No More Learning

1 But. no answer
was returned to this offer until 21 February, when peace had been
made with Siraj-ud-daula. Then they sent deputies again, and a draft
treaty was drawn up. But when the question of their powers was
raised, it proved that they could bind neither the Pondichery council
nor any royal officers who might come out to India. Thus negotiations
were broken off on 4 March.
Meanwhile Watts, that "helpless, poor, and innocent man” as
Siraj-ud-daula had called him, had been sent up to Murshidabad
to act as English resident there and watch over the execution of the
treaty. There ensued a duel between him and Law, in which the latter
had the advantage of the nawab's sympathy. He was by no means
disposed to acquiesce in his defeat, and could not speak of the English
without blazing eyes. But the durbar was on the whole inclined to the
English and against the French. Then too came news that the Durani
Afghans, who had invaded Northern India, were likely to advance
on Bengal. Under the alarm caused by this, Siraj-ud-daula wrote to
offer the English a lakh a month if they would aid him against the
Afghans. This was on 4 March, the day on which the Anglo-French
negotiations were broken off and on which also Watson had written
to the nawab a very angry letter, demanding the complete execution
of the treaty within ten days, or else "I will kindle such a flame in
your country as all the water in the Ganges shall not be able to
extinguish". In these circumstances, on the 10th, a letter was written
by the nawab's secretary, bearing the nawab's seal, permitting the
attack on Chandernagore. Law asserts that this letter was not written
by the order of the nawab. However, it was enough to authorise
Watson to move. On the 14th Chandernagore was attacked, though
not closely, from the land; on the 23rd the ships appeared off the
place and after a day's severe fighting it surrendered.
This deprived the nawab of his natural allies against the English;
and nothing can extenuate his folly in allowing their destruction.
Indeed, after his reluctant consent had been given, he seems to have
changed his mind, and ordered Rai Durlabh to march with a con-
siderable force to relieve the town. But then, on hearing from
Nandakumar, the faujdar of Hugli, that the French would not be
able to resist the English, the nawab changed his mind again, and in
the end did nothing. No conduct could have been feebler or more
3
1 Clive to Secret Committee, 1 February, 1757.
2 Siraj-ud-daula to Pigot, 30 June, 1756.
8 Watson to the nawab, 4 March, 1757.
4 Law, op. cit. pp. 121-2.


## p. 147 (#175) ############################################

DISCONTENT IN BENGAL
147
1
unwise. He gave open display to his hostile feelings against the
English while allowing them unmolested to destroy the French. And
then as if to emphasise his errors he proceeded to protect Law at
Murshidabad together with the fugitives who joined him from
Chandernagore, and to write to Bussy to come to his help from the
Deccan. These facts are established by the evidence of Law as
well as by the assertions of the English.
Although then the English had recovered Calcutta, although they
had secured from the nawab promises of privileges which they had
long desired, and although they had succeeded in depriving the French
of their principal stronghold: in Bengal, they were still far from a
position of safety. At any time might come news that the French had
arrived in strength upon the coast, and then Clive would be obliged
to abandon either Madras to the French or Calcutta to the nawab.
It was also becoming apparent that many persons besides the English
had cause to fear Siraj-ud-daula, and desired a revolution in the
government. The chief people in this movement were Hindus. 'Ali
Wardi Khan had favoured them, and had promoted many of them
to high places in his administration. Siraj-ud-daula did not share his
predecessor's feelings, and he succeeded in alienating all the principal
men of the durbar. The great Hindu bankers, the Seths, who had
contributed largely to the establishment of 'Ali Wardi Khan, had
been threatened with circumcision; Rai Durlabh, who had held the
office of diwan, had been placed under the orders of a favourite called
Mohan La'l; Mir Ja'far, who had held the office of bakshi, had been
dismissed with insult, and cannon had been planted against his
palace. The first hint of intrigues against the nawab had come to the
English through Omichand, when they were still lying at Fulta
waiting the arrival of help from Madras. Warren Hastings, who was
employed in this first affair, thought poorly of it; and for the moment
it came to nothing, partly, it seems, because the English lacked forces
and a leader, partly because the Hindus had no suitable candidate
to propose. But after the fall of Chandernagore the idea was again
brought forward. . The nawab, having defeated and slain his only
dynastic rival, Shaukat Jang, in the previous October, had lost at
once all stimulus to self-restraint in his government and the pro-
tection afforded by the hope that he would be overthrown without
the trouble and danger of private action. The Seths were at once
the persons specially concerned and specially active. Law, who was
well placed to view the position with considerable accuracy, says
that without them the revolution of 1757 would never have been
accomplished. That view is probably correct. The English policy
had never been adventurous. They had rather supported existing
.
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 112, 131.
Iden, pp. 108 sqq. ; Gleig, Warren Hasiings, 1, 41; Elliott and Dowson,
VIA, 426.


