Pompeius
reportedwttlthe senatg
76.
76.
The history of Rome; tr. with the sanction of the ... v.4. Mommsen, Theodor, 1817-1903
The Optimates in Rome sneered at the wretched emigrant, the runaway from the Italian army, the last of the robber-band of Carbo ; the sorry taunt recoiled upon its authors.
The masses that had been brought into the field against Sertorius were reckoned, including the Spanish general levy, at 120,000 infantry, 2000 archers and slingers, and 6000 cavalry.
Against this enormous superiority of force Sertorius had not only held his ground in a series of successful conflicts and victories, but had also reduced the greater part of Spain under his power.
In the Further province Metellus found himself confined to the districts immediately occupied by his troops; here all the tribes, who could, had taken the side of Sertorius.
In the Hither province, after the victories of Hirtuleius, there no longer existed a Roman army.
Emissaries of Sertorius roamed
the whole territory of Gaul; there, too, the tribes began to stir, and bands gathering together began to make the Alpine passes insecure. Lastly the sea too belonged quite as much to the insurgents as to the legitimate govern ment, since the allies of the former—the pirates—were almost as powerful in the Spanish waters as the Roman ‘ships of war. At the promontory of Diana (now Denia, between Valencia and Alicante) Sertorius established for the corsairs a fixed station, where they partly lay in wait for such Roman ships as were conveying supplies to the Roman maritime towns and the army, partly carried away or delivered goods for the insurgents, and partly formed their medium of intercourse with Italy and Asia Minor. The constant readiness of these men moving to and fro to carry everywhere sparks from the scene of conflagration tended
in a high degree to excite apprehension, especially at a time when so much combustible matter was everywhere accumulated in the Roman empire.
Amidst this state of matters the sudden death of Sulla
through
CHAP- l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 287
took place (676). So long as the man lived, at whose Death [1: voice a trained and trustworthy army of veterans was ready
any moment to rise, the oligarchy might tolerate the conse almost (as it seemed) definite abandonment of the Spanish quences' provinces to the emigrants, and the election of the leader
of the opposition at home to be supreme magistrate, at all events as transient misfortunes; and in their shortsighted way, yet not wholly without reason, might cherish con fidenoe either that the opposition would not venture to proceed to open conflict, or that, if it did venture, he who
had twice saved the oligarchy would set it up a third time. Now the state of things was changed. The democratic Hotspurs in the capital, long impatient of the endless delay and inflamed by the brilliant news from Spain, urged that a blow should be struck; and Lepidus, with whom the decision for the moment lay, entered into the proposal with all the zeal of a renegade and with his own character istic frivolity. For a moment it seemed as if the torch which kindled the funeral pile of the regent would also kindle civil war; but the influence of Pompeius and the
temper of the Sullan veterans induced the opposition to let the obsequies of the regent pass over in peace.
Yet all the more openly were arrangements thenceforth
made to introduce a fresh revolution. Daily the Forum 32,31; resounded with accusations against the “mock Romulus”
and his executioners. Even before the great potentate
had closed his eyes, the overthrow of the Sullan constitu
tion, the re-establishment of the distributions of grain, the reinstating of the tribunes of the people in their former position, the recall of those who were banished contrary to
law, the restoration of the confiscated lands, were openly
indicated by Lepidus and his adherents as the objects at which they aimed. Now communications were entered into with the proscribed; Marcus Perpenna, governor of Sicily in the days of Cinna 92), arrived in the capital.
Insurrec
(p.
288 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
The sons of those whom Sulla had declared guilty of treason*on whom the laws of the restoration bore with intolerable severity—and generally the more noted men of Marian views were invited to give their accession. Not a few, such as the young Lucius Cinna, joined the move ment; others, however, followed the example of Gaius Caesar, who had returned home from Asia on receiving the accounts of the death of Sulla and of the plans of Lepidus, but after becoming more accurately acquainted with the character of the leader and of the movement prudently withdrew. Carousing and recruiting went on in behalf of Lepidus in the taverns and brothels of the capital. At length a conspiracy against the new order of things was concocted among the Etruscan malcontents. 1
All this took place under the eyes of the government The consul Catulus as well as the more judicious Opti mates urged an immediate decisive interference and suppression of the revolt in the bud ; the indolent majority, however, could not make up their minds to begin the
struggle, but tried to deceive themselves as long as possible by a system of compromises and concessions. Lepidus also on his part at first entered into it. The suggestion, which proposed a restoration of the prerogatives taken away from the tribunes of the people, he as well as his col league Catulus repelled. On the other hand, the Gracchan distribution of grain was to a limited extent re-established. According to it not all (as according to the Sempronian law) but only a definite number-—presumably 4o,ooo— of the poorer burgesses appear to have received the earlier
as Gracchus had fixed them, of five moa'ii monthly at the price of 6% arrer (3d. )—a regulation which occasioned to the treasury an annual net loss of at least
1 The following narrative rests substantially on the account of Licini anus, which, fragmentary as it is at this very point, still givu important information as to the insurrection of Lepidus.
largesses,
CRAP. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 289
£40,000. ‘ The opposition, naturally as little satisfied as it was decidedly emboldened by this partial concession, displayed all the more rudeness and violence in the capital; and in Etruria, the true centre of all insurrections of the Italian proletariate, civil war already broke out, the dispossessed Faesulans resumed possession of their lost estates by force of arms, and several of the veterans settled there by Sulla perished in the tumult. The senate on learning what had occurred resolved to send the two consuls thither, in order to raise troops and suppress the insurrection. ‘z It was impossible to adopt a more irra
1 Under the year 676 Licinianus states (p. 23, Pertz; p. 42, Bonn); 78, (Lepidu: f) [lelgem frummtarzIam] nullo rerirtant: )[argz'jtur :41, ut ann0n[ae] quinque modi popu[la da]rmtur. According to this account, therefore, the law of the consuls of 681 Marcus Terentius Lucullus and 73,
Gaius Cassius Varus, which Cicero mentions (in Verr. iii. 70, I36; v. 2:, 52), and to which also Sallust refers (Hirt. iii. 61, 19 Dietsch), did not first re-establish the five modii, but only secured the largesses of grain by regu lating the purchases of Sicilian corn, and perhaps made various alterations of detaiL That the Sempronian law (iii. 344) allowed every burgess domiciled in Rome to share in the largesses of grain, is certain. But the later distri bution of grain was not so extensive as this, for, seeing that the monthly corn of the Roman burgesses amounted to little more than 33,000 medimm'
=198,ooo modz'i (Cic. Verr. iii. 30, 72), only some 40,000 burgesses at that time received grain, whereas the number of burgesses domiciled in the capital was certainly far more considerable. This arrangement probably proceeded from the Octavian law, which introduced instead of the ex travagant Sempronian amount “a moderate largess, tolerable for the state and necessary for the common people" (Cic. d: 015 21, 72, Brut. 62, 222) and to all appearance this very law that the lexfrumen {aria mentioned by Licinianus. That Lepidus should have entered into such a proposal of compromise, accords with his attitude as regards the restoration of the tribunate. It likewise in keeping with the circum stances that the democracy should find itself not at all satisfied by the regulation, brought about in this way, of the distribution of grain (Sallust, 1. 0. The amount of loss calculated on the basis of the grain being worth at least double (iii. 344); when piracy or other causes drove up the price of grain, a far more considerable loss must have resulted.
From the fragments of ‘the account of Licinianus (p. 44, Bonn) plain that the decree of the senate, uti Lepidur :t Calulur decretir exer n'tibur maturrime proficz'rcerentur (Sallust, Hirt. 44 Dietsch), to be understood not of a despatch of the consuls before the expiry of their consulship to their proconsular provinces, for which there would have been no reason, but of their being sent to Etruria against the revolted Faesulans, just as in the Catilinarian war the consul Gaius Antonius was dapatched to the same quarter. The statement of Philippus in Sallust
110
(Hist.
VOL IV
48, that Lepidus ob . redz'lionem provinciam cum exercitu adtplus
i. 4)
;
i.
is
it is
’
is
is
it is
is
ii.
=90
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND aoorc v
tional course. The senate, in presence of the insurrec tion, evinced its pusillanimity and its fears by the re establishment of the com-law; in order to be relieved from a street-riot, it furnished the notorious head of the insurrection with an army; and, when the two consuls were bound by the most solemn oath which could be contrived not to turn the arms entrusted to them against each other, it must have required the superhuman obduracy of oligarchic consciences to think of erecting such a bulwark against the impending insurrection. Of course Lepidus armed in Etruria not for the senate, but for the insurrec tion—sarcastically declaring that the oath which he had taken bound him only for the current year. The senate put the oracular machinery in motion to induce him to return, and committed to him the conduct of the impend ing consular elections; but Lepidus evaded compliance, and, while messengers passed to and fro and the official year drew to an end amidst proposals of accommodation, his force swelled to an army. When at length, in the
77o beginning of the following year (677), the definite order of the senate was issued to Lepidus to return without delay, the proconsul haughtily refused obedience, and de manded in his turn the renewal of the former tribunician power, the reinstatement of those who had been forcibly ejected from their civic rights and their property, and, besides this, his own re-election as consul for the current year or, in other words, the zj’ranm'r in legal form.
Thus war was declared. The senatorial party could
Outbreak
of the war. reckon, in addition to the Sullan veterans whose civil exist
ence was threatened by Lepidus, upon the army assembled by the proconsul Catulus; and so, in compliance with the
urgent warnings
of the more sagacious, particularly of
at, is entirely in harmony with this view; for the extraordinary consular wmrnand in Etruria was just as much a prom‘rwia u the ordinary pra oonsular command in Narbonese Gaul.
can. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 291
Philippus, Catulus was entrusted by the senate with the defence of the capital and the repelling of the main force of the democratic party stationed in Etruria. At the same time Gnaeus Pompeius was despatched with another corps
tgwsst from
his former protégé the valley of the Po, which was held by Lepidus’ lieutenant, Marcushlirutus.
While Pompeius speedily
and shut up the enemy’s general closely in Mutina, Lepidus_ appeared before the capital in order to conquer it for the revolution as Marius had formerly done by storm.
The “right bank of thewfl‘iberwfellwwhollyv into vhiswpower, and'he' was gEBTé’Eéen ‘to cross the river. The decisive
battle waswfdught on the Campus Martius, close under the
walls of the city. But Catulus conquered ;v and Lepidus Lepidus was compelled toretrggt to ‘Etruria, while another division, defeated. underhi's‘son Scipio, threw itself into the fortress of Alba. Thereupon the rising was substantially at an end. Mutina surwgmpgiji; and Brutus was, notwithstand
ing the safe-conduct promised to him, subsequently put
to death by order of that general. Alba too was, after a
long siege, reduced by famine, and the leader there was
likewise executed. Lepidus, pressed on two sides by
Catulus and Pompeius, fought another engagement on the
Etruria in order merely to procure the means of retreatfafi'd’theii embarked at the port of Cosa for Sardinia,
from which point he hoped to cut off the supplies of the
capital, and to obtain communication with the Spanish insurgents. But the governor of the island opposed to
him a vigorous resistance; and he himself died, not long Death of after his landing, of consumption (677), whereupon the Lepidus. war in Sardinia came to an end. A part of his soldiers dispersed; with the flower of the insurrectionary army
and with a well-filled chest the late praetor, Marcus Perpenna, proceeded to Liguria, and thence to Spain to
join the Seitorians.
c‘dagtbf
aCCOmpllSlledg_l'll§m commission
Pompeius mom
command in Spain.
