No More Learning

In like manner the army of the governor — apparently of the Hither province —Claudius Unimanus
was destroyed, that of Gaius Negidius was vanquished,
and the level country was pillaged far and wide. Trophies of victory, decorated with the insignia of the Roman governors
and the arms of the legions, were erected on the Spanish mountains; people at Rome heard with shame and con sternation of the victories of the barbarian king. The conduct of the Spanish war was now committed to a trust worthy officer, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the second son of the victor of Pydna (609). 14fc But the Romans no longer ventured to send the experienced veterans, who had just returned from Macedonia and Asia,
forth anew to the detested Spanish war; the two legions, which Maximus brought with him, were new levies and scarcely more to be trusted than the old utterly demoralized Spanish army. After the first conflicts had again issued favourably for the Lusitanians, the prudent general kept together his troops for the remainder of the year in the camp at Urso (Osuna, south-east from Seville) without accepting the enemy's offer of battle, and only took the
field afresh in the following year (610), after his troops had 144. by petty warfare become qualified for fighting ; he was then enabled to maintain the superiority, and after successful
feats of arms went into winter quarters at Corduba. But when the cowardly and incapable praetor Quinctius took
the command in room of Maximus, the Romans again suffered defeat after defeat, and their general in the middle
of summer shut himself up in Corduba, while the bands of Viriathus overran the southern province (611). 14&
having
334 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
His successor, Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus, the adopted brother of Maximus Aemilianus, sent to the peninsula with two fresh legions and ten elephants, en deavoured to penetrate into the Lusitanian country, but after a series of indecisive conflicts and an assault on the Roman camp, which was with difficulty repulsed, found himself compelled to retreat to the Roman
territory. Viriathus followed him into the province, but as his troops
after the wont of Spanish insurrectionary armies suddenly 142. melted away, he was obliged to return to Lusitania (612). 141. Next year (6 1 3) Servilianus resumed the offensive, traversed
the districts on the Baetis and Anas, and then advancing into Lusitania occupied a number of townships. A large number of the insurgents fell into his hands ; the leaders— of whom there were about 500—were executed; those who had gone over from Roman territory to the enemy had their hands cut off; the remaining mass were sold into slavery. But on this occasion also the Spanish war proved true to its fickle and capricious character. After all these successes the Roman army was attacked by Viriathus while it was besieging Erisane, defeated, and driven to a rock where it was wholly in the power of the enemy. Viriathus, however, was content, like the Samnite general formerly at the Caudine passes, to conclude a peace with Servilianus, in which the community of the Lusitanians was recognized
as sovereign and Viriathus acknowledged as its king. The power of the Romans had not risen more than the national sense of honour had sunk ; in the capital men were glad to be rid of the irksome war, and the senate and people ratified the treaty. But Quintus Servilius Caepio, the full brother of Servilianus and his successor in office, was far from satisfied with this complaisance ; and the senate was weak enough at first to authorize the consul to undertake secret machinations against Viriathus, and then to view at least with indulgence the open breach of his pledged word,
chap, i THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES *2$
for which there was no palliation. So Caepio invaded
Lusitania, and traversed the land as far as the territories of
the Vettones and Callaeci ; Viriathus declined a conflict
with the superior force, and by dexterous movements evaded
his antagonist (614). But when in the ensuing year (615) 140. 189. Caepio renewed the attack, and in addition the army, which
had in the meantime become available in the northern province, made its appearance under Marcus Popillius in Lusitania, Viriathus sued for peace on any terms. He was required to give up to the Romans all who had passed over to him from the Roman territory, amongst whom was his own father-in-law; he did so, and the Romans ordered them to be executed or to have their hands cut off. But this was not sufficient ; the Romans were not in the habit of announcing to the vanquished all at once their destined fate.
One behest after another was issued to the Lusitanians, Hii< each successive demand more intolerable than its predeces
sors ; and at length they were required even to surrender
their arms. Then Viriathus recollected the fate of his countrymen whom Galba had caused to be disarmed, and
his sword afresh. But it was too late. His wavering had sown the seeds of treachery among those who were immediately around him; three of his confidants, Audas, Ditalco, and Minucius from Urso, despairing of the possibility of renewed victory, procured from the king permission once more to enter into negotiations for peace with Caepio, and employed it for the purpose of selling the life of the Lusitanian hero to the foreigners in return for the assurance of personal amnesty and further rewards. On their return to the camp they assured the king of the favourable issue of their negotiations, and in the following night stabbed him while asleep in his tent. The Lusita nians honoured the illustrious chief by an unparalleled funeral solemnity at which two hundred pairs of champions
VOL. lit 80
grasped
/ Numantia.
military skill of his predecessor. The expedition utterly broke down, and the army on its return was attacked in crossing the Baetis and compelled to surrender uncondition- ally. Thus was Lusitania subdued, far more by treachery and assassination on the part of foreigners and natives than by honourable war.
While the southern province was scourged by Viriathus and the Lusitanians, a second and not less serious war had, not without their help, broken out in the northern province among the Celtiberian nations. The brilliant successes of
326 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book W
fought in the funeral games ; and still more highly by the fact, that they did not renounce the straggle, but nominated Tautamus as their commander-in-chief in room of the fallen hero. The plan projected by the latter for
wresting Saguntum from the Romans was sufficiently bold ; but the new general possessed neither the wise moderation nor the
144. Viriathus induced the Arevacae likewise in 610 to rise against the Romans; and for this reason the consul
Caecilius Metellus, who was sent to Spain to relieve Maximus Aemilianus, did not proceed to the southern province, but turned against the Celtiberians. In the contest with them, and more especially during the siege of the town of Contrebia which was deemed impreg nable, he showed the same ability which he had displayed in vanquishing the Macedonian pretender; after his two
148, 142. years' administration (6n, 612) the northern province was reduced to obedience. The two towns of Termantia and Numantia alone had not yet opened their gates to the Romans ; but in their case also a capitulation had been almost concluded, and the greater part of the conditions had been fulfilled by the Spaniards. When required, how ever, to deliver up their arms, they were restrained like Viriathus by their genuine Spanish pride in the possession of a well-wielded sword, and they resolved to continue the war under the daring Megaravicus. It seemed folly : the
Quintus
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES a*f
consular army, the command of which was taken up in
613 by the consul Quintus Pompeius, was four times as 141.
numerous as the whole population capable of bearing arms
in Numantia. But the general, who was wholly unac
quainted with war, sustained defeats so severe under the
walls of the two cities (613, 614), that he preferred at 141, 140, length to procure by means of negotiations the peace which
he could not compel. With Termantia a definitive agree
ment must have taken place. In the case of the Numan-
tines the Roman general liberated their captives, and summoned the community under the secret promise of favourable treatment to surrender to him at discretion.
The Numantines, weary of the war, consented, and the general actually limited his demands to the smallest possible measure. Prisoners of war, deserters, and hostages
were delivered up, and the stipulated sum of money was mostly paid, when in 615 the new general Marcus Popillius 189. Laenas arrived in the camp. As soon as Pompeius saw
the burden of command devolve on other shoulders, he, with a view to escape from the reckoning that awaited him at Rome for a peace which was according to Roman ideas disgraceful, lighted on the expedient of not merely breaking, but of disowning his word ; and when the Numantines came to make their last payment, in the presence of their officers and his own he flatly denied the conclusion of the agreement. The matter was referred for judicial decision to the senate at Rome. While it was discussed there, the war before Numantia was suspended, and Laenas occupied himself with an expedition to Lusitania where he helped to accelerate the catastrophe of Viriathus, and with a foray against the Lusones, neighbours of the Numantines. When at length the decision of the senate arrived, its purport was that the war should be continued —the state became thus a
party to the knavery of Pompeius.