## p. 148 (#176) ############################################

148
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
princes than replaced them by new. In Bengal they would not have
attempted a revolution without the certainty of a large Indian
backing; and the Seths' intrigues created the situation, bringing the
discontent to a head and the discontented into active contact with
one another, without which the English would never have stirred at
a time when a French war was visibly impending. The Select Com-
mittee declared no more than the truth when it recorded among its
other reasons for participating in the plot that
The Nabob is so universally hated by all sorts and degrees of men; the affection
of the army is so much alienated from him by his ill-usage of the officers; and
a revolution so generally wished for, that it is probable that the step will be
aitempted (and successfully too) whether we give our assistance or not. In
this case we think it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and
unconcerned spectators of an event, wherein by engaging as allies to the per-
són designed to be set up we may benefit our employers and the community very
considerably, do à general good, and effectually traverse the designs of the
French and possibly keep them entirely out of these dominions.
This matter first came to a definite form when on 20 April Scrafton
wrote to Clive that the Seths through Omichand had proposed to set
up Yar Lutf Khan as nawab. This man was a protégé of the Seths
who had employed him in command of a body of troops to protect
them against attacks from the nawab or anyone else. On the 23rd
Scrafton's letter was read in committee and Clive was authorised to
sound the principal people in Murshidabad about their willingness
to co-operate. On the 26th Watts wrote that Mir Ja'far had informed
him through Khwaja Petrus, an Armenian, that he and other im-
portant persons were willing to assist the English in overthrowing
the nawab. This proposal was obviously much more attractive than
engaging to support an unknown man such as Yar Lutf Khan. The
question was considered in committee on 1 May and at once accepted
on the following conditions : an alliance offensive and defensive; the
surrender of all French fugitives and factories; restitution of all
English losses, public and private, caused by the capture of Calcutta;
the admission of all farman rights; liberty to fortify Kasimbazar and
Dacca; no fortifications to be erected on the river below Hugli; the
recognition of English sovereignty within the bounds of Calcutta; the
grant of territories for the maintenance of a proper military force;
extraordinary expenses while the troops were on campaign for the
nawab to be paid by him; and the residence at the nawab's durbar
of one of the Company's servants. Four days later to these terms was
added the additional stipulation that "Omychund in consideration of
his services should have all his losses made good by an express article
in the treaty". But by the time that these proposals had reached
Murshidabad, Omichand had fallen into disfavour with the other
conspirators. Watts might write on 6 May, "I will conclude nothing
without consulting Omichand”, but on the 14th he had learnt that
1 Benga! Select Committee, 1 May, 1757.


## p. 149 (#177) ############################################

THE CONSPIRACY
149
the latter had procured from the nawab orders for the restoration of
his property, and, when he was shown the proposed articles, he not
only insisted on his receiving 5 per cent. on the nawab's treasure, but
also demanded many other alterations, "in which his own ambition,
cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives". 1 In conse-
quence of these intrigues both the English and Mir Ja'far resolved to
have nothing more to do with the greedy Sikh; but the matter was
not so simple as that. Omichand had unwisely been let into the
secret and the immediate problem was to keep his mouth shut until
the preparations were more complete. For this purpose the Calcutta
council decided on the expedient of a double treaty, in one copy of
which Omichand's claims were to be inserted, but which was not
to be regarded as the valid copy. In order to make the trick pass,
Watson's signature was added by some person, probably Lushington,
to the false copy. .
Meanwhile, the final terms had been concerted with Mir Ja'far.
They were rather more favourable to the English than had been at
first put forward; and on 5 June, Watts visited Mir Ja'far in secret
and obtained his oath to the treaty. But already doubts had arisen
regarding the amount of assistance that might be expected from him
and his friends. In words which proved true in the event, Watts
wrote:
We can expect no more assistance than that they will stand neuter and wait the
event of a battle. If we are successful they will reap the benefit, if otherwise
they will continue as they were without appearing to have been concerned
with us. 2
Nevertheless, the march of events was not suffered to pause. On
11 June the treaty was delivered to the Select Committee; on the
12th Watts and his companions fled from Murshidabad; and the day
after Clive began to march towards the nawab's capital.
The matter had not been kept so secret as it should have been.
We shall never know whether Omichand revealed the plot to Siraj-
ud-daula, or who broke silence at Calcutta; but it was openly dis-
cussed at the English capital on 5 June; two days later it was known
at Murshidabad; and on the 8th the Frenchman, Sinfray, warned
the nawab of what was impending. . But he was too irresolute hy
nature to take advantage of his knowledge. He seems also to have
so distrusted his army that he would not venture on the decisive step
of seizing Mir Ja'far. Instead of that he visited the latter in person,
and accepted, though presumably he did not place much trust in,
the conspirator's protestations of fidelity. Meanwhile Clive set out
with 3000 men. Of these 2200 were sepoys and topasses; 800 European
infantry and artillerymen. The sepoys were men whom he had
brought up with him to Bengal; they had been raised and trained
1 Watts to Clive, 14 May, 1757.
2 Watts to Clive, 3 June, 1757.


