Therefore
their joy after the resumption of the body
will not be greater than before.
will not be greater than before.
Summa Theologica
" Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed,
wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv. ), "man is said to be
made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God. " But man is in
God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh.
Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it
can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly
either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which
acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper
sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in
relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily
organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to
their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences,
such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common
sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province
it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight
to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call
it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically
the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in
bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body
of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the
body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect
will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in
His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally
is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take
note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so
see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those
that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see
that they live. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye,
of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg. : 'your']
heart enlightened. "
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to
see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall
see God.
Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring
and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before:
"Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall
see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly
a greater power," etc. , and afterwards he explains himself.
Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is
abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence
it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of
knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle
of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form
existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge.
Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is
removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the
corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as
participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects
of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot
think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them
immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must
always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which
cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And
since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the
body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it
follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in
an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind
of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and
especially in Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be
able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body
will not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence,
see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
1. ): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they
happen. " Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat.
22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv. ): "Since all see God
there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who
knows all things? " and he refers to the blessed who see God in His
essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that
"when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more
able to understand the least things. " Now God is the greatest of
intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly
increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him
understands all things.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding
a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the
intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii. ), "to
the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small. " Therefore
those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that
is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the
passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii,
text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all
things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected
in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a
mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints
who see the Word in its essence see all created things.
Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their
desire shall be given. " Now the just desire to know all things, since
"all men desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by
glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present
life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from
the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and
consequently they will know all.
Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be
reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21).
Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of
Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all
the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the
things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence
shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof.
Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the
form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing
God see all.
Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if
the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things. " Now the Divine essence represents all things
more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that
sees God in His essence knows all things.
Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher
about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know
not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not
enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss
observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc.
Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance. " Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may
be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more
perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now
it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all
things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35)
that "the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand. " Therefore
none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things
by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this
essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor
ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power
cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His
"science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence. " Now it is impossible
for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that
God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of
intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured
according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine
essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would
equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it
would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created
intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of
Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that
God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the
Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see
God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision.
This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that
angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say
that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not
see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine
essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know
all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the
competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in
His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things
according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it
is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus
the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining
to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more,
because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge
of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in
the Word all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things
which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because
those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which
God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not
say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and
that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the
same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such
as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is
possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of
them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from
the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels
learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things. "
Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all
creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this
blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the
Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God
sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the
deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the
Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not
according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own
mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be
infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know
all things.
Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess
and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but
also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as
the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the
Divine essence more fully.
Reply to Objection 5: When a passive power is perceptible by several
perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection,
it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the
preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge by which the created
intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end.
Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing
else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect
through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees
Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v. ): "Unhappy is he who
knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), "and knoweth not Thee: but
happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth
both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only. "
Reply to Objection 6: This mirror has a will: and even as He will show
Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will.
Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in
its power to be seen or not to be seen.
We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are
seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an
image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through
its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for
seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated
mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an
effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely.
Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror
sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause
does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the
cause.
Reply to Objection 7: The desire of the saints to know all things will
be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire
to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God.
For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and
by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision
of Him suffice the intellect: "Lord, show us the Father and it is
enough for us" (Jn. 14:8).
Reply to Objection 8: Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation
and thus it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of
things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints
in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes,
however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience:
and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain
things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels will be
cleansed from their ignorance. " In this sense ignorance is not a
penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be
done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope
Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.
Reply to Objection 9: Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ
in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with
clarity even as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul
will have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality
thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so
great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.
Reply to Objection 10: Although the Divine essence is the type of all
things knowable it will not be united to each created intellect
according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.
Reply to Objection 11: The active intellect is a form proportionate to
the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is
proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is
in the passive power of matter or the passive intellect is in the
active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent.
Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive
intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which
the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is
not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 12: Nothing hinders us from saying that after the
judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once
for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge
of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence.
Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it
sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number
of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know
God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning
those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is
written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God shall enlighten the city of
Jerusalem [*Vulg. : 'hath enlightened it'], and the Lamb is the lamp
thereof. " In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not
indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the
lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might
understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill.
Wherefore it is written (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to
justice" shall shine "as stars for all eternity. " The statement that
the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their present
ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the
judgment?
