No More Learning

The
acceptance of Islam by others than Arabians was not only not striven
for, but was in fact regarded with disfavour. The subdued peoples
might peacefully retain their old religions, provided only they paid
ample tribute. As on conversion to Islam these payments ceased, at
least in the early times such changes of religion were disliked. The
circumstance that a few pious men subsequently practised such pro-
selytism, or that the material advantages of apostasy gradually led the
population of the conquered countries to Islam, must not blind our eyes
to the fact that the movement originated from quite. other motives.


## p. 331 (#363) ############################################

The Arab Migration 331
The sudden surging forward of the Arabs was only apparently sudden.
For centuries previously the Arab migration had been in preparation. It
was the last great Semitic migration connected with the economical
decline of Arabia. Such a decline is indisputable, even though we may
not be disposed to accept all the conclusions which have in recent times
been connected with this oft-discussed thesis. Ever since the commence-
ment of our chronology the Arabs had been in fluctuation. South-Arabian
tribes were lords of Medina, others also from South Arabia were settled
in Syria and Mesopotamia. Legendary information, confirmed however
by inscriptions of Southern Arabia, shews that for a long period the
conditions of life in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula had been
growing worse. With the decline of political power the care of the
public waterworks, on which the prosperity of the land more or less
depended, also suffered. In short, long before Mahomet Arabia was
in a state of unrest, and a slow, uncontrollable infiltration of Arabian
tribes and tribal branches had permeated the adjoining civilised lands
in Persian as also in Roman territory, where they had met with the
descendants of earlier Semitic immigrants to those parts, the Aramaeans,
who were already long acclimatised there.
Persia and Byzantium suffered severely from this constant unrest in
their border provinces, and both empires had endeavoured to organise the
movement and to use it as a fighting medium, the one against the other.
The Romans had organised the Syrian Arabs for this purpose under the
leadership of princes of the house of Ghassan, the most celebrated of whom
even received the title of patrician, while the Sassanids founded a similar
bulwark in Hlra, where the Lakhmites, under Persian sovereignty, lived
a princely life, greatly celebrated by Arabian poets. A short-sighted
policy, and probably also internal weakness, permitted the ruin of
both of these States, which would have offered an almost insuperable
barrier to the Islamitic expansion. The hitherto united dominions
of the Ghassanids were subdivided and various governors took the
place of the popular Lakhmite princes. Thus the great empires had
succeeded in destroying the smaller Arabian States which had grown too
powerful, but the tradition remained, according to which the Arabians
on the borders might with impunity levy contributions on the neighbour-
ing cultivated countries during the constant wars between Persia and
Byzantium. These traditions were assimilated by those Arabs then
gradually becoming dependent on Medina, and their procedure was
sanctioned and encouraged by the young and rising Caliphate; at first
in a wavering, but later in a more and more energetic manner. The
expansion of the Saracens is thus the final stage in a process of develop-
ment extending over centuries. Islam was simply a change in the
watchword for which they fought; and thus arose at the same time
an organisation which, based on religious and ethnical principles and
crowned with unexpected success, was bound to attain an historical