## p. 150 (#178) ############################################

150
ČLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
under Lawrence in the south and had served well against the French.
After a momentary hesitation he reached Plassey at midnight 22-23
June, and found himself within striking distance of Siraj-ud-daula's
army, consisting of some 50,000 men.
His knowledge of the situation was slight and disquieting. He
had received letters from Mir Ja'far promising co-operation; but he
was by no means certain how far the latter would keep his word. In
the first draft of Orme's famous history we find a passage which was
afterwards omitted, probably in deference to the susceptibilities of
his hero:
Colonel Clive . . . saw the morning break with increasing anxiety; at sunrise he
went with another person upon the terras of the hunting-house, from whence
having contemplated the enemy's array, he was surprised at their numerous,
splendid and martial appearance. His companion asked him what he thought
would be the event; to which he replied, “We must make the best fight we can
during the day, and at night sling our muskets over our shoulders and march
back to Calcutta". Most of the officers were as doubtful of success as himself;
but the common soldiery, being mostly tried men, who had served under Major
Lawrence on the plains of Trichinopoly, maintained the blunt spirit of genuine
Englishmen, and saw nothing in the pomp or multitude of the Nabob's army.
either to admire or to fear. . . . 1
In view of the spirit of his men Clive seems to have resolved to remain
on the defensive during the day, but when night fell to try the effect
of a surprise attack upon the nawab's camp. Accordingly, till 2 o'clock
in the afternoon nothing was done but reply to the cannonade opened
by the enemy. But when the latter ceased fire and began to fall back
on their own camp, Killpatrick on his own responsibility ordered an
advance. The enemy were soon driven from the mound near the
British camp which they had occupied; the next point of attack was
another mound close to the nawab's entrenchments. Apparently at
about the time when Clive ordered his men to advance to storm this
post, the nawab sent word to the small party of Frenchmen with him
that he was betrayed, that the battle was lost, and that they should
save themselves; immediately after this he fled on a swift camel, and
himself brought to Murshidabad the news of his overthrow. All this
time Rai Durlabh and Mir Ja'far had been as inactive as the Pathan
nawabs with whom Dupleix had concerted the destruction of Nasir
Jang. They had hung on the right flank of the English forces, without
attacking, but also without giving any sign of their holding other
intentions. Not till the next morning did Mir Ja'far venture into the
English camp, and even then he was apparently very uncertain of
his reception. Scrafton noted that he started when the guard turned
out to receive him, and his face did not brighten till the colonel came
out and embraced him. That day the new nawab hastened to
Murshidabad, of which he took possession; on the 28th Clive entered
1 Orme MSS, Various, 164 A, p. 115.
2 Scrafton, Reflections, p. 90.


## p. 151 (#179) ############################################

MIR JA'FAR NAWAB
161
.
and conducted him to the masnad on which he had not yet ventured
to seat himself; and on 2 July Siraj-ud-daula was brought back by
Mir Ja'far's son Miran, and put to death that same night. So this
revolution was completed. Clive wrote of it to Orme, “I am possessed
of volumes of materials for the continuation of your history, in which
will appear fighting, tricks, chicanery, intrigues, politics, and the
Lord knows what”. " It offers a strange mingling of the admirable
and the mean. No series of events could have thrown into stronger
relief Clive's insight and the way in which he saw "things and their
consequences in an instant"; nothing could have afforded a better
illustration of his resolute conduct as soon as his swift mind had been
made up; nothing cculd have better displayed his extraordinary gift
of leadership. If once or twice he hesitated in the course of affairs, he
was after all but man; and his hesitation took place when there was
no immediate call for action. In attacking Siraj-ud-daula he was
amply justified not only by the standards of his own time but also by
those of our own. But the deception of Omichand has thrown an
ugly air over the business. As has been well said, had Omichand
sought it he could not have devised a more bitter revenge than the
stain which he brought upon the name of Clive. And the large
presents with which Mir Ja'far rewarded those who had given him
Bengal add the touch of sordidness. It is true that in this Clive and
his companions were only following the example of Dupleix and
Bussy; that their motives were not corrupt; that they might have had
more for the asking; that they were only doing what any of their
contemporaries would have done in their place. Here our judgment
must fall upon the age rather than upon the individuals; but none
the less the acceptance of the presents was of. evil example; and could
Clive have locked on to 1765 perhaps he would have refrained from
laying up for himself untold bitterness.
Clive now found himself installed in the same position and
exposed to the same dangers as Bussy in the Deccan. In character
Mir Ja'far was much like Salabat Jang-weak and irresolute. The
principal people of his durbar were as likely to be jealous of the
English as the nobles of the Deccan had proved themselves to be of
the French. Intrigue and hostility were certain. In these circumstances,
though without any formally declared intention, we find Clive adopt-
ing as a definite policy the protection of those prominent Hindus who
had assisted in bringing about the revolution, and whom Mir Ja'far
wished to despoil as soon as it was accomplished. The two chief
persons concerned were Rai Durlabh, who had been diwan and had
received repeated promises of being continued in that office, and
Ramnarayan, the deputy of Bihar, who was thought unlikely to sup-
port the new régime. Before the end of 1757 the nawab was already
1 Clive to Orme, 1 August, 1757.
Hill, Bengal in 1756-57, 1, p. clxxxix.
2


