Thomas Carlyle
.
.
.
Quilibet enim debet patriam suam
defendere, (ut in Lombar. de his qui
patriam defen. 1. prima et ultima) et
non potest pater iure patrise potestatis
resistere, quominus patrise obsequatur,
(ut ff. de muneribus et honoribus, 1.
honor. ? plebei, in fine) et princeps
omni creaturse praferendus, ut in
titulo, de maioritate et obedient, c
solite. Magna enim servitia ab uni-
versis subditis debentur imperio, ut
C. de operibus publicis 1. quicumque
locus. "
1 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 26. 1: "Die
koning is gemene richtere over al. "
Id. , iii. 33. 1: "Iewelk man hevet
sin recht vor'me koninge. "
Id. , iii. 52. 2: "Den koning kiiset
? ? F
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? 82
THE INFLUENCE OF FEUDALISM. [part L
their nature, and, while this is not the place to discuss their
actual constitutional significance in the administration and
judicial organisation of the empire, they are yet of great
importance as indicating how far at least in theory the national
conception had imposed itself upon the feudal.
The same principle is set out in the ' Summa de legibus,' one
of the Norman law books of the thirteenth century. The prince
alone has "plena iurisdictio" over all disputes brought to him,1
and again in another place, the jurisdiction of the feudal lord is
severely limited to certain cases, for all "iusticiatio personarum"
belongs in Normandy to the Duke, in virtue of the fealty which
all men owe to him; and again, jurisdiction over the bodies of all
men, small or great, belongs in Normandy to the Duke, inasmuch
as they are bound by fidelity and allegiance to him alone. 2
man to richtere over egen unde len
unde over iewelkes mannes lif. Die
keiser ne mach aver in allen landen
nicht sin, unde al ungerichte nicht
richten to aller tiet, dar umme liet he
den vorsten grafscap, unde den greven
scultheitdum. "
Id. , iii. 60. 2: "In svelke stat des
rikes de koning kumt binnen deme
rike, dar is ime ledich monte unde
toln, unde in svelke lant he kumt, dar
is ime ledich dat gerichte, dat he wol
richten mut alle die klage, die vor
gerichte nicht begunt, noch nicht
gelent ne sin. 3. Svenne die koning oc
alrest in dat land kumt, so solen ime
ledich sin alle vangene uppe recht,
unde man sal sie vor ime bringen unde
mit rechte verwinnen oder mit rechte
la ten, so man sie erst besenden mach,
seder der tiet dat sie de koning eschet
to rechte oder sine boden, to dem manne
selven oder to 'me hove oder to 'me
huse, dar sie gevangen sin oder hebbet
gewesen. Weigeret man sie vore to
bringene, sint man sie to rechte geeschet
hevet, unde man des getiich an des
koninges boden hevet, man dut to hant
in de achte alle die sie vengen, unde
hus unde liide, die sie weder recht
halden. "
Id. , ii. 12. 4: "Schilt man en ordel,
des sal man tien an den hogesten
richtere, unde to lest vor den koning;
dar sal die richtere sine boden to geven,
die_ dar horen welk ire vulkome vor
deme koninge. "
Id. , i. 58. 1: " Svenne die greve kumt
to des gogrefen dinge, so sal des
gogreven gerichte neder sin geleget.
Also is des greven, svenne die koning
in sime grafscap kumt, dar se beide
to antwerde sin. Also is jewelkes
richteres, dar die koning to antwerde
is, die klage ne ga denne uppe den
koning. "
1 'Summa de legibus,' ii. 4: "Solus
autem princeps plenam habet iuris-
dictionem de querelis ad ipsum delatis
omnibus laicalem. "
2 Id. , vi. 8: "Preter hoc tamen
sciendum est quod pro debito prin-
cipis, elapso termino solutioni deputato,
? ? solet in debitores iusticiatio fieri cor-
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? chap, v. ] FEUDALISM AND THE NATION.
83
The author of the 'Jostice et Plet,' and Beaumanoir, main-
tain the same doctrine in France. The author of 'Jostice et
Plet' is indeed so much influenced by the Eoman law that it
may be held that he is to be considered rather as a civilian than
a feudalist, but his treatment of the subject corresponds in
principle with that of the feudal jurists. His phrases are note-
worthy. The king has jurisdiction everywhere and always, he
has plenary authority in everything, while others have it only
in part. 1 Again, the count or duke has "jostice" in his
lands, but under the king who is over him, the king must not
indeed deprive ? him of this, so long as he does right, but the
king can interfere to secure justice. The king holds of no one;
dukes, counts, viscounts, and barons can hold of each other,
and become each other's men, but always, saving the dignity of
the king, against whom homage is of no avail, for all are under
the hand of the king. 2
mannie, quod eciam est in receptione
homagii exprimendum.
Uncle nec aliquis in Normannia
hominis sui corpus potest vel debet
prisonie mancipare, nisi coram eo de
latrociuio fuerit insecutus vel in pre-
senti deprehensus, vel eius serviens
fuerit, ut propositus, molendinarius vel
quoquo modo rerum suarum receptor,
quos arrestare potest quousque compo-
tum debitum et plegios sufficientes
habuerit de eisdem.
9. Ad bosci forisfactum garanne vel
aquarum defensarum, vel costume de-
tente, vel bladorum, seu pratorum vel
aliorum huiusmodi, possunt homines a
dominis feodorum arrestari . . . dum
tamen ad presens forisfactum fuerint
deprehensi, et tan tum detineri quousque
namna, vel vadia, vel plegios habuerint
de damno illato restaurando et emenda,
ubi debeat extorqueri. Si autem aliquo
casu alio pro facto criminoso aliquis
capiatur, justiciario debet reddi indi-
late.
10. Si autem dominus homini suo
feeerit iniuriam feodi ratione, ad ducem
pertinet curia de eodem, nisi dominus,
si quis fuerit interpositus, eam re-
quisierit, qui iurisdictionem habeat
feodalem. "
Id. , cxiii. 1: "Cum in Normannia
omnium iurisdictio corporum ad ducem
tam plebis pertineat quam magnatum,
eo quod fidelitate et ligancia soli
principi teneantur. "
1'Jostice et Plet,' i. 7. 6: "L'en
demande porquoi li rois use par tot et en
toz tens de juridiction, cum aucun soit
en son regne juridiction qui soie est?
et l'en respont que en roi confermee est
le poir de tote la region, s'il ne le done;
et il a plenier poer en tot, c'est a en-
tendre poer de prodome; et li autre si
n'ont que partie de poer, quar il ne
sont apele1 qu'en partie de la cure, non
pas en plenier poer.
Enten que rois conferme? est aussi
comme se chascuns metoit sa bone
volenti en la soie. Enten ci reison,
par que rois use en chascuns leu de
? ? juridicion. "
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? 84
THE INFLUENCE OF FEUDALISM. [part I.
