No More Learning

Yet it would perhaps have been better both for Rome and for Greece, if the choice had fallen on one less full of Hellenic sympathies, and if the general despatched thither had been a man, who would neither have been bribed by delicate flattery nor stung by pungent sarcasm ; who would not amidst literary and artistic
reminiscences have overlooked the pitiful condition of the constitutions of the Hellenic states ; and who, while treating Hellas according to its deserts, would have spared the Romans the trouble of striving after unattainable ideals.
The new commander-in-chief immediately had a con ference with the king, while the two armies lay face to face inactive. Philip made proposals of peace; he offered to restore all his own conquests, and to submit to an equitable arbitration regarding the damage inflicted on the Greek cities; but the negotiations broke down, when he was asked to give up ancient possessions of Macedonia and
428
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
For forty days the two armies lay in the narrow pass of the Aous ; Philip would not retire, and Flamininus could not make up his mind whether he should order an assault, or leave the king alone and reattempt the expedition of the previous year. At length the Roman general was helped out of his perplexity by the
particularly Thessaly.
chap, nil THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
429
treachery of some men of rank among the Epirots — who
were otherwise well disposed to Macedonia —and especially
of Charops. They conducted a Roman corps of 4000
infantry and 300 cavalry by mountain paths to the heights
above the Macedonian camp ; and, when the consul
attacked the enemy's army in front, the advance of that
Roman division, unexpectedly descending from the moun
tains commanding the position, decided the battle. Philip
lost his camp and entrenchments and nearly 2000 men,
and hastily retreated to the pass of Tempe, the gate of Macedonia proper. He gave up everything which he had Greece la held except the fortresses ; the Thessalian towns, which he ofj^*** could not defend, he himself destroyed; Pherae alone Romani. closed its gates against him and thereby escaped destruction.
The Epirots, induced partly by these successes of the Roman arms, partly by the judicious moderation of Flami- ninus, were the first to secede from the Macedonian alliance. On the first accounts of the Roman victory the Athamanes and Aetolians immediately invaded Thessaly, and the Romans soon followed; the open country was easily overrun, but the strong towns, which were friendly to Macedonia and received support from Philip, fell only after a brave resistance or withstood even the superior foe— especially Atrax on the left bank of the Peneius, where the phalanx stood in the breach as a substitute for the wall.
Except these Thessalian fortresses and the territory of the faithful Acarnanians, all northern Greece was thus in the hands of the coalition.
The south, on the other hand, was still in the main retained under the power of Macedonia by the fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth, which maintained communication with each other through the territory of the Boeotians who were friendly to the Macedonians, and by the Achaean neutrality ; and as it was too late to advance into Macedonia this year, Flamininus resolved to direct his land army and
Philip
SfJ0 Tempe.
The
fleet in the first place against Corinth and the Achaeans. The fleet, which had again been joined by the Rhodian and Pergamene ships, had hitherto been employed in the capture and pillage of two of the smaller towns in Euboea, Eretria and Carystus ; both however, as well as Oreus, were thereafter abandoned, and reoccupied by Philocles the Macedonian commandant of Chalcis. The united fleet proceeded thence to Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, to threaten that strong fortress. On the other side Flami- ninus advanced into Phocis and occupied the country, in which Elatea alone sustained a somewhat protracted siege : this district, and Anticyra in particular on the Corinthian gulf, were chosen as winter quarters. The Achaeans, who thus saw on the one hand the Roman legions approaching and on the other the Roman fleet already on their own coast, abandoned their morally honourable, but politically untenable, neutrality. After the deputies from the towns most closely attached to Macedonia—Dyme, Megalopolis, and Argos —had left the diet, it resolved to join the coali tion against Philip. Cycliades and other leaders of the Macedonian party went into exile; the troops of the Achaeans immediately united with the Roman fleet and hastened to invest Corinth by land, which city — the strong hold of Philip against the Achaeans —had been guaranteed to them on the part of Rome in return for their joining the coalition. Not only, however, did the Macedonian garrison, which was 1300 strong and consisted chiefly of Italian deserters, defend with determination the almost impregnable
city, but Philocles also arrived from Chalcis with a division of 1500 men, which not only relieved Corinth but also invaded the territory of the Achaeans and, in concert with the citizens who were favourable to Macedonia, wrested from them Argos. But the recompense of such devotedness was, that the king delivered over the faithful Argives to the reign of terror of Nabis of Sparta. Philip hoped, after the
enter into alliance
Rome.
43©
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
CHAP, viil THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
431
accession of the Achaeans to the Roman coalition, to gain over Nabis who had hitherto been the ally of the Romans;
for his chief reason for joining the Roman alliance had been that he was opposed to the Achaeans and since 550 204. was even at open war with them. But the affairs of Philip were in too desperate a condition for any one to feel satisfaction in joining his side now. Nabis indeed accepted Argos from Philip, but he betrayed the traitor and remained
in alliance with Flamininus, who, in his perplexity at being now allied with two powers that were at war with each other, had in the meantime arranged an armistice of four months between the Spartans and Achaeans.
Thus winter came on ; and Philip once more availed Vain himself of it to obtain if possible an equitable peace. At a^J£j,,t° a conference held at Nicaea on the Maliac gulf the king peace, appeared in person, and endeavoured to come to an under
standing with Flamininus. With haughty politeness he
repelled the forward insolence of the petty chiefs, and by
marked deference to the Romans, as the only antagonists
on an equality with him, he sought to obtain from them
tolerable terms. Flamininus was sufficiently refined to feel
himself flattered by the urbanity of the vanquished prince
towards himself and his arrogance towards the allies, whom
the Roman as well as the king had learned to despise;
but his powers were not ample enough to meet the king's
wishes. He granted him a two months' armistice in return
for the evacuation of Phocis and Locris, and referred him,
as to the main matter, to his government. The Roman
senate had long been at one in the opinion that Macedonia
must give up all her possessions abroad ; accordingly, when
the ambassadors of Philip appeared in Rome, they were
simply asked whether they had full powers to renounce all
Greece and in particular Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias,
and when they said that they had not, the negotiations were immediately broken off, and it was resolved that the war
Thessaiy.
who were besieged in Leucas ; in Greece proper he became by stratagem master of Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, in consequence of which the Boeotians were compelled to join at least nominally the alliance against Macedonia. Content with having thus interrupted the communication between Corinth and Chalcis, he proceeded to the north, where alone a decisive blow could be struck. The great difficulties of provisioning the army in a hostile and for the most part desolate country, which had often hampered its operations, were now to be obviated by the fleet accompany ing the army along the coast and carrying after it supplies sent from Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. The decisive blow came, however, earlier than Flamininus had hoped. Philip, impatient and confident as he was, could not endure to await the enemy on the Macedonian frontier : after assem bling his army at Dium, he advanced through the pass of Tempe into Thessaly, and encountered the army of the enemy advancing to meet him in the district of Scotussa.
197.
432
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
should be prosecuted with vigour. With the help of the tribunes of the people, the senate succeeded in preventing
a change in the chief command —which had often
so injurious —and in prolonging the command of Flami- ninus ; he obtained considerable reinforcements, and the two former commanders-in-chief, Publius Galba and Publius Villius, were instructed to place themselves at his disposal. Philip resolved once more to risk a pitched battle. To secure Greece, where all the states except the Acarnanians and Boeotians were now in arms against him, the garrison of Corinth was augmented to 6000 men, while he himself, straining the last energies of exhausted Macedonia and enrolling children and old men in the ranks of the phalanx, brought into the field an army of about 26,000 men, of whom 16,000 were Macedonian phalangitae.
