No More Learning

In April, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Sikkim, in May into the
Chushul area of Ladakh and in July into the Kameng Division of
NEFA. In August, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Ladakh once
again and established three checkposts, one at Nyagzu and two
near Danbuguru. In January, 1962, the Chinese crossed over near
Longju in NEFA. In April, May and June, they entered the
Chipchap and Spanggur areas of Ladakh. In July, 1962, the
Indian post in the Galwan valley was surrounded by the Chinese.
However, they did not advance further as Indian army was given
orders to defend itself in case of further Chinese advance. On 8
September, 1962, the Chinese launched a massive attack on the
NEFA border. They crossed the Thagla Ridge and intruded into
the Indian territory. On 20 September, 1962, they again opened
fire on India Guards. On 9 October, 1962, they attacked the
Indian posts on the Indian side of the Thagla Ridge. They opened
fire on Indian troops with 2" mortars, automatic weapons and hand
grenades. On 20 October, 1962, the Chinese started their big
offensive. In NEFA, the strength of the attacking forces reached
"three divisions, two from the direction of Tawang and one Divi-
sion in the direction of Kibithoo. To launch such an attack on


## p. 1005 (#1049) ##########################################

INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1005
such a large scale, one can imagine the amount of preparation they
must have undertaken. They must have been planning this for a
long time in considerable detail, and these actions in overrunning
outpost in Dhola Bridge and in occupying Thagla Ridge, must have
been with the specific aim of forcing us to react so as to give them
a good excuse for launching an attack on us” (General K. S.
Thimayya). They also attacked in the Chip Chap Valley and the
Pangong Lake areas of Ladakh. In three days, major fighting was
going on in five main areas. By 24 October, the Chinese were
well across the McMahon Line through a 25-mile wide sector to a
depth of 8 miles into the Indian territory. Kibithoo had fallen into
the hands of the enemy.
On 24 October 1962, China made a peace offer. The terms
were that the Sino-Indian border question should be settled peace-
fully. Emphas
Emphasis was put on the sanctity of the “line of actual con-
trol. ” It was suggested that the Prime Ministers of the two coun-
tries should meet and resolve the differences between the two coun-
tries. Chou En-lai observed: "What issue is there between China
and India which cannot be settled peacefully? . . . . . . China doesn't
want a single inch of India's territory. ” The reply of Nehru was:
“There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20
kilometres from what they call 'line of actual control. ' What is
this line of actual control? ' Is this the line they have created by
aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 40 or 60
kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw
20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which
can fool nobody. "
On 26 October, 1962, India declared a state of emergency. By
31 October, 1962, the Chinese had consolidated their positions in
NEFA and were poised to threaten the plains of India. On that
day, they actually launched a massive attack. Tawang fell into
their hands. Walong, Sela and Bomdila also fell into their hands
in quick succession. On the Ladakh front, Daulat Beg Oldi fell
into their hands. Chushul was attacked and its air-port was under
heavy enemy fire. Indian troops were entrenched in strong posi-
tions and put up a very gallant defence. On account of the heavy
casualties suffered by the Chinese, they give up the idea of cap-
turing Chushul.
When the Government of India was under heavy pressure from
China and there was every possibility of Assam falling into the
hands of the Chinese, Prime Minister Nehru requested the United
States and Great Britain to help him.
prompt one. There was a constant flow of arms into India from
various quarters. Help also came from Canada, West Germany
The response
was
a


