No More Learning

He failed to realise, though he saw it clearly enough later, that the Saxon
situation was entirely responsible, and that Henry's humility depended
on his position in Germany; he even did his best to bring Henry and the
Saxons to terms. To Henry's appeal for absolution he responded with
enthusiasm, and early in the following year it was effected by an embassy
headed by two cardinal-bishops and accompanied by Henry's mother
Agnes.
Assured of royal support, or at any rate relieved from the embarrass-
ment of royal opposition, he now took in hand the important questions
of Church reform and the assertion of his ecclesiastical authority. He
knew the hostility he had to face. In North Italy, Archbishop Guibert
of Ravenna had submitted himself to Alexander II and promised obedience,
but little reliance could be placed on his promises; in general, the morals
of the clergy were lax, the episcopate was mutinous. In Germany, there
was an atmosphere of sullen resentment against the measures already taken
by Alexander, and of ill-will towards his successor. It was not until 1074
that the two leading metropolitans—Siegfried of Mayence, the German
Arch-Chancellor, and Anno of Cologne (ex-regent of Germany, now living
in rement and devoted to good works)-wrote to congratulate Gregory
on his election; and there is no evidence to shew that any of the others
were more forward in this respect. Siegfried took the opportunity of
expressing his pleasure and congratulations in a letter which he wrote on
the subject of the dispute between the Bishops of Prague and Olmütz,
Bohemian sees within his province. In this letter he complained of the
intervention of the late Pope in a matter which came within his own
jurisdiction; particularly that Alexander had allowed the Bishop of
Olmütz to appeal direct to Rome, and had sent legates to Bohemia who
without reference to Siegfried had suspended the Bishop of Prague from
his office. This was a test case, and Gregory replied with great vigour.
He rebutted the arguments from Canon Law which Siegfried had urged,
and accused him of neglect of his office and of arrogance towards the
Apostolic See. Siegfried's timid attempt to assert himself was overwhelmed
by the Pope's vehemence, and he made no further effort to interfere with


## p. 61 (#107) #############################################

Contest with the German episcopate
61
the papal settlement of the question. The Bishop of Prague obeyed the
Pope's summons to Rome, and Gregory, by his lenient treatment of him,
gave the episcopate a lesson in the value of ready obedience.
This was a signal victory. He passed on to deal with the questions
of simony and clerical marriage. In the first synod he held in Rome, in
Lent 1074, he repeated the decrees of his predecessors against these abuses,
and proceeded to take measures for their enforcement in Germany. The
two cardinal-bishops, who had given absolution to the king and to his
excommunicated councillors at Easter 1074, had the further task imposed
upon them of summoning a synod of German clergy, promulgating the
decrees at this synod, and enforcing acquiescence in their execution. This
was a difficult task, rendered impossible by the overbearing manner of the
papal legates. They addressed themselves first to two of the leading arch-
bishops, Siegfried of Mayence and Liemar of Bremen, with a haughty
injunction to them to hold a synod. They met their match in Liemar.
A supporter of the reform movement, the methods of the Pope and his
legates roused his pride and independence. He refused to do anything
without previous consultation with the episcopate as a whole, and sneered
at the impracticable suggestion that he should hold a synod to which his
suffragans far distant in North Germany or in Denmark would not be
able to come! Siegfried deprecated the whole business, but from timidity
rather than pride. He temporised for six months and at last called a
synod at Erfurt in October. As he expected, he was faced by a violent
outburst from the secular clergy, who fortified themselves against the
decree enforcing celibacy by the words of St Paul, and the synod broke up
in confusion. Another incident that happened at the same time well
illustrates the temper of the episcopate. Archbishop Udo of Trèves was
ordered by the Pope to investigate the charges brought against the Bishop
of Toul by one of his clergy. He held a synod at which more than twenty
bishops were present. They commenced by a unanimous protest against
the Pope's action in submitting a bishop to the indignity of having to
answer before a synod to charges that any of his clergy might please to
bring against him. Needless to say, the bishop was unanimously acquitted.
In only one quarter, in fact, could the Pope find support—in Saxony.
Here the episcopate was allied with the lay nobility in opposition to
Henry, and it was part of its policy to keep on good terms with the Pope.
It is not surprising, then, to learn that Bishop Burchard of Halberstadt,
one of the chief leaders of the Saxons, wrote to Gregory to deplore the
unworthy treatment of the papal legates in Germany, and received his
reward in a warm letter of commendation from the Pope.
Gregory now began to take vigorous action to enforce his will. Arch-
bishop Liemar, defiant to the legates who had summoned him to appear
in Rome in November, was ordered by the Pope himself to come to the
Liemar gives a lively account of his altercation with the legates in a letter to the
Bishop of Hildesheim (Sudendorf, Reg. 1, 5).
CH. 11,