Thus the fourth campaign, that of 557, began. Flamini-
anjo^dsto nus despatched a part of the fleet against the Acarnanians,
proved
chap, via THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
433
The Macedonian and Roman armies — the latter of Battle of which had been reinforced by contingents of the Apolloni- SjjJT*" ates and the Athamanes, by the Cretans sent by Nabis, and especially by a strong band of Aetolians —contained nearly
equal numbers of combatants, each about 26,000 men ;
the Romans, however, had the superiority in cavalry. In
front of Scotussa, on the plateau of the Karadagh, during
a gloomy day of rain, the Roman vanguard unexpectedly encountered that of the enemy, which occupied a high and
steep hill named Cynoscephalae, that lay between the two
camps. Driven back into the plain, the Romans were reinforced from the camp by the light troops and the excellent corps of Aetolian cavalry, and now in turn forced
the Macedonian vanguard back upon and over the height
But here the Macedonians again found support in their
whole cavalry and the larger portion of their light infantry ;
the Romans, who had ventured forward imprudently, were pursued with great loss almost to their camp, and would
have wholly taken to flight, had not the Aetolian horsemen prolonged the combat in the plain until Flamininus brought
up his rapidly -arranged legions. The king yielded to the impetuous cry of his victorious troops demanding the continuance of the conflict, and hastily drew up his heavy-
armed soldiers for the battle, which neither general nor
soldiers had expected on that day. It was important to
occupy the hill, which for the moment was quite denuded
of troops. The right wing of the phalanx, led by the king
in person, arrived early enough to form without trouble in
battle order on the height ; the left had not yet come up,
when the light troops of the Macedonians, put to flight by
the legions, rushed up the hill. Philip quickly pushed the
crowd of fugitives past the phalanx into the middle division,
and, without waiting till Nicanor had arrived on the left
wing with the other half of the phalanx which followed
more slowly, he ordered the right phalanx to couch their
vol. 11 60
434
THE EASTERN STATES AND book III
spears and to charge down the hill on the legions, and the rearranged light infantry simultaneously to turn them and fall upon them in flank. The attack of the phalanx, irresistible on so favourable ground, shattered the Roman infantry, and the left wing of the Romans was completely beaten. Nicanor on the other wing, when he saw the king give the attack, ordered the other half of the phalanx to advance in all haste ; by this movement it was thrown into confusion, and while the first ranks were already rapidly following the victorious right wing down the hill, and were still more thrown into disorder by the inequality of the ground, the last files were just gaining the height The right wing of the Romans under these circumstances soon overcame the enemy's left ; the elephants alone, stationed upon this wing, annihilated the broken Macedonian ranks. While a fearful slaughter was taking place at this point, a resolute Roman officer collected twenty companies, and with these threw himself on the victorious Macedonian wing, which had advanced so far in pursuit of the Roman left that the Roman right came to be in its rear. Against an attack from behind the phalanx was defenceless, and this movement ended the battle. From the complete breaking up of the two phalanxes we may well believe that the Macedonian loss amounted to 13,000, partly prisoners,
partly fallen — but chiefly the latter, because the Roman soldiers were not acquainted with the Macedonian sign of surrender, the raising of the sarissae. The loss of the victors was slight Philip escaped to Larissa, and, after burning all his papers that nobody might be compromised, evacuated Thessaly and returned home.
Simultaneously with this great defeat, the Macedonians suffered other discomfitures at all the points which they still occupied ; in Caria the Rhodian mercenaries defeated the Macedonian corps stationed there and compelled it to shut
itself up in Stratonicea; the Corinthian garrison was
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
435
defeated by Nicostratus and his Achaeans with severe loss, and Leucas in Acarnania was taken by assault after a heroic resistance. Philip was completely vanquished ; his last allies, the Acarnanians, yielded on the news of the battle of Cynoscephalae.
It was completely in the power of the Romans to dictate Preiiml- peace ; they used their power without abusing The em- nanes °* pire of Alexander might be annihilated at conference of
the allies this desire was expressly put forward by the Aetolians. But what else would this mean, than to demolish the rampart protecting Hellenic culture from the Thracians and Celts Already during the war just ended
the flourishing Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese had
been totally destroyed by the Thracians— serious warning
for the future. Flamininus, who had clearly perceived the
bitter animosities subsisting among the Greek states, could
never consent that the great Roman power should be the executioner for the grudges of the Aetolian confederacy,
even his Hellenic sympathies had not been as much won
the polished and chivalrous king as his Roman national feeling was offended by the boastings of the Aetolians, the "victors of Cynoscephalae," as they called themselves. He replied to the Aetolians that was not the custom of Rome to annihilate the vanquished, and that, besides, they were their own masters and were at liberty to put an end to Macedonia, they could. The king was treated with all possible deference, and, on his declaring himself ready now to entertain the demands formerly made, an armistice for considerable term was agreed to Flamininus in return for the payment of sum of money and the furnishing of host ages, among whom was the king's son Demetrius, —an armistice which Philip greatly needed in order to expel the Dardani out of Macedonia.
The final regulation of the complicated affairs of Greece Peace with was entrusted the senate to commission of ten persons, TMIacc"
by
if a
a
by
it
a
by
if
a
a
it.
?
;
Greece free.
the head and soul of which was Flamininus. Philip obtained from it terms similar to those laid down for Carthage. He lost all his foreign possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and in the islands of the Aegean Sea ; while he re tained Macedonia proper undiminished, with the exception of some unimportant tracts on the frontier and the province of Orestis, which was declared free—a stipulation which Philip felt very keenly, but which the Romans could not avoid prescribing, for with his character it was impossible to leave him free to dispose of subjects who had once revolted from their allegiance. Macedonia was further bound not to conclude any foreign alliances without the previous knowledge of Rome, and not to send garrisons abroad ; she was bound, moreover, not to make war out of Macedonia against civilized states or against any allies of Rome at all ; and she was not to maintain any army exceed ing 5000 men, any elephants, or more than five decked ships — the rest were to be given up to the Romans. Lastly, Philip entered into symmachy with the Romans, which obliged him to send a contingent when requested ; indeed, Macedonian troops immediately afterwards fought side by side with the legions. Moreover, he paid a contribution of
1000 talents (,£244,000).
After Macedonia had thus been reduced to complete
political nullity and was left in possession of only as much power as was needful to guard the frontier of Hellas against the barbarians, steps were taken to dispose of the possessions ceded by the king. The Romans, who just at that time
were learning by experience in Spain that transmarine provinces were a very dubious gain, and who had by no means begun the war with a view to the acquisition of territory, took none of the spoil for themselves, and thus compelled their allies also to moderation. They resolved to Jeclare all the states of Greece, which had previously been under fnli^ free : and Flamininus was commissioned
436
THE EASTERN STATES AND book III
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
437
to read the decree to that effect to the Greeks assembled
at the Isthmian games (558). Thoughtful men doubtless 191 might ask whether freedom was a blessing capable of being
thus bestowed, and what was the value of freedom to a nation apart from union and unity ; but the rejoicing was great and sincere, as the intention of the senate was sincere
in conferring the freedom. 1
The only exceptions to this general rule were, the Illyrian Scodra. provinces eastward of Epidamnus, which fell to Pleuratus
the ruler of Scodra, and rendered that state of robbers and pirates, which a century before had been humbled by the Romans 218), once more one of the most powerful of
the petty principalities in those regions some townships in western Thessaly, which Amynander had occupied and was allowed to retain and the three islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, which were presented to Athens in return for her many hardships and her still more numerous addresses of thanks and courtesies of all sorts. The Rhodians, of course, retained their Carian possessions, and the Pergamenes retained Aegina. The remaining allies were only indirectly rewarded by the accession of the
cities to the several confederacies. The The Achaeans were the best treated, although they were the \aigail.
latest joining the coalition against Philip apparently enlarged, for the honourable reason, that this federation was the best
newly-liberated
and most respectable of all the Greek states.
All the possessions of Philip in the Peloponnesus and on
the Isthmus, and consequently Corinth in particular, were incorporated with their league. With the Aetolians on the The
rt
organized
other hand the Romans used little ceremony they were allowed to receive the towns of Phocis and Locris into their symmachy, but their attempts to extend also to
There are still extant gold staters, with the head of Flamininus and the inscription " T. Quincti(us)," struck in Greece under the government of the liberator of the Hellenes. The use of the Latin language signifi cant compliment.
is a
it
1
;
;
in
;
;
(p.
War
Acarnania and Thessaly were in part decidedly rejected, in part postponed, and the Thessalian cities were organized into four small independent confederacies. The Rhodian city-league reaped the benefit of the liberation of Thasos, Lemnos, and the towns of Thrace and Asia Minor.
The regulation of the affairs of the Greek states, as respected both their mutual relations and their internal condition, was attended with difficulty. The most urgent matter was the war which had been carried on between
ffb"5' f Sparta.