## p. 1006 (#1050) ##########################################

2006
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
and Australia. It was this help which enabled the Indian troops
to stand against the Chinese and it was at this time that China
declared a unilateral cease-fire to be effective from the midnight of
21 and 22 November, 1962. When the cease-fire was declared,
"the Chinese Communist armies were in possession of mountain
gateways into the plains of Assam. . . . . . were in command of the
natural approaches through the mountains to the Brahmaputra
valley and threatened the whole of Assam and its oil fields. The
entire North-Eastern Frontier Agency area now lay under the
threat of Chinese conquest. . . . . . The Chinese in lightning conquest
had seized the crest lines and now controlled the key passes and
were moving downhill towards the crowded plains. ”
While declaring cease-fire, the Chinese announced that their
frontier guards would withdraw to positions 1272 miles behind the
lines of actual control which existed between China and India.
China was to set up check-posts on its own side of the McMahon
line to forestall the activities of the saboteurs and to maintain order.
However, on Ladakh front, the Chinese were still controlling about
12,000 sq. miles of Indian territory which included Aksai Chin
area through which the Chinese had built a strategic road linking
Sinkiang with Tibet.
Many reasons have been given for unilateral cease-fire by China.
One view is that China withdrew on account of pressure from
Moscow. The Soviet Union did not approve of the Chinese aggres-
sion against India and hence China withdrew. Another view is
that China could not maintain a long supply line on account of the
approaching winter and hence withdrew. Still another view is that
China withdrew because she feared an attack on the mainland from
the Nationalist Government in Formosa. Another view is that
there was shortage of food in China and the Chinese Government
was afraid that food supplies from Canada and Australia might be
cut off if she continued her aggression against India. The world
opinion was also against China. However, a very important reason
why China withdrew was that the Governments of the United
States and Great Britain promised India military help which enabl-
ed her to put up a stiff resistance. The military help to India was
increasing and with that her capacity to defend herself. There
were the prospects of the war being a long one and hence China
stopped the war by unilateral action.
Many reasons have been given explaining China's attack on
India. One reason was that China resented the enormous prestige
which India enjoyed in South-East Asia and also among the neu-
tral powers of the world. If India was defeated in the battle-field,
all her prestige would disappear and China would emerge as the


## p. 1007 (#1051) ##########################################

INDIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA
1007
leader of Asia. In this object, China succeeded to a very great
extent. China was also not happy with the assistance given to
India by the Soviet Union and she wanted the Soviet Union to
come into the open by either joining India or China. It is con-
tended that China was jealous of the economic progress made by
India and she would like the same to be halted. That was possible
only if India was attacked by China and thus she was forced to
divert her resources from economic development to defence expendi-
ture. China also had her greedy eyes on the oil wells of Assam.
If China had conquered Assam, she would have been in possession
of oil and hence her dependence on the Soviet Union for the supply
of oil would have been avoided.
The Chinese started withdrawing on both the fronts on 1 Decem-
ber, 1962. They returned the sick and wounded Indian prisoners.
They withdrew beyond the McMahon Line on the NEFA front.
They also withdrew from the Western Sector but set up their own
check-posts in the evacuated areas in order to strengthen their
position.
After the Chinese cease-fire, many efforts were made to resolve
the Sino-Indian dispute. A conference of the representatives of
Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, the U. A. R. and Ghana was
held at Colombo from 10 December to 12 December, 1962. The
Conference put forward the famous Colombo Proposals. Accord-
ing to them, China was to withdraw on the Ladakh front 20 kilo-
metres and India was to maintain its positions. The area evacuat-
ed by the Chinese was to be administered by joint civilian posts of
both the countries. On the Eastern Sector, the line of actual con-
trol recognized by both the countries was to serve as a cease-fire
line. As regards the middle sector, the problem was to be solved
peacefully without resorting to force. Although the proposals were
against India, yet those were accepted by this country and endorsed
by the Indian Parliament. However, China refused to accept them
on the plea that those were vague and suggested that India and
China should meet and settle the dispute. Since 1962, India has
shown her willingness to start a meaningful dialogue with China
but nothing has come out of it and China continues to occupy the
territories grabbed by her through force.
Mention must be made of certain facts concerning the war
between India and China. Prime Minister Nehru expected to get
a lot of help from the Soviet Union but the promised M. I. G.
fighter planes did not come in the hour of need. Some of them
were sent so late that those could not be used at all. The non-
aligned Afro-Asian countries remained non-aligned in the hour of
India's need and advised her to negotiate for cease-fire. The Indian