## p. 62 (#108) #############################################

62
The Pope's efforts to enforce obedience in Germany
Lenten Synod of 1075. The same summons was sent to Archbishop
Siegfried, and to six of his suffragan bishops as well. The Pope further
issued circulars appealing especially to prominent laymen to assist him in
executing his decrees. Siegfried's answer to Gregory's summons was typical
of the timid man striving to extricate himself from the contest between
two violently hostile parties. Afraid to oppose the Pope's will, and equally
afraid to enforce it, he excused himself from coming to Rome on the
ground of ill-health, pleaded lack of time for his inability to examine the
conduct of the six suffragans mentioned in Gregory's letter, but declared
that he had sent on the Pope's order with instructions to them to obey
it. He expressed his compliance with the decrees against simony and
clerical marriage, but urged moderation and discretion in their execution.
The synod sat at Rome from 24 to 28 February 1075. At this synod
the Pope suspended the absent and disobedient Liemar, and passed the
same sentence on the Bishops of Bamberg, Strasbourg, and Spires, three
of the six suffragans of Mayence whose attendance he had ordered; the
other three seem to have satisfied him, temporarily at any rate, by their
appearance or through representatives. Decrees were also passed against
simony and clerical marriage, with the special addition, in conformity with
Gregory's policy, of a clause calling on the laity to assist by refraining
from attending the mass celebrated by an offending priest. In sending
the text of these decrees to Archbishop Siegfried', he shewed that the
moderation urged by Siegfried was not in his mind at all. The decrees
are to be issued and enforced in their full rigour. Instructions to the same
effect were sent to other metropolitans and bishops, for instance to the
Archbishops of Cologne and Magdeburg, with injunctions to hold synods
to enforce the decrees. This was again pressed on Siegfried and distressed
him still further. He eventually replied to the Pope in July or August,
in a letter intended to be tactful and to shift responsibility from his
own shoulders. It was no use; Gregory was quite firm. He replied on
3 September, acknowledging the weight of Siegfried's arguments but
declaring them of no effect when set in the balance against his pastoral
duty. Siegfried was forced to comply, especially as the submission of
the Saxons took away from him his chief excuse for delay. He held a
synod at Mayence in October, and, as before, it was broken up by the
turbulence of the secular clergy. But the whole question was now to be
transferred to a larger stage, and the next act in the drama is the
Council of Worms.
In this struggle with the German episcopate, in which matters were
rapidly coming to a crisis, Gregory had been able to act unhampered by
royal interference, and so far his policy of effecting a reconciliation with
1 Jaffé, Mon. Greg. ep. coll. 3. The same letter was sent as well to Archbishop
Werner of Magdeburg (ep. coll. 4) and to Bishop Otto of Constance (ep. coll. 5). There
seems little doubt that these letters should be dated February 1075 and not, as by Jaffé,
March 1074.


## p. 63 (#109) #############################################

and in North Italy
63
Henry had justified itself. But in North Italy, where he required the
active co-operation rather than the non-interference of the king, the
policy had not been so successful. Little, however, could be expected
from Henry when his position in Germany itself was so difficult, and for
two years Gregory seems to have persisted in his confidence in the king's
sincerity. He did complain, indeed, in December 1074 that Henry had
not yet taken any action with regard to Milan, and he administered a
gentle warning as to the councillors he had around him. But the more
personal letter he wrote at the same time gives expression to his confi-
dence in the king. In this letter he detailed his plan of leading a vast
expedition to the East both to protect the Eastern Christians and to
bring them back to the orthodox faith; he is careful to seek Henry's
advice and assistance in this, because in the event of his going he intends
to leave the Roman Church under Henry's care and protection. If he
could trust the king to this extent, he was profoundly suspicious of his
councillors and of their confederates the Lombard bishops. At the Lenten
Synod of 1075, three Italian bishops were suspended for disobedience to
his summons, and five of Henry's councillors, promoters of simony, are to
be excommunicated if they have not appeared in Rome and given satis-
faction by 1 June. At the same synod was passed the first decree against
lay investiture.
Against the practice of lay ownership of churches, great and small,
the reformed Papacy had already raised its protest, and the necessity of
obtaining suitable agents for the work of reform had turned its attention
to the method of appointment. While denying the right of the king to
control appointments, the Popes allowed him a considerable though un-
defined rôle, both as head of the laity and as the natural protector of
the Church. In this Gregory VII acquiesced, and where the appointments
were good from the spiritual point of view, as was the case in England
under William I, he was little disposed to question the method. It was
the insubordination of the episcopate in Germany and North Italy, and
especially the clash of papal and imperial claims at Milan, that led him
to take definite action against a royal control that led to bad appoint-
ments. The king, for his part, regarded bishoprics as being in his gift, į
and allowed no bishop to exercise his functions until he had invested him
with ring and staff. To the Church party the use of these symbols be-
tokened the conferring by the king of spiritual functions; this was an
abuse the removal of which might lead to the restoration of true canonical
election. In Gregory VII's eyes it was clearly not an end in itself, but
only a step towards the end, which was through free election by clergy
and people to obtain a personnel adequate for its spiritual functions and
amenable to papal authority.
The importance of lay investiture had been early recognised by
Cardinal Humbert in his Liber adversus Symoniacos, but Gregory VII was
the first Pope to legislate directly on the subject. The first decree
CH. II.


## p. 64 (#110) #############################################

64
The first decree against lay investiture
prohibiting lay investiture (though not imposing any penalty on laymen
who invested) was passed at this synod in 1075. But it was never properly
published. Bishops elected and invested in 1075 and 1076 could plead
ignorance of its existence and the Pope accepted their plea. No German
writer seems to know of it, and we are indebted for its wording solely
to a Milanese writer, Arnulf, which gives weight to the suggestion that
the Milanese situation was principally responsible for the framing of the
decree. The fact was that Gregory knew that he was dealing with a long-
established custom, regarded by the king as a prescriptive right, and he
knew that he must walk warily. He first of all sent the text of the decree
to the king accompanied by a message to explain that it was no new step
that he was taking but a restoration of canonical practice, and urging
the king, if he felt his rights to be in any way infringed, to communicate
with him, so that the matter could be arranged on a just and amicable
footing. Gregory attempted to establish his point by negotiation, and
he seems to have imagined that the king would recognise the fairness of
his claim. Henry made no reply to these overtures, and the Pope does
not seem to have been immediately perturbed by this ominous silence. In
July he warmly praised the king for his zeal in resisting simony and
clerical marriage, which gives him reason, he says, to hope for still higher
and better things—acquiescence, doubtless, in the new decree. Just after
this, two ambassadors from Henry arrived in Rome with a strictly con-
fidential message to the Pope to be communicated to no one except the
king's mother Agnes, or Beatrice and Matilda of Tuscany. This has been
conjectured, with great probability, to have had reference to the king's
desire to be crowned Emperor by the Pope; if this be so we have a ready
explanation of his willingness to keep on good terms with the Pope, even
after his great victory over the Saxons in June. Gregory took some time
to reply, owing to illness; but, when he did, he warmly congratulated
the king on his victory over the rebels, and wrote in a tone of confidence
that they were going to work together in harmony.
This was the last time that he expressed any such confidence, and in
the meantime the situation in Italy, especially at Milan, had been getting
steadily worse. Revolt against the Pope was spreading in North Italy,
and Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna once more took the opportunity of
proclaiming the independence of his see. In Milan, Erlembald, the leader
of the Pataria and practical ruler of the city, had, in accordance with the
Pope's appeal to the laity, forbidden the offending clergy to exercise their
functions, which were usurped by a priest of his own party, Liutprand.
A riot ensued in which Erlembald was killed and Liutprand mutilated.
Their enemies in triumph reported the facts to Henry, and asked him to
appoint a new archbishop in place of his previous nominee Godfrey, from
whom he had practically withdrawn support. That Henry for some time
ignored this request may have encouraged the Pope in the confidence
that he expressed in August. But, with the situation in Germany be-


