Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and
therefore
no multiplicity), between the moment in which it and the mo ment in which not, no time can be discovered --which impossible.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
t three grand ideas God, Freedom, and Immortality, and aim
system.
? ? *
is
a
:
it
; a
if
it a is
it
it is
is
aais ;
it a in
i9 is a
a
a
is
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is,
? SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
235
tliere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
OF THE DIALECTICAL PBOCEDURF. OF PURE REASON.
It may be said that the object, of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that ia adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which
at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethict, and, through the conjunction of both. Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange ment -- the tyitt helical one -- would be the most suitable ; but in the in vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w< should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to Bs>-- psychology, to cosmology, and thenre to theology.
? ? ? ? 23fi THAS9CE! TDENTAri DIALECTIC.
perfectly corresponds to an idea, althongh we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre misses, and by means of which we conclude from some thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheVess, by an un avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are rery well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the.
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that from things which do not know in their mere transcendental conception, conclude being of all beings which know still less means of transcenderr
? conception
? ? 1
by
I
aI a
is,
? at THi PAllALOOISMS OJr PURE fiEiSON. ft?
tid conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I ? hall call the Ideal of pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
Chap. I. -- Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism Las a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid able, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This iIs the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine o(
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con ception J, in so far as it appears in all thought.
Now, the ratiotal doctrine of the soul is really an undo*.
? the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing
? ? ? 238 NUftSOm)E>TAIi DIALECttO.
taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before Ius a pretended science,
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception nothing more than the mere apperception, think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof empirically given, cannot be re garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-con sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.
think therefore the oiily text of rational psychology, from which must develope its whole system. manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof be cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.
But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the cate
raised upon the single proposition,
or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which ex
gories, --only, as in the present case thing, as thinking
we shall -- not indeed change the order stauds the table, -- but begin at the
which thing in itself represented, and proceed backwards through the series. The topic of the
rational doctrine of the soul, from which every thing else may contain must be deduced, accordingly as follows
being, of the
at first given,
category
categories as of substance,
think, whose foundation
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:
it
is ;
it by
it is
is
is
I, J It
I is
I
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? OF THE PARALOGISMS OP PUKE SEASON.
2.
As regards its quality, it is simple.
3.
As regards the different
times in which it exists,
it is numerically iden- tical, that is toitt, not
Plurality. 4.
1.
The soul is Substance.
It is in relation to possible objects in space. *
From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality ; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility ; its identity, as in tellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality ; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
? (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the
principle of life in matter, that as soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality and this, limited and determined
the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of trans cendental psychology, which falsely held to be science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly coutentless representation which cannot even be called conception, but merely con sciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more represented than transcendental subject of thought = x, which cognized only means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of
The reader, who m>>y not so easily perceive the psychological tense of these expressions -- taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of eMitlence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms wh'ch have been employed, instead of their German synonymes, contrary to lha rules of correct writing. But judged baUer to sacrifice elegance language to perspicuity of exposition.
? ? I it
a
is
is, a
ol
by
I
?
by a
is is
a
a
a I,
J,
;
? 240 TraNbcbndeStjo, dialectic.
which, opart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a per petual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ in order 10 frame any judgment respecting it. And this inconvenience we find impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness in itself not so much representation distinguishing par ticular object, as form of representation in general, in so far as may be termed cognition for in and cognition alone do think anything.
must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the
condition, under which think, and which
property of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid foi every existence which thinks, and that we can pre umc to bass upon seemingly empirical proposition judgment which apoiieictic and universal, to wit, that every thing which thinks
constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares to lie, that is, as self-conscious being. The cause of this belief to be found in the fact, that we necessarily attribute to things
priori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now cannot obtain the least representation of thinking being means of externa! experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such ob jects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, think,
? in the present case, understood problematical sense, not in so far as contains perception of an existence (like the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum), but in regard to its mere possibility -- for the purpose of discovering, what properties may be inferred from so simple proposition and predicated of the subject of it.
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of think ing beings there lay more than the mere Cogito, -- we could likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology which would be kind physiology of the internal sense, and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense. But could never be available for discovering those properties which do not be long to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity),
nor could m^ke any apodeictic enunciation on the nature
consequently
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if
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of
it
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a
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? OF TUB PAKAL0018M8 Ot PURE REASON.
of thinking beings : -- it would therefore not be a rational
Now, as the proposition Ithink (in the problematical sense) contains the form of every judgment in general, and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories ; it is manifest, that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of the under standing excludes all empirical elements ; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable conception before hand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology ; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this exami nation to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.
Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, bat only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-conscious ness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (concep tions of the understanding --categories) ; they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable self, that of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), the object.
In all judgments am the determining subject of that rela tion which constitutes judgment. But that the which thinks, must be considered as in thought always subject, and as thing which cannot be predicate to thought, an apodeictic and identical proposition. But this proposition does not sig nify that as an object, am, for myself, self-subsist ent bsing or substance. This latter statement --an ambitious one--re quires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered in thought and are perhaps (in so far as consider the think
ing self merely as surh) not to be discovered the thinking self at all.