## p. 1008 (#1052) ##########################################

1008
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
troops “hurriedly called to the front and completely unfamiliar
with the terrain held. . . . . . a Chinese army five times larger in
number, preparing this attack for months and possessing fire power
atleast thrice more effective. " It was realised that Prime Minister
Nehru committed a blunder when he appointed V. K. Krishna
Menon as the Defence Minister of India in 1957 and kept him in
that post during the crucial period of 5 years from 1957 to 1962.
The latter did nothing to prepare the country for a war with China
although there were unmistakable signs and blunt warnings by men
like Dr. Raghuvira that war between India and China was inevit-
able and the existing Indian armies were no match for Chinese
armies both in numbers and efficiency. The time was wasted in
superseding one military officer by another and thereby creating
dissensions and discontentment in the armed forces of the country.
Favourites were appointed as the Chief of the Army Staff and also
the persons who were to lead the Indian army against the Chinese.
There was too much of interference from New Delhi and no initia-
tive was left with the men on the spot. It was found that India
entered the war with absolutely no preparation for it.
The relations between India and China are positively hostile.
China continues to maintain a war of nerves. She is trying to
interfere into the internal affairs of India. A lot of money is being
distributed in India by China to win over certain sections of the
people in this country. A section of the Communist Party of India
is pro-China. The Naxalites are openly in favour of China. China
is carrying on a lot of propaganda on her borders with India.
When Pakistan attacked India in 1965, China gave an ultimatum
to India that unless certain frivolous demands of that country
were conceded, China would declare war on India. However, the
,
Pakistan war ended abruptly and China did not attack India.
China knows full well that the relations of India and Pakistan are
not cordial and hence deliberately sights with Pakistan against
India. China has given a lot of military help to Pakistan so that
the same may be used against a common enemy, India.
PAKISTAN
The relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial.
In October, 1947, the tribal raiders backed by Pakistan attacked the
State of Jammu and Kashmir. When the latter acceded to India,
Indian troops were flown to Kashmir to halt the invasion and ulti-
mately the raiders were successfully driven out of the Kashmir
Valley. However, the problem of Kashmir was not solved and
it has been the bone of contention between the two countries. Vari-


## p. 1009 (#1053) ##########################################

INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1009
ous resolutions and missions of the United Nations have failed to
solve the tangle.
Pakistan has complained on many occasion that she is affraid
of an attack from India and that is why she has to put emphasis
on military preparedness. That also is the reason why Pakistan
has joined the Cento and the Seato. That is also the reason
why Pakistan entered into an agreement with the U. S. A. in 1954
by which she was to get a lot of military help from the United
States. Another justification is also put forward to explain her
friendship with China and the receipt of military help from that
country. However, all these assertions of Pakistan are without any
substance. India had to face an attack from China in 1962 and
from Pakistan in 1965 and she has to arm herself in self-defence.
India had requested Pakistan many a time to make a “no war”
declaration but it is Pakistan which has refused to do so. India
has no ambition against Pakistan and in spite of it Liaquat Ali
Khan followed the “clenched fist” policy towards India. There
was no substance in the allegation of Feroze Khan Noon that India
was the only enemy of Pakistan. He should not have threatened
India that he would “let loose the hordes of tribesmen who had
thoroughly devastated the part of Kashmir during the autumn of
1947. ” Alama Mashriqi, the Khaksar leader, is said to have re-
marked on 2 January, 1957: “Just as dawn of the day after every
night is certain, similarly downfall of the present Bharati Govern-
ment is a settled fact. Forces of history have ordained that I should
direct the energies of the Muslims to the right channel and thus
realise the 900-year-old prediction of Nematullah Shah Wali as
also of Hindu astrologers that Bharat is to lose tremendously in this
year. Hindus and Sikhs are looking for liberation. ”
The Indus Basin Water dispute strained the relations between
the two countries but the same was ultimately settled amicably by
the Indus Waters Treaty signed by the Governments of Pakistan
and India on 19 September 1960. The Treaty allocated the waters
of the rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India with certain exceptions.
The main exception was that during the transitional period when
the works were being constructed in Pakistan for the replacement
of the Eastern river water, India would continue to deliver water
to Pakistan from her rivers. The transitional period was to last
ten years but the same could be extended for three more years.
The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were to be for the
use of Pakistan and India undertook to let flow for the unrestricted
use of Pakistan all the waters of those three rivers subject to the
condition that some of those waters could be used by India in areas
upstream of the Pakistan border for the development of irrigation,
a