Beaumanoir asserts very emphatically that the king is
supreme over all jurisdictions and over all persons. In one
passage of great importance which we have already discussed
he explains the sense in which he uses the word "souverain,"
and says that while every baron is "souverain" in his own
barony, the king is "souverain" over all, and has the charge
of the whole kingdom, and therefore can make "establisse-
ments" which are binding everywhere. No one is so great
that he cannot be called before the king's court, "pour defaute
de droit ou pour faus jugement. " 1
The whole conception is summed up by Bracton in an
emphatic passage in which he lays down the principle that the
king has the "ordinary" jurisdiction and authority over all men
who are in the kingdom, for all laws which belong to the crown
and the lay authority and the temporal sword are in his hand;
it is he who holds justice and judgment, that is jurisdiction,
so that it is by his jurisdiction, as being the minister and
seignories et totes joutices, sauf le roi,
qui est li par desus, a` amender le torfet
qu'il a fet, et sauf ce que li rois a en la
duche? e, et autres par jutes causes. "
Id. , i. 16. 1: "Li rois ne doit tenir
de nuil. Duc, conte, vicomte, baron,
puent tenir li un des autres et devenir
home, sauf la dignite? le roi, contre qui
homage ne vaut riens. . . . Et tuit
sont soz la main au roi. "
1Beaumanoir, xxxiv. 1013: "Pour
ce que nous parlons eu cest livre, en
pluseurs lieus, du souverain, et de ce
qu'il puet et doit fere, li aucun pour-
raient entendre, pour ce que nous ne
nommons conte ne duc, que ce fust
du roi; mais en tous les lieus la ou li
rois n'est pas nomme? s, nous entendons
de ceus qui tienent en baronnie, car
c? hascuns barons est souverain en sa
baronie. Voirs est que le rois est
souverains par dessus tous, et a, de
son droit la general garde de tout son
roiaume, par quoi il puet fere teus
etablissemens comme il li plest pour le
commun pourflt, et ce qu'il establist
doit estre tenu. Et se n'i a nul si
grant dessous li qui ne puist estre tres
en sa court pour defaute de droit ou
pour faus jugement et pour tous les
cas qui touchuent le roi. Et pour ce
qu'il est souverain par desseus tous,
nous le nommons, quant nous parlons
d'aucune souverainete? qui a li apar-
tient. "
Cf. xlviii. 1499: "Mes quant li
Rois fet aucun establissement especi-
aument en son demaine, si baron ne
lessent pas pour ce a user en leur
terres, selonc les anciennes coustumes.
Mes quant li establissemens est gener-
aus, il doit courre par tout le roiaume,
et nous devons croire que tel estab-
lissement sont fet par tres grant conseil
et ppur le commun pourfit. "
Cf. also xi. 322: "Qar toute la laie
juridicion du roiaume est tenue du roi
en fief ou en arriere fief. Et pour ce
puet on venir en sa court, par voie de
defaute de droit ou de faus jugement
? ? quant cil qui de lui tienent n'en font
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? CHAP, v. ] FEUDALISM AND THE NATION. 85
vicar of God, that he gives to every man that which is to be
his. 1
When we now endeavour to sum up the conclusions which
arise from the study of the political theory of the feudal law
books, it is evident that they represent very different principles
from those which have been sometimes thought of as related to
feudalism. The conception of personal devotion and loyalty,
of an almost unquestioning obedience and fidelity of the vassal
towards his lord, was no doubt of great importance, and the con-
ception has left deeply marked traces in the structure and th9
sentiments of European political society. But it is also clear that
the principle of loyalty did not, in the minds of the feudal law-
yers, or, as we shall see further in the second part of the volume,
in the judgment of mediseval society in general, override other
considerations of an ideal and rational kind. The feudal jurists
recognised very clearly that all human relations, and not least
the relations of lord and vassal, must be controlled by the prin-
ciples of equity and justice, and that these principles found
their embodiment in the law--the law which is the superior of
kings and princes, which is the expression not of their will
merely, but of justice, and of the custom and consent of the
community. It is clear that the feudal jurists conceived of the
relations of vassal and lord as being limited and determined by
the law, that lord and vassal were equally obliged to obey and
to maintain the law, which prescribed the nature and extent of
their mutual obligations. The relation of lord and vassal was a
contractual relation, the terms of the contract were prescribed
1 Bracton, ii. 24. 1: "Nunc autem
dicendum est de libertatibus, quis con-
cedere possit libertatem, et quibus, et
qualiter transferuntur, et qualiter possi-
dentur vel quasi, et qualiter per usum
retinentur. Quis? Et sciendum, quod
ipse dominus rex, qui ordinariam habet
iurisdictionem et dignitatem et potes-
tatem super omnes qui in regno suo
sunt, habet enim omnia iura in manu
sua, quse ad coronam et laicalem
pertinent potestatem et materialem
gladium, qui pertinet ad regni guber-
naculum, habet etiam iustitiam et
iudicium, quse sunt iurisdictionis, ut
ex iurisdictione sua, sicut Dei minister
et vicarius, tribuat unicuique quod
suum fuerit. "
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? 86
THE INFLUENCE OP FEUDALISM. [part I.
by law, and the obligation of the contract was determined
by law.
Again, we have seen that while feudalism, in its great develop-
ment in the tenth century, was the result of the operation
of forces which were anarchical, or which at least tended
to disintegrate the larger political organisations of Western
Europe, these tendencies were rapidly checked by the growth
of the principle that the feudal jurisdictions were subject to
the control of the rising national systems, and that beyond
the obligations of the vassal to his immediate lord every in-
dividual free man owed allegiance to the national sovereign.
We have considered the history of this movement as it is
reflected in the feudal law books themselves, and have seen
that at least as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
it was recognised that the royal or national authority was
paramount over all other authorities.
It is no doubt true that feudalism left for many centuries
deep traces in the structure of Western society, and even on
the theory of political relations, but it is also true that, when
we consider the subject in the broadest way, feudalism did not
counteract the normal development of the political ideas of
Western civilisation, but rather that in the end its main influ-
ence went to further the growth of the principle that the
community is governed by law, and that the ruler as much as
the subject is bound to obey the law.
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? PART II.
POLITICAL THEORY IN
THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES.
CHAPTER I.
NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
We now turn to the history of the general development of
political ideas from the beginning of the tenth century to the
end of the twelfth, that is, we can resume the history of these
conceptions at the point where we left them in our first volume.
We shall in doing this have occasion from time to time to
take account of the influence of the three systems of law which
we have considered, the feudal, the civil, and the canon law,
but our main task is to trace this development in the general
literature of those times, and in the principles expressed or
implicit in the constitutional development of Europe. For the
time being we shall not discuss directly the questions concerned
with the relations of the temporal and spiritual powers. These
became during this period so important that we propose to
devote a separate volume to them.
In considering the theories of the civilians and canonists we
have seen how important was the conception of natural law in
the Middle Ages, but we must not look for any detailed discus-
sion of this in the literature which we have now to examine,
for these writers were for the most part engaged in considering
the principles of political society as they emerged in the actual
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? 88 POLITICAL THEORY: llTH 4 12TH CENTDRIES. [part n.
controversies and conflicts of this time. On the other hand,
there is enough to show us that so far as they reflected upon
the matter they all thought under the terms of the contrast
between the natural and conventional condition.