241
? ? ? in R
Iaa
is I
; I, is
a
aI
is,
a
1.
it
? 242 TRANXCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
2. That the / or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is lingular or simple, and cannot be readied into a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject, --this is self-evidentfrom the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance -- for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which conse quently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought : but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be sur prising, if the conception of substance, which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition -- so much trouble too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter), should be presented immediately to me, as if by reve lation, in the poorest mental representation of all.
3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is conse quently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which 1 am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the iden tity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition.
4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me --among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical propo sition, for other things are exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself. But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external to me ; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man), -- cannot be known or inferred from this proposition.
Thus we have gained nothing as regards *he cognition, of myself as object, by the analysis of the consrinnsnc*s of
? ? ? ? OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUKE BEASON. 241
my Self in thought. The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the
object.
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous,
if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of per sonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have pene trated into the sphere of noumena ; and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it. For the proposition, " Every thinking being, as snch, is simple sub stance," is an h priori synthetical proposition ; because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of and adds to the mere notion of thinking being the mode its existence, and in the second place annexes predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter conception -- pre dicate which could not have discovered in the sphere of
? would follow that priori synthetical propo sitions are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have
experience.
maintained, in relation to objects of possible
and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are applicable to things as things in themselves --an inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical
But indeed the danger not so great, we look little closer into the question.
There lurks the procedure of rational psychology para logism, which represented in the following syllogism
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject,
procedure.
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and substance.
therefore
thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogi tated otherwise than as subject.
exists also as such, that as substance.
In the major we speak of being that can be cogitated gene
rally and in every relation, consequently as may be given in intuition. But in the minor we speak of the same being only so far as regards itself aa subject, relatively to thought
There/ore
experience,
? ? in
a
it
It it
a
is, it
A it
it, of
is
:a
if
is in
is
h
a
a
a
? 244 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intui tion, by which it is presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sojphisma figures dictionis. *
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be
plain to any one who will consider the general remark which
precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure under standing, and the section on noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality ; that is to say, we can never know, whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception ; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition ; we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If, then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance --that of subject existing per se -- to the subject as thinking being. And thus the con ception of the simple nature of substance, which connected with the objective reality of this conception, shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought whilst we remain perfectly ignorant, whether the subject composite or not.
Thought taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. In the major considered as relating and applying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand
as relating merely lo self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of thingi, but of thought, (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego always the subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, " cannot exist otherwise than as subject but only "
in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judg ment. " But this an identical proposition, and throws no lijht on \\ts mode of my existence.
? can,
? ? is
is I
it is is
;"
is
; is
I
it
?
is
a
is, a
? REFUTATION OF MEXDEtSSOHS's ABGtTltENT. 246
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub stantiality or Permanence* of the Soul.
Thh acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul -- it being granted that it is a simple being --cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition ; he saw it is not impossible
\ for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance. He endea voured to prove in his Pheedo, that the soul cannot be annihi
lated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist.
Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity), between the moment in which it and the mo ment in which not, no time can be discovered --which impossible. But this philosopher did not consider, that, grant ing the soul to possess this simple nature, which contains no parts external to each other, and consequently no extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to any less than to any other being, intensive quantity, that degree of reality in regard to all its faculties,- nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this degree of reality can become less and less through an in finite series of smaller degrees. follows, therefore, that this supposed substance --this thing, the permanence of which
not assured in any other way, may, not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently elanguescence, may employ this expression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has always degree, which may be lessened. ^ Consequently the faculty of being
There no philosophical term our language which can express, without saying too much or too little, the meaning of Beharrlichieil. Permanence will be sufficient, taken in an absolute, instead of the com monly received relative sense. -- TV.
Verschwinden.
Clearness not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of repre sentation. For certain degree of consciousness, which may not, how ever, be sufficient for recollection, to be met with in many dim re presentations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we connect as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once several notes in improvising piece of music. But representation clear, in which our consciousness sufficient for the cotuciousnett the difference of thif representation from others. If we are only conscious that there dtf
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a ;
of
is
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a
jt
*
is
is
is ifit
a
a is
if is
is, it It a
in
a
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is
by
is
if
is,
? 24G TBAU3CENDEKTAX DIALECTIC.
conscious may be diminished ; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of the soul, therefoie, as an object of the internal sense, remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemon strable. Its permanence in life is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere conceptions, its permanence beyond life. *
f;rence, but are not conscious of the difference -- that is, what the difference is -- the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire disappearance
* There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought --of which tney have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life -- after this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, ii the possibility of the division of a timpk substance into several substances ; and conversely, of the coalition of several into oue simple substance. For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul--even that of con sciousness --as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it ; and we can believe that, as in this case everything that is real in the soul, and has a degree -- consequently its entire existence -- has been halved, a particular substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it ; and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the foi mer substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which appear under the form of matter might, (not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence, of which the former would be but the phtenomenal appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the formei repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from allowing any value to such chimeras ; and the principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of the categories-- that of substance, for example --is possible. But il Ose rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority of tbt
? ? ? ? OF TUK I'-Ui. W. uutailS Oi HUE 1HSASOK.
