(14) Nam etiam si idcirco, quoniam futura sunt, providentur: non
vero ideo, quoniam providentur, eveniunt: nihilo minus tamen a Deo
vel ventura provideri, vel provisa evenire necesse est:
(15) Quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est.
vero ideo, quoniam providentur, eveniunt: nihilo minus tamen a Deo
vel ventura provideri, vel provisa evenire necesse est:
(15) Quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est.
Chaucer - Boethius
in any manere taki?
hys
causes. hys ordre. and hys formes. of ? e stablenesse of ? e deuyne
? ou? t [and thilke deuyne thowht] ? at is yset and put in ? e toure.
? at is to seyne in ? e hey? t of ? e simplicite of god. stablisi?
many manere gyses to ? inges ? at ben to don.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, bk. iv. pr. 6, p. 134. )
V. THE PART IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, THE IMPERFECT FROM THE PERFECT.
Wel may men knowe, but it be a fool,
That every partye dyryveth from his hool.
For nature hath nat take his bygynnyng
Of no partye ne cantel of a thing,
But of a thing that parfyt is and stable,
Descendyng so, til it be corumpable.
(_Knightes Tale_, vol. ii. p. 92. )
For al ? ing ? at is cleped inperfit . is proued inperfit by ? e
amenusynge of perfeccioun . or of ? ing ? at is perfit . and her-of
come? it . ? at in euery ? ing general . yif ? at . ? at men seen any
? ing ? at is inperfit . certys in ? ilke general ? er mot ben somme
? ing ? at is perfit. For yif so be ? at perfeccioun is don awey .
men may nat ? inke nor seye fro whennes ? ilke ? ing is ? at is cleped
inperfit . For ? e nature of ? inges ne token nat her bygynnyng of
? inges amenused and inperfit . but it procedi? of ? ingus ? at ben
al hool . and absolut . and descende? so doune in-to outerest
? inges and in-to ? ingus empty and wi? -oute fruyt . but as I haue
shewed a litel her byforne . ? at yif ? er be a blisfulnesse ? at be
frele and vein and inperfit . ? er may no man doute . ? at ? er nys
som blisfulnesse ? at is sad stedfast and perfit. '
(bk. iii. pr. 10, p. 89. )
Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id deminutione perfecti
imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit ut si in quolibet genere
imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod
esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud, quod
imperfectum perhibetur, extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. _Neque
enim ab diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium,
sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effoeta
dilabitur. _ Quod si, uti paulo ante monstravimus, est quaedam boni
fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque
non potest dubitari.
(_Boeth. _, lib. iii. pr. 10. )
VI. GENTILITY.
For gentilnesse nys but renome
Of thin auncestres, for her heigh bounte
Which is a straunge thing to thy persone.
(_The Wyf of Bathes Tale_, vol. ii. p. 241. )
For if ? e name of gentilesse be referred to renoun and clernesse
of linage. ? an is gentil name but a foreine ? ing.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 78. )
_Quae_ [nobilitas], _si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. _
(_Boethius_, lib. iii. pr. 6. )
VII. NERO'S CRUELTY.
No teer out of his eyen for that sighte
Ne cam; but sayde, a fair womman was sche.
Gret wonder is how that he couthe or mighte
Be domesman on hir dede beaute.
(_The Monkes Tale_, vol. iii. p. 217. )
Ne no tere ne wette his face, but he was so hard-herted ? at he
my? te ben domesman or iuge of hire dede beaute.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 55. )
Ora non tinxit lacrymis, sed esse
Censor extincti potuit decoris.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. met. 6. )
VIII. PREDESTINATION AND FREE-WILL.
In 'Troylus and Cryseyde' we find the following long passage taken from
Boethius, book v. prose 2, 3.
Book iv. st. 134, vol. iv. p. 339.
(1) Syn God seth every thynge, out of doutaunce,
And hem disponeth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothely for to be,
As they shul comen by predesteyne
136
(2) For som men seyn if God seth al byforne,
Ne God may not deseyved ben parde!