## p. 65 (#111) #############################################

The events of the autumn of 1075
65
coming increasingly favourable, Henry seems to have felt himself strong
enough to follow his own inclinations, and to listen again to those coun-
cillors from whom Gregory had been most anxious to separate him. His
two ambassadors, who were still waiting instructions from him in Rome,
suddenly received a message at the beginning of September to make public
what he had previously wished to be a close secret, a discourtesy to the
Pope which the latter rightly felt to be ominous. And at the same time
he sent an embassy into Italy which revealed a complete change in his
policy. It was headed by Count Eberhard of Nellenburg, who was almost
certainly one of the councillors placed under a ban by the Pope. Its first
object was to make an alliance with the Lombard bishops and to attempt
to ally the king with the excommunicated Norman duke, Robert Guiscard.
Further, by royal authority, bishops were appointed to the vacant sees of
Fermo and Spoleto, sees which lay within the provincia Romana'. But
the main purpose of the embassy was to make a settlement of affairs at
Milan, so as completely to re-establish the old imperial authority.
Acceding to the request of the anti-Patarian party, Henry ignored both
his own nominee Godfrey and also Atto, whom the Pope recognised as
archbishop, and proceeded to invest one Tedald, who was consecrated
archbishop by the suffragans of Milan. As in 1072, Henry so long
compliant deliberately provoked a rupture on the question of Milan. It
was an issue in which imperial and papal interests vitally conflicted, and
now that he was master once more in Germany it was an issue that he
felt himself strong enough to raise. Henry had revealed himself in his
true colours. The Pope's eyes were opened. He realised at last the meaning
of Henry's submission in 1073, and that it was due not to sincerity but
to defeat. It was clear that compliance could be expected from Henry
only when his fortunes were at a low ebb, and that at such times no re-
liance could be placed on his promises. The Pope's dream is at an end;
he is now awake to the realities of the situation, the bitter frustration of
all his hopes.
His tone to the usurper Tedald and his orders to the suffragan bishops
of Milan were sharp and uncompromising. With the king he tried the
effect of threats to see if they would succeed where persuasion had failed.
By the king's own ambassadors he sent him a letter in which he summed
up the leading offences of Henry-he is reported to be associating with
his excommunicated councillors, and if this be true must do penance and
seek absolution; he is certainly guilty with regard to Fermo and Spoleto
and most culpable of all in his action at Milan, which was a direct breach
of all his promises and a proof of the falseness of his pretended humility
and obedience to Rome. A more mild rebuke follows for Henry's silence
to his overtures regarding the investiture decree; if the king felt himself
aggrieved he ought to have stated his grievances. Until he has given satis-
faction on all these points, the king must expect no answer to his previous
1 Hence Gregory's complaint that they were men unknown to him.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. II.
5


## p. 66 (#112) #############################################

66
The Council of Worms, 24 January 1076
enquiry (again, doubtless, on the question of his coronation at Rome).
He concludes with a warning to the king to remember the fate of Saul,
who, like Henry, had displayed pride and disobedience after his victory;
it is the humility of David that a righteous king must imitate. The letter
was stern, but not uncompromising; the message given to the ambassadors
to deliver by word of mouth was more direct. It amounted to a distinct
threat that, failing compliance, Henry must expect the sentence of
excommunication, and possibly of deposition also, to be pronounced
against him from the papal chair. This verbal message was in effect an
ultimatum.
The embassy reached Henry early in January 1076. He could not
brook threats of this nature when policy no longer required him to yield
to them. He had been humble to the Pope only until he had defeated
his other foe; now that he was victorious, the need for humility was past,
and he could deal directly with the other enemy that was menacing the
imperial rights. His previous humiliation only made his desire for revenge
more keen, and his indignation demanded a speedy revenge. The bishops
he knew to be as bitter against the Pope as himself; and he summoned
them to a Council at Worms on 24 January. The short notice given in
the summons must have prevented the attendance of several, such as
Archbishop Liemar, who would gladly have been present; even so, two
archbishops, Siegfried of Mayence and Udo of Trèves, and twenty-four
bishops, subscribed their names to the proceedings. There was no need
for persuasion or deliberation. They readilyrenounced allegiance to the
Pope, and concocted a letter addressed to him in which they brought
forward various charges (of adultery, perjury, and the like) to blacken his
character, but laid their principal stress on the only serious charge they
could bring—his treatment of the episcopate. The king composed a letter
on his own account, making the bishops' cause his own, and indignantly
repudiating Gregory's claim to exercise authority over himself, who as
the Lord's anointed was above all earthly judgment, ordered him to de-
scend from the papal throne and yield it to a more worthy occupant. The
next step was to obtain the adhesion of the North Italian bishops,
which was very readily given at a council at Piacenza, and to Roland
of Parma was entrusted the mission of delivering to the Pope the
sentence of deposition pronounced by the king and the bishops of the
Empire.
At Christmas 1075 had occurred the outrage of Cencius, who laid
violent hands on the Pope and hurried him, a prisoner, into a fortress of
his own. Gregory was rescued by the Roman populace, and had to inter-
vene to prevent them from tearing his captor in pieces. The horror
aroused at this incident gave an added reverence to the person of the Pope,
and it was in these circumstances, and while the Lenten Synod was about
to commence its deliberations, that Roland of Parma arrived. The message
1 Except Bishop Herman of Metz, who was doubtless coerced into siguing.