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152
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
.
accusing Rai Durlabh of intending to set up a new nawab. On this
pretext the unfortunate brother of Siraj-ud-daula was put to death;
and Rai Durlabh was on the verge of being attacked. Watts, who
was still resident at the durbar, interfered and brought about a re-
conciliation for the time being, which was the more necessary because
Ramnarayan was reported to be allying himself with the wazir of
Oudh against Mir Ja'far. However, when the nawab took the field to
march against Bihar, Rai Durlabh refused to march with him, on the
pretext of ill-health, but really because he was afraid to trust himself
in the nawab's camp. Clive, who had decided to accompany Mir Ja'far
to Patna, visited the diwan at Murshidabad in connection with the
Company's claims for payment which were overdue. At first he
secured nothing but promises. But when the diwan was warned that
he was risking the loss of English protection, an agreement was
reached under which the Company was to receive orders on the
collectors of the various districts (30 December). Clive and Mir
Ja'far now moved towards Patna. At first Clive had been decidedly
hostile towards Ramnarayan. Immediately after the battle of Plassey
he had sent Coote up with a detachment in order to seize Law and
any other Frenchmen whom he could find; and he also issued orders
to dispossess Ramnarayan of Bihar. These orders were never carried
out, because Coote was dissuaded by Mir Ja'far's friends, who prc-
bably thought that the plunder of the deputy had better be left
for their own hands. Six months later Clive's attitude had changed.
In December he had received protestations of the deputy's fidelity;
and on 1 January he had with the approval of the nawab written
giving that guarantee of personal safety without which Ramnarayan
refused to trust himself within the nawab's reach. Relying on this,
Ramnarayan at once came down the river to meet the nawab; and
then ensued a pretty trial of strength between the nawab and Clive,
the first bent on the spoliation of the deputy, the second on the main-
tenance of his promise. Clive won, although at one time after his
arrival at Patna he had certainly speculated on the possibility of
being attacked by the nawab's forces, as Bussy had been at the
Chahar Mahal. Ramnarayan received investiture of his office, for
which he paid nine lakhs of rupees; and he received a definite promise
that so long as he did not intrigue with foreign powers and provided
his due share of the revenues, he should not be dismissed. The net
result was that the two principal servants of the state depended for
their personal security not upon their ostensible master but upon the
influence of Clive.
Down to this time Clive had no definite position among the
1 Clive to Secret Committee, 23 December, 1757.
2 Clive to Secret Committee, 18, February, 1758.
3 See Coote's correspondence and journal up. Orme MSS, India, VII, pp.
1608-50, and 1673-91.
+ Clive to Select Committee, 7 February, 1758.


## p. 153 (#181) ############################################

INVASION OF BIHAR
163
a
English at Bengal, and still remained a servant of the governor and
council of Madras. On the receipt of the news of the fall of Calcutta,
after some deliberation the Company had resorted to that absurd plan,
which had been attempted before in the period of confusion at the
beginning of the century, of establishing a rotation government. On
this occasion there were to be four governors, who were to have suc-
ceeded to the chair in successive periods of a month. But the Calcutta
Council refused to put this plan into operation; Clive was invited to
act as governor till orders should arrive subsequent to the news of
the revolution. This sensible decision was taken in June, 1758; and
later in the year a dispatch arrived by which the Company appointed
Clive to the position which he was already occupying.
Meanwhile the policy of protecting the Hindu servants of the
nawab was further developed by the attack made by Miran upon Rai
Durlabh. The resident had once more to intervene in order to prevent
his use being plundered; and then an intrigue was started with a
view to ruining him with the English by accusing him of a conspiracy
against the nawab. Clive with great probability on his side refused
to credit the accusation, and the minister was allowed to retire to
Calcutta. The support of persons whom he wished to plunder must
have done much to alienate the nawab; but almost immediately
afterwards came a reminder that he depended upon the English for
military support. In 1759 appeared on the borders of Bihar 'Ali
Gauhar, better known under his later title of Shah 'Alam II, who,
flying from the confusion of Delhi, had found a refuge in Oudh and
was now hoping to strengthen his position by the occupation of Bihar
and Bengal. He laid siege to Patna, but Ramnarayan proved staunch;
after temporising as long as he could, he defended the place until
succour arrived, on which the wandering prince withdrew into Oudh.
This support was the occasion of that great gift of the jagir, which
involved Clive in such animated disputes with the Company at a later
time. It consisted of the quit-rent which the nawab had withheld
when he granted the 24-Parganas to the Company, and which was
till Clive's death and later paid to him instead of to the nawab,
though he had much ado to secure his rights from the Company when
control of the direction passed for the time being out of his hands.
The last striking incident of his first government in Bengal was
the attempt of the Dutch to supplant English influence with the nawab
Although the centre of Dutch power and wealth lay not in India but
in the islands to the eastward, they had watched with growing dis-
favour first the French and then the English establishing themselves
in a position of political predominance. When Masulipatam had been
granted to the French in 1751, the Dutch, who had long had a factory
there, made several attempts to assert their independence. On more
than one occasion they attempted to hoist their flag-a thing which
the French would in no wise permit; and they constantly scrupled to
pay the duties which the French imposed on the trade within their