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworne,
That purveyaunce hath seyn befor to be,
Wherfor I seye, that, from eterne, if he
Hathe wiste byforn our thought ek as oure dede,
We have no fre choys, as thise clerkes rede.
137
(3) For other thoughte, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere moo,
Hath feled byforne, withouten ignoraunce;
For if ther myghte ben a variaunce,
To wrythen out fro Goddes purveyinge,
Ther nere no prescience of thynge comynge;
138
(4) But it were rather an opinyon
Uncertein, and no stedfast forseynge;
And certes that were an abusyon
That God shold han no parfit clere wetynge,
More than we men, that han douteous wenynge,
But swich an erroure upon God to gesse
Were fals, and foule, and wikked corsednesse.
139
(5) They seyn right thus, that thynge is nat to come,
For that the prescience hath seyne byfore
That it shal come; but they seyn that therfore
That it shal come, therfor the purveyaunce
Woot it bifore, withouten ignorance.
140
(6) And in this manere this necessite
Retourneth in his part contrarye agayn;
For nedfully byhoveth it not to be,
That thilke thynges fallen in certeyn
That ben purveyed; but nedly, as they seyne,
Bihoveth it that thynges, which that falle,
That thei in certein ben purveied alle.
141
(7) I mene as though I labourede me in this,
To enqueren which thynge cause of whiche thynge be;
(8) As, whether that the prescience of God is
The certein cause of the necessite
Of thynges that to comen ben, parde!
Or, if necessite of thynge comynge
Be cause certein of the purveyinge.
142
(9) But now nenforce I me nat in shewynge
How the ordre of causes stant; but wel woot I
That it bihoveth that the bifallynge
Of thynges, wiste bifor certeinly,
Be necessarie, al seme it nat therby
That prescience put fallynge necessaire
To thynge to come, al falle it foule or faire.
143
(10) For, if ther sit a man yonde on a see, [seat]
Than by necessite bihoveth it,
That certes thyn opinioun soth be,
That wenest or conjectest that he sit;
And, further over, now ayeinwarde yit,
Lo right so is it on the part contrarie,
As thus,--nowe herkene, for I wol nat tarie:--
144
(11) I sey, that if the opinion of the
Be soth for that he sit, than seye I this,
That he moot sitten by necessite;
And thus necessite in either is,
For in hym nede of sittynge is, ywis,
And in the, nede of soth; and thus forsoth
Ther mot necessite ben in yow bothe.
145
(12) But thow maist seyne, the man sit nat therfore,
That thyn opinioun of his sittynge sothe is;
But rather, for the man sat there byfore,
Therfor is thyn opinioun soth, ywys;
And I seye, though the cause of soth of this
Cometh of his sittynge, yet necessite
Is interchaunged both in hym and the.
146
(13) Thus in the same wyse, out of doutaunce,
I may wel maken, as it semeth me,
My resonynge of Goddes purveiaunce,
And of the thynges that to comen be; . . .
147
(14) For although that for thynge shal come, ywys,
Therfor it is purveyed certeynly,
Nat that it cometh for it purveied is;
Yet, natheles, bihoveth it nedfully,
That thynge to come be purveied trewly;
Or elles thynges that purveied be.
That they bitiden by necessite.
148
(15) And this sufficeth right ynough, certeyn,
For to distruye oure fre choys everydele.
(1) Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens providentiae cernit
intuitus, et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata disponit. . . . .
(_Boethius_, lib. v. pr. 2. ) . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Nam si cuncta prospicit Deus neque falli ullo modo potest,
evenire necesse est, quod providentia futurum esse praeviderit.
Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo, sed etiam consilia
voluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas;
(3) Neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quaelibet existere
poterit voluntas, nisi quam nescia falli providentia divina
praesenserit. Nam si res aliorsum, quam provisae sunt detorqueri
valent, non jam erit futuri firma praescientia;
(4) Sed opinio potius incerta; quod de Deo nefas credere judico.