This is specially clear in regard to the conception of human
nature and its " natural" characteristics.
We are apt to think
of mediseval society as governed by the idea of distinctions of
blood and birth, and these conceptions were not wholly unim-
portant. It is, however, clear that, so far as men reflected
upon the matter, they accepted the tradition of the later philo-
sophical system of the ancient world, and of Christianity as
handed down by the Christian Fathers and by the civil law, that
there are no " natural" distinctions in human nature, and that
all differences of rank and condition are conventional or
"positive. "
We have dealt with the subject as it is illustrated in the
writings of the civilians and canonists in the second volume,1
and we only therefore add one citation from an ecclesiastical
writer. It is, however, specially significant to observe how
emphatically the conception of the natural freedom of men is
stated by some of the feudal lawyers.
In the tenth century, in a work of that strange and eccentric
prelate, Eatherius, Bishop of Verona, we find a passage in which
he urges upon Christian men that they should remember that
God made all men equal in nature, and that it is quite possible
that the subject may be a better man than his lord. The
man who boasts of his noble blood should remember that we are
all of one origin and are made of the same substance. In
Christ we are all one, redeemed with the same price, reborn in
the same baptism, and those who rend asunder the unity of
the brotherhood by setting themselves over others are really
denying the common fatherhood and redemption of men. In
the sight of God we are only distinguished from each other so
far as our actions are better; the man who humbly serves
is better than the man who arrogantly despises his fellow-
men, he is nobler who observes the law of nature and does
not repudiate his true origin, than he who violates that
1 Cf. vol. ii. Part I. chap. 4; Part II. chap. 5.
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? CHAP. I. ]
89
NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
friendship between men which is so great and natural a
good. 1
The passage is no doubt based mainly upon recollections of
earlier writers, of the Fathers, and, probably through them,
of Stoic writers like Seneca,2 but it is representative of the
normal judgment of mediseval thinkers.
We may take as our first illustration from the feudal lawyers
a very notable passage in the 'Sachsenspiegel. ' God, says the
author, made all men in His own likeness, and redeemed man
by His passion, the poor as well as the rich; there were no
slaves when the forefathers of the Germans first settled in the
land; slavery, or serfdom, began by violence and capture and
unrighteous force; the law of Moses required all slaves to be
set free in the seventh year; and the author holds that it is
not in accordance with the truth or the will of God that one
man should belong to another. 3
1 Ratherius of Verona--' Praloqui-
orum,' i. 10: "Attende Deutu in
prineipio creationis humame dixisse:
'Crescite et multiplicamini,' . . . ut
intelligas homines non hominibus, sed
volatilibus, bestiis et piscibus esse
prselatos, omnesque a Deo natura
sequales conditos, sed insequalitate
morum factente, aliis alios intantum
suppositos, ut plerumque aliqui domi-
nentur etiam melioribus. . . . Nota
vero tu, quisquis es, qui de fastu
alti gloriaris abusive sanguinis; cum
omne hominum genus in terris simili
surgat ab ortu, et non ex alia, sed
ex eadem massa compositus, ex uno
patre, ex eademque, qua servorum
quilibet, sis matre creatus. Quia si
omnes in Christo quoque unum sumus,
uno scilicet pretio redempti, eodemque
baptismo renati: quisquis eatndem
fraternitatis unitatem caiteris se pro-
ponendo scindere nititur, paternitatem
sine dubio illius, redemptionem et
regenerationem quoque, qua eius filii
efficimus, quantum in se est, annul-
lare, et, ut ita dicam, abnegare pro-
batur. Verum si solummodo in hac
a Deo parte discernimus, si meliores
aliis in operibus bonis, et humiles
inveniamur: convincitur melior esse
qui tibi servit humiliter, quam tu,
qui eum despicis arroganter; nobilior,
qui tibi, quod promisit, exhibit
fideliter, quam tu, qui eum decipis
meudaciter; generosior, qui iura
naturse custodiers, proprium non
deserit ortum, quam tu, qui vitiis
vitia nutriens vim amicitise mag-
numque et naturale violas bonum. "
3 Cf. vol. i. pp. 20-22, and chap. 10.
3 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 42. 1: "Got
hevet den man na ime selven gebeldet,
unde hevet ine mit sinen martere
geledeget, den enen also den anderen,
ime is die arme also besvas als die
rike. . . .
3. Do man ok recht irst satte, do ne
was nen dienstman, unde waren al die
lude vri, do unse vorderen her to
? ? lande quamen. An minen sinnen ne
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? 90 POLITICAL THEORY : llTH & 12TH CENTURIES, [part II.
We may put beside these phrases a passage from Beaumanoir
in which he sets out the same principles, but in different
terms. All men, he says, were at the beginning free, and of
the same freedom, for all men are descended from one father
and mother; slavery (or serfdom) arose in many ways, such as
that men were taken prisoners in war, or sold themselves into
slavery on account of their poverty, or because they could not
defend themselves against the unjust violence of lords; however
men may have become slaves it is a great act of charity that a
lord should set his slaves (or serfs) free, for it is a great evil that
Christian men should be in the servile condition. 1
he ok to haldene, unde dat eevede
jar, dat het dat jar der losunge; bo
solde man ledich laten unde vri alle
die gevangen waren unde in egenscap
getogen, mit alsogedaneme gerede als
man sie vieng, of sie ledich unde
vri wolden wesen. Over sevenwerf
seven jar quam dat veftegiste jar, dat
het dat jar der vrouden, so muste
aller manlik ledich unde vri wesen,
he wolde oder newolde.
5. Ok gaf uns got orkiindes mer
an enem penninge, dar man ime mede
besochte, do he sprak: latet den
keiser sines beldes geweldich, unde
godes belde gevet gode. Dar bi uns
kundich von godes worden, dat die
mensche, godes belde, godes wesen
sal, unde sve ine anders iemanne to
seget danne gode, dat he weder got
dut.
6. N'a rechter warheit so hevet
egenscap begin von gedvange, unde
von vengnisse, unde von unrechter
walt, die man von aldere in unrechte
warheit getogen hevet, unde nu vore
recht hebben wel. "
Cf. 'Schwabenspiegel,' 57. 2: "Wir
han daz von der schrift, daz nieman
sol eigen sin. Doch ist ez also dar
komen mit gewalt unde mit twancsal,
daz es nu reht ist daz eigen liute sin. "
1 Beaumanoir, xlv. 1453: "Com-
ment que pluseur esta^t de gent soient
maintenant, voirs est qu'au com-
mencement tuit furent franc et d'une
meisme franchise; car chascuns set
que nous descendismes tuit d'un pere
et d'une mere. . . . Et l i serf si
sont venu par mout de manieres
d'aquisicions. Car li aucun sont venu
par estre pris de guerre, si donnoient
servitude seur aus et seur lor oirs,
par raenc? on, ou por issir de prison;
et li autre sont venu parce qu'il se
vendoient par povrete? , ou par con-
voitise d'avoir . . . et li autre sont
venu parce qu'il n'ont eu pouoir d'aus
defendre des seigneurs,'qui a tort et
par force les ont atre`s a servitude.
