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Archidamus saw that the men were wholly occupied in saving their possessions, and was afraid that they themselves would be trapped and buried in the buildings. Therefore he ordered the trumpet to sound an alarm; at this, the Laconians, imagining that an enemy was advancing against them, assembled around him. In this way, even when their houses collapsed, the men themselves were kept safe. [see also: Plutarch, Cim_16]

4 When he was about to be utterly defeated by the Arcadians, Archidamus, who was weak and disabled by his wounds, sent to ask for a truce, so that they could bury their dead, before the rest of his army was destroyed. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_7. 4'25]

5 Archidamus marched his army at night to Caryae, by a long difficult route, rough and craggy, and lacking in water. He tried, as much as possible, to keep up the spirits of his men, although they were harassed by a tiring and laborious march, and continually encouraged them to persevere. By this forced march, they surprised the enemy; and because they were unprepared for so sudden an attack, entirely defeated them, and plundered the city. Afterwards, when they were celebrating their victory in the captured town, Archidamus asked them, at what particular time the city appeared to them to be captured. Some answered, when they began the close attack; others, when they came within reach of their javelins. "Neither," replied Archidamus, "but when we continued our march along that tedious dry road; for perseverance and resolution eventually conquer everything. "

[42] Gylippus.

Gylippus, wishing to be invested with the chief command of the Syracusan army, invited the other generals to a council of war. There he communicated to them a plan for gaining possession of a hill which lay between the city and the Athenian camp. After they had confirmed that they agreed with this plan, he dispatched a deserter to inform the Athenians of his intentions; they took advantage of this information, and themselves immediately took possession of the hill. Gylippus pretended great indignation at this, as if his plan had been revealed to the enemy by one of the other generals. To prevent any such unwanted disclosures in future, the Syracusan leaders entrusted to Gylippus the sole management of the war.

2 In order to recover the hill, which the Athenians had occupied, Gylippus selected twenty out of a great number of triremes, which he manned and kept in readiness. As soon as he had a full complement for the rest of the fleet, he ordered these ships to put out to sea early the next morning. The enemy no sooner perceived them under sail, than they also embarked, and advanced to give them battle. But while they were edging off, and the Athenians were briskly pursuing them, Gylippus also, having manned the rest of the fleet, put out to sea. Because the Athenians were distracted by the naval action, the few troops that they had left behind were easily dislodged by Gylippus' infantry, who afterwards occupied the position. [see also: Thucydides, 7. 22]

[43] Hermocrates.

When an insurrection took place at Syracuse, and a great band of slaves was gathered together, Hermocrates sent an envoy to their leader Sosistratus. The envoy was Daïmachus, a captain of cavalry and formerly a friend and particular acquaintance of Sosistratus. He told Sosistratus from the generals, that because of their great regard for the bravery which he had shown, they had agreed to give the men their freedom, furnish them with arms, and grant them military rations; and that they also admitted him to the rank of general, and requested that he would forthwith come and join them in their deliberations on public business. Relying on the friendship of Daïmachus, Sosistratus went to meet the generals, with twenty of his best and ablest men; but they were immediately seized, and thrown into chains. Meanwhile Hermocrates marched out with six thousand picked men, and having captured the rest of the slaves, he promised them on oath, that they should receive no ill treatment from him, provided that they would return to their respective masters; to which they all agreed, except three hundred, who deserted to the Athenians.

2 The Athenians, having been defeated in a final naval battle off Sicily, resolved to withdraw their forces during the night, while the Syracusans were overcome by wine and sleep after celebrating their victories with a sacrifice. Hermocrates suspected their intentions, but did not want to hazard a battle with troops as drowsy and inebriated as his were. He dispatched a deserter, who told Nicias that his friends, who were always keen to pass him crucial information, informed him that if he attempted to make his retreat during the night, he would inevitably fall into the enemy's ambush. Nicias was convinced by the message, and remained in his camp until the next day. The next morning, Hermocrates ordered the Syracusans to arms; by that time they were well refreshed and had slept off the effects of the evening's wine. He occupied positions at the crossings and bridges over the rivers, and defeated the Athenians with great slaughter. [see also: Thucydides, 7. 73]

[44] Eteonicus.

While Conon the Athenian was besieging Eteonicus the Laconian at Mytilene, a light-horseman arrived with news that Callicratidas, the Spartan admiral, had been defeated at Arginusae. Eteonicus commanded the messenger to leave the city secretly by night, and to return the next day, crowned with a wreath and singing a paean. Eteonicus then offered a sacrifice for the news of the victory, while Conon and the Attic army, struck with consternation, raised the siege. Eteonicus, exerting himself with renewed vigour, sent the fleet away to Chios, and marched the army to Methymna, a city which was then in alliance with the Lacedaemonians. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_1. 6'36]

[45] Lysander.