The oligarchy was thus victorious over Lepidus; but it found itself compelled by the dangérbifsmr the SEELw torian wvarto concessions, which violated the letter as well as the “spirit of the Sullan constitution. It was absolutely
:92
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
‘mu-wu
necessary to send7 gawstfong army and an able generali to
Spain; and. Pompeius indicated, very plainly,v that he desired, or rather demanded, this cornmjgjon. The pre tensio‘rY‘wa's bold. Itgwas already had enough that they had allowed this secret‘ opponent agaiiiFattaimanmextra ordinary command in the pressuie of the hepidiaiivtr‘eivolu tion; but it was far more hazardous, in disregard of all the rules instituted by Sulla for the magisterial hieraifqhy, to invest a man who had hitherto filled no civil oflice with one of the most important ordinary proyincialgvqggrnworships, under'circumstances in which the observance of the legal term of a year was not to be thought of. The oligarchy had thus, even apart from the respect due to their general Metellus, good reason to oppose with all earnestness this new attempt of the ambitious youth to perpetuate his exceptional position. But this was not easy. In the first place, they had not a single man fitted for the diflicult post of general inSp’a‘Hin. ‘ 'mtfla'é'fgfiiié' consuls 6f1h€§é§r showed any desire to measure himself against Sertorius; and what Lucius Philippus said in a full meeting of the senate had to be admitted as too true—that, a‘nigpgaailihe senators of note, not one was able and willing to command in a seriousyyar. Yet they might, perhaps, have got over this, and after the manner of oligarchs, when they had no capable candidate, have filled the place with some sort of makeshift, if Pompeius had merely desired the command and had not demanded it at the head of angarrny. He had already rent a deaf ear to the injunctions of Catulus that he shouldwdismissmtglgguagm ; it was at least doubtful whethe'r'those of the senate would find a better reception, and the consequences of a breach no one could calculate
CHAP. l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 293
—the scale of aristocracy might very easily mount up, if the sword of a well-known general were thrown into the
scale. So the majority resolved on concession. Not from the people, which constitutionally ought to have been consulted in a case where a private man was to be invested with the supreme magisterial power, but from the séiia‘t'e, Pompeius received proconsular authority
chief v epfiirfiind‘in Hither Spain; and, forty days after he had 'received crossed the Alps in the summer of 677. 77.
First of all the new general found employment in Gaul, Pompeius where no formal insurrection had broken out, but serioushuGmL disturbances of the peace had occurred at several places;
in consequence of which Pompeius deprived the cantons of
the Volcae-Arecomici and the Helvii of their independence,
and placed them under Massilia. He also laid out new
road over the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre, 258), and
so established a shorter communication between the valley
of the Po and Gaul. Amidst this work the best season of
the year passed away; was not till late in autumn that Pompeius crossed the Pyrenees.
Sertorius had meanwhile not been idle. He had de spatched Hirtuleius into the Further province to keep Metellus in check, and had himself endeavoured to follow up his complete victory in the Hither province, and to
for the reception of Pompeius. The isolated Celtiberian towns there, which still adhered to Rome, were attacked and reduced one after another; at last, in the very middle of winter, the strong Contrebia (south-east of Saragossa) had fallen. In vain the hard-pressed towns had sent message after message to Pompeius; would not be
opposite
prepare
any entreaties to depart from his wonted ,rut of slowly advancing. With the exception of the maritime towns, which were defended the Roman fleet, and the
induced
of the Indigetes and Laletani in the north-east corner of Spain, where Pompeius established himself after
Appear.
2:35;“, in Spain.
districts
andwthe
"
by
by
he
it
ii.
a
r)
\v
it,
294
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND 8001! v
he had at length crossed the Pyrenees, and made his raw troops bivouac throughout the winter to inure them to hardships, the whole of Hither Spain had at the end of
77. 677 become by treaty or force dependent on Sertorius, and the district on the upper and middle Ebro thenceforth continued the main stay of his power. Even the appre hension, which the fresh Roman force and the celebrated name of the general excited in the army of the insurgents, had a salutary effect on Marcus Perpenna, who hitherto as the equal of Sertorius in rank had claimed an inde
command over the force which he had brought with him from Liguria, was, on the news of the arrival of Pompeius in Spain, compelled by his soldiers to place himself under the orders of his ables colleague.
{Ear the campaign of 678 Sertorius again employed the corpslof Hirtuleius against Metellus, while Perpenna with strong army took up his position along the lower course
of the Ebro to prevent Pompeius from crossing the river, he should march, as was to be expected, in southerly
direction with the view of effecting junction with Metellus, and along the coast for the sake of procuring supplies for his troops‘; The corps of Gaius Herennius was destined to the immediate support of Perpenna farther inland on the upper Ebro, Sertorius in person prosecuted meanwhile the subjugation of several districts friendly to Rome, and held himself at the same time ready to hasten according to circumstances to the aid of Perpenna or Hirtuleius. It was still his intention to avoid any pitched battle, and to anno the enemy by petty conflicts and cutting off supplies.
Ebmpeius, however, forced the passageioifwthe Ebro against Perpenna and took up position on the river Pallantias, near Saguntum, whence, as we have already said, the Sertorians maintained their communications with Italy and the It was time that Sertorius should appear in persona, asn? throw the superiority of his numbers
pendent
Pompeius defeated.
76.
a;a
if
a
a
it.
CHAP. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 295
and of his genius into the scale against the greater excellence of the soldiers of his opponent. For a considerable time the struggle was concentrated around the town of Lauro (on the ' Xucar, south of Valencia), which had declared for Pompeius and was on that account besieged by Sertorius.
himself to the utmost to relieve it; but, after several of his divisions had already been assailed
Pompeiusgxerted
separately and cut to pieces, the great warrior found himsel
—just when he thought that he had surrounded the Ser "Tl-W.
\. v torians, and when he had already invited the besieged to
be spectators of the capture of the besieging army-—all owfwakm sudden completelyoutmanoeuvred; and in order that he might name himself surrounded, he had to look on fromuhivsficgmp
at the capture and reduction to ashes of the allied town and
‘at the carrying oil‘ of its inhabitants to Lusitania—an event whichin'duced a number of towns that had been wavering in middle and eastern Spain to adhere anew to Sertorius.
Meanwhile MetelluSiQBEht uhhhsttermfottnne- In a Victoriesd sharp engagement at Italica (not far from Seville), which Metellus‘
Hirtuleius had imprudently risked, and in which both generals fought hand to hand and Hirtuleius was wounded, Metellus defeated him and compelled him to evacuate the Ranaii’fénimy proper, and to throw himself into Lusitania.
This victory permitted Metellus to unite“ flitll'gompgius.
The two generals took up their winter-quarters in 678-79 at 76-75, the Pyrenees, and in the next campaign in 679 they resolved 75, to make a joint attack on the enemy in his position near Valentia. But while Metellus was advancing, Pompeius offered battle beforehand-to the main army of the enemy,
with a view to wipe out the of Lauro to gaipathe ‘ stain and
expect-ed laurels, if possible, alone. With “36'; Sertorius embraced the opportunity of fighting with Pompeius before Metellus arrived.
The armies met on the river Sucgo (Xpsar) : after “a Battle on sharp conflictvPompeius was beaten on the right wing,
/_~. -‘
II! w";- the sum
-
,- p-n- . . . pm
296
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND Boox v
and was himself carried from thejeldvsevergllmulided. M
Afranius no doubt conquerednwipth;the'lefiand topk the camp of the Sertorians,‘ but during its pillage he was
suddenly assailed by Sertorius‘ compelleslwalso to give way. Had Sertorius been able to renew the battle on the
following day, the army of Pompeius would iié'fiiEtiiGé been
annihilated. But meanwhile Metellus had come up, had over . v. . . . . . _-v. M ‘ . va g- . |. »_ “exams-us
thrown the corps of Perpenna ranged take anmd“nW' “M
his camp: it was not possible to resume the battle against’:
the two armies united. The successeggf
junction of the hostile forces, the sudden stagnation after the victory, diffused terror among the Sertorians ; and, as not unfrequently happened with Spanish armies, in con sequence of this turn of things the greater portion of the Sertorian soldiers dispersed. But the despondency passed away as quickly as it had come; the white fawn, which represented in the eyes of the multitude the military plans of the general, was soon more popular than ever; in a short time Sertorius appeared with a new army confronting the Romans in the level country to the south of §agtirivtum
M§t§1lus,_the
which firmly adhered to Rome, while the Sertorian privateers impeded the Roman supplies by sea, and scarcity was already making itself felt in the Roman camp. Another battle took place in the plains of the river Turia
(Murviedro),
and the struggle was long undecided.
(Guadalaviar),
Pompeius with the cavalry was defeated.
his brother-in-law and quaestor, the brave Lucius Memmius,
was slain; on the other hand Metellus vwp. v.
vanquished vlierpenna,
and victoriously repelled the attack of the enemy’is'“iinain army directed against him, receiving himself {5065331 the
conflict. Once more the Sertorian army
Valentia, which Gaius Herennius hetdTor
taken and razed to the ground. The Romans,
for a moment, cherished a hope that they were done with their tough antagonist. The Sertorian army had dis
bygiertggipsliid
MwIM
dispersed. SerrormsT‘waS
probably
cm. 1 QUINTUS SERTORIUS 297
appeared; the Roman troops, penetrating far into the interior, besieged the*general himself in thefortress. Clunia on the upper Douro. But while they vainly invested this rocky stronghold, the contingents of the insurgent com munities assembled elsewhere; Sertoriusstole. outof. the fortress and even before the expiry of the year stood once
at the head of an army.
Again the‘ Roman generals had to take up their winter
quarters with the cheerless prospect of an inevitable renewal of their Sisyphean war-toils. It was not even possible to choose quarters in the region of Valentia, so important on account of the communication with Italy and the east, but fearfully devastated by friend and foe; Pompeius led his troops first intothe. writers‘012 . theXascoaesl (Biscay) and then spent the winter in the territory of the Vaccaei (about Valladolid), and Metellus even in Gaul.
For five “W Indefinite . v,v~w. . _. years the soerlgwrianwwar wthu“sbconwtinuedhapd
still there seemed no prospect of its termination. The state 2:210“, it beyond description. The flower of the character
rtalian youth perished amid the exhausting fatigues of these campaigns. The public treasuryv was not only deprived of war. the Spanishwgevenues, but had annually to send to Spain ror‘ui'éfiiy and maintenance of the Spanish armies very considerable‘ sums, which the government hardly knew how
to raise. Spain was devastated and impoverished, and the Roman civilization, which unfolded so fair a promise there, received a severe shock; as was naturally to be expected
in the case of an insurrectionary war waged with so much bitterness, and but too often occasioning the destruction of whole communities. Even the towns which adhered to
the dominant party in Rome had countless hardships to
1 In the recently found fragments of Sallust, which appear to belong
to the campaign of 679. the following words relate to this incident: 75. Romania [urn-Pita: (of Pompeius)frumenti g‘rn[tia rjmotur in Van-ant:
ei
m'o'ie'asmgeneral
i Aria: fer-ind:
. . . [itjemgue Serlan'u: man . . . e, cuiur mullum ne
[r'kr
e! Italiae in[lntr]at, inferdudcrdur].
an
298
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
endure; those situated on the coast had to be provided with necessaries by the Roman fleet, and the situation of the faithful communities in the interior was almost desperate. Gaul suffered hardly less, partly from the requisitions for contingents of infantry and cavalry, for grain and money, partly from the oppressive burden of the winter-quarters, which rose to an intolerable degree in consequence of the
14. bad harvest of 680 ; almost all the local treasuries were compelled to betake themselves to the Roman bankers, and to burden themselves with a crushing load of debt. Generals and soldiers carried on the war with reluctance. The‘genefalsmhad‘ encounteredan opponent far supeiiormm talent, a tough and protracted resistance, a warfare of very serious perils and of successes difficult to be attained and far from brilliant; it was asserted that Pompeius was scheming to get himself recalled from Spain. and entrusted with a more desirable command somewhere else. The soldiersdoq-foun‘d‘little satisfaction in ‘a campaign in which not only was there nothing to be got save hard blows and worthless booty, but their very pay was doled out to them with extreme irregularity.
Pompeius reportedwttlthe senatg
76. at the end of 679, that the paymwas'two‘years infiarregraand that the army was threatening to break up. The Roman government might certainly have obviated a considerable portion of these evils, if they could have prevailed on them selves to carry on the Spanish war with less remissness, to say nothing of better will. In the main, however, it was neither their fault nor the fault of their generals that a genius so superior as that of Sertorius was able to carry on this petty warfare year after year, despite of all numerical and military superiority, on ground so thoroughly favourable to insurrectionary and piratical warfare. So little could its end be foreseen, that the Sertorian insurrection seemed rather as if it would become intermingled with other contemporary revolts and thereby add to its dangerous character.