438
THE EASTERN STATES AND book hi
804. the Spartans and Achaeans since 550, in which the duty of mediating necessarily fell to the Romans. But after various attempts to induce Nabis to yield, and particularly to give up the city of Argos belonging to the Achaean league, which Philip had surrendered to him, no course at last was left to Flamininus but to have war declared against the obstinate
petty robber-chieftain, who reckoned on the well-known grudge of the Aetolians against the Romans and on the
advance of Antiochus into Europe, and
refused to restore Argos. War was declared, accordingly, by all the Hellenes at a great diet in Corinth, and Flami ninus advanced into the Peloponnesus accompanied by the fleet and the Romano-allied army, which included a con tingent sent by Philip and a division of Lacedaemonian emigrants under Agesipolis, the legitimate king of Sparta
195. (559). In order to crush his antagonist immediately by an overwhelming superiority of force, no less than 50,000 men were brought into the field, and, the other towns being disregarded, the capital itself was at once invested ; but the desired result was not attained. Nabis had sent into the field a considerable army amounting to 15,000 men, of whom 5000 were mercenaries, and he had confirmed his rule afresh by a complete reign of terror—by the execution en masse of the officers and inhabitants of the country whom he suspected. Even when he himself after the first successes of the Roman army and fleet resolved to yield
pertinaciously
chap, viii THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
439
and to accept the comparatively favourable terms of peace proposed by Flamininus, " the people," that is to say the gang of robbers whom Nabis had domiciled in Sparta, not without reason apprehensive of a reckoning after the victory, and deceived by an accompaniment of lies as to the nature of the terms of peace and as to the advance of the Aetoli- ans and Asiatics, rejected the peace offered by the Roman general, so that the struggle began anew. A battle took place in front of the walls and an assault was made upon them ; they were already scaled by the Romans, when the setting on fire of the captured streets compelled the assail ants to retire.
At last the obstinate resistance came to an end. Sparta Settlement
retained its independence and was neither compelled to receive back the emigrants nor to join the Achaean league ; even the existing monarchical constitution, and Nabis himself, were left intact On the other hand Nabis had to cede his foreign possessions, Argos, Messene, the Cretan cities, and the whole coast besides; to bind himself neither to conclude foreign alliances, nor to wage war, nor to keep any other vessels than two open boats ; and lastly to disgorge all his plunder, to give to the Romans hostages, and to pay to them a war-contribution. The towns on the Laconian coast were given to the Spartan emigrants, and this new community, who named themselves the "free Laconians" in contrast to the monarchically governed Spartans, were directed to enter the Achaean league. The emigrants did not receive back their property, as the district assigned to them was regarded as a compensation for it ; it was stipulated, on the other hand, that their wives and children should not be detained in Sparta against their will. The Achaeans, although by this arrangement they gained the accession of the free Laconians as well as Argos, were yet far from content; they had expected that the dreaded and hated Nabis would be superseded, that the
jjajnTM^
Final oKJrrec"
440
THE EASTERN STATES AND book iii
emigrants would be brought back, and that the Achaean symmachy would be extended to the whole Peloponnesus. Unprejudiced persons, however, will not fail to see that Flamininus managed these difficult affairs as fairly and justly as it was possible to manage them where two political parties, both chargeable with unfairness and injustice, stood opposed to each other. With the old and deep
between the Spartans and Achaeans, the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean league would
have been equivalent to subjecting Sparta to the Achaeans, a course no less contrary to equity than to prudence. The restitution of the emigrants, and the complete restora tion of a government that had been set aside for twenty years, would only have substituted one reign of terror for another; the expedient adopted by Flamininus was the right one, just because it failed to satisfy either of the extreme parties. At length thorough provision appeared to be made that the Spartan system of robbery by sea and land should cease, and that the government there, such as it was, should prove troublesome only to its own subjects.
It is possible that Flamininus, who knew Nabis and could
not but be aware how desirable it was that he should
personally be superseded, omitted to take such a step from the mere desire to have done with the matter and not to mar the clear impression of his successes by complications that might be prolonged beyond all calculation; it is possible, moreover, that he sought to preserve Sparta as a counterpoise to the power of the Achaean confederacy in the Peloponnesus. But the former objection relates to a point of secondary importance ; and as to the latter view, it is far from probable that the Romans condescended to fear the Achaeans.
Peace was thus established, externally at least, among the Pettv Greek states. But the internal condition of the several communities also furnished employment to the
hostility subsisting
chap, via THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
441
Roman arbiter. The Boeotians openly displayed their Macedonian tendencies, even after the expulsion of the Macedonians from Greece ; after Flamininus had at their request allowed their countrymen who were in the service of Philip to return home, Brachyllas, the most decided partisan of Macedonia, was elected to the presidency of the Boeotian confederacy, and Flamininus was otherwise irritated in every way. He bore it with unparalleled patience ; but the Boeotians friendly to Rome, who knew what awaited them after the departure of the Romans, determined to put Brachyllas to death, and Flamininus, whose permission they deemed it necessary to ask, at least did not forbid them. Brachyllas was accordingly killed ;
which the Boeotians were not only content with prosecuting the murderers, but lay in wait for the Roman soldiers passing singly or in small parties through their territories, and killed about 500 of them. This was too much to be endured ; Flamininus imposed on them a fine of a talent for every soldier ; and when they did not pay
he collected the nearest troops and besieged Coronea
Now they betook themselves to entreaty; Flamini- It* nus reality desisted on the intercession of the Achaeans
and Athenians, exacting but very moderate fine from those who were guilty and although the Macedonian party remained continuously at the helm in the petty province, the Romans met their puerile opposition simply
with the forbearance of superior power. In the rest of Greece Flamininus contented himself with exerting his influence, so far as he could do so without violence, over
the internal affairs especially of the newly-freed com munities with placing the council and the courts the hands of the more wealthy and bringing the anti- Macedonian party to the helm and with attaching as
much as possible the civic commonwealths to the Roman interest, by adding everything, which in each community
upon
(558).
;
;
in
;
a
in
it,
194.
should have fallen by martial law to the Romans, to the common property of the city concerned. The work was finished in the spring of 560; Flamininus once more assembled the deputies of all the Greek communities at Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use ot the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only return for the kindness of the Romans, that they would within thirty days send to him the Italian captives who had been sold into Greece during the Hannibalic war. Then he evacuated the last fortresses in which Roman
were still stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along with the smaller forts dependent upon it in Euboea, and Acrocorinthus — thus practically giving the lie to the assertion of the Aetolians that Rome had inherited from Philip the "fetters" of Greece —and departed homeward with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.
It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly sentimentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans were entirely in earnest with the liberation of Greece ; and the reason why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so sorry a structure, is to be sought only in the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic nation. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and as the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons and the unlimited right of self- government ; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation made the liberation of Greece a possibility for the Romans ; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus himself. If the Romans are liable
44*
THE EASTERN STATES AND book in
garrisons
Results.
chap, vill THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
443
to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular Flamininus who overcame the well-founded scruples of the senate, were hindered by the magic charm of the Hellenic name from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character of the Greek states of that period, and so allowed yet further freedom for the doings of communities which, owing to the impotent antipathies that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations, knew neither how to act nor how to keep quiet As things stood, it was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if
not to instigate, at least to permit, a political murder, because the Romans had resolved to withdraw their troops from Greece and, consequently, could not prevent the Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their remedy in the usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with Antiochus would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but tor the military blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin — for an impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious
generosity.