## p. 332 (#364) ############################################

332 Character of the Movement [632
importance quite different from that of buffer States like Hira and
Ghassan.
Under these circumstances it would be a mistake to regard the Arab
migration merely as a religious movement incited by Mahomet. The
question may in fact be put whether the whole movement is not conceivable
without the intervention of Islam. There can in any case be no question
of any zealous impulse towards proselytism. That strong religious tie
which at the present time binds together all Muslims, that exclusive
religious spirit of the later world of Islam, is at all events not the
primary cause of the Arab migration, but merely a consequence of the
political and cultural conditions caused by it. The importance of Islam
in this direction lies in its masked political character, which the modern
world has even in our own time to take into consideration. In the
1 outset Islam meant the supremacy of Medina, but it soon identified
itself with Arabianism, i. e. , it preached the superiority of the Arabian
people generally. This great idea gives an intellectual purport to the
restless striving for expansion, and makes a political focus of the great
Arabian State of Medina, founded on religion. Hunger and avarice,
not religion, are the impelling forces, but religion supplies the essential
unity and central power. The expansion of the Saracens1 religion, both
in point of time and in itself, can only be regarded as of minor import and
rather as a political necessity. The movement itself had been on foot
long before Islam gave it a party cry and an organisation. Then it was
that the minor streams of Arabian nationality, gradually encroaching on
the cultivated territory, united with the related elements already resident
there and formed that irresistible migratory current which flooded the
older kingdoms, and seemed to flood them suddenly.
If the expansion of the Saracens is thus allowed to take its proper
place in the entire development of the Middle Ages, a glance at the state
of affairs at the time of the prophet's death leads directly to the history
of the Arab migration itself.
The death of the prophet is represented by tradition as an event
which surprised the whole world and to the faithful seemed impossible,
notwithstanding the fact that Mahomet had always confessed himself
to be a mortal man. He had, it is true, never taken his eventual decease
into consideration, nor had he left a definite code of laws or any
instructions regarding his succession. But can we suppose a similar self-
deception also among his nearest companions, who must certainly have
seen how he was ageing, and must have had him before them in all his
human weakness? Can we suppose any delusion in so circumspect a
nature as Abu Bakr, or in such a genius for government as Omar?
The energetic and wise conduct of both these men and their companion
Abu 'Ubaida, immediately after the catastrophe, seems to prove the
contrary and their action seems based on well-prepared arrange-
ments. Energetic action was moreover very necessary, for it was


## p. 333 (#365) ############################################

632] Abu Bakrs Election 833
a giant task which Mahomet bequeathed to those entrusted with the
regulation of his inheritance. At the very outset loomed up the
difficulties in the capital itself. The sacred personality of the prophet
had succeeded in holding in check the old antipathies within the ranks of
the Medina allies (Ansar) and the continual petty jealousies between
these and the Muhajirun, the companions of his flight from Mecca. But
on his death, which for the great majority was sudden and unexpected,
these two groups confronted each other, each claiming the right to take
up the lead. As soon as the news of the death first reached them the
Khazraj, the most numerous tribe of the Ansar, assembled in the hall
(Saklfa) of the Banu Sa'ida. Informed of this by the Aus, who feared a
revival of the old dissensions, Abu Bakr, Omar and Abu 'Ubaida at once
repaired thither and arrived just in time to prevent a split in the
community. The hot-blooded Omar wanted to put a stop to it promptly
and by energetic means, and would of a certainty have spoiled the whole
situation, but at this stage the venerable and awe-inspiring Abu Bakr,
the oldest companion of the prophet, intervened and whilst fully recog-
nising the merits of the Ansar insisted on the election of one of the
Kuraishite companions of the prophet as leader of the community.
He proposed Omar or Abu 'Ubaida. The proposal did not meet with
success and the discussion became more and more excited; suddenly
Omar seized the hand of Abu Bakr and rendered homage to him, and
others followed his example. In the meantime the hall and adjoining
rooms had become filled with people belonging, not to either of the
main groups, but to the fluctuating population of Muslim Arabs of
the neighbourhood, who had in the preceding years become especially
numerous in Medina, and whose main interest was that matters should
remain in statu quo. These people really turned the scales, and thus
Abu Bakr was chosen by a minority and recognised on the following day
by the community, though unwillingly, as even tradition is unable to veil,
on the part of many. They rendered homage to him as the repre-
sentative (Khalifa) of the prophet. The term Caliph was at that time
not regarded as a title, but simply as a designation of office; Omar, the
successor of Abu Bakr, is said to have been the first to assume the
distinctive title "Commander of the Faithful," Amir al-Mu'minin,
rendered by the Greek papyri as dfiipaXfiovfiviv.
The election of Abu Bakr was doubtless a fortunate one, but it was
regarded in circles closely interested as an inexcusable coup de main.
Quite apart from the fact that the Ansar had failed to carry their
point and were accordingly in bad humour, the nearer relations of the
prophet and their more intimate companions appear to have carried
out a policy of obstruction which yielded only to force. Ali, the
husband of the prophet's daughter Fatima and father of the prophet's
grandsons Hasan and Husain, who had previously held the first claim
to the supreme position, was suddenly ousted from the front rank. His