Just
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 299
at that time the Romans were contending on every sea with piratical fleets, in Italy with the revolted slaves, in Mace donia with the tribes on the lower Danube; and in the east Mithradates, partly induced by the successes of the Spanish insurrection, resolved once more to try the fortune of arms. That Sertorius had formed connections vLith the Italian and Macedonian enemies of Rome, cannot be distinctly affirmed,
he certainly was in constant intercourse with the Marians in Italy. With the pirates, on the other hand, he had previously formed an avowed league, and with the Pontic king—with whom he had long maintained relations through the medium of the Roman emigrants staying at his court—he now concluded a formal treaty of alliance, in which Sertorius ceded to the king the client-states of Asia Minor, but not the Roman province of Asia, and promised, moreover, to send him an oflicer qualified to lead his troops, and a number of soldiers, while the king, in turn, bound himself to transmit to Sertorius forty ships and 3000 talents (£720,000). The wise politicians in the capital were already recalling the time when Italy found itself threatened by Philip from the east and by Hannibal from the west; they conceived that the new Hannibal, just like his pre decessor, after having by himself subdued Spain, could easily arrive with the forces of Spain in Italy sooner than Pompeius, in order that, like the Phoenician formerly, he might summon the Etruscans and Samnites to arms against Rome.
But this comparison was more ingenious than accurate. Collapse
although
Sertorius was far from being strong enough to renew the of the power of
gigantic enterprise of Hannibal. He was lost if he left Spain, Sertorius. where all his successes were bound up with the peculiarities
of the country and the people ; and even there he was more
and more compelled to renounce the offensive. His admirable skill as a leader could not change the nature of
his troops. The Spanish militia retained its
. “cHha-rMacs,ter,
',s. _wa~ (“m““M wm-“fi-rwwi’amr . t, ‘. . . r. ("mess-w»
300
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND B001: v
untrustworthy as the wave or the wind; now collected in masses to the number of ' ' ow melting away again to a mere handful. e oman emigrants, likewise, continued insubordinate, arrogant, and stubborn. Those kinds of armed force which require that a corps should keep together for a considerable time, such as cavalry especially, were of course very inadequately represented in his army. The war gradually swept off his ablest officers and the flower of his veterans ; and even the most
trustworthy communities, weary of being harassed by the Romans and maltreated by the Sertorian officers, began to show
signs of impatience and wavering allegiance. It is re markable that vSe. 1;mr. ius, in this respect also like Hannibal, never deceived himself as to the hopelessness of his position; he allowed no opportunity for bringing about a compromise to pass, and would have 'been ready a533, 'in‘oi'nwéintitb lay down his staff of command on the assurance of being allowed to live peacefully in his native land. But political ortho doxy knows nothing of compromise and conciliation. Sertorius might not recede or step aside; he was compelled inevitably to move on along the path which he had once entered, however narrow and giddy it might become.
The representations which Pompeius addressed to Rome, and which derived emphasis from the behaviour of Mithra dates in the east, were successful. He had the necessary supplies of money sent to him by the senate and was reinforced by two fresh legions. Thus the two generals went
74. to work again in the spring of 680 and'bricé‘ihb‘iét'r'iissed the Ebro. Eastern Spain was wrested from the Sertorians in consequencgof the battles on the Xucarand Guadalaviar; the struggle thenceforth became concentrated on the upper and middle Ebro around the chief strongholds of the Sertor. ians-—Calagurris, Osca, Ilerda. As Metellus had done best in the earlier campaigns, so too on this occasion he-gained
-
M-I-fl'
the most important successes. His old opponent Hirtuleius.
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 30:
who again confronted him, was completely defeated and fell himself along with his brother—an irreparable loss for the Sertorians. Sertorius, whom the unfortunate news reached just as he was on the point of assailing the enemy opposed to him, out down the messenger, that the tidings might not discourage his troops; but the news could not be long concealed. One
aw. . . “ toi. wnv after MetelluLoficcupiedWthgugeltibegian
another surrendered,
tswris'fsegobrigiffiéiwé'éh Toledo and Cuenca) and Bilbilis (near Calatayud). Pompeius besieged. Pallantia (Palencia above Valladolid), but Sertorius relieved and compelled Pompeius to fall back upon Metellus; in front of Calagurris (Calahorra, on the upper Ebro), into which Sertorius had thrown himself, they both suffered severe losses. Nevertheless, when they went into winter-quarters -—Pompeius to Gaul, Metellus to his own province—they were able to look back on considerable results; great portion of the insurgents had submitted or had been subdued arms.
In similar way the campaign of the following year (681) 78.
ran its course vthis case was especially Pompeius who slowly but steadilywrestricted the. field of the insurrection.
m'l'lie'idiscomfiture sustained by the arms of the insurgents
failed not to react on the tone of feeling in their camp.
The military successes of Sertorius became like those of Hannibal, of necessity less and less considerable; people
began to call in question his military talent: he was no
longer, was alleged, what he had been; he spent the day
in feasting or over his cups, and squandered money as well
as time. The number of the deserters, and of communities Internal falling away, increased. Soon projects formed by the Egg): Roman emigrants against the life of the general were Sertorianl. reported to him they sounded credible enough, especially
as various officers of the insurgent army, and Perpenna in particular, had submitted with reluctance to the supremacy
;
in
it
a
by ;
it
a
it,
Assassina tion of Sertorius.
of Sertorius, and the Roman governors had for long promised amnesty and a high reward to any one who should kill him. Sertorius, on hearing such allegations, withdrew the charge of guarding his person from the Roman soldiers and entrusted it to select Spaniards. Against the suspected themselves he proceeded with fearful but necessary severity, and condemned various of the accused to death without resorting, as in other cases, to the advice of his council ; he was now more dangerous—it was thereupon aflirmed in the circles of the malcontents—to his friends than to his foes.
A second conspiracy was soon discovered, which had its seat in his own staff; whoever was denounced had to take flight or die; but all were not betrayed, and the remaining conspirators, including especially Perpenna, found in the
circumstances only a new incentive to make haste. They were in the headquarters at Osca. There, on the instiga tion of Perpenna, a brilliant victory was reported to the general as having been achieved by his troops ; and at the festal banquet arranged by Perpenna to celebrate this victory Sertorius accordingly appeared, attended, as was his wont, by his Spanish retinue. Contrary to former custom in the Sertorian headquarters, the feast soon became a revel ; wild words passed at table, and it seemed as if some of the guests sought opportunity to begin an altercation. Sertorius threw himself back on his couch, and seemed desirous not to hear the disturbance. Then a wine-cup was dashed on the floor; Perpenna had given the concerted sign. Marcus Antonius, Sertorius’ neighbour at table, dealt the first blow against him, and when Sertorius turned round and attempted to rise, the assassin flung himself upon him and held him down till the other guests at table, all of them implicated in the conspiracy, threw themselves on the struggling pair, and stabbed the defenceless general while his arms were pinioned (682). With him died his faithful
attendants. So ended one of the greatest men, if not the
302
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND B00x v
78.
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS
303
very greatest man, that Rome had hitherto produced—a man who under more fortunate circumstances would perhaps have become the regenerator of his country-—by the treason of the wretched band of emigrants whom he was condemned to lead against his native land. History loves not the Coriolani ; nor has she made any exception even in the case of this the most magnanimous, most gifted, most deserving to be regretted of them all.
The murderers thought to succeed to the heritage of the Perpenna murdered. After the death of Sertorius, Perpenna, as the sue-weds
Sertorius. highest among the Roman oflicers of the Spanish army, laid
claim to the chief command. The army submitted, but with mistrust and reluctance. However men had murmured against Sertorius in his lifetime, death reinstated the hero in his rights, and vehement was the indignation of the soldiers when, on the publication of his testament, the name of Perpenna was read forth among the heirs. A part of the soldiers, especially the Lusitanians, dispersed ; the remainder had a presentiment that with the death of Sertorius their spirit and their fortune had departed.
Accordingly, at the first encounter with Pompeius, the Pompeius
wretchedly led and despondent ranks of the insurgents puts an end to the
were utterly broken, and Perpenna, among other oflicers, insurrec was taken prisoner. The wretch sought to purchase his tion. life by delivering up the correspondence of Sertorius, which
would have compromised numerous men of standing in
Italy ; but Pompeius ordered the papers to be burnt unread, and handed him, as well as the other chiefs of the insurgents, over to the executioner. The emigrants who had escaped dispersed; and most of them went into the Mauretanian deserts or joined the pirates. Soon afterwards the Plotian law, which was zealously supported by the young Caesar in particular, opened up to a portion of them the opportunity of returning home; but all those who had taken part in the murder of Sertorius, with but
MARCUS LEPIDUS & QUINTUS SERTORIUS BOOK \
a single exception, died a violent death. Osca, and most of the towns which had still adhered to Sertorius in Hither Spain, now voluntarily opened their gates to Pompeius; Uxama (Osma), Clunia, and Calagurris alone had to be reduced by force. The two provinces were regulated anew; in the Further province, Metellus raised the annual tribute of the most guilty communities; in the Hither, Pompeius dispensed reward and punishment: Calagurris, for example, lost its independence and was placed under Osca. A band of Sertorian soldiers, which had collected in the Pyrenees, was induced by Pompeius to surrender, and was settled by him to the north of the Pyrenees near Lugudunum (St. Bertrand, in the department Haute
304
as the community of the “congregated” The Roman emblems of victory were erected at the summit of the pass of the Pyrenees; at the close 71. of 683, Metellus and Pompeius marched with their armies
through the streets of the capital, to present the thanks of the nation to Father Jovis at the Capitol for the conquest of the Spaniards. The good fortune of Sulla seemed still to be with his creation after he had been laid in the grave, and to protect it better than the incapable and negligent watchmen appointed to guard The opposition in Italy had broken down from the incapacity and precipitation of its leader, and that of the emigrants from dissension within their own ranks. These defeats, although far more the result of their own perverseness and discordance than of the exertions of their opponents, were yet so many victories for the oligarchy. The curule chairs were rendered once more secure.
Garonne), (carwmae).
it.
can. u RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
305
CHAPTER II
RULE or me SULLAN zms'rom'nou
WHEN the suppression of the Cinnan revolution, which External threatened the very existence of the senate, rendered it "mm" possible for the restored senatorial government to devote
once more the requisite attention to the internal and
external security of the empire, there emerged affairs enough, the settlement of which could not be postponed without injuring the most important interests and allowing present inconveniences to grow into future dangers. Apart from the very serious complications in Spain, it was absolutely necessary effectually to check the barbarians in Thrace and the regions of the Danube, whom Sulla on his march through Macedonia had only been able superficially to chastise (p. 50), and to regulate, by military intervention,
. he disorderly state of things along the northern frontier of the Greek peninsula; thoroughly to suppress the bands
of pirates infesting the seas everywhere, but especially the eastern waters 5 and lastly to introduce better order into the unsettled relations of Asia Minor. The peace which Sulla had concluded in 670 with Mithradates, king of Pontus 84. (p. 49, 52), and of which the treaty with Murena in 673 81. (p. 9 5) was essentially a repetition,bore throughout the stamp
of a provisional arrangement to meet the exigencies of the moment; and the relations of the Romans with Tigranes, k'ng of Armenia, with whom they had defiuto waged war,
VOL IY 1'9
306
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
DalmatO Macedon in ex peditions.
remained wholly untouched in this peace. Tigranes had with right regarded this as a tacit permission to bring the Roman possessions in Asia under his power. If these were not to be abandoned, it was necessary to come to terms amicably or by force with the new great-king of
’
Asia.
In the preceding chapter we have described the move
ments in Italy and Spain connected with the proceedings of the democracy, and their subjugation by the senatorial government. In the present chapter we shall review the external government, as the authorities installed by Sulla conducted or failed to conduct
We still recognize the vigorous hand of Sulla in the energetic measures which, in the last period of his regency, the senate adopted almost simultaneously against the Sertorians, the Dalmatians and Thracians, and the Cilician pirates.
The expedition to the Graeco-Illyrian peninsula was designed partly to reduce to subjection or at least to tame the barbarous tribes who ranged over the whole interior from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and of whom the Bessi (in the great Balkan) especially were, as was then said, notorious as robbers even among race of robbers
partly to destroy the corsairs in their haunts, especially along
the Dalmatian coast. As usual, the attack took place simultaneously from Dalmatia and from Macedonia, in which province an army of five legions was assembled for the purpose. In Dalmatia the former praetor Gaius Cosconius held the command, marched through the country in all directions, and took by storm the fortress of Salona after two years’ siege. In Macedonia the proconsul
78-76. Appius Claudius (676-678) first attempted along the Macedono-Thracian frontier to make himself master of the mountain districts on the left bank of the Karasu. Or. both sides the war was conducted with savage ferocity;
a
5
a
it.
it
CHAP. I! RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
307
the Thracians destroyed the townships which they took and massacred their captives, and the Romans returned like for like. But no results of importance were attained; the toilsome marches and the constant conflicts with the numerous and brave inhabitants of the mountains deci
mated the army to no purpose; the general himself sickened and died. His successor, Gaius Scribonius Curio
was induced by various obstacles, and par 75-78. ticularly by a not inconsiderable military revolt, to desist
from the diflicult expedition against the Thracians, and to
turn himself instead to the northern frontier of Macedonia, where he subdued the weaker Dardani (in Servia) and reached as far as the Danube. The brave and able
(679-681),
Marcus Lucullus (682, 683) was the first who again advanced eastward, defeated the Bessi in their mountains,
took their capital Uscudama (Adrianople), and compelled
them to submit to the Roman supremacy. Sadalas king subdued. of the Odrysians, and the Greek towns on the east coast
to the north and south of the Balkan chain-—Istropolis, Tomi, Callatis, Odessus (near Varna), Mesembria, and others—became dependent on the Romans. Thrace, of which the Romans had hitherto held little more than the
Attalic possessions on the Chersonese, now became a portion—though far from obedient—of the province of Macedonia.