With unimpaired courage and increased resentment the Mandnot
m8 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book it
Numantines resumed the struggle; Laenas fought against
them unsuccessfully, nor was his successor Gaius Hostilius IMflJ Mancinus more fortunate (617). But the catastrophe was
brought about not so much by the arms of the Numantines, as by the lax and wretched military discipline of the Roman generals and by—what was its natural consequence—the annually - increasing dissoluteness, insubordination, and cowardice of the Roman soldiers. The mere rumour, which moreover was false, that the Cantabri and Vaccaei were advancing to the relief of Numantia, induced the Roman army to evacuate the camp by night without orders, and to seek shelter in the entrenchments con structed sixteen years before by Nobilior 216). The Numantines, informed of their sudden departure, hotly pursued the fugitive army, and surrounded it: there remained to no choice save to fight its way with sword
hand through the enemy, or to conclude peace on the terms laid down by the Numantines. Although the consul was personally man of honour, he was weak and little known. Tiberius Gracchus, who served in the army as quaestor, had more influence with the Celtiberians from the hereditary respect in which he was held on account of his father who had so wisely organized the province of the Ebro, and induced the Numantines to be content with an equitable treaty of peace sworn to by all the staff-officers. But the senate not only recalled the general immediately, but after long deliberation caused proposal to be sub mitted to the burgesses that the convention should be treated as they had formerly treated that of Caudium, in other words, that they should refuse to ratify and should devolve the responsibility for on those by whom had been concluded. By right this category ought to have included all the officers who had sworn to the treaty but Gracchus and the others were saved by their connections. Mancinus alone, who did not belong to the circles of the
;
it
a
it it
(p.
a
in
it
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 339
highest aristocracy, was destined to pay the penalty for his own and others' guilt. Stripped of his insignia, the Roman consular was conducted to the enemy's outposts, and, when the Numantines refused to receive him that they might not on their part acknowledge the treaty as null, the late commander-in-chief stood in his shirt and with his hands tied behind his back for a whole day before the gates of Numantia, a pitiful spectacle to friend and foe. Yet the bitter lesson seemed utterly lost on the successor of Mancinus, his colleague in the consulship, Marcus Aemilius
While the discussions as to the treaty with \ Mancinus were pending in Rome, he attacked the free ( people of the Vaccaei under frivolous pretexts just as \ Lucullus had done sixteen years before, and began in / concert with the general of the Further province to besiege Pallantia (618). A decree of the senate enjoined him to 188. desist from the war; nevertheless, under the pretext that
the circumstances had meanwhile changed, he continued
the siege. In doing so he showed himself as bad a soldier \
as he was a bad citizen. After lying so long before the
large and strong city that his supplies in that rugged and / hostile country failed, he was obliged to leave behind all I the sick and wounded and to undertake a retreat, in which
the pursuing Pallantines destroyed half of his soldiers, and,
if they had not broken off the pursuit too early, would probably have utterly annihilated the Roman army, which
was already in full course of dissolution. For this conduct
a fine was imposed on the high-born general at his return.
His successors Lucius Furius Philus (618) and Gaius 136. Calpurnius Piso (619) had again to wage war against the 135. Numantines; and, inasmuch as they did nothing at all,
they fortunately came home without defeat.
Even the Roman government began at length to perceive Sdpto that matters could no longer continue on this footing ; they A '" resolved to entrust the subjugation of the small Spanish
Lepidus.
a3o THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES BOOK iv
as an extraordinary measure, to the first general of Rome, Scipio Aemilianus. The pecuniary means
for carrying on the war were indeed doled out to him with preposterous parsimony, and the permission to levy soldiers, which he asked, was even directly refused — a result towards which coterie-intrigues and the fear of being burdensome to the sovereign people may have co-operated. But a great number of friends and clients voluntarily accompanied him ; among them was his brother Maximus Aemilianus, who some years before had commanded with distinction against Viriathus. Supported by this trusty band, which was formed into a guard for the general, Scipio began to reorganize the
184. deeply disordered army (620). First of all, the camp- followers had to take their departure — there were found as many as 2000 courtesans, and an endless number of sooth sayers and priests of all sorts —and, if the soldier was not
available for fighting, he had at least to work in the trenches and to march. During the first summer the general avoided any conflict with the Numantines; he contented himself with destroying the stores in the surrounding country, and with chastising the Vaccaei who sold corn to the Numantines, and compelling them to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. It was only towards winter that Scipio drew together his army round Numantia. Besides the Numidian contingent of horsemen, infantry, and twelve elephants led by the prince Jugurtha, and the numerous Spanish con tingents, there were four legions, in all a force of 60,000 men investing a city whose citizens capable of bearing arms did not exceed 8000 at the most Nevertheless the besieged frequently offered battle ; but Scipio, perceiving clearly that the disorganization of many years was not to be repaired all at once, refused to accept and, when conflicts did occur in connection with the sallies of the besieged, the cowardly flight of the legionaries, checked with difficulty
the appearance of the general in person, justified such tactics
country-town,
by
it,
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES «31
only too forcibly. Never did a general treat his soldiers more contemptuously than Scipio treated the Numantine army ; and he showed his opinion of it not only by bitter speeches, but above all by his course of action. For the first time the Romans waged war by means of mattock and spade, where it depended on themselves alone whether they should use the sword. Around the whole circuit of the city wall, which was nearly three miles in length, there was con structed a double line of circumvallation of twice that extent, provided with walls, towers, and ditches ; and the river Douro, by which at first some supplies had reached the besieged through the efforts of bold boatmen and divers, was at length closed. Thus the town, which they did not venture to assault, could not well fail to be reduced through famine ; the more so, as it had not been possible for the citizens to lay in provisions during the last summer. The Numantines soon suffered from want of everything. One of their boldest men, Retogenes, cut his way with a few companions through the lines of the enemy, and his touching entreaty that kinsmen should not be allowed to perish without
help pro duced a great effect in Lutia at least, one of the towns of
the Arevacae. But before the citizens of Lutia had come to a decision, Scipio, having received information from the partisans of Rome in the town, appeared with a superior force before its walls, and compelled the authorities to deliver up to him the leaders of the movement, 400 of the flower of the youth, whose hands were all cut off by order of the Roman general. The Numantines, thus deprived of their last hope, sent to Scipio to negotiate as to their submission and called on the brave man to spare the brave ; but when the envoys on their return announced that Scipio required unconditional surrender, they were torn in pieces by the furious multitude, and a fresh term elapsed before famine and pestilence had completed their work. At length a second message was sent to the Roman head-quarters, that
The
138. I
232 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
the town was now ready to submit at discretion. When the citizens were accordingly instructed to appear on the following day before the gates, they asked for some days' delay, to allow those of their number who had determined not to survive the loss of liberty time to die. It was granted, and not a few took advantage of it. At last the miserable remnant appeared before the gates. Scipio chose fifty of the most eminent to form part of his triumphal procession ; the rest were sold into slavery, the city was levelled with the ground, and its territory was distributed among the neigh- bouring towns. This occurred in the autumn of 62 1, fifteen months after Scipio had assumed the chief command.
The fall of Numantia struck at the root of the opposition that was still here and there stirring against Rome ; military demonstrations and the imposition of fines sufficed to secure the acknowledgment of the Roman supremacy in all Hither Spain.