## p. 334 (#366) ############################################

334 Mahomets Burial \m
uncle 'Abbas and probably also Talha and Zubair (two of the earliest
converts to Islam) allied themselves with him. Ali was a good
swordsman but not a man of cautious action or quick resolve. He
and those nearest to him appear to have had no other object in vie*
than to gather around the corpse of the prophet while the fight for
the succession was raging without. The news of Abu Baler's election
however roused them at last from their lethargy, and thereupon
ensued an act of revenge, shrouded certainly in mystery by Muslim
f tradition, but which cannot be obliterated; the body of the prophet was
I secretly buried during the same night below the floor of his death-
chamber. It was the custom, after pronouncing the benediction over
the coffin, to carry the dead in solemn procession through the town to
the cemetery. As however this procession would have simultaneously
formed the triumphal entry of the new ruler, the body was disposed of
as quickly as possible without the knowledge of Abu Bakr or the
other leading companions. Tradition, which represents the old com-
panions as working together in pure friendship and unanimity, has
endeavoured with much care to picture these remarkable occurrences as
legal. For instance Mahomet is said to have stated previously that
prophets should always be buried at the spot where they died. To the
modern historian however this episode unveils the strong passions and
deep antipathies which divided, not only the Meccans and the Medina
faction, but also the nearest companions of the prophet. Abu Baler's rule
was but feebly established, and a dissolution of the young realm would
have been inevitable had not the pure instinct of self-preservation forced
the opposing parties into unity.
The news of the death appeared to let loose all the centrifugal forces
of the new State. According to Muslim accounts all Arabia was already
subjected and converted to Islam; and as soon as the news of Mahomet's
death was known, many of the tribes seceded from Islam and had to be
again subjected in bloody wars and reconverted. This apostasy is
termed Ridda, a change of belief, a well-known term of the later la*
of Islam. In reality Mahomet, at the time of his death, had by no
means united Arabia, much less had he converted all the country to
Islam. Not quite all of what to-day forms the Turkish province of
Hijaz, that is the central portion of the west coast of Arabia with its
corresponding back-country, was in reality politically joined with
Medina and Mecca as a united power, and even this was held together
more by interest than by religious brotherhood. The tribes of Central
Arabia, e. g. , the Ghatafan, Bahila, Tayyi', Asad, etc. , were in a state
of somewhat lax dependence on Mahomet and had probably also
partially accepted the doctrine of Islam, whilst in the Christian district
to the north and in Yamama, which had its own prophet, and in the
south and east of the peninsula Mahomet either had no connexions
whatever or had made treaties with single or isolated tribes, i. e. , with a


## p. 335 (#367) ############################################

632] The Ridda War 385
weak minority. It was inexplicable to the subsequent historians of the
Arabian State that after the death of Mahomet so many wars were
necessary on Arabian soil; they accounted for this fact by a Ridda, an
apostasy, from Islam. The death of the prophet was doubtless a reason
for secession to all those who had unwillingly followed Mahomet's lead,
or who regarded their contracts as void on his death. The majority of
those regarded as secessionists (Ahl ar-Ridda) had however previously
never been adherents of the religion, and many had not even belonged
to the political State of Islam. It has but recently been recognised that
an intelligible history of the expansion of the Arabs is only possible by
making these wars against the Ridda the starting-point from which the
great invasions developed themselves, more from internal necessity than
through any wise direction from Medina—undertakings moreover from
the enormous extent of which even the optimism of Mahomet would
have flinched.
The movement in Arabia had received through the formation of
the State of Medina a new and powerful stimulation. Mahomet's
campaigns, with their rich booty, had allured many from afar. He
had moreover, as a great diplomatist, strengthened the opposition
where he could find no direct acknowledgment. His example alone
had also its effect. Should not the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, of
the Asad, or of the Tamim be able to do what the Meccan Naln had
done? In this way prophetism gained ground in Arabia, i. e. , the
tension already existing grew until it neared an outburst. The sudden
death of Mahomet gave new support to the centrifugal tendencies.
The character of the whole movement, as it forces itself on the notice
of the historian, was of course hidden from contemporaries. Arabia
would have sunk into particularism if the necessity caused by the
secession of the Ahl ar-Ridda had not developed in the State of Medina
an energy which carried all before it. The fight against the Ridda was
not a fight against apostates; the objection was not to Islam per se but
to the tribute which had to be paid to Medina; the fight was for the
political supremacy over Arabia; and its natural result was the
extension of the dominions of the prophet, not their restoration. With
such a distribution of the Arabian element as has been described it was
only in the nature of things that the fight must make itself felt moreover
beyond the boundaries of Arabia proper.
Only a few of the tribes more nearly connected with Medina
recognised the supremacy of Abu Bakr, the others all seceding. Before
the news of these secessions reached Medina an expedition, which had
been prepared by Mahomet before his death, had already departed for
the Syrian border to avenge the defeat at Mu'ta, Medina was therefore
quite denuded of troops. A few former allies wished to utilise this pre-
carious position and make a sudden attack on Medina; this however was
prevented by Abu Bakr with great energy. Fortunately the expedition