But the predatory raids of the Thracians and Dardani, Piracy confined as they were to a small part of the empire, were
far less injurious to the state and to individuals than the
evil of piracy, which was continually spreading farther and acquiring more solid organization. The commerce of the
whole Mediterranean was in its power. Italy could neither
export its products nor import grain from the provinces ; in
the former the people were starving, in the latter the culti
vation of the corn-fields ceased for want of a vent for
the produce. No consignment of money, no traveller was
12, 11. Thrace
30:; RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION Boo]: v
longer safe: the public treasury suffered most serious losses ; a great many Romans of standing were captured by the corsairs, and compelled to pay heavy sums for their ransom, if it was not even the pleasure of the pirates to execute on individuals the sentence of death, which in that case was seasoned with a savage humour. The merchants, and even the divisions of Roman troops destined for the east, began to postpone their voyages chiefly to the un favourable season of the year, and to be less afraid of the winter storms than of the piratical vessels, which indeed even at this season did not wholly disappear from the sea. But severely as the closing of the sea was felt, it was more tolerable than the raids made on the islands and coasts of Greece and Asia Minor. Just as afterwards
in the time of the Normans, piratical squadrons ran up to the maritime towns, and either compelled them to buy themselves 06' with large sums, or besieged and took them by storm. When Samothrace, Clazomenae,
M. Samos, Iassus were pillaged by the pirates (670) under the eyes of Sulla after peace was concluded with Mithra dates, we may conceive how matters went where neither a Roman army nor a Roman fleet was at hand. All the old rich temples along the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor were plundered one after another; from Samo thrace alone a treasure of 1000 talents (£240,000) is said to have been carried off. Apollo, according to a
Roman poet of this period, was so impoverished by the pirates that, when the swallow paid him a visit, he could no longer produce to it out of all his treasures even a drachm of gold. More than four hundred townships were enumerated as having been taken or laid under contribu tion by the pirates, including cities like Cnidus, Samos, Colophon; from not a few places on islands or the coast, which were previously flourishing, the whole population migrated, that they might not be carried off by the pirates.
CHAP. I! RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
309
Even inland districts were no longer safe from their attacks; there were instances of their assailing townships distant one or two days’ march from the coast. The fearful debt, under which subsequently all the communities of the Greek east succumbed, proceeded in great part from these fatal times.
Piracy had totally changed its character. The pirates
Organisa were no longer bold freebooters, who levied their tribute tion of
piracy. from the large Italo-Oriental traflic in slaves and luxuries,
as it passed through the Cretan waters between Cyrene and the Peloponnesus—in the language of the pirates the
sea”; no longer even armed slave-catchers, who prosecuted “war, trade, and piracy” equally side by side; they formed now a piratical state, with a peculiar esprit de corpr, with a solid and very respectable organization, with a home of their own and the germs of a symmachy, and doubtless also with definite political designs. The
called themselves Cilicians; in fact their vessels were the rendezvous of desperadoes and adventurers from all countries-—discharged mercenaries from the recruiting grounds of Crete, burgesses from the destroyed townships of Italy, Spain, and Asia, soldiers and oflicers from the armies of Fimbria and Sertorius, in a word the ruined men of all nations, the hunted refugees of all vanquished parties, every one that was wretched and daring—and where was there not misery and outrage in this unhappy age? It was no longer a gang of robbers who had flocked together, but
“golden
pirates
soldier-state, in which the freemasonry of exile and crime took the place of nationality, and within which crime redeemed itself, as it so often does in its own eyes,
a compact
the most generous public spirit. In an abandoned age, when cowardice and insubordination had
relaxed all the bonds of social order, the legitimate common wealths might have taken a pattern from this state-—the mongrel offspring of distress and violence—within which
by displaying
310
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
military political power.
alone the inviolable determination to stand side by side, the sense of comradeship, respect for the pledged word and the self-chosen chiefs, valour and adroitness seemed to have taken refuge. If the banner of this state was inscribed with vengeance against the civil society which, rightly or wrongly, had ejected its members, it might be a question whether this device was much worse than those of the Italian oligarchy and the Oriental sultanship which seemed in the fair way of dividing the world between them. The corsairs at least felt themselves on a level with any legitimate state ; their robber-pride, their robber-pomp, and their robber humour are attested by many a genuine pirate’s tale of mad merriment and chivalrous bandittism: they professed, and made it their boast, to live at righteous war with all the world : what they gained in that warfare was designated not as plunder, but as military spoil; and, while the captured corsair was sure of the cross in every Roman seaport, they too claimed the right of executing any of their captives.
Their military-political organization, especially since the Mithradatic war, was compact. Their ships, for the most
that small open swift-sailing barks, with smaller proportion of biremes and triremes, now regularly sailed associated in squadrons and under admirals, whose
barges were wont to glitter in gold and purple. To comrade in peril, though he might be totally unknown, no pirate captain refused the requested aid an agreement concluded with any one of them was absolutely recognized by the whole society, and any injury inflicted on one was
avenged by all. Their true home was the sea from the pillars of Hercules to the Syrian and Egyptian waters; the refuges which they needed for themselves and their floating
houses on the mainland were readily furnished to them by the Mauretanian and Dalmatian coasts, by the island of Crete, and, above all, by the southern coast of Asia Minor, which abounded in headlands and lurking-places, com
part myoparaner,
;
a
a
is,
CHAP. II RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
311
manded the chief thoroughfare of the maritime commerce
of that age, and was virtually without a master. The league
of Lycian cities there, and the Pamphylian communities,
were of little importance; the Roman station, which had existed in Cilicia since 652, was far from adequate to 10! . command the extensive coast; the Syrian dominion over Cilicia had always been but nominal, and had recently been superseded by the Armenian, the holder of which, as a true great-king, gave himself no concern at all about the sea and readily abandoned it to the pillage of the Cilicians. It was
nothing wonderful, therefore, that the corsairs flourished there as they had never done anywhere else. Not only did they possess everywhere along the coast signal-places and stations, but further inland—in the most remote recesses of the impassable and mountainous interior of Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia—they had built their rock castles, in which they concealed their wives, children, and treasures during their own absence at sea, and, doubtless, in times of danger found an asylum themselves. Great numbers of such corsair-castles existed especially in the Rough Cilicia, the forests of which at the same time furnished the pirates with the most excellent timber for shipbuilding; and there, accordingly, their principal dock yards and arsenals were situated. It was not to be wondered at that this organized military state gained a firm body of clients among the Greek maritime cities, which were more or less left to themselves and managed their own affairs: these cities entered into traflic with the pirates as with a friendly power on the basis of definite treaties, and did not
comply with the summons of the Roman governors to furnish vessels against them. The not inconsiderable town of Side in Pamphylia, for instance, allowed the pirates to build ships on its quays, and to sell the free men whom they had captured in its market.
Such a society of pirates was a political power; and al
312
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK 1
a. political power it gave itself out and was accepted from the time when the Syrian king Tryphon first employed it as such and rested his throne on its support (iii. 292). We find the pirates as allies of king Mithradates of Pontus as well as of the Roman democratic emigrants; we find them giving battle to the fleets of Sulla in the eastern and in the western waters; we find individual pirate princes ruling over a series of considerable coast towns. We cannot tell how far the internal political development of this floating state had already advanced; but its arrangements undeniably con tained the germ of a sea-kingdom, which was already beginning to establish itself, and out of which, under favourable circumstances, a permanent state might have been developed.
This state of matters clearly shows, as we have partly
Nnlllty of
the Roman indicated already 290), how the Romans kept—or rather
marine police.
(iii.
did not keep—order on “their sea. ” The protectorate of
Rome over the provinces consisted essentially in military guardianship; the provincials paid tax or tribute to the Romans for their defence by sea and land, which was con centrated in Roman hands. But never, perhaps, did a guardian‘ more shamelessly defraud his ward than the Roman oligarchy defrauded the subject communities. In stead of Rome equipping a general fleet for the empire and centralizing her marine police, the senate permitted the unity of her maritime superintendence—without which in this matter nothing could at all be done—to fall into abeyance, and left it to each governor and each client state to defend themselves against the pirates as each chose and was able. Instead of Rome providing for the fleet, as she had bound herself to do, exclusively with her own blood and treasure and with those of the client states which had remained formally sovereign, the senate allowed the Italian war-marine
to fall into decay, and learned to make shift with the vessels which the several mercantile towns were required to furnish,
CHAP. ll RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
313
or still more frequently with the coast-guards everywhere organized—all the cost and burden falling, in either case,
on the subjects. The provincials might deem themselves fortunate, if their Roman governor applied the requisitions which he raised for the defence of the coast in reality solely
to that object, and did not intercept them for himself; or if they were not, as very frequently happened, called on to pay ransom for some Roman of rank captured by the buccaneers. Measures undertaken perhaps with judgment, such as the occupation of Cilicia in 652, were sure to be spoilt in the 102. execution. Any Roman of this period, who was not wholly carried away by the current intoxicating idea of the national greatness, must have wished that the ships’ beaks might be
torn down from the orator’s platform in the Forum, that at least he might not be constantly reminded by them of the naval victories achieved in better times.
Nevertheless Sulla, who in the war against Mithradates Expedition had the opportunity of acquiring an adequate conviction of £2,131” com the dangers which the neglect of the fleet involved, took ofvAsia various steps seriously to check the evil. It is true that Mm"
the instructions which he had left to the governors whom
he appointed in Asia, to equip in the maritime towns a fleet
against the pirates, had borne little fruit, for Murena pre
ferred to begin war with Mithradates, and Gnaeus Dola
bella, the governor of Cilicia, proved wholly incapable. Accordingly the senate resolved in 675 to send one of the 79. consuls to Cilicia ; the lot fell on the capable Publius Publius Servilius. He defeated the piratical fleet in a bloody engagement, and then applied himself to destroy those towns
on the south coast of Asia Minor which served them as
and trading stations. The fortresses of the maritime prince Zenicetes—Olympus, Corycus, Zenlcetq
anchorages
powerful
Phaselis in eastern Lycia, Attalia in Pamphylia—were 2gb“. reduced, and the prince himself met his death in the flames
of his stronghold Olympus. A movement was next made
The Isaurians subdued.
against the Isaurians, who in the north-west corner of the Rough Cilicia, on the northern slope of Mount Taurus, inhabited a labyrinth of steep mountain ridges, jagged rocks, and deeply-cut valleys, covered with magnificent oak forests—a region which is even at the present day filled with reminiscences of the old robber times. To reduce these Isaurian fastnesses, the last and most secure retreats of the freebooters, Servilius led the first Roman army over
the Taurus, and broke up the strongholds of the enemy, Oroanda, and above all Isaura itself—the ideal of a robber town, situated on the summit of a scarcely accessible moun tain-ridge, and completely overlooking and commanding the wide plain of Iconium. The war, not ended till 679, from which Publius Servilius acquired for himself and his descendants the surname of Isauricus, was not without fruit 3 a great number of pirates and piratical vessels fell in consequence of it into the power of the Romans; Lycia, Pamphylia, West Cilicia were severely devastated, the territories of the destroyed towns were confiscated, and the province of Cilicia was enlarged by their addition to it. But, in the nature of the case, piracy was far from being suppressed by these measures; on the contrary, it simply betook itself for the time to other regions, and particularly
to Crete, the oldest harbour for the corsairs of the Medi terranean (iii. 291). Nothing but repressive measures carried
out on a large scale and with unity of purpose-—nothing, in fact, but the establishment of a standing maritime police —could in such a case afford thorough relief.