## p. 154 (#182) ############################################

157
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
grants. But Dutch interests in the Northern Sarkars were trivial
compared with their interests in Bengal. Not only were the piece-
goods of Bengal exported in great quantities to Batavia on the
account of the Dutch Company, but the Dutch servants enjoyed a
most lucrative though secret monopoly of the export of opium ti
Batavia; and though this never appeared in the forefront of their
disputes with the English, we may be sure that it was never far from
their minds. On the establishment of Mir Ja'far they had attempted
to obtain a price for recognising him as nawab; and as a penalty had
seen their trade stopped and their agent seized. ? Then when Pocock
left the Hugli for the Coromandel Coast, the Dutch had been invited
to concert measures to prevent French vessels from entering the river;
they had not been able to concur; and so the English took their own
measures, which consisted in subjecting ali foreign vessels coming up
the river to a strict search 3 Then too, Clive had obtained for the
English Company a monopoly of the saltpetre produced in Bengal,
with a view to preventing that article from reaching the French, and
the Dutch protested against this measure, although they had them-
selves applied for a similar privilege to Siraj-ud-daula. The duties on
the export of opium were also raised and workmen were said to have
been prevented from working for the Dutch Company. The Dutch
were in fact in the same position as the English would have occupied
on the Coromandel Coast had Saunders done nothing to counteract
the schemes of Dupleix. Bisdom and Vernet, the Dutch leaders, have
therefore the same moral justification for attempting to overthrow the
English supremacy as Saunders and Clive have for overthrowing that
of the French in the south. They committed, however, so many errors
of conduct as entirely to destroy any chances that they may ever
have had against so wary and resolute a leader as Clive.
The Dutch authorities at Batavia had already resolved to increase
their Indian garrisons by some 2000 men, but, before they had put
this design into execution, they received news from Chinsura that
Vernet had entered inio relations with Miran, taking advantage of
the disputes over Rai Durlabh, with a view to the introduction of a
large force into Bengal; and early in 1759 Vernet had interviews with
Mir Ja'far, in which he expressed hatred of the English and a desire
to be done with them.
In the following June the Dutch governor-
general dispatched a small fleet of seven vessels with 300 Europeans
and 600 Malay troops, with orders to proceed to Negapatam and
follow such orders as they should receive there. The Dutch evidently
felt that they could not take decisive action from so remote a station
as Batavia; but it was the first of many gross mistakes. The ships lay
1 Pondichery to Negapatam, 5 August, and 11 and 27 September, 1750,
Pondichery Records, No. 15, pp. 424, 442, 143.
2 Klerk de Reuss, De expeditie naar Bengale, p. 6.
8 Bengal Select Committee, 2 March, 1758.


## p. 155 (#183) ############################################

DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH
155
at Negapatam for a month, during which the English had time to
assemble their men to repulse the threatened invasion. Even when
at the beginning of October the Dutch reached the entrance to the
river, they still had not made up their minds what they would do.
They were confronted with a prohibition, in the name of the nawab,
of introducing troops into Bengal. They were simple enough to
attempt to induce the nawab to withdraw his orders, which were,
indeed, the orders of Clive. They evidently did not understand that,
as in the days before Plassey, Mir Ja'far could not be expected to
show his hand till he saw how things were going. More than a month
was thus wasted; and then the Dutch resolved to force their way in.
They seized various small English craft near the mouth of the river,
thus giving their enemies a better casus belli than they could have
hoped for; and finally made their attempt, landing the troops on the
night of 21-22 November. But they met with complete failure. On
the 24th their vessels were all captured by three Company's ships
that Clive had equipped for the purpose of defending the river. On
the same day Forde, who had returned from Masulipatam in the nick
of time, but who, had the Dutch been less supine, would have been
too late, routed a party of 400 men marching from Chinsura to meet
the new troops; and on the next day he met and completely overthrew
the latter body. It is curious to note that the Malay troops were
armed with the old plug-bayonets which had been disused in Europe
for some sixty years. "
These repeated disasters brought the Dutch to their knees. Indeed
they had no choice. Their garrison had been destroyed, and now that
the issue had been decided Miran had suddenly appeared before
Chinsura with a large body of horse, eager to punish them for having
lured him on with the hope of changing one master for another. The
Dutch acknowledged that they had begun the hostilities, submitted
to a demand that the forces they maintained in Bengal should be
limited, and promised to pay ten lakhs damages. Thus Clive, taking
warning by the events of the Carnatic, had a second 'ime, by his
prompt action, crushed the danger of war in Bengal with another
European power. The province was not to be fought over, and its
revenues destroyed, as had happened in the Carnatic.
He had thus been singularly successful in establishing the English
in a position of predominance and had skilfully avoided for three
years the various dangers that arose to threaten their position. But
he had only done so by virtue of his astounding mastery over weaker
minds and his promptitude in crushing each enemy as he arose. But
the general position was still uncertain. The English had no moral
position in the province. Their power was a matter of personal
influence and military force. Clive's dexterity might maintain the
1 Klerk de Reuss, op. cit. ; Malcolm, Clive, a, 74-90; Price to Pocock, 25
December, 1759 (P. R. O. Adm. I-161).


