
that we can hardly live near a very sensitive person
without being filled, like a hogshead, with his fors
and againsts? In the first place, complete forbear-
ance of judgment is very difficult, and sometimes
absolutely intolerable to our vanity; it has the
same appearance as poverty of thought and
sentiment, or as timidity and unmanliness; and so
we are, at least, driven on to take a side, perhaps
contrary to our environment, if this attitude gives
greater pleasure to our pride. As a rule, however,—
and this is the second point,—we are not conscious
of the transition from indifference to liking or
disliking, but we gradually accustom ourselves to
the sentiments of our environment, and because
sympathetic agreement and acquiescence are so
agreeable, we soon wear all the signs and party-
colours of our surroundings.


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MAN IN SOCIETY. 289
372.
IRONY. —Irony is only permissible as a peda-
gogic expedient, on the part of a teacher when
dealing with his pupils; its purpose is to humble
and to shame, but in the wholesome way that
causes good resolutions to spring up and teaches
people to show honour and gratitude, as they would
to a doctor, to him who has so treated them. The
ironical man pretends to be ignorant, and does it
so well that the pupils conversing with him are
deceived, and in their firm belief in their own
superior knowledge they grow bold and expose all
their weak points; they lose their cautiousness and
reveal themselves as they are,—until all of a sudden
the light which they have held up to the teacher's
face casts its rays back very humiliatingly upon
themselves. Where such a relation, as that between
teacher and pupil, does not exist, irony is a rudeness
and a vulgar conceit. All ironical writers count on
the silly species of human beings, who like to feel
themselves superior to all others in common with
the author himself, whom they look upon as the
mouthpiece of their arrogance. Moreover, the habit
of irony, like that of sarcasm, spoils the character;
it gradually fosters the quality of a malicious
superiority; one finally grows like a snappy dog,
that has learnt to laugh as well as to bite.
373-
Arrogance. —There is nothing one should so
guard against as the growth of the weed called


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290
HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
arrogance, which spoils all one's good harvest; for
there is arrogance in cordiality, in showing honour,
in kindly familiarity, in caressing, in friendly
counsel, in acknowledgment of faults, in sympathy
for others,—and all these fine things arouse aversion
when the weed in question grows up among them.
The arrogant man—that is to say, he who desires
to appear more than he is or passes for—always
miscalculates. It is true that he obtains a momen-
tary success, inasmuch as those with whom he is
arrogant generally give him the amount of honour
that he demands, owing to fear or for the sake of
convenience; but they take a bad revenge for it,
inasmuch as they subtract from the value which
they hitherto attached to him just as much as he
demands above that amount. There is nothing for
which men ask to be paid dearer than for humilia-
tion. The arrogant man can make his really great
merit so suspicious and small in the eyes of others
that they tread on it with dusty feet. If at all,
we should only allow ourselves a proud manner
where we are quite sure of not being misunder-
stood and considered as arrogant; as, for
instance, with friends and wives. For in social
intercourse there is no greater folly than to acquire
a reputation for arrogance; it is still worse than
not having learnt to deceive politely.
374-
Tete-A-Tete—Private conversation is the
perfect conversation, because everything the one
person says receives its particular colouring, its


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MAN IN SOCIETY. 291
tone, and its accompanying gestures out of strict
consideration for the other person engaged in the
conversation, it therefore corresponds to what takes
place in intercourse by letter, viz. , that one and
the same person exhibits ten kinds of psychical
expression, according as he writes now to this
individual and now to that one. In duologue there
is only a single refraction of thought; the person
conversed with produces it, as the mirror in whom
we want to behold our thoughts anew in their
finest form. But how is it when there are two or
three, or even more persons conversing with one?
Conversation then necessarily loses something of
its individualising subtlety, different considerations
thwart and neutralise each other; the style which
pleases one does not suit the taste of another.
In intercourse with several individuals a person is
therefore to withdraw within himself and represent
facts as they are; but he has also to remove from
the subjects the pulsating ether of humanity
which makes conversation one of the pleasantest
things in the world. Listen only to the tone
in which those who mingle with whole groups of
men are in the habit of speaking; it is as if
the fundamental base of all speech were, "It is
myself \ I say this, so make what you will of it! "
That is the reason why clever ladies usually leave
a singular, painful, and forbidding impression on
those who have met them in society; it is the
talking to many people, before many people, that
robs them of all intellectual amiability and shows
only their conscious dependence on themselves,
their tactics, and their intention of gaining a


