Reply to
Objection
2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are
manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason.
manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason.
Summa Theologica
For Hesychius commenting on Lev.
26:26, "Ten
women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am
the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his
commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg. : "their"] "two iniquities");
the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord thy God in vain. " He states that there are six precepts pertaining
to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the
second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt
not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet. "
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,
if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two
statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept.
Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod. ) who also distinguishes four precepts
as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in
the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as
third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. " The other
six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg. : Cherubim] to
be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex.
25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven
thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the
purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh;
whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of
possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore
Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting
of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's
wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and
seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct
from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about
worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident
principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other
promulgation that the infusion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the
negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should
honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man;
nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept
is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two
distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
"Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there
are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not
believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and
therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as
though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of
covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of
the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 5).
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven. " But sins are distinguished according as man
sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations
to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to
the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept
about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others
also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury,
so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the
teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " Therefore there should
be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false
doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his
parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue
are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the
commandment is charity. " Therefore as there is a precept referring to
parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in
thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the
prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
wife. " Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins
of homicide and false witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the
irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when
it is said, "Thou shalt not covet. " Therefore the decalogue should have
included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone. "
I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the
precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community
or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he
behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave
well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is
therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first
place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second
place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who
are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first,
fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the
sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have
strange gods. " Reverence to his master requires that he should do
nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second
commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain. " Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the
creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying
his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about
honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done
to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i. e. as to his personal
existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of
offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the
aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not
steal. " Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is
forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet. "
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways.
First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the
precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept
about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of
loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its
vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of
God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing
oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had
written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. " Hence the
precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand
at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a
man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he
owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters
which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain
duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to
himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed
through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and,
consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of
past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the
sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine
favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the
reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord
made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and
final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life,
by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also
foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing
thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the
holy of the Lord glorious. " Because these favors first and chiefly are
borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the
past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to
the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by
one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of
all their controversy. " Hence, since oaths are common to all,
inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept
of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words,
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a
prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou
shalt not say that Christ is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an
immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts
that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an
immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in
return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a
son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it
by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and
being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue
does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone
except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be
indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the
reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and
"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue
contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the
same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of
wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful
good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they
needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it
is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired
only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins
of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of
thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the
concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it
were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of
the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than
God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom
he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? " But the first three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to
the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories
[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos. ], vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the
negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions.
But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed.
Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts,
are unsuitably placed last in order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "The things that are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg. : 'Those that are, are ordained of God'].
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as
stated above [2085](A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming
order.
I answer that, As stated above ([2086]AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of
the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.
Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by
the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.
Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end,
that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is
supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is
God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue,
first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to this is most
grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as
to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to
the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly
it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other
soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is
that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in
common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him
reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an
army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a
compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this
last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of
service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his
neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more
grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons
to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that
direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given
to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we
again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is
more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word;
and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which
destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery,
which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave
than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by
the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for
the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ([2087]SS,
Q[25], A[1]; [2088]SS, Q[26], A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man
to God demanded precedence of the others.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being
in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in
respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was
fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds
in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of
deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in
the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and
Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the
order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line is
known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge
of sin" (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the
first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that
which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which
belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last,
since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order
of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order
of reason.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to
acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of
vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one
another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a
precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a
negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts
should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is
based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the
Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each
precept, and not only in the first and third.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be
rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the
precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each
precept, and not only in the second and fourth.
Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so
far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat
of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old
Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in
each, and not only in the first and second.
Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in
the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of
thy heart. " Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory
should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems
that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things,
in measure, number and weight. " Much more therefore did He observe a
suitable manner in formulating His Law.
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations. " Now it belongs to wisdom to
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be
evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the
denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always
lead to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is
white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black,
it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And
hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to
the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of
reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness.
Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in
the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has
received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two
whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father,
as stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two
affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other
about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are
manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the
precepts include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general
moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou
shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the
Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason
in each case.
Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to
some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it
seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might
be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since
parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is
expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the
precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept
forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered
from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by
entering into a compact with the demons.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are
prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of
punishment is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade
evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason
of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury
on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is
affixed to the first two precepts.
Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in
memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is
made therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a
determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law,
wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like
human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of
law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation,
as stated above ([2089]Q[96], A[6];[2090] Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a
dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as
God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law
made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are
ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor.
2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your
sakes have I done it in the person of Christ. " Therefore superiors can
dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one
forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in
this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human
law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a
precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that
day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the
Sabbath-day, we will fight against him. " Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by
dispensation.
I answer that, As stated above ([2091]Q[96], A[6];[2092] Q[97], A[4]),
precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in
which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the
lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed
first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice
and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If
therefore there by any precepts which contain the very preservation of
the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts
contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable.
For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as
this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth,
or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything
unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if
other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining
certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit
of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain
cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the
intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the
commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men
should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed
from this on account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which
is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of
justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone,
and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are
to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the
decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural
law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing
principle that "justice should be preserved. " But he is speaking in
reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to
apply in certain cases.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God
continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself. " But He would deny Himself
if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He
is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be
lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to
His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one
another.
Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the
decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for
in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human
law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not
undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this
is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is
no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib.
Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if
it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as
forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to
them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay
his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be
slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it
is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and
ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the
executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer
any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife
of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of
adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself one who was
his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of
marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the
place of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather
than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he
does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat.
12:3, seqq. ).
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Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the
precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice
should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely,
and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt.
26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just. "
Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the
lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the
lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic.
ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the
mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in
working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of
the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with
gladness"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do
gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully,
it is done in thee, not by thee. " Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has
the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished.
Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would
deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the
intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by
habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not
fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law
is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now
the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are
differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the
penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under
the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with
the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that
appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the
Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills,
according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God. "
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way,
it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode
of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic.
ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject
to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does
in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i. e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two,
Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human
law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas
the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with
his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. "
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies
that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode
of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human
law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of
filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls
under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but
not that they be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His
aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of
the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear
on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or
disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without
sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works
with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i. e.
joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor
(which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in
another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure
ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence
of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure
either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming
habit.
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Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the
precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): "If thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow
that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they
be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in
doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God. " Therefore
the mode of charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the
precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done
without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can
fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of
Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God.
Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an
affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding
not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of
charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes
it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor. " In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i. e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of
the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean
that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must
honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity,
does not break this precept: although he does break the precept
concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be
punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among
which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction
that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all
things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the
precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother,"
but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart. " And since these are two affirmative precepts, not
binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different
time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring
his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept
concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without
charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for
man to fulfil the law without grace.
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Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides
the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
declared (Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity
"dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " But these two commandments
are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial
and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral
precepts besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains,
besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,
liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some
precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,
sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore
unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls. " But man is preserved from the stain of
sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides
those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include
other moral precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99],
AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from
their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there
are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need
no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which
are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can
have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed,
the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet
they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few
instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the
precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of
which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral
precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through
Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we
know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so
many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids
the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt.
18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall
expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . .
. neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that
consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the
truth from the dead. " The second commandment forbids perjury. To this
is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are
added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment
prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about
honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary
head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the
precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters,
or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth
commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred
and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to
Lev.
women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its
observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he
distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, "I am
the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his
commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg. : "their"] "two iniquities");
the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the
Lord thy God in vain. " He states that there are six precepts pertaining
to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the
second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt
not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet. "
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the
Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,
if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is
written (Mat. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two
statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange
gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept.
Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod. ) who also distinguishes four precepts
as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in
the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as
third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and
as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. " The other
six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything
is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as
gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg. : Cherubim] to
be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex.
25:18---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven
thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the
purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh;
whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of
possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore
Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting
of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's
wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and
seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct
from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about
worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of
charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident
principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other
promulgation that the infusion of faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the
negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should
honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man;
nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept
is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two
distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
"Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there
are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not
believing in strange gods.
Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and
therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as
though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of
covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of
the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. x, 5).