(5) Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse eventurum quoniam id providentia
futurum esse prospexerit; sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid
futurum est, id divinam providentiam latere non possit.
(6) Eoque modo necessarium est hoc in contrariam relabi partem;
neque enim necesse est contingere quae providentur, sed necesse est
quae futura sunt provideri.
(7) Quasi vero quae cujusque rei causa sit,
(8) Praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas
providentiae, laboretur.
(9) At nos illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo
causarum, necessarium esse eventum praescitarum rerum, etiam si
praescientia futuris rebus eveniendi necessitatem non videatur
inferre.
(10) Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere conjectat
veram esse necesse est: at e converso rursus,
(11) Si de quopiam vera sit opinio quoniam sedet eum sedere
necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest: in hoc quidem
sedendi, at vero in altero veritatis.
(12) Sed non idcirco quisque sedet, quoniam vera est opinio: sed
haec potius vera est, quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum
causa veritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in
utraque necessitas.
(13) Similia de providentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet.
(14) Nam etiam si idcirco, quoniam futura sunt, providentur: non
vero ideo, quoniam providentur, eveniunt: nihilo minus tamen a Deo
vel ventura provideri, vel provisa evenire necesse est:
(15) Quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est.
(lib. v. pr. 3. )
See _Chaucer's Boethius_, pp. 154-6.
IX. THE GRIEF OF REMEMBERING BYGONE HAPPINESS.
For, of fortunes scharp adversite,
The worste kynde of infortune is this,
A man to han ben in prosperite,
And it remembren, when it passed is.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 226, vol. iv. p. 291. )
Sed hoc est, quod recolentem me vehementius coquit. Nam in omni
adversitate fortunae infelicissimum genus est infortunii, fuisse
felicem. [I-10]
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. pr. 4. )
[Footnote I-10: Cf. Dante, _Inferno_, V. 121.
Nessun maggior dolore
Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
Nella miseria; e cio sa 'l tuo Dottore. ]
X. VULTURES TEAR THE STOMACH OF TITYUS IN HELL.
----Syciphus in Helle,
Whos stomak fowles tyren everemo,
That hyghten volturis.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, book i. st. 113, p. 140. )
? e fowel ? at hy? t voltor ? at eti? ? e stomak or ? e giser of ticius.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 107. )
XI. THE MUTABILITY OF FORTUNE.
For if hire (Fortune's) whiel stynte any thinge to torne
Thanne cessed she Fortune anon to be.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. i. st. 122, p. 142. )
If fortune bygan to dwelle stable. she cesed[e] ? an to ben fortune.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 32. )
(Compare stanzas 120, 121, p. 142, and stanza 136, p. 146, of 'Troylus
and Cryseyde' with pp. 31, 33, 35, and p. 34 of Chaucer's Boethius. )
At omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere incipit, fors esse
desistit.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 1. )
XII. WORLDLY SELYNESSE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Imedled is with many a bitternesse.
Ful angwyshous than is, God woote, quod she,
Condicion of veyn prosperite!
For oyther joies comen nought yfeere,
Or elles no wight hath hem alwey here.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 110, p. 258. )
? e swetnesse of mannes welefulnesse is yspranid wi? many[e]
bitternesses.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 42. )
--ful anguissous ? ing is ? e condicioun of mans goodes. For ey? er
it come? al to-gidre to a wy? t. or ellys it laste? not perpetuely.
(_Ib. _ p. 41. )
Quam multis amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa
est!
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 4. )
Anxia enim res est humanorum conditio bonorum, et quae vel nunquam
tota proveniat, vel nunquam perpetua subsistat.
(_Ib. _)
O, brotel wele of mannes joie unstable!
