The 'Baden Memorial' (Denkschrift), drawn up by
Bismarck for King William in July 1861, repeated the
familiar analysis of the reasons why the existing federal
system was ruinous to Prussia--the continuous deadlock,
Austrian jealousy, the subordination of Prussian initiative
and independence to the votes of petty States, organised by
a non-German Empire at Vienna.
Bismarck for King William in July 1861, repeated the
familiar analysis of the reasons why the existing federal
system was ruinous to Prussia--the continuous deadlock,
Austrian jealousy, the subordination of Prussian initiative
and independence to the votes of petty States, organised by
a non-German Empire at Vienna.
Robertson - Bismarck
net/2027/mdp.
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BISMARCK
Italian war of 1859, France openly in the field against
Austria, the French victories, the Austrian defeats, the
demand for a revision of the system of 1815, were blows at
the citadel of Conservatism; they stirred Nationalism
throughout Europe, and Cavour had pinned his flag to the
cause of constitutional and Liberal monarchism. Germany
was in an uproar. Conservatives, Nationalists, Liberals,
the dynasties from Berlin to Munich, felt that the national
enemy in the west was in arms, defeating a German State
in Austria, about to destroy legitimist and sovereign
princes in Italy, and to reopen the question of the Rhine.
'Austria in danger ' was a potent cry. Her sins were for-
gotten in the common peril to German supremacy and
legitimist monarchy in Central Europe. It was the crisis
of 1854 repeated in an acute form. For France--a Napo-
leonic France--was attacking Austria, and it would be
Prussia's turn next. And in 1859 it was not an affair of the
Danubian principalities, nor of Austrian neutrality. At
Berlin, as usual, government and nation faced at once
front to the Rhine. The Prince Regent mobilised four
corps; his strong sympathies as a ruler and as a German
with Austria, his desire to prove his German patriotism
and lead Germany in a national struggle, brought a great
European war into sight. Even so cold a head and so self-
controlled a Prussian patriot as Moltke decided on cool
reflection that the time had come for Prussia to intervene
and strike a blow for Austria and Germany.
Bismarck was literally in anguish, and he was helpless.
At Petersburg or Wiesbaden he was removed from the
direct contact with German affairs he had enjoyed at
Frankfurt; he was not consulted; and he had not the con-
fidence either of the Prince Regent or the ministers. The
winds of Liberalism were sweeping from the lemon groves
of Sicily across the Lombardy plains to the sands and
heath of Pomerania, the March of Brandenburg and
East Prussia. War with France would blow his policy to
the limbo of shattered ideals. Prussia would enter it as
the ally of Austria, -and with Prussia would march every
Nationalist and Liberal heart. The issue would, and must
be, the defeat of France. Austria would recover her grip
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 105
on Italy--for what could Piedmont do without the red
trousers ? --and either Austria would impose her will on
Germany, and re-rivet her supremacy, or under the stress
of the fray Prussia and Germany would be mastered by the
Liberals, in combination with the Nationalists, and unified
on the anvil of war by the master spirits of 1848. Which
would be worse--a Germany unified on a Liberal basis, or
an Austria triumphant on the Danube, the Po, and the
Rhine, reorganising the German Confederation beyond
Prussian control? Germany in the grip either of the
anti-Prussian * princelets grouped round Austria, or of
the National ,Union of the Liberals under Bennigsen,
Duncker, Gneist, and the Coburg pro-English group?
Everywhere Bismarck saw all the machinery at work
that he had tracked out at Frankfurt--the Austrian hand
manipulating the middle States, coercing the petty ones;
the illuminated princelets dabbling with Liberalism and
striving to combine Nationalism with Particularism;
Habsburg egoism appealing to Hohenzollern pride and
generosity, but determined that Prussia's army should
extricate Austria from her dilemma, sacrifice Prussian blood
to save Lombardy, Venetia, and Hungary, and receive
the reward of disinterestedness by riveting the Austrian
yoke on the Confederation; and all this was to be done in
the name of Conservatism, and the European solidarity of
legitimism against Jacobinism, Caesarism, and the Revolu-
tion. 'Our policy,' he wrote to his wife, 'daily glides
more and more in the wake of Austria; a shot on the
Rhine, and it is all over with the Austro-Italian war, and
in its place will come a Franco-Prussian war, in which
Austria, when we have lifted the burden off her shoulders,
will support or fail us as her interest dictates. . . . . As God
wills! It is only a question of time; nations and men,
folly and wisdom, war and peace, come and go like waves,
but the sea remains; there is nothing in this world but
It was idle to urge, as he did, that Napoleon could be
secured by tact, or, if need be, by paying blackmail; that
Austria's necessities afforded an unrivalled opportunity
for re-settling her relations with Prussia to Prussia's advan-
and the jugglers' tricks. '
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BISMARCK
tage, and that if Prussian aid were required Austria must
pay in advance, and that a wedge could be driven in
between the middle and petty States and their Habsburg
ally; that Prussia could indicate she and not Austria would
reform the Confederation. Such advice only deepened the
distrust at the Berlin Court, angered the Gerlach Conser-
vatives, and stirred the scorn of the Liberals. It was mid-
summer Machiavellianism, destitute of all principle, and
Liberals and Conservatives alike stood for principles and
the solidarity of their cause with the cause outside Prussia
or Germany.
Bismarck was bitterly attacked from both camps. He
could tolerate Radical denunciations, but the reproaches
of the Kreuxzeitung cut into the quick. 'Write me down
a devil,' he wrote,' but I am a Teutonic devil, not a Gallic
one. ' His idea of securing Napoleon never involved the
surrender of essentials. He had taken Napoleon's measure
already. 'The itch with Napoleon,' he pronounced in
1855, 'to achieve the unexpected amounts to a disease,
and it is nourished by the Empress. ' 'He is no general
. . . he will only seek a war when internal necessities
drive him to it,' he wrote in 1857. 'His heart is much
stronger than his head,' he decided in 1861. He meant to
flatter his vanity, encourage him to wander on the misty
peaks of dreamland--les idees Napolioniennes--commit
nothing to paper; words could always be disavowed and
unverified verbal promises explained away. In Bismarck's
statecraft, as his advice about Austria revealed, the extor-
tion of services from an embarrassed friend only added
contempt for the deluded to dislike. His theory of inter-
national relations left no place for gratitude or generosity.
The successful deception of France would only increase
Prussian resentment at obligations incurred to an enemy,
stupid or weak enough to believe in gratitude. Statesmen
lent or borrowed the capital and currency of the political
life. The needy must pay, and the affluent had a right to
exact a high rate of interest because the needy were so
needy. In the remorseless world of inter-State com-
petition business was business. Ethical considerations
could not apply in the markets of diplomacy; for their
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 107
application ignored the real motives of State conduct.
Bismarck wrote to Roon that Prussia was committing the
folly of being Liberal at home and Conservative abroad.
Such a policy sapped the confidence of the sound elements
in Prussia and flouted the real forces at work in Germany.
Roon agreed in this diagnosis and the mischief of the ' new
era. ' But the recommendation of a Conservative policy
at home and a Liberal one abroad, left him wondering
whether illness had not shaken ' Otto's ' sanity.
Bismarck in the meanwhile could only growl and moan,
and do his best to strengthen the bonds between Prussia
and Russia. The gods decided for him. The crisis of
1859, like that of 1854, was tided over by the action of
France and Austria. Napoleon shrank from the conse-
quences of his own intervention in Italy. Magenta and
Solferino had not been victories in the manner of his uncle;
the idea of a war on the Rhine sent shivers through him;
Italy was breaking away into unforeseen revolutions; the
Ultramontanes were applying a pitiless pressure on the
Tuileries; and France was not prepared for a colossal
struggle. Francis Joseph, with Hungary simmering into
rebellion, Russia deaf and cold, and Great Britain swinging
over to Italy's side, was prepared to sacrifice Lombardy
rather than imperil Austrian supremacy in Germany. The
armistice of Villa Franca, which shattered the hopes of
Cavour, brought immediate relief to the tension in Ger-
many. The Prince Regent in Prussia could face the
German world. He had mobilised, he had not truckled
to France, he had satisfied German honour and his own
conscience.