In Further Spain the Roman dominion was confirmed c*n*e°. and extended by the subjugation of the Lusitanians. The consul Decimus Junius Brutus, who came in Caepio's room,
settled the Lusitanian war-captives in the neighbourhood of
Saguntum, and gave to their new town Valentia (Valencia), 188. like Carteia, a Latin constitution (616); he moreover (616-
188-186. 618) traversed the Iberian west coast in various directions, and was the first of the Romans to reach the shore of the
Atlantic Ocean. The towns of the Lusitanians
there, which were obstinately defended by their inhabitants, both men and women, were subdued by him; and the hitherto independent Callaeci were united with the Roman province after a great battle, in which 50,000 of them are said to have fallen. After the subjugation of the Vaccaei, Lusitanians, and Callaeci, the whole peninsula, with the exception of the north coast, was now at least nominally subject to the Romans.
A senatorial commission was sent to Spain in order to
dwelling
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 233
organize, in concert with Scipio, the newly-won provincial New org*, territory after the Roman method; and Scipio did what he^s^On. "0 could to obviate the effects of the infamous and stupid]
policy of his predecessors. The Caucani for instance, whose / shameful maltreatment by Lucullus he had been obliged to I
witness nineteen years before when a military tribune, were ') invited by him to return to their town and to rebuild it. Spain began again to experience more tolerable times. The suppression of piracy, which found dangerous lurking-places
in the Baleares, through the occupation of these islands by Quintus Caecilius Metellus in 631, was singularly conducive. 128. to the prosperity of Spanish commerce ; and in other respects
also the fertile islands, inhabited by a dense population which was unsurpassed in the use of the sling, were a valu
able possession. How numerous the Latin-speaking popula
tion in the peninsula was even then, is shown by the settlement of 3000 Spanish Latins in the towns of Falma
and Pollentia (Pollenza) in the newly-acquired islands. In spite of various grave evils the Roman administration of Spain preserved on the whole the stamp which the Catonian period, and primarily Tiberius Gracchus, had impressed on
true that the Roman frontier territory had not little to suffer from the inroads of the tribes, but half sub dued or not subdued at all, on the north and west. Among the Lusitanians in particular the poorer youths regularly con gregated as banditti, and large gangs levied contributions from their countrymen or their neighbours, for which reason, even at much later period, the isolated homesteads in this region were constructed in the style of fortresses, and were, in case of need, capable of defence nor did the Romans succeed in putting an end to these predatory habits in the inhospitable and almost inaccessible Lusitanian mountains. But what had previously been wars assumed more and more the character of brigandage, which every tolerably efficient governor was able to repress with his ordinary resources
j
a
;
It a is
in
it.
The states!
834 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
and in spite of such inflictions on the border districts Spain was the most flourishing and best-organized country in all
the Roman dominions ; the system of tenths and the middle men were there unknown ; the population was numerous, and the country was rich in corn and cattle. —
Far more insupportable was the condition intermediate between formal sovereignty and actual subjection —of the African, Greek, and Asiatic states which were brought within the sphere of Roman hegemony through the wars of Rome with Carthage, Macedonia, and Syria, and their conse quences. An independent state does not pay too dear a
for its independence in accepting the sufferings of war when it cannot avoid them ; a state which has lost its independence may find at least some compensation in the fact that its protector procures for it peace with its
But these client states of Rome had neither independence nor peace. In Africa there practically sub sisted a perpetual border-war between Carthage and Numidia. In Egypt Roman arbitration had settled the dispute as to the succession between the two brothers Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy the Fat; nevertheless the new rulers of Egypt and Cyrene waged war for the possession of Cyprus. In Asia not only were most of the kingdoms — Bithynia, Cappadocia, Syria — likewise torn by internal quarrels as to the succession and by the inter ventions of neighbouring states to which these quarrels gave rise, but various and severe wars were carried on
between the Attalids and the Galatians, between the Attalids and the kings of Bithynia, and even between Rhodes and Crete. In Hellas proper, in like manner, the pigmy feuds which were customary there continued to smoulder; and even Macedonia, formerly so tranquil, consumed its strength in the intestine strife that arose out of its new democratic constitutions. It was the fault of the rulers as well as the ruled, that the last vital energies
price
neighbours.
chap. I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES a3J
and the last prosperity of the nations were expended in these aimless feuds. The client states ought to have perceived that a state which cannot wage war against every
one cannot wage war at all, and that, as the possessions
and power enjoyed by all these states were practically under Roman guarantee, they had in the event of any difference no alternative but to settle the matter amicably
with their neighbours or to call in the Romans as arbiters. When the Achaean diet was urged by the Rhodians and Cretans to grant them the aid of the league, and seriously deliberated as to sending it (601), it was simply a political 168 farce ; the principle which the leader of the party friendly
to Rome then laid down — that the Achaeans were no longer at liberty to wage war without the permission of the Romans —expressed, doubtless with disagreeable precision, the simple truth that the sovereignty of the dependent states was merely a formal one, and that any attempt to give life to the shadow must necessarily lead to the destruc tion of the shadow itself. But the ruling community deserves a censure more severe than that directed against the ruled. It is no easy task for a man — any more than for a state —to own to insignificance ; it is the duty and right of the ruler either to renounce his authority, or by the display of an imposing material superiority to compel the ruled to resignation. The Roman senate did neither. Invoked and importuned on all hands, the senate interfered incessantly in the course of African, Hellenic, Asiatic, and Egyptian affairs; but it did so after so inconstant and loose a fashion, that its attempts to settle matters usually only rendered the confusion worse. It was the epoch of commissions. Commissioners of the senate were constantly going to Carthage and Alexandria, to the Achaean diet, and to the courts of the rulers of western Asia; they investigated, inhibited, reported, and yet decisive steps were not unfrequently taken in the most important matters
»36 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES lOOK rv
without the knowledge, or against the wishes, of the senate. It might happen that Cyprus, for instance, which the senate had assigned to the kingdom of Cyrene, was nevertheless retained by Egypt; that a Syrian prince ascended the throne of his ancestors under the pretext that he had ob tained a promise of it from the Romans, while the senate had in fact expressly refused to give it to him, and he himself had only escaped from Rome by breaking their interdict ; that even the open murder of a Roman commis sioner, who under the orders of the senate administered as
the government of Syria, passed totally unpun ished. The Asiatics were very well aware that they were not in a position to resist the Roman legions ; but they were no less aware that the senate was but little inclined to give the burgesses orders to march for the Euphrates or the Nile. Thus the state of these remote countries re sembled that of the schoolroom when the teacher is absent or lax ; and the government of Rome deprived the nations at once of the blessings of freedom and of the blessings of order. For the Romans themselves, moreover, this state of matters was so far perilous that it to a certain extent left their northern and eastern frontier exposed. In these quarters kingdoms might be formed by the aid of the inland countries situated beyond the limits of the Roman hegemony and in antagonism to the weak states under Roman protection, without Rome being able directly or speedily to interfere, and might develop a power dangerous to, and entering sooner or later into rivalry with, Rome. No doubt the condition of the bordering nations —every where split into fragments and nowhere favourable to political development on a great scale —formed some sort
of protection against this danger; yet we very clearly perceive in the history of the east, that at this period the Euphrates was no longer guarded by the phalanx of Seleu cus and was not yet watched by the legions of Augustus.
guardian
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 337
It was high time to put an end to this state of indecision. But the only possible way of ending it was by converting the client states into Roman provinces. This could be done all the more easily, that the Roman provincial consti tution in substance only concentrated military power in the hands of the Roman governor, while administration and
jurisdiction in the main were, or at any rate were intended to be, retained by the communities, so that as much of the
old political independence as was at all capable of life might be preserved in the form of communal freedom. The necessity for this administrative reform could not well be mistaken ; the only question was, whether the senate would delay and mar or whether would have the courage and the power clearly to discern and energetically to execute what was needful.