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
CHAPTER DC
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
Antlochtn In the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidae had *TM been worn since 531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great- great-grandson of the founder of the dynasty. He had, like
Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years of age, and had dis played sufficient energy and enterprise, especially in his first campaigns in the east, to warrant his being without too ludi crous impropriety addressed in courtly style as " the Great" He had succeeded—more, however, through the negligence of his opponents and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular, than through any ability of his own — in restoring in some degree the integrity of the monarchy, and in reuniting with his crown first the eastern satrapies of Media and Parthyene, and then the separate state which Achaeus had founded on this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to wrest from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of which he sorely felt, had, in the year of the battle of the Trasimene lake, met with a bloody repulse from Philopator at Raphia; and Antiochus had taken good care not to resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man—even though he were but an indolent one—occupied the Egyptian
105. throne. But, after Philopator's death (549), the right moment for crushing Egypt appeared to have arrived ; with that view Antiochus entered into concert with Philip, and had thrown himself upon Coele-Syria, while Philip attacked
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
445
the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed in
that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would make common cause with Philip against them — the course suggested by the position of affairs, as well as by the treaty
of alliance. But, not far-seeing enough to repel at once with all his energy any interference whatever by the Romans
in the affairs of the east, Antiochus thought that his best course was to take advantage of the subjugation of Philip by
the Romans (which might easily be foreseen), in order to secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwith standing the close relations of Rome with the court of Alexandria and her royal ward, the senate by no means intended to be in reality, what it was in name, his
" protector ; " firmly resolved to give itself no concern about Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of Hercules and the Hellespont, it allowed the great-king to take his course. He himself was not probably in earnest
with the conquest of Egypt proper—which was more easily talked of than achieved—but he contemplated the sub jugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another,
and at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and Palestine. The great victory, which he gained in 556 over 198. the Egyptian general Scopas at Mount Panium near the sources of the Jordan, not only gave him complete posses
sion of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt proper, but so alarmed the Egyptian guardians of the young king that, to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they sub mitted to a peace and sealed it by the betrothal of their ward to Cleopatra the daughter of Antiochus. When he had thus achieved his first object, he proceeded in the fol lowing year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalae, with a strong fleet of 100 decked and 100 open vessels to Asia Minor, to take possession of the districts that formerly
Difficulties Rome.
belonged to Egypt on the south and west coasts of Asia Minor—probably the Egyptian government had ceded these districts, which were de facto in the hands of Philip, to Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced all their foreign possessions in his favour — and to recover the Greeks of Asia Minor generally for his empire. At the same time a strong Syrian land-army assembled in Sardes.
This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans, w^o from the first ^ad ^d it down as a condition for Philip that he should withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and should leave to the Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory and to the free cities their former constitution unimpaired, and who had now to look on while Antiochus took posses sion of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the Rhodians found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus with precisely the same danger as had driven them a few years before into the war with Philip ; and they naturally sought to involve the Romans in this war as well as in that
446
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
199-198. which had just terminated. Already in 555—6 Attalus had requested from the Romans military aid against Antiochus, who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic Rhodians even declared to king Antiochus, when in the
197. spring of 557 his fleet appeared off the coast of Asia Minor, that they would regard its passing beyond the Chelidonian islands (off the Lycian coast) as a declaration of war ; and, when Antiochus did not regard the threat, they, emboldened
by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle at Cynoscephalae, had immediately begun the war and had
actually protected from the king the most important of the Carian cities, Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the island of Samos. Most of the half-free cities had submitted to Antiochus, but some of them, more especially the important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and Lamp- sacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
447
taken courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent entreaties were combined with those of the Rhodians.
It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was at all capable of forming a resolution and adhering to had already made up his mind not only to attach to his empire the Egyptian possessions Asia, but also to make conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, not to seek on that account war with Rome, at any rate to risk The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that request of their allies, and to interfere directly Asia; but they showed little inclination to do so. They not only delayed as long as the Macedonian war lasted, and gave to Attalus nothing but the protection of diplomatic inter cession, which, we may add, proved in the first instance effective; but even after the victory, while they doubtless spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of Ptolemy and Philip ought not to be taken possession of Antiochus, and while the freedom of the Asiatic cities, Myrina, Abydus, Lampsacus,1 and Cius, figured in Roman documents, they took not the smallest step to give effect to
and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable
According to a recently discovered decree of the town of Lampsacus (Mitth. dts arch. Inst, in Athen, vi. 95) the Lampsacenes after the defeat of Philip sent envoys to the Roman senate with the request that the town might be embraced in the treaty concluded between Rome and (Philip) the king (Sirtot cvimptXriQBwim [tr reuf avrOJKOti] raft ytvotUrais 'Pwfialott rpis ti)c [fkuriXia]), which the senate, at least according to the view of the petitioners, granted to them and referred them, as regarded other matters, to Flamininus and the ten envoys. From the latter they then obtain in Corinth a guarantee of their constitution and letters to the kings. " Flamininus also gives to them similar letters of their contents we learn nothing more particular, than that in the decree the embassy is described as successful. But the senate and Flamininus had formally and positively guaranteed the autonomy and democracy of the Lampsacenes, the decree would hardly dwell so much at length on the courteous answers, which the Roman commanders, who had been appealed to on the way for their intercession with the senate, gave to the envoys. " "
Other remarkable points in this document are the brotherhood of the Lampsacenes and the Romans, certainly going back to the Trojan legend, and the mediation, invoked by the former with success, of the allies and friends of Rome, the Massiliots, who were connected with the Lampsacenes through their common mother-city Phocaea.
if
;
'
if in
1 it,
by
it.
it,
a
in
448
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons to introduce his own. In fact, they even went so far as to submit to his landing in Europe in the spring
196. of 558 and invading the Thracian Chersonese, where he occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a considerable time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had selected as his chief place of arms and as the capital of the newly-instituted satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who was entrusted with the conduct of these affairs, sent to the king at Lysimachia envoys, who talked of the integrity of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom of all the Hellenes ; but nothing came out of it The king talked in turn of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom of Lysimachus conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, ex plained that he was employed not in making territorial acquisitions but only in preserving the integrity of his hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention of the Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in Asia Minor. With justice he could add that peace had already been concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans were thus far deprived of any formal pretext for interfering. 1 The sudden return of the king to Asia occasioned by a false report of the death of the young king of Egypt, and the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the confer ences without coming to any conclusion, still less producing
195. any result. In the following year, 559, Antiochus returned to Lysimachia with his fleet and army reinforced, and employed himself in organizing the new satrapy which he
1 The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of the 198. Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in con
nection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. Syr. 3, and with the 193. actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond a doubt that the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt was in this case
formally uncalled for.
chap, xi THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
449
destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had been obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus;
and the singularly honourable reception accorded to the exile was virtually a declaration of war against Rome. Nevertheless Flamininus in the spring of 560 withdrew all 194. the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was under the existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not a criminal acting in opposition to his own better knowledge ;
for we cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to carry home with him the undiminished glory of having wholly terminated the war and liberated Hellas, contented himself with superficially covering up for the moment the smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced any attempt to bring Greece directly under the dominion of the Romans, and any intervention of the Romans in Asiatic affairs, to be a political blunder ; but the opposition fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance of the Asiatic king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of the bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the west in arms against Rome —all these were clear signs of
the approach of a fresh rising in arms on the part of the Hellenic east, which could not but have for its aim at least to transfer Greece from the clientship of Rome to that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if this object should be attained, would immediately extend the circle of its operations. It is plain that Rome could not allow this to take place. When Flamininus, ignoring all these sure indications of war, withdrew the garrisons from Greece,
and yet at the same time made demands on the king of Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to support, he overdid his part in words as much as *»» fell short in action, and forgot his duty as a general and aa a citizen in the indulgence of his personal vanity — a
vanity, which wished to confer, and imagined that it had vol. 11 61
Prepara tions of Antiochos for war with Rome.
198.
conferred, peace on Rome and freedom on the Greeks of both continents.
Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strength ening his position at home and his relations with his neighbours before beginning the war, on which for his part he was resolved, and became all the more so, the more the enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now (561) gave his daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage to the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time promised to restore the provinces wrested from his son-in- law, was afterwards affirmed on the part of Egypt, but probably without warrant ; at any rate the land remained actually attached to the Syrian kingdom. 1 He offered to
45°
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
197. restore to Eumenes, who had in 557 succeeded his father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from him, and to give him also one of his daughters in marriage, if he would abandon the Roman alliance. In like manner he bestowed a daughter on Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gained the Galatians by presents, while he reduced by arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt, and other small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king declared that he would permit the independence of the old free cities such as Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would be content in the case of the others with a mere formal recognition of his sovereignty ; he even gave them to under stand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on the Aetolians, and he hoped to induce Philip again to take
1 For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. 1), which the sequel of the history of Judaea completely confirms ; Eusebius (p. 117, Mai) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly find
187.
that about 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at Alex andria (Joseph, xii. 4, 7) ; but this doubtless took place without detriment to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of Cleopatra con stituted a charge on those revenues ; and from this very circumstance presumably arose the subsequent dispute.