The European crisis was over, and Prussia had made
neither mistakes nor concessions. William 1. had now to
face his Liberal subjects. The Liberals no longer hampered
by the cry of 'Austria in danger' and the 'Watch on the
Rhine,' took up the programme of constitutional reform
with renewed energy, and the war crisis indirectly brought
the domestic issues to a head.
The Prince Regent was a competent soldier, thoroughly
sound in professional technique, and intimately acquainted
with the administration of the Prussian army. As heir
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BISMARCK
to the throne, and now as virtually king and commander-
in-chief, he had studied military science, and he had at his
elbow first-rate military advisers on all army questions.
Prince William had the expert's knowledge and framed his
own judgment. The supreme command was his prero-
gative, and he was not prepared to surrender the control
it conferred to any one, least of all to politicians and
civilians who had neither his knowledge nor his militarist
principles. The rights of the Crown over the army in-
herited from his ancestors and expressly guaranteed in the
Constitution of 1851, were the rocher de bronze on which
the Prussian monarchy was impregnably based. The
crises of 1854 and 0f I%59 had revealed defects in the great
military machine, while the economic development of
Prussia had outstripped the system embodied in the law
of 1814.
Three points called for immediate attention. First
and least important, the technical and material equipment
required modernisation and extension. Secondly, the
twenty thousand men who annually escaped military ser-
vice, because the increase in the population furnished an
annual contingent larger than that originally prescribed,
must be brought into training; thirdly, the relations
between the active army, the reserve, and the Landwehr
--the constitutional militia--must be revised. The royal
and ministerial programme, finally adopted after earnest
consideration, aimed broadly at (1) increasing the numbers
of the active army by the creation of new regiments; (2)
remoulding the reserve and the Landwehr so as to give a
larger first reserve for bringing the peace establishment
up to war strength on mobilisation, and a second reserve
better trained and more closely incorporated with the
first line; (3) a supplemental annual charge in money of
nine million thalers. This programme required the assent
of the Landtag because the additional cost must be voted
in the budget, and because the abolition of the old, and
the reorganising of the new, Landwehr involved funda-
mental changes in the law of the land. In figures the
situation came to this: the old system approximately gave
Prussia a standing army of 150,000 with a war establish-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 109
ment (without the Landwehr) of 230,000 men; and with
the old Landwehr, approximately, 480,000 men. The
new royal plan, with three years' service, would give a war
establishment of 450,000 men, and with the remodelled
Landwehr a total of 756,000. The plan of the opposition,
with two years' service, reduced the war establishment,
approximately, to 400,000, and the total, with the Land-
wehr, probably to some 600,000.
The Liberals, who were in a substantial majority in the
Lower House, had their chance. They recognised to the
full the desirability of increasing Prussia's military strength
--Prussia was to unify Germany--but they met the royal
programme by demanding (1) the reduction of compulsory
service from three years to two; (2) revision of the new
Landwehr scheme; (3) the annual voting of the Army
Budget. For our purpose here the details of a complicated
problem--military, financial, and constitutional--are not
of importance. But the principles in collision were vital,
and it must suffice briefly and clearly to disentangle them.
Prince William, as a professional soldier and as a ruler,
resented the criticism of a civilian opposition on the tech-
nical aspects of the scheme; his military advisers and he
himself were convinced that military efficiency could be
secured by the royal programme alone. But these tech-
nical questions were completely overshadowed by the
constitutional controversy. The opposition did not dis-
pute the prerogative of the sovereign, as commander-in-
chief, or the duty of every Prussian male to be trained in
the army; but they put forward three claims. First,
that as the obligation of military service affected every
man in Prussia, the nation had the legal and moral right
through its representatives to decide on what conditions
that service should be performed, and if Parliament chose
to reduce the period with the Colours from three years to
two, it had the right to do so; secondly, Parliament had
the legal right to vote or to refuse the taxes required for
maintaining the army; thirdly, the army estimates were
part of the annual budget, and the representatives of the
nation had the right annually to review this budget, since
without parliamentary sanction no taxes were legal for the
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? no
BISMARCK
army or any other institution of the State. In so far as
the army was dependent on statute law and taxation for
its existence, the concurrence of Parliament was essential.
The importance of these claims did not he in their legal
validity, which was undeniable, but in the principles and
consequences they involved. The Prince Regent and
Roon quite correctly grasped that the opposition was
determined to assert, through the annual revision of the
budget, the principle of ministerial responsibility to the
Lower House; and that through the power of the purse
the establishment of ministerial responsibility would lead
inevitably to a general and unlimited control of policy and
executive ministerial action. Prussia would cease to be a
State in which the King governed through the legislature;
it would become a State in which ministers, dependent on
the legislature, governed through the King. The army
would be turned into a creation of the Landtag, and the
prerogative of the sovereign would be legislated out of
existence. In a word, the old conception of the monarchy
was in irreconcilable collision with the new conception of
parliamentary Liberalism. For the Crown, the power and
character of the monarchy were at stake; for the Liberals,
the power and character of Parliament as a national insti-
tution of government. An issue had been raised on which
compromise was impossible. Was there, or was there not,
to be parliamentary and constitutional government in
Prussia? It was recognised that the decision would
affect not merely Prussia, but the whole of Germany.
At the outset the struggle was embittered by an act of
bad faith. The opposition temporarily voted the addi-
tional money required on the understanding that the
ministerial scheme should be withdrawn and the whole
question of reorganisation reserved for future consideration.
But the War Office promptly created the new regiments;
colours were solemnly given them by the Regent; and
the revised budget assumed that the scheme had been ap-
proved. William, who had become king in 1861, peremp-
torily refused to disavow the accomplished facts. His
acts as War-Lord (Kriegesherf) were not subject to parlia-
mentary revision; the money had been voted, and it was
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN in
within his prerogative to apply it. Rejection of the
budget and a dissolution of Parliament followed, with the
result that the Conservative minority was smitten hip and
thigh. The Conservative party numbered a tiny handful
in the new Landtag. The Crown was apparently con-
fronted with surrender to the opposition or resort to a
coup cPEtat.
Bismarck rejoiced in the quarrel. He had had nothing so
far to do either with framing the scheme or the crisis that
arose out of it. In his judgment-nothing could be better
than to strengthen the army, and it was for the soldiers to
decide how most effectively to do this. But even better was
the collision between the Crown and the Liberals. The
control of the army by an irresponsible Crown and ministers
responsible to the Crown alone, lay in the essence of his
everything that he hated and feared--parliamentary
government, the Landtag as a government-making, policy-
making organ, and ministers under the thumb of a majority
composed of professors, lawyers, journalists, and middle-class
amateurs. Even if the scheme were wrong, the Crown
must be supported and the opposition smashed into heel.
The King was desperately unhappy. His Liberal minis-
ters saw no solution but to yield. How could the
government continue without a budget? The country
at the general election had pronounced. The Crown
Prince had the gravest misgivings about a policy which
threatened to destroy national confidence in the sovereign,
perhaps even shatter the throne. Prussia was at this
moment insisting that the incurable autocrat of Hesse-
Cassel must obey his constitution and his legislature, yet
at home was defying the plain rights of the Landtag to vote
taxes and determine their application laid down in the
Prussian law of the land. Roon and the soldiers daily
reminded his Majesty that the army as a monarchical
institution was at stake, and a Hohenzollern who betrayed
the army betrayed himself. Surrender? Civil war? A
coup d fitat? Abdication? Which was King William to
choose? Roon also suggested that if his Majesty's
ministers refused to do their plain duty and defy Parlia-
programme. The demands of the
implied
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? 112
BISMARCK
ment, there was at Petersburg an experienced diplo-
matist who could be trusted to do the King's business.
But William shrank at the thought. Bismarck would be
loyal, but he would Insist on carrying out his foreign
policy, an entente with France and opposition to Austria.
His appointment was burning the bridges and blowing
up the magazines. The opposition might still be brought
to an honourable compromise, but not by Bismarck.