247
now, we take the above propositions--as they must be ac<< cepted as valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology --in synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation, with the proposition, " All thinking beings are, as such, substances," backwards through the series, till the circle completed we come at last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational psychology, substances are held t. o be conscious, independently of external things nay, asserted that, in relation to the permanence which a necessary characteristic of substance, they can of themselves determine external things. follows that Idealism --at least problematical Idealism, perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system.
And, the existence of outward things not held to be re quisite to the determination of the existence of substance in
? time the existence of these outward things at all,
assumption which remains without the possibility of proof.
But we proceed analytically -- the " think " as propo sition containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being the principle -- and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence in time and space without the aid of any thing external the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of thinking being, but with reality, and the properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality cogitated, after everything empirical had been
abstracted as
2.
as Subject,
shown in the following table think,
3.
at simple Subject,
4.
as identical Subject,
every state of my thought.
faculty of thought -- without any intuition, whereby an object
gives self-subsistciu being, merely because the unity of apperception in
thought cannot allow him to believe composite being, instead of de claring, as he ought to do, that he unable to explain the possibility of thinking nature; what ought to hinder the materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist in directly opposite manner -- still preserving the formal unity r. ^quirtd
bis opponent
--
gratuitous
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a
If, is
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is it a
I; 1.
is a
aa
if inisa It
;
is
:
is a a;
a
I
is
;
if
is
is
it is
;
? 248 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in tliis second pro position, whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject,
and not also as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense ; and it remains undetermined, whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not. Bat in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception --the simple Ego in the re presentation to which all connection and separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself important ; even although it presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real that is at the same time simple ; for points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely think ing subject. But, because my existence is considered in the
? first proposition as given, for it does not mean, " Every think ing being exists" (for this"wIould be predicating of them abso lute necessity,) but only, exist thinking ;" the proposition is quite empirical, and contains the determinability of my ex istence merely in relation to my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal intuition ; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism
is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is, that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart from external objects.
And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity of consciousness --which we cognize only for the reason that it is indispensable to the possibility of expr- rience -- to pass the bounds of experience (our existence in this life) ; and to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical -- but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly undetermined --proposition, " I think ? "
There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doc trine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassabh)
? ? ? OF TttE PAHAL00I3MS OF PUKE ItEASOlT. 2-19
limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to pre vent on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of baseless spiritualism. teaches ua
to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this our human life, as hint to abandon fruitless speculation and to direct, to practical use, our knowledge of ourselves --which, although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from higher source, and regulates its procedure as our destiny reached far beyoud the boun daries of experience and life.
? From all this evident that rational psychology hns its origin in mere misunderstanding. The unity of conscious ness, which lies at the basis of the categories, considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object and the category of substance applied to the intuition. But this unity nothing more than the unity in tkouyht, by which no object
given to which therefore the category of substance-- which always presupposes given intuition --cannot be ap
plied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very rea son that cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories for, to cogitate these, must lay at the foundation its owu pure self-consciousness -- the very thing that wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis, can not determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, the latter
impossible, the former, as an attempt means of the categories as thinking
to determine itself being in general,
The " think"
tion, and contains the proposition, " exist. " But cannot say " Every thing, which thinks, exists for in this ease the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing necessary beings, Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, " think," as Des Cartes maintained -- because in this case the major premiss, " Every thing, which thinks, existi," must precede --but the two propositions art identical. The proposition " think," expresses an undetermined em pirical intuition, that is, perception,* (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposi-
? See 2*1 -Tr.
no less so. *
as has been already stated, an empirical proposi-
? ? ;" I
is, is
byis
is aa a
*
is
a
it,
if
1 itit a
i)it, a I;
I Ia
;
it
;
is
if
it a
is
It
is ;
? 260 TBANSCKNDKNTiiL DIALECTIC.
Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of ex perience --a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved the futility of the attempt of spe culative philosophy in this region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our pro position must be proved apodeictically ; or, if this is unsuc cessful, the sources of this inability must be sought for, and if these are discovered to exist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the same law of renunciation, and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic assertion.
But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future
life, upon principles of the practical conjoined with the specu lative use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation ; for
the merely speculative proof hns never had any influence upon the common reason of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it and spinning it like a top ; and even in their eyes it has never been able to pre sent any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The
tion); but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time ; and existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that hsj been given, only, however, to thought in general--but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon) but only as something that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, " I think. " For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition, " I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But without some empirical representation, which presents to ths mind material for thought, the mental act, " I think," would not take place ; and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual faculty.
? ? ? ? Of THE FARALOGISilS OF tUllK ttEASO:*. 251
proofs which have been current among men, preserve their valu<< undiminished ; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisti cated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province -- the arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement of nature ; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own exist ence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world, in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle, that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is superfluous, nothing dispropor tionate to its use, nothing nnsuited to its end ; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to its destination iu life,--we shall find that man, who alone is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be ex cepted from it. For his natural gifts, not merely as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them -- but especially the moral law in him, stretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound
to prize the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all ad vantageous consequences --even the shadowy gift of posthu mous fame -- above everything ; and he is conscious of an in ward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in this world --without regard to mere sublunary interests --the citizen of a better. This mighty, irresistible proof -- accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a pur pose in everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless immeusity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our know ledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith -- remains to humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the necessity of an existence after death.
