No More Learning

I.
Philosophie und Religion (1804), where the genesis of the world from God is explained by the aid of the Platonic myth of the declension of the ideas or souls from the divine unity. That this explanation explains nothing is evident ; for the possibility of a declension presupposes the existence of the finite. The possibility of such a declension remained incon ceivable as long as the conception of the absolute was adhered to as pure and simple identity. An alteration of this concep tion was therefore necessary on internal grounds, but it was actually brought about by Schelling's study of the theosophy of Jakob Bohme, one of the fundamental principles of which was, that God is not a simple but a living unity, comprehend ing distinctions within itself. From this new point of view
Schelling wrote his Untersuchungen iiber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). The indifference of opposites, he now teaches, is not as yet God's actual being, but only its primal source (or Urgrund, to use Bohme's term). This unity differentiates God himself into the antitheses of nature and intelligence, which only when combined constitute the actual life of God. Moreover, nature in God, as in us, pre cedes intelligence as its Basis, and without it personality is as little conceivable in God as in us ; for personality depends upon the combination of a self-contained principle with an in dependent Basis. This nature in God is as such simply a blind, unreasoning instinct. By it we can explain the residue of reality never resolvable into reason, the irregularities under lying all order in the world, as a chaos never wholly subdued.
The desire for reconciliation on the part of this dark Basis
reason, which, when united with the instinct of nature, becomes free, creative, almighty will, and reduces to order the forces of chaos. But since the blind will of this Basis continually reacts, and only gradually gives way to reason, the conversion of nature into spirit can only proceed by degrees in the various grades of the natural world. All beings, as springing from the dark Basis in God, have an individual will of their own ; but, as also originating in God's reason, a universal will. From the increase and disunion of these two forces in man results evil, which has thus poten tially its origin in the Basis of God, but actually in man's own act in separating himself from the Universal will by an act of self-determination out of time, and by that act simultaneously
? produces
determining
his individual character, which is manifested in
? ? ? Ch. V. ] SCHELLING. 67
his life in time. On the struggle of these two principles turns the world's history. After the primitive age of natural in nocence, the will of the Basis, or natural self-will, obtains the supremacy in the age of heathenism, till the divine light, or the word of the divine Reason, appears in a personal mediator for the restoration of the connection of creation with God. Then the struggle between the divine and daemoniacal king doms reaches its height; but in this struggle the physical glory of the old world passes away, and God reveals himself in the new world as the victorious spirit of the good. The goal of history is the reconciliation of the natural self-will and the universal will in love, which is the higher unity of both, and by which alone God can really be all in all.
While we must acknowledge that this theosophy contains
profound ideas, which have influenced theological and philo
sophical thinkers (Baader, Martensen, Rothe, Schopenhauer), we still cannot deny that these ideas are mixed up with much
mythological poetry, which fails to satisfy either philosophical thought or the religious consciousness. The notion of the divine Intelligence issuing from a dark Basis of nature and blind instinct grates upon religious feeling as a reminiscence of heathen theogonies, by which the spiritual and ethical purity of the Christian idea of God would be marred. This defect remains substantially uncorrected in the final form of Schelling's philosophy, though on this point the philosopher designedly adheres very closely to the terminology of ecclesi astical dogmatics. As this "philosophy of mythology and revelation " was only published after Schelling's death, about the middle of this century, and has had no influence upon the development of theology, any account of it is foreign to our
purpose.
? ? ? ? CHAPTER VI. hegel's logical evolutionary
idealism.
Hegel
agreed with his fellow Swabian and fellow-student that the
started from the earlier of Schelling's positions. He
subject of philosophy is not merely phenomena, or the con sciousness of the ego, but the Absolute, which unfolds the wealth of its content in the world of nature and history.
Hegel, however, conceived the Absolute, not as the " indif ference" of nature and spirit, but as spirit itself, which, as the rational source of nature, must be prior to nature ; while, as the self-existent spirit of the conscious subject, it must have proceeded from nature. Spinoza had conceived the Absolute as Substance, Fichte as Ego or Subject, while Schelling had blended these antitheses in his neutral " In difference. " Hegel agreed with Schelling in his neutralisation of opposites in the higher unity of the Absolute, but argued that this unity must not be simply asserted without proof, "as if shot from a pistol " ; but the thing needed was to show how Substance, or self-existent Reason, can become a subject, by evolving its correlate nature, and passing through generate itself as a subject or self-conscious spirit. Passive " indif ference," excluding opposites, thus changed into the self- development of spirit, passing through its opposite to a unity at once destroying and preserving the opposition. In con junction with this change in matter there an alteration in method. Hegel was indeed at one with Schelling as to the unsatisfactoriness of the philosophy of reflection, which pro ceeded from the antithesis of thought and being, and was accordingly incapable of apprehending being itself, and could never get beyond the antitheses of finite and infinite, appear ance and actual being, world and God. But he was as much opposed to the " intellectual intuition " which Schelling wished to substitute for rational reflection as the sole philosophical method. This intellectual intuition, which really an aesthetic condition of mind most nearly akin to Schleiermacher's reli
? ? ? is
is
is
it,
? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 69
gious intuition of the universe, cannot, Hegel argues, be the basis of philosophy, which is concerned with concepts, and
is therefore the matter of thought. Only philosophic thought must not be something abstract, perpetuating the antitheses in their hostile exclusiveness, but something concrete, resolv ing antitheses and tracing concepts in their process through their opposite. If thought, according to the philosophy of identity, is one with being, and if the essential nature of the absolute Spirit consists in living development, then, Hegel infers, the philosophic method of thought must also consist in the dialectical development of concepts ; hence the philosopher has to imitate in the dialectical method the self-development of the absolute Reason ; or, more strictly, his attitude is that of a spectator observing the objective active process of pure thought, this self- development of the absolute idea through the process of the world's self-genesis. All the capriciousness of merely subjective thinking is thereby excluded ; it is the logical necessity of absolute Reason, as it develops into reality, which is reproduced in the philosopher's " thought. " Herein, according to Hegel, consists the only truly rational thought, which combines the analytical reflection of the understanding with synthetic intuition, in order to carry the absolute unity of the one through the oppositions of the other up to the derivative unity of the "concrete idea. " Hegel thus supple mented and corrected Schelling's intuitive method by Fichte's dialectical reflection ; from Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre he took the general plan of his dialectic, the movement of thought through Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; but what in Fichte was the movement of the subjective consciousness to the formation of its ideal world, became in Hegel the movement of absolute Thought, the self-development of which into the world of actuality repeats itself in the movement of the dialec tical thought of the philosopher to the formation of his system.