Lysander, who had promised his Milesian friends that he would put the people under their control, went to Miletus for that purpose. In his public speeches, he severely reprimanded the plotters, but promised the citizens that he would strive to secure their liberty, and to protect them in it. The people, not doubting his sincerity, readily accepted his offers, and put themselves under his protection. Then, at a given signal, his friends fell upon the unsuspecting citizens, who were unprepared for such an attack; and after the leaders of the opposition had been slain, they established themselves as rulers of Miletus. [see also: Plutarch, Lys_8]

2 At Aegospotami the Athenians several times put out to sea, and bearing down upon the enemy offered them battle, which Lysander the Laconian always declined; whereupon they returned to their camp, exulting in their success and singing paeans. Lysander at last sent two triremes to observe them; and their captains, as soon as they observed the enemy landing, hoisted a brazen shield as a signal to Lysander, who immediately advanced with the rest of the fleet. The Laconians rowed across as fast as possible, and reached the Athenians just after their forces had been landed. Some of the Athenians had gone to rest, while others were employed, some on one task and some on another. Then the Lacedaemonians suddenly attacked them, and as a regular force against a confused rabble, obtained an easy victory. They captured the whole fleet, both men and triremes, except only the Paralus, which escaped to carry the news of the defeat to Athens. [see also: Plutarch, Lys_11]

3 Lysander used to say, that boys were to be cheated with dice, but an enemy with oaths. [see also: Plutarch, Lys_8]

4 After Lysander had seized control of Thasos, knowing that many of the citizens, who supported the Athenians, had concealed themselves through fear of the Laconian, he assembled the Thasians in the temple of Heracles. There, in a gracious and conciliating speech, he indicated to them how readily he forgave all those who might have concealed themselves as a result of this revolution in the state; and hoped that they would dismiss all fear of his resentment. The Thasians trusted in the assurance he gave them, in so sacred a place as the temple, and that too in the city of his ancestor Heracles. Those, who had before concealed themselves, began to venture out and appear in public. But Lysander, after forbearing two or three days to take any notice of them, so that they might become less cautious, suddenly ordered them to be seized and executed. [see also: Nepos, 6'2]

5 When the Lacedaemonians and their allies were debating, whether they should entirely destroy the city of Athens, Lysander urged many arguments against doing so. He particularly emphasised that Thebes, which was a neighbouring state, would thereby be rendered more powerful, and a more formidable enemy to Sparta. Whereas, if they could preserve the loyalty of Athens, under the government of tyrants, they might watch over the actions of the Thebans from nearby, and keep them from growing too great. Lysander's advice was approved, and they were prevailed upon to give up the plan of destroying Athens.

[46] Agis.

In a war with the Peloponnesians, the Lacedaemonians suffered from great scarcity of provisions. Agis gave orders that the oxen should be kept from feeding for one whole day; and to conceal from the enemy their distress, he sent some deserters to inform them, that the next day large reinforcements were expected in the Laconian camp. Throughout the day the mouths of the cattle were kept muzzled; and they were loosed as soon as night came on. The hungry oxen, when they thus set free and turned loose into the pastures, leaped about and bellowed, raising a terrible noise, which the cavities between the hills increased yet more. Agis ordered the soldiers at the same time to spread around, and kindle several fires. The Peloponnesians, alarmed at the bellowing of the oxen and the shouting, as well as by the fires that they observed, assumed that the enemy had been strongly reinforced. They immediately struck camp, and fled away.

[47] Thrasyllus.

To conceal from the enemy the number of his ships, Thrasyllus ordered the pilots to link them together in pairs, unfurling the sails of only one of each pair. By this stratagem, his fleet appeared to the enemy to be only half of its real size.

2 Thrasyllus, who was vigorously besieging Byzantium, struck Anaxilas and the other Byzantine generals with such terror, lest their city should be captured by storm, that they agreed to surrender the city within a fixed time, and gave hostages for the observance of these terms. Thrasyllus accordingly raised the siege, and sailed off with his army for Ionia; but then he returned secretly by night, and seized control of the city of the Byzantines while they were off their guard. [see also: Diodorus, 13. 66-67]

[48] Conon.

Conon, who was in danger of being abandoned by his allies, dispatched a deserter to the enemy, with information of their intended retreat, of the time when they intended to depart, and of their route. The enemy took measures accordingly, and placed an ambush to intercept them. Conon then told the allied army that he had received intelligence, that an ambush had been planted to intercept them; but he was happy to be able to inform them, so that they might be on their guard, and thus make their retreat more safely. The allies took his advice, and discovered the ambush; then, won over by his generosity, they returned to the camp, and remained with him until he had put a successful end to the war.

2 Conon was confronted by Callicratidas, with a fleet twice the size of his, and pursued almost to Mytilene; but when Conon observed that the Lacedaemonian ships were widely separated in the pursuit, he hoisted the purple flag, which was a signal for battle to the other commanders. His ships immediately stood to, and forming a line, furiously attacked the Lacedaemonian fleet. The enemy were thrown into confusion by this sudden about-turn, and most of their ships were either damaged or sunk. Thus Conon obtained a complete victory. [see also: Diodorus, 13. 77]

3 When Agesilaus was ravaging Asia, Conon, who had been sent to assist Pharnabazus, advised the Persian to distribute his gold amongst the demagogues of the Greek cities. "Once they have received this," he said, "they will at your request persuade their states, not only to make peace with you, but also to take up arms against the Lacedaemonians. " Pharnabazus followed this advice, and as a result the Corinthian war soon broke out, which forced the Spartans to recall Agesilaus from Asia. [see also: Diodorus, 14. 81-83]

4 Conon, when he was blocked up in Mytilene by the Lacedaemonians, wished to inform the Athenians of the situation, but realised that it was difficult to do so without being intercepted. Therefore he manned two of his swiftest sailing ships with able seamen, and after providing them with everything necessary, he ordered them to lie still until evening. As soon as day closed, he observed that the guards were straggling around the shore, and employed in various tasks: some dressing their wounds, some piling up wood, and others lighting fires. Then he ordered the ships to set sail, and to steer on different courses, so that if one was captured, the other might escape. The ships both arrived safely, because the enemy were too preoccupied to pursue them in time. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_1. 6'20]

5 Just before a naval battle, Conon, who had been informed by a deserter that a picked detachment of the enemy's fleet intended, as their principal aim, to capture the ship in which he sailed, fitted out a trireme exactly like his own, and dressed the captain in an admiral's uniform. He ordered the ship to take its position on the right wing, and also commanded that the whole fleet should receive their signals from it. When the enemy observed this, they formed a line of their best ships, and immediately advanced against the supposed flagship. But Conon, vigorously attacking them with the rest of his fleet, sank some of the ships, and put the rest to flight.