(2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?
(3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of
charity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than
before?
Objection 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be
greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing
approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it
participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated
from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is
greater before being reunited to the body than after.
Objection 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united than
when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body
than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power
for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness,
since this consists in action [*Cf. [5129]FS, Q[3], A[2]].
Objection 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative
intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily
organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not
become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's
happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.
Objection 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so
the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something
greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its
reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite
good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will
rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this
is a finite good.
Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body
will not be greater than before.
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls
of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of the saints are
under the altar, i. e. less exalted than they will be. " Therefore their
happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their
death.
Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is
unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked
after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they
will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore
the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of
the body than before.
I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will
increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will
then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's
happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will
rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may
also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity [*Cf.
[5130]FS, Q[4], A[5] , ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement].
For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent
on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that
hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly
completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body,
its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since
every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the
whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more
perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole---namely, man who
results from the union of soul and body---than when it is a separate
part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body
hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15)
that "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. " If, then, there be
removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul's
action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a
body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in
being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the
operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than
the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a
body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit.
Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation [*Cf. [5131]FS,
Q[3], A[2], seqq. ], the soul's happiness after its reunion with the
body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated
from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when
united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its
operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every
imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul
naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection its operation whereby it is
borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that "on account of the body's desire
it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign
good. "
Reply to Objection 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more like
to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has
more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like
to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in
movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest,
although God is never moved.
Reply to Objection 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of
being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when
separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate
from matter is more effective.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul
does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat
conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as
through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect
in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and
accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as
it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the
Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce
instrumentally to the happiness of life.
Reply to Objection 4: Although finite added to infinite does not make a
greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two
things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent
of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is
increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory,
in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's
glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in
so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the
soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the
greater the delight [*Cf. [5132]FS, Q[32], A[1]], as stated in Ethic.
x, 8.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be
called mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas
mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various
degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.
Objection 2: Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place
where the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual,
namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and
consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called
mansions.
Objection 3: Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits,
so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers.
But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo.
Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in
heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions": and Augustine expounds this in reference to the
different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxvii in Joan. ).
Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions.
Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore
we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various
degrees of beatitude.
I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms
of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to
all other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys. , liber viii,
7). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has
arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained
therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the
movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore
since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite
and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called
a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to
the unity of beatitude which unity is on the part of the object, and
the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude
on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that
there is one same place above to which all light objects tend, whereas
each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that
they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.
Reply to Objection 1: Mansion implies the notion of end and
consequently of reward which is the end of merit.
Reply to Objection 2: Though there is one spiritual place, there are
different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions
correspond to these.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory
have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not
distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell,
wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various
degrees of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the various mansions are not
distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is
written (Mat. 25:15): "He gave to every one according to his proper
virtue [Douay: 'ability']. " Now the proper ability of a thing is its
natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are
distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to
every man according to his works. " Now that which is rendered is the
measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are
distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to
the diversity of charity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence "it
is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the
conflict" (Ethic. i, 8) and "he . . . shall not be [Vulg. : 'is not']
crowned except he strive lawfully. " Now beatitude is a reward.
Therefore the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the
various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of
charity.
On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will
one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one's union with
God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the
difference of charity.
Further, "if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the
increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter. " Now to
have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater
beatitude follows from having greater charity.
I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of
beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate
principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the
blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in
respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the
merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which
the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him
capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the
increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our
actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but
only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every
virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity [*Cf. [5133]FS,
Q[114], A[4]], which has the end itself for its object [*Cf. [5134]SS,
Q[24], A[3], ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the
diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish
the mansions by way of merit.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage "virtue" denotes not the natural
ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to
obtain grace [*Cf. [5135]SS, Q[23], A[8]]. Consequently virtue in this
sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace
and glory that one will receive. But charity is the formal complement
of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees
in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees
of the aforesaid virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Works in themselves do not demand the payment of
a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various
degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the habit of charity or of any virtue
whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less
the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently
according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not
prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered
generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is
joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in
some created good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
(2) Whether they pity them?
(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?