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156
CLIVE IN BENGAL, 1756-60
balance; had he continued governor of Fort William, he might have
continued to maintain it; but it was unlikely that any lesser man
would succeed in doing so. Leaving matters in this uncertain position,
though no external danger was at the moment to be feared, Clive
delivered over the chair to Holwell, and embarked for England on
25 February, 1760.
NOTE ON THE BLACK HOLE. In Bengal Past and Present, July, 1915, and
January, 1916, will be found an attempt to discredit the accepted version of the
Black Hole tragedy by Mr. J. H. Little. His principal arguments are (1) that
Holwell's narrative contains numerous demonstrable errors; (2) that it lacks
contemporary corroboration. He concludes that Holwell, Cooke, and the other
persons who vouch for the event concocted the story, and that those who are
supposed to have perished in the Black Hole really were killed in the storm of
the place. At a later stage in the controversy he even asserted that there was
no evidence for the existence of the monument in memory of the Black Hole
which Holwell erected. Everyone who has studied the records of the time must
have come to the conclusion that Holwell was not a virtuous man; it is even
likely that he touched up his story so as to make the part he played as conspi-
cuous as possible. But even when we have made all allowance for this sort of
thing, the main outlines of the story still remain. The small divergences which
distinguish the story of Cooke from that of Holwell, for instance, are such as
constantly occur in the independent accounts of contemporary witnesses; and,
so far from throwing suspicion on the whole story, suggest that Cooke and
Holwell did not combine to foist a false version of events on the public. Mr.
Little labours to prove that there could not have been so many survivors in the
fort as Holwell says were shut up in the Black Hole; but the truth is that we
have not the material to decide what may have been the exact number of
persons remaining after the capitulation. His first argument thus casts doubt
over certain details only. As regards the silence of contemporaries, he is in
more than one respect entirely mistaken. It was natural that the Calcutta
Council should avoid mention of the Black Hole which threw such a lurid light
over the circumstances of their desertion of the place. It is not the fact that
neither Clive, nor Watson, nor Pigot, refers to the Black Hole. Clive does so
in some of his published correspondence; Watson does in his declaration of
war; Pigot does so in a letter dated 18 September following. But, says Mr.
Little, the acceptance of the story by uncritical contemporaries proves nothing.
However, Holwell's contemporaries were exceedingly critical. Watts, for
instance, who disliked Holwell so much, and criticised his assertions so sharply,
makes no attack upon this. Drake and the other fugitive councillors could
have cast off a load of obloquy had they proved Holwell's story of the Black
Hole to be the imposture Mr. Little supposes it to have been. Altogether the
controversy seems to have arisen from the perplexities of a student unaccus-
tomed to the conflicts of evidence which the historian has perpetually to
encounter; and his negative arguments do not seem to me capable of bearing
the weight he would lay upon them.


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CHAPTER VIII
THE SEVEN YEARS WAR
DURING the negotiations in Europe which finally resulted in
the conclusion of Godeheu's provisional treaty with Saunders, Admiral
Watson had been sent out to the Coromandel Coast with a smail
squadron and Adlercron's regiment of foot, in case the French should
refuse to come to terms; and in the next year, 1755, Clive returned
to India, after a two years' rest at home, with additional troops and
rank as lieutenant-colonel in the king's service. His dispatch was
connected with a project that had been formed in London in case, as
was shrewdly suspected, the French refused to evacuate the Deccan.
This project contemplated an alliance with Balaji Rao and an attack
on Bussy's position either from Bombay or from some point on the
east coast. But this scheme fell through, partly because the dispatches
to Madras were delayed by the loss of the Doddington conveying the
originals, partly because the Bombay Presidency was reluctant to
co-operate. ” The result was that the naval and military forces assem-
bled at Bombay early in 1756 were employed on an affair of mere
local interest—the capture, in co-operation with the forces of Balaji
Rao, of the pirate stronghold of Gheriah, after which the English
and Marathas fell out over the division of the plunder. Clive pro-
ceeded to take up his post as deputy-governor of Fort St David, and
then, as we have seen, sailed with all the forces that could be spared
at Madras for the recovery of Calcutta.
The new war that was opening in 1756 differed much from the
preceding struggle. The successes of Dupleix and Bussy had been
obtained during an interval of peace between France and Great
Britain, that is to say at a time when the French in India did not have
to trouble about their sea-communications with Europe, and when
there was no possibility of hostile interference with the arrival of
munitions and reinforcements. But that favourable situation had
disappeared; and success now meant the control of two elements
instead of one. Further it was fought out almost exclusively in the
Carnatic. First Madras was besieged, and then Pondichery. The only
extension of the war into Bengal consisted of Clive's seizure of Chan-
dernagore early in 1757. So that all the advantages which the English
had secured by Clive's extraordinary successes remained unimpaired.
When funds ran short at Madras, Calcutta could supply the needl.
In this sense the Seven Years' War may be considered as the attack
1 Military dispatches to Madras and Bombạy, 26 March, 1755.
2 Madras Record Office, Military Sundry, No. 9. Private Committees.