## p. 336 (#368) ############################################

336 Khalid's Arabian Campaign [635
returned in time to enable him to capture the camp of the insurgents
after a severe battle at Dhu-1-Kassa (Aug. —Sept. 632). Khalid ibn al-
Walid, who had already distinguished himself under Mahomet, was
thereupon entrusted with the task of breaking the opposition of the
tribes of Central Arabia. Khalid was without doubt a military genius
of the first rank. He was somewhat lax in matters of religion and could be
\ ' as cruel as his master had been before him; but was a brilliant strategist,
carefully weighing his chances; yet once his mind was made up, he was
endued with an energy and daring before which all had to yield. He is
the actual conqueror of the Ridda, and his good generalship secured
victory after victory for Islam.
With a force of about 4000 men he again reduced the TayyT to
obedience, and then in rapid succession routed at Buzakha the Asad and
Ghatafan, who had gathered round a prophet called Talha, scoffinglv
styled by the Muslims fulmlra? meaning the little Talha. Khalids
success caused fresh troops to flock to his standard. He then at once
proceeded further into the territory of the Tamlm, but against the
wishes of the Ansar accompanying him and without the authority of the
Caliph. This arbitrary procedure, together with a cruel act of personal
revenge which he performed at the last-named place caused his recall; he
was however not only exculpated, but a proposal of his was adopted, to
strike a heavy blow at the Banu Hanifa in Yamama. At this place the
prophet Maslama was then ruling, and as in the case of Tulaiha the
Muslims sarcastically formed a diminutive of his name and styled him
Musailima. According to tradition this Musailima had maintained
friendly relations with Mahomet. Be that as it may, certain it is
that he was not in any way subject to Medina in either a political
or religious sense, but more probably an imitator of his successful
colleague Mahomet. In any case his rule was somewhat firmly
established, and it cost Khalid a bloody battle to destroy his power.
This memorable battle was fought at 'Akraba and was without doubt
the bloodiest and most important during the whole of the Ridda war.
We are as yet but poorly informed in regard to the chronology of these
events, but it may probably be assumed that the battle of 'Akraba was
fought about one year after the death of the prophet.
By the side of these great successes of Khalid the campaigns of other
generals in Bahrain, 'Uman, Mahra, Hadramaut and Yaman are less
important. Moreover the earliest subjection of all these lands under the
rule of Islam was not carried out by troops specially sent out from
Medina; it may even be doubtful if the commanders, with whose names
these conquests are associated, were despatched from Medina. It may
be that they were only subsequently legalised and that Muhajir ibn
Abl Umayya was the first actual delegate of the Caliph. In any case
these districts were unsettled for a long time after the Muslim troop had
invaded Syria and the 'Irak. Further, the same districts were in less than