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the conception -- in every respect undetermined -- of a think ing being in general. I cogitate myself in "behalf of a pos sible experience, at the same time making abstraction of all actual experience ; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious
? ? ? ? 2. V2 TtlASSCENDF. XT. AL DTAT. ECTTC.
of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible abstraction of my em pirically determined existence with the supposed conscious ness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self ; and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination of cognition.
The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking ; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word, al though occupying itself with an object of experience --only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heteroge
neity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the ob jects of the external senses ; inasmuch ns the formal condition of the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also. But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far ns the one appears exter nally to the other -- consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogene ous ; this difficulty disappears. There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the question --how a com munity of substances is possible ; a question which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader, after what in our Analytic has been said of primitive forces and fa culties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human
cognition.
Genebal Remahk.
On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.
The proposition " I think," or, " I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phseno- menon ; and thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul,
even in thought, is merely a pha;nomenon ; and in this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts upon nothing.
? ? ? ? TRANSITION TO C08MOLOOT.
Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it does not represent the ""subject of con sciousness as a phenomenon --for this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to myself ; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode of in tuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of representation are not related to the categories of substance or of cause ; for these are functions of thought ap plicable only to our sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking ; in whst mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon --although not in so far as I am a thinking being ; but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me any property of this being ns material for thought.
? But the proposition " I think," in so far as it declares, " /
exist thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It determines the subject (which is in this case an object also,) in relation to existence ; and it cannot be given without the aid of the internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but always as a phe nomenon. In this proposition there is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of thought ; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that my thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now,
this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, and so forth not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of the representation but also for the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that of cognizing itself as nou- menon. But this impossible, for the internal empirical in tuition sensuous, and presents us with nothing but pheno menal data, which do not assist the object of pure conscious ness in its attempt to cognize itself as separate existence,
but are useful only as contributions to exp>>-ience.
? ? a
is
is
J,
; is,
in
is,
? 254 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in expert ence, but in certain firmly-established a priori lews of the use of pure reason -- laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves as legislating & priori in relation to our own existence and as determining this existence ; we should, on this supposition, find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition. We should also become aware, that in the consciousness of our existence there was an a priori content, which would serve to determine our own existence --an existence only sensuously determinable -- relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible world.
But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual, --but by what predicates ? By none other than those which are given in sensuous intuition. Thus
I should, find myself in the same position in rational psycho logy which 1 formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give
significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself : but these intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of ex perience. I should be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to their practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience --in conformity with their analogical significance when employed theoretically --to freedom and its subject. * At the same time, I should understand them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very dif
ferent principle. We have made these observations for the purpose of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel.
>> The Ego. -- 7V,
? by
? ? ? THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK II.
Chap. II. -- The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
We showed in tlic introduction to this part of our work,
that all transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from
dialectical arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in
its three formal species of syllogisms--just as the categories
find their logical schema in the four functions- of all judg
ments. The first kind of these sophistical arguments related
to the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all
representations in general (of the subject or bouI), in corre
spondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major of which,
as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a sub
ject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore
be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllo
gisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions
in the phenomenon ; aud, in this way, the theme of the third
kind to be treated of in the following chapter, will be the un
conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility
of objects in general.
But it is worthy of remark, that the transcendental paralo
gism produced in the mind only a one-sided illusion, in re gard to the idea of the subject of our thought ; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is completely on the side of Pneu - matism ; although this theory itself passes into nought, in the crucible of pure reason.
Very different is the case, when we apply reason to the 06- jectite synthesis of pbajnomena. Here, certainly, reason es
tablishes, with much plausibility, its principle of unconditioned
unity ; but it very soon falls into such contradictions, that it is
compelled, in relation to cosmology, to renounce its pretensions. For here a new phsenomenon of human reason meets us, -- a perfectly natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry, but into which reason of it-
self unavoidably falls. It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied conviction -- which a merely one-sided illusion produces ; but it is at the same time com- pelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a despair
? ? ? ? 256 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALLCTIC.
ing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical confi dence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhsps deserve the title of the Euthanasia of pure reason.
Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall present the reader with some considerations, in ex planation and justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cosmical conception! ; partly on ac count of this unconditioned totality, on which the conception of the world-whole is based -- a conception which is itself an idea,--partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of phsenomena --the empirical synthesis ; while, on the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all lM>ssible things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct from the cosraical conception, although it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy
ples of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, --not, how ever, to declare it valid and to appropriate but -- as the very term of conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to pre sent as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phsenomena and experience.
The Antinomy of puhe season.
SECTION FIRST. System of Cosmological Ideas.
That we may be able to enumerate with systematic preci sion these ideas according to principle, we must remark, in the first place, that from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions take their origin that the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the understanding from the un avoidable limitation of possible experience, and thus endea
? of pure reason will present us with the transcendental princi
? ? a
it is
;
a
it
a
it,
?
system.