With what wight so thow be, or how thow pleye,
Oither he woot that thow joie art muable,
Or woot it nought, it mot ben on of tweyen:
Now if he woot it not, how may he seyen
That he hath veray joie and selynesse,
That is of ignoraunce ay in distresse?
Now if he woote that joie is transitorie,
As every joie of worldly thynge mot fle,
Thanne every tyme he that hath in memorie,
The drede of lesyng maketh hym that he
May in no parfyte selynesse be:
And if to lese his joie, he sette not a myte,
Than semeth it, that joie is worth ful lite.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 111, 112, vol. iv. p. 258. )
(1) What man ? at ? is toumblyng welefulnesse leedi? , ei? er he woot
? at [it] is chaungeable. or ellis he woot it nat. And yif he woot
it not. what blisful fortune may ? er be in ? e blyndenesse of
ignoraunce.
(2) And yif he woot ? at it is chaungeable. he mot alwey ben adrad
? at he ne lese ? at ? ing. ? at he ne doute? nat but ? at he may
leesen it. . . . . . For whiche ? e continuel drede ? at he ha?
ne suffri? hym nat to ben weleful. Or ellys yif he leese it he
wene[? ] to be dispised and forleten hit. Certis eke ? at is a ful
lytel goode ? at is born wi? euene hert[e] whan it is loost.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, pp. 43, 44. )
(1) Quem caduca ista felicitas vehit, vel scit eam, vel nescit
esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest
ignorantiae in caecitate?
(2) Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat, quod amitti posse non
dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An vel si
amiserit, negligendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est, quod
aequo animo feratur amissum.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 4. )
XIII. FORTUNE.
----Fortune
That semeth trewest when she wol bigyle,
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
And, when a wight is from hire whiel ithrowe,
Than laugheth she, and maketh hym the mowe.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 254, vol. iv. p. 299. )
She (Fortune) vse? ful flatryng familarite wi? hem ? at she
enforce? to bygyle.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 30. )
. .
causes. hys ordre. and hys formes. of ? e stablenesse of ? e deuyne
? ou? t [and thilke deuyne thowht] ? at is yset and put in ? e toure.
? at is to seyne in ? e hey? t of ? e simplicite of god. stablisi?
many manere gyses to ? inges ? at ben to don.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, bk. iv. pr. 6, p. 134. )
V. THE PART IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, THE IMPERFECT FROM THE PERFECT.
Wel may men knowe, but it be a fool,
That every partye dyryveth from his hool.
For nature hath nat take his bygynnyng
Of no partye ne cantel of a thing,
But of a thing that parfyt is and stable,
Descendyng so, til it be corumpable.
(_Knightes Tale_, vol. ii. p. 92. )
For al ? ing ? at is cleped inperfit . is proued inperfit by ? e
amenusynge of perfeccioun . or of ? ing ? at is perfit . and her-of
come? it . ? at in euery ? ing general . yif ? at . ? at men seen any
? ing ? at is inperfit . certys in ? ilke general ? er mot ben somme
? ing ? at is perfit. For yif so be ? at perfeccioun is don awey .
men may nat ? inke nor seye fro whennes ? ilke ? ing is ? at is cleped
inperfit . For ? e nature of ? inges ne token nat her bygynnyng of
? inges amenused and inperfit . but it procedi? of ? ingus ? at ben
al hool . and absolut . and descende? so doune in-to outerest
? inges and in-to ? ingus empty and wi? -oute fruyt . but as I haue
shewed a litel her byforne . ? at yif ? er be a blisfulnesse ? at be
frele and vein and inperfit . ? er may no man doute . ? at ? er nys
som blisfulnesse ? at is sad stedfast and perfit. '
(bk. iii. pr. 10, p. 89. )
Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id deminutione perfecti
imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit ut si in quolibet genere
imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod
esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud, quod
imperfectum perhibetur, extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. _Neque
enim ab diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium,
sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effoeta
dilabitur. _ Quod si, uti paulo ante monstravimus, est quaedam boni
fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque
non potest dubitari.