## p. 67 (#113) #############################################

Lenten Synod at Rome. Excommunication of Henry IV 67
which he delivered to the assembled synod was an outrage beside which
that of Cencius paled into insignificance. It shocked the general feeling
of the day, which was accordingly prejudiced on the Pope's side at the
commencement of the struggle. At the synod itself there was a scene of
wild disorder and uproar. The Pope, depressed at the final ruin of his
hopes and at the prospect of the struggle before him, alone remained calm;
he intervened to protect Roland from their fury, and succeeded at last in
quieting the assembly and recalling it to its deliberations. The verdict
was assured and he proceeded to pass sentence on his aggressors. Arch-
bishop Siegfried and the other German bishops that subscribed are
sentenced to deposition and separated from communion with the Church;
a proviso is added giving the opportunity to those who had been coerced
into signing to make their peace before 1 August. The same sentence is
passed on the Lombard bishops. Finally he deals with the king in an
impressive utterance addressed to St Peter, in whose name he declares
him deposed and absolves his subjects from their oath of allegiance; and
then he bans him from the communion of the Church, recounting his
various offences-communicating with the excommunicated councillors;
his many iniquities; his contempt of papal warnings; his breach of the
unity of the Church by his attack on the Pope.
The hasty violence and the fantastic charges of the king and the bishops
contrasted very strikingly with the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
Pope. Confident himself in the justice of his action, there were some who
doubted, and for these he wrote a circular letter detailing the events that
led to Henry's excommunication. The facts spoke for themselves, but
there were still some who continued to doubt whether in any circum-
stances the Pope had the right to excommunicate the king; to convince
these he wrote a letter to Bishop Herman of Metz (who had hastened to
make his peace with the Pope for his enforced signature at Worms), in
which he justifies himself by precedents, by the power given to St Peter,
and by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers. It is rather a hurried
letter, in which he answers briefly and somewhat impatiently several
questions put to him by Herman. He makes it quite clear, however,
that he regards the spiritual power as superior to the temporal, and that
his authority extends over all temporal rulers. Henceforward there is no
sign of his earlier attitude which seemed to imply adherence to the
Gelasian standpoint; he is now the judge who decides whether the king
is doing that which is right (i. e. is worthy to be king), and the test of
right-doing is obedience to the papal commands. One point calls for re-
mark. It is only the excommunication that he justifies. The sentence of
deposition plays little part in 1076; it is not a final sentence as in 1080,
and even by Henry's enemies in Germany, who considered this to be a
question rather for them to decide, little attention is paid to this part of
the sentence. Probably in the Pope's eyes it was subsidiary; deposition
and the absolving of the king's subjects from their oath of allegiance was
CH. II.
5-2


## p. 68 (#114) #############################################

68
Results of the excommunication
a necessary consequence of excommunication in order to save from the
same penalty the subjects of the excommunicated king. As is clear from
his letter to Bishop Herman, he contemplated the absolution of the
king as a possibility in the near future, and he did not at present
contemplate the appointment of a successor to Henry.
The king received intelligence of the papal sentence at Easter, and im-
mediately summoned a council to meet at Worms on Whitsunday. The
crisis had been reached. The king had ordered the Pope to descend from
St Peter's chair; the Pope treated the king as contumacious, excommuni-
cated him, and declared him to be no longer king. Which was to prevail?
The answer to this was quickly given. The papal ban was seen to be
speedily efficacious. It frightened the more timid of Henry's adherents,
it impressed moderate men who had been horrified by the king's attack on
the Pope. Moreover it gave the excuse for revolt to raise its head in
Saxony once more, and to win adherents from among the higher nobility
in the rest of Germany, alienated by the high-handed measures of the
king in his moment of triumph and resenting their own lack of influence
in the affairs of the kingdom. The situation in Germany is dealt with in
another chapter. Here it is enough to say that Henry found himself iso-
lated, and faced by a coalition far more dangerous to his power than the
revolt of 1073. His summons to councils at Worms and Mayence were
ignored, and the bishops of Germany were hastening to make their peace
with the Pope, either directly or indirectly through the papal legate,
Bishop Altmann of Passau. Only in North Italy were his adherents still
faithful, and with them it was not possible for him to join forces. The
imperial authority was humiliated between the encroachments of the
spiritual power on the one hand, and the decentralising policy of the
leading nobles on the other. At the Diet of princes held at Tribur in
October these two powers came to terms for mutual action.
Two papal
legates were present, and the Pope's letter of the previous month, in
which for the first time he contemplates the possibility of a successor to
Henry, was probably before the diet. He insists in that event on being
consulted as to their choice, requiring careful information as to per-
sonal character; he claims that the Apostolic See has the right of confirm-
ing the election made by the nobles. Such a right was not likely to be
conceded by them, but to obtain papal support they were willing to
satisfy him essentially. Henry was forced to send a solemn promise of
obedience to the Pope and of satisfaction for his offences, and to pro-
mulgate his change of mind to all the nobles, lay and ecclesiastical, of the
kingdom.
The diet then arrived at two important decisions. Accepting
the justice of Henry's excommunication, they agreed that if he had not
obtained absolution by 22 February they would no longer recognise him
as king. Secondly, they summoned a council to be held at Augsburg on
2 February, at which they invited the Pope to be present and to preside;
at this council the question of Henry's worthiness to reign was to be