[49] Xenophon.

Xenophon, in the famous retreat of the ten thousand men from Persia, when he found that Tisaphernes' cavalry were continually attacking his baggage, advised that their wagons, along with all that was not absolutely necessary either for war or for the transport of their supplies, should be left behind. Otherwise the Greek would lose all chance of retreating safely, by sacrificing their lives in defence of their property. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_3. 2'27]

2 As the enemy kept on harassing his rear, Xenophon formed his little army into two lines, placing his baggage in a hollow square in the middle. In this formation, he proceeded on his march; and his rear was protected by the cavalry, slingers and peltasts, who repelled the frequent attacks of the barbarians. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_3. 3'16-19]

3 Xenophon observed that the barbarians had occupied a narrow defile, through which he had to march. Looking around from a high mountain with a wide view of the countryside, he spotted a hill, that was accessible, but defended by a group of the enemy. He took a detachment, which he judged sufficient for the purpose, and led them towards the hill. After dislodging the forces who were posted there, he showed himself to the enemy below. When they saw the advantageous position of the Greeks, they took to flight; and thus provided a safe way through for the Greek army. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_3. 4'37-49]

4 The barbarian cavalry were drawn up on the other side of a river, which Xenophon needed to cross, and were ready to resist his passage over it. Xenophon selected a thousand men, whom he sent to ford the river a little upstream, while he himself, to distract the attention of the enemy, made a feint as if to cross it directly opposite their forces. When the detachment reached the opposite side of the river, they attacked the enemy from above and inflicted many casualties, so that Xenophon was able to cross over safely with the remaining part of his army. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_4. 3'20-21]

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Polyaenus: Stratagems
- BOOK 2
Adapted from the translation by R. Shepherd (1793). See key to translations for an explanation of the format.

The Greek text of Book 2 is available in archive. org.

CONTENTS: 1 Agesilaus ; 2 Clearchus ; 3 Epaminondas ; 4 Pelopidas ; 5 Gorgidas ; 6 Dercyllidas ; 7 Alcetas ; 8 Arxilaidas ; 9 Isidas ; 10 Cleandridas ; 11 Pharacidas ; 12 Deiphontes ; 13 Eurypon ; 14 The ephors ; 15 Hippodamas ; 16 Gastron ; 17 Megacleidas ; 18 The harmost ; 19 Thibron ; 20 Demaratus ; 21 Herippidas ; 22 Ischolaus ; 23 Mnasippidas ; 24 Antalcidas ; 25 Agesipolis ; 26 Sthenippus ; 27 Callicratidas of Cyrene ; 28 Magas ; 29 Cleonymus ; 30 Clearchus the tyrant ; 31 Aristomenes ; 32 Cineas ; 33 Hegetorides ; 34 Deinias ; 35 Nicon ; 36 Dioetas ; 37 Tisamenus ; 38 Onomarchus

[Preface] I beg leave to present your most sacred majesties, Antoninus and Verus, with this second book of Stratagems. You are yourselves well qualified to judge, how much labour and time I have employed to compile this collection; especially as the position, which I hold under you in the courts, allows me few leisure hours for other studies.

[1] Agesilaus.

Agesilaus marched out to fight against the Acarnanians at about the time of sowing. The Laconians wished to prevent the enemy from sowing, but Agesilaus told them that after the Acarnanians had sown their corn, they would want to preserve it, and thus would be more inclined to sue for peace. "For then," he said, "they must either have peace; or allow us to reap the fruits of their labour. " [see also: Xenophon, Hell_4. 6'13]

2 When the Lacedaemonians were advancing to battle against the united forces of Thebes and Athens, although the light-armed troops and peltasts could be of no service to them, Agesilaus ordered the entire phalanx to the attack. Chabrias, general of the Athenians, and Gorgidas, general of the Thebans, ordered their men not to advance, but to await the enemy's charge, with their shields fixed on their knees, and their spears poised. Agesilaus, impressed by the firm disposition of their battle line, decided that it was wiser for a general to retreat, rather than risk fighting about such a resolute enemy. [see also: Diodorus, 15. 32'4]

3 Not long after Agesilaus brought his army to Coroneia, a messenger arrived with news that Peisander, the Lacedaemonian admiral, had been defeated and killed by Pharnabazus. Lest the army should be discouraged by this bad news, Agesilaus ordered the heralds to proclaim the opposite: that the Lacedaemonians had won a victory at sea. To support the deceit, he himself appeared crowned, and offered sacrifices on account of the auspicious news, and sent portions of meat from the victims round to his friends. These signs of victory so inspired his troops, that they marched out to battle at Coroneia with confidence and alacrity. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_17]

4 Agesilaus always told his troops to leave the enemy a door open for flight.

5 Agesilaus, after his victory at Coroneia, was told that the Athenians had fled for refuge to the temple of Athene. He replied, "Let them go wherever they are inclined; for nothing can be more dangerous than to risk a battle with an enemy who is aroused by despair. " [see also: Xenophon, Hell_4. 3'20]

6 Agesilaus, during his campaign in Asia, in order to inspire his men with contempt for the barbarians, ordered some Persian captives to be stripped. He exposed them naked before the army, and told the Greeks to observe their delicate and puny bodies, caused by the luxurious lives in which they were brought up; but on the other hand, their clothes were rich and costly. He added laconically, "Those are our enemies, and these are the rewards of victory. " [see also: Plutarch, Ages_9]