(_Boeth. _, lib. iii. pr. 10. )
VI. GENTILITY.
For gentilnesse nys but renome
Of thin auncestres, for her heigh bounte
Which is a straunge thing to thy persone.
(_The Wyf of Bathes Tale_, vol. ii. p. 241. )
For if ? e name of gentilesse be referred to renoun and clernesse
of linage. ? an is gentil name but a foreine ? ing.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 78. )
_Quae_ [nobilitas], _si ad claritudinem refertur, aliena est. _
(_Boethius_, lib. iii. pr. 6. )
VII. NERO'S CRUELTY.
No teer out of his eyen for that sighte
Ne cam; but sayde, a fair womman was sche.
Gret wonder is how that he couthe or mighte
Be domesman on hir dede beaute.
(_The Monkes Tale_, vol. iii. p. 217. )
Ne no tere ne wette his face, but he was so hard-herted ? at he
my? te ben domesman or iuge of hire dede beaute.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 55. )
Ora non tinxit lacrymis, sed esse
Censor extincti potuit decoris.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. met. 6. )
VIII. PREDESTINATION AND FREE-WILL.
In 'Troylus and Cryseyde' we find the following long passage taken from
Boethius, book v. prose 2, 3.
Book iv. st. 134, vol. iv. p. 339.
(1) Syn God seth every thynge, out of doutaunce,
And hem disponeth, thorugh his ordinaunce,
In hire merites sothely for to be,
As they shul comen by predesteyne
136
(2) For som men seyn if God seth al byforne,
Ne God may not deseyved ben parde!
Than moot it fallen, theigh men hadde it sworne,
That purveyaunce hath seyn befor to be,
Wherfor I seye, that, from eterne, if he
Hathe wiste byforn our thought ek as oure dede,
We have no fre choys, as thise clerkes rede.
137
(3) For other thoughte, nor other dede also,
Myghte nevere ben, but swich as purveyaunce,
Which may nat ben deceyved nevere moo,
Hath feled byforne, withouten ignoraunce;
For if ther myghte ben a variaunce,
To wrythen out fro Goddes purveyinge,
Ther nere no prescience of thynge comynge;
138
(4) But it were rather an opinyon
Uncertein, and no stedfast forseynge;
And certes that were an abusyon
That God shold han no parfit clere wetynge,
More than we men, that han douteous wenynge,
But swich an erroure upon God to gesse
Were fals, and foule, and wikked corsednesse.
139
(5) They seyn right thus, that thynge is nat to come,
For that the prescience hath seyne byfore
That it shal come; but they seyn that therfore
That it shal come, therfor the purveyaunce
Woot it bifore, withouten ignorance.
140
(6) And in this manere this necessite
Retourneth in his part contrarye agayn;
For nedfully byhoveth it not to be,
That thilke thynges fallen in certeyn
That ben purveyed; but nedly, as they seyne,
Bihoveth it that thynges, which that falle,
That thei in certein ben purveied alle.
141
(7) I mene as though I labourede me in this,
To enqueren which thynge cause of whiche thynge be;
(8) As, whether that the prescience of God is
The certein cause of the necessite
Of thynges that to comen ben, parde!
Or, if necessite of thynge comynge
Be cause certein of the purveyinge.
142
(9) But now nenforce I me nat in shewynge
How the ordre of causes stant; but wel woot I
That it bihoveth that the bifallynge
Of thynges, wiste bifor certeinly,
Be necessarie, al seme it nat therby
That prescience put fallynge necessaire
To thynge to come, al falle it foule or faire.
143
(10) For, if ther sit a man yonde on a see, [seat]
Than by necessite bihoveth it,
That certes thyn opinioun soth be,
That wenest or conjectest that he sit;
And, further over, now ayeinwarde yit,
Lo right so is it on the part contrarie,
As thus,--nowe herkene, for I wol nat tarie:--
144
(11) I sey, that if the opinion of the
Be soth for that he sit, than seye I this,
That he moot sitten by necessite;
And thus necessite in either is,
For in hym nede of sittynge is, ywis,
And in the, nede of soth; and thus forsoth
Ther mot necessite ben in yow bothe.