Et par quelconques manieres qu'il
soient venu, nous pouons entendre
que grant aumosne fet li sires qui
les oste de servitude et les met en
franchise, car c'est grans maus quant
nues crestiens est de serve condition. "
Cf. id. , xlv. 1438: "Par toutes tes
? ? choses sont servitudes venues avant,
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? chap. I. ] NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
91
It is clear that even the feudal lawyers were profoundly
affected by the earlier traditions, and that to them just as much
as to the Christian fathers the subjection of man to man as
slave or villein was a thing conventional, not natural.
qui prsecessor fiat tanquam minis- quidam sunt prsecellentes et prelati,
trator. Apud homines vero est et aliis principantur. "
differentia personarum, quia hominum
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? 92
CHAPTER II.
THE DIVINE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
In the first volume of this work we have examined the
characteristic elements of the theory of the origin and nature
of political authority as it is set out in the literature of the
ninth century, and we think that enough has been said to
make it clear that as soon as we find any literary treatment
of political conditions and ideas, we find that there were
very clearly fixed in the minds of the men of the new mediseval
civilisation some highly important conceptions of political
origins and obligations. We have in the last volume en-
deavoured to examine the relation of the revived Eoman law,
and of the new system of Ecclesiastical law, to these conceptions,
and in the first part of this volume we have considered the
bearing upon them of Feudalism. We must now inquire how
far these conceptions can be said to have been continuously
present to men's minds in the centuries from the tenth to the
twelfth, and how far they were modified or developed.
We are entering upon the study of an age in which the structure
of society was very rapidly growing and changing, and we have
to inquire how far and in what manner men's conceptions of
the principles of the political order changed with it. If our
, interpretation of the political theory of the ninth century is
at all correct, the main features of that theory are to be found
1 in three principles--first, that all authority, whether Tem-
poral or Spiritual, is ultimately derived from God; second,
that the supreme authority in political society is that of the
law, the law which represents the principle of justice; and
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? CHAP. II. ] DIVINE NATDRE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 93
third, that the immediate source of all political authority is"
the community, for law is primarily the custom of the com-
munity, and there can be no legitimate authority without the
election or recognition of the community. We have to inquire
how far these principles continued to control the conception
of political society, and in what manner they were modified or
developed.
During the tenth century and the earlier part of the eleventh
we should infer, from the fragments of the literature which
have survived, that there was not very much active political
speculation; we can indeed gather from occasional phrases the
general nature of the conceptions which were current, but it may
be doubted whether men did generally do much more than
repeat the commonplaces of the ninth century tradition. These
commonplaces were not, however, unimportant, and in some
respects they seem to represent real and intimate convictions.
It was the great constitutional and ecclesiastical conflicts
of the latter part of the eleventh century, continued in the
twelfth, which compelled men to consider these traditional pre-
suppositions more closely, and from the middle of the eleventh
century we have an abundant and important body of literature
in which we can discern with great clearness the main features
of an energetic and determined political speculation.
We must begin by considering the question how far in the
period with which we are now dealing it was doubted or denied
that the secular authority was derived from God, and this will
lead us on to the closely related question whether the State
was or was not conceived of as having a moral function and
purpose.
As we have seen, the principles of the divine source of
political authority, and of the moral function of government,
were most emphatically laid down by the Fathers,1 and main-
tained by the writers of the ninth century. 2 It has been
suggested that these conceptions were really undermined by
the influence of St Augustine, especially as expressed in the
* De Civitate Dei,' and that the effects of St Augustine's mode
1 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 11, 13, 14. 2 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 17, 18.
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? 94 POLITICAL THEORY : llTH & 12TH CENTURIES, [part II.
of thought are clearly traceable in the Middle Ages. We
cannot here discuss the real and complete meaning of St
Augustine, the subject has been handled with great care and
restraint by Eeuter. 1 The question with which we have to
deal is whether there was among the political theorists of
the eleventh or twelfth centuries any important tendency to
think of the secular power as lacking the divine authority,
and as representing a principle of evil rather than of good.
The discussion centres round some phrases of Pope Gregory
VII. (Hildebrand), their meaning and their influence. Some
writers have attached a very great importance to these, and
have considered them to be representative of a clear and
dogmatic theory, which as they have thought was of great
importance in the Middle Ages. And no doubt Hildebrand's
phrases are emphatic and startling. The best known of them
is to be found in his famous letter to Hermann, the Bishop of
Metz (1081): "Quis nesciat: reges et duces ab iis habuisse
principium, qui, Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia,
homicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus, mundi principe
diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares, scilicet homines, dominari
cseca cupidine et intolerabili prsesumptione affectaverunt. "2
Beside these words we may put those of an earlier letter
written to the same Bishop (1076): "Sed forte putant, quod
regia dignitas episcopalem prsecellat. Ex earum principiis
colligere possunt, quantum a se utraque differunt. Illam
quidem superbia humana repperit, banc divina pietas in-
stituit. Illa vanam gloriam incessanter captat, hsec ad
ccelestem vitam semper aspirat. "3 These are indeed strong
phrases, and might well, to the unwary, seem to imply a
definite doctrine of the secular power, as representing not the
authority of God, but of evil.
In order, however, to arrive at the meaning of Hildebrand's
phrases, we must begin by observing that in other places he
speaks of the secular power in very different terms. In a
letter written to Eudolph, Duke of Suabia, in 1073, he speaks
of his hope that the "sacerdotium" and the "imperium" may
1 H. Reuter, 'Augustinische Studien. ' 3 Id. id. , iv. 2.
2 Gregory VII. , Registrum, viii. 21.
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? CHAP. II. ] DIVINE NATURE OP POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 95
be united in concord, that, as the human body is ruled by its
two eyes, so the body of the Church may be ruled and en-
lightened when the two authorities agree in the true religion. 1
In a letter of 1074 to Henry IV. , he bids him to know that he
rightly holds the royal power, if he obeys Christ the King of
Kings and defends and restores the Church. 2 In a letter to
Sweyn, King of Denmark, in 1075, he prays him to administer
the authority entrusted to him, according to God, to adorn the
dignity of the royal title with the appropriate virtues, and to
make it manifest that that justice, in virtue of which he reigned
over his subjects, also ruled in his heart. 3 Again, in writing to
Harold, King of Denmark, in 1077, he admonishes him to keep
the honour of the kingdom committed to him by God with all
diligence, and to make his life worthy of it, in wisdom, justice,
and mercy, that God may be able to say of him, "By me this
King reigneth. "4 And again, in writing to Olaf, King of
Norway, in 1078, he describes the true function of his royal
authority as being to help the oppressed, to defend the widow,
and to love and defend justice with all his might. 6
Perhaps the most notable passage is contained in a letter
1 Id. id. , i.
Quilibet enim debet patriam suam
defendere, (ut in Lombar. de his qui
patriam defen. 1. prima et ultima) et
non potest pater iure patrise potestatis
resistere, quominus patrise obsequatur,
(ut ff. de muneribus et honoribus, 1.
honor. ? plebei, in fine) et princeps
omni creaturse praferendus, ut in
titulo, de maioritate et obedient, c
solite. Magna enim servitia ab uni-
versis subditis debentur imperio, ut
C. de operibus publicis 1. quicumque
locus. "
1 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 26. 1: "Die
koning is gemene richtere over al. "
Id. , iii. 33. 1: "Iewelk man hevet
sin recht vor'me koninge. "
Id. , iii. 52. 2: "Den koning kiiset
? ? F
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? 82
THE INFLUENCE OF FEUDALISM. [part L
their nature, and, while this is not the place to discuss their
actual constitutional significance in the administration and
judicial organisation of the empire, they are yet of great
importance as indicating how far at least in theory the national
conception had imposed itself upon the feudal.