The 'Baden Memorial' (Denkschrift), drawn up by
Bismarck for King William in July 1861, repeated the
familiar analysis of the reasons why the existing federal
system was ruinous to Prussia--the continuous deadlock,
Austrian jealousy, the subordination of Prussian initiative
and independence to the votes of petty States, organised by
a non-German Empire at Vienna. Bismarck urged the
King to put Prussia at the head of the unitary movement
and lay before the Federal Diet a proposal to create a
national Parliament, chosen by direct suffrage from all
Germany, which would give Prussia the political direction
that it had already in the Tariff Union. Skilfully devised,
such a Parliament would enlist for Prussia popular sym-
pathy throughout Germany and largely heal the internal
strife in Prussia itself. The 'Baden Memorial' marks an
important stage in the evolution of Bismarck's thought.
It assumed the existence of a strong Prussian army, and
the will to employ it at the right moment in imposing a.
Prussian solution on all recalcitrants. 'Make me,' he said,
with reference to the Hesse-Cassel affair, 'an Under-
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and I will produce for you
in three weeks a civil war of the first quality. '
Throughout 1861 and the spring of 1862 gossip in the
capital was rife with reports that the ambassador at
Petersburg was to be given ministerial office. Roon
kept Bismarck closely informed of all that was passing.
More than once he was brought' on sick leave ' to Berlin,
to be ready, but nothing came of it. The King was fas-
cinated and repelled by the idea. Audiences between
Bismarck and his sovereign improved their personal but not
their political relations. William felt that in this strong,
frank, masterful man's hands he would be dragged whither
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 113
he knew not. 'He goes furthest who knows not whither
he is going,' pronounced the practical mysticism of Crom-
well, And in Bismarck's surveys of the future there was
always a grand and indefinable atmosphere, a conscious-
ness of the vastness of life, and the illimitable potencies of
the future floating over the concrete directness of his grip
on realities. He knew not whither he was going--he did
not wish to know. Forces beyond human calculation
were driving Prussia, and he must march with them. The
Time-spirit would provide the golden opportunities and
reveal how they could be used.
Bismarck concluded that his transference (May 29,
1862) to the embassy at Paris signified a definitive refusal
of a ministerial portfolio at Berlin. He had learned much
at Petersburg: sounded and charted the European
situation; established a personal friendship with the
Tsar; and by meekly sitting at the feet of the vain Gort-
schakov had created a credit on which in good time he
intended to draw. 'The hatred of Austria here,' he
wrote from Petersburg, 'exceeds everything I had
believed possible. ' Paris was the political centre of
Europe, and a pleasanter place than Petersburg. The
Court of the Second Empire was at the zenith of its social
brilliance. The Empress Eugenie and her galaxy of frail
butterflies--fetes, balls, fashions, and opera--would be
an agreeable background to the serious political work of
exploiting Napoleon. On June 1 he was presenting his
credentials to the Man of Sin at the Tuileries, and before
long intimately discussing the higher statecraft with the
Emperor and his ministers, and suggesting with a delicious
audacity that a tyro in diplomacy would be grateful for
all the instructions he could receive from the French ex-
perts--Bismarck instructed by a Persigny, a Drouyn de
Lhuys, a Walewski, or a De Morny! He was also scrib-
bling notes to Roon on the iniquities of the Liberal majority
in the Landtag, and letters to his wife and sister describ-
ing the Parisian fashions, with touches on the vanity of
French ministers, and the beauty of the Champs Elysees
in a Paris midsummer. He dashed off to London to see
the great Exhibition and met Palmerston and Disraeli at
B. II
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? H4
BISMARCK
the Russian Embassy. An amusing fellow this Prussian
Ambassador, every one agreed. His verve and racy reck-
lessness delighted the company, and his sketch of how in
a few years he would settle Europe and Germany was more
exhilarating than, and quite as evanescent as, champagne.
Disraeli judged more correctly. 'Take care of that man;
he means what he says,' was a verdict no less accurate and
prophetic than Bismarck's scribbled comment to Roon.
'I am just back from London. People there are much
better informed about China and Turkey than about
Prussia. Loftus (the English Ambassador in Berlin) must
write to his minister much more nonsense than I imagine. '
It was tragically true. Neither at the Foreign Office,
nor in Parliament, not even in the office of The Times, or in
the exalted circles of the Court, did they know the truth
about Prussia and Germany, and it is doubtful whether
they wished to know.
From Paris Bismarck visited Trouville, and then, rest-
less and dissatisfied, went on a tour to the south' Not
even ' the Lafitte, Mouton Rothschild, Pichon, Laroze,
Latour, Margaux, St. Julien, Beaune, Armillac, and other
wines'--the ' other ' is a pretty touch--which he noted as
having drunk at Bordeaux, nor the beauty of dawn on the
seashore and of sunset in the Pyrenees, described in letters
to his wife, could appease his feeling that Paris after all
was exile; that the world of action lay in Berlin, and that
he was shut out from it. Life was slipping away. Was
he to'be an ambassador all his days, and never have the
great political levers in his hands i Ministerial office
was hateful, yet he could not be happy without it. 'My
furniture,' he wrote on September 12, 1862, 'is still at
Petersburg and will freeze there; my carriages are at
Stettin, my horses at grass near Berlin, my family in
Pomerania, and I am on the streets. '
Three days later came a telegram from Roon: 'Come.
The pear is ripe. Periculum in mora. ' He plucked an
olive branch as he hurried through Avignon on his way to
Paris, and was in Berlin on the morning of September 20.
In the forenoon of September 22 he had a memorable
interview with the King at Schloss Babelsberg. He per-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 115
suaded William 1. to tear up the abdication he had drafted,
put himself unreservedly at his sovereign's disposal, and
declared his readiness to fight for the rights of the Crown
and the royal scheme of reorganisation of the army to the
last. There could be no surrender. This was a fight for
honour and existence and must be fought to a finish.
Next day (September 23) the Gazette announced the
appointment of Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen to office
as temporary Minister-President. On the same day the
budget for 1862, providing for the army in accordance with
the royal scheme of reorganisation, was decisively rejected
in the Lower House of the Landtag by 273 to 68 votes.
September 23,1862, is a red-letter day in the Hohenzollern
calendar; it opened a new chapter, or rather a new
volume, in the history of Prussia and of Europe.
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? CHAPTER IV
THE M1NJSTER-PRES1DENT, 1S62-1867
? I. 1'he Constitutional Conflict, the Polish Question, and
the German Problem
On October 8, 1862, Bismarck's provisional appointment
as Minister-President was definitely ratified. He took up
his residence in the Wilhelmstrasse, which was to be his
official abode for twenty-eight years. The new minister
was in his forty-eighth year, and he had passed, without
any ministerial experience, direct from an embassy to the
highest office in the State. Both in Prussia and outside it
men naturally asked, What did it mean? What would
happen next?
Apart from the constitutional controversy and the dead-
lock created by the overwhelming vote of September 23
--a situation grave enough to demand the undivided
energies of the government--a series of critical questions
in foreign policy pressed for solution. Schleswig-Holstein,
the situation in Hesse-Cassel, Poland, the renewal of the
Zollverein, the proposed commercial treaty with France,
the German problem--each and all of these in combination
threatened to become acute. They involved the relations
of Prussia as a German Power with the middle and petty
States in Germany, and her relations as a European Power
with Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the new
but incomplete kingdom of Italy. Public opinion in Ger-
many recognised the gravity of the crisis, and was aware
that a false step in foreign policy would create an inter-
national situation which would leave Prussia isolated and
confronted with a hostile coalition that would reduce her
to a humiliating impotence.
Bismarck's appointment was clearly a challenge. It
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
117
provoked in different quarters indignation, amazement,
contempt, amusement. As we look back to-day and deli-
berately forget the knowledge of what happened between
1862 and 1871, it is instructive to read in contemporary
literature--the newspapers, memoirs, letters, pamphlets,
caricatures and dispatches--the judgments and inter-
pretations expressed in these critical years of 1862-66.
Rechberg at Vienna in 1862 described Bismarck to
Gramont as 'incapable de sacrifier une idee preconcue, un
prejuge, une idee de parti, a n'importe quelle raison d'un
ordre superieur; il n'a pas le sens pratique de la politique,
c'est un homme de parti dans la force du mot,' adding
truly enough, 'ce n'est pas un ami que nous aurons la. '
The new appointment was so clearly either a jest four rire
to cover a deliberate ride for a fall, a surrender to the oppo-
sition, and perhaps the King's abdication, or it was the
gambler's last throw, the discovery of a Prussian Polignac
which proclaimed a coming coup d'lttat. Capitulation or
revolution? What else could it mean, when the King
selected this Junker diplomatist, known only too well for
his violent, reckless, and impenitent championship of Prus-
sian Conservatism in its most particularist form? The
constitutional crisis and the international situation de-
manded a cool, conciliatory, and experienced statesman.