? ? *
is
a
:
it
; a
if
it a is
it
it is
is
aais ;
it a in
i9 is a
a
a
is
a
is,
? SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
235
tliere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
OF THE DIALECTICAL PBOCEDURF. OF PURE REASON.
It may be said that the object, of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that ia adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which
at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethict, and, through the conjunction of both. Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange ment -- the tyitt helical one -- would be the most suitable ; but in the in vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w< should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to Bs>-- psychology, to cosmology, and thenre to theology.
? ? ? ? 23fi THAS9CE! TDENTAri DIALECTIC.
perfectly corresponds to an idea, althongh we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre misses, and by means of which we conclude from some thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheVess, by an un avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are rery well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the.
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that from things which do not know in their mere transcendental conception, conclude being of all beings which know still less means of transcenderr
? conception
? ? 1
by
I
aI a
is,
? at THi PAllALOOISMS OJr PURE fiEiSON. ft?
tid conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I ? hall call the Ideal of pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
Chap. I. -- Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism Las a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid able, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This iIs the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine o(
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con ception J, in so far as it appears in all thought.
Now, the ratiotal doctrine of the soul is really an undo*.
? the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing
? ? ? 238 NUftSOm)E>TAIi DIALECttO.
taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before Ius a pretended science,
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception nothing more than the mere apperception, think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof empirically given, cannot be re garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-con sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.
think therefore the oiily text of rational psychology, from which must develope its whole system. manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof be cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.
But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the cate
raised upon the single proposition,
or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which ex
gories, --only, as in the present case thing, as thinking
we shall -- not indeed change the order stauds the table, -- but begin at the
which thing in itself represented, and proceed backwards through the series. The topic of the
rational doctrine of the soul, from which every thing else may contain must be deduced, accordingly as follows
being, of the
at first given,
category
categories as of substance,
think, whose foundation
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:
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I, J It
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? OF THE PARALOGISMS OP PUKE SEASON.
2.
As regards its quality, it is simple.
3.
As regards the different
times in which it exists,
it is numerically iden- tical, that is toitt, not
Plurality. 4.
1.
The soul is Substance.
It is in relation to possible objects in space. *
From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality ; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility ; its identity, as in tellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality ; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
? (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the
principle of life in matter, that as soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality and this, limited and determined
the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of trans cendental psychology, which falsely held to be science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly coutentless representation which cannot even be called conception, but merely con sciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more represented than transcendental subject of thought = x, which cognized only means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of
The reader, who m>>y not so easily perceive the psychological tense of these expressions -- taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of eMitlence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms wh'ch have been employed, instead of their German synonymes, contrary to lha rules of correct writing. But judged baUer to sacrifice elegance language to perspicuity of exposition.
? ? I it
a
is
is, a
ol
by
I
?
by a
is is
a
a
a I,
J,
;
? 240 TraNbcbndeStjo, dialectic.
which, opart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a per petual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ in order 10 frame any judgment respecting it. And this inconvenience we find impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness in itself not so much representation distinguishing par ticular object, as form of representation in general, in so far as may be termed cognition for in and cognition alone do think anything.
must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the
condition, under which think, and which
property of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid foi every existence which thinks, and that we can pre umc to bass upon seemingly empirical proposition judgment which apoiieictic and universal, to wit, that every thing which thinks
constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares to lie, that is, as self-conscious being. The cause of this belief to be found in the fact, that we necessarily attribute to things
priori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now cannot obtain the least representation of thinking being means of externa! experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such ob jects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, think,
? in the present case, understood problematical sense, not in so far as contains perception of an existence (like the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum), but in regard to its mere possibility -- for the purpose of discovering, what properties may be inferred from so simple proposition and predicated of the subject of it.
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of think ing beings there lay more than the mere Cogito, -- we could likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology which would be kind physiology of the internal sense, and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense. But could never be available for discovering those properties which do not be long to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity),
nor could m^ke any apodeictic enunciation on the nature
consequently
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in a
by I
a
is by
/
a
a ;
a
? OF TUB PAKAL0018M8 Ot PURE REASON.
of thinking beings : -- it would therefore not be a rational
Now, as the proposition Ithink (in the problematical sense) contains the form of every judgment in general, and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories ; it is manifest, that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of the under standing excludes all empirical elements ; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable conception before hand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology ; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this exami nation to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.
Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, bat only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-conscious ness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (concep tions of the understanding --categories) ; they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable self, that of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), the object.
In all judgments am the determining subject of that rela tion which constitutes judgment. But that the which thinks, must be considered as in thought always subject, and as thing which cannot be predicate to thought, an apodeictic and identical proposition. But this proposition does not sig nify that as an object, am, for myself, self-subsist ent bsing or substance. This latter statement --an ambitious one--re quires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered in thought and are perhaps (in so far as consider the think
ing self merely as surh) not to be discovered the thinking self at all.