The affairs of the mainland of Asia Minor were con nected by various relations with this maritime war. The variance which existed between Rome and the kings of Pontus and Armenia did not abate, but increased more and more. On the one hand Tigranes, king of Armenia, pursued his aggressive conquests in the most reckless
75.
314
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
Asiatic relations.
Tigranes and the new great
kinsdom of manner.
the whole territory of Gaul; there, too, the tribes began to stir, and bands gathering together began to make the Alpine passes insecure. Lastly the sea too belonged quite as much to the insurgents as to the legitimate govern ment, since the allies of the former—the pirates—were almost as powerful in the Spanish waters as the Roman ‘ships of war. At the promontory of Diana (now Denia, between Valencia and Alicante) Sertorius established for the corsairs a fixed station, where they partly lay in wait for such Roman ships as were conveying supplies to the Roman maritime towns and the army, partly carried away or delivered goods for the insurgents, and partly formed their medium of intercourse with Italy and Asia Minor. The constant readiness of these men moving to and fro to carry everywhere sparks from the scene of conflagration tended
in a high degree to excite apprehension, especially at a time when so much combustible matter was everywhere accumulated in the Roman empire.
Amidst this state of matters the sudden death of Sulla
through
CHAP- l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 287
took place (676). So long as the man lived, at whose Death [1: voice a trained and trustworthy army of veterans was ready
any moment to rise, the oligarchy might tolerate the conse almost (as it seemed) definite abandonment of the Spanish quences' provinces to the emigrants, and the election of the leader
of the opposition at home to be supreme magistrate, at all events as transient misfortunes; and in their shortsighted way, yet not wholly without reason, might cherish con fidenoe either that the opposition would not venture to proceed to open conflict, or that, if it did venture, he who
had twice saved the oligarchy would set it up a third time. Now the state of things was changed. The democratic Hotspurs in the capital, long impatient of the endless delay and inflamed by the brilliant news from Spain, urged that a blow should be struck; and Lepidus, with whom the decision for the moment lay, entered into the proposal with all the zeal of a renegade and with his own character istic frivolity. For a moment it seemed as if the torch which kindled the funeral pile of the regent would also kindle civil war; but the influence of Pompeius and the
temper of the Sullan veterans induced the opposition to let the obsequies of the regent pass over in peace.
Yet all the more openly were arrangements thenceforth
made to introduce a fresh revolution. Daily the Forum 32,31; resounded with accusations against the “mock Romulus”
and his executioners. Even before the great potentate
had closed his eyes, the overthrow of the Sullan constitu
tion, the re-establishment of the distributions of grain, the reinstating of the tribunes of the people in their former position, the recall of those who were banished contrary to
law, the restoration of the confiscated lands, were openly
indicated by Lepidus and his adherents as the objects at which they aimed. Now communications were entered into with the proscribed; Marcus Perpenna, governor of Sicily in the days of Cinna 92), arrived in the capital.
Insurrec
(p.
288 MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
The sons of those whom Sulla had declared guilty of treason*on whom the laws of the restoration bore with intolerable severity—and generally the more noted men of Marian views were invited to give their accession. Not a few, such as the young Lucius Cinna, joined the move ment; others, however, followed the example of Gaius Caesar, who had returned home from Asia on receiving the accounts of the death of Sulla and of the plans of Lepidus, but after becoming more accurately acquainted with the character of the leader and of the movement prudently withdrew. Carousing and recruiting went on in behalf of Lepidus in the taverns and brothels of the capital. At length a conspiracy against the new order of things was concocted among the Etruscan malcontents. 1
All this took place under the eyes of the government The consul Catulus as well as the more judicious Opti mates urged an immediate decisive interference and suppression of the revolt in the bud ; the indolent majority, however, could not make up their minds to begin the
struggle, but tried to deceive themselves as long as possible by a system of compromises and concessions. Lepidus also on his part at first entered into it. The suggestion, which proposed a restoration of the prerogatives taken away from the tribunes of the people, he as well as his col league Catulus repelled. On the other hand, the Gracchan distribution of grain was to a limited extent re-established. According to it not all (as according to the Sempronian law) but only a definite number-—presumably 4o,ooo— of the poorer burgesses appear to have received the earlier
as Gracchus had fixed them, of five moa'ii monthly at the price of 6% arrer (3d. )—a regulation which occasioned to the treasury an annual net loss of at least
1 The following narrative rests substantially on the account of Licini anus, which, fragmentary as it is at this very point, still givu important information as to the insurrection of Lepidus.
largesses,
CRAP. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 289
£40,000. ‘ The opposition, naturally as little satisfied as it was decidedly emboldened by this partial concession, displayed all the more rudeness and violence in the capital; and in Etruria, the true centre of all insurrections of the Italian proletariate, civil war already broke out, the dispossessed Faesulans resumed possession of their lost estates by force of arms, and several of the veterans settled there by Sulla perished in the tumult. The senate on learning what had occurred resolved to send the two consuls thither, in order to raise troops and suppress the insurrection. ‘z It was impossible to adopt a more irra
1 Under the year 676 Licinianus states (p. 23, Pertz; p. 42, Bonn); 78, (Lepidu: f) [lelgem frummtarzIam] nullo rerirtant: )[argz'jtur :41, ut ann0n[ae] quinque modi popu[la da]rmtur. According to this account, therefore, the law of the consuls of 681 Marcus Terentius Lucullus and 73,
Gaius Cassius Varus, which Cicero mentions (in Verr. iii. 70, I36; v. 2:, 52), and to which also Sallust refers (Hirt. iii. 61, 19 Dietsch), did not first re-establish the five modii, but only secured the largesses of grain by regu lating the purchases of Sicilian corn, and perhaps made various alterations of detaiL That the Sempronian law (iii. 344) allowed every burgess domiciled in Rome to share in the largesses of grain, is certain. But the later distri bution of grain was not so extensive as this, for, seeing that the monthly corn of the Roman burgesses amounted to little more than 33,000 medimm'
=198,ooo modz'i (Cic. Verr. iii. 30, 72), only some 40,000 burgesses at that time received grain, whereas the number of burgesses domiciled in the capital was certainly far more considerable. This arrangement probably proceeded from the Octavian law, which introduced instead of the ex travagant Sempronian amount “a moderate largess, tolerable for the state and necessary for the common people" (Cic. d: 015 21, 72, Brut. 62, 222) and to all appearance this very law that the lexfrumen {aria mentioned by Licinianus. That Lepidus should have entered into such a proposal of compromise, accords with his attitude as regards the restoration of the tribunate. It likewise in keeping with the circum stances that the democracy should find itself not at all satisfied by the regulation, brought about in this way, of the distribution of grain (Sallust, 1. 0. The amount of loss calculated on the basis of the grain being worth at least double (iii. 344); when piracy or other causes drove up the price of grain, a far more considerable loss must have resulted.
From the fragments of ‘the account of Licinianus (p. 44, Bonn) plain that the decree of the senate, uti Lepidur :t Calulur decretir exer n'tibur maturrime proficz'rcerentur (Sallust, Hirt. 44 Dietsch), to be understood not of a despatch of the consuls before the expiry of their consulship to their proconsular provinces, for which there would have been no reason, but of their being sent to Etruria against the revolted Faesulans, just as in the Catilinarian war the consul Gaius Antonius was dapatched to the same quarter. The statement of Philippus in Sallust
110
(Hist.
VOL IV
48, that Lepidus ob . redz'lionem provinciam cum exercitu adtplus
i. 4)
;
i.
is
it is
’
is
is
it is
is
ii.
=90
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND aoorc v
tional course. The senate, in presence of the insurrec tion, evinced its pusillanimity and its fears by the re establishment of the com-law; in order to be relieved from a street-riot, it furnished the notorious head of the insurrection with an army; and, when the two consuls were bound by the most solemn oath which could be contrived not to turn the arms entrusted to them against each other, it must have required the superhuman obduracy of oligarchic consciences to think of erecting such a bulwark against the impending insurrection. Of course Lepidus armed in Etruria not for the senate, but for the insurrec tion—sarcastically declaring that the oath which he had taken bound him only for the current year. The senate put the oracular machinery in motion to induce him to return, and committed to him the conduct of the impend ing consular elections; but Lepidus evaded compliance, and, while messengers passed to and fro and the official year drew to an end amidst proposals of accommodation, his force swelled to an army. When at length, in the
77o beginning of the following year (677), the definite order of the senate was issued to Lepidus to return without delay, the proconsul haughtily refused obedience, and de manded in his turn the renewal of the former tribunician power, the reinstatement of those who had been forcibly ejected from their civic rights and their property, and, besides this, his own re-election as consul for the current year or, in other words, the zj’ranm'r in legal form.
Thus war was declared. The senatorial party could
Outbreak
of the war. reckon, in addition to the Sullan veterans whose civil exist
ence was threatened by Lepidus, upon the army assembled by the proconsul Catulus; and so, in compliance with the
urgent warnings
of the more sagacious, particularly of
at, is entirely in harmony with this view; for the extraordinary consular wmrnand in Etruria was just as much a prom‘rwia u the ordinary pra oonsular command in Narbonese Gaul.
can. i QUINTUS SERTORIUS 291
Philippus, Catulus was entrusted by the senate with the defence of the capital and the repelling of the main force of the democratic party stationed in Etruria. At the same time Gnaeus Pompeius was despatched with another corps
tgwsst from
his former protégé the valley of the Po, which was held by Lepidus’ lieutenant, Marcushlirutus.
While Pompeius speedily
and shut up the enemy’s general closely in Mutina, Lepidus_ appeared before the capital in order to conquer it for the revolution as Marius had formerly done by storm.
The “right bank of thewfl‘iberwfellwwhollyv into vhiswpower, and'he' was gEBTé’Eéen ‘to cross the river. The decisive
battle waswfdught on the Campus Martius, close under the
walls of the city. But Catulus conquered ;v and Lepidus Lepidus was compelled toretrggt to ‘Etruria, while another division, defeated. underhi's‘son Scipio, threw itself into the fortress of Alba. Thereupon the rising was substantially at an end. Mutina surwgmpgiji; and Brutus was, notwithstand
ing the safe-conduct promised to him, subsequently put
to death by order of that general. Alba too was, after a
long siege, reduced by famine, and the leader there was
likewise executed. Lepidus, pressed on two sides by
Catulus and Pompeius, fought another engagement on the
Etruria in order merely to procure the means of retreatfafi'd’theii embarked at the port of Cosa for Sardinia,
from which point he hoped to cut off the supplies of the
capital, and to obtain communication with the Spanish insurgents. But the governor of the island opposed to
him a vigorous resistance; and he himself died, not long Death of after his landing, of consumption (677), whereupon the Lepidus. war in Sardinia came to an end. A part of his soldiers dispersed; with the flower of the insurrectionary army
and with a well-filled chest the late praetor, Marcus Perpenna, proceeded to Liguria, and thence to Spain to
join the Seitorians.
c‘dagtbf
aCCOmpllSlledg_l'll§m commission
Pompeius mom
command in Spain.
The oligarchy was thus victorious over Lepidus; but it found itself compelled by the dangérbifsmr the SEELw torian wvarto concessions, which violated the letter as well as the “spirit of the Sullan constitution. It was absolutely
:92
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
‘mu-wu
necessary to send7 gawstfong army and an able generali to
Spain; and. Pompeius indicated, very plainly,v that he desired, or rather demanded, this cornmjgjon. The pre tensio‘rY‘wa's bold. Itgwas already had enough that they had allowed this secret‘ opponent agaiiiFattaimanmextra ordinary command in the pressuie of the hepidiaiivtr‘eivolu tion; but it was far more hazardous, in disregard of all the rules instituted by Sulla for the magisterial hieraifqhy, to invest a man who had hitherto filled no civil oflice with one of the most important ordinary proyincialgvqggrnworships, under'circumstances in which the observance of the legal term of a year was not to be thought of. The oligarchy had thus, even apart from the respect due to their general Metellus, good reason to oppose with all earnestness this new attempt of the ambitious youth to perpetuate his exceptional position. But this was not easy. In the first place, they had not a single man fitted for the diflicult post of general inSp’a‘Hin. ‘ 'mtfla'é'fgfiiié' consuls 6f1h€§é§r showed any desire to measure himself against Sertorius; and what Lucius Philippus said in a full meeting of the senate had to be admitted as too true—that, a‘nigpgaailihe senators of note, not one was able and willing to command in a seriousyyar. Yet they might, perhaps, have got over this, and after the manner of oligarchs, when they had no capable candidate, have filled the place with some sort of makeshift, if Pompeius had merely desired the command and had not demanded it at the head of angarrny. He had already rent a deaf ear to the injunctions of Catulus that he shouldwdismissmtglgguagm ; it was at least doubtful whethe'r'those of the senate would find a better reception, and the consequences of a breach no one could calculate
CHAP. l QUINTUS SERTORIUS 293
—the scale of aristocracy might very easily mount up, if the sword of a well-known general were thrown into the
scale. So the majority resolved on concession. Not from the people, which constitutionally ought to have been consulted in a case where a private man was to be invested with the supreme magisterial power, but from the séiia‘t'e, Pompeius received proconsular authority
chief v epfiirfiind‘in Hither Spain; and, forty days after he had 'received crossed the Alps in the summer of 677. 77.