## p. 1010 (#1054) ##########################################

1010
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
electric power and certain other specific uses. Pakistan was to
construct during the transitional period a system of works, a part
of which was to replace from the Western rivers those irrigation
uses in Pakistan which had hitherto been met from the Eastern
rivers. India was to contribute to the Indus Basin Development Fund
£62,000,000 in ten equal instalments. The total cost of construc-
tion was to be about £380 millions of which approximately £310
million were to be spent on works in Pakistan and approximately £70
millions on works in India. The money was to come from the
contributions to be made by India, Australia, Canada, Germany,
New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States, proceeds
of a United States Government Loan to Pakistan, proceeds of a
World Bank Loan to Pakistan and some contribution to be made
by Pakistan. The Treaty provided for a permanent Indus Com-
mission which was to have general responsibility for implementing
the terms of the Treaty and reconcile any points of disagreement
that might arise. If differences or disputes between the parties
could not be resolved by agreement, the same were to be referred
to a neutral expert for final decision on technical questions. The
matter could also be taken to a Court of Arbitration.
In spite of the Treaty, the relations between the two countries
did not improve. When India was attacked by China in 1962,
Pakistan showed her sympathies for China. After 1962, Pakistan
started following the politico-military tactics of the Chinese against
India. Cease-fire violations in Kashmir became a common feature.
There were 448 cease-fire violations in Kashmir in 1963, 1,522 in
1964 and 1,800 in 1965 up to the end of July. In April, 1965,
Pakistan tried to occupy Kutch, but the matter was ultimately
referred to arbitration. Pakistan also tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road and as that was India's life-line to Ladakh, India replied by
occupying two important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil on
16 May, 1965. India withdrew her armies from the two Pakistani
posts when she was given a guarantee of security by the United
Nations.
On 4 August, 1965, armed Pakistanis in civilian clothes crossed
the cease-fire line in thousands and mixed with the native popula-
tion of Kashmir on the Indian side. India got the information
from one Mohammad Din, a shepherd, who was bribed by the
Pakistani military officials to supply them information regarding the
location of Indian grain stores, transport depots etc. so that they
may be able to destroy them. Mohammed Din alerted the police
about the presence of “out soldiers. ” Pakistani infiltration went on
steadily from 5 August onwards but the Kashmir Muslims gave
the infiltrators no quarter. On 7 August, Pakistani commandoes