Let us first glance at Africa. The order of things estab- Carthage
lished by the Romans in Libya rested in substance on balance of power between the Nomad kingdom of Massi- nissa and the city of Carthage. While the former was enlarged, confirmed, and civilized under the vigorous and sagacious government of Massinissa 382), Carthage consequence simply of state of peace became once more,v at least in wealth and population, what had been at the height of its political power. The Romans saw with ill- concealed and envious fear the apparently indestructible prosperity of their old rival; while hitherto they had re fused to grant to any real protection against the constantly continued encroachments of Massinissa, they now began openly to interfere in favour of the neighbouring prince. The dispute which had been pending for more than thirty years between the city and the king as to the possession of the province of Emporia on the Lesser Syrtis, one of the most fertile in the Carthaginian territory, was at length
decided by Roman commissioners to the Mfc effect that the Carthaginians should evacuate those towns
(about 594)
^
jfuinldia.
'
it
it
(ii.
it
a
it,
in a
The do-
^^j^0
**
had been the old Marcus Cato, at that time perhaps the most influential man in the senate, and, as a veteran sur vivor from the Hannibalic war, still filled with thorough hatred and thorough dread of the Phoenicians. With surprise and jealousy Cato had seen with his own eyes the flourishing state of the hereditary foes of Rome, the luxuriant country and the crowded streets, the immense stores of arms in the magazines and the rich materials for
J a fleet; already he in spirit beheld a second Hannibal ) wielding all these resources against Rome. In his honest i and manly, but thoroughly narrow-minded, fashion, he
came to the conclusion that Rome could not be secure \ until Carthage had disappeared from the face of the earth, and immediately after his return set forth this view in the senate. Those of the aristocracy whose ideas were more enlarged, and especially Scipio Nasica, opposed this paltry
»3* THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book it
of Emporia which still remained in their possession, and should pay 500 talents (,£120,000) to the king as compen sation for the illegal enjoyment of the territory. The con sequence was, that Massinissa immediately seized another Carthaginian district on the western frontier of their territory, the town of Tusca and the great plains near the Bagradas ; no course was left to the Carthaginians but to commence another hopeless process at Rome. After long and, beyond doubt, intentional delay a second commission
157. appeared in Africa (597); but, when the Carthaginians were unwilling to commit themselves unconditionally to a decision to be pronounced by it as arbiter without an exact preliminary investigation into the question of legal right, and insisted on a thorough discussion of the latter question, the commissioners without further ceremony returned to Rome.
The question of right between Carthage and Massinissa thus remained unsettled ; but the mission gave rise to a
rooivcd on more important decision. The head of this commission
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 239
policy with great earnestness ; and showed how blind were the fears entertained regarding a mercantile city whose Phoenician inhabitants were becoming more and more disused to warlike arts and ideas, and how the existence of that rich commercial city was quite compatible with the political supremacy of Rome. Even the conversion of Carthage into a Roman provincial town would have been practicable, and indeed, compared with the present con dition of the Phoenicians, perhaps even not unwelcome. Cato, however, desired not the submission, but the destruc tion of the hated city. His policy, as it would seem, found allies partly in the statesmen who were inclined to bring the transmarine territories into immediate dependence on Rome, partly and especially in the mighty influence of the Roman bankers and great capitalists on whom, after the destruction of the rich moneyed and mercantile city, its inheritance would necessarily devolve. The majority re solved at the first fitting opportunity —respect for public opinion required that they should wait for such — to bring about war with Carthage, or rather the destruction of the city.
The desired occasion was soon found. The provoking War violations of right on the part of Massinissa and the JSV^ Romans brought to the helm in Carthage Hasdrubal and and Carthalo, the leaders of the patriotic party, which was Cartlia'*' not indeed, like the Achaean, disposed to revolt against
the Roman supremacy, but was at least resolved to defend,
if necessary, by arms against Massinissa the rights belonging
by treaty to the Carthaginians. The patriots ordered forty
of the most decided partisans of Massinissa to be banished
from the city, and made the people swear that they would
on no accoifht ever permit their return ; at the same time,
in order to repel the attacks that might be expected from Mas
sinissa, they formed out of the free Numidians a numerous
army under Arcobarzanes, the grandson of Syphax (about
*iO
THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
154. 600). Massinissa, however, was prudent enough not to take arms now, but to submit himself unconditionally to the decision of the Romans respecting the disputed territory on the Bagradas ; and thus the Romans could assert with some plausibility that the Carthaginian preparations must have been directed against them, and could insist on the immediate dismissal of the army and destruction of the naval stores. The Carthaginian senate was disposed to consent, but the multitude prevented the execution of the decree, and the Roman envoys, who had brought this order to Carthage, were in peril of their lives. Massinissa sent his son Gulussa to Rome to report the continuance of the Carthaginian warlike preparations by land and sea, and to hasten the declaration of war. After a further embassy of ten men had confirmed the statement that Carthage was in
U2. reality arming (602), the senate rejected the demand of Cato for an absolute declaration of war, but resolved in a secret sitting that war should be declared if the Carthagi nians would not consent to dismiss their army and to burn their materials for a fleet. Meanwhile the conflict had already begun in Africa. Massinissa had sent back the men whom the Carthaginians had banished, under the escort of his son Gulussa, to the city. When the Car thaginians closed their gates against them and killed also some of the Numidians returning home, Massinissa put his troops in motion, and the patriot party in Carthage also prepared for the struggle. But Hasdrubal, who was placed at the head of their army, was one of the usual army-destroyers whom the Carthaginians were in the habit of employing as generals ; strutting about in his general's purple like a theatrical king, and pampering his portly person even in the camp, that vain and unwieldy man was little fitted to render help in an exigency which perhaps even the genius of Hamilcar and the arm of Hannibal could have no longer averted. Before the eyes of Scipio Aemi
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 341
lianus, who at that time a military tribune in the Spanish army, had been sent to Massinissa to bring over African elephants for his commander, and who on this occasion looked down on the conflict from a mountain "like Zeus from Ida," the Carthaginians and Numidians fought a great battle, in which the former, though reinforced by 6000 Numidian horsemen brought to them by discontented captains of Massinissa, and superior in number to the enemy, were worsted. After this defeat the Carthaginians offered to make cessions of territory and payments of money to Massinissa, and Scipio at their solicitation attempted to bring about an agreement; but the project of peace was frustrated by the refusal of the Carthaginian patriots to surrender the deserters. Hasdrubal, however, closely hemmed in by the troops of his antagonist, was com pelled to grant to the latter all that he demanded —the surrender of the deserters, the return of the exiles, the delivery of arms, the marching off under the yoke, the payment of 100 talents (,£24,000) annually for the next fifty years. But even this agreement was not kept by the Numidians ; on the contrary the disarmed remnant of the Carthaginian army was cut to pieces by them on the way home.