7 The allies complained, that the Lacedaemonians had brought fewer soldiers into battle than themselves. Agesilaus ordered the allies to sit down by themselves; and the Laconians to do the same; so that he could give them proof. A herald then made a proclamation, that all the potters should stand up; and a great many of the allies did so. Secondly, the smiths were ordered to rise; many more stood up. Then the carpenters, who were a numerous group, were ordered to stand up. In the same way, all the other craftsmen and artisans were ordered to stand up. After this, there were hardly any of the allies left seated. But of the Lacedaemonians, not a man was seen standing; for their laws forbade them from practising any such trade. Thus the allies were taught that, although they had contributed more men towards the conduct of the war, yet the Laconians had brought more soldiers for battle. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_26]

8 When Agesilaus marched his army into Asia and ravaged the king's territory in that region, Tisaphernes proposed a truce of three months; in that time, they might persuade the king to grant freedom to the Greek cities in Asia. Consequently, the Greeks avoided action and waited for the expiry of the truce; but the Persian was indefatigable in augmenting his forces, and contrary to what he had agreed, suddenly attacked the Greeks. Because they were not expecting an enemy, and were not prepared for resistance, there was confusion and consternation throughout the camp. But Agesilaus came forward with a tranquil expression, or rather looking full of joy, and said to the Greeks, "I thank Tisaphernes for his perjury, by which he has made the gods his enemies, and our allies. Let us therefore march out with confidence, because we have such powerful allies. " Encouraged by this short speech, they followed their general into battle and completely defeated the barbarians. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_3. 4'5]

9 When he marched to Sardis, Agesilaus sent men to spread a rumour, that his march was only a pretence to deceive Tisaphernes; for although his expedition seemed professedly against Lydia, in reality his target was Caria. Tisaphernes, informed of this, directed all his attention towards the defence of Caria; but the Lacedaemonian ravaged Lydia, and enriched himself with the spoil of the defenceless territory. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_4. 3'20]

10 When Agesilaus invaded Acarnania, the inhabitants retreated into the mountains; he halted in the plains, and contented himself with destroying the wood in the neighbouring places, by uprooting the trees. Because he seemed preoccupied in destroying their trees, the Acarnanians despised his apparent indolence; they abandoned the positions they had taken in the mountains, and returned to the cities which were situated in the plains. This spurred Agesilaus into action; by a forced march of a hundred and sixty stades in one night, he surprised them the next morning. He captured many of the Acarnanians in the plain, and took away a great quantity of cattle and other booty. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_4. 6'5]

11 When Agesilaus heard that the Thebans had secured the pass at Scolus, he ordered all the embassies from Greece to remain at Thespiae; and commanded the supplies for the army to be stored there. The Thebans, informed of this, marched their forces from Scolus to Thespiae, in order to intercept the enemy there. Meanwhile Agesilaus, after a two days' march, found the post at Scolus deserted, and passed through without opposition. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_5. 4'48]

12 When Agesilaus was ravaging their territory, the Thebans occupied a hill, called the Seat of Rhea, which was almost inaccessible by nature. He could not attack them there except at a great disadvantage, nor could he penetrate any further into the country, without dislodging them from there. Therefore he made a feint of drawing away his forces, and marching directly against Thebes, which was at that time quite undefended. The Thebans, afraid for their city, abandoned their advantageous position, and hastened to the defence of their homes. Then Agesilaus passed by the hill without opposition. [see also: Xenophon, Hell_5. 4'49]

13 At the battle of Leuctra, many of the Lacedaemonians threw down their arms and deserted their ranks. In order that so large a number of men might not be branded with infamy, Agesilaus arranged to be appointed as a temporary legislator. In that capacity, he did not venture to weaken the constitution by establishing any new laws, but for a short time he prevented the execution of the old laws, and then allowed them to regain their full force after the battle of Leuctra. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_30]

14 A mutiny happened at Sparta, and many of the hoplites occupied the sacred mountain of Artemisa Issoria, near Pitane. At the same time the Thebans and Arcadians pressed hard upon them, and there was general consternation between the dangers of war and mutiny. Agesilaus, who always retained his resolution and promptness of thought even in the most widespread confusion, judged that it would be too dangerous at that moment to try to force the rebels to obedience; but to plead with them would demean his authority. Therefore he went to the mountain alone and unarmed, and with an intrepid and serene expression, he called out, "Men, you have mistaken my orders; go over to that mountain" (and he pointed to another place) "and remain on guard in your various posts. " The Laconians assumed that he was unaware of their mutiny; they obeyed his orders, and marched off to their new positions. But as soon as night arrived, Agesilaus seized twelve of the ringleaders in different places, and thus quashed the mutiny. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_32]

15 The army was in great distress, and many soldiers were deserting every day. To conceal the number of deserters from the rest of the army, Agesilaus sent men throughout the different parts of the camp by night, with orders to gather up all the shields which had been cast away, and bring them to him; so that the discovery of a shield should not reveal the desertion of its owner. In this way, because no discarded shields were to be seen, the other soldiers remained unaware of the deserters. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_32]

16 Agesilaus besieged Phocaea for a long time, without being able to capture the city; nor could he afford to remain there for the further length of time, that the siege was likely to require. However the allies of the Phocaeans were no less weary of the siege than he was. Therefore he ordered his army to strike camp; and retreated. After he had retreated, the allies of the Phocaeans gladly left for their homes; but Agesilaus, learning of this, returned to the city and easily captured it, now that it had been abandoned by its allies. [see also: Frontinus, Str_3. 11'2]

17 When he needed to march through Macedonia, Agesilaus sent envoys to king Aeropus, asking him for a free passage.
But Aeropus, who had been informed that the Laconians were weak in cavalry, refused to enter into any treaty with him; instead, he replied that he would meet him in person, and ordered his own cavalry to take the field. Therefore Agesilaus, to give the impression of more cavalry than he really had, ordered the infantry to form the first line; and behind them placed all the horses that he could muster, forming them into a double phalanx, and augmenting them with asses, mules, and some horses which, though too old for service, were still used to pull the baggage. There were soldiers mounted on all of these, in complete cavalry armour, so that they gave the appearance of a large number of horsemen. When he saw such a formidable force, Aeropus agreed a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, which allowed them a free passage through his dominions.