The King replied by appointing a red reactionary. In the
chancelleries of Europe the statesmen du vieux panialon
shrugged their shoulders and made bets whether Bismarck
would last three weeks or three months. To the Liberals,
above all, in Prussia the King's action was a stinging affront,
and a summons either to make a revolution or to capitulate.
Such judgments--and they could be cited by the page
? --were natural under the circumstances, for neither the
official world at London, Paris, Vienna, Dresden, and
Munich, nor the superheated public in Berlin knew the
real Bismarck. They simply saw in him the Junker of
1848-51. When he had practically disappeared at Frank-
furt from the public gaze the little that had emerged since
1852 confirmed the assumption that he had not altered,
indeed, that he was more than ever the sworn foe of the
causes he had opposed with such fiery audacity. The
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BISMARCK
profound change in his views and the breadth and variety
of his experience were unknown to most, and were even
misinterpreted by the few who had the material for
framing a correct judgment. In September 1862 no one
had divined the intellectual power, the cool and calculating
brain, the intensity of conviction, the political nerve, and
the extraordinary strength of character and will stored up
and disciplined in that titanic frame. As with Moltke, so
with Bismarck, the revelation of the next eight years was
to astound and hypnotise Germany and Europe.
And if men did not know Bismarck they were no less
ignorant in 1862 of Prussia and Prussianism. Since 1815
Prussia as a German state and as a European Power had done
nothing to justify her claim to parity with the other great
Powers. She had produced competent internal adminis-
trators, distinguished professors, and ardent but ineffective
politicians. Her statesmen for fifty years were mediocrities;
her policy continuously tarnished by prejudice, timidity,
and irresolution--reaction ruined by spasmodic and in-
sincere repentance. The material and economic strength
of the country had been enormously increased since 1815;
in her organised civil service and her army, no less than
her system of education, Prussia was in 1862 far ahead of
every other German state, and superior not merely to
Austria and Russia but to France and Great Britain. The
generation born in the Napoleonic epoch, under the
shadows of Jena and the sunlight of the great age of reform
--the age of Scharnhorst, Stein, and the War of Liberation
--had been patiently moulded and tempered in the chill
school of work and disappointment to a capacity for sus-
tained sacrifice and effort which only required leadership
--a man and a cause--to . evoke a single-minded co-opera-
tion. Here lay the secret of the strength of the opposition
in Parliament, for it represented a Prussia which had
broken with the historic tradition because the organs of
that tradition--monarchy, ministers, and the executive--
seemed blind to the greatness of the German renaissance,
and ignorant of the moral and intellectual forces that com-
Eelled the true German mind to be Liberal and Nationalist.
>eaf to the call of the future, Prussia had frittered for
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
forty years the vigour of the nation on a parochial
prosperity or the ignoble scuffles of the dynasties in the
Federal Diet.
Bismarck was a child of the age that had produced 1848
and the constitutional crisis of 1862--lived, learned, and
inwardly digested. Like the Liberals whom he detested
he had divined the strength of Prussia, but, unlike the
Liberals, he diagnosed the cause of Prussia's failure in one
vital and fatal omission. The Frederician tradition had
been successfully followed in domestic administration, but
had been neglected or betrayed in policy, above all, foreign
policy. The time had come at last--and not too late--
to prove what a strong Prussia could do, when her policy
was shaped and directed by a minister to whom nothing
was sacred or unclean, prepared like Frederick, the master,
to devote soul, brain and body to the service of Prussia, and
determined to concentrate unflinchingly the whole force
of the State on one end and one end alone, the greatness
of Prussia--a man to whom parties, causes, principles, con-
ventions, were either means to that end or empty phrases.
Prussia herself and Europe had forgotten the principles
and methods of Frederick the Great. The schools of
Metternich and Canning, of Palmerston, Guizot or
Nicholas 1. j lingered on in the shibboleths of the middle-
aged, who advised their governments from office desks in
the Foreign Offices; the school of Cavour had come and
gone with 1861; in the west at Paris reigned the sham
Napoleonism of the Second Empire; at London were the
statesmen of both parties who persisted in interpreting the
Continent, if they interpreted it at all, in the terms of an
obsolete continental or a complacent insular tradition, no
longer in touch with realities. By 1871 it began to dawn
on Europe that in Bismarck had come to life a reincarnation
of the Frederick who had shattered the Europe of Walpole,
Maria Theresa, and Louis xv. , a statesman controlling an
organised Prussia, far stronger relatively than the Prussia
of Frederick the Great--a statesmanship that was a re-
created gospel in action. The State as Egoism and the
State as Power, directed by the genius of the illuminated
despot, had made a new Europe and a new Prussia between
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? 120
BISMARCK
1740 and 1786; directed by the illuminated genius of
Bismarck it was to make a new Prussia, a new Germany,
and a new Europe between 1862 and 1890.
It was not therefore either the unrepentant Berserker
of Junkertum or a mere diplomatist trained in the conven-
tional manege of Frankfurt, Petersburg, and Paris, who
at Roon's bidding had promised his sovereign in the garden
of Schloss Babelberg to lead a forlorn hope. Bismarck had
studied the men both at Berlin and all over Europe with
whom he would have to deal; he was convinced that in
a test of resource, nerve, courage, and tenacity of will, or
in mastery of the realities in any situation, it would not be
he who would fail. This bitter quarrel was none of his
making, and his first step, when he met the triumphant
majority of the opposition in 'The House of Phrases,' as
he called the Landtag, was quietly to lay on the table the
olive branch that he had plucked at Avignon, with the
remark that it was a present to the progressive party, but
the time for it had apparently not yet come.
Bismarck's desire for an honourable compromise was pro-
bably sincere. He desired to be free from internal compli-
cations in order to deal with foreign policy. However, it
was a fixed principle of his system, enunciated now and fifty
times in the next twenty-five years, that government by
a monarchy through a representative assembly must rest
on compromises, and it was the function of statesmanship
to frame and work them. The external situation was
critical; foreign policy would demand for the next two
or three years sleepless vigilance, and the difficulties,
sufficiently great in themselves, would be aggravated by
an embittered controversy at home. He v/as new to
office; his position would be enormously strengthened
if he could inaugurate his minister-presidency by a reason-
able settlement. Neither now, nor at any time, was it his
habit to close the doors or drive an adversary to open war
until he was convinced that negotiation could not secure
the essentials. But he made his terms perfectly clear.
Let the controversy over rights on both sides be dismissed
as misleading juristic jargon. But the Crown must have
the money for the reorganisation of the army, and the
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 121
control of that army and of policy must rest with the King.
Co-operation with Parliament by all means, government
by a parliamentary majority--never. If the opposition
chose to make the issue not a question of right but of
might, between government by the monarchy and govern-
ment by the Lower House of the Landtag, against the'will
of the King and the Upper House, the struggle must be
fought out, and there would only be one end to it--the
defeat of the opposition which usurped the lawful authority
of the State, inalienably inherent in the Crown.
Bismarck calmly explained his interpretation of the con-
stitution, and to this he adhered through the period of
conflict. He quietly ignored the overwhelming endorse-
ment of the action taken in the previous Parliament by
the general election. The Lower House had the right, he
agreed, to vote taxes or reject the budget, but the veto of
the Lower House was not conclusive, for the budget was
expressed in a law, and laws required the assent of the
Crown and the Upper, as well as of the Lower, House.
If the consent of any one of these were withheld, a dead-
lock was created which could, under the constitution, only
be removed by the voluntary act of the organ concerned
and by no other means. Failing such, the constitution
expressly reserved to the Crown the residual right of
government. The Crown was therefore legally entitled
to carry on the administration during the emergency
created by the deadlock. Otherwise it failed in its duty
to itself as the head of the State and to the whole kingdom.
The Crown, therefore, simply was driven to avail itself of
the special powers provided to meet a temporary and ex-
ceptional situation. The King might challenge the wisdom
or patriotism of the action which had produced the
deadlock, but in exercising his special powers he was not
denying the legal rights of the Lower House, which was
similarly bound not to deny the legal rights of the Crown.