The same principle is set out in the ' Summa de legibus,' one
of the Norman law books of the thirteenth century. The prince
alone has "plena iurisdictio" over all disputes brought to him,1
and again in another place, the jurisdiction of the feudal lord is
severely limited to certain cases, for all "iusticiatio personarum"
belongs in Normandy to the Duke, in virtue of the fealty which
all men owe to him; and again, jurisdiction over the bodies of all
men, small or great, belongs in Normandy to the Duke, inasmuch
as they are bound by fidelity and allegiance to him alone. 2
man to richtere over egen unde len
unde over iewelkes mannes lif. Die
keiser ne mach aver in allen landen
nicht sin, unde al ungerichte nicht
richten to aller tiet, dar umme liet he
den vorsten grafscap, unde den greven
scultheitdum. "
Id. , iii. 60. 2: "In svelke stat des
rikes de koning kumt binnen deme
rike, dar is ime ledich monte unde
toln, unde in svelke lant he kumt, dar
is ime ledich dat gerichte, dat he wol
richten mut alle die klage, die vor
gerichte nicht begunt, noch nicht
gelent ne sin. 3. Svenne die koning oc
alrest in dat land kumt, so solen ime
ledich sin alle vangene uppe recht,
unde man sal sie vor ime bringen unde
mit rechte verwinnen oder mit rechte
la ten, so man sie erst besenden mach,
seder der tiet dat sie de koning eschet
to rechte oder sine boden, to dem manne
selven oder to 'me hove oder to 'me
huse, dar sie gevangen sin oder hebbet
gewesen. Weigeret man sie vore to
bringene, sint man sie to rechte geeschet
hevet, unde man des getiich an des
koninges boden hevet, man dut to hant
in de achte alle die sie vengen, unde
hus unde liide, die sie weder recht
halden. "
Id. , ii. 12. 4: "Schilt man en ordel,
des sal man tien an den hogesten
richtere, unde to lest vor den koning;
dar sal die richtere sine boden to geven,
die_ dar horen welk ire vulkome vor
deme koninge. "
Id. , i. 58. 1: " Svenne die greve kumt
to des gogrefen dinge, so sal des
gogreven gerichte neder sin geleget.
Also is des greven, svenne die koning
in sime grafscap kumt, dar se beide
to antwerde sin. Also is jewelkes
richteres, dar die koning to antwerde
is, die klage ne ga denne uppe den
koning. "
1 'Summa de legibus,' ii. 4: "Solus
autem princeps plenam habet iuris-
dictionem de querelis ad ipsum delatis
omnibus laicalem. "
2 Id. , vi. 8: "Preter hoc tamen
sciendum est quod pro debito prin-
cipis, elapso termino solutioni deputato,
? ? solet in debitores iusticiatio fieri cor-
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? chap, v. ] FEUDALISM AND THE NATION.
83
The author of the 'Jostice et Plet,' and Beaumanoir, main-
tain the same doctrine in France. The author of 'Jostice et
Plet' is indeed so much influenced by the Eoman law that it
may be held that he is to be considered rather as a civilian than
a feudalist, but his treatment of the subject corresponds in
principle with that of the feudal jurists. His phrases are note-
worthy. The king has jurisdiction everywhere and always, he
has plenary authority in everything, while others have it only
in part. 1 Again, the count or duke has "jostice" in his
lands, but under the king who is over him, the king must not
indeed deprive ? him of this, so long as he does right, but the
king can interfere to secure justice. The king holds of no one;
dukes, counts, viscounts, and barons can hold of each other,
and become each other's men, but always, saving the dignity of
the king, against whom homage is of no avail, for all are under
the hand of the king. 2
mannie, quod eciam est in receptione
homagii exprimendum.
Uncle nec aliquis in Normannia
hominis sui corpus potest vel debet
prisonie mancipare, nisi coram eo de
latrociuio fuerit insecutus vel in pre-
senti deprehensus, vel eius serviens
fuerit, ut propositus, molendinarius vel
quoquo modo rerum suarum receptor,
quos arrestare potest quousque compo-
tum debitum et plegios sufficientes
habuerit de eisdem.
9. Ad bosci forisfactum garanne vel
aquarum defensarum, vel costume de-
tente, vel bladorum, seu pratorum vel
aliorum huiusmodi, possunt homines a
dominis feodorum arrestari . . . dum
tamen ad presens forisfactum fuerint
deprehensi, et tan tum detineri quousque
namna, vel vadia, vel plegios habuerint
de damno illato restaurando et emenda,
ubi debeat extorqueri. Si autem aliquo
casu alio pro facto criminoso aliquis
capiatur, justiciario debet reddi indi-
late.
10. Si autem dominus homini suo
feeerit iniuriam feodi ratione, ad ducem
pertinet curia de eodem, nisi dominus,
si quis fuerit interpositus, eam re-
quisierit, qui iurisdictionem habeat
feodalem. "
Id. , cxiii. 1: "Cum in Normannia
omnium iurisdictio corporum ad ducem
tam plebis pertineat quam magnatum,
eo quod fidelitate et ligancia soli
principi teneantur. "
1'Jostice et Plet,' i. 7. 6: "L'en
demande porquoi li rois use par tot et en
toz tens de juridiction, cum aucun soit
en son regne juridiction qui soie est?
et l'en respont que en roi confermee est
le poir de tote la region, s'il ne le done;
et il a plenier poer en tot, c'est a en-
tendre poer de prodome; et li autre si
n'ont que partie de poer, quar il ne
sont apele1 qu'en partie de la cure, non
pas en plenier poer.
Enten que rois conferme? est aussi
comme se chascuns metoit sa bone
volenti en la soie. Enten ci reison,
par que rois use en chascuns leu de
? ? juridicion. "
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? 84
THE INFLUENCE OF FEUDALISM. [part I.