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Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the
sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the
blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of
wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, "Abraham hath not known us,"
says: "The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing" [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii,
xv]. Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of
the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is
most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which
fall under the sight. " Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in
the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there
will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the
sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): "They shall go out and see
the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me"; and a
gloss says: "The elect will go out by understanding or seeing
manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God. "
I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the
perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for
being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed
beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order
that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and
that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are
allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are
able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by
natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in
heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the
damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job's words (14:21),
"'Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not
understand,' do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since
they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that
external things are unknown to them. " [*Concerning this Reply, Cf.
[5136]FP, Q[89], A[8]].
Reply to Objection 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to
the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen
without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby
the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also
God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and
deformed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity
will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most
especially pity the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity
as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore
He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways:
first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed
there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the
reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except
by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's
choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore
in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be
dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in
this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the
Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and
sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have
compassion on them both by the choice of the will---in which sense God,
the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their
salvation---and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good
men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will
be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and
consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according
to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on
the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's
unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it
would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their
afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as
though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than
they deserve.
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Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the
punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to
hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will
not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest
degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions.
Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the
damned.
Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no
place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a
wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy
to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the
punishment of the damned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge. "
Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh. '] the sight of all flesh. " Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints
will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly,
by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints
will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein
the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill
them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance
will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the
punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to
hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something
annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when
we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My
brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations"
(James 1:2).
Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such,
He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice
in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice
in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions
often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions
are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in
the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a
comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment
of reason.
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OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES) [*The Latin 'dos' signifies a
dowry. ]
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?
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Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to
the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3,
De jure dot. ) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens
of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride,
as being members of the Church.
wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv. ), "man is said to be
made to God's image inasmuch as he is able to see God. " But man is in
God's image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh.
Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.
I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two
ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it
can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly
either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which
acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper
sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in
relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily
organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the
recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to
their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences,
such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common
sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense,
neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those
things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of
Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the
intellect's knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the
object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this
kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province
it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed
directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse
(thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks):
otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or
perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither
here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be
removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that
which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no
sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight
to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call
it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically
the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be
impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct
vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on
the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in
bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body
of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the
body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect
will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in
His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally
is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take
note of his words, for he says: "It is very credible that we shall so
see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see
most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those
that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see
that they live. "
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye,
of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): "The eyes of our [Vulg. : 'your']
heart enlightened. "
Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to
see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall
see God.
Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring
and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before:
"Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall
see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly
a greater power," etc. , and afterwards he explains himself.
Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is
abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence
it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of
knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle
of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form
existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge.
Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is
removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the
corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as
participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects
of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot
think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them
immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must
always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which
cannot be apprehended corporeally.
Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And
since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the
body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it
follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in
an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind
of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and
especially in Christ's body.
Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be
able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body
will not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12],
AA[7],8]
Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence,
see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon.
1. ): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they
happen. " Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat.
22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv. ): "Since all see God
there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who
knows all things? " and he refers to the blessed who see God in His
essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that
"when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more
able to understand the least things. " Now God is the greatest of
intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly
increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him
understands all things.
Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding
a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the
intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii. ), "to
the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small. " Therefore
those who see God in His essence know all things.
Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is
imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that
is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since "the
passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality" (De Anima iii,
text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all
things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.
Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected
in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a
mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints
who see the Word in its essence see all created things.
Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, "to the just their
desire shall be given. " Now the just desire to know all things, since
"all men desire naturally to know," and nature is not done away by
glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.
Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present
life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from
the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and
consequently they will know all.
Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be
reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ's body (Phil. 3:21).
Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of
Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all
the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.
Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the
things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence
shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof.
Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the
form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing
God see all.
Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that "if
the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should
understand all things. " Now the Divine essence represents all things
more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that
sees God in His essence knows all things.
Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher
about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know
not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not
enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss
observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have brought to nought," etc.
Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): "The higher angels
cleanse the lower angels from ignorance. " Now the lower angels see the
Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may
be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more
perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not "by measure" (Jn. 3:34). Now
it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all
things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35)
that "the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand. " Therefore
none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its
effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence
will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more
things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.
I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever
that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things
by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were
present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this
essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor
ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power
cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His
"science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence. " Now it is impossible
for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that
God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of
intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured
according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine
essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would
equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it
would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created
intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of
Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that
God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the
Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see
God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision.
