No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
publican (Lk. 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi. ] that "if
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels
by the judgment seat of God. " Hence it is clear that humility is set
above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the
virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. [*S. 10,
C[1]]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
Attend first of all to the foundation of humility. " Now this would seem
to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore
apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward.
Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
himself shall be exalted" (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the
greatest of virtues.

Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the
human nature which He assumed. " Now He especially proposed His humility
for our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because I am meek
and humble of heart. " Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the
"lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility
of God. " Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity. " Therefore humility is
not the greatest of virtues.

I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by
participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this
ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now
humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in
all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special
matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual
virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially
legal justice, humility stands before all others.

Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before
that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue;
even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility
"he went down into his house justified. " Hence Chrysostom says [*De
incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in
the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and
you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength,
but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not
by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride. "

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by
reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that
which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
to the humble. " In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of
the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step
towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God
must believe. " In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
excellent way than humility.

Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly
things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
despise earthly riches, according to Mat. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures
in heaven. " Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who
despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, "Blessed are they that
mourn, for they shall be comforted. " In the same way spiritual
uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it,
but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who
humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: 'He shall
be exalted. ' And do not imagine that his exaltation in men's eyes is
effected by bodily uplifting. "

Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility
to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's
spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual
things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual
welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward
exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a
disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods.
Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and
other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than
humility.
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Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule
of the Blessed Benedict?

Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are
set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these
degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are
unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in
heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on
the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to
be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and disposed
to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one is asked";
the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common
rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and acknowledge
oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself worthless and
unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to confess one's sin";
the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and
contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject oneself to a
superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own
desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always mindful of
everything that God has commanded. " For among these there are some
things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience.
Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion---and this is
inconsistent with any virtue---namely to declare oneself more
despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in
all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly
placed among the degrees of humility.

Objection 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do
other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern
outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to
inward actions.

Objection 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq. ) gives seven degrees
of humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself
contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to confess
it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish them to
believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said of us";
the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt"; the
seventh, "to love being thus treated. " Therefore the aforesaid degrees
would seem to be too numerous.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Mat. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has
three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above
us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The
second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our
inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to
subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness. "
Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure
of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is
imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to
be entrapped. " Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed
according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that
it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

I answer that, As stated above [3604](A[2]) humility has essentially to
do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of
his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in
the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above
what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the
reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads
to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest
that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues.
For "a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him,
by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of
humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the
twelfth degree, "that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in
mind. "

Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest
one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three
ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to the
eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior
judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being
deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that
come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms
in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by
acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the
eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things,
and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect
one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth
degree.

Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of
these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart
from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others
have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to
speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not
immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do
with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which
regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs
of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Reply to Objection 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and
avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults
which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which
others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you that
some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly
you are better than they. " Again, without falsehood one may avow and
believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of
one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God,
according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything
of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God. " And
there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that
pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another,
so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act
of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and
chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the
outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all
restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the
inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility
are here enumerated.

Reply to Objection 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible
to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it
would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by
the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of
one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one's
failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees
have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but
outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of
words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is
nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard,
for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble
towards those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and
sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to
embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so
that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh
mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself,
namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are
either of higher or lower or of equal degree.

Reply to Objection 5: This argument also considers the degrees of
humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which
the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various
conditions of men.
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OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first
man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head there
are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pride is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?

(4) Of its species;

(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?

(7) Of its relation to other sins;

(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?
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Whether pride is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the
object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do;
and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine
promises: for it is written (Is. 60:15): "I will make thee to be an
everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and
generation. " Therefore pride is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for
every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this
become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness.
Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is love of
one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely
excellent. " Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride imitates
exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all. " Therefore
pride is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to
a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice
is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to
reign in thy mind or in thy words. "

I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims
higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A man is
said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he
really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud.
Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that
which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride
denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have
the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4),
"the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason. " Therefore it is evident
that pride is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways.
First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this
sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate
"super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be
called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of
super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Is.
61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil pride"; or "a sinful pride
which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He
bestows. "

It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those
things in which men may take pride.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason has the direction of those things for
which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from
the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful,
as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally.
Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the
"desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he asserts
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for
it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi.
dominion over our fellow-creatures. "

Reply to Objection 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of
humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as
magnanimity, as stated above ([3605]Q[161], A[1], ad 3). Hence the vice
opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which
is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to
magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it
belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of
great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for
a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to
magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to
things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by
default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way,
on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity
and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as
it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great
things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation,
it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which
denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more
directly opposed to magnanimity.
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Whether pride is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that
is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2)
that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible. "
Therefore pride is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man
from wickedness [*Vulg. : 'From the things that he is doing, and may
deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he
transgresses His commandments by sin. " Now according to Ambrose [*De
Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a
disobedience of the heavenly commandments. " Therefore every sin is
pride.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one
virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and
like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body";
and Isidore says (Etym.
[*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the
downfall of all virtues. " Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Objection 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride
has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one man
is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean
and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues. " Therefore
pride is not a special but a general sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look
into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law,
pride is a very different sin from other vices. " Now the genus is not
different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a
special sin.