## p. 69 (#115) #############################################

Henry's journey to Canossa
69
decided and, if necessary, the choice of a successor was to be made. These
decisions were communicated to the Pope, and also to Henry, who was
remaining on the other side of the river at Oppenheim, carefully watched,
with only a few attendants, almost a prisoner.
The Pope received the news with delight and accepted the invitation
with alacrity. It meant for him the realisation of his aims and the
exhibition to the world of the relative importance of the spiritual and
temporal powers; Pope Gregory VII sitting in judgment on King
Henry IV would efface the unhappy memory of King Henry III sitting
in judgment on Pope Gregory VI thirty years before. He left Rome in
December and travelled north into Lombardy. But the escort promised
him from Germany did not arrive, and the news reached him that Henry
had crossed the Alps and was in Italy. Uncertain as to the king's inten-
tions and fully aware of the hostility of the Lombards, he took refuge
in Countess Matilda's castle of Canossa.
The king was in a desperate position. He could expect little mercy
from the council of his enemies at Augsburg in February. The conjunc-
tion of the Pope and the German nobles was above all things to be
avoided. The only resource left to him was to obtain absolution, and to
obtain it from the Pope in Italy, before he arrived in Germany. To effect
this a humiliation even more abject than that of 1073 was necessary: he
must appear in person before the Pope not as a king but as a penitent
sinner; it would be hard for the Pope to refuse absolution to a humble
penitent. His decision arrived at, he acted with singular courage and
resolution. He had to elude the close vigilance of the nobles and escape
from his present confinement; as they were guarding the other passes into
Italy, only the Mont Cenis pass was left to him, which was in the control
of his wife's family, the counts of Savoy; but the winter was one of the
most severe on record, and the passage of the Mont Cenis pass was an
undertaking that might have daunted the hardiest mountaineer. All
these difficulties Henry overcame, and with his wife, his infant son, and
a few personal attendants he reached the plains of Lombardy. Here he
found numerous supporters, militant anti-Papalists, eager to flock to his
banner. It was a serious temptation, but his good sense shewed him that
it would ultimately have been fatal, and he resisted it. With his meagre
retinue he continued his journey until he arrived at the gates of Canossa,
where the final difficulty was to be overcome, the obtaining of the papal
absolution. To this end he strove to obtain the intercession of his god-
father Abbot Hugh of Cluny, of the Countess Matilda, of any of those
present whose influence might prevail with the Pope. And he carried
out to the full his design of throwing off the king and appearing as
the sinner seeking absolution; bare-footed, in the woollen garb of the
penitent, for three days he stood humbly in the outer courtyard of
Canossa.
There are few moments in history that have impressed later genera-
CH. II.


## p. 70 (#116) #############################################

70
Canossa
tions so much as this spectacle of the heir to the Empire standing in the
courtyard of Canossa, a humble suppliant for papal absolution. But it
is within the castle that we must look for the real drama of Canossa.
Paradoxical as it sounds, it was the king who had planned and achieved
this situation; the plans of the Pope were upset by this sudden appear-
ance, his mind was unprepared for the emergency. The three days of
waiting are not so much the measure of Henry's humiliation as of
Gregory's irresolution. Could he refuse absolution to one so humble and
apparently so penitent? The influence of those on whom he was wont to
lean for spiritual help, especially the Abbot of Cluny, urged him to
mercy; the appeal of the beloved Countess Matilda moved him in the
same direction. But they only saw a king in penitential garb; he had
the bitter experience of the last two years to guide him, and what confi-
dence could he feel that the penitence of Henry was more sincere now,
when his need was greater, than it had been in 1073? He saw before him
too the prospect of the wrecking of all his hopes, the breach of his
engagement with the German nobles, which would probably result
from an absolution given in circumstances that neither he nor they had
contemplated. His long hesitation was due, then, to the conflict in his
mind; it was not a deliberate delay designed to increase to the utmost the
degradation of the king.
But at last the appeal to the divine mercy prevailed over all other
considerations. The doors were opened and Henry admitted to the Pope's
presence; the ban was removed, and the king was received once more
into communion with the Church. From him the Pope extracted such
assurances of his penitence and guarantees for his future conduct as would
justify the absolution and at the same time leave the situation as far as
possible unaltered from the papal point of view. With his hand on the
Gospels the king took an oath to follow the Pope's directions with regard
to the charges of the German nobles against him, whichever way they
might tend, and further by no act or instigation of his to impede
Gregory from coming into Germany or to interfere with his safe-conduct
while there. The Pope sent a copy of this oath to the German nobles
with a letter describing the events at Canossa. He realised that the
absolution of Henry in Italy would appear to them in the light of a be-
trayal of the compact he had entered into with them. His letter is an
explanation, almost an apology of his action; while he points out that
1 Or contemporary opinion so little. Bismarck's famous words “zu Canossa gehen
wir nicht" indicate the aspect of Canossa that impresses the modern mind. But the
brief allusions to Canossa in contemporary writers only refer to the king's absolution
and its political results; it did not occur to them that the monarchy had been
degraded by Henry's action. His seat on the throne had been shaken by the ex-
communication; he righted himself by his penance at Canossa.
2 This letter ! ( Reg. iv, 12) is our only real authority for the details of Canossa.
Lampert of Hersfeld's account is clearly based on the Pope's letter, with characteristic
embellishments of his own invention.