First of all the new general found employment in Gaul, Pompeius where no formal insurrection had broken out, but serioushuGmL disturbances of the peace had occurred at several places;
in consequence of which Pompeius deprived the cantons of
the Volcae-Arecomici and the Helvii of their independence,
and placed them under Massilia. He also laid out new
road over the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre, 258), and
so established a shorter communication between the valley
of the Po and Gaul. Amidst this work the best season of
the year passed away; was not till late in autumn that Pompeius crossed the Pyrenees.
Sertorius had meanwhile not been idle. He had de spatched Hirtuleius into the Further province to keep Metellus in check, and had himself endeavoured to follow up his complete victory in the Hither province, and to
for the reception of Pompeius. The isolated Celtiberian towns there, which still adhered to Rome, were attacked and reduced one after another; at last, in the very middle of winter, the strong Contrebia (south-east of Saragossa) had fallen. In vain the hard-pressed towns had sent message after message to Pompeius; would not be
opposite
prepare
any entreaties to depart from his wonted ,rut of slowly advancing. With the exception of the maritime towns, which were defended the Roman fleet, and the
induced
of the Indigetes and Laletani in the north-east corner of Spain, where Pompeius established himself after
Appear.
2:35;“, in Spain.
districts
andwthe
"
by
by
he
it
ii.
a
r)
\v
it,
294
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND 8001! v
he had at length crossed the Pyrenees, and made his raw troops bivouac throughout the winter to inure them to hardships, the whole of Hither Spain had at the end of
77. 677 become by treaty or force dependent on Sertorius, and the district on the upper and middle Ebro thenceforth continued the main stay of his power. Even the appre hension, which the fresh Roman force and the celebrated name of the general excited in the army of the insurgents, had a salutary effect on Marcus Perpenna, who hitherto as the equal of Sertorius in rank had claimed an inde
command over the force which he had brought with him from Liguria, was, on the news of the arrival of Pompeius in Spain, compelled by his soldiers to place himself under the orders of his ables colleague.
{Ear the campaign of 678 Sertorius again employed the corpslof Hirtuleius against Metellus, while Perpenna with strong army took up his position along the lower course
of the Ebro to prevent Pompeius from crossing the river, he should march, as was to be expected, in southerly
direction with the view of effecting junction with Metellus, and along the coast for the sake of procuring supplies for his troops‘; The corps of Gaius Herennius was destined to the immediate support of Perpenna farther inland on the upper Ebro, Sertorius in person prosecuted meanwhile the subjugation of several districts friendly to Rome, and held himself at the same time ready to hasten according to circumstances to the aid of Perpenna or Hirtuleius. It was still his intention to avoid any pitched battle, and to anno the enemy by petty conflicts and cutting off supplies.
Ebmpeius, however, forced the passageioifwthe Ebro against Perpenna and took up position on the river Pallantias, near Saguntum, whence, as we have already said, the Sertorians maintained their communications with Italy and the It was time that Sertorius should appear in persona, asn? throw the superiority of his numbers
pendent
Pompeius defeated.
76.
a;a
if
a
a
it.
CHAP. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 295
and of his genius into the scale against the greater excellence of the soldiers of his opponent. For a considerable time the struggle was concentrated around the town of Lauro (on the ' Xucar, south of Valencia), which had declared for Pompeius and was on that account besieged by Sertorius.
himself to the utmost to relieve it; but, after several of his divisions had already been assailed
Pompeiusgxerted
separately and cut to pieces, the great warrior found himsel
—just when he thought that he had surrounded the Ser "Tl-W.
\. v torians, and when he had already invited the besieged to
be spectators of the capture of the besieging army-—all owfwakm sudden completelyoutmanoeuvred; and in order that he might name himself surrounded, he had to look on fromuhivsficgmp
at the capture and reduction to ashes of the allied town and
‘at the carrying oil‘ of its inhabitants to Lusitania—an event whichin'duced a number of towns that had been wavering in middle and eastern Spain to adhere anew to Sertorius.
Meanwhile MetelluSiQBEht uhhhsttermfottnne- In a Victoriesd sharp engagement at Italica (not far from Seville), which Metellus‘
Hirtuleius had imprudently risked, and in which both generals fought hand to hand and Hirtuleius was wounded, Metellus defeated him and compelled him to evacuate the Ranaii’fénimy proper, and to throw himself into Lusitania.
This victory permitted Metellus to unite“ flitll'gompgius.
The two generals took up their winter-quarters in 678-79 at 76-75, the Pyrenees, and in the next campaign in 679 they resolved 75, to make a joint attack on the enemy in his position near Valentia. But while Metellus was advancing, Pompeius offered battle beforehand-to the main army of the enemy,
with a view to wipe out the of Lauro to gaipathe ‘ stain and
expect-ed laurels, if possible, alone. With “36'; Sertorius embraced the opportunity of fighting with Pompeius before Metellus arrived.
The armies met on the river Sucgo (Xpsar) : after “a Battle on sharp conflictvPompeius was beaten on the right wing,
/_~. -‘
II! w";- the sum
-
,- p-n- . . . pm
296
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND Boox v
and was himself carried from thejeldvsevergllmulided. M
Afranius no doubt conquerednwipth;the'lefiand topk the camp of the Sertorians,‘ but during its pillage he was
suddenly assailed by Sertorius‘ compelleslwalso to give way. Had Sertorius been able to renew the battle on the
following day, the army of Pompeius would iié'fiiEtiiGé been
annihilated. But meanwhile Metellus had come up, had over . v. . . . . . _-v. M ‘ . va g- . |. »_ “exams-us
thrown the corps of Perpenna ranged take anmd“nW' “M
his camp: it was not possible to resume the battle against’:
the two armies united. The successeggf
junction of the hostile forces, the sudden stagnation after the victory, diffused terror among the Sertorians ; and, as not unfrequently happened with Spanish armies, in con sequence of this turn of things the greater portion of the Sertorian soldiers dispersed. But the despondency passed away as quickly as it had come; the white fawn, which represented in the eyes of the multitude the military plans of the general, was soon more popular than ever; in a short time Sertorius appeared with a new army confronting the Romans in the level country to the south of §agtirivtum
M§t§1lus,_the
which firmly adhered to Rome, while the Sertorian privateers impeded the Roman supplies by sea, and scarcity was already making itself felt in the Roman camp. Another battle took place in the plains of the river Turia
(Murviedro),
and the struggle was long undecided.
(Guadalaviar),
Pompeius with the cavalry was defeated.
his brother-in-law and quaestor, the brave Lucius Memmius,
was slain; on the other hand Metellus vwp. v.
vanquished vlierpenna,
and victoriously repelled the attack of the enemy’is'“iinain army directed against him, receiving himself {5065331 the
conflict. Once more the Sertorian army
Valentia, which Gaius Herennius hetdTor
taken and razed to the ground. The Romans,
for a moment, cherished a hope that they were done with their tough antagonist. The Sertorian army had dis
bygiertggipsliid
MwIM
dispersed. SerrormsT‘waS
probably
cm. 1 QUINTUS SERTORIUS 297
appeared; the Roman troops, penetrating far into the interior, besieged the*general himself in thefortress. Clunia on the upper Douro. But while they vainly invested this rocky stronghold, the contingents of the insurgent com munities assembled elsewhere; Sertoriusstole. outof. the fortress and even before the expiry of the year stood once
at the head of an army.
Again the‘ Roman generals had to take up their winter
quarters with the cheerless prospect of an inevitable renewal of their Sisyphean war-toils. It was not even possible to choose quarters in the region of Valentia, so important on account of the communication with Italy and the east, but fearfully devastated by friend and foe; Pompeius led his troops first intothe. writers‘012 . theXascoaesl (Biscay) and then spent the winter in the territory of the Vaccaei (about Valladolid), and Metellus even in Gaul.
For five “W Indefinite . v,v~w. . _. years the soerlgwrianwwar wthu“sbconwtinuedhapd
still there seemed no prospect of its termination. The state 2:210“, it beyond description. The flower of the character
rtalian youth perished amid the exhausting fatigues of these campaigns. The public treasuryv was not only deprived of war. the Spanishwgevenues, but had annually to send to Spain ror‘ui'éfiiy and maintenance of the Spanish armies very considerable‘ sums, which the government hardly knew how
to raise. Spain was devastated and impoverished, and the Roman civilization, which unfolded so fair a promise there, received a severe shock; as was naturally to be expected
in the case of an insurrectionary war waged with so much bitterness, and but too often occasioning the destruction of whole communities. Even the towns which adhered to
the dominant party in Rome had countless hardships to
1 In the recently found fragments of Sallust, which appear to belong
to the campaign of 679. the following words relate to this incident: 75. Romania [urn-Pita: (of Pompeius)frumenti g‘rn[tia rjmotur in Van-ant:
ei
m'o'ie'asmgeneral
i Aria: fer-ind:
. . . [itjemgue Serlan'u: man . . . e, cuiur mullum ne
[r'kr
e! Italiae in[lntr]at, inferdudcrdur].
an
298
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND BOOK v
endure; those situated on the coast had to be provided with necessaries by the Roman fleet, and the situation of the faithful communities in the interior was almost desperate. Gaul suffered hardly less, partly from the requisitions for contingents of infantry and cavalry, for grain and money, partly from the oppressive burden of the winter-quarters, which rose to an intolerable degree in consequence of the
14. bad harvest of 680 ; almost all the local treasuries were compelled to betake themselves to the Roman bankers, and to burden themselves with a crushing load of debt. Generals and soldiers carried on the war with reluctance. The‘genefalsmhad‘ encounteredan opponent far supeiiormm talent, a tough and protracted resistance, a warfare of very serious perils and of successes difficult to be attained and far from brilliant; it was asserted that Pompeius was scheming to get himself recalled from Spain. and entrusted with a more desirable command somewhere else. The soldiersdoq-foun‘d‘little satisfaction in ‘a campaign in which not only was there nothing to be got save hard blows and worthless booty, but their very pay was doled out to them with extreme irregularity.
Pompeius reportedwttlthe senatg
76. at the end of 679, that the paymwas'two‘years infiarregraand that the army was threatening to break up. The Roman government might certainly have obviated a considerable portion of these evils, if they could have prevailed on them selves to carry on the Spanish war with less remissness, to say nothing of better will. In the main, however, it was neither their fault nor the fault of their generals that a genius so superior as that of Sertorius was able to carry on this petty warfare year after year, despite of all numerical and military superiority, on ground so thoroughly favourable to insurrectionary and piratical warfare. So little could its end be foreseen, that the Sertorian insurrection seemed rather as if it would become intermingled with other contemporary revolts and thereby add to its dangerous character.
Just
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 299
at that time the Romans were contending on every sea with piratical fleets, in Italy with the revolted slaves, in Mace donia with the tribes on the lower Danube; and in the east Mithradates, partly induced by the successes of the Spanish insurrection, resolved once more to try the fortune of arms. That Sertorius had formed connections vLith the Italian and Macedonian enemies of Rome, cannot be distinctly affirmed,
he certainly was in constant intercourse with the Marians in Italy. With the pirates, on the other hand, he had previously formed an avowed league, and with the Pontic king—with whom he had long maintained relations through the medium of the Roman emigrants staying at his court—he now concluded a formal treaty of alliance, in which Sertorius ceded to the king the client-states of Asia Minor, but not the Roman province of Asia, and promised, moreover, to send him an oflicer qualified to lead his troops, and a number of soldiers, while the king, in turn, bound himself to transmit to Sertorius forty ships and 3000 talents (£720,000). The wise politicians in the capital were already recalling the time when Italy found itself threatened by Philip from the east and by Hannibal from the west; they conceived that the new Hannibal, just like his pre decessor, after having by himself subdued Spain, could easily arrive with the forces of Spain in Italy sooner than Pompeius, in order that, like the Phoenician formerly, he might summon the Etruscans and Samnites to arms against Rome.