This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that
angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say
that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not
see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine
essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know
all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the
competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in
His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things
according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it
is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus
the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on
increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining
to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more,
because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge
of vision.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that "the angels know in
the Word all things before they happen," cannot refer to those things
which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because
those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which
God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not
say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and
that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the
same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such
as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is
possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of
them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from
the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the lower angels
learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things. "
Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all
creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this
blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the
Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God
sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the
deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the
Divine essence.
Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not
according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own
mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be
infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know
all things.
Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess
and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but
also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the
intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image
of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who
sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as
the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the
Divine essence more fully.
Reply to Objection 5: When a passive power is perceptible by several
perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection,
it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the
preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge by which the created
intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end.
Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing
else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect
through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees
Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v. ): "Unhappy is he who
knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), "and knoweth not Thee: but
happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth
both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only. "
Reply to Objection 6: This mirror has a will: and even as He will show
Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will.
Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in
its power to be seen or not to be seen.
We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are
seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an
image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through
its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for
seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated
mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an
effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely.
Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror
sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause
does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the
cause.
Reply to Objection 7: The desire of the saints to know all things will
be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire
to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God.
For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and
by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision
of Him suffice the intellect: "Lord, show us the Father and it is
enough for us" (Jn. 14:8).
Reply to Objection 8: Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation
and thus it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of
things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints
in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes,
however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience:
and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain
things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels will be
cleansed from their ignorance. " In this sense ignorance is not a
penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be
done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope
Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.
Reply to Objection 9: Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ
in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with
clarity even as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul
will have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality
thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so
great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.
Reply to Objection 10: Although the Divine essence is the type of all
things knowable it will not be united to each created intellect
according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.
Reply to Objection 11: The active intellect is a form proportionate to
the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is
proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is
in the passive power of matter or the passive intellect is in the
active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent.
Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive
intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which
the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is
not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 12: Nothing hinders us from saying that after the
judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once
for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge
of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence.
Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it
sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number
of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know
God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning
those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is
written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God shall enlighten the city of
Jerusalem [*Vulg. : 'hath enlightened it'], and the Lamb is the lamp
thereof. " In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not
indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the
lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might
understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill.
Wherefore it is written (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to
justice" shall shine "as stars for all eternity. " The statement that
the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their present
ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.
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OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the
judgment?
(2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?
(3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of
charity?
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Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than
before?
Objection 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be
greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing
approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it
participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated
from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is
greater before being reunited to the body than after.
Objection 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united than
when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body
than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power
for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness,
since this consists in action [*Cf. [5129]FS, Q[3], A[2]].
Objection 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative
intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily
organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not
become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's
happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.
Objection 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so
the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something
greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its
reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite
good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will
rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this
is a finite good.
Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body
will not be greater than before.
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls
of them that were slain," says: "At present the souls of the saints are
under the altar, i. e. less exalted than they will be. " Therefore their
happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their
death.
Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is
unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked
after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they
will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore
the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of
the body than before.
I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will
increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will
then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul's
happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will
rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may
also say that the soul's happiness will increase in intensity [*Cf.
[5130]FS, Q[4], A[5] , ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement].
For man's body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent
on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that
hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly
completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body,
its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since
every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the
whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more
perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole---namely, man who
results from the union of soul and body---than when it is a separate
part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body
hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15)
that "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. " If, then, there be
removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul's
action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a
body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in
being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the
operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than
the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a
body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit.
Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation [*Cf. [5131]FS,
Q[3], A[2], seqq. ], the soul's happiness after its reunion with the
body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated
from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when
united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its
operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every
imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul
naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection its operation whereby it is
borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that "on account of the body's desire
it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign
good. "
Reply to Objection 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more like
to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has
more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like
to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in
movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest,
although God is never moved.
Reply to Objection 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of
being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when
separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate
from matter is more effective.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul
does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat
conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as
through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect
in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and
accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as
it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the
Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce
instrumentally to the happiness of life.