## p. 1011 (#1055) ##########################################

INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1011
9
with grenades, guns and detonators took up positions throughout
the valley of Kashmir. On 9 August, the news broke out that
major moves had been made across the border into Kashmir.
Within a few days, it was an open secret. Referring to the events
of 7 and 8 August, in the Baramula sector, General Nimmo, Chief
of the U. N. observers team, reported that “the observers interviewed
one of the captured raiders who stated that he was a soldier of the
16th Azad Kashmir infantry and that the raiding party was com-
posed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and hundred Mujahids
(armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics). ” Writing from Rawal-
pindi, the Times correspondent reported on 31st August that "there
can be no doubt that the guerilla action in Kashmir results from
infiltration from this (Pakistan) side in an operation conceived,
planned and directed by the Government of Pakistan. ” The Daily
Telegraph reported that the “most likely reason for Pakistan's ac-
tion in sending the infiltrators into Kashmir seems to be the realiza-
tion by Pakistan that it was futile to place any reliance on the local
population and that the only way to keep the Kashmir question
alive was to send in groups of well armed intruders for sabotage
and general guerilla warfare.
” William Patterson wrote on 13
October, 1965: "The armed infiltrators Pakistan began sending
into Kashmir last August were to inspire local uprisings. . . . . . The
Pakistan army, poised and waiting, was then to respond to pleas
from ‘our Kashmir brothers' for protection against Indian brutality,
and was to sweep through Kashmir on a mission of mercy right to
the Indian frontier. There it was to halt while President Ayub
Khan presented the world with a fait accompli. . . . . . the strategy
was to mix force with appeals to the United Nations for peace. . . .
in order to consolidate politically the armed seizure of Kashmir. ”
8 August, 1965, was the annual festival day of Pir Dastgir Sahib,
a local saint of Srinagar. Pakistani infiltrators hoped to join the
pilgrim crowd and make that day the day of Kashmir's deliverance
from India. However, the invasion miscarried and Srinagar whose
fall was reported to be imminent, was safe in the hands of India.
On the night of 14 August, 1965, some Pakistani infiltrators got
into within a few miles of Srinagar and set fire to Batmalu. "Pakis-
tani radio broadcast this jubilantly but later insisted that the Indian
army had set fire to this quarter when it realized that its confession
of arson was not going to be kindly received by those who had
been rendered homeless. "
Once again, Pakistan deliberately tried to cut the Srinagar-Leh
road. The result was that on 15 August, India recaptured the two
important Pakistani posts overlooking Kargil and also occupied
another vital post to prevent Pakistan from doing mischief in that


## p. 1012 (#1056) ##########################################

1012
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
“highly sensitive sector. ” On the night of 24-25 August, the de-
tachments of the Indian Army crossed over into Azad Kashmir to
occupy the Pakistani outposts in the Tithwal sector and on 27-28
August into the Uri-Poonch area to secure vantage positions,
amongst them the Haji Pir Pass which overlooks the routes the
infiltrators took to come into the State of Kashmir.
The authorities in Pakistan were under the impression that after
the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, no great leader was left in India
and hence it was the time to attack India. It was believed that
India was defended by an ill-equipped army lacking in physical
strength and moral courage. The Pakistani soldiers took pride in
the fact that they were infinitely superior to the Indian soldiers.
Pakistan was sure of support from her Allies. Pakistan felt that
she was in stronger position on account of her membership of the
Seato and the Cento. She was also certain of help from Commun-
ist China against India India was considered to be a land of
Banias or shopkeepers who could not stand against the Pathans of
Pakistan. Such was the psychological background with which
Pakistan attacked India in September, 1965.
At dawn on 1 September, 1965, tanks of Pakistan's Armoured
Division rumbled across the Indian border in the Akhnoor sector
in Jammu with the objective of cutting off a Jaurian, India's main-
link with Jammu and the entire valley of Kashmir and Ladakh.
Pakistan was more advantageously situated than India to use her
tanks with telling effect. It was not possible for India to move in
her heavy armour beyond Akhnoor. Even if it was possible, it was
not prudent to do so. Consequently, the Indian troops fell back
in a series of planned withdrawals behind Chhamb. A day later,
,
the enemy came in water-proof jeeps and tanks with sealed engines.
At this stage, the aid of the Indian Air Force was sought and with-
in 45 minutes as many as 28 sorties were flown in 7 missions. The
Indian Air Force did a wonderful job. It knocked out 13 enemy
tanks. The ground fire disabled five tanks. Pakistan also called
in its Air Force but her Sabres were no match for Indian Gnats.
Pakistani drive to Akhnoor was temporarily halted on 1 September,
1965.
On 2 September, 1965, U Thant appealed to both India and
Pakistan for a cease-fire. He frankly told the Security Council
that he was not able to get from Pakistan “any assurance that the
cease-fire and the cease-fire line will be respected henceforth. ” On
4 September, the Security Council formally called for a cease-fire.
India was willing to accept a cease-fire provided Pakistan withdrew
from Chhamb and pulled out the infiltrators from Kashmir and
also promised not to do so again.