But this comparison was more ingenious than accurate. Collapse
although
Sertorius was far from being strong enough to renew the of the power of
gigantic enterprise of Hannibal. He was lost if he left Spain, Sertorius. where all his successes were bound up with the peculiarities
of the country and the people ; and even there he was more
and more compelled to renounce the offensive. His admirable skill as a leader could not change the nature of
his troops. The Spanish militia retained its
. “cHha-rMacs,ter,
',s. _wa~ (“m““M wm-“fi-rwwi’amr . t, ‘. . . r. ("mess-w»
300
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND B001: v
untrustworthy as the wave or the wind; now collected in masses to the number of ' ' ow melting away again to a mere handful. e oman emigrants, likewise, continued insubordinate, arrogant, and stubborn. Those kinds of armed force which require that a corps should keep together for a considerable time, such as cavalry especially, were of course very inadequately represented in his army. The war gradually swept off his ablest officers and the flower of his veterans ; and even the most
trustworthy communities, weary of being harassed by the Romans and maltreated by the Sertorian officers, began to show
signs of impatience and wavering allegiance. It is re markable that vSe. 1;mr. ius, in this respect also like Hannibal, never deceived himself as to the hopelessness of his position; he allowed no opportunity for bringing about a compromise to pass, and would have 'been ready a533, 'in‘oi'nwéintitb lay down his staff of command on the assurance of being allowed to live peacefully in his native land. But political ortho doxy knows nothing of compromise and conciliation. Sertorius might not recede or step aside; he was compelled inevitably to move on along the path which he had once entered, however narrow and giddy it might become.
The representations which Pompeius addressed to Rome, and which derived emphasis from the behaviour of Mithra dates in the east, were successful. He had the necessary supplies of money sent to him by the senate and was reinforced by two fresh legions. Thus the two generals went
74. to work again in the spring of 680 and'bricé‘ihb‘iét'r'iissed the Ebro. Eastern Spain was wrested from the Sertorians in consequencgof the battles on the Xucarand Guadalaviar; the struggle thenceforth became concentrated on the upper and middle Ebro around the chief strongholds of the Sertor. ians-—Calagurris, Osca, Ilerda. As Metellus had done best in the earlier campaigns, so too on this occasion he-gained
-
M-I-fl'
the most important successes. His old opponent Hirtuleius.
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS 30:
who again confronted him, was completely defeated and fell himself along with his brother—an irreparable loss for the Sertorians. Sertorius, whom the unfortunate news reached just as he was on the point of assailing the enemy opposed to him, out down the messenger, that the tidings might not discourage his troops; but the news could not be long concealed. One
aw. . . “ toi. wnv after MetelluLoficcupiedWthgugeltibegian
another surrendered,
tswris'fsegobrigiffiéiwé'éh Toledo and Cuenca) and Bilbilis (near Calatayud). Pompeius besieged. Pallantia (Palencia above Valladolid), but Sertorius relieved and compelled Pompeius to fall back upon Metellus; in front of Calagurris (Calahorra, on the upper Ebro), into which Sertorius had thrown himself, they both suffered severe losses. Nevertheless, when they went into winter-quarters -—Pompeius to Gaul, Metellus to his own province—they were able to look back on considerable results; great portion of the insurgents had submitted or had been subdued arms.
In similar way the campaign of the following year (681) 78.
ran its course vthis case was especially Pompeius who slowly but steadilywrestricted the. field of the insurrection.
m'l'lie'idiscomfiture sustained by the arms of the insurgents
failed not to react on the tone of feeling in their camp.
The military successes of Sertorius became like those of Hannibal, of necessity less and less considerable; people
began to call in question his military talent: he was no
longer, was alleged, what he had been; he spent the day
in feasting or over his cups, and squandered money as well
as time. The number of the deserters, and of communities Internal falling away, increased. Soon projects formed by the Egg): Roman emigrants against the life of the general were Sertorianl. reported to him they sounded credible enough, especially
as various officers of the insurgent army, and Perpenna in particular, had submitted with reluctance to the supremacy
;
in
it
a
by ;
it
a
it,
Assassina tion of Sertorius.
of Sertorius, and the Roman governors had for long promised amnesty and a high reward to any one who should kill him. Sertorius, on hearing such allegations, withdrew the charge of guarding his person from the Roman soldiers and entrusted it to select Spaniards. Against the suspected themselves he proceeded with fearful but necessary severity, and condemned various of the accused to death without resorting, as in other cases, to the advice of his council ; he was now more dangerous—it was thereupon aflirmed in the circles of the malcontents—to his friends than to his foes.
A second conspiracy was soon discovered, which had its seat in his own staff; whoever was denounced had to take flight or die; but all were not betrayed, and the remaining conspirators, including especially Perpenna, found in the
circumstances only a new incentive to make haste. They were in the headquarters at Osca. There, on the instiga tion of Perpenna, a brilliant victory was reported to the general as having been achieved by his troops ; and at the festal banquet arranged by Perpenna to celebrate this victory Sertorius accordingly appeared, attended, as was his wont, by his Spanish retinue. Contrary to former custom in the Sertorian headquarters, the feast soon became a revel ; wild words passed at table, and it seemed as if some of the guests sought opportunity to begin an altercation. Sertorius threw himself back on his couch, and seemed desirous not to hear the disturbance. Then a wine-cup was dashed on the floor; Perpenna had given the concerted sign. Marcus Antonius, Sertorius’ neighbour at table, dealt the first blow against him, and when Sertorius turned round and attempted to rise, the assassin flung himself upon him and held him down till the other guests at table, all of them implicated in the conspiracy, threw themselves on the struggling pair, and stabbed the defenceless general while his arms were pinioned (682). With him died his faithful
attendants. So ended one of the greatest men, if not the
302
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND B00x v
78.
can. I QUINTUS SERTORIUS
303
very greatest man, that Rome had hitherto produced—a man who under more fortunate circumstances would perhaps have become the regenerator of his country-—by the treason of the wretched band of emigrants whom he was condemned to lead against his native land. History loves not the Coriolani ; nor has she made any exception even in the case of this the most magnanimous, most gifted, most deserving to be regretted of them all.
The murderers thought to succeed to the heritage of the Perpenna murdered. After the death of Sertorius, Perpenna, as the sue-weds
Sertorius. highest among the Roman oflicers of the Spanish army, laid
claim to the chief command. The army submitted, but with mistrust and reluctance. However men had murmured against Sertorius in his lifetime, death reinstated the hero in his rights, and vehement was the indignation of the soldiers when, on the publication of his testament, the name of Perpenna was read forth among the heirs. A part of the soldiers, especially the Lusitanians, dispersed ; the remainder had a presentiment that with the death of Sertorius their spirit and their fortune had departed.
Accordingly, at the first encounter with Pompeius, the Pompeius
wretchedly led and despondent ranks of the insurgents puts an end to the
were utterly broken, and Perpenna, among other oflicers, insurrec was taken prisoner. The wretch sought to purchase his tion. life by delivering up the correspondence of Sertorius, which
would have compromised numerous men of standing in
Italy ; but Pompeius ordered the papers to be burnt unread, and handed him, as well as the other chiefs of the insurgents, over to the executioner. The emigrants who had escaped dispersed; and most of them went into the Mauretanian deserts or joined the pirates. Soon afterwards the Plotian law, which was zealously supported by the young Caesar in particular, opened up to a portion of them the opportunity of returning home; but all those who had taken part in the murder of Sertorius, with but
MARCUS LEPIDUS & QUINTUS SERTORIUS BOOK \
a single exception, died a violent death. Osca, and most of the towns which had still adhered to Sertorius in Hither Spain, now voluntarily opened their gates to Pompeius; Uxama (Osma), Clunia, and Calagurris alone had to be reduced by force. The two provinces were regulated anew; in the Further province, Metellus raised the annual tribute of the most guilty communities; in the Hither, Pompeius dispensed reward and punishment: Calagurris, for example, lost its independence and was placed under Osca. A band of Sertorian soldiers, which had collected in the Pyrenees, was induced by Pompeius to surrender, and was settled by him to the north of the Pyrenees near Lugudunum (St. Bertrand, in the department Haute
304
as the community of the “congregated” The Roman emblems of victory were erected at the summit of the pass of the Pyrenees; at the close 71. of 683, Metellus and Pompeius marched with their armies
through the streets of the capital, to present the thanks of the nation to Father Jovis at the Capitol for the conquest of the Spaniards. The good fortune of Sulla seemed still to be with his creation after he had been laid in the grave, and to protect it better than the incapable and negligent watchmen appointed to guard The opposition in Italy had broken down from the incapacity and precipitation of its leader, and that of the emigrants from dissension within their own ranks. These defeats, although far more the result of their own perverseness and discordance than of the exertions of their opponents, were yet so many victories for the oligarchy. The curule chairs were rendered once more secure.
Garonne), (carwmae).
it.
can. u RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
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CHAPTER II
RULE or me SULLAN zms'rom'nou
WHEN the suppression of the Cinnan revolution, which External threatened the very existence of the senate, rendered it "mm" possible for the restored senatorial government to devote
once more the requisite attention to the internal and
external security of the empire, there emerged affairs enough, the settlement of which could not be postponed without injuring the most important interests and allowing present inconveniences to grow into future dangers. Apart from the very serious complications in Spain, it was absolutely necessary effectually to check the barbarians in Thrace and the regions of the Danube, whom Sulla on his march through Macedonia had only been able superficially to chastise (p. 50), and to regulate, by military intervention,
. he disorderly state of things along the northern frontier of the Greek peninsula; thoroughly to suppress the bands
of pirates infesting the seas everywhere, but especially the eastern waters 5 and lastly to introduce better order into the unsettled relations of Asia Minor. The peace which Sulla had concluded in 670 with Mithradates, king of Pontus 84. (p. 49, 52), and of which the treaty with Murena in 673 81. (p. 9 5) was essentially a repetition,bore throughout the stamp
of a provisional arrangement to meet the exigencies of the moment; and the relations of the Romans with Tigranes, k'ng of Armenia, with whom they had defiuto waged war,
VOL IY 1'9
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RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
DalmatO Macedon in ex peditions.
remained wholly untouched in this peace. Tigranes had with right regarded this as a tacit permission to bring the Roman possessions in Asia under his power. If these were not to be abandoned, it was necessary to come to terms amicably or by force with the new great-king of
’
Asia.
In the preceding chapter we have described the move
ments in Italy and Spain connected with the proceedings of the democracy, and their subjugation by the senatorial government. In the present chapter we shall review the external government, as the authorities installed by Sulla conducted or failed to conduct
We still recognize the vigorous hand of Sulla in the energetic measures which, in the last period of his regency, the senate adopted almost simultaneously against the Sertorians, the Dalmatians and Thracians, and the Cilician pirates.
The expedition to the Graeco-Illyrian peninsula was designed partly to reduce to subjection or at least to tame the barbarous tribes who ranged over the whole interior from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and of whom the Bessi (in the great Balkan) especially were, as was then said, notorious as robbers even among race of robbers
partly to destroy the corsairs in their haunts, especially along
the Dalmatian coast. As usual, the attack took place simultaneously from Dalmatia and from Macedonia, in which province an army of five legions was assembled for the purpose. In Dalmatia the former praetor Gaius Cosconius held the command, marched through the country in all directions, and took by storm the fortress of Salona after two years’ siege. In Macedonia the proconsul
78-76. Appius Claudius (676-678) first attempted along the Macedono-Thracian frontier to make himself master of the mountain districts on the left bank of the Karasu. Or. both sides the war was conducted with savage ferocity;
a
5
a
it.
it
CHAP. I! RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
307
the Thracians destroyed the townships which they took and massacred their captives, and the Romans returned like for like. But no results of importance were attained; the toilsome marches and the constant conflicts with the numerous and brave inhabitants of the mountains deci
mated the army to no purpose; the general himself sickened and died. His successor, Gaius Scribonius Curio
was induced by various obstacles, and par 75-78. ticularly by a not inconsiderable military revolt, to desist
from the diflicult expedition against the Thracians, and to
turn himself instead to the northern frontier of Macedonia, where he subdued the weaker Dardani (in Servia) and reached as far as the Danube. The brave and able
(679-681),
Marcus Lucullus (682, 683) was the first who again advanced eastward, defeated the Bessi in their mountains,
took their capital Uscudama (Adrianople), and compelled
them to submit to the Roman supremacy. Sadalas king subdued. of the Odrysians, and the Greek towns on the east coast
to the north and south of the Balkan chain-—Istropolis, Tomi, Callatis, Odessus (near Varna), Mesembria, and others—became dependent on the Romans. Thrace, of which the Romans had hitherto held little more than the
Attalic possessions on the Chersonese, now became a portion—though far from obedient—of the province of Macedonia.