Beaumanoir asserts very emphatically that the king is
supreme over all jurisdictions and over all persons. In one
passage of great importance which we have already discussed
he explains the sense in which he uses the word "souverain,"
and says that while every baron is "souverain" in his own
barony, the king is "souverain" over all, and has the charge
of the whole kingdom, and therefore can make "establisse-
ments" which are binding everywhere. No one is so great
that he cannot be called before the king's court, "pour defaute
de droit ou pour faus jugement. " 1
The whole conception is summed up by Bracton in an
emphatic passage in which he lays down the principle that the
king has the "ordinary" jurisdiction and authority over all men
who are in the kingdom, for all laws which belong to the crown
and the lay authority and the temporal sword are in his hand;
it is he who holds justice and judgment, that is jurisdiction,
so that it is by his jurisdiction, as being the minister and
seignories et totes joutices, sauf le roi,
qui est li par desus, a` amender le torfet
qu'il a fet, et sauf ce que li rois a en la
duche? e, et autres par jutes causes. "
Id. , i. 16. 1: "Li rois ne doit tenir
de nuil. Duc, conte, vicomte, baron,
puent tenir li un des autres et devenir
home, sauf la dignite? le roi, contre qui
homage ne vaut riens. . . . Et tuit
sont soz la main au roi. "
1Beaumanoir, xxxiv. 1013: "Pour
ce que nous parlons eu cest livre, en
pluseurs lieus, du souverain, et de ce
qu'il puet et doit fere, li aucun pour-
raient entendre, pour ce que nous ne
nommons conte ne duc, que ce fust
du roi; mais en tous les lieus la ou li
rois n'est pas nomme? s, nous entendons
de ceus qui tienent en baronnie, car
c? hascuns barons est souverain en sa
baronie. Voirs est que le rois est
souverains par dessus tous, et a, de
son droit la general garde de tout son
roiaume, par quoi il puet fere teus
etablissemens comme il li plest pour le
commun pourflt, et ce qu'il establist
doit estre tenu. Et se n'i a nul si
grant dessous li qui ne puist estre tres
en sa court pour defaute de droit ou
pour faus jugement et pour tous les
cas qui touchuent le roi. Et pour ce
qu'il est souverain par desseus tous,
nous le nommons, quant nous parlons
d'aucune souverainete? qui a li apar-
tient. "
Cf. xlviii. 1499: "Mes quant li
Rois fet aucun establissement especi-
aument en son demaine, si baron ne
lessent pas pour ce a user en leur
terres, selonc les anciennes coustumes.
Mes quant li establissemens est gener-
aus, il doit courre par tout le roiaume,
et nous devons croire que tel estab-
lissement sont fet par tres grant conseil
et ppur le commun pourfit. "
Cf. also xi. 322: "Qar toute la laie
juridicion du roiaume est tenue du roi
en fief ou en arriere fief. Et pour ce
puet on venir en sa court, par voie de
defaute de droit ou de faus jugement
? ? quant cil qui de lui tienent n'en font
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? CHAP, v. ] FEUDALISM AND THE NATION. 85
vicar of God, that he gives to every man that which is to be
his. 1
When we now endeavour to sum up the conclusions which
arise from the study of the political theory of the feudal law
books, it is evident that they represent very different principles
from those which have been sometimes thought of as related to
feudalism. The conception of personal devotion and loyalty,
of an almost unquestioning obedience and fidelity of the vassal
towards his lord, was no doubt of great importance, and the con-
ception has left deeply marked traces in the structure and th9
sentiments of European political society. But it is also clear that
the principle of loyalty did not, in the minds of the feudal law-
yers, or, as we shall see further in the second part of the volume,
in the judgment of mediseval society in general, override other
considerations of an ideal and rational kind. The feudal jurists
recognised very clearly that all human relations, and not least
the relations of lord and vassal, must be controlled by the prin-
ciples of equity and justice, and that these principles found
their embodiment in the law--the law which is the superior of
kings and princes, which is the expression not of their will
merely, but of justice, and of the custom and consent of the
community. It is clear that the feudal jurists conceived of the
relations of vassal and lord as being limited and determined by
the law, that lord and vassal were equally obliged to obey and
to maintain the law, which prescribed the nature and extent of
their mutual obligations. The relation of lord and vassal was a
contractual relation, the terms of the contract were prescribed
1 Bracton, ii. 24. 1: "Nunc autem
dicendum est de libertatibus, quis con-
cedere possit libertatem, et quibus, et
qualiter transferuntur, et qualiter possi-
dentur vel quasi, et qualiter per usum
retinentur. Quis? Et sciendum, quod
ipse dominus rex, qui ordinariam habet
iurisdictionem et dignitatem et potes-
tatem super omnes qui in regno suo
sunt, habet enim omnia iura in manu
sua, quse ad coronam et laicalem
pertinent potestatem et materialem
gladium, qui pertinet ad regni guber-
naculum, habet etiam iustitiam et
iudicium, quse sunt iurisdictionis, ut
ex iurisdictione sua, sicut Dei minister
et vicarius, tribuat unicuique quod
suum fuerit. "
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? 86
THE INFLUENCE OP FEUDALISM. [part I.
by law, and the obligation of the contract was determined
by law.
Again, we have seen that while feudalism, in its great develop-
ment in the tenth century, was the result of the operation
of forces which were anarchical, or which at least tended
to disintegrate the larger political organisations of Western
Europe, these tendencies were rapidly checked by the growth
of the principle that the feudal jurisdictions were subject to
the control of the rising national systems, and that beyond
the obligations of the vassal to his immediate lord every in-
dividual free man owed allegiance to the national sovereign.
We have considered the history of this movement as it is
reflected in the feudal law books themselves, and have seen
that at least as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
it was recognised that the royal or national authority was
paramount over all other authorities.
It is no doubt true that feudalism left for many centuries
deep traces in the structure of Western society, and even on
the theory of political relations, but it is also true that, when
we consider the subject in the broadest way, feudalism did not
counteract the normal development of the political ideas of
Western civilisation, but rather that in the end its main influ-
ence went to further the growth of the principle that the
community is governed by law, and that the ruler as much as
the subject is bound to obey the law.
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? PART II.
POLITICAL THEORY IN
THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES.
CHAPTER I.
NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
We now turn to the history of the general development of
political ideas from the beginning of the tenth century to the
end of the twelfth, that is, we can resume the history of these
conceptions at the point where we left them in our first volume.
We shall in doing this have occasion from time to time to
take account of the influence of the three systems of law which
we have considered, the feudal, the civil, and the canon law,
but our main task is to trace this development in the general
literature of those times, and in the principles expressed or
implicit in the constitutional development of Europe. For the
time being we shall not discuss directly the questions concerned
with the relations of the temporal and spiritual powers. These
became during this period so important that we propose to
devote a separate volume to them.
In considering the theories of the civilians and canonists we
have seen how important was the conception of natural law in
the Middle Ages, but we must not look for any detailed discus-
sion of this in the literature which we have now to examine,
for these writers were for the most part engaged in considering
the principles of political society as they emerged in the actual
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? 88 POLITICAL THEORY: llTH 4 12TH CENTDRIES. [part n.
controversies and conflicts of this time. On the other hand,
there is enough to show us that so far as they reflected upon
the matter they all thought under the terms of the contrast
between the natural and conventional condition.
