Therefore
not only priests have the keys.
Summa Theologica
For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but
only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be
necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order
to have one's sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a
desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the
remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see
that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of
the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on
the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to
Baptism, were it never given save to adults.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18),
the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may
forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as
ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning of this
article] the operation of God Who forgives. Now this happens in three
ways. First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future
forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the
sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the
priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the
forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness
without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the
sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God
gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments
containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion,
even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation
that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is
conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and
there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect
dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and
more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the
cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New
Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in
speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the
ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable
that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the
remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already
remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered
in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.
Reply to Objection 2: Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the
sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission
of guilt, directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows
the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in
life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4864]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4865]TP,
Q[64], A[1]; [4866]TP, Q[86], A[6]]. Hence the Reply to the Third
Objection is evident.
The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the
remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.
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Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the
punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after
the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo
temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the
priest does not remit the punishment in any way.
Objection 2: Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God.
But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to
undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.
Objection 3: Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less
susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a
graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any
way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a
sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater
than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the
priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight
sin: which is false.
Objection 4: Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a
sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is
taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more
to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be
so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will
be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than
the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished,
which is absurd.
On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the
priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from
punishment.
Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St.
Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the
negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4867]TP, Q[62],
A[1]; [4868]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4869]TP, Q[86], A[6]], as stated in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like
reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment,
he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether
contrary to the words of the Gospel.
I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred
on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of
the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already
been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his
sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to
Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace
is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment,
since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like
manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his
sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal
punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of
the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his
grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of
which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this
temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only
partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed to
the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy
of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all
punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his
preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto
punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a
new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt
for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man
does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but
healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect
in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted,
but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which
could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does
this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at
the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and
sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of
the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in
Purgatory, so that one who has been absolved and dies before making
satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before
receiving absolution.
Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not remit the entire temporal
punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains
obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory
for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine
justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner
deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches him
through the sacraments of the Church.
Reply to Objection 3: Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each
sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue
of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is
remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is
remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain
without any punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the
punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that at the first absolution, as much as
possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the
second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on
account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the
priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.
But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason
for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating
the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about
his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the
second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament
of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the
reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done
once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for
the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect
therein.
For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution
something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because
when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the
greater the grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of
the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that
blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is
more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes
himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so
great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is
remitted, as we have already stated ([4870]Q[5], A[2]). Consequently it
is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole
punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since
Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.
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Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the
power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy
against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is
rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the
power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot
bind.
Objection 2: Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an
obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven
is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no
sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.
Objection 3: Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ's
Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the
priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): "Whatsoever thou shalt
bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven. "
Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of
the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with
it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose,
it can bind.
I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is
conformed to God's operation, Whose minister he is. Now God's operation
extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to
loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said
to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends
to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and
inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in
absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt,
in the way mentioned above [4871](A[1]), nevertheless, in binding, he
exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not
absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has
the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment.
For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to
the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways---first as
regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus
he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be
bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and
thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.
Reply to Objection 1: The remainder of the punishment to which the
priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter
from the blemish of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle
to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said
in the article.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some
punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.
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Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?
Objection 1: It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to
his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist.
i] says: "The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so
precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the
decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest. "
Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own
judgment.
Objection 2: Further, "The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch
as he had done wisely" (Lk. 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal
discount to his master's debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy
than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the
priest remits, the more he is to be commended.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's every action is our instruction. Now on
some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life, as
in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore it seems that
the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own
judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.
On the contrary, Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5] says:
"We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the
authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin. " Therefore it
seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.
Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest
could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have
no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion.
Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest's judgment.
I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and
minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except
in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius
says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult. ) that "priests should use their
hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God. " A sign of
this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter (Mat.
16:19) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the
Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby "the sons of God are
led" (Rom. 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles
to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his
power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as
Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl. , cap. ult. ), and, besides, he would be
turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of
a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as
the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all,
but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who
follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory
punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have
to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the
Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently
refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently efficacious to heal the
disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness
of nature so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains
from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the
severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away
altogether from repentance.
Reply to Objection 1: This judgment should be guided entirely by the
Divine instinct.
Reply to Objection 2: The steward is commended also for having done
wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need
for discretion.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ had the power of "excellence" in the
sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the
punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no
comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which
head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?
(2) Whether Christ had the keys?
(3) Whether priests alone have the keys?
(4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?
(5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?
(6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate,
suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?
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Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys.
For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they had
orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law
had the keys.
Objection 2: Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are
two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the
priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had
the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the
rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power
would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a
spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.
On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly
kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore
the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the
old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom
could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be
opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who
administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.
I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the
kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing
punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Lev. 5, which
right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete
then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the
priests of the New Law.
But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the
Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. 9:11-12). For there the priesthood of
Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch
as Christ came, "a high priest of the good things to come," and brought
us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the
priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of
oxen. " Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not
reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so,
we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys
were foreshadowed in them.
Reply to Objection 1: The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood
whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the
priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an
earthly tabernacle.
Reply to Objection 2: The priests of the Old Law had authority to
discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but
only into the shadow of heavenly things.
Reply to Objection 3: They had no spiritual power, since, by the
sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from
irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter
into a tabernacle which was "made with hand. "
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Whether Christ had the key?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the
key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a
character. Therefore He had not the key.