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
451
up arms. In fact, a plan of Hannibal obtained the royal approval, according to which he was to receive from Antiochus a fleet of 100 sail and a land army of 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was to employ them in kindling first a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a second Hannibalic war in Italy ; Tyrian emissaries pro ceeded to Carthage to pave the way for a rising in arms there 380). Finally, good results were anticipated from the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal left Carthage, was at its height (p. 390).
While the storm was thus gathering from far and wide Aetolian against Rome, was on this, as on all occasions, the Hel- "JJH*^? " lenes implicated in the enterprise, who were of the least Rome, moment, and yet took action of the greatest importance
and with the utmost impatience. The exasperated and arrogant Aetolians began by degrees to persuade them
selves that Philip had been vanquished by them and not
by the Romans, and could not even wait till Antiochus
should advance into Greece. Their policy character
istically expressed in the reply, which their strategus gave
soon afterwards to Flamininus, when he requested copy
of the declaration of war against Rome that he would
deliver to him in person, when the Aetolian army should
encamp on the Tiber. The Aetolians acted as the agents
of the Syrian king in Greece and deceived both parties,
to the king that all the Hellenes were waiting with open arms to receive him as their true deliverer, and telling those in Greece who were
disposed to listen to them that the landing of the king was nearer than was reality. Thus they actually succeeded inducing the simple obstinacy of Nabis to break loose and to rekindle in Greece the flame of war two years after Flamininus's departure, in the spring of
by representing
but in doing so they missed their aim. Nabis 192. attacked Gythium, one of the towns of the free Laconians
562
;
in
by
it
it in
it
(p.
:
is
a
45a
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
that by the last treaty had been annexed to the Achaean league, and took it ; but the experienced strategus of the Achaeans, Philopoemen, defeated him at the Barbos- thenian mountains, and the tyrant brought back barely a fourth part of his army to his capital, in which Philo poemen shut him up. As such a commencement was no sufficient inducement for Antiochus to come to Europe, the Aetolians resolved to possess themselves of Sparta, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and by gaining these important towns to prevail upon the king to embark. In the first place they thought to become masters of Sparta, by arranging that the Aetolian Alexamenus should march with iooo men into the town under pretext of bringing a contingent in terms of the alliance, and should embrace the opportunity of making away with Nabis and of occupying the town. This was done, and Nabis was killed at a review of the troops; but, when the Aetolians dispersed to plunder the town, the Lacedaemonians found time to rally and slew them to the last man. The city was then induced by Philopoemen to join the Achaean
league. After this laudable project of the Aetolians had thus not only deservedly failed, but had had precisely the opposite effect of uniting almost the whole Peloponnesus in the hands of the other party, it fared little better with them at Chalcis, for the Roman party there called in the citizens of Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, who were favourable to Rome, to render seasonable aid
against the Aetolians and the Chalcidian exiles. On the other hand the occupation of Demetrias was successful, for the
Magnetes to whom the city had been assigned were, not without reason, apprehensive that it had been promised by the Romans to Philip as a prize in return for his aid against Antiochus ; several squadrons of Aetolian horse moreover managed to steal into the town under the pretext of forming an escort for Eurylochus, the recalled
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
453
head of the opposition to Rome. Thus the Magnetes passed over, partly of their own accord, partly by com pulsion, to the side of the Aetolians, and the latter did not fail to make use of the fact at the court of the Seleucid.
Antiochus took his resolutioa A rupture with Rome, Rupture
in spite of endeavours to postpone it by the diplomatic palliative of embassies, could no longer be avoided. As early as the spring of 561 Flamininus, who continued to have the decisive voice in the senate as to eastern affairs, had expressed the Roman ultimatum to the envoys of the king, Menippus and Hegesianax; viz. that he should either evacuate Europe and dispose of Asia at his pleasure, or retain Thrace and submit to the Roman protectorate over Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria Troas. These demands had been again discussed at
Airtfoctau) "nd *•
^^
the chief place of arms and fixed quarters of
the king in Asia Minor, in the spring of 562, between Antiochus and the envoys of the senate, Publius Sulpicius
and Publius Villius ; and they had separated with the conviction on both sides that a peaceful settlement was
no longer possible. Thenceforth war was resolved on
in Rome. In that very summer of 562 a Roman fleet 192. of 30 sail, with 3000 soldiers on board, under Aulus Atilius Serranus, appeared off Gythium, where their arrival accelerated the conclusion of the treaty between the Achaeans and Spartans ; the eastern coasts of Sicily and Italy were strongly garrisoned, so as to be secure against
any attempts at a landing ; a land army was expected in Greece in the autumn. Since the spring of 562 Flami- 192. ninus, by direction of the senate, had journeyed through Greece to thwart the intrigues of the opposite party, and
to counteract as far as possible the evil effects of the ill-
timed evacuation of the country. The Aetolians had already gone so far as formally to declare war in their
Ephesus,
192.
454 THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book in
diet against Rome. But Flamininus succeeded in saving Chalcis for the Romans by throwing into it a garrison of 500 Achaeans and 500 Pergamenes. He made an attempt also to recover Demetrias; and the Magnetes wavered. Though some towns in Asia Minor, which Antiochus had proposed to subdue before beginning the great war, still held out, he could now no longer delay his landing, unless he
was willing to let the Romans recover all the advantages which they had surrendered two years before by with drawing their garrisons from Greece. He collected the vessels and troops which were at hand — he had but 40 decked vessels and 10,000 infantry, along with 500 horse and 6 elephants—and started from the Thracian Chersonese
102. for Greece, where he landed in the autumn
Pteleum on the Pagasaean gulf, and immediately occupied the adjoining Demetrias. Nearly about the same time a Roman army of some 25,000 men under the praetor Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia. The war was thus begun on both sides.
Attitude of
powers. Carthage
Hannibal.
Everything depended on the extent to which that com- prehensively - planned coalition against Rome, of which Antiochus came forward as the head, might be realized As to the plan, first of all, of stirring up enemies to the Romans in Carthage and Italy, it was the fate of Hannibal at the court of Ephesus, as through his whole career, to have projected his noble and high-spirited plans for the behoof of people pedantic and mean. Nothing was done towards their execution, except that some Cartha
ginian patriots were compromised; no choice was left to the Carthaginians but to show unconditional submission to Rome. The camarilla would have nothing to do with Hannibal—such a man was too inconveniently great for court cabals; and, after having tried all sorts of absurd expedients, such as accusing the general, with whose name the Romans frightened their children, of concert with the
of 562 at
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
455
Roman envoys, they succeeded in persuading Antiochus the Great, who like all insignificant monarchs plumed himself greatly on his independence and was influenced by nothing so easily as by the fear of being ruled, into the wise belief that he ought not to allow himself to be thrown into the shade by so celebrated a man. Accordingly it was in solemn council resolved that the Phoenician should be employed in future only for subordinate enter prises and for giving advice — with the reservation, of course, that the advice should never be followed. Hannibal revenged himself on the rabble, by accepting every commission and brilliantly executing all.
In Asia Cappadocia adhered to the great-king ; Prusias States of of Bithynia on the other hand took, as always, the side of j^0T the stronger. King Eumenes remained faithful to the old
policy of his house, which was now at length to yield to
him its true fruit He had not only persistently refused
the offers of Antiochus, but had constantly urged the
Romans to a war, from which he expected the aggrandize
ment of his kingdom. The Rhodians and
likewise joined their old allies. Egypt too took the side of
Rome and offered support in supplies and men ; which, however, the Romans did not accept
In Europe the result mainly depended on the position Mace-
onu*
which Philip of Macedonia would take up. It would have been perhaps the right policy for him, notwithstanding all
the injuries or shortcomings of the past, to unite with Antiochus. But Philip was ordinarily influenced not by such considerations, but by his likings and dislikings ; and his hatred was naturally directed much more against the faithless ally, who had left him to contend alone with the common enemy, had sought merely to seize his own share in the spoil, and had become a burdensome neighbour to him in Thrace, than against the conqueror, who had treated him respectfully and honourably. Antiochus had,
Byzantines
Greek
moreover, given deep offence to the hot temper of Philip by the setting up of absurd pretenders to the Macedonian crown, and by the ostentatious burial of the Macedonian bones bleaching at Cynoscephalae. Philip therefore placed his whole force with cordial zeal at the disposal of the Romans.