This is specially clear in regard to the conception of human
nature and its " natural" characteristics.
We are apt to think
of mediseval society as governed by the idea of distinctions of
blood and birth, and these conceptions were not wholly unim-
portant. It is, however, clear that, so far as men reflected
upon the matter, they accepted the tradition of the later philo-
sophical system of the ancient world, and of Christianity as
handed down by the Christian Fathers and by the civil law, that
there are no " natural" distinctions in human nature, and that
all differences of rank and condition are conventional or
"positive. "
We have dealt with the subject as it is illustrated in the
writings of the civilians and canonists in the second volume,1
and we only therefore add one citation from an ecclesiastical
writer. It is, however, specially significant to observe how
emphatically the conception of the natural freedom of men is
stated by some of the feudal lawyers.
In the tenth century, in a work of that strange and eccentric
prelate, Eatherius, Bishop of Verona, we find a passage in which
he urges upon Christian men that they should remember that
God made all men equal in nature, and that it is quite possible
that the subject may be a better man than his lord. The
man who boasts of his noble blood should remember that we are
all of one origin and are made of the same substance. In
Christ we are all one, redeemed with the same price, reborn in
the same baptism, and those who rend asunder the unity of
the brotherhood by setting themselves over others are really
denying the common fatherhood and redemption of men. In
the sight of God we are only distinguished from each other so
far as our actions are better; the man who humbly serves
is better than the man who arrogantly despises his fellow-
men, he is nobler who observes the law of nature and does
not repudiate his true origin, than he who violates that
1 Cf. vol. ii. Part I. chap. 4; Part II. chap. 5.
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? CHAP. I. ]
89
NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
friendship between men which is so great and natural a
good. 1
The passage is no doubt based mainly upon recollections of
earlier writers, of the Fathers, and, probably through them,
of Stoic writers like Seneca,2 but it is representative of the
normal judgment of mediseval thinkers.
We may take as our first illustration from the feudal lawyers
a very notable passage in the 'Sachsenspiegel. ' God, says the
author, made all men in His own likeness, and redeemed man
by His passion, the poor as well as the rich; there were no
slaves when the forefathers of the Germans first settled in the
land; slavery, or serfdom, began by violence and capture and
unrighteous force; the law of Moses required all slaves to be
set free in the seventh year; and the author holds that it is
not in accordance with the truth or the will of God that one
man should belong to another. 3
1 Ratherius of Verona--' Praloqui-
orum,' i. 10: "Attende Deutu in
prineipio creationis humame dixisse:
'Crescite et multiplicamini,' . . . ut
intelligas homines non hominibus, sed
volatilibus, bestiis et piscibus esse
prselatos, omnesque a Deo natura
sequales conditos, sed insequalitate
morum factente, aliis alios intantum
suppositos, ut plerumque aliqui domi-
nentur etiam melioribus. . . . Nota
vero tu, quisquis es, qui de fastu
alti gloriaris abusive sanguinis; cum
omne hominum genus in terris simili
surgat ab ortu, et non ex alia, sed
ex eadem massa compositus, ex uno
patre, ex eademque, qua servorum
quilibet, sis matre creatus. Quia si
omnes in Christo quoque unum sumus,
uno scilicet pretio redempti, eodemque
baptismo renati: quisquis eatndem
fraternitatis unitatem caiteris se pro-
ponendo scindere nititur, paternitatem
sine dubio illius, redemptionem et
regenerationem quoque, qua eius filii
efficimus, quantum in se est, annul-
lare, et, ut ita dicam, abnegare pro-
batur. Verum si solummodo in hac
a Deo parte discernimus, si meliores
aliis in operibus bonis, et humiles
inveniamur: convincitur melior esse
qui tibi servit humiliter, quam tu,
qui eum despicis arroganter; nobilior,
qui tibi, quod promisit, exhibit
fideliter, quam tu, qui eum decipis
meudaciter; generosior, qui iura
naturse custodiers, proprium non
deserit ortum, quam tu, qui vitiis
vitia nutriens vim amicitise mag-
numque et naturale violas bonum. "
3 Cf. vol. i. pp. 20-22, and chap. 10.
3 'Sachsenspiegel,' iii. 42. 1: "Got
hevet den man na ime selven gebeldet,
unde hevet ine mit sinen martere
geledeget, den enen also den anderen,
ime is die arme also besvas als die
rike. . . .
3. Do man ok recht irst satte, do ne
was nen dienstman, unde waren al die
lude vri, do unse vorderen her to
? ? lande quamen. An minen sinnen ne
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? 90 POLITICAL THEORY : llTH & 12TH CENTURIES, [part II.
We may put beside these phrases a passage from Beaumanoir
in which he sets out the same principles, but in different
terms. All men, he says, were at the beginning free, and of
the same freedom, for all men are descended from one father
and mother; slavery (or serfdom) arose in many ways, such as
that men were taken prisoners in war, or sold themselves into
slavery on account of their poverty, or because they could not
defend themselves against the unjust violence of lords; however
men may have become slaves it is a great act of charity that a
lord should set his slaves (or serfs) free, for it is a great evil that
Christian men should be in the servile condition. 1
he ok to haldene, unde dat eevede
jar, dat het dat jar der losunge; bo
solde man ledich laten unde vri alle
die gevangen waren unde in egenscap
getogen, mit alsogedaneme gerede als
man sie vieng, of sie ledich unde
vri wolden wesen. Over sevenwerf
seven jar quam dat veftegiste jar, dat
het dat jar der vrouden, so muste
aller manlik ledich unde vri wesen,
he wolde oder newolde.
5. Ok gaf uns got orkiindes mer
an enem penninge, dar man ime mede
besochte, do he sprak: latet den
keiser sines beldes geweldich, unde
godes belde gevet gode. Dar bi uns
kundich von godes worden, dat die
mensche, godes belde, godes wesen
sal, unde sve ine anders iemanne to
seget danne gode, dat he weder got
dut.
6. N'a rechter warheit so hevet
egenscap begin von gedvange, unde
von vengnisse, unde von unrechter
walt, die man von aldere in unrechte
warheit getogen hevet, unde nu vore
recht hebben wel. "
Cf. 'Schwabenspiegel,' 57. 2: "Wir
han daz von der schrift, daz nieman
sol eigen sin. Doch ist ez also dar
komen mit gewalt unde mit twancsal,
daz es nu reht ist daz eigen liute sin. "
1 Beaumanoir, xlv. 1453: "Com-
ment que pluseur esta^t de gent soient
maintenant, voirs est qu'au com-
mencement tuit furent franc et d'une
meisme franchise; car chascuns set
que nous descendismes tuit d'un pere
et d'une mere. . . . Et l i serf si
sont venu par mout de manieres
d'aquisicions. Car li aucun sont venu
par estre pris de guerre, si donnoient
servitude seur aus et seur lor oirs,
par raenc? on, ou por issir de prison;
et li autre sont venu parce qu'il se
vendoient par povrete? , ou par con-
voitise d'avoir . . . et li autre sont
venu parce qu'il n'ont eu pouoir d'aus
defendre des seigneurs,'qui a tort et
par force les ont atre`s a servitude.