241
? ? ? in R
Iaa
is I
; I, is
a
aI
is,
a
1.
it
? 242 TRANXCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
2. That the / or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is lingular or simple, and cannot be readied into a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject, --this is self-evidentfrom the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance -- for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which conse quently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought : but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be sur prising, if the conception of substance, which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition -- so much trouble too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter), should be presented immediately to me, as if by reve lation, in the poorest mental representation of all.
3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is conse quently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which 1 am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the iden tity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition.
4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me --among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical propo sition, for other things are exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself. But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external to me ; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man), -- cannot be known or inferred from this proposition.
Thus we have gained nothing as regards *he cognition, of myself as object, by the analysis of the consrinnsnc*s of
? ? ? ? OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUKE BEASON. 241
my Self in thought. The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the
object.
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous,
if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of per sonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have pene trated into the sphere of noumena ; and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it. For the proposition, " Every thinking being, as snch, is simple sub stance," is an h priori synthetical proposition ; because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of and adds to the mere notion of thinking being the mode its existence, and in the second place annexes predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter conception -- pre dicate which could not have discovered in the sphere of
? would follow that priori synthetical propo sitions are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have
experience.
maintained, in relation to objects of possible
and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are applicable to things as things in themselves --an inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical
But indeed the danger not so great, we look little closer into the question.
There lurks the procedure of rational psychology para logism, which represented in the following syllogism
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject,
procedure.
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and substance.
therefore
thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogi tated otherwise than as subject.
exists also as such, that as substance.
In the major we speak of being that can be cogitated gene
rally and in every relation, consequently as may be given in intuition. But in the minor we speak of the same being only so far as regards itself aa subject, relatively to thought
There/ore
experience,
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a
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It it
a
is, it
A it
it, of
is
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is in
is
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a
a
a
? 244 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intui tion, by which it is presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sojphisma figures dictionis. *
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be
plain to any one who will consider the general remark which
precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure under standing, and the section on noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality ; that is to say, we can never know, whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception ; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition ; we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If, then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance --that of subject existing per se -- to the subject as thinking being. And thus the con ception of the simple nature of substance, which connected with the objective reality of this conception, shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought whilst we remain perfectly ignorant, whether the subject composite or not.
Thought taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. In the major considered as relating and applying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand
as relating merely lo self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of thingi, but of thought, (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego always the subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, " cannot exist otherwise than as subject but only "
in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judg ment. " But this an identical proposition, and throws no lijht on \\ts mode of my existence.
? can,
? ? is
is I
it is is
;"
is
; is
I
it
?
is
a
is, a
? REFUTATION OF MEXDEtSSOHS's ABGtTltENT. 246
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub stantiality or Permanence* of the Soul.
Thh acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul -- it being granted that it is a simple being --cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition ; he saw it is not impossible
\ for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance. He endea voured to prove in his Pheedo, that the soul cannot be annihi
lated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist.
Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity), between the moment in which it and the mo ment in which not, no time can be discovered --which impossible. But this philosopher did not consider, that, grant ing the soul to possess this simple nature, which contains no parts external to each other, and consequently no extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to any less than to any other being, intensive quantity, that degree of reality in regard to all its faculties,- nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this degree of reality can become less and less through an in finite series of smaller degrees. follows, therefore, that this supposed substance --this thing, the permanence of which
not assured in any other way, may, not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently elanguescence, may employ this expression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has always degree, which may be lessened. ^ Consequently the faculty of being
There no philosophical term our language which can express, without saying too much or too little, the meaning of Beharrlichieil. Permanence will be sufficient, taken in an absolute, instead of the com monly received relative sense. -- TV.
Verschwinden.
Clearness not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of repre sentation. For certain degree of consciousness, which may not, how ever, be sufficient for recollection, to be met with in many dim re presentations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we connect as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once several notes in improvising piece of music. But representation clear, in which our consciousness sufficient for the cotuciousnett the difference of thif representation from others. If we are only conscious that there dtf
? ? ? b a
a ;
of
is
?
a
jt
*
is
is
is ifit
a
a is
if is
is, it It a
in
a
I
is
by
is
if
is,
? 24G TBAU3CENDEKTAX DIALECTIC.
conscious may be diminished ; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of the soul, therefoie, as an object of the internal sense, remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemon strable. Its permanence in life is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere conceptions, its permanence beyond life. *
f;rence, but are not conscious of the difference -- that is, what the difference is -- the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire disappearance
* There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought --of which tney have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life -- after this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, ii the possibility of the division of a timpk substance into several substances ; and conversely, of the coalition of several into oue simple substance. For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul--even that of con sciousness --as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it ; and we can believe that, as in this case everything that is real in the soul, and has a degree -- consequently its entire existence -- has been halved, a particular substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it ; and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the foi mer substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which appear under the form of matter might, (not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence, of which the former would be but the phtenomenal appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the formei repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from allowing any value to such chimeras ; and the principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of the categories-- that of substance, for example --is possible. But il Ose rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority of tbt
? ? ? ? OF TUK I'-Ui. W. uutailS Oi HUE 1HSASOK.