Here, as in Fichte, the world is simply the product of the development of logical thought, though not, as in Fichte, of the thought of the ego, but of the absolute Spirit ; it is not subjective, but absolute logical idealism. But in contradis tinction to Schelling, for whom the Absolute was passive identity and intuition the method of philosophical knowledge, Hegel's logical idealism is at the same time evolutionary in two senses ; the actual is the evolution of the absolute Reason
? in and through nature and history, and philosophy is the
? ? S~
? 70 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
imitation of this evolution in the dialectical movement of ideas.
The Hegelian philosophy was the most logical and most fruitful working out of the idealism which proceeded from Kant's Critique ofPure Reason, which made the understanding the lawgiver of nature. It was natural that this philosophy should produce an immense impression upon its time, and that it should be looked upon as containing the solution of all problems. It gave the thinking mind the exalted conscious ness of perfectly comprehending the world, of fixing the place in its system of ideas for all the realities of nature and history, and of constructing a priori all the laws of phenomena in conformity with the laws of thought. And to the practical mind it gave the reassuring certainty that its sublimest ideas were not merely subjective postulates and imperatives never to be actually realised, but the eternal truths of reason, which, as the all-ruling Power, infallibly carries out its plans in the world of reality, and has realised itself in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. The proposition that the rational is actual, and the actual rational, expressed a more optimistic faith in the reign of reason in the world than any other philosophical system since Leibnitz had offered. In this ideal optimism a generation weary of endless discussion found the longed-for reconciliation of the intense but unprac- ticable and disappointed idealism of the 18th century with the actual forces of history, whose awful realities idealistic enthusiasts had been compelled, by the great events of the time, to remember and respect. If reason is everywhere the deepest basis and the guiding law of reality, it need no longer be looked for, as Kant taught, in a Golden Age of the future, in an Eternal Peace which seemed never coming, in a perfect condition of civil and political society, not as yet discovered ; and equally little in a Golden Age of the past,
in a happy state of nature, in which Rousseau and, to some
extent, even Herder, had revelled. From all such super
natural and extravagant speculations, toward which an age of enthusiasm had directed its gaze in hope or sorrow, to the disregard of the historical world, Hegel called his contem poraries back to the firm ground of the historical life of man, and showed them how a loving eye might there discover undreamed-of stores of rational ideas and working ideals, in which at all times and in every nation the sovereign Reason
? ? ? ? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 7 1
of the world had been able to attain its lofty ends, half uncon
sciously to man himself; though each end, as soon as reached,
must be seen to be but an imperfect stage in the development,
and must serve as means to a yet higher end. From this
standpoint a far profounder view could be taken of history,
and a far juster estimate formed of its varied phenomena. In
fact,
historical inquiry. The arbitrary treatment of details which, in the case of Hegel and his immediate disciples, crept in, under the influence of his philosophical idea, had of course to be corrected by more exact historians ; but the lasting gain is rich and manifold. It is a deeper insight into historical life generally, as an orderly development of the one common spirit of nations and ages, ruled by ideas, and aiming at necessary common ends ; it is a more penetrating glance, through the confused play of phenomena, into the essence of man and things, into the dominant thoughts which are the controlling motives underlying even the apparent discord of individual passions ; it is the unprejudiced appreciation of the necessity even of the oppositions and conflicts, the errors and passions of men, because, as Hegel says, with Heraclitus, war is the father of all things, and only through the strife of partial rights and one-sided truths can the whole truth of the idea gradually struggle into existence ; it is finally an intelligent reverence for the heroic figures in history, in whom is embodied the genius of nations or ages, who, as instruments of a higher
power, have roused the thought slumbering in the souls of all, have given it clear expression, and in mighty deed have sum moned it to life. No such historians as Leopold Ranke, or Thomas Carlyle, or Christian Ferdinand Baur are conceivable without the Hegelian philosophy of history.