## p. 337 (#369) ############################################

632] Consequences of the Ridda War 337
half a century later almost independent, and later still a focus of
heterodox tendencies.
The further march of events is connected, not with these wars
but with Khalid's unparalleled succession of victories, and with the
complication on the Syrian border. The subjection of Central Arabia
to Medina inspired the Arabs of the border districts with a profound
respect, but it simultaneously excited the warlike propensities of the
most important tribes of Arabia. It would have been an enormous task
for the government in Medina to compel all these restless elements,
accustomed to marauding excursions, to live side by side in neighbourly
peace under the sanctuary of Islam in unfertile Arabia. Within the
boundaries of the empire however such fratricidal feuds were henceforth
abolished. It was only to be expected that after the withdrawal of
Khalid's army a reaction against Medina should seize upon the newly
subjected tribes. The necessity of keeping their own victorious troops
employed, as also of reconciling the subjected ones to the new conditions,
irresistibly compelled an extension of the Islamitic rule beyond the
borders of Arabia. Chronologically the raid on 'Irak (the ancient
Babylonia) stands at the commencement of these enterprises. This
however was quite a minor affair, and the main attention of the govern-
ment was directed to Syria.
Before going further, we have to shew that our exposition differs
radically from all the usual descriptions of the expansion of the Arabs,
not only in our estimates of the sources and events, but also in our
chronological arrangement of them. The conquests of the Saracens
have in later years been a focus of scientific debate. Through the labours
of De Goeje, Wellhausen and Miednikoff a complete revolution in our
views has been effected. We have learnt to differentiate the various
schools of tradition, of which that of 'Irak, represented by Saif ibn
Omar, has produced an historical novel which can hardly be classed as
actual history. The reports of the Medina and the Syrian schools are
more trustworthy, and a certain amount of reliance may be placed on
the Egyptian school, but they all suffer from later harmonising efforts,
and also from their revision during the period of the Abbasids, in which
it was sought in every way to depreciate the Umayyads. All these
traditions are now being collected and critically sifted in the stupendous
annals of Leone Caetani. His epoch-making results are utilised in the
following paragraphs.
Between Yamama and the Hira district, which we must regard as a
long, narrow strip of country, the North Arabian (Ishmaelite) tribe of Bakr
ibn Wall led a nomadic existence on the borders of the cultivated country,
covered by the protecting marshes of the lower Euphrates, and this tribe
was again subdivided into various independent minor groups. They
formed part of the restless border tribes against which Hira had been
erected as a bulwark. The sub-tribe of the Banu Shaiban especially
c. mkii. ii. vol. ii. en. xi. 22


## p. 338 (#370) ############################################

338 Khalid on the Euphrates [604-632
had brilliant traditions, for it was these people who had won the first
and much celebrated victory of the Arabs over Persian regular troops at
Dhu Kar before the rise of Islam (between 604 and 611). This tribe of the
Banu Shaiban and their leader Muthanna ibn Huritha, whose example
was followed by the others, induced Khalid and his Muslims to cross the
Persian boundary for the first time. That was not a matter of chance,
but shews the deep inner connexion of the Saracen expansion with the
migration already in being before the rise of Islam. The Shaiban, like all
the other components of the Bakr ibn VVa'il, were wholly independent of
Medina, and had no intention of becoming Muslims. But when Medina
suddenly extended its dominion beyond Yamama, and all Arabia echoed
with the fame of Khalid in warfare, the Bakr found themselves in a
dilemma between the rising Arabian great power and their old here-
ditary enemy, Persia. What could be more obvious than that, simply
because they needed a screen for their rear, they should draw the related
Muslims into their alliance and with their assistance continue their raids
into the cultivated country? Khalid, reckless plunger that he was, seized
with avidity this opportunity for fresh deeds of valour. Tradition reports
that the chiefs of the Bakr tribes, and of them Muthanna first and
foremost, paid a visit to the Caliph Abu Bakr at Medina, professed
Islam, and received from Abu Bakr the command to conquer 'Irak
in conjunction with Khalid. In reality it is doubtful whether the Caliph
even so much as knew of any connexion between Khalid and the Bakr
tribes. At the same time it is not improbable that he gave his consent for
Khalid to participate in one of the customary raids of the Bakr ibn Wa'il,
but the conversion of the head of the tribes was no part of his plan, much
less the conversion of the tribes themselves. They certainly from this
time onward were in touch with Medina, and regarded themselves as in
political alliance with the Muslims; and in the rapid developments of
the next few years they were merged in the Caliph's dominions. Abu
Bakr did not at first contemplate any systematic occupation of 'Irak, for
he was at that time considering an expedition against Syria, which from
the point of view of Medina was of infinitely greater importance. Even
at that time they desired to have Khalid in Syria; but he had in any
case already taken part in the raid of the Banu Shaiban, either with or
without the knowledge of the Caliph. How little any conquest of Persia
was contemplated is shewn by the fact that the main body of Khalid's
troops was ordered home to recruit, and he undertook his first invasion
of Persian territory with only about 500 men, certainly well selected
troops, and then continued his march further with the same contingent
into Syria.
Khalid attracted volunteers of all kinds from Central Arabia, and
marched with them westward of the Euphrates to avoid the marshes; at
Khaftan he effected a junction with the Bakr under Muthanna; their com-
bined forces amounted in all to only two to three thousand men, but they