I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First
with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its
proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a
special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as
stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain
influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic
character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways.
First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride
which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that
is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it
were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise
the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20,
"Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I
will not serve. "

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride
admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,
but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For
though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,
through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break
the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through
ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss
which are not done through pride. "

Reply to Objection 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his
book De Nat. et Grat. , not as being his own, but as those of someone
with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion,
and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might,
however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring
to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the
commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of
pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not
always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes
through weakness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but
not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a
parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it.
Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself
against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply to Objection 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one
way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt
every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the
special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way
a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus
pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride
in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence.
Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object,
which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love
of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
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Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind
is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light. " Now the
knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational
faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud
observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them
with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride":
wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now
observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

Objection 3: Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible
things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it
consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God. " Now
the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot
extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the
irascible.

Objection 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent.
294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence. " But love is not in the
irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the
irascible.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of
fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the
irascible.

I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained
from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be
other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now
the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the
desire of one's own excellence, as stated above ([3606]AA[1],2).
Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict
sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger,
strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly,
the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to
the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed.
It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a
passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment.
Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not
distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the [3607]FP,
Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.

Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were
merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend,
pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive
appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is
common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that
the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a
part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as
applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed
also to the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, "Thou
hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i. e. from the
proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed
them to little ones," i. e. to the humble.

Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction. " The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths
be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and
if they know of them they cannot relish them. " Hence it is written
(Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom. "

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3608]Q[161], AA[2], 6),
humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true
self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for
he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an
inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to
believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite
is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently
whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to
pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings,
just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17),
"holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves. " Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of
the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general
signification, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9),
"love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is
in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence,"
inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority
over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
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Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?

Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks
by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either
when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe
it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits;
or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and
wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have. " For pride
is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue
from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not
received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through
his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of
pride.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species
of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
stated above ([3609]Q[110], A[2];[3610] Q[112]). Therefore it should
not be accounted a species of pride.

Objection 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride,
which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
excuse oneself of a sin one has committed. " Again, presumption whereby
one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do
with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently
account for the different species of pride.

Objection 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq. ] divides the uplifting of pride,
saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
deed. " Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq. ] also reckons
twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense
of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful
habit. " Now these apparently are not comprised under the species
mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned
unfittingly.

On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3611]AA[1],2,3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered
in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the
good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it.
Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has,
it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure
exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride,
namely "boasting of having what one has not. "

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we
have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has
from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that
which he has received from above to be due to his own merits. "

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we
have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others
and wishes to be singularly conspicuous. "

Reply to Objection 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways.
First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in
point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is
a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their
merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to
unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast
of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own
merits.

Reply to Objection 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what
he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is
reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.

Reply to Objection 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he
has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good
of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above
one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists
in wishing to be preferred to others.

Reply to Objection 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
above ([3612]Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to "be
humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed
on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in
looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second
degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be
loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man
is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily
moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth. "
The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is
asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is
"to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the
monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to
seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe
and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed
"arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh
degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for
all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
one's sins. " The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under
difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed "deceitful
confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins
confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is
"obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness. " The eleventh degree
of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to
this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely
whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this
is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.

In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated
above with regard to humility ([3613]Q[161], A[6]).
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Whether pride is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss
on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely,
the universal sin which is pride. " Therefore if pride were a mortal
sin, so would every sin be.

Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But
pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of
God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence
which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to
God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal
sin.

Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride
is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime
and heavenly virtues. " Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most
evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
elect. " But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ([3614]Q[161],
A[1], ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in
so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but
according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us. "
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of
man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is
found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His
rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very
nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and
consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as
in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication
and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of
their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and
being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens
that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not
consent to them.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3615](A[2]) pride is a general
sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all
sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all
sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we
have stated to be a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God,
inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule
as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established
order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.

Reply to Objection 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
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Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins.
For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would
seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment
of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy
them. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater
good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to
which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above
(Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.

Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser
evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom.
1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men
of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient. " Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously,"
says: "The greatest sin in man is pride.