## p. 71 (#117) #############################################

The election of Rudolf as anti-king
71
the non-appearance of the promised escort had prevented him from
reaching Germany, he is careful to insist firstly that it was impossible for
him to refuse absolution, secondly that he has entered into no engagement
with the king and that his purpose is as before to be present at a council
in Germany. He lingered, in fact, for some months in North Italy,
waiting for the escort that never came; at last he resigned himself to the
inevitable and slowly retraced his steps to Rome, which he reached at the
beginning of September.
Henry's plan had been precisely fulfilled. He had counted the cost-
a public humiliation—and was prepared to pay the additional price in the
form of promises; he had obtained his end-absolution-and the results
he had anticipated from this were to prove the success of his policy? . In
Lombardy he resumed his royal rights, but resisted the clamour of his
Italian adherents, whose ardour he most thoroughly disappointed; he
must still walk with great discretion, and Germany, not Italy, was his
immediate objective. Thither he soon returned, and the effects of his
absolution were at once revealed. By the majority of his subjects he was
regarded as the lawful sovereign once more. He had endured a grave
injury to imperial prestige, but he had administered an important check
to the two dangerous rivals of imperial power—the spiritual authority
and the feudal nobility.
The news of Henry's absolution came as a shock to his enemies in
Germany, upsetting their plans and disappointing their expectations.
Nor were they comforted by the Pope's effort to reassure them. They
decided, however, to proceed with their original purpose and to hold a
diet at Forchheim in March. Their invitation to the Pope to be present
at this diet must have contained a reference to their disappointment at
his action, for in his reply he finds it necessary to justify himself again,
laying stress also on their failure to provide an escort. This was still the
difficulty that prevented him from coming to Germany, but he sent two
papal legates who were present at Forchheim, and who seem on their own
responsibility to have confirmed the decision of the nobles and to have
given papal sanction to the election of Duke Rudolf of Swabia as king.
The election of Rudolf created a difficult situation, but one full of
possibilities for the Pope which he was not slow to recognise. He refused,
indeed, to confirm the action of his legates at Forchheim, but he recog-
nised the existence of two kings and claimed for himself the decision
between them. If he could establish this claim and obtain acquiescence
in his decision, the predominance of the spiritual power would be revealed
as a fact. His decision must not be hurried; it must be given only after
clear evidence and on the spiritual and moral grounds which were the
justification of the supremacy he claimed. Righteousness must be the
supreme test; he will give his decision to the king cui iustitia favet.
1 This is very clearly stated by the writer most favourable to him, Vita Heinrici
imperatoris, c. 3, SGUS, p. 16.
3
CB, II.


## p. 72 (#118) #############################################

72
The Pope's neutrality
Again and again he emphasised this, and that the marks of iustitia were
humility and obedience, obedience to the commandments of God and so
to St Peter, and through St Peter to himself. Obedience to the Pope was
to be the final test of worthiness to rule, and he gave one practical
application of this principle. He still continued for a time to cherish the
hope that he would preside in person over a council in Germany; when
this was proved impossible, his plan was to send legates to preside in his
place. From both kings he expected assistance. The king who was con-
victed of hindering the holding of the council would be deposed, and
judgment given in favour of the other; for as Gregory the Great had said,
“even kings lose their thrones if they presume to oppose apostolic
decrees. ” Naturally his attitude gave intense dissatisfaction to both
Henry and Rudolf; neither felt strong enough to stand alone, and both
expected papal support. Henry urged the Pope to excommunicate the
traitor Rudolf, who had presumed to set himself up against God's anointed.
The supporters of Rudolf were equally persistent. The Pope had absolved
them from their allegiance to Henry. In conformity with this they had
made a compact with him for joint action, a compact which they felt he
had broken by his absolution of Henry. They had persisted, however,
with the scheme and had elected Rudolf, and papal legates had been
present and confirmed the election. Moreover, a garbled version of
Canossa soon prevailed among them, which made it appear that the king
had been granted absolution on conditions (distinct from those in his oath)
which he had immediately broken, and was thereby again excommunicate
In this view they were again supported by the papal legates, who continued
to embarrass the Pope by exceeding their instructions. Rudolf and his
supporters can hardly be blamed for interpreting the action of the legates
as performed on behalf of the Pope and by his orders. His continued
neutrality and his constant reference to two kings only bewildered and
irritated them. He persisted, however, in neutrality, undeterred by the
complaints of either side, determined to take no action until the righteous-
ness of one party or the absence of it in the other could be made apparent.
But there could never have been much doubt as to the final decision. He
always shewed complete confidence in Rudolf's rectitude; his previous
experience could have given him little confidence in Henry. The three
days' hesitation at Canossa had ended when he allowed himself to be
assured of Henry's penitence; the hesitation of the three years following
Canossa was to be resolved when he could feel complete assurance of
Henry's guilt.
From 1077 to 1080 the decision in Germany is naturally the chief
object of the Pope's attention. This did not divert his mind from the
important questions of Church government and papal authority, but to
some extent it hampered and restricted his actions; it would appear that
he was careful to avoid any cause of friction with Henry which might
compromise the settlement of the great decision. His authority was set