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the
commandments of heaven. " But sins are distinguished according as man
sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the
decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations
to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to
the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept
about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others
also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury,
so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the
teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " Therefore there should
be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false
doctrine.
Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his
parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue
are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the
commandment is charity. " Therefore as there is a precept referring to
parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbors.
Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in
thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt
not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from the
prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
wife. " Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins
of homicide and false witness.
Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the
concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the
irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when
it is said, "Thou shalt not covet. " Therefore the decalogue should have
included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible
faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly enumerated.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): "He shewed you His covenant,
which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two
tablets of stone. "
I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of
human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the
precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community
or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell
aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he
behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave
well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is
therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first
place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second
place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who
are his neighbors and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first,
fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master
consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the
sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt not have
strange gods. " Reverence to his master requires that he should do
nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second
commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain. " Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the
creation of all things.
To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in
general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying
his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about
honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to
none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done
to one's neighbor---sometimes in his person, i. e. as to his personal
existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of
offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not commit
adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the
aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou shalt not
steal. " Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not
bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done by thought is
forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet. "
The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also
be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds;
wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the
second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the
sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept,
requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps.
32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the
First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His
goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last
end.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways.
First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the
precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept
about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of
loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its
vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of
God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing
oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those
precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are
those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is
written (Dt. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had
written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you. " Hence the
precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand
at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a
man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he
owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters
which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain
duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it
seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And
therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to
himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed
through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and,
consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of
past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the
sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine
favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the
reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord
made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and
final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life,
by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also
foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Is. 58:13): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing
thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the
holy of the Lord glorious. " Because these favors first and chiefly are
borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the
past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future
Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to
the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone,
and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the
precepts of the decalogue.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by
one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of
all their controversy. " Hence, since oaths are common to all,
inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept
of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words,
"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a
prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: "Thou
shalt not say that Christ is a creature. "
Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an
immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts
that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an
immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in
return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a
son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it
by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and
being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue
does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone
except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be
indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the
reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and
"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue
contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the
same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of
wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful
good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they
needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But
murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it
is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired
only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins
of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of
thought, but only sins of deed.
Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the
concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it
were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of
the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.
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Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than
God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: "He that loveth not his brother, whom
he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not? " But the first three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to
the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are
not set in proper order.
Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative
precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories
[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos. ], vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the
negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions.
But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed.
Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts,
are unsuitably placed last in order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "The things that are of
God, are well ordered" [Vulg. : 'Those that are, are ordained of God'].
But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as
stated above [2085](A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming
order.
I answer that, As stated above ([2086]AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of
the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.
Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by
the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.
Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end,
that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is
supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is
God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue,
first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to this is most
grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as
to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to
the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly
it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other
soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is
that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in
common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him
reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an
army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a
compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this
last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of
service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his
neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more
grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons
to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that
direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given
to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we
again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is
more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word;
and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which
destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery,
which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave
than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by
the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for
the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ([2087]SS,
Q[25], A[1]; [2088]SS, Q[26], A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man
to God demanded precedence of the others.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being
in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in
respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was
fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds
in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of
deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in
the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are
sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and
Is. 1:16,17: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the
order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line is
known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge
of sin" (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the
first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that
which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which
belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last,
since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order
of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order
of reason.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to
acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of
vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one
another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a
precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a
negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts
should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is
based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the
Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each
precept, and not only in the first and third.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be
rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the
precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each
precept, and not only in the second and fourth.
Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so
far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat
of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old
Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in
each, and not only in the first and second.
Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in
the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables of
thy heart. " Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory
should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems
that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things,
in measure, number and weight. " Much more therefore did He observe a
suitable manner in formulating His Law.
I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the
Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations. " Now it belongs to wisdom to
arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be
evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the
denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always
lead to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is
white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black,
it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And
hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to
the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of
reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness.
Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in
the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has
received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two
whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father,
as stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two
affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other
about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are
manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the
precepts include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general
moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou
shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the
Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason
in each case.
Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to
some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it
seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might
be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since
parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is
expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the
precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept
forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered
from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by
entering into a compact with the demons.
Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are
prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of
punishment is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade
evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason
of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury
on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is
affixed to the first two precepts.
Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in
memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is
made therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a
determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law,
wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.
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Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like
human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of
law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation,
as stated above ([2089]Q[96], A[6];[2090] Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a
dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as
God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law
made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are
ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor.
2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your
sakes have I done it in the person of Christ. " Therefore superiors can
dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one
forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in
this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human
law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a
precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in that
day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the
Sabbath-day, we will fight against him. " Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for
that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting
covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by
dispensation.
I answer that, As stated above ([2091]Q[96], A[6];[2092] Q[97], A[4]),
precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in
which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the
lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed
first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice
and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If
therefore there by any precepts which contain the very preservation of
the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts
contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable.
For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as
this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth,
or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything
unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if
other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining
certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit
of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain
cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the
intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the
commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men
should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed
from this on account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct
us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which
is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of
justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone,
and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are
to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the
decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural
law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing
principle that "justice should be preserved. " But he is speaking in
reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to
apply in certain cases.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God
continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself. " But He would deny Himself
if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He
is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be
lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to
His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one
another.
Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the
decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for
in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human
law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not
undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this
is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is
no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib.
Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if
it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as
forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to
them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay
his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be
slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it
is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and
ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the
executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer
any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife
of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of
adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself one who was
his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of
marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any
determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that
this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not---in this point they
admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such
matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the
like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are
subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the
place of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather
than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he
does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat.
12:3, seqq. ).
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Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the
precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice
should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely,
and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt.
26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just. "
Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the
lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the
lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic.
ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the
mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in
working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of
the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with
gladness"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do
gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully,
it is done in thee, not by thee. " Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has
the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished.
Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would
deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the
intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by
habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not
fall under the precept.
I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of
law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law
is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now
the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9,
because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are
differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the
penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under
the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with
the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that
appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the
Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills,
according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God. "
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some
sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is
regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way,
it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode
of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic.
ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject
to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does
in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and
Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i. e. "from
choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a
twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,
about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two,
Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human
law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas
the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with
his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. "
The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable
principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies
that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode
of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human
law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of
filial piety.
Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls
under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but
not that they be done from the habit of justice.
Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His
aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of
the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear
on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or
disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept
and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without
sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works
with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i. e.
joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor
(which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in
another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure
ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence
of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure
either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming
habit.
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Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the
precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): "If thou
wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow
that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into
life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they
be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my
body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. "
Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in
doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God. " Therefore
the mode of charity falls under the precept.
Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the
precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done
without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can
fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of
Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If
therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that
whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has
not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows
that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some
have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this
precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God.
Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins
mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an
affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding
not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of
charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is
altogether outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of
charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and
thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes
it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor. " In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity;
since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses
it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as
being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i. e. inasmuch as the
acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of
the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above
([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of
the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept,
that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean
that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must
honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity,
does not break this precept: although he does break the precept
concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be
punished.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among
which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our
neighbor.
Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction
that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all
things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the
precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother,"
but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart. " And since these are two affirmative precepts, not
binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different
time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring
his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept
concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without
charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for
man to fulfil the law without grace.
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Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides
the decalogue?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral
precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
declared (Mat. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity
"dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " But these two commandments
are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial
and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the
determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and
ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in
the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral
precepts besides the decalogue.
Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the
virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains,
besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,
liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some
precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,
sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore
unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls. " But man is preserved from the stain of
sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides
those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include
other moral precepts.
I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99],
AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from
their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed
of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the
moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there
are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need
no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our
neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which
are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can
have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed,
the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet
they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few
instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the
precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of
which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral
precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through
Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we
know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to
the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so
many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids
the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts
forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt.
18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall
expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . .
. neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that
consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the
truth from the dead. " The second commandment forbids perjury. To this
is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are
added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment
prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about
honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary
head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the
precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters,
or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth
commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred
and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to
Lev.