This profoundly suggestive conception of history has been of especial service in the departments of religious and ecclesi astical historical study. Hegel teaches us to see in the
history of religion an orderly development of divine revela tion in man's consciousness of God, a development in which no point is wholly without truth, though none has the whole pure truth ; gradually divine truth reveals itself to the human consciousness in ever greater purity, but always veiled under imperfect conceptions and symbols. The positive religions are accordingly neither inventions of human caprice and cunning nor expressions of the accidental emotions of in
no other branch of study owes to Hegel so much as
? ? ? ? 72
BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
dividual devout souls ; but, like law and custom, art and science, they are necessary creations of the peculiar common spirit of the different nations, and can therefore be properly understood only in close connection with the general history of the development of human society. Christianity is so far an exception, that in it the spirit, not of a single nation only but of mankind as a whole, becomes conscious of its essential relation to God, and it is thus the absolute religion of revealed truth ; though in too, this truth always clothed and en veloped in conceptions which are more or less inadequate to the idea. When once the whole history of the pre-Christian and Christian religions conceived as the religious spirit the process of evolution, having divine reason for its source and human reason, --i. e. , man's true consciousness of his rela tion to God, -- for its end, the opposition between rational faith neglecting history and historic faith contrary to reason,--which was the point at issue between the Aufkldrung and its
opponents, -- then perceived to be a misleading abstraction which must be replaced by rational historic faith and historical rational faith. Thus Hegel's philosophy of religion, like his philosophy of law and history, seeks to reconcile the claims of personal freedom of thought with the claims of an authority that has grown up in the course of history and acquired valid ity in society seeks to mediate between subjective and objective reason, between personal liberty and reverence for the social forces of history.
We must not, however, omit to look at the dark as well as the bright side of Hegel's logical idealism. The assertion the rationality of everything actual was so one-sidedly opti mistic as necessarily to produce the reaction of Schopen
hauer's pessimism. Hegel's optimism led to a sluggish conservatism, a passive tolerance of the existing state of things simply because exists could be fair and tolerant towards all historical phenomena except the Aufkldrung and its rationalistic criticism of tradition its dislike of abstract subjectivism might be carried so far as to reinstate faith every authority, no matter how irrational and these results of his system were so obvious that, though not intended Hegel himself, they at once showed themselves his school and disastrously perpetuated and increased the confusion ideas produced by Romanticism. But apart from these prac tical consequences, the question arises, Is the foundation
? ? ? in
of of by in
of
in
;
;
is
it
it, is
; it
; it
is
? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 73
this absolute logical idealism sound ? Is the position tenable, that thought and being are identical and the whole world only the self-evolution of pure thought ? Hegel makes the transi tion from logic, the region of pure thought, to the world of reality by means of the proposition that the idea externates itself and evolves nature from itself as its correlate ; but this is really a phrase that explains nothing, to which Schelling
that it is impossible to deduce the real from a mere idea But if this proposition is untenable, the whole foundation of logical idealism is cut from
under the identification of the real evolution of the world with the logical evolution of ideas made impossible, the dialectical method based on the identification a failure, the whole system which stands or falls with this method doomed, and a radical reform of idealism unavoidable. To this extent the reaction of post- Hegelian empiricism was fully justified, provided only that did not go so far as again to deny alto gether the ideal element in knowledge and philosophy, and so surrender the lasting results of the Kantian critical philo sophy. We shall return again to this point in another con
nection.
The exclusively logical character of Hegel's philosophy, with its resolution of all life into conceptual relations and
processes of thought, the ground of the weakness of Hegel's theory of religion, viz. , its intellectual character, its exclusive accentuation of the religious concept, and its failure to see that religion essentially a matter of the heart. According to Hegel, religion has the same subject-matter as philosophy, yet not, like the latter, the form of logical concepts, but of intuitions Vorstellungen) in which the truth conveyed for the world at large religion therefore to certain extent an exoteric philosophy for the general community, while philo sophy the esoteric knowledge of the truth of religion. The common content of both "the knowledge possessed by the finite spirit of its nature as absolute spirit," which also pre supposes " the absolute spirit's knowledge of itself the finite spirit," a self-communication or revelation of the divine spirit in the human. But man's knowledge of the God revealing
Himself him not reached at once a final and complete form developed in a gradual advance of the conscious ness from the worthlessness and slavery of our natural existence to the truth and freedom of a spirit at one with God. This
(like Fichte)
unanswerably replied,
? ? ? ;
it
is in
is
it,
is
in
is
is
is
is in
a is in
is is
(
is
; it
? 74 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
necessary process of self-deliverance from bondage to nature, of coming to oneself and becoming conscious of our divine nature, furnishes the proof of the truth of religion and of its foundation in man's nature. In his description of this de velopment of the religious consciousness Hegel distinguishes three stages -- feeling, intuition, thought (Gefiihl, Vorstellung,
Feeling he describes as the immediate form in which a content of consciousness is made ours ; and he is far from disputing that the true content of religion, in order to be our personal possession, must be an emotion, must be in the heart, as the permanent seat of feeling and willing. But this direct form, feeling, must not be regarded as the whole of re ligion, or as its distinctive excellence. For this form can have the most various contents, the basest as well as the highest, the truest as well as the most worthless. " As the object of feel ing, God is in nothing superior to the worst thing ; the king- liest flower springs from the same soil as the most rampant weed. " Feeling Hegel does not even regard as specifically human, but as the sense-form of consciousness common to men and animals ; in it only the individual subjectivity asserts itself, desiring merely its own enjoyment, instead of forgetting self and living in objective thought and action. Hence feel ing, though the necessary lowest grade in consciousness, is one that must be overcome and superseded by intuition and thought. (This view of feeling is clearly based upon a false psychology, connected with the fundamental error of logical idealism ; instead of recognising the co-ordination and inter action of the emotional and the rational side of our spiritual nature, the former is made a subordinate stage of the latter, which is plainly contrary to all experience and eminently pre
judicial to a true appreciation of religious experience. )
By intuition, or inward perception, consciousness, according
to Hegel's further description of the religious process, con verts the content, with which it was directly united in feeling, into an object distinct from the subject. Intuition uses sense- forms derived from direct perception, but in order to convey spiritual truth, a higher rational sense ; it is therefore truth under sense-symbols. It presents spirit, which transcends time and space, as subject to the conditions of time and space (e. g. in sacred history), or under a multiplicity of contradictory conditions (e. g. man's freedom and dependence), each of which taken by itself is accidental and irrational, since only in their
Gedanke).
? ? ? ? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 75
unity can we perceive their truth as phases of the one Spirit. Hence intuition is an inadequate form of truth, and must be
replaced by conceptual thought. But in thought Hegel again distinguishes the reflection of the understanding from truly rational or speculative thought. The former perpetuates the opposition of infinite and finite, nature and spirit, etc. , and cannot effect their union. But thereby the infinite, conceived as outside and beyond the finite, is itself limited and so made finite ; and the ego, conscious of itself as the author of this act of limitation, appears itself to be the Infinite ; the antitheses change places, the humble consciousness of finiteness becomes proud self-deification (comp. Feuerbach's anthropologism). But religion demands a point of view which shall be both the negation of the ego in its self-centred isolation and at the same time the affirmation of its true self in God. These conditions are fulfilled by speculative thought, which includes the finite, as an element of the divine life, and the infinite, as the living process by which it first becomes and then ceases to be finite. If the absolute self-conscious spirit thus appears from our finite point of view as a result which has been brought about by nature and finite spirit, in reality it is the Alpha, the
? basis of the finite world. God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual, yet not such a unity as to place the two on an equality, for the unity is spirit, not
some tertiumquid in which both are neutralised. God on the one hand (as finite) one side of the antithesis, and again (as absolute) that which includes the other side, and so the unity of both (nature and finite spirit). This clearly indicates the difference between Hegel's speculative idea of God and Schelling's Absolute as the identity of spirit and nature the latter the neutral identity in which both sides of the anti thesis are equally absorbed Hegel's Absolute the spiritual principle which creates and dominates the antithesis, not so as to be related in the same way to both sides, but so as to make nature, as its own correlate, an instrument for the pur pose of the spirit which reproduces itself. cannot be denied that this conception of God at least more allied to theism than to what generally understood by " pantheism. " So far undoubtedly Hegel was to some extent justified in maintaining that there was no material contradiction between his philosophy and Christian dogma though we cannot deny that he optimistically underrated the difference.
necessarily presupposed
^
? ? ;
is
in is
it
;
is It
is
;
is
is,
? 76
BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
Hegel's Philosophy of Religion most nearly approaches Christian doctrine in the profound chapter on worship, which he regards as the active union of man with God by the
act,
speaks spiritually, for spirit reveals itself to spirit only. " The end and aim of worship is self-sacrifice, self-renunciation, and
the appropriation of the divine grace as the real strength of our own goodness, as the Holy Spirit. This inward senti ment then finds its expression in moral action also ; hence religious faith and worship have everywhere the profoundest influence upon the habits and laws of society ; want of freedom in religion leads to want of freedom in the State ; freedom in the State and not in religion leads to conflicts, such as have arisen between the modern State and the Catholic Church. In this recognition of the historical and social importance of re
ligion Hegel's religious philosophy compares favourably with
surrender of himself to the divine revelation ex
voluntary
perienced within him. Worship is primarily an inward
or faith, this living communion of the ego with God. It may begin from some external witness or authority, but then it is only formal faith ; true faith has as its basis and subject- matter nothing accidental or merely traditional, but the living witness of the spirit. " The non-spiritual cannot by its nature constitute the subject-matter of faith. If God speaks, he
? Schleiermacher's
After discussing, in the first part of his Philosophy of
subjective mysticism.
Religion, the nature of religion in general, Hegel proceeds in the second part to speak of " specific religion," i. e. , religion in its pre-Christian forms. These various positive religions are partial representations of special elements in the idea of re ligion, not indeed adequate to but necessary stages its evolution. Hegel distinguishes immediate religion, or the religion of nature, corresponding to the childhood of humanity then the religion of spiritual individuality, corresponding to the period of youth, or of growing spiritual freedom to this class belong the religion of the sublime (the Jewish), of the beautiful (the Greek), and of the expedient (the Roman). Finally comes " the absolute religion," or Christianity, in which the idea itself finds manifestation Hegel also calls
" the revealed religion," because in God known as He who reveals himself our spirit as truth and love and again " the religion of truth and freedom," because in the spirit re cognises itself in its true nature and thus at the same time
? ? in
is ; it ;
it
;
in it ;
it,
? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 77
attains its freedom. In his account of Christianity he treats
of God, firstly, per se, as He is in eternity (kingdom of the Father) ; then in His manifestation in history (kingdom of the Son); lastly, in His return from manifestation into Himself, in the process of reconciliation, or as the spirit of the Church, which is the eternal in time. We must look rather more closely at this philosophy of Christianity, as we shall often meet traces of it in the history of theology.
must not be taken literally, but as the figurative expression of the true thought --that God is not abstract unity, the identity without difference conceived by the understanding, or the supermundane omnipotence of the Jewish religion, but "eternal love," which is itself when in its correlative. This nature of God is a mystery to the sensuous mode of thought and to the understanding, clinging to differences as final, but not to the reason, which finds in all life a continual generation and destruction of contradiction, and therefore an analogy of the triune life of God. It is easy to see that this speculative interpretation of the Trinity is nearly identical with that given by Lessing and Schelling, according to which the Son is the world as an object of the divine thought, the intelligible world, called also in Philo the Son of God.
The element of difference, already implicit in the nature of God, comes into definite existence in nature, the correlative in which spirit alienates itself, and completes itself in man as conscious disunion.