## p. 73 (#119) #############################################

Papal legislation, 1078-1079
73
at naught by the bishops of North Italy, who refused to execute his decrees
and defied his repeated excommunications. In Germany there is hardly a
trace of the struggle that had been so bitter in 1074 and 1075; this was
mainly due to the confusion arising from the state of civil war. Probably
too the German episcopate was not anxious to engage in another trial
of strength with the Pope. Their revolt at Worms had resulted in
bringing them in submission to the Pope's feet, and their leader, Arch-
bishop Siegfried of Mayence, had given up all further thoughts of revolt
against him. He had even abandoned his royal master and had con-
secrated Rudolf as king; his instinct in every crisis for the losing side
remained with him to the end. In Gregory's correspondence during this
period there is an almost complete absence of reference to ecclesiastical
affairs in Germany. At the same time it is the period of his chief legis-
lative activity. At the Lenten and November Synods of 1078, especially
at the latter, he issued a number of decrees dealing with the leading ques-
tions of Church discipline, most of which were subsequently incorporated
by Gratian into his Decretum. . The increased stringency of the measures
taken to deal with ecclesiastical offenders is the principal feature of these
decrees. Bishops are ordered to enforce clerical chastity in their dioceses,
under penalty of suspension. The sacraments of married clergy had
previously been declared invalid, and the laity ordered not to hear the
mass of a married priest; now entry into churches is forbidden to married
clergy. All ordinations, simoniacal or otherwise uncanonical, are declared
null and void, as are the orders of those ordained by excommunicated
bishops. Naturally, then, the ordinations of simoniacal bishops are invalid;
an exception is made in the case of those ordained nescienter et sine pretio
by simoniacal bishops before the papacy of Nicholas II, who, after the
laying-on of hands, might be confirmed in their orders! As to the en-
forcement of these decrees by the Pope we hear nothing; but they raised
issues which were to be seriously contested after his death, and his imme-
diate successors were eventually to take less extreme views. Further, the
Pope dealt with the unlawful intervention of the laity in ecclesiastical
affairs. Not only are the laity sternly prohibited from holding Church pro-
perty or tithes; a decree is also passed in November 1078 condemning the
practice of lay investiture. It is noticeable that it only prohibits investi-
ture with the spiritual office, and that it enforces penalties only on the
recipients, not on the laity who invest. Finally, there were a number of
decrees connected with points of doctrine, the most important of which was
issued after considerable debate at the Lenten Synod of 1079, affirming
the substantial change of the elements after consecration. It was an
answer to the heresy of Berengar of Tours, who is compelled once more to
recant; Gregory as before shewed great leniency in dealing with him, and
actually threatened with excommunication anyone who should molest him.
Reg. vi, 39. Saltet, Les Réordinations, pp. 205 sq. , fails to notice this im-
portant letter, and therefore forms a different conclusion as to Gregory's attitude.
1
CH. II.


## p. 74 (#120) #############################################

74
Excommunication and deposition of Henry IV, 1080
All this legislation, important as it was and fruitful in future contro-
versies, was subsidiary to the question of the German kingdom, which at
every synod took the leading place. Gregory was continually striving to
bring about the council in Germany over which his legates were to preside.
Both kings promised to co-operate and to abide by the decision of the
legates; both promised an escort to ensure the safe conduct of the legates.
But nothing was done by either; Rudolf was doubtless unable, Henry
was certainly unwilling. There was in consequence a strong feeling at the
Lenten Synod of 1079 that the Pope should immediately decide for Rudolf,
Gregory, however, persevered and contented himself with renewed promises,
guaranteed by oath, from the ambassadors of both kings. Henry was be-
coming impatient. As his position in Germany grew more secure, his
need to conciliate the Pope became less urgent. At the Lenten Synod of
1080 his ambassadors appeared not with promises but with the demand,
accompanied probably by threats, that the Pope should immediately
excommunicate Rudolf; Rudolf's ambassadors replied with a string of
charges against Henry, to prove his unrighteousness and insincerity. The
Pope could remain neutral no longer. Henry's embassy had provided the
evidence he required to prove the king's breach of faith. Against Henry
the decision was given.
The proceedings of the synod commenced with a renewal of the decree
against lay investiture, accompanied, now that negotiation with Henry
was at an end, by a further decree threatening with excommunication the
lay power that presumed to confer investiture of bishopric or abbey. A
third decree enforced the pure canonical election of bishops, and provided
that, where this was in any way vitiated, the power of election should
devolve on the Pope or the metropolitan. The synod terminated with
the pronouncement of the papal decision on the German kingdom. Again
in the form of a solemn address, this time with added effect to both
St Peter and St Paul, Gregory dwells on his reluctance at every stage in his
advancement to the papal chair, and recounts the history of his relations
with Henry during the three preceding years, marking the insincerity of
the king and his final disobedience in the matter of the council, which, with
the ruin and desolation he had caused in Germany, proved his unrighteous-
ness and unfitness to reign. Then follows the sentence—Henry, for his
pride, disobedience, and falsehood, is excommunicated, deposed from his
kingdom, and his subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance. Rudolf
by his humility, obedience, truthfulness, is revealed as the righteous man;
to him the kingdom, to which he had been elected by the German people,
is entrusted by the Pope acting in the name of the two Apostles, to whom
he appeals for a vindication of his just sentence.
The sentence has a ring of finality in it that was not present in 1076.
Henry is now deposed for ever and a successor appointed in his place. So it
is on the deposition that the main emphasis is laid, as it was on the excom-
munication in 1076. Gregory's justification of his action is again addressed