The action of the Lower House amounted to a claim to
compel the Crown to surrender its prerogative at dis-
cretion, and to make the King's government dependent on
the fiat of one chamber of the legislature, or, if the Crown
refused to give way, to make all government impossible.
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? 104
BISMARCK
Italian war of 1859, France openly in the field against
Austria, the French victories, the Austrian defeats, the
demand for a revision of the system of 1815, were blows at
the citadel of Conservatism; they stirred Nationalism
throughout Europe, and Cavour had pinned his flag to the
cause of constitutional and Liberal monarchism. Germany
was in an uproar. Conservatives, Nationalists, Liberals,
the dynasties from Berlin to Munich, felt that the national
enemy in the west was in arms, defeating a German State
in Austria, about to destroy legitimist and sovereign
princes in Italy, and to reopen the question of the Rhine.
'Austria in danger ' was a potent cry. Her sins were for-
gotten in the common peril to German supremacy and
legitimist monarchy in Central Europe. It was the crisis
of 1854 repeated in an acute form. For France--a Napo-
leonic France--was attacking Austria, and it would be
Prussia's turn next. And in 1859 it was not an affair of the
Danubian principalities, nor of Austrian neutrality. At
Berlin, as usual, government and nation faced at once
front to the Rhine. The Prince Regent mobilised four
corps; his strong sympathies as a ruler and as a German
with Austria, his desire to prove his German patriotism
and lead Germany in a national struggle, brought a great
European war into sight. Even so cold a head and so self-
controlled a Prussian patriot as Moltke decided on cool
reflection that the time had come for Prussia to intervene
and strike a blow for Austria and Germany.
Bismarck was literally in anguish, and he was helpless.
At Petersburg or Wiesbaden he was removed from the
direct contact with German affairs he had enjoyed at
Frankfurt; he was not consulted; and he had not the con-
fidence either of the Prince Regent or the ministers. The
winds of Liberalism were sweeping from the lemon groves
of Sicily across the Lombardy plains to the sands and
heath of Pomerania, the March of Brandenburg and
East Prussia. War with France would blow his policy to
the limbo of shattered ideals. Prussia would enter it as
the ally of Austria, -and with Prussia would march every
Nationalist and Liberal heart. The issue would, and must
be, the defeat of France. Austria would recover her grip
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 105
on Italy--for what could Piedmont do without the red
trousers ? --and either Austria would impose her will on
Germany, and re-rivet her supremacy, or under the stress
of the fray Prussia and Germany would be mastered by the
Liberals, in combination with the Nationalists, and unified
on the anvil of war by the master spirits of 1848. Which
would be worse--a Germany unified on a Liberal basis, or
an Austria triumphant on the Danube, the Po, and the
Rhine, reorganising the German Confederation beyond
Prussian control? Germany in the grip either of the
anti-Prussian * princelets grouped round Austria, or of
the National ,Union of the Liberals under Bennigsen,
Duncker, Gneist, and the Coburg pro-English group?
Everywhere Bismarck saw all the machinery at work
that he had tracked out at Frankfurt--the Austrian hand
manipulating the middle States, coercing the petty ones;
the illuminated princelets dabbling with Liberalism and
striving to combine Nationalism with Particularism;
Habsburg egoism appealing to Hohenzollern pride and
generosity, but determined that Prussia's army should
extricate Austria from her dilemma, sacrifice Prussian blood
to save Lombardy, Venetia, and Hungary, and receive
the reward of disinterestedness by riveting the Austrian
yoke on the Confederation; and all this was to be done in
the name of Conservatism, and the European solidarity of
legitimism against Jacobinism, Caesarism, and the Revolu-
tion. 'Our policy,' he wrote to his wife, 'daily glides
more and more in the wake of Austria; a shot on the
Rhine, and it is all over with the Austro-Italian war, and
in its place will come a Franco-Prussian war, in which
Austria, when we have lifted the burden off her shoulders,
will support or fail us as her interest dictates. . . . . As God
wills! It is only a question of time; nations and men,
folly and wisdom, war and peace, come and go like waves,
but the sea remains; there is nothing in this world but
It was idle to urge, as he did, that Napoleon could be
secured by tact, or, if need be, by paying blackmail; that
Austria's necessities afforded an unrivalled opportunity
for re-settling her relations with Prussia to Prussia's advan-
and the jugglers' tricks. '
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BISMARCK
tage, and that if Prussian aid were required Austria must
pay in advance, and that a wedge could be driven in
between the middle and petty States and their Habsburg
ally; that Prussia could indicate she and not Austria would
reform the Confederation. Such advice only deepened the
distrust at the Berlin Court, angered the Gerlach Conser-
vatives, and stirred the scorn of the Liberals. It was mid-
summer Machiavellianism, destitute of all principle, and
Liberals and Conservatives alike stood for principles and
the solidarity of their cause with the cause outside Prussia
or Germany.
Bismarck was bitterly attacked from both camps. He
could tolerate Radical denunciations, but the reproaches
of the Kreuxzeitung cut into the quick. 'Write me down
a devil,' he wrote,' but I am a Teutonic devil, not a Gallic
one. ' His idea of securing Napoleon never involved the
surrender of essentials. He had taken Napoleon's measure
already. 'The itch with Napoleon,' he pronounced in
1855, 'to achieve the unexpected amounts to a disease,
and it is nourished by the Empress. ' 'He is no general
. . . he will only seek a war when internal necessities
drive him to it,' he wrote in 1857. 'His heart is much
stronger than his head,' he decided in 1861. He meant to
flatter his vanity, encourage him to wander on the misty
peaks of dreamland--les idees Napolioniennes--commit
nothing to paper; words could always be disavowed and
unverified verbal promises explained away. In Bismarck's
statecraft, as his advice about Austria revealed, the extor-
tion of services from an embarrassed friend only added
contempt for the deluded to dislike. His theory of inter-
national relations left no place for gratitude or generosity.
The successful deception of France would only increase
Prussian resentment at obligations incurred to an enemy,
stupid or weak enough to believe in gratitude. Statesmen
lent or borrowed the capital and currency of the political
life. The needy must pay, and the affluent had a right to
exact a high rate of interest because the needy were so
needy. In the remorseless world of inter-State com-
petition business was business. Ethical considerations
could not apply in the markets of diplomacy; for their
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 107
application ignored the real motives of State conduct.
Bismarck wrote to Roon that Prussia was committing the
folly of being Liberal at home and Conservative abroad.
Such a policy sapped the confidence of the sound elements
in Prussia and flouted the real forces at work in Germany.
Roon agreed in this diagnosis and the mischief of the ' new
era. ' But the recommendation of a Conservative policy
at home and a Liberal one abroad, left him wondering
whether illness had not shaken ' Otto's ' sanity.
Bismarck in the meanwhile could only growl and moan,
and do his best to strengthen the bonds between Prussia
and Russia. The gods decided for him. The crisis of
1859, like that of 1854, was tided over by the action of
France and Austria. Napoleon shrank from the conse-
quences of his own intervention in Italy. Magenta and
Solferino had not been victories in the manner of his uncle;
the idea of a war on the Rhine sent shivers through him;
Italy was breaking away into unforeseen revolutions; the
Ultramontanes were applying a pitiless pressure on the
Tuileries; and France was not prepared for a colossal
struggle. Francis Joseph, with Hungary simmering into
rebellion, Russia deaf and cold, and Great Britain swinging
over to Italy's side, was prepared to sacrifice Lombardy
rather than imperil Austrian supremacy in Germany. The
armistice of Villa Franca, which shattered the hopes of
Cavour, brought immediate relief to the tension in Ger-
many. The Prince Regent in Prussia could face the
German world. He had mobilised, he had not truckled
to France, he had satisfied German honour and his own
conscience.
The European crisis was over, and Prussia had made
neither mistakes nor concessions. William 1. had now to
face his Liberal subjects. The Liberals no longer hampered
by the cry of 'Austria in danger' and the 'Watch on the
Rhine,' took up the programme of constitutional reform
with renewed energy, and the war crisis indirectly brought
the domestic issues to a head.