The orthodox doctrine of the original state and fall of the first man, Hegel says, must be taken as the symbol of what holds of man generally as such. The idea of man, his design and function, is to be spirit, to think and to will rationally, to learn to know God and nature ; but if this idea of man is imagined to be his original condition in time, this is a mythical notion. For by its very nature spirit cannot be actually existent from the beginning. At first it is still absorbed in nature, and must, therefore, in order actually to become rational thought and free will, withdraw itself from nature and come into conflict with it. An original direct union with nature, so far from being a condition of superiority,
the Church's doctrine of the Trinity as
Hegel regards
supplying the stages of the speculative idea of God ; the self- contained unity, self-differentiation, and the absorption of the difference into the concrete identity of the differentiated one. Of the three Persons, he expressly states that they
? ? ? ? 78 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bit I.
is the condition of barbarism and wild desire, unworthy of
spirit, and diametrically opposed to its higher vocation. To this animal insensibility, to the want of moral consciousness, must be ascribed the innocence of man as the child of nature. The loss of this was therefore not at all an irremediable mis fortune, but a divine necessity. The ever-recurring history
of man's freedom is that of his progress from this insensibility of his earliest years to the light of consciousness, or more particularly, that he learns to know good and evil. This ad vance from naive consciousness to moral consciousness, with its contradiction between will and duty, its guilt and remorse, its discipline and labour, does indeed at first seem to be a calamity ; but this is only one side of the matter ; the other side that within this calamity lies the source of the remedy. Evil therefore did not spring from the accidental act of the first man, nor transmitted by inheritance to his descend
ants, but involved, without any mediation whatsoever, the freedom of each individual as the first mode of its appearance. For freedom arises solely through consciousness, and consciousness the act of the disunion of the ego, as dividual will, from the universal and rational will. In this dis union within, and in relation to everything else, both freedom and evil have their seat the source of moral disease and also of its cure, of the reconciliation of the contradiction.
Like the contradiction, the reconciliation can only take
place by process within the human spirit. Still Hegel finds sufficient reason for its being conceived in the creed of the
Christian Church as the external history of the incarnation God in Christ, as the atoning death of the God-man. For the reconciliation cannot be produced from within man himself, by his subjective will and action, which never gets
? the contradiction but the consciousness must be to look at and in faith appropriate the reconciliation
beyond
brought
as a supposition certain in itself, as the objective truth mankind's actual reconciliation with God and by God as
love. Man can feel himself reconciled with God and received into union with Him only when he sees God
being no longer foreign to himself and keeping mankind at a distance, but Spirit and Love, in which man's nature as spirit and free also affirmed. But this unity of the divine and human nature can become an immediate certainty the religious man only when takes the form of God appearing
reconciling
? ? is
a
is
aa
; it ; it is
in
in
of of in in
it is
is
is,
? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL.
79
to him as man and man as God, and indeed in the contempla tion of a concrete person in whom both are conjoined ; thus the orthodox conception of the deity and humanity of
Christ, is explained as an inner necessity of the religious con sciousness in its Christian stage. Still Hegel is by no means of opinion that the historical Christ was really a supernatural being in the sense of the dogma of the two natures, but he holds the historical Jesus to be essentially a man, who was conscious of being himself one with the divine will, and in this consciousness of union with God proclaimed, in the
language of inspiration, the highest religious truths ; by his teaching and life he brought home to men, as the truth and the necessary foundation of their religious consciousness, the doctrine that God is not supermundane and far off, but present in his kingdom, that He is love, and that the certainty of this must be realised in each man's own breast. But it was by faith only that the words of the man Jesus were rightly and spiritually understood ; and this spiritual faith was the fruit of Christ's death. His death was the crucial point
in the development of the Christian consciousness, when the great transition was effected from faith in a mere man to faith in the God-man, for it brought clearly before men's minds the truth of the unity of the divine and human natures. And
it was just because this consciousness of the reconciliation of God with the world, so fundamental to the Christian faith, dawned upon the Church in its full spiritual significance only after the death of Jesus, that Christians came to regard this death itself as the central point of the reconciliation, and beheld in it the absolute love, which in the finite itself over comes the finite -- death, and so negatives again this negation.
But though it was intelligible and, looked at historically, necessary, that the Christian Church should contemplate the idea of reconciliation in the form of a particular occurrence in history, it was nevertheless an incongruity to conceive what was really eternal and of universal validity as having happened once only and in the case of one individual. This incongruity
was in the first instance partially corrected by the two addi tional doctrines of Christ's second advent and of the mission and perpetual presence of the Holy Spirit. By these two conceptions the limitation to one external event put upon the idea of reconciliation in the history of Christ was removed, the reconciliation being made universal, perpetual, and inward,
? ? ? ? 80 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
just as the one fall of the first man was supplemented by the idea of all men's inheritance of Adam's sin. This addition was indeed only an external correction, one partial conception being added on to another equally partial. The essential thing, the real advance from the outward to the inward, can only come to pass by individual Christians personally going through this history or process, which they conceived at first as a divine history external to them and enacted for their sakes. By the enactment of the reconciliation as a subjective process in individuals themselves is realised the Christian Church. The Church is the institution having for its object that men come to the truth, and that the Holy Ghost become in them a living power, the knowledge and desire of the truth. The means of attaining this object is doctrine, in which the Church develops into conceptions (dogmas) the truth origin ally given as the direct witness of the spirit. Baptism declares that the world into which the child enters is not a hostile one, but the Church, in which evil as such, already overcome and God reconciled. only remains for the individual to form himself upon the Church, by education and practice, and to habituate himself to the goodness and truth already existing in This constitutes his regeneration. The spirit not directly and without mediation what designed to be the natural heart, by which man held captive, the foe to be striven against. The work of the Church this very education of the spirit, so that truth may become more and more inwardly one with the man, with his will, and so his own personal knowledge and volition. Here we have no mere naked obligation, progress without an end, endeavour never to be fulfilled, as in the Kantian philosophy. Here evil known to be in itself already overcome in the spirit (the Holy Spirit of the Church) and the individual only makes his own will good by means of this Spirit, by believing in the reconciliation already accomplished, evil has for him personally disappeared and sin felt to have been
This act on the one hand, the act of the individual, who sacrifices his self-will (dies with Christ), on the other, the act of the divine Spirit within him, which the spirit of the individual so far as he has faith. In the Lord's Supper the Church celebrates this presence of God the immediate self-consciousness of believers. But this reconcilia tion, accomplished worship, as an inward certainty the.