## p. 75 (#121) #############################################

The Pope's justification of his sentence. Its effect
75
to Bishop Herman of Metz, though not written till the following year.
Unlike the similar letter of 1076 it shews no sign of haste or impatience;
it is a reasoned statement, full of quotations from precedent and authority,
and is concerned mainly with emphasising the complete subjection of the
secular to the spiritual power, for even the lowest in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy have powers which are not given to the greatest Emperors. It
is a mighty assertion of the unlimited autocracy of the Pope over all men,
even the greatest, on earth. And it was an assertion of authority in the
justice of which Gregory had the supremest confidence. In the sentence
he had prayed that Henry might acquire no strength in war, no victory
in his lifetime. He followed this up on Easter Monday by his famous
prophecy that Henry, if he did not repent, would be dead or deposed
before St Peter's day. He felt assured that the easy victory of 1076 would
be repeated. But the situation was entirely different from that in 1076,
as also the issue was to be. Then opinion in Germany had been shocked
by the violence and illegality of the king in attempting to expel the Pope.
The papal excommunication had been obeyed as a just retribution; to the
sentence of deposition little attention had been paid. As soon as the king
was absolved he received again the allegiance of all those who were in
favour of legitimacy and a strong central authority, and were opposed to
the local ambitions of the dukes who set up Rudolf. The Pope's claim
to have the deciding voice was not regarded very seriously by them, and
still less attention was paid to his assertion of the complete autocracy of
the spiritual power. When Henry would do nothing to make possible
the council that the Pope so earnestly desired, his action was doubtless
approved by them; and when the Pope in consequence excommunicated
and deposed the king and appointed Rudolf in his place, he aroused
very wide-spread indignation. It is Gregory who is the aggressor now,
as Henry was in 1076; it is he that is regarded now as exceeding his
powers in attempting to dethrone the temporal head of Western Christen-
dom. The situation is completely reversed, and it is not too much to say
that as a result of the papal sentence Henry's power in Germany became
stronger than it had been for some years.
Henry was probably more alive than Gregory to the real facts of the
situation. Rapidly, but with less precipitancy than he had shewn in 1076,
he planned his counter-stroke. A council of German bishops held at
Mayence on Whitsunday decreed the deposition of the Pope and arranged
another council to be held at Brixen on 25 June, where a successor to
Gregory was to be appointed. To this council the bishops of North Italy
came in large numbers; the king was present and many nobles both of
Germany and Italy. The bishops confirmed the Mayence decree and
unanimously declared Gregory deposed; to the royal power was entrusted
the task of executing the sentence. They also proceeded to the election
of a successor, and their choice fell on Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna,
the leader of the Lombard bishops in their revolt against papal authority.
CH. 11


## p. 76 (#122) #############################################

76
Council of Brixen. The anti-Pope Guibert
A man of strong determination, resolute in upholding the independence
he claimed for his see, he had been repeatedly summoned to Rome by the
Pope, and for his absence and contumacy repeatedly excommunicated.
Though violently attacked by papalist writers and likened to the beast in
the Apocalypse, no charges were made against his personal character; he
seems also to have been in sympathy with Church reform, as his decrees
shew. A stubborn opponent of Gregory, unmoved by papal excommuni-
cations, he was eminently the man for Henry's purpose in the final struggle
that had now begun. For it was a struggle that admitted of no compro-
mise—king and anti-Pope versus Pope and anti-king. St Peter's day
came and Gregory's prophecy was not fulfilled; in October Rudolf was
killed in battle. It was now possible for Henry to take in hand the
execution of the Brixen decree, and to use the temporal weapon to expel
the deposed Pope.
Even before the Council of Brixen met, Gregory had realised the danger
that threatened him. Spiritual weapons were of avail no longer; he must
have recourse to the aid of temporal power. The Romans, he knew, were
loyal to him and would resist the invader. In Tuscany he could rely
absolutely on the devotion of Countess Matilda, but against this must be
set the hostility of Lombardy. To restore the balance in his favour he
was driven to seek assistance from the Normans in South Italy. He knew
that they would welcome the alliance if he was willing to pay their price.
The issues at stake were so vital to the Papacy and the Church that he
felt justified in consenting to the price they demanded, though it involved
what in other circumstances he would have regarded as an important
breach of principle. To understand this it is necessary to review briefly
his relations with the Normans during the past seven years.
The relations of the Pope with the Normans were affected by two
considerations—the protection of papal territory, and the possible need
for their assistance. Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia, Calabria, and
Sicily, who was trying to form a centralised Norman state in South
Italy, had readily done homage to previous Popes in return for the
cession of territory, and had rendered valuable assistance to the Papacy
at Alexander II's accession. Gregory was determined to yield no more ter-
ritory. This and the reconciliation with Henry were the two chief objects
of his attention during the first few months of his papacy. He increased
the area of papal suzerainty by the addition of the lands belonging to
the surviving Lombard rulers in the south, especially Benevento and
Salerno; in return for his protection they surrendered them to the Pope
and received them back again as fiefs from the Papacy. Richard, Prince
of Capua, the only Norman who could rival Robert Guiscard, took the
same step, and Gregory was delighted at the success of his policy, which
was, as he himself declared, to keep the Normans from uniting to the
damage of the Church. Robert Guiscard, desiring to expand his power,
could only do so at the expense of papal territory. This, in spite of his


## p. 77 (#123) #############################################

Alliance of the Pope with Robert Guiscard
77
oath, he did not scruple to do, and was in consequence excommunicated
at the Lenten Synods of 1074 and 1075. But the breach with Henry in
1076 caused the Pope to contemplate the desirability of Norman aid;
Robert made the cession of papal territory a necessary condition, and
negotiations fell through. Moreover Richard of Capua had in the mean-
time broken his allegiance and allied himself with Robert Guiscard, and
together they made a successful attack on various portions of the papal
territory. In Lent 1078 the Pope issued a bull of excommunication against
them once more. Richard died soon afterwards and on his death-bed was
reconciled with the Church; his son Jordan came to Rome and made his
peace with the Pope on the old terms. So once more Gregory had brought
about disunion; and a serious revolt of his vassals against Robert Guiscard,
which it took the latter two years to quell, saved the Pope from further
Norman aggression. The revolt was extinguished by the middle of 1080, at
the very moment that the Pope decided to appeal to Robert for aid. They
met at Ceprano in June. The ban was removed, Robert did fealty to the
Pope, and in return received investiture both of the lands granted him by
Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II and of the territory he had himself
seized, for which he agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Pope. The
Pope thus confirmed what he is careful to call “an unjust tenure," and
to gain Robert's aid sacrificed the principle for which he had stood firm
in 1076.