18 While his army was encamped in Boeotia, Agesilaus noticed that the allies were unwilling to fight, and were continually slipping away. He secretly sent orders to Orchomenus, an allied city which was the destination of many of the deserters, that they should receive none of the allies into their city, without his permission. Therefore the allies found that they had no place of refuge; and they were forced to place their hopes of safety in victory, rather than flight. [see also: Frontinus, Str_1. 11'5]

19 When the Thebans were hard pressed in a battle with the Lacedaemonians, they attempted to cut their way out through the Lacedaemonian phalanx. This resulted in obstinate fighting, with many casualties on both sides. Then Agesilaus ordered his troops to act on the defensive, and to open up their ranks, so that the Thebans had an opportunity of breaking through. The Thebans immediately ran through and took to flight; but Agesilaus then fell on their rear, and without further loss to himself, obtained a complete victory over the fleeing enemy. [see also: Frontinus, Str_2. 6'6]

20 In another battle with the Boeotians, when he noticed that his allies were on the point of yielding, Agesilaus ordered a retreat through a narrow defile in the mountains, with the Lacedaemonians leading the way. When the enemy fell upon his rear, the allies had no choice but to conquer, or die.

21 When Agesilaus invaded Boeotia, he ordered the allies to destroy the timber, and to ravage the countryside; but when he saw how negligent and lax they were in executing his orders, he commanded them to desist from the devastation. At the same time, he moved his camp three or four times each day, and because of these manoeuvres, the allies were obliged to cut down wood for the purpose of erecting their tents. Thus they were compelled by necessity to do what they had failed to do earlier, and to inflict this damage on the enemy.

22 When Agesilaus was sent as an ally to Nectanebus in Egypt, they were hemmed in on a narrow strip of land, and blockaded. The Egyptian, who could not bear to be encircled in this way, urged Agesilaus to risk a battle. But Agesilaus did not give in to his demands; instead he waited until his little army was almost surrounded by a wall and trench, with only one small gap remaining, which looked like an entrance into the enclosure. Then Agesilaus called out, "Now is the time for courage! " After sallying out through the entrance, he vigorously attacked and routed the enemy, while the wall served as a fortification to prevent his men from being surrounded by the superior numbers of the enemy. [see also: Plutarch, Ages_39]

23 A battle was fought between the Lacedaemonians and Thebans, which remained undecided when it was brought to an end by the approach of night. In the night, Agesilaus sent a group of trustworthy soldiers, with orders to carry away from the field or secretly bury all the Spartans that they could find. After accomplishing this, they returned to the camp before daybreak. When it became light, the enemy saw that almost all the dead were Thebans, and as a result they were dispirited, because they assumed that they had been completely defeated.

24 When Agesilaus, on his return from his campaign in Asia, was marching through Boeotia, the Thebans tried to harass him and occupied the defiles through which he had to pass. But Agesilaus formed his army into a double phalanx, and ordered the soldiers to march towards Thebes in that formation. The Thebans were terrified that he would capture their city while it was undefended, and they immediately left their positions. While they rushed back to defend the city, Agesilaus continued his march without opposition. [see also: Frontinus, Str_1. 4'3]

25 In order to halt the invasion of their territory by Agesilaus, the Thebans fortified a camp, on either side of which were narrow defiles. Agesilaus formed his army into a square, hollow column and advanced against the pass on the left. After he had drawn the enemy's whole attention in this direction, he secretly sent small groups of soldiers from his rear, who occupied the other pass without opposition. Then he entered the Theban territory through the other pass, and thoroughly devastated it before retreating safely.

26 While Agesilaus was encamped near Lampsacus, there came to him some Greek deserters from the mines, who announced in the camp, that the inhabitants of Lampsacus had decided to send all the prisoners that they might capture to the mines. This so enraged the army, that they advanced right up to the walls of the city, determined to storm and plunder it. Agesilaus, who was unable to suppress their fury but wanted to save the city, pretended to join in the general resentment. He ordered his troops immediately to destroy the neighbouring vineyards, because they belonged to the leading citizens. While the troops were engaged in doing this, Agesilaus managed to inform the citizens of Lampsacus of their danger, and they took steps to guard themselves against the intended attack.

27 The Lacedaemonians and Thebans were encamped against each other, on opposite sides of the river Eurotas. Agesilaus noticed that the Lacedaemonians were eager to cross the river, but he was afraid of the superior numbers of the enemy. He deliberately spread a rumour that the oracle had declared that the army, which first crossed the river, would be routed. After curbing the enthusiasm of the Lacedaemonians in this way, he left a few of the allies, under the command of their general Symmachus of Thasos, to guard the crossing of the Eurotas; he concealed some other troops in ambush within a hollow; and he himself took up a strong position with the Lacedaemonian veterans. The Thebans, when they observed the small force that was left under Symmachus to dispute their crossing, confidently advanced to cross the river; but while they pursued the troops, who deliberately fled away from them, they fell into the ambush and lost six hundred men. [see also: Frontinus, Str_1. 10'3]

28 After marching into Messenia, Agesilaus sent out a spy, who returned with information, not only that the Messenians had left their city in order to oppose him, but also that they had been joined by their wives and children, and even by their slaves, who had been manumitted for the purpose. He therefore abandoned his attack, observing that men who were so desperate would always fight with the most determined courage.