145
(12) But thow maist seyne, the man sit nat therfore,
That thyn opinioun of his sittynge sothe is;
But rather, for the man sat there byfore,
Therfor is thyn opinioun soth, ywys;
And I seye, though the cause of soth of this
Cometh of his sittynge, yet necessite
Is interchaunged both in hym and the.
146
(13) Thus in the same wyse, out of doutaunce,
I may wel maken, as it semeth me,
My resonynge of Goddes purveiaunce,
And of the thynges that to comen be; . . .
147
(14) For although that for thynge shal come, ywys,
Therfor it is purveyed certeynly,
Nat that it cometh for it purveied is;
Yet, natheles, bihoveth it nedfully,
That thynge to come be purveied trewly;
Or elles thynges that purveied be.
That they bitiden by necessite.
148
(15) And this sufficeth right ynough, certeyn,
For to distruye oure fre choys everydele.
(1) Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens providentiae cernit
intuitus, et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata disponit. . . . .
(_Boethius_, lib. v. pr. 2. ) . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Nam si cuncta prospicit Deus neque falli ullo modo potest,
evenire necesse est, quod providentia futurum esse praeviderit.
Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo, sed etiam consilia
voluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas;
(3) Neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quaelibet existere
poterit voluntas, nisi quam nescia falli providentia divina
praesenserit. Nam si res aliorsum, quam provisae sunt detorqueri
valent, non jam erit futuri firma praescientia;
(4) Sed opinio potius incerta; quod de Deo nefas credere judico.
(5) Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse eventurum quoniam id providentia
futurum esse prospexerit; sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid
futurum est, id divinam providentiam latere non possit.
(6) Eoque modo necessarium est hoc in contrariam relabi partem;
neque enim necesse est contingere quae providentur, sed necesse est
quae futura sunt provideri.
(7) Quasi vero quae cujusque rei causa sit,
(8) Praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas
providentiae, laboretur.
(9) At nos illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo
causarum, necessarium esse eventum praescitarum rerum, etiam si
praescientia futuris rebus eveniendi necessitatem non videatur
inferre.
(10) Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere conjectat
veram esse necesse est: at e converso rursus,
(11) Si de quopiam vera sit opinio quoniam sedet eum sedere
necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest: in hoc quidem
sedendi, at vero in altero veritatis.
(12) Sed non idcirco quisque sedet, quoniam vera est opinio: sed
haec potius vera est, quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita cum
causa veritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in
utraque necessitas.
(13) Similia de providentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet.
(14) Nam etiam si idcirco, quoniam futura sunt, providentur: non
vero ideo, quoniam providentur, eveniunt: nihilo minus tamen a Deo
vel ventura provideri, vel provisa evenire necesse est:
(15) Quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est.
(lib. v. pr. 3. )
See _Chaucer's Boethius_, pp. 154-6.
IX. THE GRIEF OF REMEMBERING BYGONE HAPPINESS.
For, of fortunes scharp adversite,
The worste kynde of infortune is this,
A man to han ben in prosperite,
And it remembren, when it passed is.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 226, vol. iv. p. 291. )
Sed hoc est, quod recolentem me vehementius coquit. Nam in omni
adversitate fortunae infelicissimum genus est infortunii, fuisse
felicem. [I-10]
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. pr. 4. )
[Footnote I-10: Cf. Dante, _Inferno_, V. 121.