? forgiven.
? ? in
in
in
is
is
it
is,
it.
is
if
;
It
is,
is
is is
is
;
is
? Ch. VI. ] HEGEL. 8 1
depths of the soul, must make itself felt in the world of nature and society. Moreover, the freedom of the spirit reconciled to God must be active, not merely a negative, monkish re nunciation of the world, but must work positively, in permeating all secular interests with the Holy Spirit, and in moulding the world after the pattern of eternal truth. The harmonising of true religion with true secularity is effected in morals and science, which are the realisation of reason in the will and knowledge of society.
Thus the Hegelian philosophy of religion ends as it began, with the conviction that religion and Christianity, if taken in
a deep and free spiritual sense, so far from being antagonistic to secular culture and knowledge, really form their source, foundation, and motive power, and, on the other hand, find in them their consummation, confirmation, and choicest fruit. Kant's idealistic philosophy had started with the emancipation of thought from the fetters of external authority, demanded by the Aufkldrung, and with his sketch of " a religion within the limits of pure reason. " But even Kant, bold critic as he was, had warned men not to confound Aufkldrung with radical revolution, but to seek it in a just and orderly use of the understanding ; and he had arrived by his investigation of the laws of reason at a point of view which was so far superior in ethical depth to the popular philosophy, and so essentially in touch with the Christian view of the world, that he was even able in his theory of religion to undertake what was really a defence of Christian doctrines, at any rate in respect of their ethical contents. Herder and Schleiermacher did justice to religious emotion and intuitive imagination, which Kant had slighted, and at the same time attempted to connect ideal religion more closely with the historical facts and the Biblical records of Christianity ; still these thinkers (we are
here speaking only of Schleiermacher's early period of
? were too much shut in by the horizon of a subjective piety to attain to a full appreciation of the historical development of Christianity. This was the side from which Schelling attacked the problem ; like the ancient Gnostics, he tried to explain Christianity, from the most comprehensive point of view, as a phase of the general development of the world, not however without falling again into the Gnostics' error of resolving religion into cosmo-mythological processes.
Hegel carefully avoided everything like Gnostic mythology, c. t. G
Romanticism)
? ? ? 82 BASIS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. [Bk. I.
but carried on the great task of applying an objective historical method to the study of religion. Herein lay his strength and his lasting importance, while he was weak in the psychological analysis of the religious consciousness and the emotions in fluencing But though his theology, and even more that of his disciples, needed to be supplemented in this respect by the school of Schleiermacher, was of great importance that Hegel clearly pointed out that the history of religion a development of the rational spirit, under the guidance of ideas, and a development in closest connection with all other sides of social life. He thus accomplished what Herder had demanded, and an advance of the abstract subjectivity and
the poor external pragmatism of the Aufkldrung was thereby finally checked.
? ? ? is
it
it.
? ? BOOK II.
THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
? ? ? CHAPTER I.
THE THEOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL OF KANT.
The Kantian philosophy influenced the whole theology of its time, but in very various ways, according as the one or the other of the tendencies of thought involved in it was followed by theologians, -- whether it happened to be the sceptical, or the moral and rationalistic, or the theological utilitarian side of the system. The theological postulates based on utilitarian considerations, in which Kant, sceptic and rigorous moralist as he was, made conciliatory advances to popular thought, offered both to the conservative supernaturalists and the Wolfian neologists of the Aufkldrung a welcome means of approach ing this new philosophy and connecting themselves with it. In other respects the former of these parties adopted the scepticism of Kant's theoretical critique, and made it the foundation of their historical dogmatism, while they either simply rejected or else greatly limited the autonomous rational ism of the practical reason ; the neologists, on the contrary, adopted Kant's rational ethics and ethical theory of religion, though they toned down the rigour of his ethics, on the lines of theological and philosophical utilitarianism, and tried, with more or less success, to bring the rationalism of his religious system into closer connection with historical Christianity.
Hence originated the various shades of the Rationalistic theo logy derived from the school of Kant. It alone concerns us here; while the use made of the Kantian criticism in the cause of ecclesiastical and Biblical orthodoxy was so foreign to the spirit of this philosophy, and had so little influence on the development of theology, that we are justified in dismissing it with a passing mention.