## p. 339 (#371) ############################################

632-636] KhalicFs Raid into Syria 339
had fortune on their side. They crossed the fertile land to the north of
Hlra unmolested and plundering as they went; Ullais was also put under
contribution, and suddenly they appeared before Hlra. The town was
well fortified, but the garrison was palpably insufficient for an open
battle. And what was the use of resistance within the walls if their rich
lands around were to be desolated? Thinking thus they quickly resolved
to pay a ransom, especially as the Arabs only demanded the ridiculously
small sum of 60,000 dirhams. To the Arabs this seemed an enormous
booty. Elated with victory they withdrew, and Hlra was thus saved for
the time being. It is scarcely conceivable that the payment of this
sum was regarded as an annual tribute. After this expedition Khalid
marched on with his braves, by command of the Caliph, right through
the enemy's territory, appearing in all directions with lightning speed
and disappearing again with equal rapidity, from Hlra through Palmyra
to Syria where he appeared, suddenly and unexpectedly, under the walls
of Damascus. This expedition, so woven round with legendary lore, and
apart from that a military masterpiece, shews better than anything else
that the conquest of Persia was not premeditated, and that the Muslims
were making their main effort in Syria. The raid against Hlra was made
at a time of the greatest confusion in Persia, but few months after the
accession of Yezdegerd, when the central authority was to some extent
restored by his general Rustam. Thereupon a counter-raid was prepared
against the plunderers. Muthanna sought help from Medina. This
was in the early days of Omar's government, and he granted the request
only with a certain amount of reluctance, refusing to spare his best
troops from Syria. The combined troops of the Bakr and of Medina
were few and badly handled, and in a second expedition they were
almost annihilated; in the so-called Bridge battle Muthanna saved with
difficulty the remnants, of the Muslim army (26 Nov. 634). It was in
consequence of this disaster that Omar, a year later (635), was led to a
more energetic interference in the conditions of the 'Irak, but even then
his actions were somewhat dilatory. Of this it will be necessary to
speak later, if only briefly. For a history of the Middle Ages the
expansion of the Arabs in Mediterranean territories is of much greater
importance.
The Arabian records of these events are not only distorted by lies,
but are terribly confused: especially in their chronology. Fortunately
we are better informed through some of the Byzantine writers, especially
Theophanes. It was not the sagacity of the Caliphs, wanting to conquer
tReTworTd, that flung the Muslim host on Syria, but the Christian Arabs
of the border districts who applied to the powerful organisation of
Medina for assistance. We are told very little about the relations
between Mahomet and the great tribes of North Arabia, such as the
Judham, Kalb, Kuda'a, Lakhm, Ghassfin; but the defeat of Mu'ta
shews that they were enemies of Medina. It was only the expedition
ch. xi. 22—2