The second power of Greece, the Achaean league, adhered no less decidedly than the first to the alliance with Rome. Of the smaller powers, the Thessalians and the Athenians held by Rome; among the latter an Achaean garrison introduced by Flamininus into the citadel brought
the patriotic party, which was pretty strong, to reason. The Epirots exerted themselves to keep on good terms, if
Antiochus fa Greece.
456
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book hi
with both parties. Thus, in addition to the Aetolians and the Magnetes who were joined by a portion of the neighbouring Perrhaebians, Antiochus was supported only by Amynander, the weak king of the Athamanes, who allowed himself to be dazzled by foolish designs on the Macedonian crown ; by the Boeotians, among whom the party opposed to Rome was still at the helm ; and in the Peloponnesus by the Eleans and Messenians, who were in the habit of taking part with the Aetolians against the Achaeans. This was indeed a hopeful beginning ; and the title of commander-in-chief with absolute power, which the Aetolians decreed to the great-king, seemed insult added to injury. There had been, just as usual, deception on both sides. Instead of the countless hordes of Asia, the king brought up a force scarcely half as strong as an ordinary consular army; and instead of the open arms with which all the Hellenes were to welcome their deliverer from the Roman yoke, one or two bands of klephts and some dissolute civic communities offered to the brotherhood in arms.
For the moment, indeed, Antiochus had anticipated the Romans in Greece proper. Chalcis was garrisoned by the
possible,
king
chap, ix THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
457
Greek allies of the Romans, and refused the first summons ;
but the fortress surrendered when Antiochus advanced
with all his force; and a Roman division, which arrived
too late to occupy was annihilated Antiochus at
Delium. Euboea was thus lost to the Romans. Antiochus
still made even in winter an attempt, in concert with the Aetolians and Athamanes, to gain Thessaly Thermopylae
was occupied, Pherae and other towns were taken, but
Appius Claudius came up with 2000 men from Apollonia, relieved Larisa, and took up his position there. Antiochus,
tired of the winter campaign, preferred to return to his pleasant quarters at Chalcis, where the time was spent
merrily, and the king even, in spite of his fifty years and
his warlike schemes, wedded fair Chalcidian. So the
winter of 562-3 passed, without Antiochus doing much 192-191. more than sending letters hither and thither through
Greece he waged the war— Roman officer remarked — means of pen and ink.
In the beginning of spring 563 the Roman staff arrived 191.
at Apollonia. The commander-in-chief was Marius Acilius £f^n* Glabrio, man of humble origin, but an able general feared Roman*, both by his soldiers and the enemy; the admiral was
Gaius Livius; and among the military tribunes were Marcus Porcius Cato, the conqueror of Spain, and Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who after the old Roman wont did not
disdain, although they had been consuls, to re-enter the army as simple war-tribunes. They brought with them rein forcements in ships and men, including Numidian cavalry and Libyan elephants sent Massinissa, and the permission of the senate to accept auxiliary troops to the number of 5000 from the extra-Italian allies, so that the whole number of the Roman forces was raised to about 40,000 men. The king, who in the beginning of spring had gone to the Aetolians and had thence made an aimless expedition to Acarnania, on the news of Glabrio's landing returned to his
by
by
a
by
:
a
a
;
by
it,
Battle at Thermo pylae.
head-quarters to begin the campaign in earnest. But incom prehensibly, through his own negligence and that of his lieutenants in Asia, reinforcements had wholly failed to reach him, so that he had nothing but the weak army—now further decimated by sickness and desertion in its dissolute winter-quarters —with which he had landed at Pteleum in the autumn of the previous year. The Aetolians too, who had professed to send such enormous numbers into the field, now, when their support was of moment, brought to their commander-in-chief no more than 4000 men. The Roman troops had already begun operations in Thessaly, where the vanguard in concert with the Macedonian army drove the garrisons of Antiochus out of the Thessalian towns and occupied the territory of the Athamanes. The consul with the main army followed ; the whole force of the Romans assembled at Larisa.
Instead of returning with all speed to Asia and evacuat ing the field before an enemy in every respect superior, Antiochus resolved to entrench himself at Thermopylae, which he had occupied, and there to await the arrival of the great army from Asia. He himself took up a position in the chief pass, and commanded the Aetolians to occupy the mountain-path, by which Xerxes had formerly succeeded in turning the Spartans. But only half of the Aetolian contin gent was pleased to comply with this order of the com mander-in-chief; the other 2000 men threw themselves into the neighbouring town of Heraclea, where they took no other part in the battle than that of attempting during its progress to surprise and plunder the Roman camp. Even the Aetolians posted on the heights discharged their duty of watching with remissness and reluctance ; their post on the Callidromus allowed itself to be surprised by Cato, and
the Asiatic phalanx, which the consul had meanwhile assailed in front, dispersed, when the Romans hastening down the mountain fell upon its flank. As Antiochus had made no
458
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK III
CHAP. IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
459
provision for any case and had not thought of retreat, the army was destroyed partly on the field of battle, partly during its flight; with difficulty a small band reached Demetrias, and the king himself escaped to Chalcis with 500 men. He embarked in haste for Ephesus ; Europe was lost to him all but his possessions in Thrace, and even the fortresses could be no longer defended. Chalcis sur- rendered to the Romans, and Demetrias to Philip, who received permission —as a compensation for the conquest of the town of Lamia in Achaia Phthiotis, which he was on the point of accomplishing and had then abandoned by orders of the consul —to make himself master of all the communities that had gone over to Antiochus in Thessaly proper, and even of the territories bordering on Aetolia, the districts of Dolopia and Aperantia. All the Greeks that had pronounced in favour of Antiochus hastened to make their peace ; the Epirots humbly besought pardon for their ambiguous conduct, the Boeotians surrendered at discretion, the Eleans and Messenians, the latter after some struggle, submitted to the Achaeans. The prediction of Hannibal to the king was fulfilled, that no dependence at all could be placed upon the Greeks, who would submit to any con queror. Even the Aetolians, when their corps shut up in Heraclea had been compelled after obstinate resistance to capitulate, attempted to make their peace with the sorely
Romans ; but the stringent demands of the Roman consul, and a consignment of money seasonably arriving from Antiochus, emboldened them once more to break off the negotiations and to sustain for two whole months a siege in Naupactus. The town was already reduced to extremities, and its capture or capitulation could not have been long delayed, when Flamininus, constantly striving to save every Hellenic community from the worst consequences of its own folly and from the severity of his ruder colleagues, interposed and arranged in the first
Greece
^the Roman*
provoked
Resistance °f *•
Maritime
prepare- tions for
crossincr to Ajh,
instance an armistice on tolerable terms. This terminated, at least for the moment, armed resistance in Greece.
A more serious war was impending in Asia — a war which appeared of a very hazardous character on account not So much of the enemy as of the great distance and the insecurity of the communications with home, while yet, owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of Antiochus, the struggle could not well be terminated otherwise than by an attack on the enemy in his own country. The first object was to secure the sea. The Roman fleet, which during the campaign in Greece was charged with the task of interrupt
ing the communication between Greece and Asia Minor, and which had been successful about the time of the battle at Thermopylae in seizing a strong Asiatic transport fleet near Andros, was thenceforth employed in making prepara tions for the crossing of the Romans to Asia next year and first of all in driving the enemy's fleet out of the Aegean Sea. It lay in the harbour of Cyssus on the southern shore of the tongue of land that projects from Ionia towards Chios ; thither in search of it the Roman fleet proceeded, consisting of 75 Roman, 24 Pergamene, and 6 Cartha ginian, decked vessels under the command of Gaius Livius. The Syrian admiral, Polyxenidas, a Rhodian emigrant, had only 70 decked vessels to oppose to it ; but, as the Roman fleet still expected the ships of Rhodes, and as Polyxenidas relied on the superior seaworthiness of his vessels, those of Tyre and Sidon in particular, he immediately accepted battle. At the outset the Asiatics succeeded in sinking one of the Carthaginian vessels; but, when they came to grapple, Roman valour prevailed, and it was owing solely to the swiftness of their rowing and sailing that the enemy lost no more than 23 ships. During the pursuit the Roman fleet was joined by 25 ships from Rhodes, and the superiority of the Romans in those waters was now doubly assured. The enemy's fleet thenceforth kept the shelter of
460
THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
461
the harbour of Ephesus, and, as it could not be induced to risk a second battle, the fleet of the Romans and allies broke up for the winter ; the Roman ships of war proceeded to the harbour of Cane in the neighbourhood of Pergamus.