The Prince Regent was a competent soldier, thoroughly
sound in professional technique, and intimately acquainted
with the administration of the Prussian army. As heir
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BISMARCK
to the throne, and now as virtually king and commander-
in-chief, he had studied military science, and he had at his
elbow first-rate military advisers on all army questions.
Prince William had the expert's knowledge and framed his
own judgment. The supreme command was his prero-
gative, and he was not prepared to surrender the control
it conferred to any one, least of all to politicians and
civilians who had neither his knowledge nor his militarist
principles. The rights of the Crown over the army in-
herited from his ancestors and expressly guaranteed in the
Constitution of 1851, were the rocher de bronze on which
the Prussian monarchy was impregnably based. The
crises of 1854 and 0f I%59 had revealed defects in the great
military machine, while the economic development of
Prussia had outstripped the system embodied in the law
of 1814.
Three points called for immediate attention. First
and least important, the technical and material equipment
required modernisation and extension. Secondly, the
twenty thousand men who annually escaped military ser-
vice, because the increase in the population furnished an
annual contingent larger than that originally prescribed,
must be brought into training; thirdly, the relations
between the active army, the reserve, and the Landwehr
--the constitutional militia--must be revised. The royal
and ministerial programme, finally adopted after earnest
consideration, aimed broadly at (1) increasing the numbers
of the active army by the creation of new regiments; (2)
remoulding the reserve and the Landwehr so as to give a
larger first reserve for bringing the peace establishment
up to war strength on mobilisation, and a second reserve
better trained and more closely incorporated with the
first line; (3) a supplemental annual charge in money of
nine million thalers. This programme required the assent
of the Landtag because the additional cost must be voted
in the budget, and because the abolition of the old, and
the reorganising of the new, Landwehr involved funda-
mental changes in the law of the land. In figures the
situation came to this: the old system approximately gave
Prussia a standing army of 150,000 with a war establish-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 109
ment (without the Landwehr) of 230,000 men; and with
the old Landwehr, approximately, 480,000 men. The
new royal plan, with three years' service, would give a war
establishment of 450,000 men, and with the remodelled
Landwehr a total of 756,000. The plan of the opposition,
with two years' service, reduced the war establishment,
approximately, to 400,000, and the total, with the Land-
wehr, probably to some 600,000.
The Liberals, who were in a substantial majority in the
Lower House, had their chance. They recognised to the
full the desirability of increasing Prussia's military strength
--Prussia was to unify Germany--but they met the royal
programme by demanding (1) the reduction of compulsory
service from three years to two; (2) revision of the new
Landwehr scheme; (3) the annual voting of the Army
Budget. For our purpose here the details of a complicated
problem--military, financial, and constitutional--are not
of importance. But the principles in collision were vital,
and it must suffice briefly and clearly to disentangle them.
Prince William, as a professional soldier and as a ruler,
resented the criticism of a civilian opposition on the tech-
nical aspects of the scheme; his military advisers and he
himself were convinced that military efficiency could be
secured by the royal programme alone. But these tech-
nical questions were completely overshadowed by the
constitutional controversy. The opposition did not dis-
pute the prerogative of the sovereign, as commander-in-
chief, or the duty of every Prussian male to be trained in
the army; but they put forward three claims. First,
that as the obligation of military service affected every
man in Prussia, the nation had the legal and moral right
through its representatives to decide on what conditions
that service should be performed, and if Parliament chose
to reduce the period with the Colours from three years to
two, it had the right to do so; secondly, Parliament had
the legal right to vote or to refuse the taxes required for
maintaining the army; thirdly, the army estimates were
part of the annual budget, and the representatives of the
nation had the right annually to review this budget, since
without parliamentary sanction no taxes were legal for the
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BISMARCK
army or any other institution of the State. In so far as
the army was dependent on statute law and taxation for
its existence, the concurrence of Parliament was essential.
The importance of these claims did not he in their legal
validity, which was undeniable, but in the principles and
consequences they involved. The Prince Regent and
Roon quite correctly grasped that the opposition was
determined to assert, through the annual revision of the
budget, the principle of ministerial responsibility to the
Lower House; and that through the power of the purse
the establishment of ministerial responsibility would lead
inevitably to a general and unlimited control of policy and
executive ministerial action. Prussia would cease to be a
State in which the King governed through the legislature;
it would become a State in which ministers, dependent on
the legislature, governed through the King. The army
would be turned into a creation of the Landtag, and the
prerogative of the sovereign would be legislated out of
existence. In a word, the old conception of the monarchy
was in irreconcilable collision with the new conception of
parliamentary Liberalism. For the Crown, the power and
character of the monarchy were at stake; for the Liberals,
the power and character of Parliament as a national insti-
tution of government. An issue had been raised on which
compromise was impossible. Was there, or was there not,
to be parliamentary and constitutional government in
Prussia? It was recognised that the decision would
affect not merely Prussia, but the whole of Germany.
At the outset the struggle was embittered by an act of
bad faith. The opposition temporarily voted the addi-
tional money required on the understanding that the
ministerial scheme should be withdrawn and the whole
question of reorganisation reserved for future consideration.
But the War Office promptly created the new regiments;
colours were solemnly given them by the Regent; and
the revised budget assumed that the scheme had been ap-
proved. William, who had become king in 1861, peremp-
torily refused to disavow the accomplished facts. His
acts as War-Lord (Kriegesherf) were not subject to parlia-
mentary revision; the money had been voted, and it was
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN in
within his prerogative to apply it. Rejection of the
budget and a dissolution of Parliament followed, with the
result that the Conservative minority was smitten hip and
thigh. The Conservative party numbered a tiny handful
in the new Landtag. The Crown was apparently con-
fronted with surrender to the opposition or resort to a
coup cPEtat.
Bismarck rejoiced in the quarrel. He had had nothing so
far to do either with framing the scheme or the crisis that
arose out of it. In his judgment-nothing could be better
than to strengthen the army, and it was for the soldiers to
decide how most effectively to do this. But even better was
the collision between the Crown and the Liberals. The
control of the army by an irresponsible Crown and ministers
responsible to the Crown alone, lay in the essence of his
everything that he hated and feared--parliamentary
government, the Landtag as a government-making, policy-
making organ, and ministers under the thumb of a majority
composed of professors, lawyers, journalists, and middle-class
amateurs. Even if the scheme were wrong, the Crown
must be supported and the opposition smashed into heel.
The King was desperately unhappy. His Liberal minis-
ters saw no solution but to yield. How could the
government continue without a budget? The country
at the general election had pronounced. The Crown
Prince had the gravest misgivings about a policy which
threatened to destroy national confidence in the sovereign,
perhaps even shatter the throne. Prussia was at this
moment insisting that the incurable autocrat of Hesse-
Cassel must obey his constitution and his legislature, yet
at home was defying the plain rights of the Landtag to vote
taxes and determine their application laid down in the
Prussian law of the land. Roon and the soldiers daily
reminded his Majesty that the army as a monarchical
institution was at stake, and a Hohenzollern who betrayed
the army betrayed himself. Surrender? Civil war? A
coup d fitat? Abdication? Which was King William to
choose? Roon also suggested that if his Majesty's
ministers refused to do their plain duty and defy Parlia-
programme. The demands of the
implied
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? 112
BISMARCK
ment, there was at Petersburg an experienced diplo-
matist who could be trusted to do the King's business.
But William shrank at the thought. Bismarck would be
loyal, but he would Insist on carrying out his foreign
policy, an entente with France and opposition to Austria.
His appointment was burning the bridges and blowing
up the magazines. The opposition might still be brought
to an honourable compromise, but not by Bismarck.
The 'Baden Memorial' (Denkschrift), drawn up by
Bismarck for King William in July 1861, repeated the
familiar analysis of the reasons why the existing federal
system was ruinous to Prussia--the continuous deadlock,
Austrian jealousy, the subordination of Prussian initiative
and independence to the votes of petty States, organised by
a non-German Empire at Vienna. Bismarck urged the
King to put Prussia at the head of the unitary movement
and lay before the Federal Diet a proposal to create a
national Parliament, chosen by direct suffrage from all
Germany, which would give Prussia the political direction
that it had already in the Tariff Union. Skilfully devised,
such a Parliament would enlist for Prussia popular sym-
pathy throughout Germany and largely heal the internal
strife in Prussia itself. The 'Baden Memorial' marks an
important stage in the evolution of Bismarck's thought.