247
now, we take the above propositions--as they must be ac<< cepted as valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology --in synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation, with the proposition, " All thinking beings are, as such, substances," backwards through the series, till the circle completed we come at last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational psychology, substances are held t. o be conscious, independently of external things nay, asserted that, in relation to the permanence which a necessary characteristic of substance, they can of themselves determine external things. follows that Idealism --at least problematical Idealism, perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system.
And, the existence of outward things not held to be re quisite to the determination of the existence of substance in
? time the existence of these outward things at all,
assumption which remains without the possibility of proof.
But we proceed analytically -- the " think " as propo sition containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being the principle -- and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence in time and space without the aid of any thing external the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of thinking being, but with reality, and the properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality cogitated, after everything empirical had been
abstracted as
2.
as Subject,
shown in the following table think,
3.
at simple Subject,
4.
as identical Subject,
every state of my thought.
faculty of thought -- without any intuition, whereby an object
gives self-subsistciu being, merely because the unity of apperception in
thought cannot allow him to believe composite being, instead of de claring, as he ought to do, that he unable to explain the possibility of thinking nature; what ought to hinder the materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist in directly opposite manner -- still preserving the formal unity r. ^quirtd
bis opponent
--
gratuitous
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a
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if inisa It
;
is
:
is a a;
a
I
is
;
if
is
is
it is
;
? 248 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in tliis second pro position, whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject,
and not also as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense ; and it remains undetermined, whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not. Bat in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception --the simple Ego in the re presentation to which all connection and separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself important ; even although it presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real that is at the same time simple ; for points, which are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely think ing subject. But, because my existence is considered in the
? first proposition as given, for it does not mean, " Every think ing being exists" (for this"wIould be predicating of them abso lute necessity,) but only, exist thinking ;" the proposition is quite empirical, and contains the determinability of my ex istence merely in relation to my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal intuition ; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism
is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is, that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart from external objects.
And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity of consciousness --which we cognize only for the reason that it is indispensable to the possibility of expr- rience -- to pass the bounds of experience (our existence in this life) ; and to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical -- but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly undetermined --proposition, " I think ? "
There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doc trine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassabh)
? ? ? OF TttE PAHAL00I3MS OF PUKE ItEASOlT. 2-19
limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to pre vent on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of baseless spiritualism. teaches ua
to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this our human life, as hint to abandon fruitless speculation and to direct, to practical use, our knowledge of ourselves --which, although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from higher source, and regulates its procedure as our destiny reached far beyoud the boun daries of experience and life.
? From all this evident that rational psychology hns its origin in mere misunderstanding. The unity of conscious ness, which lies at the basis of the categories, considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object and the category of substance applied to the intuition. But this unity nothing more than the unity in tkouyht, by which no object
given to which therefore the category of substance-- which always presupposes given intuition --cannot be ap
plied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very rea son that cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories for, to cogitate these, must lay at the foundation its owu pure self-consciousness -- the very thing that wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis, can not determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, the latter
impossible, the former, as an attempt means of the categories as thinking
to determine itself being in general,
The " think"
tion, and contains the proposition, " exist. " But cannot say " Every thing, which thinks, exists for in this ease the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing necessary beings, Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, " think," as Des Cartes maintained -- because in this case the major premiss, " Every thing, which thinks, existi," must precede --but the two propositions art identical. The proposition " think," expresses an undetermined em pirical intuition, that is, perception,* (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposi-
? See 2*1 -Tr.
no less so. *
as has been already stated, an empirical proposi-
? ? ;" I
is, is
byis
is aa a
*
is
a
it,
if
1 itit a
i)it, a I;
I Ia
;
it
;
is
if
it a
is
It
is ;
? 260 TBANSCKNDKNTiiL DIALECTIC.
Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of ex perience --a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved the futility of the attempt of spe culative philosophy in this region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our pro position must be proved apodeictically ; or, if this is unsuc cessful, the sources of this inability must be sought for, and if these are discovered to exist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the same law of renunciation, and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic assertion.
But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future
life, upon principles of the practical conjoined with the specu lative use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation ; for
the merely speculative proof hns never had any influence upon the common reason of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it and spinning it like a top ; and even in their eyes it has never been able to pre sent any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The
tion); but it precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time ; and existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that hsj been given, only, however, to thought in general--but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon) but only as something that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, " I think. " For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition, " I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But without some empirical representation, which presents to ths mind material for thought, the mental act, " I think," would not take place ; and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual faculty.
? ? ? ? Of THE FARALOGISilS OF tUllK ttEASO:*. 251
proofs which have been current among men, preserve their valu<< undiminished ; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisti cated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province -- the arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement of nature ; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own exist ence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world, in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle, that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is superfluous, nothing dispropor tionate to its use, nothing nnsuited to its end ; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to its destination iu life,--we shall find that man, who alone is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be ex cepted from it. For his natural gifts, not merely as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them -- but especially the moral law in him, stretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound
to prize the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all ad vantageous consequences --even the shadowy gift of posthu mous fame -- above everything ; and he is conscious of an in ward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in this world --without regard to mere sublunary interests --the citizen of a better. This mighty, irresistible proof -- accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a pur pose in everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless immeusity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our know ledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith -- remains to humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the necessity of an existence after death.