Both parties were busy during the winter in preparing for the next campaign. The Romans sought to gain over the Greeks of Asia Minor; Smyrna, which had persever- ingly resisted all the attempts of the king to get possession of the city, received the Romans with open arms, and the Roman party gained the ascendency in Samos, Chios,
Clazomenae, Phocaea, Cyme, and elsewhere. Antiochus was resolved, if possible, to prevent the Romans from crossing to Asia, and with that view he made zealous naval preparations —employing Polyxenidas to fit out and augment the fleet stationed at Ephesus, and Hannibal to equip a new fleet in Lycia, Syria, and Phoenicia ; while he further collected in Asia Minor a powerful land army from
all regions of his extensive empire. Early next year (564) 19flL the Roman fleet resumed its operations. Gaius Livius left
the Rhodian fleet —which had appeared in good time this year, numbering 36 sail — to observe that of the enemy in
the offing of Ephesus, and went with the greater portion of
the Roman and Pergamene vessels to the Hellespont in
Erythrae,
accordance with his instructions, to pave the way for the passage of the land army by the capture of the fortresses there. Sestus was already occupied and Abydus reduced to extremities, when the news of the defeat of the Rhodian fleet recalled him. The Rhodian admiral Pausistratus, lulled into security by the representations of his countryman that he wished to desert from Antiochus, had allowed himself to be surprised in the harbour of Samos ; he him self fell, and all his vessels were destroyed except five
Rhodian and two Coan ships ; Samos, Phocaea, and Cyme on hearing the news went over to Seleucus, who held the chief command by land in those provinces for his father.
Polyxenl-
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But when the Roman fleet arrived partly from Cane, partly from the Hellespont, and was after some time joined by twenty new ships of the Rhodians at Samos, Polyxenidas was once more compelled to shut himself up in the harbour of Ephesus. As he declined the offered naval battle, and as, owing to the small numbers of the Roman force, an attack by land was not to be thought of, nothing remained for the Roman fleet but to take up its position in like manner at Samos. A division meanwhile proceeded to Patara on the Lycian coast, partly to relieve the Rhodians from the very troublesome attacks that were directed against them from that quarter, partly and chiefly to prevent the hostile fleet, which Hannibal was expected to bring up, from entering the Aegean Sea. When the squadron sent against Patara achieved nothing, the new admiral Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who had arrived with 20 war-vessels from Rome and had relieved Gaius Livius at Samos, was so indignant that he proceeded thither with the whole fleet ; his officers with difficulty succeeded, while they were on their voyage, in making him understand that the primary object was not the conquest of Patara but the command of the Aegean Sea, and in inducing him to return to Samos. On the mainland of Asia Minor Seleucus had in the meanwhile begun the siege of Pergamus, while Antiochus with his chief army ravaged the Pergamene territory and the possessions of the Mytilenaeans on the mainland ; they hoped to crush the hated Attalids, before Roman aid appeared. The Roman fleet went to Elaea and the port of Adramytium to help their ally; but, as the admiral wanted troops, he accomplished nothing.
Pergamus seemed lost ; but the laxity and negligence with which the siege was conducted allowed Eumenes to throw into the city Achaean auxiliaries under Diophanes, whose bold and successful sallies compelled the Gallic mercenaries, whom Antiochus had entrusted with the siege, to raise it
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463
In the southern waters too the projects of Antiochus were Engage frustrated. The fleet equipped and led by Hannibal, after ment off
having been long detained by the constant westerly winds, attempted at length to reach the Aegean; but at the
Aspendua,
mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in Pamphylia, it encountered a Rhodian squadron under Eudamus ; and in the battle, which ensued between the two fleets, the ex cellence of the Rhodian ships and naval officers carried the victory over Hannibal's tactics and his numerical supe riority. It was the first naval battle, and the last battle against Rome, fought by the great Carthaginian. The victorious Rhodian fleet then took its station at Patara, and there prevented the intended junction of the two Asiatic fleets. In the Aegean Sea the Romano- Rhodian fleet at Samos, after being weakened by detaching the Pergamene ships to the Hellespont to support the land
army which had arrived there, was in its turn attacked by
that of Polyxenidas, who now numbered nine sail more
than his opponents. On December 23 of the uncorrected Battle of calendar, according to the corrected calendar about the ne^? " end of August, in 564, a battle took place at the promon- 190. tory of Myonnesus between Teos and Colophon; the
Romans broke through the line of the enemy, and totally surrounded the left wing, so that they took or sank 42
ships. An inscription in Saturnian verse over the temple
of the Lares Permarini, which was built in the Campus
Martius in memory of this victory, for many centuries thereafter proclaimed to the Romans how the fleet of the
Asiatics had been defeated before the eyes of king Antiochus and of all his land army, and how the Romans
thus "settled the mighty strife and subdued the kings. " Thenceforth the enemy's ships no longer ventured to show themselves on the open sea, and made no further attempt
to obstruct the crossing of the Roman land army.
The conqueror of Zama had been selected at Rome to
THE WAR WITH ANTlOCHUS OF ASIA book lit Expedition conduct the war on the Asiatic continent ; he practically
to Asia.
464
exercised the supreme command for the nominal com mander-in-chief, his brother Lucius Scipio, whose intellect was insignificant, and who had no military capacity. The reserve hitherto stationed in Lower Italy was destined for Greece, the army of Glabrio for Asia: when it became known who was to command 5000 veterans from the Hannibalic war voluntarily enrolled, to fight once more under their beloved leader. In the Roman July, but according to the true time in March, the Scipios arrived at the army to commence the Asiatic campaign but tbey were disagreeably surprised to find themselves instead in volved, in the first instance, in an endless struggle with the desperate Aetolians. The senate, finding that Flamininus pushed his boundless consideration for the Hellenes too far, had left the Aetolians to choose between paying an
exorbitant war contribution and unconditional surrender, and thus had driven them anew to arms none could tell when this warfare among mountains and strong holds would come to an end. Scipio got rid of the convenient obstacle concerting six-months' armistice, and then entered on his march to Asia. As the one fleet of the enemy was only blockaded in the Aegean Sea, and the other, which was coming up from the south, might daily arrive there in spite of the squadron charged to inter cept seemed advisable to take the land route through Macedonia and Thrace and to cross the Hellespont In that direction no real obstacles were to be anticipated for Philip of Macedonia might be entirely depended on, Prusias king of Bithynia was in alliance with the Romans, and the Roman fleet could easily establish itself in the straits. The long and weary march along the coast of Macedonia and Thrace was accomplished without material loss Philip made provision on the one hand for supplying their wants, on the other for their friendly reception the
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Thracian barbarians. They had lost so much time how ever, partly with the Aetolians, partly on the march, that the army only reached the Thracian Chersonese about the time of the battle of Myonnesus. But the marvellous good fortune of Scipio now in Asia, as formerly in Spain and Africa, cleared his path of all difficulties.
On the news of the battle at Myonnesus Antiochus so Passage completely lost his judgment, that in Europe he caused Hellespont the strongly-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress of by the
Lysimachia to be evacuated by the garrison and by the inhabitants who were faithfully devoted to the restorer of their city, and withal even forgot to withdraw in like manner the garrisons or to destroy the rich magazines at Aenus and Maronea ; and on the Asiatic coast he opposed not the slightest resistance to the landing of the Romans, but on the contrary, while it was taking place, spent his time at Sardes in upbraiding destiny. It is scarcely doubt ful that, had he but provided for the defence of Lysimachia down to the no longer distant close of the summer, and moved forward his great army to the Hellespont, Scipio would have been compelled to take up winter quarters on
the European shore, in a position far from being, in a military or political point of view, secure.
While the Romans, after disembarking on the Asiatic shore, paused for some days to refresh themselves and to await their leader who was detained behind by religious duties, ambassadors from the great-king arrived in their camp to negotiate for peace. Antiochus offered half the expenses of the war, and the cession of his European possessions as well as of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor that had gone over to Rome; but Scipio demanded the whole costs of the war and the surrender of all Asia Minor. The former terms, he declared, might have been accepted, had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the European side of the Hellespont ; but they did not suffice
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THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA book iii
now, when the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The attempts of the great -king to purchase peace from his antagonist after the Oriental manner by sums of money— he offered the half of his year's revenues ! —failed as they deserved; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the great-king with the friendly advice to make peace on any terms. This was not in reality necessary : had the king possessed the resolution to prolong the war and to draw the enemy after him by retreating into the interior, a favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But
Antiochus, irritated by the presumably intentional arrogance of his antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and consistent warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to expose his unwieldy, but unequal, and undisciplined mass
of an army to the shock of the Roman legions.