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168
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
2
and defence of the outworks of Bengal. Had Lally conquered the
Carnatic, ne would speedily have appeared before Fort William. It
was exceedingly lucky for the English that the war should have been
fought out in an area of minor financial importance. They stood to
gain everything and to lose little.
For the first eighteen months after the news of war had been
received in November, 1756, the only outstanding event was the
capture of Chandernagore, which has already been described. The
English squadron was still lying in the Hugli, and Madras and Pon-
dichery were both too bare of troops to attempt hostilities. Leyrit,
governor of Pondichery, had sent all the troops he could spare to
assist Bussy at Hyderabad; Pigot, governor of Madras, had sent the
major part of the English forces to recover Calcutta. It had, however,
been definitely understood that on the outbreak of war Clive was to
return to the south with the Madras troops; and as no one in Fort
St George knew what momentous designs he was revolving, much
annoyance was felt and expressed at his failure to carry out his
promises. The French were the first to receive reinforcements. In
September, 1757, a squadron of ten vessels arrived under the command
of Bouvet, who had made a fugitive appearance on the coast nine
years before; and he brought a battalion of the régiment de Lorraine
under the Chevalier de Soupire. But the season was too advanced
for active operations. Within a month or so the north-east monsoon
might be expected to set in with the storms which made the harbour-
less coast so dangerous to ships at that season, and deluges of rain
that rendered all military movements impossible. Bouvet therefore
made haste to return to Mauritius whence he had come, and Soupire
did little except send some troops against Trichinopoly and seize the
little fort of Chetpattu.
Operations really began in 1758. In February Pocock, who had
succeeded to the naval command on the death of Watson in 1757,
sailed from the Hugli and assembled his whole squadron of seven
ships of the line at Madras. He then cruised down the coast in order
to intercept any fleet that might be making for Pondichery. On
28 April he sighted a French fleet of nine ships of the line a little to
the northward of Pondichery. After an action lasting from 3 to 5 in
the afternoon, the French bore away, and the English were too
crippled to pursue; but the former had lost 400 killed and wounded
as against 118 among the English.
This fleet had convoyed the second portion of the French rein-
forcements, with its leader, Lally. He brought with him his own
regiment, and had been invested with the fullest civil and military
powers. He was syndic for the company, commissary for the king,
and commandant-general of the French settlements in India; and he
1 Madras (Military) to the Company, 28 June, 1759.
2 Madras Military Consultations, 28 April, 1757.


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CAPTURE OF FORT ST DAVID
169
unarged with the two-fold task of reforming the French admi-
nistration and driving the English out of India. However, the control
of the squadron was reserved for the commander d'Aché, so that Lally
might find himself unexpectedly deprived of its co-operation.
The instant his troops were brought ashore, he hurried them off
to besiege Fort St David. He was naturally and properly anxious to
lose nothing by delay. Accordingly all the available troops were
dispatched and the siege formed on 1 May. After some delay, while
the material was being collected, Lally was able to break ground on
the 17th. The same day he carried the outworks of the place by
storm. On the 27th he began to batter in breach; and on 2 June the
place capitulated. This was a disagreeable surprise for the English,
who had expected it to hold out much longer. But the place was not
really strong. Its extensive outworks demanded more men for their
defence than the place could accommodate; there was no bomb-proof
shelter for the men off duty; above all the commandant, Major Polier,
distrusted and was distrusted by his men. But though the issue
was not flattering to English hopes, there were ugly omens on the
French side too. Lally had shown great vigour and resolution, but
it was something of that vis consilii expers which does not lead to
victory. When the mortars or fascines were delayed beyond expecta-
tion, he would hasten to Pondichery and tell off Leyrit and the coun-
cillors, who retained their offices, much as he would tell off a private
who appeared dirty on parade. 2
Fort St David taken, Lally desired to proceed at once against
Madras. But d'Aché refused to sail against Pocock; and without his
assistance the siege was impossible until the approach of the north-
east monsoon should have driven the English squadron off the coast.
Meanwhile, therefore, Lally resolved, mainly on the advice of the
Jesuit, Père Lavaur, to raise money by attacking Tanjore. In 1749
the raja, when besieged by Chanda Sahib and the French, had given
them his bond for seventy lakhs of rupees on condition of their raising
the siege. Later developments had relieved him of the need of paying
any part of it; Lally decided to demand payment of the bond, sword
in hand, and he might doubtless have secured a considerable sum of
money had he gone to work a little less ferociously, and with a little
more forethought. But he displayed the same inconsiderate haste
with which he had marched against Fort St David. He marched his
men off down the coast without adequate arrangements for feeding
them, and without sufficient quantities of military stores. On entering
Tanjore, he seized the seaport of Nagur and sold the plunder of the
place to his colonel of hussars. Then turning inland he reached
Tiruvalur, a place with a temple famous for its sanctity. Here Lally
expected to find great plunder, but got nothing and displayed such
1 Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, p. 162.
2 Cf. Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, XI, 278.