We may notice as a curiosity that many theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, beheld in Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena and his limitation of knowledge to the former, the means of rescuing the orthodox system from
the onslaughts of neological doubt. Though in the world of 85
? ? ? ? 86 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC TIIEOLOGV. [Bk. II.
phenomena three persons are not equal to one person, and one person cannot have two natures, still, they argued, the possibility of this cannot be disputed in the case of the Divine Persons, since they belong to the noumena, of which we know nothing except that in this realm everything is in all respects different from what prevails in the case of phenomena. A similar position was held by Storr and his colleagues and disciples, the so-called older Tubingen school, who exercised greater freedom with regard to ecclesiastical dogmas, but held all the more strictly to Biblical supernaturalism, which they rested upon the traditional theory of inspiration. They main tained their Biblical system against all the objections and doubts of the Aufkldrung by an appeal to the Kantian philo sophy ; since, according to the critical philosophy, reason itself admits its inability to know anything of the supersensible, it has logically no right to protest against what has been made known to us concerning supersensible things by historical revelation ; with regard to the practical reason, Kant himself allows that it demands a requiting Deity for the satisfaction of our desire for happiness, and is therefore in its own interest called upon to receive upon authority the historical revelation
concerning God and his government of the world. Hence the truth of the Biblical doctrines stands higher than the critique of the speculative reason which confesses its own incompetence, and accords with the demands of the practical reason ; it has therefore nothing to fear and nothing to expect from philosophy, but rests entirely upon the positive authority of a supernatural revelation, which has only to be first histori cally proved and then reduced to a system. Storr did this by putting together a dogmatic system, in the fashion of a mosaic, from detached Biblical texts, without caring for any other proof of his propositions, either by appealing to philosophy or to the religious consciousness. We cannot but recognise the strength of this position, which meets all rationalistic objections by a sceptical depreciation of reason ; in all periods this standpoint of faith, founded purely upon authority, has been popular, but especially in those when philosophic thought was at a low ebb owing to the overweening flights of previous speculation. Its weak point is the unhistorical arbitrariness with which individual passages of Scripture, torn from their context, are used in proof of a system which is foreign to them, because unknown to any of the Biblical writers. This
? ? ? ? Ch. KANTIAN RATIONALISTS.
87
method of using the Scriptures as one uniform code of doc
trine quite ignores the peculiarities and variety of the religious habit of thought of the Biblical authors, so different in point of time, place, and character. Hence this Biblical dogmatism could not survive a really historical examination of the Scrip tures, such as was undertaken by the later Tubingen school. History had been the sole basis of the system of the older Tubingen school, and by means of history was overthrown
the younger Tubingen school. Profound thinkers, like the youthful Schelling, had, indeed, before this clearly perceived how little this application of the Kantian philosophy to the service of theological dogmatism accorded with its real mean ing and spirit his ridicule of these pseudo-Kantians was not undeserved and dislike of this movement may well have been one of the motives which soon began to lead Schelling himself to subordinate, and this too absolutely, the critical to the speculative side of Kant's system.
The thinker whose position was nearest that of Kant's
philosophy of religion was the theologian and philosopher T1eftrunk. He held that the only possible foundation for a religion with any claim to universal truth the consciousness of unconditional freedom and autonomy, by which we raise ourselves above the world of sense and become members of a world of spirits, or, indeed, even gods, as he says in the hyperbolical language of the then prevalent idealism, and differ from God, the supreme head of all intelligences, only in degree, not kind we have the same will and the same law as God, our existence and independent activity are alike un conditional, and we have by our own will an infinite object in our holiness, wisdom, and blessedness, which also the object
God. But whilst God pure intelligence and therefore his power of good equal to his will of we are at the same time creatures of sense, and our power of execution on that account falls short of our autonomous reason. Thus the law of reason becomes a command to which both our sensuous inclination and the external world of sense are often opposed. Hence as intelligences we are supreme, and have no other reason for obeying the moral law than the demands of the dignity of our own personality. If we could satisfy this law
its infinitude, we should be all-sufficient in ourselves and have no need of a God. But as in reality our personal worth only that wholly depends upon our own will, while our
? ? ? it is
it,
is
in
of
by
is
is
in ;
;
;
is
it
I. ]
? 88 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [Bk. II.
circumstantial well-being is not in our own power, inasmuch as though we ought by merit to claim happiness we cannot accord it to ourselves, we are led to acknowledge God, who solves the contradiction between our ethical sovereignty and our natural dependence by making all things subsidiary to the end of created spirits and assigning them a natural condition corresponding to their personal merit. Here, just as in Kant, the existence of God and his government of the world are postulated to make up for our want of power over nature, while our moral nature, taken in itself, is conceived as so abso lute as in its self-sufficiency to have no need of God. It is true that from this point of view faith in God, as thus estab lished, our reason itself, and its autonomy, are traced back to a divine origin, but still the relation of the pre-supposed sovereign autonomy to the divine legislation is not made clear ; ethical idealism and the religious mode of thought have no necessary connection, but move in parallel lines, sometimes supplementing and sometimes restricting each other. -- Though the idea of God cannot be established by speculation, its certainty is grounded on ethical necessities of thought, for it forms the condition of the possibility of the supreme good, in which we are by our moral nature compelled to believe.
Nor, again, is the further determination of our idea of God possible by the methods of ontology, but by those of ethical analogy --by our reasoning analogically from our own moral causality to the relation of the divine causality to the world, whereby we are able, at any rate symbolically, to describe the action though not the nature of God, his moral attributes, holiness, justice, goodness, and wisdom being first inferred, and then the ontological ones deduced. The doctrine of the Trinity is interpreted, with Kant, of the threefold relation of God -- as Creator and Lawgiver, as Ruler, and as Judge. Further, the belief in immortality is rested, in Kantian fashion, upon its being the condition of the possibility of endless moral
progress.
These doctrines, according to Tieftrunk, make up the
essential contents of every religion, no religion being univer sally valid save as it rests upon the principle, cognisable by reason, of freedom and the moral law. From this he infers that Rationalism alone meets the requirements of religion ;
for religion does not originate in feeling, but solely in the spontaneity of the knowing faculty, and is therefore valuable
? ? ? ? Ch. KANTIAN RATIONALISTS.