The Romans, who had carefully abstained from prevent-
Ing the war itself by seasonable interposition, had now what tionof war they wished : namely, a serviceable pretext for war—for the by Rome. Carthaginians had certainly now transgressed the stipulations
of the treaty, that they should not wage war against the
allies of Rome or beyond their own bounds (ii. 361, 376)
—and an antagonist already beaten beforehand. The
Italian contingents were already summoned to Rome, and
the ships were assembled ; the declaration of war might
Issue at any moment. The Carthaginians made every
effort to avert the impending blow. Hasdrubal and Car-
thalo, the leaders of the patriot party, were condemned to
vol. in 81
Declare
14* THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book i»
death, and an embassy was sent to Rome to throw the responsibility on them. But at the same time envoys from Utica, the second city of the Libyan Phoenicians, arrived there with full powers to surrender their community wholly to the Romans —compared with such obliging submissive- ness, it seemed almost an insolence that the Carthaginians had rested content with ordering, unbidden, the execution of their most eminent men. The senate declared that the excuse of the Carthaginians was found insufficient; to the question, what in that case would suffice, the reply was given that the Carthaginians knew that themselves. They might, no doubt, have known what the Romans wished; but yet it seemed impossible to believe that the last hour of their loved native city had really come. Once more Carthaginian envoys — on this occasion thirty in number and with unlimited powers — were sent to Rome. When
149. they arrived, war was already declared (beginning of 605), and the double consular army had embarked. Yet they even now attempted to dispel the storm by complete submission. The senate replied that Rome was ready to guarantee to the Carthaginian community its territory, its municipal freedom and its laws, its public and private property, provided that it would furnish to the consuls who had just departed for Sicily within the space of a month at Lilybaeum 300 hostages from the children of the leading families, and would fulfil the further orders which the consuls in con formity with their instructions should issue to them. The reply has been called ambiguous ; but very erroneously, as even at the time clearsighted men among the Carthaginians themselves pointed out. The circumstance that everything which they could ask was guaranteed with the single ex ception of the city, and that nothing was said as to stopping the embarkation of the troops for Africa, showed very clearly what the Roman intentions were ; the senate acted
with fearful harshness, but it did not assume the semblance
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 243
of concession.
The Carthaginians, however, would not open their eyes ; there was no statesman found, who had the power to move the unstable multitude of the city either to thorough resistance or to thorough resignation. When they heard at the same time of the horrible decree of wai and of the endurable demand for hostages, they complied immediately with the latter, and still clung to hope, because they had not the courage fully to realize the import of surrendering themselves beforehand to the arbitrary will of a mortal foe. The consuls sent back the hostages from Lilybaeum to Rome, and informed the Carthaginian envoys that they would learn further particulars in Africa. The landing was accomplished without resistance, and the provisions demanded were supplied. When the gerusia of Carthage appeared in a body at the head-quarters in Utica to receive the further orders, the consuls required in the first instance the disarming of the city. To the question of the Carthaginians, who was in that case to protect them even against their own emigrants — against the army, which had swelled to 20,000 men, under the command of Husdrubal who had saved himself from the sentence of death by flight—it was replied, that this would be the con cern of the Romans. Accordingly the council of the city obsequiously appeared before the consuls with all their fleet- material, all the military stores of the public magazines, all the arms that were found in the possession of private persons—to the number of 3000 catapults and 200,000 sets of armour — and inquired whether anything more was desired. Then the consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus rose and announced to the council, that in accordance with the
instructions given by the senate the existing city was to be destroyed, but that the inhabitants were at liberty to settle anew in their territory wherever they chose, provided it were at a distance of at least ten miles from the sea.
This fearful command aroused in the Phoenicians all
144 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book IV
Resistance the —shall we say magnanimous or frenzied ? —enthusiasm,
ancestral city and their venerated and dear home beside the sea. Hope and deliverance were out of the question ; political discretion enjoined even now an unconditional submissioa But the voice of the few who counselled the acceptance of what was inevitable was, like the call of the pilot during a hurricane, drowned amidst the furious yells of the multitude ; which, in its frantic rage, laid hands on the magistrates of the city who had counselled the sur render of the hostages and arms, made such of the inno cent bearers of the news as had ventured at all to return home expiate their terrible tidings, and tore in pieces the Italians who chanced to be sojourning in the city by way of avenging beforehand, at least on them, the destruction of its native home. No resolution was passed to defend themselves; unarmed as they were, this was a matter of course. The gates were closed; stones were carried to the battlements of the walls that had been stripped of the catapults ; the chief command was entrusted to Has- drubal, the grandson of Massinissa ; the slaves in a body were declared free. The army of refugees under the fugitive Hasdrubal — which was in possession of the whole Carthaginian territory with the exception of the towns on the east coast occupied by the Romans, viz. Had- rumetum, Little Leptis, Thapsus and Achulla, and ^the city of Utica, and offered an invaluable support for the defence — was entreated not to refuse its aid to the commonwealth in this dire emergency. At the same
ihagtohn*. which was
displayed previously by the Tyrians against Alexander, and subsequently by the Jews against Ves pasian. Unparalleled as was the patience with which this nation could endure bondage and oppression, as un paralleled was now the furious rising of that mercantile and seafaring population, when the things at stake were not the state and freedom, but the beloved soil of their
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES «45
time, concealing in true Phoenician style the most un bounded resentment under the cloak of humility, they attempted to deceive the enemy. A message was sent to the consuls to request a thirty days' armistice for the despatch of an embassy to Rome. The Carthaginians were well aware that the generals neither would nor could grant this request, which had been refused once already ; but the consuls were confirmed by it in the natural supposition that after the first outbreak of despair the utterly defenceless city would submit, and accordingly postponed the attack. The precious interval was employed in preparing catapults and armour ; day and night all, with out distinction of age or sex, were occupied in constructing machines and forging arms ; the public buildings were torn down to procure timber and metal ; women cut off their hair to furnish the strings indispensable for the catapults ; in an incredibly short time the walls and the men were once more armed. That all this could be done without the consuls, who were but a few miles off, learning any
of not the least marvellous feature in this marvellous movement sustained by truly enthusiastic, and in fact superhuman, national hatred. When at length the consuls, weary of waiting, broke up from their camp at Utica, and thought that they should be able to scale the bare walls with ladders, they found to their surprise and horror the battlements crowned anew with catapults, and the large populous city which they had hoped to occupy like an open village, able and ready to defend itself to the last man.
Carthage was rendered very strong both by the nature of its situation and by the art of its inhabitants, who had
The line of the coast has been in the course of centuries so much changed that the former local relations are but imperfectly recognizable on the ancient site. The name of the city preserved by Cape Carta gena—also called from the saint's tomb found there Ras Sidi bu Said
thing
situation of c*rth*8B.
is
1
1
it, is
a
246 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
very often to depend on the protection of its walls. Into the broad gulf of Tunis, which is bounded on the west
Farina and on the east by Cape Bon, there projects in a direction from west to east a promontory, which is encompassed on three sides by the sea and is connected with the mainland only towards the west This
at its narrowest part only about two miles broad and on the whole flat, again expands towards the gulf, and terminates there in the two heights of Jebel- Khawi and Sidi bu Said, between which extends the plain of El Mersa. On its southern portion which ends in the height of Sidi bu Said lay the city of Carthage. The pretty steep declivity of that height towards the gulf and its numerous rocks and shallows gave natural strength to the side of the city next to the gulf, and a simple circumvallation was sufficient there. On the wall along the west or landward side, on the other hand, where nature afforded no protection, every appliance within the power of the art of fortification in those times was ex
It consisted, as its recently discovered remains exactly tallying with the description of Polybius have shown, of an outer wall 6\ feet thick and immense casemates attached to it behind, probably along its whole extent ; these were separated from the outer wall by a covered way 6 feet broad, and had a depth of 14 feet, exclusive of the front and back walls, each of which was fully 3 feet broad. 1
—the eastern headland of the peninsula, projecting into the gulf with its highest point rising to 393 feet above the level of the sea.