Objection 2: Further, Christ had power of "excellence" in the
sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the
sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He
needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): "These things saith . . .
He that hath the key of David," etc.
I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in
the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other
sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as
principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we
consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St.
Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. [4872]TP, Q[48], A[6];
[4873]FS, Q[112], A[1], AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a
power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or
by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key,
but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have
the key of "excellence. "
Reply to Objection 1: A character implies the notion of something
derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from
Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ,
whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the
principal form.
Reply to Objection 2: The key, which Christ had was not sacramental,
but the origin of the sacramental key.
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Whether priests alone have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For
Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad. " Now
this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said
([4874]Q[17], A[2]). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers
have the keys.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being
anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an
individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of
excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not
only priests have the key.
Objection 4: Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the
priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who
exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of
binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone. "
Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between
the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is
"ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer
up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests
have the keys.
I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself
directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order. " Priests
alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in
the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to
heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By
this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out
from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by
excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of "jurisdiction"
in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can
have this key, e. g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can
excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a
disposition thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of
those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to
judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that
temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but
in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the
administrators of the priestly power.
Reply to Objection 2: Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that
they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is
confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from
God, as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction
of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence
of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ,
they reign over the Christian people.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in civil matters the whole power is
sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is
vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with
equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may
be exercised both by one alone, e. g. a bishop, and by many together,
e. g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they
have not all together the key of order.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:11; Titus
2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no
spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii)
that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into
the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order
nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is
allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are
under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to
dwell under the same roof.
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Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that holy men, even those who are not
priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of
Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who
follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it
seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and
loose.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): "Without all
contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg. :
'better']. " Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De
Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater. " Therefore those who are
better, i. e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them.
Hence the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the
Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a
spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are
competent to have the use of the keys.
I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an
instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the
principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes
a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in
another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but
through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a
certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal
agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it
follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him,
and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act
of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf.
[4875]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4876]FS, Q[112], A[1], ad 1]. But another man
is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither
can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he
merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental
agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is
likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no
matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of
the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as between instrument and effect there is
need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the
instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the
principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the
suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for
another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the
salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds
from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be
conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so
far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other
blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally
through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and
not of virtue.
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Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the
keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the
apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But
wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of
the keys.
Objection 2: Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the
dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in
dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself.
Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not
the use of the keys.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives
the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only
by Himself or through His saints. " Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or
by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the
use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove,"
have not the use of the keys.
Objection 4: Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect
reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an
unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet
greater severity. " But the use of the keys implies a kind of
intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked
priests cannot use the keys effectively.
On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of
grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been
absolved, which would be very unfitting.
Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of
his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he
cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given
through him.
I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an
effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument.
Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys,
however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are
forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the
use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but
because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he
that submits to them receives their effect.
Reply to Objection 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in
the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with
the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated,
because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some,
for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects
through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so
far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by
merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even
through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is
the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of
the Dove," i. e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as
He remits sins on account of their intercession.
We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are
not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from
them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from
those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because
they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of
necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.
Reply to Objection 4: The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on
his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a
minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet
in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are subject to
him.
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Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or
degraded have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics,
excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just
as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of
consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of
consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin
in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.
Objection 2: Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use
of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power
of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred
with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the
Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it
when they will.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by
punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys
on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of
the aforesaid.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan. ) that the
"charity of the Church forgives sins. " Now it is the charity of the
Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are
disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the
keys in remitting sins.
Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for
anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys
the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so
the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its
essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For
since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the
person on whom they are used, as stated above ([4877]Q[17], A[2], ad
2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a
man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church
that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of
his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors.
Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the
like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in
some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the
use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on
which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread,
and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a
heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so
neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet
he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion is true, provided matter be not
lacking as it is in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as
certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because
it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.
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OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be
exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?
(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
(3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?
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Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has,
on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine
authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you
shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was
said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it
on any without restriction.
Objection 2: Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all
locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind
of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by
means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for
all others.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more
perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old
Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between
different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard
to all.
On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not
lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner. "
Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than
in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge
everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment,
it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard
to everyone.
I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not
equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general
principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt
those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one
who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others
to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the
Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the
Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the
Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained
above ([4878]FP, Q[113], AA[1],2). Consequently there should be a like
order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate
authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there
should be others under him, having distinct authority over various
people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise
authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the
proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all
indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have
received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on
everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in
cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.
Reply to Objection 1: A twofold power is required in order to absolve
from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former
power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore,
when our Lord (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power
of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results
from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests
when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of
forgiving sins (Mat. 16:19), that we may understand that he has the
power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders,
considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our
Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in
dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.
Reply to Objection 2: A material key can open only its own lock. nor
can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the
matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one
can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 3: The people of Israel were one people, and had but
one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly
jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various
peoples and nations.
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Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of
an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office,
unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others. " But a
priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e. g. by
knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he
cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all
his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to
it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from
which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot
use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in
the above manner.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was
foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases,
and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: "If any
question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them. " It
seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver
sins, but should refer him to his superior.
On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the
accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the
Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins
is subordinate [*Cf. [4879] Q[17], A[2], ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the
power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from
any sins whatever.
Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses
sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of
the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the
remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their
superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to
himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior;
otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any
sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his
penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be
imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the
sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when
the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being
excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an
irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has
to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The
fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes
to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom
in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the
confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but
must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask
permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if
he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less
shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because
when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he
is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the
sacrament.