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the conception -- in every respect undetermined -- of a think ing being in general. I cogitate myself in "behalf of a pos sible experience, at the same time making abstraction of all actual experience ; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious
? ? ? ? 2. V2 TtlASSCENDF. XT. AL DTAT. ECTTC.
of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible abstraction of my em pirically determined existence with the supposed conscious ness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self ; and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination of cognition.
The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking ; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word, al though occupying itself with an object of experience --only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heteroge
neity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the ob jects of the external senses ; inasmuch ns the formal condition of the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also. But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far ns the one appears exter nally to the other -- consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogene ous ; this difficulty disappears. There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the question --how a com munity of substances is possible ; a question which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader, after what in our Analytic has been said of primitive forces and fa culties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human
cognition.
Genebal Remahk.
On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.
The proposition " I think," or, " I exist thinking," is an empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phseno- menon ; and thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul,
even in thought, is merely a pha;nomenon ; and in this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts upon nothing.
? ? ? ? TRANSITION TO C08MOLOOT.
Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it does not represent the ""subject of con sciousness as a phenomenon --for this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to myself ; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode of in tuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of representation are not related to the categories of substance or of cause ; for these are functions of thought ap plicable only to our sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking ; in whst mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon --although not in so far as I am a thinking being ; but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me any property of this being ns material for thought.
? But the proposition " I think," in so far as it declares, " /
exist thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It determines the subject (which is in this case an object also,) in relation to existence ; and it cannot be given without the aid of the internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but always as a phe nomenon. In this proposition there is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of thought ; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that my thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now,
this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, and so forth not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of the representation but also for the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that of cognizing itself as nou- menon. But this impossible, for the internal empirical in tuition sensuous, and presents us with nothing but pheno menal data, which do not assist the object of pure conscious ness in its attempt to cognize itself as separate existence,
but are useful only as contributions to exp>>-ience.
? ? a
is
is
J,
; is,
in
is,
? 254 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in expert ence, but in certain firmly-established a priori lews of the use of pure reason -- laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves as legislating & priori in relation to our own existence and as determining this existence ; we should, on this supposition, find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition. We should also become aware, that in the consciousness of our existence there was an a priori content, which would serve to determine our own existence --an existence only sensuously determinable -- relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible world.
But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual, --but by what predicates ? By none other than those which are given in sensuous intuition. Thus
I should, find myself in the same position in rational psycho logy which 1 formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give
significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself : but these intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of ex perience. I should be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to their practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience --in conformity with their analogical significance when employed theoretically --to freedom and its subject. * At the same time, I should understand them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very dif
ferent principle. We have made these observations for the purpose of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel.
>> The Ego. -- 7V,
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? ? ? THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK II.
Chap. II. -- The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
We showed in tlic introduction to this part of our work,
that all transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from
dialectical arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in
its three formal species of syllogisms--just as the categories
find their logical schema in the four functions- of all judg
ments. The first kind of these sophistical arguments related
to the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all
representations in general (of the subject or bouI), in corre
spondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major of which,
as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a sub
ject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore
be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllo
gisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions
in the phenomenon ; aud, in this way, the theme of the third
kind to be treated of in the following chapter, will be the un
conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility
of objects in general.
But it is worthy of remark, that the transcendental paralo
gism produced in the mind only a one-sided illusion, in re gard to the idea of the subject of our thought ; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is completely on the side of Pneu - matism ; although this theory itself passes into nought, in the crucible of pure reason.
Very different is the case, when we apply reason to the 06- jectite synthesis of pbajnomena. Here, certainly, reason es
tablishes, with much plausibility, its principle of unconditioned
unity ; but it very soon falls into such contradictions, that it is
compelled, in relation to cosmology, to renounce its pretensions. For here a new phsenomenon of human reason meets us, -- a perfectly natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry, but into which reason of it-
self unavoidably falls. It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied conviction -- which a merely one-sided illusion produces ; but it is at the same time com- pelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a despair
? ? ? ? 256 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALLCTIC.
ing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical confi dence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhsps deserve the title of the Euthanasia of pure reason.
Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall present the reader with some considerations, in ex planation and justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cosmical conception! ; partly on ac count of this unconditioned totality, on which the conception of the world-whole is based -- a conception which is itself an idea,--partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of phsenomena --the empirical synthesis ; while, on the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all lM>ssible things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct from the cosraical conception, although it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy
ples of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, --not, how ever, to declare it valid and to appropriate but -- as the very term of conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to pre sent as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phsenomena and experience.
The Antinomy of puhe season.
SECTION FIRST. System of Cosmological Ideas.
That we may be able to enumerate with systematic preci sion these ideas according to principle, we must remark, in the first place, that from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions take their origin that the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the understanding from the un avoidable limitation of possible experience, and thus endea
? of pure reason will present us with the transcendental princi
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