## p. 1013 (#1057) ##########################################

INDIA AND PAKISTAN
1013
2
war.
Marshal Chen-i, the Foreign Minister of China, flew to Karachi
on 4 September and conferred with Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr.
Bhutto for 6 hours. The Chinese Marshal openly supported the
"just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provoca-
tion in Kashmir. ” On 5 September, a Pakistani Sabre made an
unsuccessful low level attack on certain key Air Force installations
in the Amritsar area. The situation was really grave.
It was at this stage that India decided to hit back. On 9 Sep-
tember, 1965, Indian troops opened two new fronts, one against
Pakistan's Sialkot sector and the other across the border at Gadra
in Rajasthan. The Indian offensive in Lahore sector was carried
up to the Ichogil Canal. It was found that Pakistan had built
up in this area military structures which must have taken her
years to do so.
That showed that Pakistan was making prepara-
tions for a war with India for years. In the Lahore sector, the
battles were fought between the Indian border and the Ichogil
Canal. There were attacks and counter-attacks. India was able
to capture Dograi and Burki. No attempt was made to capture
Lahore as this would have been given back to Pakistan after the
India concentrated on destroying the war potential and mili-
tary machine of Pakistan.
Two battles deserve special treatment, one at Asal-uttar and the
other at Phillora. The Pakistani soldiers were well poised for at-
tack at Kasur and they attacked the Indians with all their vigour
and strength. The Indian army was forced to fall back under
heavy pressure. The Indian troops took up new positions at the
head of a fort at Khem Karan bordering on the village of Asal-
uttar. The Pakistanis felt that the Indian troops were running
away and it was the most opportune time to attack them. The
battle was fought at Asal-uttar. There are two meanings of this
word, 'true north' and 'the real answer. ' India won a splendid
victory at Asal-Uttar. “Pakistan had lost 97 tanks, a large number
of them pattons, of which 9 were captured intact and two were
surrendered with crew. Ten lieutenant-colonels, six majors, six
other officers and several other ranks were captured in this engage-
ment. This was indeed a real answer. "
In the Sialkot sector, a series of tank battles took place. As a
matter of fact, the tank battle continued for fifteen days without
break. The decisive battle was fought at Phillora on 11 September.
The Indians destroyed as many as 66 enemy tanks on that single
day and won a victory.
When the cease-fire took elfect at 3-30 A. M. on 23 September,
1965, the Indian forces held a salient of 180 sq. miles, only 4,000
yards from Sialkot. 243 enemy tanks had been destroyed. The


## p. 1014 (#1058) ##########################################

1014
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
Indian Air Force had tried to draw the Pakistan Air Force into
battle but the latter avoided the challange and continued to bom-
bard indiscriminately targets in India. The St. Paul's Cathedral
in Ambala was razed to the ground by a Pakistani bomb. The
Military Hospital in Ambala was bombed on 18 September. The
Jodhpur Jail Hospital was bombed on 22 September. On 15 Sep-
tember, there were as many as 10 air raids on Amritsar in one
single day. Many attacks were made on Delhi. The industrial
town near Amritsar (Chhiarta) was bombed on the night the cease-
fire took place and a lot of damage was done to life and property.
On 11 September, every nook and corner of the residence of Kewal
Singh, India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, in Karachi was
searched. On 13 September, the India Chancery in Karachi was
searched for 7 hours, in violation of the principles of international
law. Pakistan Air Force attacked a small, unarmed civil aircraft
flying in the Indian territory and that resulted in the death of the
Chief Minister of Gujarat who was travelling in that aeroplane.
When the war was still going on between India and Pakistan,
China issued a three-day ultimatum to India on 16 September, 1965.
The Chinese allegations were that there were Indian military struc-
tures on the Tibet side of Sikkim-Tibet border, that the Indians
had committed the theft of 59 yak and 800 sheep. The ultimatum
was extended for another three-days and then withdrawn. The
Chinese armies marched up and down the several passes and Indian
posts in Sikkim. Probably, the object of the Chinese move was to
frighten India and help Pakistan in her war against India. It may
be that its object was to encourage Pakistan to continue her war
with India.
India was willing to accept cease-fire from 6-30 P. M. on 14 Sep-
tember as originally proposed by U Thant. However, it was Pakis-
tan who wavered. The Chinese ultimatum did not give Pakistan
what she desired. She wanted to link up the cease-fire with the
settlement of Kashmir but this was not agreeable to India who
considered Kashmir as an integral part of India and hence not
within the purview of the Security Council to discuss it. On 10
October, 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri declared:
“Pakistan may give up all talk of Kashmir so that, during that
period, she may regain her poise and composure in order to forget
about Kashmir. "
Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union invited Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan to Tashkent to iron out
differences between India and Pakistan and on 10 January, 1966
was issued the famous Tashkent Declaration under the signatures
of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Field Marshal Avub Khan. India and