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160
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
severity, executing six of the temple Brahmans whom he took for
spies, that, when he marched on the inhabitants abandoned the
country through which he passed. When he arrived before the city
of Tanjore (18 July), he could not begin the siege for want of powder
and shot. He therefore opened negotiations, in the hope that with
the assistance of the raja he might be able to attack the English force
at Trichinopoly. The raja sat comfortably behind his walls, content
to negotiate till famine drove away the enemy. At last Lally grew
tired of fruitless discussions. He improvised batteries and opened
an attack upon the place. Then on 8 August he heard that Pocock had
beaten d'Aché off Karikal; he lacked material to carry through his
attack; and at midnight 10-11 August he raised the siege and marched
for the coast, having dispirited his men by useless hardships and
inflicted a deep wound on his own reputation. "
The action at sea, too, had serious consequences. After the first
battle d'Aché had been prevented with difficulty from sailing back
to the French islands, and only remained on the coast in consequence
of the urgent demands of Lally and every other Frenchman in Pon-
dichery. He lay there till 27 July, and then put to sea on the news of
Pocock's approach. An action followed on 3 August, which lasted
for about an hour, during which the French squadron lost over 500
men while the English did not lose 200. This time d'Aché refused to
remain longer on the coast or again to encounter the English ships.
After embittered discussions in a council consisting of the chief naval,
military, and civil officers, d'Aché called another council consisting
of his naval officers only, who resolved with one accord that the
squadron could not remain longer upon the coast. Having landed
a body of seamen under the Chevalier de Poëte to reinforce Lally's
land forces, he set sail from Pondichery on 3 September, and did not
reappear for a twelvemonth all but a day. 2
All that Lally could do for the moment was to wait until the
change in the season should compel Pocock likewise to depart, when
he might, if the rains were favourable, have a couple of months free
in which to besiege Madras. He was still very superior to the English
in numbers. The latter were still waiting for their reinforcements,
and had received only a detachment of Draper's regiment, together
with its commander, an amiable and not unskilful soldier, whose main
claim to memory, however, is his courage in venturing to cross pens
with Junius. But though their numbers were few, a different spirit
reigned in the place from that which had so meekly submitted to
La Bourdonnais. The governor, George Pigot, was irascible but
resolute; he had the old veteran Colonel Lawrence to command the
forces; he had John Call as engineer. The works had been entirely
new-drawn; and though they were but earth, faced with turf, and
1 Cf. Duteil, Une famille militaire, pp. 131 sqq,
Dodwell, op. cit. p. 168.


## p. 161 (#189) ############################################

SIEGE OF MADRAS
161
needed constant repair, they were skilfully designed to frustrate
attack. Ever since Lally's arrival Pigot had been busy gathering
great stores of munitions and food; and orders had come from the
Company that, if ever an enemy sat down before the place, the council
was to deliver its authority over to the governor and the four principal
military officers. Moreover, they were united, whereas Lally and the
French council hated each other worse than they hated the English.
Early in October the French marched to take possession of various
posts lying between Pondichery and Madras. This was successfully
carried out, with the exception of Chingleput, which remained in
English hands. For the moment that place, Madras, and Trichinopoly
were the only spots in the Carnatic left to them. Then, when the
rains were over, the French advanced and formed the siege (14
December). No attempt was made to defend the Black Town, which
was at once occupied, though an unsuccessful sally was made on the
news that the besiegers had got drunk on stores of arrack which they
found there on their arrival. After this the siege dragged on with
few incidents. As usual Lally had been unable to co-ordinate his
efforts. The preparation of stores for the attack and their transport
to Madras took longer than he had expected; and he was not able to
open fire until 2 January, 1759. After a month's steady fire a breach
was made, but the fire of the place was still unsubdued, and the breach
itself so steep and so commanded by the fire of the neighbouring
works that it was deemed impracticable. Neither had the besiegers
been able to carry on their work unmolested. While all the French
forces were lying before Madras, a detachment of the English had
marched up from Trichinopoly to join the Chingleput garrison, and
these troops had harassed the besiegers, threatening their convoys and
posting themselves near St Thomas Mount, until Lally, had been
obliged to send out strong detachments against them. The French
army was worn out between its work in the trenches and the pursuit
of this elusive enemy. Lally hesitated, but did not venture to attempt
a storm. Finally, on 16 February, a squadron of ships hove in sight.
It proved to be English; and Lally at once quitted his trenches and
abandane the siege. This was the second great blow to his reputation
and a proportionate encouragement to the English. Indced their
defence had been gallant. The whole of the garrison off duty as well
as on had been exposed, for want of bomb-proof shelter, to the enemy's
shell which he threw perpetually into the fort, and many were thus
killed in their sleep; but in spite of everything they held on with
admirable determination. Indeed their failure would have imperilled
Clive's work in Bengal.
This severe check to the French arms was speedily followed by
another. Clive, w:ll aware of the importance of keeping the French
1 The official narrative of the siege is Madras Public Sundry, no. 13. -_Diary
of the siege of Fort St George, 1758-59 (Records of Fort St George, 1915).
11


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162
THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
at a distance, and yet having no troops that could be permanently
spared, decided to help Madras by sending a detachment under
Colonel Forde against the French in the Northern Sarkars. Lally,
as has been said in a previous chapter, had resolved to recall Bussy
and his troops from the Deccan. But he had not fully carried out his
first intention. He had insisted on the return of Bussy and Moracin;
but he had allowed a body of troops to continue under other and
incapable commanders. Lally had urged with great truth the need
of drawing together the whole force of the French; and there he had
been right. But he had not persisted in his purpose. Bussy joined
him without a man of his northern troops, who had been left behind
to guard what were probably private interests. The French troops
were still separated, and the Deccan detachment was now in
incompetent hands. Forde had landed, at Vizagapatam early in
October, 1758, and was joined by Ananda Razu, the important zamindar
of Vizianagram. After a pause spent in collecting provisions and
coming to exact terms with his ally, Forde marched south, and
completely defeated the French under Conflans at Kondur, a little to
the north of Rajahmundry, the capital of the province (7 December).
That place was occupied, and there a long delay occurred, owing to
the difficulty of getting the promised funds from.