But the predatory raids of the Thracians and Dardani, Piracy confined as they were to a small part of the empire, were
far less injurious to the state and to individuals than the
evil of piracy, which was continually spreading farther and acquiring more solid organization. The commerce of the
whole Mediterranean was in its power. Italy could neither
export its products nor import grain from the provinces ; in
the former the people were starving, in the latter the culti
vation of the corn-fields ceased for want of a vent for
the produce. No consignment of money, no traveller was
12, 11. Thrace
30:; RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION Boo]: v
longer safe: the public treasury suffered most serious losses ; a great many Romans of standing were captured by the corsairs, and compelled to pay heavy sums for their ransom, if it was not even the pleasure of the pirates to execute on individuals the sentence of death, which in that case was seasoned with a savage humour. The merchants, and even the divisions of Roman troops destined for the east, began to postpone their voyages chiefly to the un favourable season of the year, and to be less afraid of the winter storms than of the piratical vessels, which indeed even at this season did not wholly disappear from the sea. But severely as the closing of the sea was felt, it was more tolerable than the raids made on the islands and coasts of Greece and Asia Minor. Just as afterwards
in the time of the Normans, piratical squadrons ran up to the maritime towns, and either compelled them to buy themselves 06' with large sums, or besieged and took them by storm. When Samothrace, Clazomenae,
M. Samos, Iassus were pillaged by the pirates (670) under the eyes of Sulla after peace was concluded with Mithra dates, we may conceive how matters went where neither a Roman army nor a Roman fleet was at hand. All the old rich temples along the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor were plundered one after another; from Samo thrace alone a treasure of 1000 talents (£240,000) is said to have been carried off. Apollo, according to a
Roman poet of this period, was so impoverished by the pirates that, when the swallow paid him a visit, he could no longer produce to it out of all his treasures even a drachm of gold. More than four hundred townships were enumerated as having been taken or laid under contribu tion by the pirates, including cities like Cnidus, Samos, Colophon; from not a few places on islands or the coast, which were previously flourishing, the whole population migrated, that they might not be carried off by the pirates.
CHAP. I! RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
309
Even inland districts were no longer safe from their attacks; there were instances of their assailing townships distant one or two days’ march from the coast. The fearful debt, under which subsequently all the communities of the Greek east succumbed, proceeded in great part from these fatal times.
Piracy had totally changed its character. The pirates
Organisa were no longer bold freebooters, who levied their tribute tion of
piracy. from the large Italo-Oriental traflic in slaves and luxuries,
as it passed through the Cretan waters between Cyrene and the Peloponnesus—in the language of the pirates the
sea”; no longer even armed slave-catchers, who prosecuted “war, trade, and piracy” equally side by side; they formed now a piratical state, with a peculiar esprit de corpr, with a solid and very respectable organization, with a home of their own and the germs of a symmachy, and doubtless also with definite political designs. The
called themselves Cilicians; in fact their vessels were the rendezvous of desperadoes and adventurers from all countries-—discharged mercenaries from the recruiting grounds of Crete, burgesses from the destroyed townships of Italy, Spain, and Asia, soldiers and oflicers from the armies of Fimbria and Sertorius, in a word the ruined men of all nations, the hunted refugees of all vanquished parties, every one that was wretched and daring—and where was there not misery and outrage in this unhappy age? It was no longer a gang of robbers who had flocked together, but
“golden
pirates
soldier-state, in which the freemasonry of exile and crime took the place of nationality, and within which crime redeemed itself, as it so often does in its own eyes,
a compact
the most generous public spirit. In an abandoned age, when cowardice and insubordination had
relaxed all the bonds of social order, the legitimate common wealths might have taken a pattern from this state-—the mongrel offspring of distress and violence—within which
by displaying
310
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
military political power.
alone the inviolable determination to stand side by side, the sense of comradeship, respect for the pledged word and the self-chosen chiefs, valour and adroitness seemed to have taken refuge. If the banner of this state was inscribed with vengeance against the civil society which, rightly or wrongly, had ejected its members, it might be a question whether this device was much worse than those of the Italian oligarchy and the Oriental sultanship which seemed in the fair way of dividing the world between them. The corsairs at least felt themselves on a level with any legitimate state ; their robber-pride, their robber-pomp, and their robber humour are attested by many a genuine pirate’s tale of mad merriment and chivalrous bandittism: they professed, and made it their boast, to live at righteous war with all the world : what they gained in that warfare was designated not as plunder, but as military spoil; and, while the captured corsair was sure of the cross in every Roman seaport, they too claimed the right of executing any of their captives.
Their military-political organization, especially since the Mithradatic war, was compact. Their ships, for the most
that small open swift-sailing barks, with smaller proportion of biremes and triremes, now regularly sailed associated in squadrons and under admirals, whose
barges were wont to glitter in gold and purple. To comrade in peril, though he might be totally unknown, no pirate captain refused the requested aid an agreement concluded with any one of them was absolutely recognized by the whole society, and any injury inflicted on one was
avenged by all. Their true home was the sea from the pillars of Hercules to the Syrian and Egyptian waters; the refuges which they needed for themselves and their floating
houses on the mainland were readily furnished to them by the Mauretanian and Dalmatian coasts, by the island of Crete, and, above all, by the southern coast of Asia Minor, which abounded in headlands and lurking-places, com
part myoparaner,
;
a
a
is,
CHAP. II RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
311
manded the chief thoroughfare of the maritime commerce
of that age, and was virtually without a master. The league
of Lycian cities there, and the Pamphylian communities,
were of little importance; the Roman station, which had existed in Cilicia since 652, was far from adequate to 10! . command the extensive coast; the Syrian dominion over Cilicia had always been but nominal, and had recently been superseded by the Armenian, the holder of which, as a true great-king, gave himself no concern at all about the sea and readily abandoned it to the pillage of the Cilicians. It was
nothing wonderful, therefore, that the corsairs flourished there as they had never done anywhere else. Not only did they possess everywhere along the coast signal-places and stations, but further inland—in the most remote recesses of the impassable and mountainous interior of Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia—they had built their rock castles, in which they concealed their wives, children, and treasures during their own absence at sea, and, doubtless, in times of danger found an asylum themselves. Great numbers of such corsair-castles existed especially in the Rough Cilicia, the forests of which at the same time furnished the pirates with the most excellent timber for shipbuilding; and there, accordingly, their principal dock yards and arsenals were situated. It was not to be wondered at that this organized military state gained a firm body of clients among the Greek maritime cities, which were more or less left to themselves and managed their own affairs: these cities entered into traflic with the pirates as with a friendly power on the basis of definite treaties, and did not
comply with the summons of the Roman governors to furnish vessels against them. The not inconsiderable town of Side in Pamphylia, for instance, allowed the pirates to build ships on its quays, and to sell the free men whom they had captured in its market.
Such a society of pirates was a political power; and al
312
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK 1
a. political power it gave itself out and was accepted from the time when the Syrian king Tryphon first employed it as such and rested his throne on its support (iii. 292). We find the pirates as allies of king Mithradates of Pontus as well as of the Roman democratic emigrants; we find them giving battle to the fleets of Sulla in the eastern and in the western waters; we find individual pirate princes ruling over a series of considerable coast towns. We cannot tell how far the internal political development of this floating state had already advanced; but its arrangements undeniably con tained the germ of a sea-kingdom, which was already beginning to establish itself, and out of which, under favourable circumstances, a permanent state might have been developed.
This state of matters clearly shows, as we have partly
Nnlllty of
the Roman indicated already 290), how the Romans kept—or rather
marine police.
(iii.
did not keep—order on “their sea. ” The protectorate of
Rome over the provinces consisted essentially in military guardianship; the provincials paid tax or tribute to the Romans for their defence by sea and land, which was con centrated in Roman hands. But never, perhaps, did a guardian‘ more shamelessly defraud his ward than the Roman oligarchy defrauded the subject communities. In stead of Rome equipping a general fleet for the empire and centralizing her marine police, the senate permitted the unity of her maritime superintendence—without which in this matter nothing could at all be done—to fall into abeyance, and left it to each governor and each client state to defend themselves against the pirates as each chose and was able. Instead of Rome providing for the fleet, as she had bound herself to do, exclusively with her own blood and treasure and with those of the client states which had remained formally sovereign, the senate allowed the Italian war-marine
to fall into decay, and learned to make shift with the vessels which the several mercantile towns were required to furnish,
CHAP. ll RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION
313
or still more frequently with the coast-guards everywhere organized—all the cost and burden falling, in either case,
on the subjects. The provincials might deem themselves fortunate, if their Roman governor applied the requisitions which he raised for the defence of the coast in reality solely
to that object, and did not intercept them for himself; or if they were not, as very frequently happened, called on to pay ransom for some Roman of rank captured by the buccaneers. Measures undertaken perhaps with judgment, such as the occupation of Cilicia in 652, were sure to be spoilt in the 102. execution. Any Roman of this period, who was not wholly carried away by the current intoxicating idea of the national greatness, must have wished that the ships’ beaks might be
torn down from the orator’s platform in the Forum, that at least he might not be constantly reminded by them of the naval victories achieved in better times.
Nevertheless Sulla, who in the war against Mithradates Expedition had the opportunity of acquiring an adequate conviction of £2,131” com the dangers which the neglect of the fleet involved, took ofvAsia various steps seriously to check the evil. It is true that Mm"
the instructions which he had left to the governors whom
he appointed in Asia, to equip in the maritime towns a fleet
against the pirates, had borne little fruit, for Murena pre
ferred to begin war with Mithradates, and Gnaeus Dola
bella, the governor of Cilicia, proved wholly incapable. Accordingly the senate resolved in 675 to send one of the 79. consuls to Cilicia ; the lot fell on the capable Publius Publius Servilius. He defeated the piratical fleet in a bloody engagement, and then applied himself to destroy those towns
on the south coast of Asia Minor which served them as
and trading stations. The fortresses of the maritime prince Zenicetes—Olympus, Corycus, Zenlcetq
anchorages
powerful
Phaselis in eastern Lycia, Attalia in Pamphylia—were 2gb“. reduced, and the prince himself met his death in the flames
of his stronghold Olympus. A movement was next made
The Isaurians subdued.
against the Isaurians, who in the north-west corner of the Rough Cilicia, on the northern slope of Mount Taurus, inhabited a labyrinth of steep mountain ridges, jagged rocks, and deeply-cut valleys, covered with magnificent oak forests—a region which is even at the present day filled with reminiscences of the old robber times. To reduce these Isaurian fastnesses, the last and most secure retreats of the freebooters, Servilius led the first Roman army over
the Taurus, and broke up the strongholds of the enemy, Oroanda, and above all Isaura itself—the ideal of a robber town, situated on the summit of a scarcely accessible moun tain-ridge, and completely overlooking and commanding the wide plain of Iconium. The war, not ended till 679, from which Publius Servilius acquired for himself and his descendants the surname of Isauricus, was not without fruit 3 a great number of pirates and piratical vessels fell in consequence of it into the power of the Romans; Lycia, Pamphylia, West Cilicia were severely devastated, the territories of the destroyed towns were confiscated, and the province of Cilicia was enlarged by their addition to it. But, in the nature of the case, piracy was far from being suppressed by these measures; on the contrary, it simply betook itself for the time to other regions, and particularly
to Crete, the oldest harbour for the corsairs of the Medi terranean (iii. 291). Nothing but repressive measures carried
out on a large scale and with unity of purpose-—nothing, in fact, but the establishment of a standing maritime police —could in such a case afford thorough relief.
The affairs of the mainland of Asia Minor were con nected by various relations with this maritime war. The variance which existed between Rome and the kings of Pontus and Armenia did not abate, but increased more and more. On the one hand Tigranes, king of Armenia, pursued his aggressive conquests in the most reckless
75.
314
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION BOOK v
Asiatic relations.
Tigranes and the new great
kinsdom of manner.