29 When the Lacedaemonians were besieged in their city by the Thebans, they were indignant at being cooped up within their walls along with the women, and decided to sally out in a glorious attempt either to conquer or to die. Agesilaus dissuaded them from this rash intention, by reminding them, that they had once blocked up the Athenians in a similar way; but the Athenians, instead of throwing away their lives in such a wild attempt, had manned their walls and defended their city, until the Lacedaemonians, worn down by the opposition and delay, had been compelled to raise the siege and evacuate the country.

30 While Agesilaus was bringing back a great quantity of spoils in Asia, he was harassed by the enemy, who attacked him with their arrows and javelins. Therefore he flanked his army with prisoners; the barbarians were unwilling to kill their own men, and desisted from further attacks. [see also: Frontinus, Str_1. 4'2]

31 Agesilaus surprised by night the city of Menda, which supported the Athenians, and occupied the strongest part of it. The inhabitants were enraged, and immediately gathered together in their assembly. Agesilaus stood up and said to them all: "Why are you so angry and resentful? Half of you belong to the conspiracy, which betrayed the city to me. " This made the citizens of Menda turn to suspecting each other, and they submitted to the victor's terms without further resistance.

32 It was the practice of Agesilaus, to restore to their countries without ransom those captives, who had powerful connections in their respective states. In this way he reduced their influence and ability to incite rebellion, by creating suspicion of their loyalty in the minds of their fellow citizens.

33 When Agesilaus negotiated with the enemy, he always insisted that they should send their most important men to discuss the terms with him. He then conversed with these men in a friendly fashion, and entertained them lavishly, so that he created suspicion of them among the common people, and caused dissension within their state.

[2] Clearchus.

Clearchus advanced with a numerous army to a river, which in one place was so easily fordable that the water would not reach higher than the knees, but in another place was deep enough to be breast-high. He tried first to force a passage where the water was shallowest. But when he found that the crossing was strongly contested by the enemy with slings and arrows, he marched his hoplites to the spot where the river was deepest. While they were crossing there, most of their bodies were concealed beneath the water, and the parts which were above the water were covered by their shields. Therefore they were able to cross the river without loss, and forced the enemy to retreat. Then the remaining part of the army crossed the shallow ford without opposition.

2 During the retreat of the Greek forces after the death of Cyrus, Clearchus encamped in a region which abounded with provisions. Tisaphernes sent envoys there, and assured them that he would allow them to continue unmolested there, if they gave up their weapons. Clearchus showed so much attention to the envoys, that Tisaphernes, assuming that a treaty would be agreed, disbanded some of his troops and sent his army back to their quarters. Then the Greeks struck camp at night, and by marching continuously through the day and the night advanced so far ahead of the Persian, that before he could gather his scattered troops, they were completely out of his reach. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_2. 1]

3 Clearchus asked Cyrus not to expose himself to danger, but to stay at a distance, as a spectator of the battle. He said to him that a single man, merely by his physical strength, could be of little consequence in determining the outcome of a battle; whereas if he fell in battle, they would all fall with him. He then advanced slowly with the Greeks in a close firm phalanx, and the well-ordered charge struck terror into the enemy. As soon as they approached within reach of their javelins, Clearchus ordered his men to close with the enemy, as fast as they could run. By this manoeuvre the Greeks completely defeated the Persians. [see also: Diodorus, 14. 23]

4 After the death of Cyrus, the Greeks were left in possession of a large and fertile tract of country, which was surrounded by a river, so that it was almost an island, except for one narrow isthmus. Clearchus, in order to dissuade his troops from remaining encamped in this peninsula, dispatched to their camp a pretended deserter, who informed them that the king intended to build a wall across the isthmus, and hem them in. Alarmed by this news, the Greeks took the advice of Clearchus, and placed their camp outside the isthmus. [see also: Xenophon, Anab_2. 4'14]

5 When he was returning from a raid with a large amount of booty, Clearchus was surprised by a superior force on a mountain, where he had halted. The enemy began to dig a trench around the mountain, and his officers strongly urged him to fight, before they were completely blocked in. Clearchus told them to be patient. As soon as the evening approached, he threw his baggage and booty into the most incomplete part of the trench, and there he attacked the enemy, as if on a narrow pass, and defeated them because they were unable to use the advantage of their superior numbers.

6 When Clearchus was returning with the spoils which he had captured in Thrace, he was unable to complete his retreat to Byzantium, and encamped near the Thracian mountains. Because he expected that the Thracians would pour down from the mountains and attack him in the night, he ordered his men to keep on their armour, and to wake up at frequent intervals during the night. In order to test their readiness to meet a sudden attack, he chose a very dark night and in the middle of it, he appeared before his own camp at the head of a small detachment, who brandished and struck their weapons against each other in the Thracian manner. His troops, assuming that they were the enemy, immediately formed up to resist them. Meanwhile the Thracians really did advance in the hope of surprising them while they were asleep; but the Greeks, being already dressed and armed, confronted the assailants. The Thracians were unprepared for such a ready and vigorous resistance, and were defeated with great slaughter.