## p. 340 (#372) ############################################

840 First Victory in Syria [633-634
against Tabuk, which had to be subjected two years before the death of
the prophet, that created friendly relations with at least a few of the
tribes on the southern boundary of Palestine. In the war of conquest
the great tribes of the former boundary State of the Ghassanids still
fought on the side of the Byzantines. The tribes to the south of the
Dead Sea however, such as the Judham and Kuda'a, who commanded
the route from Medina to Gaza, had every reason for connecting them-
selves more closely with Medina. Previously they had been in the pay
of the Byzantines, and being moreover Christians, they had no intentiou
of allying themselves with the Muslims. Soon after the battle of Mu'ta
however, we are informed, the Emperor Heraclius, who at that time was
in great financial difficulties owing to the debt contracted with the
Church for the great Persian war, suspended the yearly subsidies to the
Bedouins on the southern boundary, probably thinking that with
the new political situation he might venture on this economy. At that
time even a far-seeing politician could not have regarded as serious the
organisation of the ever-divided Arabs living in the interior of Arabia.
Judging by the behaviour of the northern tribes, they continued for a
time to be paid. Theophanes even treats the suspension of subsidies as
being in some way the cause of the summoning of the Muslims. Apart
from this may be added that, after the victories of Khalid in Central
Arabia, these border tribes, like the Bakr ibn Wa'il in the East, were led
into a dilemma; as Byzantium withdrew the subsidies from them it was
only natural that they made an alliance with the Muslims to recoup
themselves by plundering raids.
Their suggestion met with the approval of the Caliph, who probably
recognised that the commotion which had been raised must be diverted
in some direction or other. The Medina people themselves, according to
Arabian reports, do not appear to have at first displayed any enthusiasm
for such a risky action; probably they had-not forgotten the disaster of
Mu'ta Nevertheless in the autumn of 633 various small detachments
were sent off' into Syria, the first under Yazld ibn Abl Sufyan, a brother
of the subsequent Caliph Mu'awiya, the second under Shurahbll ibn
Hasana, the third under 'Amr ibn al-'As. The first two bodies of
troops, probably co-operating most of the time, took the direct track via
Tabuk-Ma'an; 'Amr marched along the coast via Aila ('Akaba); other
smaller companies followed later and pushed forward from the South into
the country east of the Jordan. The first to get engaged in battle was
Yazld. Approaching from westward he ascended the hills surmounting
the WadI 'Araba, the great valley south of the Dead Sea, and surprised
several thousands of Byzantine troops under the Patricius of Caesarea,
named Sergius. These were routed and compelled to retire on Gaza;
before reaching this town however they were overtaken (4 Feb. 634) by
the Arabs and annihilated, Sergius also losing his life. After this
success Yazld again retired beyond the protecting Dead Sea. Shortly


## p. 341 (#373) ############################################

634] Battle of Ajnadain 341
afterwards 'Amr put in an appearance, coming from Aila with fresh
troops, which had been further strengthened on the way by recruits. They
raided the whole of southern Palestine as far as Gaza, and 'Amr in fact
on one occasion pushed forward into the district of Kaisarlya (Caesarea).
Upon hearing of these surprising events the Emperor Heraclius who
at that time was still dwelling at Emesa, in northern Syria, concen-
trated a great army to the south of Damascus, and placed it under the
command of his brother Theodorus. It was unusually difficult for the
Greeks to recognise any plan of attack on the part of the Arabs; these
simply advanced without any definite aim; the leader of each detach-
ment went whithersoever he listed, and whither he conceived the greatest
amount of booty was available. Possibly the troops of Theodorus may
have destroyed a small detachment of the Arabs in the country east of
the Jordan, but in any case they advanced very slowly in a southerly
direction, where the greatest danger threatened, for Jerusalem was
temporarily cut off from the sea, and even Caesarea and Gaza were
threatened. Immediately after this advance Khalid, approaching in
their rear from the Euphrates, suddenly appeared before Damascus
(24 April 634). He remained unmolested, because all available troops
were then on the way to the South. Clever strategist that he was, and
without the selfish greed for plunder of the other leaders, Khalid at once
recognised the precarious position of the Arabs in the southern part
of Palestine. Advancing down the country east of Jordan he succeeded,
probably with the utmost difficulty, in effecting a junction with the
detachments in the South, engaged in their own selfish interests. Finally,
in the WadI 'Araba, he united with 'Amr and Yazid, who were retiring
before the approaching Byzantines. This effected, the combined forces
of the Muslims once more advanced against Theodorus, who had occupied
a strong position at Ajnadain, or better Jannabatain, between Jeru-
salem and Gaza. On 30 July 634 a bloody battle ensued, terminating
in a brilliant victory for the Arabs. Who commanded the Arabs, or
whether in fact they had any commander-in-chief, remains a matter of
doubt, but it is probably not wide of the mark to recognise the actual
victor in Khalid. Hereupon all Palestine lay open to the Arabs, i. e. , all
the flat country; the well-fortified towns, even though without large
garrisons, held out for a considerable time longer. The Arabs, who still
regarded themselves as being out on a plundering expedition, probably
spared the resident population less than they did later, when the
systematic occupation took place. Report states that Gaza also fell at this
time, but this simply means that Gaza was laid under contribution in
the same way that Hira had been before. The Patriarch Sophronius of
Jerusalem, in his Christmas sermon at the end of the year 634, describes
in moving terms the doleful condition of the country. Anarchy appears
to have ruled supreme. The Arabs dispersed themselves throughout the
country, and even pushed forward far towards the North; the temporary