It assumed the existence of a strong Prussian army, and
the will to employ it at the right moment in imposing a.
Prussian solution on all recalcitrants. 'Make me,' he said,
with reference to the Hesse-Cassel affair, 'an Under-
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and I will produce for you
in three weeks a civil war of the first quality. '
Throughout 1861 and the spring of 1862 gossip in the
capital was rife with reports that the ambassador at
Petersburg was to be given ministerial office. Roon
kept Bismarck closely informed of all that was passing.
More than once he was brought' on sick leave ' to Berlin,
to be ready, but nothing came of it. The King was fas-
cinated and repelled by the idea. Audiences between
Bismarck and his sovereign improved their personal but not
their political relations. William felt that in this strong,
frank, masterful man's hands he would be dragged whither
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 113
he knew not. 'He goes furthest who knows not whither
he is going,' pronounced the practical mysticism of Crom-
well, And in Bismarck's surveys of the future there was
always a grand and indefinable atmosphere, a conscious-
ness of the vastness of life, and the illimitable potencies of
the future floating over the concrete directness of his grip
on realities. He knew not whither he was going--he did
not wish to know. Forces beyond human calculation
were driving Prussia, and he must march with them. The
Time-spirit would provide the golden opportunities and
reveal how they could be used.
Bismarck concluded that his transference (May 29,
1862) to the embassy at Paris signified a definitive refusal
of a ministerial portfolio at Berlin. He had learned much
at Petersburg: sounded and charted the European
situation; established a personal friendship with the
Tsar; and by meekly sitting at the feet of the vain Gort-
schakov had created a credit on which in good time he
intended to draw. 'The hatred of Austria here,' he
wrote from Petersburg, 'exceeds everything I had
believed possible. ' Paris was the political centre of
Europe, and a pleasanter place than Petersburg. The
Court of the Second Empire was at the zenith of its social
brilliance. The Empress Eugenie and her galaxy of frail
butterflies--fetes, balls, fashions, and opera--would be
an agreeable background to the serious political work of
exploiting Napoleon. On June 1 he was presenting his
credentials to the Man of Sin at the Tuileries, and before
long intimately discussing the higher statecraft with the
Emperor and his ministers, and suggesting with a delicious
audacity that a tyro in diplomacy would be grateful for
all the instructions he could receive from the French ex-
perts--Bismarck instructed by a Persigny, a Drouyn de
Lhuys, a Walewski, or a De Morny! He was also scrib-
bling notes to Roon on the iniquities of the Liberal majority
in the Landtag, and letters to his wife and sister describ-
ing the Parisian fashions, with touches on the vanity of
French ministers, and the beauty of the Champs Elysees
in a Paris midsummer. He dashed off to London to see
the great Exhibition and met Palmerston and Disraeli at
B. II
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? H4
BISMARCK
the Russian Embassy. An amusing fellow this Prussian
Ambassador, every one agreed. His verve and racy reck-
lessness delighted the company, and his sketch of how in
a few years he would settle Europe and Germany was more
exhilarating than, and quite as evanescent as, champagne.
Disraeli judged more correctly. 'Take care of that man;
he means what he says,' was a verdict no less accurate and
prophetic than Bismarck's scribbled comment to Roon.
'I am just back from London. People there are much
better informed about China and Turkey than about
Prussia. Loftus (the English Ambassador in Berlin) must
write to his minister much more nonsense than I imagine. '
It was tragically true. Neither at the Foreign Office,
nor in Parliament, not even in the office of The Times, or in
the exalted circles of the Court, did they know the truth
about Prussia and Germany, and it is doubtful whether
they wished to know.
From Paris Bismarck visited Trouville, and then, rest-
less and dissatisfied, went on a tour to the south' Not
even ' the Lafitte, Mouton Rothschild, Pichon, Laroze,
Latour, Margaux, St. Julien, Beaune, Armillac, and other
wines'--the ' other ' is a pretty touch--which he noted as
having drunk at Bordeaux, nor the beauty of dawn on the
seashore and of sunset in the Pyrenees, described in letters
to his wife, could appease his feeling that Paris after all
was exile; that the world of action lay in Berlin, and that
he was shut out from it. Life was slipping away. Was
he to'be an ambassador all his days, and never have the
great political levers in his hands i Ministerial office
was hateful, yet he could not be happy without it. 'My
furniture,' he wrote on September 12, 1862, 'is still at
Petersburg and will freeze there; my carriages are at
Stettin, my horses at grass near Berlin, my family in
Pomerania, and I am on the streets. '
Three days later came a telegram from Roon: 'Come.
The pear is ripe. Periculum in mora. ' He plucked an
olive branch as he hurried through Avignon on his way to
Paris, and was in Berlin on the morning of September 20.
In the forenoon of September 22 he had a memorable
interview with the King at Schloss Babelsberg. He per-
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? THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 115
suaded William 1. to tear up the abdication he had drafted,
put himself unreservedly at his sovereign's disposal, and
declared his readiness to fight for the rights of the Crown
and the royal scheme of reorganisation of the army to the
last. There could be no surrender. This was a fight for
honour and existence and must be fought to a finish.
Next day (September 23) the Gazette announced the
appointment of Herr von Bismarck-Schonhausen to office
as temporary Minister-President. On the same day the
budget for 1862, providing for the army in accordance with
the royal scheme of reorganisation, was decisively rejected
in the Lower House of the Landtag by 273 to 68 votes.
September 23,1862, is a red-letter day in the Hohenzollern
calendar; it opened a new chapter, or rather a new
volume, in the history of Prussia and of Europe.
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? CHAPTER IV
THE M1NJSTER-PRES1DENT, 1S62-1867
? I. 1'he Constitutional Conflict, the Polish Question, and
the German Problem
On October 8, 1862, Bismarck's provisional appointment
as Minister-President was definitely ratified. He took up
his residence in the Wilhelmstrasse, which was to be his
official abode for twenty-eight years. The new minister
was in his forty-eighth year, and he had passed, without
any ministerial experience, direct from an embassy to the
highest office in the State. Both in Prussia and outside it
men naturally asked, What did it mean? What would
happen next?
Apart from the constitutional controversy and the dead-
lock created by the overwhelming vote of September 23
--a situation grave enough to demand the undivided
energies of the government--a series of critical questions
in foreign policy pressed for solution. Schleswig-Holstein,
the situation in Hesse-Cassel, Poland, the renewal of the
Zollverein, the proposed commercial treaty with France,
the German problem--each and all of these in combination
threatened to become acute. They involved the relations
of Prussia as a German Power with the middle and petty
States in Germany, and her relations as a European Power
with Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the new
but incomplete kingdom of Italy. Public opinion in Ger-
many recognised the gravity of the crisis, and was aware
that a false step in foreign policy would create an inter-
national situation which would leave Prussia isolated and
confronted with a hostile coalition that would reduce her
to a humiliating impotence.
Bismarck's appointment was clearly a challenge. It
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
117
provoked in different quarters indignation, amazement,
contempt, amusement. As we look back to-day and deli-
berately forget the knowledge of what happened between
1862 and 1871, it is instructive to read in contemporary
literature--the newspapers, memoirs, letters, pamphlets,
caricatures and dispatches--the judgments and inter-
pretations expressed in these critical years of 1862-66.
Rechberg at Vienna in 1862 described Bismarck to
Gramont as 'incapable de sacrifier une idee preconcue, un
prejuge, une idee de parti, a n'importe quelle raison d'un
ordre superieur; il n'a pas le sens pratique de la politique,
c'est un homme de parti dans la force du mot,' adding
truly enough, 'ce n'est pas un ami que nous aurons la. '
The new appointment was so clearly either a jest four rire
to cover a deliberate ride for a fall, a surrender to the oppo-
sition, and perhaps the King's abdication, or it was the
gambler's last throw, the discovery of a Prussian Polignac
which proclaimed a coming coup d'lttat. Capitulation or
revolution? What else could it mean, when the King
selected this Junker diplomatist, known only too well for
his violent, reckless, and impenitent championship of Prus-
sian Conservatism in its most particularist form? The
constitutional crisis and the international situation de-
manded a cool, conciliatory, and experienced statesman.