89
only when the product of perfect insight and thorough convic tion. " Religious feelings must be produced by knowledge, and not vice versa the perception of the moral law, of the existence of God, and of our own immortality, the first step, and pro duces in us an interest, which, as resulting from our recogni tion of these truths, we can call a religious emotion. " But the theologian Tieftrunk could not rest satisfied with this
formal and self-sufficient Rationalism. He endeavoured to find an opening for historical religion and its claim to revelation. In the first place, he showed in general that a revelation logically conceivable and morally probable on the supposition of a declension of human morality so profound as to be remediable only by a direct divine proclamation of the moral law, together with the necessary outward means of securing its observance. Among the latter he includes mira cles wrought on nature, which are considered quite possible, as the sensible effects of a supersensible cause, as our own free will operates the world of sense as intelligible causality. When once supernaturalism, after its repulse at the hands of arrogant Rationalism, had thus been re-admitted by a back door, maintained its position, at any rate so far as the Christian religion based, upon the historical testimony of the Biblical writings. Since these satisfy the moral criteria, a priori necessary, of a divine revelation, their acceptance may be regarded as rationally justified. Still, Tieftrunk far from constructing upon this foundation a positive system of Biblical dogmas after the manner of Storr's. On the
contrary, he holds that the content of revealed religion the same as that of natural religion, inasmuch as the essence of the teaching of Jesus consists the love of God and of our neighbour, which equivalent to Kant's "joyful recognition and observance of the moral law as divine command. " He cannot however but see that even the revealed religion of the Bible (not to speak of the theology of the Church) contains some things beyond natural religion. Though what this addition consists, and what its value
and importance for us, are questions to which this Rationalism can give only confused and indefinite answers.
The Rationalists Ammon, Bretschneidek, Wegscheider, and Rohr sought to keep closer touch, to some extent, with the historical theology of the Protestant churches, and were thus enabled to exercise more widespread influence on the
? ? ? a
in
in
is
is
is
is
in
a is
is
is
in
it
;
I. ]
? 90 DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. [Bk. II.
thought of the churches. In their theological manuals it was their custom to begin with an historical sketch of the develop ment of the various doctrines in the Bible, the Fathers, and the Protestant creeds, and only then to state their own view in the form of a final judgment. This method had several advantages : in the first place, it involved a full historical statement of the facts of the case, and thus put the student in a position to form an independent opinion from his knowledge of the actual materials ; and secondly, it brought clearly out the mutability of dogmatic conceptions, and their dependence in every case upon contemporary thought, and thus destroyed a naive faith in the infallible authority of a particular form of doctrine, and established the right of the present to form an opinion, from its own point of view, on the dogmatic decisions of past ages, and to restate them in more adequate forms. This procedure constitutes both the justification and the his torical merit of these theologians, who have been too uncere moniously and disdainfully dismissed by the later conservative theology. By their learned and impartial presentation of the history of dogmas they trained up a generation of scientific and liberal-minded theologians such as we do not afterwards meet with in equal numbers. And with regard to the conclu sions they themselves drew from the history of doctrine, we must recognise not only their intelligent clearness and manly honesty, but also their profound moral earnestness, their sin cere piety, and their living trust in God ; in other words, a disposition of mind which could justly claim to be Christian piety, even though it did not adequately represent the specifi cally Christian doctrines of salvation, and on that account could not satisfy profounder religious needs. In any case this theological school has as much historical justification as any other, and it is undeniable that its representatives in the first half of our century presented Christianity to the great majority of the German people in the form most intelligible to them, and did better work in the cause of quiet, practical Christi anity than many of those who from the proud position of a reactionary theology, artificially conformed to the creeds, assumed the right to condemn these men.
By its juster appreciation of the importance of the historical element in religion, this post-Kantian Rationalism contrasts favourably with Kant's unhistorical Rationalism. While Kant had held everything positive which goes beyond the moral
? ? ? ? Ch. KANTIAN RATIONALISTS.
faith of reason to be simply " statutory," the product of man's imagination and caprice, Ammon pronounced the positive re
of the Bible divinely revealed, inasmuch as, while not
ligion
contradicting natural religion, still did not originate solely
the reason common to all men, but was imparted by divine Providence througrr "definite historical persons and events to supplement and confirm the truths of natural religion. Hence the relation of natural to positive religion resembles that of the universal moral consciousness to the definite morals and laws of individual nations, or that of the common constitution of men as men to the special unfolding of history. From this very useful point of view Bretschneider explained the relation of a general and a special revelation the former lays the foundation of religious knowledge in the constitution of the world and of our nature, the latter extends and de velops this foundation by gradually educating us to a higher wisdom. The need of special revelation owing to the
mind's need of education, or to the fact that our knowledge of God, as well as our knowledge of the world, can only gradu ally arise and be made perfect. Revelation and reason come from the same source--the divine Logos, and hence cannot contradict each other. But revelation related to reason as religious education to the individual does not give religious ideas all at once in their complete form, but at first only general outlines and without a clear perception of their foundations, as truths to be received on authority but by de grees reason, led and growing strong in the leading strings of authority, attains to a clearer and purer comprehension of religious ideas, and to a perception of their inward truth and agreement with the nature of the world and of man. The very fact that immediate revelation harmonises with the uni versal revelation, and really develops further religious ideas,
the final proof of its divine origin while its possibility cannot, according to Bretschneider, be denied, since the Spirit of God pervades all creation, including therefore the human spirit, and hence able to impart illumination to though this always conditioned by men's general culture and knowledge of the world.
Whilst therefore Ammon and Bretschneider, neither of whom remained uninfluenced by the advanced thought of their time, held the idea of revelation in such a way as to avoid an absolute antithesis between the divine immediateness and the
? ?