1 The dimensions given by Beule (Fouilles a Carthage, 1861) are as follows in metres and in Greek feet (1=0*309 metre) :
Outer wall a metres = 61 feet. Corridor 1-9 ,, = 6 „
,, a* ,,
by Cape
promontory,
pended.
Front wall of casemates .
. 1
3$
Casemate rooms
Back wall of casemates . .
42 ,,
=14
•■
. 1 . . . . —
Whole breadth of the walls . . 10 1 metres =33 feet
Of, as Diodorus (p. 522) states 22 cubits Greek cubit = feet),
„ m ,, 3$
it,
(1
ij
:hap. i THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 047
This enormous wall, composed throughout of large hewn blocks, rose in two stories, exclusive of the battlements and the huge towers four stories high, to a height of 45 feet,1 and furnished in the lower range of the casemates stables and provender-stores for 300 elephants, in the upper range stalls for horses, magazines, and barracks. 2 The citadel-hill, the Byrsa (Syriac, btrtha = citadel), a compara
while Llvy (ap. Oros. It. as) and Appian (Pun. 95), who seem to have had before them another less accurate passage of Polybius, state the breadth of the walls at 30 feet. The triple wall of Appian—as to which a false idea has hitherto been diffused by Floras 31) — denotes the outer wall, and the front and back walls of the casemates. That this coincidence not accidental, and that we have here in reality the remains of the famed walls of Carthage before us, will be evident to every one the objections of Davis (Carthage and her Remains, p. 370 et sea. ) only show how little even the utmost zeal can adduce in opposition to the main results of Reute. Only we must maintain that all the ancient authorities give the statements of which we are now speaking with reference not to the citadel-wall, but to the city-wall on the landward side, of which the wall along the south side of the citadel-hill was an integral part (Oros. iv.
In accordance with this view, the excavations at the citadel-hill on the east, north, and west, have shown no traces of fortifications, whereas on the south side they have brought to light the very remains of this great wall. There is no reason for regarding these as the remains of a separate fortification of the citadel distinct from the city wall may be presumed that further excavations at corresponding depth —the foundation of the city wall discovered at the Byrsa lies fly-six feet beneath the present surface — will bring to light like, or at any rate analogous, foundations along the whole landward side, although probable that at the point where the walled suburb of Magalia rested on the main wall the fortification was either weaker from the first or was early neglected. The length of the wall as a whole cannot be stated with precision but must have been very considerable, for three hundred elephants were stabled there, and the stores for their fodder and perhaps other spaces also as well as the gates are to be taken into account It easy to conceive how the inner city, within the walls of which the Byrsa was included, should, especially by way of contrast to the suburb of Magalia which had its separate circum- vallation, be sometimes itself called Byrsa (App. Pun. 117; Nepos, ap. Serv. Aen.
aa).
368).
Such the height given by Appian, e. Diodorus gives the height,
probably inclusive of the battlements, at 40 cubits or 60 feet. The remnant preserved still from 13 to 16 feet (4-5 metres) high.
The rooms of a horse-shoe shape brought to light in excavation have a depth of 14, and a breadth of 11, Greek feet the width of the entrances not specified. Whether these dimensions and the proportions of the corridor suffice for our recognizing them as elephants' stalls, remains to
be settled by a more accurate investigation. The partition-walls, which separate the apartments, have a thickness of metre = feet
J3
it
1 1
;
is
*1
is i. is
is
is
a
A
; is
fi
;
it
; it
:
(i.
248 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
tively considerable rock having a height of 188 feet and at its base a circumference of fully 2000 double paces,1 was joined to this wall at its southern end, just as the rock-wall of the Capitol was joined to the city-wall of Rome. Its summit bore the huge temple of the God of Healing, resting on a basement of sixty steps. The south side of the city was washed partly by the shallow lake of Tunes towards the south-west, which was separated almost wholly from the gulf by a narrow and low tongue of land running southwards from the Carthaginian peninsula,2 partly by the open gulf towards the south-east. At this last spot was situated the double harbour of the city, a work of human hands ; the outer or commercial harbour, a longish rect angle with the narrow end turned to the sea, from whose entrance, only 70 feet wide, broad quays stretched along the water on both sides, and the inner circular war-
harbour, the Cothon,8 with the island containing the admiral's house in the middle, which was approached
the outer harbour. Between the two passed the city wall, which turning eastward from the Byrsa excluded the tongue of land and the outer harbour, but included the war-harbour, so that the entrance to the latter must be conceived as capable of being closed like a gate. Not far from the war-harbour lay the market place, which was connected by three narrow streets with, the citadel open on the side towards the town. To the
1 Oros. iv. a3. Fully 3000 paces, or—as Polybius must have said— 16 stadia, are = about 3000 mitres. The citadel-hill, on which the church of St. Louis now stands, measures at the top about 1400, half-way up about 3600, metres in circumference (Beulg, p. 33) ; for the circumference at the base that estimate will very well suffice.
through
* It now bears the fort Goletta.
' That this Phoenician word signifies a basin excavated in a circular shape, is shown both by Diodorus (iii. 44), and by its being employed by the Greeks to denote a "cup. " It thus suits only the inner harbour of Carthage, and in that sense it is used by Strabo (xvii. a, 14, where it is strictly applied to the admiral's island) and Fest. Ef. v. cothones, p. 37. Appian (Pun. 137) is not quite accurate in describing the rectangular harbour in front of the Cothon as part of it.
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 249
north of, and beyond, the city proper, the pretty con siderable space of the modern El Mersa, even at that time occupied in great part by villas and well- watered gardens, and then called Magalia, had a circumvallation of its own joining on to the city wall. On the opposite point of the peninsula, the Jebel-Khawi near the modem village of Ghamart, lay the necropolis. These three— the old city, the suburb, and the necropolis —together filled the whole breadth of the promontory on its side next the gulf, and were only accessible by the two highways leading to Utica and Tunes along that narrow tongue of land, which, although not closed by a wall, yet afforded a most advantageous position for the armies taking their stand under the protection of the capital with the view of protecting it in return.
The difficult task of reducing so well fortified a city was rendered still more difficult by the fact, that the resources of the capital itself and of its territory which still included 800 townships and was mostly under the power of the emi grant party on the one hand, and the numerous tribes of the free or half-free Libyans hostile to Massinissa on the other, enabled the Carthaginians simultaneously with their defence of the city to keep a numerous army in the field — an army which, from the desperate temper of the emigrants and the serviceableness of the light Numidian cavalry, the besiegers could not afford to disregard.