## p. 1015 (#1059) ##########################################

INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS
1015
Pakistan declared their firm resolve to restore normal and peace-
ful relations between their countries and to promote understanding
and friendly relations between their people. They considered the
attainment of those objectives of vital importance for the welfare
of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan. It was agreed
that the armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn
not later than 25 February, 1966 to the positions they held prior
to 5 August, 1965, and both sides were to observe the cease-fire
terms. It was agreed that the relations between the two countries
shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of each other. Both sides were to discourage any propa-
ganda directed against the other country and were to encourage
propaganda which promoted the development of friendly relations
between the two countries. The diplomatic relations were to be
restored between the two countries. Steps were to be taken to-
wards the restoration of economic and trade relations. Prisoners
of war were to be repatriated. There were to be meetings both at
the highest and other levels on matters of common concern to both
the countries.
In spite of the Tashkent Declaration, the relations between India
and Pakistan are not normal. Petty pin-pricks continue between
the two countries day after day. Although four years have pass-
ed, no trade relations have been established between the two coun-
tries and Pakistan continues to carry on propaganda that India is
her enemy No. 1. This is most unfortunate.
NEPAL
as
Nepal lies between India and China and serves a buffer
between the two countries. More than 80% of her population con-
sists of Hindus and the rest are Muslims and Buddhists. Up to
1949, Nepal was ruled by the Ranas and the King was merely a
puppet in their hands. There was a revolt in 1949 and King Tri-
bhuvan sought asylum in the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu. The
Ranas were forced to give up power and a popular Government was
installed.
King Tribhuvan died in 1955 and he was succeeded by King
Mohindra. The new King dismissed the popular ministry and
abrogated the Constitution. Many popular leaders were arrested
but some of them escaped to India from where they started their
raids on the Nepalese territory. This resulted in a lot of bitterness
between the two countries. King Mohindra visited Peking in 1961
and entered into an agreement with China for the construction of
a highway connecting Kathmandu with Lhasa. That agreement


## p. 1016 (#1060) ##########################################

1016
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
was not liked by the Indian Government. There was a border
agreement between China and Nepal in 1962 by which China was
able to claim some territory which formerly was under Nepal. In
the same year, King Mohindra visited Delhi and there was a frank
exchange of views between the two countries. India promised not
to allow the rebels to operate from the Indian territory. During
the Indo-Chinese War in 1962, Nepal was neutral. However, the
relations between Nepal and India improved after 1962 as India
began to re-organise her armed forces and became a strong country
militarily. India attaches great importance to friendship with
Nepal but she has to counter Chinese influence in Nepal in every
field. Only recently, Shri Dinesh Singh, Foreign Minister of India,
visited Nepal on a good-will mission but in spite of that new diffi-
culties have cropped up (July 1969).
BHUTAN
The relations between India and Bhutan were governed by the
treaties of 1865 and 1900. On 8 August, 1949, India entered into a
new treaty of perpetual peace and friendship with Bhutan under
which India was not to interfere with the internal administration
of that country. Bhutan agreed to be guided by India in regard
to her external relations. The Government of India gave to Bhutan
the territory known as Dewanagari and also raised the annual sub-
sidy to Rs. 5 lakhs. During a visit to Bhutan on 23 December,
1958, Prime Minister Nehru pointedly said, “In the event of any
aggression against Bhutan by any country, India would consider it
an act of aggression against herself and act accordingly. "
SIKKIM
In 1947 when India became free, the relations between India
and Sikkim were governed by a Stand-still agreement. In March
1950, a provisional agreement was made between the two coun-
tries. On 5 December, 1950, another treaty was entered into
between the two countries. Sikkim was to be a protectorate of
India. She was to enjoy internal autonomy but the Government
of India was to be responsible for her defence, external relations and
communications. India was to pay Rs. 3 lakhs every year to Sikkim.
On 15 February, 1961, Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Par-
liament that "any kind of incursion into Sikkim or Bhutan will be
considered an incursion into India and we shall abide by the assur-
ances we have given to them. ”