In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot
0j \fount Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman
190. fell in with the enemy late in the autumn of 564. The
force of Antiochus numbered close on 80,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry ; the Romans —who had along with them about 5000 Achaeans, Pergamenes, and Mace donian volunteers — had not nearly half that number, but they were so sure of victory, that they did not even wait for the recovery of their general who had remained behind sick at Elaea ; Gnaeus Domitius took the command in his stead. Antiochus, in order to be able even to place his immense mass of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were placed the mass of the light troops, the peltasts, bowmen, slingers, the mounted archers of Mysians, Dahae, and Elymaeans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and the scythe- chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the Cataphractae, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the flanks; next to these, in the intermediate division, the Gallic and Cappadocian infantry ; and in the very centre
Battle of Magnesia.
troops
chap, IX THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA
467
the phalanx armed after the Macedonian fashion, 16,000 strong, the flower of the army, which, however, had not room in the narrow space and had to be drawn up in double files 32 deep. In the space between the two divisions were placed 54 elephants, distributed between the bands of the phalanx and of the heavy cavalry. The Romans stationed but a few squadrons on the left wing, where the river gave protection ; the mass of the cavalry and all the light armed were placed on the right, which was led by Eumenes; the legions stood in the centre. Eumenes began the battle by despatching his archers and slingers against the scythe-chariots with orders to shoot at the teams ; in a short time not only were these thrown into disorder, but the camel-riders stationed next to them were also carried away, and even in the second division the left wing of heavy cavalry placed behind fell into confusion. Eumenes now threw himself with all the Roman cavalry, numbering 3000 horse, on the mercenary infantry , which was placed in the second division between the phalanx and the left wing of heavy cavalry, and, when these gave way, the cuirassiers who had already fallen into disorder also fled. The phalanx, which had just allowed the light troops to pass through and was preparing to advance
the Roman legions, was hampered by the attack of the cavalry in flank, and compelled to stand still and to form front on both sides—a movement which the depth of its disposition favoured. Had the heavy Asiatic cavalry been at hand, the battle might have been restored ; but the left wing was shattered, and the right, led by Antiochus in person, had driven before it the little division of Roman cavalry opposed to and had reached the Roman camp, which was with great difficulty defended from its attack. In this way the cavalry were at the decisive moment absent
from the scene of action. The Romans were careful not to assail the phalanx with their legions, but sent against the
against
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Conclusion
archers and slingers, not one of whose missiles failed to take effect on the densely-crowded mass. The phalanx neverthe less retired slowly and in good order, till the elephants stationed in the interstices became frightened and broke the ranks. Then the whole army dispersed in tumultuous flight ; an attempt to hold the camp failed, and only increased the number of the dead and the prisoners. The estimate of the loss of Antiochus at 50,000 men considering the infinite confusion, not incredible the legions of the Romans had never been engaged, and the victory, which gave them third continent, cost them 24 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers. Asia Minor submitted including even Ephesus, whence the admiral had hastily to withdraw his fleet, and
Sardes the residence of the court.
The king sued for peace and consented to the terms
proposed by the Romans, which, as usual, were just the same as those offered before the battle and consequently included the cession of Asia Minor. Till they were ratified, the army remained in Asia Minor at the expense of the king which came to cost him not less than 3000 talents (,£730,000). Antiochus himself in his careless fashion soon consoled himself for the loss of half his kingdom
was in keeping with his character, that he declared himself grateful to the Romans for saving him the trouble of governing too large an empire. But with the day of Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never perhaps did great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidae under this Antiochus the Great He himself
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THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA BOOK m
187. was soon afterwards (567) slain the indignant inhabit ants of Elymais at the head of the Persian gulf, on occasion of pillaging the temple of Bel, with the treasures of which he had sought to replenish his empty coffers.
The Roman government, after having achieved the victory, had to arrange the affairs of Asia Minor and of
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Greece. If the Roman rule was here to be erected on a Expedition firm foundation, it was by no means enough that Antiochus J? "^,. should have renounced the supremacy in the west of Asia of Asia Minor. The circumstances of the political situation there Mtaor- have been set forth above 401 ff. ). The Greek free cities
on the Ionian and Aeolian coast, as well as the kingdom of Pergamus of substantially similar nature, were certainly the natural pillars of the new Roman supreme power, which here too came forward essentially as protector of the Hellenes kindred in race. But the dynasts in the interior of Asia Minor and on the north coast of the Black Sea had hardly yielded for long any serious obedience to the kings of Asia, and the treaty with Antiochus alone gave to the Romans no power over the interior. was indispensable to draw
certain line within which the Roman influence was hence forth to exercise control. Here the element of chief importance was the relation of the Asiatic Hellenes to the Celts who had been for century settled there. These had formally apportioned among them the regions of Asia Minor, and each one of the three cantons raised its fixed tribute from the territory laid under contribution. Doubt less the burgesses of Pergamus, under the vigorous guid ance of their presidents who had thereby become hereditary princes, had rid themselves of the unworthy yoke and the fair afterbloom of Hellenic art, which had recently emerged afresh from the soil, had grown out of these last Hellenic wars sustained national public spirit But was vigorous counterblow, not decisive success; again and again the Pergamenes had to defend with arms their urban peace against the raids of the wild hordes from the eastern mountains, and the great majority of the other Greek cities probably remained in their old state of dependence. 1
From the decree of Lampsacus mentioned at p. 447, appears pretty certain that the Lampsacenes requested from the Massiliots not merely intercession at Rome, but also intercession with the Tolistoagii (so the Celts, elsewhere named Tolistobogi, are designated in this document and in the
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If the protectorate of Rome over the Hellenes was to be in Asia more than a name, an end had to be put to this tributary obligation of their new clients ; and, as the Roman policy at this time declined, much more even in Asia than on the Graeco-Macedonian peninsula, the possession of the country on its own behalf and the permanent occupation therewith connected, there was no course in fact left but to carry the arms of Rome up to the limit which was to be staked off for the domain of Rome's power, and effectively to inaugurate the new supremacy among the inhabitants of Asia Minor generally, and above all in the Celtic cantons.
This was done by the new Roman commander-in-chief, Gnaeus Manlius Volso, who relieved Lucius Scipio in Asia Minor. He was subjected to severe reproach on this score ; the men in the senate who were averse to the new turn of policy failed to see either the aim, or the pretext, for such a war. There is no warrant for the former objection, as directed against this movement in particular; it was on the con trary, after the Roman state had once interfered in Hellenic affairs as it had done, a necessary consequence of this
Whether it was the right course for Rome to undertake the protectorate over the Hellenes collectively, may certainly be called in question ; but regarded from the point of view which Flamininus and the majority led by him had now taken up, the overthrow of the Galatians was in fact a duty of prudence as well as of honour. Better founded was the objection that there was not at the time a proper ground of war against them ; for they had not been, strictly speaking, in alliance with Antiochus, but had only according to their wont allowed him to levy hired troops in their country. But on the other side there fell
Pergamene inscription, C. J. Gr. 3536,—the oldest monuments which mention them). Accordingly the Lampsacenes were probably still about the time of the war with Philip tributary to this canton (comp. Li*. xxxviii. 16).
policy.
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471
the decisive consideration, that the sending of a Roman military force to Asia could only be demanded of the Roman burgesses under circumstances altogether extra ordinary, and, if once such an expedition was necessary, everything told in favour of carrying it out at once and
with the victorious army that was now stationed in Asia.
So, doubtless under the influence of Flamininus and of those who shared his views in the senate, the campaign
into the interior of Asia Minor was undertaken in the spring of 565. The consul started from Ephesus, levied 189. contributions from the towns and princes on the upper Maeander and in Pamphylia without measure, and then turned northwards against the Celts. Their western canton, the Tolistoagii, had retired with their belongings
to Mount Olympus, and the middle canton, the Tectosages, to Mount Magaba, in the hope that they would be able there to defend themselves till the winter should compel the strangers to withdraw.