Reply to Objection 4: Although finite added to infinite does not make a
greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two
things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent
of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is
increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body's glory,
in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body's
glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in
so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the
soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the
greater the delight [*Cf. [5132]FS, Q[32], A[1]], as stated in Ethic.
x, 8.
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Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be
called mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas
mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various
degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.
Objection 2: Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place
where the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual,
namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and
consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called
mansions.
Objection 3: Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits,
so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers.
But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo.
Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in
heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions": and Augustine expounds this in reference to the
different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxvii in Joan. ).
Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions.
Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore
we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various
degrees of beatitude.
I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms
of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to
all other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys. , liber viii,
7). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has
arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained
therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the
movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore
since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite
and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called
a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to
the unity of beatitude which unity is on the part of the object, and
the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude
on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that
there is one same place above to which all light objects tend, whereas
each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that
they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.
Reply to Objection 1: Mansion implies the notion of end and
consequently of reward which is the end of merit.
Reply to Objection 2: Though there is one spiritual place, there are
different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions
correspond to these.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory
have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not
distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell,
wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.
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Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various
degrees of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the various mansions are not
distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is
written (Mat. 25:15): "He gave to every one according to his proper
virtue [Douay: 'ability']. " Now the proper ability of a thing is its
natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are
distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): "Thou wilt render to
every man according to his works. " Now that which is rendered is the
measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are
distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to
the diversity of charity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence "it
is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the
conflict" (Ethic. i, 8) and "he . . . shall not be [Vulg. : 'is not']
crowned except he strive lawfully. " Now beatitude is a reward.
Therefore the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the
various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of
charity.
On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will
one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one's union with
God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the
difference of charity.
Further, "if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the
increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter. " Now to
have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater
beatitude follows from having greater charity.
I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of
beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate
principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the
blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in
respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the
merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which
the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him
capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the
increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our
actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but
only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every
virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity [*Cf. [5133]FS,
Q[114], A[4]], which has the end itself for its object [*Cf. [5134]SS,
Q[24], A[3], ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the
diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish
the mansions by way of merit.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage "virtue" denotes not the natural
ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to
obtain grace [*Cf. [5135]SS, Q[23], A[8]]. Consequently virtue in this
sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace
and glory that one will receive. But charity is the formal complement
of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees
in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees
of the aforesaid virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Works in themselves do not demand the payment of
a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various
degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the habit of charity or of any virtue
whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less
the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently
according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not
prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered
generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is
joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in
some created good.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
(2) Whether they pity them?
(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?
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Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the
sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the
blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of
wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, "Abraham hath not known us,"
says: "The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing" [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii,
xv]. Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of
the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that
"the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is
most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which
fall under the sight. " Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in
the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there
will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the
sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): "They shall go out and see
the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me"; and a
gloss says: "The elect will go out by understanding or seeing
manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God. "
I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the
perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for
being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed
beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order
that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and
that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are
allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are
able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by
natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in
heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the
damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job's words (14:21),
"'Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not
understand,' do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since
they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that
external things are unknown to them. " [*Concerning this Reply, Cf.
[5136]FP, Q[89], A[8]].
Reply to Objection 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to
the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen
without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby
the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also
God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and
deformed.
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Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity
will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most
especially pity the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity
as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore
He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways:
first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed
there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the
reason's choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except
by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's
choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore
in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be
dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in
this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the
Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and
sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have
compassion on them both by the choice of the will---in which sense God,
the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their
salvation---and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good
men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will
be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and
consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according
to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on
the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's
unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it
would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not
prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their
afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as
though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than
they deserve.
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Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the
punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to
hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will
not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest
degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions.
Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the
damned.
Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no
place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a
wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy
to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the
punishment of the damned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice
when he shall see the revenge. "
Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh. '] the sight of all flesh. " Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints
will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly,
by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints
will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein
the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill
them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance
will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the
punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to
hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something
annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when
we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My
brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations"
(James 1:2).
Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such,
He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice
in another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice
in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions
often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions
are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in
the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a
comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment
of reason.
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OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES) [*The Latin 'dos' signifies a
dowry. ]
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there
are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?
(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?
(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?
(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?
(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?
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Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to
the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3,
De jure dot. ) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens
of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride,
as being members of the Church.