7 After the revolt of Byzantium, Clearchus, although he had been condemned by the ephors, continued with a raid against the Thracians. He arrived with four ships at Lampsacus, where apparently he lived in a loose and dissipated manner. The Byzantines appealed to him for assistance against the Thracians, by whom were being hard pressed. He pretended a severe attack of gout, and waited for three days before he agreed to meet with the Byzantine envoys. Then he assured then, that he felt very sorry for their situation, and assured them that they would receive the assistance which they required. Accordingly, after manning two other ships besides the four which he had with him, he set sail for Byzantium. There he disembarked his own troops, and at an assembly of the people he urged them to put all their cavalry and their hoplites on board the ships, so that they could fall on the enemy's rear, and thereby divert their attention away from the city. At the same time, he ordered the captains of the ships to weigh anchor, as soon as they saw him give the signal for battle. The troops embarked, and at the given signal the ships immediately set sail. Then Clearchus, pretending to be thirsty, invited the Byzantine generals to step inside a nearby tavern with him. After posting a group of his men at the door, he massacred the generals, and ordered the landlord of the tavern, on pain of death, not to reveal what had happened. Meanwhile he took advantage of the absence of the citizens, who were on the ships, to send his own troops into the city, and gained control of it. [see also: Diodorus, 14. 12]

8 The Thracians sent envoys to Clearchus to sue for peace, after he had spread terror and devastation throughout their country. Clearchus was opposed to peace on any terms, and to prove this, he ordered his cooks to cut into pieces two or three Thracian bodies, and hang them up. He told them, if any Thracians asked what this meant, to reply that they were being prepared for Clearchus's supper. Struck with horror at such acts, the Thracian envoys abandoned their mission and returned home. [see also: Frontinus, Str_3. 5'1]

9 When Clearchus's hoplites were being harassed by the enemy's cavalry, he formed his army eight deep, in a looser formation than the usual square. He ordered his men to lower their shields, and under cover of the shields to use their swords to dig ditches, as large as they could conveniently make them. As soon as this was finished, he advanced beyond the ditches into the plain which lay in front of them, and ordered his troops, as soon as they were pressed by the enemy, to retreat behind the ditches which they had recently made. The enemy's cavalry, charging eagerly after them, fell one over another into the ditches, and became easy victims to the troops of Clearchus.

10 When Clearchus was in Thrace, his army was seized by a groundless fear of attacks at night. To restore order in his camp, he ordered that, if any tumult should arise, no-one should stir; and if anyone rose and left his tent, he should be killed as an enemy. This order effectively put an end to the fears of a night attack, and the camp became quiet and tranquil again.

[3] Epaminondas.

Phoebidas, the officer in charge of the Cadmeia, conceived a passion for the wife of Epaminondas, who informed her husband of the advances he had made to her. Epaminondas told her to feign acceptance of his advances, and to invite him to dinner; she asked him at the same time to bring along some friends with him, to whom she promised to introduce ladies who were as easy and compliant as herself. Accordingly, Phoebidas and his friends came to dinner, and found everything as they had hoped. After they had eaten, and drunk freely, the ladies asked for leave to retire, in order to go to an evening sacrifice; they promised that they would return later. The men agreed, and told the doormen to let them in when they returned. After leaving, the women exchanged their clothes with some beardless youths; the youths then accompanied one of the women, who led them back and after a short conversation persuaded the doormen to let them in. The young men, as they had been instructed, immediately killed both Phoebidas and his companions.

2 In the battle at Leuctra, Epaminondas commanded the Thebans, and Cleombrotus commanded the Lacedaemonians. The battle remained finely balanced for a long time, until Epaminondas called on his troops to give him one step more, and he would ensure the victory. They did as he asked; and they gained the victory. The Spartan king Cleombrotus was killed in the fighting, and the Laconians left the enemy in possession of the battlefield.

3 When Epaminondas advanced to Leuctra, the Thespians showed that they were reluctant to fight. Epaminondas plainly noticed this, but in order to avoid the confusion which would be caused in his army by their desertion, he announced just before he attacked, that whoever of the Boeotians wished to leave the battlefield, they were at liberty to do so. The Thespians, who were already armed, took advantage of his proclamation and withdrew. Meanwhile Epaminondas led the resolute troops, who remained with him, to a great and glorious victory. [see also: Pausanias, 9. 13'8]

4 When Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese, he found the enemy encamped at Mount Oneium. A violent storm of thunder happened at the same time, which greatly intimidated his army, and the soothsayer declared against fighting. But Epaminondas said that it was the right time for fighting; because the thunder was clearly directed against the enemy in their camp. His interpretation of the occurrence brought fresh courage to his soldiers; and they advanced eagerly to the attack. [see also: Plutarch, Mor_193'A]

5 After a successful expedition against the Lacedaemonians, Epaminondas had it in his power to capture Lacedaemon; but he retreated from the vicinity of the city, without taking advantage of the opportunity. When his colleagues threatened to bring him to trial for his conduct, he showed them the Arcadians, Messenians, Argives and other Peloponnesians. "If we were to destroy the Lacedaemonians," he said, "all these would become our enemies. They are at present our allies, not for the sake of helping Thebes, but to keep the Spartan power in check. "

6 Epaminondas used to encourage the Thebans to try their strength with the Lacedaemonians, who lived amongst them, in wrestling and boxing. When the Thebans easily mastered them in these exercises, they conceived a contempt for the people; and so they learned to meet them on the battlefield with confidence in their own superiority.

7 While he was in the Peloponnese, Epaminondas constantly drew up his army at sun-rise, as if ready to fight; and thereby he gave the impression to the enemy that he intended to confront them openly in battle. After the Lacedaemonians had been deceived by this feint, he attacked them during the night, while they were quite unprepared to resist him.