The consuls accordingly had by no means an easy task The siege to perform, when they now found themselves compelled to commence a regular siege. Manius Manilius, who com
manded the land army, pitched his camp opposite the wall
of the citadel, while Lucius Censorinus stationed himself with the fleet on the lake and there began operations on
the tongue of land. The Carthaginian army, under Has- drubal, encamped on the other side of the lake near the fortress of Nepheris, whence it obstructed the labours of
aso THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book it
the Roman soldiers despatched to cut timber for con structing machines, and the able cavalry-leader in parti cular, Himilco Phameas, slew many of the Romans. Censorinus fitted up two large battering-rams on the tongue, and made a breach with them at this weakest place of the wall ; but, as evening had set in, the assault had to be postponed. During the night the besieged succeeded in filling up a great part of the breach, and in so damaging the Roman machines by a sortie that they could not work next day. Nevertheless the Romans ventured on the assault ; but they found the breach and the portions of the wall and houses in the neighbourhood so strongly occupied, and advanced with such imprudence, that they were repulsed with severe loss and would have suffered still greater damage, had not the military tribune
Aemilianus, foreseeing the issue of the foolhardy attack, kept together his men in front of the walls and with them intercepted the fugitives. Manilius accomplished still less against the impregnable wall of the citadel. The siege thus lingered on. The diseases engendered in the camp by the heat of summer, the departure of Censorinus the abler general, the ill-humour and inaction of Massinissa who was naturally far from pleased to see the Romans taking for themselves the booty which he had long coveted, and the death of the king at the age of ninety which ensued
149. soon after (end of 605), utterly arrested the offensive opera tions of the Romans. They had enough to do in pro tecting their ships against the Carthaginian incendiaries and their camp against nocturnal surprises, and in securing food for their men and horses by the construction of a harbour-fort and by forays in the neighbourhood. Two expeditions directed against Hasdrubal remained without success ; and in fact the first, badly led over difficult ground, had almost terminated in a formal defeat But, while the course of the war was inglorious for the general
Scipio
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 251
and the army, the military tribune Scipio achieved in it brilliant distinction. It was he who, on occasion of a nocturnal attack by the enemy on the Roman camp, starting with some squadrons of horse and taking the enemy in rear, compelled him to retreat. On the first expedition to Nepheris, when the passage of the river had taken place in opposition to his advice and had almost occasioned the destruction of the army, by a bold attack in flank he relieved the pressure on the retreating troops, and by his devoted and heroic courage rescued a division which had been given up as lost While the other officers, and the consul in
particular, by their perfidy deterred the towns and party-leaders that were inclined to negotiate, Scipio succeeded in in
ducing one of the ablest of the latter, Himilco Phameas, to pass over to the Romans with 2200 cavalry. Lastly, after he had in fulfilment of the charge of the dying Massinissa divided his kingdom among his three sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal, he brought to the Roman army in Gulussa a cavalry-leader worthy of his father, and thereby remedied the want, which had hitherto been seriously felt, of light cavalry. His refined and yet simple demeanour, which recalled rather his own father than him whose name he bore, overcame even envy, and in the camp as in the capital the name of Scipio was on the lips of all. Even Cato, who was not liberal with his
a few months before his death —he died at the
end of 605 without having seen the wish of his life, the 149. destruction of Carthage, accomplished —applied to the young officer and to his incapable comrades the Homeric
line • —
He only is a living man, the rest are gliding shades. 1
While these events were passing, the close of the year 1 0&>I rfwrvrtu, ~ol Si aiuai Uattwa.
praise,
Sdpto lianai
15» THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
had come and with it a change of commanders ; the consul 148. Lucius Piso (606) was somewhat late in appearing and took the command of the land army, while Lucius Mancinus
took charge of the fleet. But, if their predecessors had done little, these did nothing at all. Instead of prosecuting the siege of Carthage or subduing the army of Hasdrubal,
Piso employed himself in attacking the small maritime towns of the Phoenicians, and that mostly without success. Clupea, for example, repulsed him, and he was obliged to retire in disgrace from Hippo Diarrhytus, after having lost the whole summer in front of it and having had his besieg ing apparatus twice burnt Neapolis was no doubt taken ; but the pillage of the town in opposition to his pledged word of honour was not specially favourable to the progress of the Roman arms. The courage of the Carthaginians rose. Bithyas, a Numidian sheik, passed over to them with 800 horse; Carthaginian envoys were enabled to attempt negotiations with the kings of Numidia and Maure- tania and even with Philip the Macedonian pretender. It was perhaps internal intrigues —Hasdrubal the emigrant brought the general of the same name, who commanded in the city, into suspicion on account of his relationship with
Massinissa, and caused him to be put to death in the senate- house — rather than the activity of the Romans, that prevented things from assuming a turn still more favourable for Carthage.
With the view of producing a change in the state of African affairs, which excited uneasiness, the Romans re sorted to the extraordinary measure of entrusting the conduct of the war to the only man who had as yet brought home honour from the Libyan plains, and who was recom mended for this war by his very name. Instead of calling Scipio to the aedileship for which he was a candidate, they gave to him the consulship before the usual time, setting aside the laws to the contrary effect, and committed to him
chap. I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 153
by special decree the conduct of the African war. He arrived (607) in Utica at a moment when much was at stake. 147. The Roman admiral Mancinus, charged by Piso with the nominal continuance of the siege of the capital, had occupied
a steep cliff, far remote from the inhabited district and scarcely defended, on the almost inaccessible seaward side
of the suburb of Magalia, and had united nearly his whole
not very numerous force there, in the hope of being able to penetrate thence into the outer town. In fact the assailants
had been for a moment within its gates and the camp- followers had flocked forward in a body in the hope of spoil, when they were again driven back to the cliff and, being without supplies and almost cut off, were in the great
est danger. Scipio found matters in that position. He
had hardly arrived when he despatched the troops which
he had brought with him and the militia of Utica by sea to
the threatened point, and succeeded in saving its garrison
and holding the cliff itself. After this danger was averted,
the general proceeded to the camp of Piso to take over the
army and bring it back to Carthage. Hasdrubal and Bithyas availed themselves of his absence to move their camp immediately up to the city, and to renew the attack on the garrison of the cliff before Magalia; but even now Scipio appeared with the vanguard of the main army in sufficient time to afford assistance to the post Then the siege began afresh and more earnestly. First of all Scipio cleared the camp of the mass of camp-followers and sutlers and once more tightened the relaxed reins of discipline. Military operations were soon resumed with increased vigour. In an attack by night on the suburb the Romans succeeded in passing from a tower—placed in front of the walls and equal to them in height—on to the battlements, and opened a little gate through which the whole army entered. The Carthaginians abandoned the suburb and their camp before the gates, and gave the chief command
»54 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book it
of the garrison of the city, amounting to 30,000 men, to Hasdrubal. The new commander displayed his energy in the first instance by giving orders that all the Roman pri soners should be brought to the battlements and, after undergoing cruel tortures, should be thrown over before the eyes of the besieging army ; and, when voices were raised in disapproval of the act, a reign of terror was introduced with reference to the citizens also.
Scipio, meanwhile, after having confined the besieged to the city itself, sought totally to cut off their intercourse with the outer world. He took
up his head-quarters on the ridge by which the Carthaginian peninsula was connected with the mainland, and, notwith standing the various attempts of the Carthaginians to disturb his operations, constructed a great camp across the whole breadth of the isthmus, which completely blockaded the city from the landward side. Nevertheless ships with pro visions still ran into the harbour, partly bold merchantmen allured by the great gain, partly vessels of Bithyas, who availed himself of every favourable wind to convey supplies to the city from Nepheris at the end of the lake of Tunes ; whatever might now be the sufferings of the citizens, the garrison was still sufficiently provided for. Scipio therefore constructed a stone mole, 96 feet broad, running from the tongue of land between the lake and gulf into the latter, so as thus to close the mouth of the harbour. The city seemed lost, when the success of this undertaking, which was at first ridiculed by the Carthaginians as impracticable, became evident. But one surprise was balanced by another. While the Roman labourers were constructing the mole, work was going forward night and day for two months in the Carthaginian harbour, without even the deserters
being able to tell what were the designs of the besieged. All of a sudden, just as the Romans had completed the bar across
the entrance to the harbour, fifty Carthaginian triremes and a number of boats and skiffs sailed forth from that same
chap. I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES 255
harbour into the gulf—while the enemy were closing the old mouth of the harbour towards the south, the Cartha ginians had by means of a canal formed in an easterly direction procured for themselves a new outlet, which owing to the depth of the sea at that spot could not possibly be closed. Had the Carthaginians, instead of resting content with a mere demonstration, thrown themselves at once and resolutely on the half-dismantled and wholly unprepared Roman fleet, it must have been lost ; when they returned on the third day to give the naval battle, they found the Romans in readiness. The conflict came off without deci sive result ; but on their return the Carthaginian vessels so ran foul of each other in and before the entrance of the harbour, that the damage thus occasioned was equivalent to a defeat Scipio now directed his attacks against the outer quay, which lay outside of the city walls and was only protected for the exigency by an earthen rampart of recent construction. The machines were stationed on the tongue of land, and a breach was easily made ; but with unexam pled intrepidity the Carthaginians, wading through the shallows, assailed the besieging implements, chased away the covering force which ran off in such a manner that Scipio was obliged to make his own troopers cut them down, and destroyed the machines. In this way they gained time to close the breach. Scipio, however, again established the machines and set on fire the wooden towers of the enemy ; by which means he obtained possession of the quay and of the outer harbour along with A rampart equal ling the city wall in height was here constructed, and the town was now at length completely blockaded land and sea, for the inner harbour could only be reached through the outer. To ensure the completeness of the blockade, Scipio ordered Gaius Laelius to attack the camp at Nepheris, where Diogenes now held the command was captured
fortunate stratagem, and the whole countless multitude
by a
; it
by
it.