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INDIA AND INDONESIA
1017
INDONESIA
India played an important part in securing the independence of
indonesia. After her independence, the relations between India
and Indonesia were cordial. Both the President of India and Prime
Minister of India visited Indonesia. Likewise, India was visited
by President Soekarno and the various Prime Ministers of that
country. On the initiative of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Bandung Con-
ference was held in Indonesia in April, 1955. However, the rela-
tions between the two countries got strained when Indonesia came
under the influence of Peking. During the Indo-Pakistan War of
1965, Indonesia gave Pakistan military help. This anti-Indian
attitude continued till the overthrow of President Soekarno. Things
have changed under President Suharto. The Government of India
has given a loan to the new Government of Indonesia and at pre-
sent (1969), the relations between the two countries are cordial.
ISRAF!
On account of the pro-Arab attitude of the Government of India,
the State of Israel was not recognised by her for some time and the
same was done on 17 September, 1950. In spite of that, Israel
was allowed to have only a Consul-General in India to operate
from Bombay. During the war between Israel and the U. A. R. in
June 1967, India held Israel guilty of aggression and supported
President Nasser. It appears that in view of the hostile attitude
of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran and Turkey towards India during
the Indo-Pakistan war, India must put Israel on a footing of equal-
ity with other countries having diplomatic relations with India.
In May, 1969, on the occasion of the death of Dr. Zakir Husain,
the Consul-General of Israel in India complained of the shabby
treatment meted out to him when he went to put a wreath on the
dead body of the President of India.
MALAYASIA
When India was attacked by China in 1962, Tunku Abdul Rah-
man, Prime Minister of Malaya, was in India. In spite of the fact
that there is a large Chinese population in his own country, Tunku
Abdul Rahman denounced the Chinese invasion of India which "aim-
ed at showing Communist China's strength and might to impress the
smaller nations. ” On 1 November, 1962, he declared in Singapu.
that in the event of a war between India and China, his country
would give India "all-out support. ” However, the attitude of


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1018
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1909
India towards Malayasia was not proper when she was confronted
by Indonesia and the Philippines. India refused to commit herself
to help Malayasia.
The present position of India is that she finds herself in a difficult
position. She does not belong to any camp. No world power can
rely upon her and consequently India also cannot rely upon any
Great Power in the hour of her necd. They may help her if their
own interests so demand. The U. S. A. came to her help in Octoher
1962, although she was not bound to do so. It is well known that
when the Indian Government sounded the United States on 17
September, 1965, the United States refused to commit herself to
come to the help of India in the event of a war between India
and China. Likewise, India must never forget that on 25 Octo-
ber, 1962, the Soviet Union also wavered in her attitude towards
India and actually showed her sympathy for the Chinese cause.
Indian leaders keep on harping on a policy of non-alignment in the
face of a dual danger from China and Pakistan. This is partiu-
larly so when it is conceded by all the intelligent persons in the
country that India alone is no match for Communist China. The
leaders of India, both inside and outside the Government, must
realise that it is a suicidal policy and the earlier it is changed the
better.