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_;*»? g! fj;0. "
292
HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
public victory in full light; whilst in a private
conversation the same ladies become womanly
again, and recover their intellectual grace and
charm.
375-
Posthumous Fame. —There is sense in hoping
for recognition in a distant future only when we
take it for granted that mankind will remain
essentially unchanged, and that whatever is great
is not for one age only but will be looked upon
as great for all time. But this is an error. In
all their sentiments and judgments concerning
what is good and beautiful mankind have greatly
changed; it is mere fantasy to imagine one's self
to be a mile ahead, and that the whole of mankind
is coming our way. Besides, a scholar who is
misjudged may at present reckon with certainty
that his discovery will be made by others, and
that, at best, it will be allowed to him later on by
some historian that he also already knew this or
that but was not in a position to secure the recog-
nition of his knowledge. Not to be recognised
is always interpreted by posterity as lack of power.
In short, one should not so readily speak in favour
of haughty solitude. There are, however, ex-
ceptional cases; but it is chiefly our faults, weak-
ness, and follies that hinder the recognition of our
great qualities.
376.
Of Friends. —Just consider with thyself how
different are the feelings, how divided are the


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MAN IN SOCIETY. 293
opinions of even the nearest acquaintances; how
even the same opinions in thy friend's mind have
quite a different aspect and strength from what
they have in thine own; and how manifold are
the occasions which arise for misunderstanding
and hostile severance. After all this thou wilt
say to thyself, " How insecure is the ground upon
which all our alliances and friendships rest, how
liable to cold downpours and bad weather, how
lonely is every creature! " When a person recog-
nises this fact, and, in addition, that all opinions
and the nature and strength of them in his fellow-
men are just as necessary and irresponsible as
their actions; when his eye learns to see this
internal necessity of opinions, owing to the indis-
soluble interweaving of character, occupation, talent,
and environment,—he will perhaps get rid of the
bitterness and sharpness of the feeling with which
the sage exclaimed," Friends, there are no friends! "
Much rather will he make the confession to him-
self :—Yes, there are friends, but they were drawn
towards thee by error and deception concerning
thy character; and they must have learnt to be
silent in order to remain thy friends; for such
human relationships almost always rest on the
fact that some few things are never said, are
never, indeed, alluded to; but if these pebbles are set
rolling friendship follows afterwards and is broken.
Are there any who would not be mortally injured
if they were to learn what their most intimate
friends really knew about them? By getting a
knowledge of ourselves, and by looking upon our
nature as a changing sphere of opinions and moods,


## p. 294 (#416) ############################################

294
HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
and thereby learning to despise ourselves a little,
we recover once more our equilibrium with the
rest of mankind. It is true that we have good
reason to despise each of our acquaintances, even
the greatest of them; but just as good reason to
turn this feeling against ourselves. And so we
will bear with each other, since we bear with our-
selves; and perhaps there will come to each a
happier hour, when he will exclaim:
"Friends, there are really no friends ! " thus cried
th' expiring old sophist;
"Foes, there is really no foe! "—thus shout I,
the incarnate fool.
>


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3:
SEVENTH DIVISION.
WIFE AND CHILD.
377-
The Perfect Woman. —The perfect woman is
a higher type of humanity than the perfect man,
and also something much rarer. The natural
history of animals furnishes grounds in support of
this theory.
378.
FRIENbsHlP AND Marriage. —The best friend
will probably get the best wife, because a good
marriage is based on talent for friendship.
379-
The Survival of the Parents. —The un-
dissolved dissonances in the relation of the
character and sentiments of the parents survive
in the nature of the child and make up the
history of its inner sufferings.
380.
Inherited from the Mother. —Every one 1
bears within him an image of woman, inherited
from his mother: it determines his attitude to-


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