Capture of *'
a56 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
assembled there were put to death or taken prisoners. Winter had now arrived and Scipio suspended his opera tions, leaving famine and pestilence to complete what he had begun.
How fearfully these mighty agencies had laboured in the work of destruction during the interval while Hasdrubal continued to vaunt and to gormandize, appeared so soon as
146. the Roman army proceeded in the spring of 608 to attack the inner towa Hasdrubal gave orders to set fire to the outer harbour and made himself ready to repel the ex pected assault on the Cothon ; but Laelius succeeded in scaling the wall, hardly longer defended by the famished garrison, at a point farther up and thus penetrated into the inner harbour. The city was captured, but the struggle was still by no means at an end. The assailants occupied the market-place contiguous to the small harbour, and slowly pushed their way along the three narrow streets leading from this to the citadel — slowly, for the huge
houses of six stories in height had to be taken one by one ; on the roofs or on beams laid over the street the soldiers penetrated from one of these fortress-like buildings to that which was adjoining or opposite, and cut down whatever they encountered there. Thus six days elapsed, terrible for the inhabitants of the city and full of difficulty and danger also for the assailants ; at length they arrived in front of the steep citadel-rock, whither Hasdrubal and the force still surviving had retreated. To procure a wider approach, Scipio gave orders to set fire to the captured streets and to level the ruins ; on which occasion a number
of persons unable to fight, who were concealed in the houses, miserably perished. Then at last the remnant of the population, crowded together in the citadel, besought for mercy. Bare life was conceded to them, and they appeared before the victor, 30,000 men and 25,000 women, not the tenth part of the former population. The Roman
chap, 1 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES »57
deserters alone, 900 in number, and the general Hasdrubal with his wife and his two children had thrown themselves into the temple of the God of Healing ; for them — for soldiers who had deserted their posts, and for the murderer of the Roman prisoners — there were no terms. But when, yielding to famine, the most resolute of them set fire to the temple, Hasdrubal could not endure to face death; alone he ran forth to the victor and falling upon his knees pleaded for his life. It was granted ; but, when his wife who with her children was among the rest on the roof of the temple saw him at the feet of Scipio, her proud heart swelled at this disgrace brought on her dear perishing home, and, with bitter words bidding her husband be careful to save his life, she plunged first her sons and then herself into the flames. The struggle was at an end. The joy in the camp and at Rome was boundless ; the noblest of the people alone were in secret ashamed of the most recent grand achievement of the nation. The prisoners were mostly sold as slaves ; several were allowed to languish in prison ; the most notable, Hasdrubal and Bithyas, were sent to the interior of Italy as Roman state-prisoners and tolerably treated. The moveable property, with the excep tion of gold, silver, and votive gifts, was abandoned to the pillage of the soldiers. As to the temple treasures, the booty that had been in better times carried off by the Carthaginians from the Sicilian towns was restored to them ; the bull of Phalaris, for example, was returned to the Agrigentines ; the rest fell to the Roman state.
But by far the larger portion of the city still remained Destruc-
standing. We may believe that Scipio desired its preserva- tion ; at least he addressed a special inquiry to the senate on the subject Scipio Nasica once more attempted to gain a hearing for the demands of reason and honour ; but in vain. The senate ordered the general to level the city of Carthage and the suburb of Magalia with the ground,
VOL III 82
c^L_
Province of Africa.
358 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES book iv
and to do the same with all the townships which had held by Carthage to the last ; and thereafter to pass the plough over the site of Carthage so as to put an end in legal form to the existence of the city, and to cur. se the soil and site for ever, that neither house nor cornfield might ever re appear on the spot. The command was punctually obeyed. The ruins burned for seventeen days : recently, when the remains of the Carthaginian city wall were excavated, they were found to be covered with a layer of ashes from four to five feet deep, filled with half-charred pieces of wood, fragments of iron, and projectiles. Where the industrious Phoenicians had bustled and trafficked for five hundred years, Roman slaves henceforth pastured the herds of their distant masters. Scipio, however, whom nature had destined for a nobler part than that of an executioner, gazed with horror on his own work ; and, instead of the joy of victory, the victor himself was haunted by a presentiment of the retribution that would inevitably follow such a
misdeed.
There remained the work of arranging the future
organization of the country. The earlier plan of investing the allies of Rome with the transmarine possessions that she acquired was no longer viewed with favour. Micipsa and Ins brothers retained in substance their former territory, including the districts recently wrested from the Cartha ginians on the Bagradas and in Emporia ; their long- cherished hope of obtaining Carthage as a capital was for ever frustrated ; the senate presented them instead with the Carthaginian libraries. The Carthaginian territory as possessed by the city in its last days — viz. the narrow border of the African coast lying immediately opposite to Sicily, from the river Tusca (near Thabraca) to Thaenae (opposite to the island of Karkenah) — became a Roman
In the interior, where the constant encroach ments of Massinissa had more and more narrowed the
province.
chap, I THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES a59
Carthaginian dominions and Bulla, Zama, and Aquae already belonged to the kings, the Numidians retained what they possessed. But the careful regulation of the boundary between the Roman province and the Numidian kingdom, which enclosed it on three sides, showed that Rome would by no means tolerate in reference to herself what she had permitted in reference to Carthage ; while the name of the new province, Africa, on the other hand appeared to indicate that Rome did not at all regard the boundary now marked off as a definitive one. The supreme administra tion of the new province was entrusted to a Roman governor, who had his seat at Utica. Its frontier did not need any regular defence, as the allied Numidian kingdom everywhere separated it from the inhabitants of the desert. In the matter of taxes Rome dealt on the whole with moderation. Those communities which from the beginning of the war had taken part with Rome —viz. only the maritime towns of Utica, Hadrumetum, Little Leptis, Thapsus, Achulla, and Usalis, and the inland town of Theudalis — retained their territory and became free cities ; which was also the case with the newly-founded community of deserters. The territory of the city of Carthage —with the exception of a tract presented to Utica—and that of the other destroyed townships became Roman domain-land, which was let on lease. The remaining townships likewise forfeited in law their property in the soil and their municipal liberties; but their land and their constitution were for the time being, and until further orders from the Roman government, left to them as a possession liable to be recalled, and the communities paid annually to Rome for the use of their soil which had become Roman a once- for-all fixed tribute (slipendium), which they in their turn collected by means of a property-tax levied from the in dividuals liable.