The King replied by appointing a red reactionary. In the
chancelleries of Europe the statesmen du vieux panialon
shrugged their shoulders and made bets whether Bismarck
would last three weeks or three months. To the Liberals,
above all, in Prussia the King's action was a stinging affront,
and a summons either to make a revolution or to capitulate.
Such judgments--and they could be cited by the page
? --were natural under the circumstances, for neither the
official world at London, Paris, Vienna, Dresden, and
Munich, nor the superheated public in Berlin knew the
real Bismarck. They simply saw in him the Junker of
1848-51. When he had practically disappeared at Frank-
furt from the public gaze the little that had emerged since
1852 confirmed the assumption that he had not altered,
indeed, that he was more than ever the sworn foe of the
causes he had opposed with such fiery audacity. The
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? n8
BISMARCK
profound change in his views and the breadth and variety
of his experience were unknown to most, and were even
misinterpreted by the few who had the material for
framing a correct judgment. In September 1862 no one
had divined the intellectual power, the cool and calculating
brain, the intensity of conviction, the political nerve, and
the extraordinary strength of character and will stored up
and disciplined in that titanic frame. As with Moltke, so
with Bismarck, the revelation of the next eight years was
to astound and hypnotise Germany and Europe.
And if men did not know Bismarck they were no less
ignorant in 1862 of Prussia and Prussianism. Since 1815
Prussia as a German state and as a European Power had done
nothing to justify her claim to parity with the other great
Powers. She had produced competent internal adminis-
trators, distinguished professors, and ardent but ineffective
politicians. Her statesmen for fifty years were mediocrities;
her policy continuously tarnished by prejudice, timidity,
and irresolution--reaction ruined by spasmodic and in-
sincere repentance. The material and economic strength
of the country had been enormously increased since 1815;
in her organised civil service and her army, no less than
her system of education, Prussia was in 1862 far ahead of
every other German state, and superior not merely to
Austria and Russia but to France and Great Britain. The
generation born in the Napoleonic epoch, under the
shadows of Jena and the sunlight of the great age of reform
--the age of Scharnhorst, Stein, and the War of Liberation
--had been patiently moulded and tempered in the chill
school of work and disappointment to a capacity for sus-
tained sacrifice and effort which only required leadership
--a man and a cause--to . evoke a single-minded co-opera-
tion. Here lay the secret of the strength of the opposition
in Parliament, for it represented a Prussia which had
broken with the historic tradition because the organs of
that tradition--monarchy, ministers, and the executive--
seemed blind to the greatness of the German renaissance,
and ignorant of the moral and intellectual forces that com-
Eelled the true German mind to be Liberal and Nationalist.
>eaf to the call of the future, Prussia had frittered for
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
forty years the vigour of the nation on a parochial
prosperity or the ignoble scuffles of the dynasties in the
Federal Diet.
Bismarck was a child of the age that had produced 1848
and the constitutional crisis of 1862--lived, learned, and
inwardly digested. Like the Liberals whom he detested
he had divined the strength of Prussia, but, unlike the
Liberals, he diagnosed the cause of Prussia's failure in one
vital and fatal omission. The Frederician tradition had
been successfully followed in domestic administration, but
had been neglected or betrayed in policy, above all, foreign
policy. The time had come at last--and not too late--
to prove what a strong Prussia could do, when her policy
was shaped and directed by a minister to whom nothing
was sacred or unclean, prepared like Frederick, the master,
to devote soul, brain and body to the service of Prussia, and
determined to concentrate unflinchingly the whole force
of the State on one end and one end alone, the greatness
of Prussia--a man to whom parties, causes, principles, con-
ventions, were either means to that end or empty phrases.
Prussia herself and Europe had forgotten the principles
and methods of Frederick the Great. The schools of
Metternich and Canning, of Palmerston, Guizot or
Nicholas 1. j lingered on in the shibboleths of the middle-
aged, who advised their governments from office desks in
the Foreign Offices; the school of Cavour had come and
gone with 1861; in the west at Paris reigned the sham
Napoleonism of the Second Empire; at London were the
statesmen of both parties who persisted in interpreting the
Continent, if they interpreted it at all, in the terms of an
obsolete continental or a complacent insular tradition, no
longer in touch with realities. By 1871 it began to dawn
on Europe that in Bismarck had come to life a reincarnation
of the Frederick who had shattered the Europe of Walpole,
Maria Theresa, and Louis xv. , a statesman controlling an
organised Prussia, far stronger relatively than the Prussia
of Frederick the Great--a statesmanship that was a re-
created gospel in action. The State as Egoism and the
State as Power, directed by the genius of the illuminated
despot, had made a new Europe and a new Prussia between
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? 120
BISMARCK
1740 and 1786; directed by the illuminated genius of
Bismarck it was to make a new Prussia, a new Germany,
and a new Europe between 1862 and 1890.
It was not therefore either the unrepentant Berserker
of Junkertum or a mere diplomatist trained in the conven-
tional manege of Frankfurt, Petersburg, and Paris, who
at Roon's bidding had promised his sovereign in the garden
of Schloss Babelberg to lead a forlorn hope. Bismarck had
studied the men both at Berlin and all over Europe with
whom he would have to deal; he was convinced that in
a test of resource, nerve, courage, and tenacity of will, or
in mastery of the realities in any situation, it would not be
he who would fail. This bitter quarrel was none of his
making, and his first step, when he met the triumphant
majority of the opposition in 'The House of Phrases,' as
he called the Landtag, was quietly to lay on the table the
olive branch that he had plucked at Avignon, with the
remark that it was a present to the progressive party, but
the time for it had apparently not yet come.
Bismarck's desire for an honourable compromise was pro-
bably sincere. He desired to be free from internal compli-
cations in order to deal with foreign policy. However, it
was a fixed principle of his system, enunciated now and fifty
times in the next twenty-five years, that government by
a monarchy through a representative assembly must rest
on compromises, and it was the function of statesmanship
to frame and work them. The external situation was
critical; foreign policy would demand for the next two
or three years sleepless vigilance, and the difficulties,
sufficiently great in themselves, would be aggravated by
an embittered controversy at home. He v/as new to
office; his position would be enormously strengthened
if he could inaugurate his minister-presidency by a reason-
able settlement. Neither now, nor at any time, was it his
habit to close the doors or drive an adversary to open war
until he was convinced that negotiation could not secure
the essentials. But he made his terms perfectly clear.
Let the controversy over rights on both sides be dismissed
as misleading juristic jargon. But the Crown must have
the money for the reorganisation of the army, and the
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? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 121
control of that army and of policy must rest with the King.
Co-operation with Parliament by all means, government
by a parliamentary majority--never. If the opposition
chose to make the issue not a question of right but of
might, between government by the monarchy and govern-
ment by the Lower House of the Landtag, against the'will
of the King and the Upper House, the struggle must be
fought out, and there would only be one end to it--the
defeat of the opposition which usurped the lawful authority
of the State, inalienably inherent in the Crown.
Bismarck calmly explained his interpretation of the con-
stitution, and to this he adhered through the period of
conflict. He quietly ignored the overwhelming endorse-
ment of the action taken in the previous Parliament by
the general election. The Lower House had the right, he
agreed, to vote taxes or reject the budget, but the veto of
the Lower House was not conclusive, for the budget was
expressed in a law, and laws required the assent of the
Crown and the Upper, as well as of the Lower, House.
If the consent of any one of these were withheld, a dead-
lock was created which could, under the constitution, only
be removed by the voluntary act of the organ concerned
and by no other means. Failing such, the constitution
expressly reserved to the Crown the residual right of
government. The Crown was therefore legally entitled
to carry on the administration during the emergency
created by the deadlock. Otherwise it failed in its duty
to itself as the head of the State and to the whole kingdom.
The Crown, therefore, simply was driven to avail itself of
the special powers provided to meet a temporary and ex-
ceptional situation. The King might challenge the wisdom
or patriotism of the action which had produced the
deadlock, but in exercising his special powers he was not
denying the legal rights of the Lower House, which was
similarly bound not to deny the legal rights of the Crown.
The action of the Lower House amounted to a claim to
compel the Crown to surrender its prerogative at dis-
cretion, and to make the King's government dependent on
the fiat of one chamber of the legislature, or, if the Crown
refused to give way, to make all government impossible.
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