8 At the famous battle between the Lacedaemonians and their allies, commanded by Cleombrotus, and the Thebans, under the command of Epaminondas, the Theban general used two stratagems to raise the spirits of his troops, when they were alarmed by the superior numbers of the enemy, whose army amounted to forty thousand men. When they marched out of the city, he arranged for them to be met by a stranger, who had a garland on his head, and was adorned with ribbons. The man said that he was sent by Trophonius to inform them, that the victory would belong to those, who began the attack. Then Epaminondas told the Thebans, who were moved with superstition by this pronouncement of the oracle, to pay their vows at the temple of Heracles. He had previously ordered the priests to open the temple during the night, take out the rusty weapons which were kept there, polish them up, and lay them before the statue of the god; after they had done this, he told them to leave the building and inform no-one of what had happened. When the soldiers and their officers entered the building, they found no-one in attendance, but the old rusty weapons were newly polished, bright and gleaming. The soldiers immediately shouted in acclamation, and advanced out to battle, confident that they were fighting under the protection of Heracles. As a result of their confidence, they were able to defeat the army of forty thousand men. [see also: Diodorus, 15. 53]

9 In order to prevent an expedition that Epaminondas planned to make against Lacedaemon, a body of Laconians were sent to secure the pass by Mount Oneium. Epaminondas halted by the mountain, and pretended that he would immediately attempt to take it by force. The Laconians remained in arms all through the night, in readiness to resist him. But on the contrary, Epaminondas ordered his men to relax and rest themselves, and waited until the next morning. Then he struck camp and attacked the enemy while they were exhausted and sleeping. He easily defeated them, and forced his way through the pass. [see also: Diodorus, 15. 68]

10 Epaminondas once attempted to gain control of Lacedaemon by a night attack, while the Lacedaemonian forces were absent. But Agesilaus, who had been informed of this plan by deserters, entered the city after a forced march with a body of troops; and after preparing to receive the enemy, he drove them back with great loss. Amidst the confusion, many of the Theban soldiers, who had been routed in the night and were being vigorously pursued by the Lacedaemonians, threw away their shields. When Epaminondas observed this, in order to conceal their disgrace, he ordered the troops to hand over their shields to the keepers of the baggage, and to follow their general with only their swords and their spears. This earned him the gratitude of those who had thrown away their shields; and in return for that act of favour, they were most alert from then on in executing his commands. [see also: Frontinus, Str_3. 11'5]

11 In a battle between the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians, when night came on and the victory remained undecided, both armies returned to their respective camps. The Lacedaemonians, who encamped in regular formation, in their own regiments and morae, could see who was missing and were aware of their losses, which greatly discouraged and concerned them. But Epaminondas ordered the Thebans, without regard to their particular regiment or company, to eat as quickly as they could, in whatever tent they could find, sharing with each other whatever provisions they could find. The next morning they advanced to the attack, well refreshed and in full spirits; and they obtained an easy victory over the enemy, who were so disheartened by the loss of their friends that they were like an army that had already suffered a defeat.

12 When Epaminondas advanced to fight against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whose army amounted to forty thousand men, he observed that the Theban troops, as might be expected, were alarmed by the great superiority in numbers of the enemy. He employed various stratagems to keep up their spirits. There was in the temple of Athene at Thebes a statue of the goddess, holding a spear in her right hand and with a shield before her knees. During the night, he sent an artist into the temple, who altered the statue so that the goddess was holding the handle of the shield in her left hand. In the morning, before the troops marched out, he ordered the temples to be opened up, on pretence of performing some religious ceremonies before he went out to battle. The soldiers noticed with astonishment how the appearance of the goddess had changed; and they considered that they were assured of her direct protection. Then Epaminondas reassured them in a powerful speech, that Athene was taking up her shield against their foes. As a result, the Thebans fought with such confidence of success, that after charging against the enemy sword in hand, they obtained a complete and brilliant victory, despite their inferiority in numbers. [see also: Frontinus, Str_1. 11'16]

13 The Thessalians were drawn up on the other side of the river Spercheius, ready to dispute the crossing of the Thebans over the bridge. In the morning, Epaminondas observed that a heavy cloud was rising up from the river. He ordered each of his men to carry two parcels of wood, one green and one dry; in the middle of the night they set fire to the dry one, and put the green one on top of it. In the night, the clouds and the smoke so obscured the view, that Epaminondas and his army were able to cross the bridge without being observed. It was not until the smoke and the clouds had dispersed, that the Thessalians realised that the Theban army had crossed the bridge; and meanwhile the Thebans drew up in order of battle on the open plain. [see also: Diodorus, 15. 71'5]

14 To gain the advantage of ground over the Lacedaemonians near Tegea, Epaminondas ordered the commander of his cavalry, with sixteen hundred men, to ride up and down, a small distance in front of the army. By this means they raised a cloud of dust, which prevented the enemy from observing his movements. Then he moved away, and took possession of the higher ground. When the Spartans saw his new position, they realised the reason for the movements of his cavalry, which they had been unable to understand beforehand. [see also: Frontinus, Str_2. 2'12]

15 In order to encourage the Thebans to make a vigorous attack on the Lacedaemonians, Epaminondas produced a large snake, and crushed its head in front of the army. "If you crush the head," he said, "you see how impotent is the rest of the body. So let us crush the head of the confederacy, that is the Laconians, and the power of their allies will become insignificant. ". The Thebans appreciated the force of his argument. They attacked and routed the Laconian phalanx; after which, the whole army of the allies immediately gave way and fled.