Nessun maggior dolore
Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
Nella miseria; e cio sa 'l tuo Dottore. ]
X. VULTURES TEAR THE STOMACH OF TITYUS IN HELL.
----Syciphus in Helle,
Whos stomak fowles tyren everemo,
That hyghten volturis.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, book i. st. 113, p. 140. )
? e fowel ? at hy? t voltor ? at eti? ? e stomak or ? e giser of ticius.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 107. )
XI. THE MUTABILITY OF FORTUNE.
For if hire (Fortune's) whiel stynte any thinge to torne
Thanne cessed she Fortune anon to be.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. i. st. 122, p. 142. )
If fortune bygan to dwelle stable. she cesed[e] ? an to ben fortune.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 32. )
(Compare stanzas 120, 121, p. 142, and stanza 136, p. 146, of 'Troylus
and Cryseyde' with pp. 31, 33, 35, and p. 34 of Chaucer's Boethius. )
At omnium mortalium stolidissime, si manere incipit, fors esse
desistit.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 1. )
XII. WORLDLY SELYNESSE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Imedled is with many a bitternesse.
Ful angwyshous than is, God woote, quod she,
Condicion of veyn prosperite!
For oyther joies comen nought yfeere,
Or elles no wight hath hem alwey here.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 110, p. 258. )
? e swetnesse of mannes welefulnesse is yspranid wi? many[e]
bitternesses.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 42. )
--ful anguissous ? ing is ? e condicioun of mans goodes. For ey? er
it come? al to-gidre to a wy? t. or ellys it laste? not perpetuely.
(_Ib. _ p. 41. )
Quam multis amaritudinibus humanae felicitatis dulcedo respersa
est!
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 4. )
Anxia enim res est humanorum conditio bonorum, et quae vel nunquam
tota proveniat, vel nunquam perpetua subsistat.
(_Ib. _)
O, brotel wele of mannes joie unstable!
With what wight so thow be, or how thow pleye,
Oither he woot that thow joie art muable,
Or woot it nought, it mot ben on of tweyen:
Now if he woot it not, how may he seyen
That he hath veray joie and selynesse,
That is of ignoraunce ay in distresse?
Now if he woote that joie is transitorie,
As every joie of worldly thynge mot fle,
Thanne every tyme he that hath in memorie,
The drede of lesyng maketh hym that he
May in no parfyte selynesse be:
And if to lese his joie, he sette not a myte,
Than semeth it, that joie is worth ful lite.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 111, 112, vol. iv. p. 258. )
(1) What man ? at ? is toumblyng welefulnesse leedi? , ei? er he woot
? at [it] is chaungeable. or ellis he woot it nat. And yif he woot
it not. what blisful fortune may ? er be in ? e blyndenesse of
ignoraunce.
(2) And yif he woot ? at it is chaungeable. he mot alwey ben adrad
? at he ne lese ? at ? ing. ? at he ne doute? nat but ? at he may
leesen it. . . . . . For whiche ? e continuel drede ? at he ha?
ne suffri? hym nat to ben weleful. Or ellys yif he leese it he
wene[? ] to be dispised and forleten hit. Certis eke ? at is a ful
lytel goode ? at is born wi? euene hert[e] whan it is loost.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, pp. 43, 44. )
(1) Quem caduca ista felicitas vehit, vel scit eam, vel nescit
esse mutabilem. Si nescit, quaenam beata sors esse potest
ignorantiae in caecitate?
(2) Si scit, metuat necesse est, ne amittat, quod amitti posse non
dubitat; quare continuus timor non sinit esse felicem. An vel si
amiserit, negligendum putat? Sic quoque perexile bonum est, quod
aequo animo feratur amissum.
(_Boethius_, lib. ii. prose 4. )
XIII. FORTUNE.
----Fortune
That semeth trewest when she wol bigyle,
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
And, when a wight is from hire whiel ithrowe,
Than laugheth she, and maketh hym the mowe.
(_Troylus and Cryseyde_, bk. iii. st. 254, vol. iv. p. 299. )
She (Fortune) vse? ful flatryng familarite wi? hem ? at she
enforce? to bygyle.
(_Chaucer's Boethius_, p. 30. )
. .