Et par quelconques manieres qu'il
soient venu, nous pouons entendre
que grant aumosne fet li sires qui
les oste de servitude et les met en
franchise, car c'est grans maus quant
nues crestiens est de serve condition. "
Cf. id. , xlv. 1438: "Par toutes tes
? ? choses sont servitudes venues avant,
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? chap. I. ] NATURAL LAW AND EQUALITY.
91
It is clear that even the feudal lawyers were profoundly
affected by the earlier traditions, and that to them just as much
as to the Christian fathers the subjection of man to man as
slave or villein was a thing conventional, not natural.
qui prsecessor fiat tanquam minis- quidam sunt prsecellentes et prelati,
trator. Apud homines vero est et aliis principantur. "
differentia personarum, quia hominum
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? 92
CHAPTER II.
THE DIVINE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
In the first volume of this work we have examined the
characteristic elements of the theory of the origin and nature
of political authority as it is set out in the literature of the
ninth century, and we think that enough has been said to
make it clear that as soon as we find any literary treatment
of political conditions and ideas, we find that there were
very clearly fixed in the minds of the men of the new mediseval
civilisation some highly important conceptions of political
origins and obligations. We have in the last volume en-
deavoured to examine the relation of the revived Eoman law,
and of the new system of Ecclesiastical law, to these conceptions,
and in the first part of this volume we have considered the
bearing upon them of Feudalism. We must now inquire how
far these conceptions can be said to have been continuously
present to men's minds in the centuries from the tenth to the
twelfth, and how far they were modified or developed.
We are entering upon the study of an age in which the structure
of society was very rapidly growing and changing, and we have
to inquire how far and in what manner men's conceptions of
the principles of the political order changed with it. If our
, interpretation of the political theory of the ninth century is
at all correct, the main features of that theory are to be found
1 in three principles--first, that all authority, whether Tem-
poral or Spiritual, is ultimately derived from God; second,
that the supreme authority in political society is that of the
law, the law which represents the principle of justice; and
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? CHAP. II. ] DIVINE NATDRE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 93
third, that the immediate source of all political authority is"
the community, for law is primarily the custom of the com-
munity, and there can be no legitimate authority without the
election or recognition of the community. We have to inquire
how far these principles continued to control the conception
of political society, and in what manner they were modified or
developed.
During the tenth century and the earlier part of the eleventh
we should infer, from the fragments of the literature which
have survived, that there was not very much active political
speculation; we can indeed gather from occasional phrases the
general nature of the conceptions which were current, but it may
be doubted whether men did generally do much more than
repeat the commonplaces of the ninth century tradition. These
commonplaces were not, however, unimportant, and in some
respects they seem to represent real and intimate convictions.
It was the great constitutional and ecclesiastical conflicts
of the latter part of the eleventh century, continued in the
twelfth, which compelled men to consider these traditional pre-
suppositions more closely, and from the middle of the eleventh
century we have an abundant and important body of literature
in which we can discern with great clearness the main features
of an energetic and determined political speculation.
We must begin by considering the question how far in the
period with which we are now dealing it was doubted or denied
that the secular authority was derived from God, and this will
lead us on to the closely related question whether the State
was or was not conceived of as having a moral function and
purpose.
As we have seen, the principles of the divine source of
political authority, and of the moral function of government,
were most emphatically laid down by the Fathers,1 and main-
tained by the writers of the ninth century. 2 It has been
suggested that these conceptions were really undermined by
the influence of St Augustine, especially as expressed in the
* De Civitate Dei,' and that the effects of St Augustine's mode
1 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 11, 13, 14. 2 Cf. vol. i. chaps. 17, 18.
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? 94 POLITICAL THEORY : llTH & 12TH CENTURIES, [part II.
of thought are clearly traceable in the Middle Ages. We
cannot here discuss the real and complete meaning of St
Augustine, the subject has been handled with great care and
restraint by Eeuter. 1 The question with which we have to
deal is whether there was among the political theorists of
the eleventh or twelfth centuries any important tendency to
think of the secular power as lacking the divine authority,
and as representing a principle of evil rather than of good.
The discussion centres round some phrases of Pope Gregory
VII. (Hildebrand), their meaning and their influence. Some
writers have attached a very great importance to these, and
have considered them to be representative of a clear and
dogmatic theory, which as they have thought was of great
importance in the Middle Ages. And no doubt Hildebrand's
phrases are emphatic and startling. The best known of them
is to be found in his famous letter to Hermann, the Bishop of
Metz (1081): "Quis nesciat: reges et duces ab iis habuisse
principium, qui, Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia,
homicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus, mundi principe
diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares, scilicet homines, dominari
cseca cupidine et intolerabili prsesumptione affectaverunt. "2
Beside these words we may put those of an earlier letter
written to the same Bishop (1076): "Sed forte putant, quod
regia dignitas episcopalem prsecellat. Ex earum principiis
colligere possunt, quantum a se utraque differunt. Illam
quidem superbia humana repperit, banc divina pietas in-
stituit. Illa vanam gloriam incessanter captat, hsec ad
ccelestem vitam semper aspirat. "3 These are indeed strong
phrases, and might well, to the unwary, seem to imply a
definite doctrine of the secular power, as representing not the
authority of God, but of evil.
In order, however, to arrive at the meaning of Hildebrand's
phrases, we must begin by observing that in other places he
speaks of the secular power in very different terms. In a
letter written to Eudolph, Duke of Suabia, in 1073, he speaks
of his hope that the "sacerdotium" and the "imperium" may
1 H. Reuter, 'Augustinische Studien. ' 3 Id. id. , iv. 2.
2 Gregory VII. , Registrum, viii. 21.
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? CHAP. II. ] DIVINE NATURE OP POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 95
be united in concord, that, as the human body is ruled by its
two eyes, so the body of the Church may be ruled and en-
lightened when the two authorities agree in the true religion. 1
In a letter of 1074 to Henry IV. , he bids him to know that he
rightly holds the royal power, if he obeys Christ the King of
Kings and defends and restores the Church. 2 In a letter to
Sweyn, King of Denmark, in 1075, he prays him to administer
the authority entrusted to him, according to God, to adorn the
dignity of the royal title with the appropriate virtues, and to
make it manifest that that justice, in virtue of which he reigned
over his subjects, also ruled in his heart. 3 Again, in writing to
Harold, King of Denmark, in 1077, he admonishes him to keep
the honour of the kingdom committed to him by God with all
diligence, and to make his life worthy of it, in wisdom, justice,
and mercy, that God may be able to say of him, "By me this
King reigneth. "4 And again, in writing to Olaf, King of
Norway, in 1078, he describes the true function of his royal
authority as being to help the oppressed, to defend the widow,
and to love and defend justice with all his might. 6
Perhaps the most notable passage is contained in a letter
1 Id. id. , i.