## p. 342 (#374) ############################################

342 No longer Raids but Conquest [634—635
appearance of the Arabs before Emesa in January 635 is credibly
authenticated by a Syrian source.
During the six months following the battle of Ajnadain the tone of
public opinion must have undergone a considerable change. Men of the
rank of Khalid and 'Amr could not but perceive that they could not go
on with such planless raids; a systematic occupation of the country
appeared urgent. In addition to this the Caliph Abu Bakr died soon
after the battle of Ajnadain (634) and the energetic far-seeing Omar
had been nominated by him as his successor and recognised on all sides
without question. This new view was further supported both at the
front and at head-quarters by the continued pressing forward of the Arab
element from the south of the peninsula; after the termination of the
Ridda wars these people, incited by the unparalleled successes of the
- Medina people, also marched to Syria. These new arrivals did not
yiowever arrive in the form of organised troops, but advanced in tribes,
bringing their wives and children with them and hoping to find in the
; new land fertile residential areas. This process is very difficult to record
in detail, and doubtless extended over several years. It was only after
the battle of the Yarmuk that the Arabs really began seriously to take
in hand the administration of the country. But within six months of
the battle of Ajnadain there began a much more systematic progress of
the Arabs, who were now clearly placed under the supreme command of
Khalid. The last troops of Heraclius had now withdrawn to Damascus,
the defeated Theodorus had been recalled to Constantinople and the
conduct of further operations lay in the hands of Baanes, who con-
centrated his troops in the beginning of 635 at Fihl, a strategically
important position situated south of the Sea of Gennesareth and covering
the crossing of the Jordan and the route to Damascus. By cutting
dykes he endeavoured to prevent the advance of the Arabs. Impressed
however probably by their slowly changing conception of the task before
them and led by Khalid, the Muslims forced the position at Fihl (23 Jan.
635) and immediately afterwards took possession of Baisan (Bethshan).
They then pushed forward determinedly towards Damascus. Baanes again
opposed their advance at Marj as-Suffar (25 Feb. 635) but was defeated
and two weeks later the Muslims were before the gates of Damascus.
The Arabs were not in a position properly to lay siege to the town,
for they were quite ignorant of this kind of warfare. They were
compelled therefore to endeavour to isolate the town, and so to exasperate
the residents as to cause them to compel the garrison to surrender.
It was however not until the early autumn (Aug. —Sept. ) that the town
capitulated, after Heraclius had endeavoured in vain on several occasions
to relieve it; in one of the abortive attempts he had however inflicted on
the Arabs a rather serious reverse. The capitulation ensued at last
palpably through the treachery of the civil authorities, assisted by the
Bishop and the tax-collector. After the fall of Damascus the Arabs


## p. 343 (#375) ############################################

635-636] Battle of the Yarmuk 343
proceeded to the pacification of the conquered country, without giving
further heed to the Byzantines, from whom they did not consider they
had anything more to fear. The various leaders operated in Palestine
and the country east of the Jordan; Khalid himself pressed forward once
more against Emesa, and occupied this place at the close of the year 635.
A number of smaller towns hereupon opened their gates to the con-
querors whilst the larger fortresses such as Jerusalem, Caesarea and the
coastal towns, still held out in hope of rescue by Heraclius.
Heraclius certainly as yet had no intention of giving up the country
to the Arabs. He shewed a feverish activity in Antioch and Edessa.
Together with the customary Byzantine mercenaries, Armenians and
Arabs formed the main body of his new army, which he placed under the
command of Theodorus Trithurius, and in which Baanes had the control
of an independent division. The relief of Damascus not having been
effected, Heraclius permitted the winter months to pass, intending
when he was so much the better prepared to take the offensive and
strike a crushing blow against the Arabs. In the spring of 636 this new
army unexpectedly approached Emesa, where Khalid was on outpost
duty. He at once recognised his dangerous position. Hitherto the
Arabs had always fought against an inferior Byzantine force, but now
they were suddenly opposed by a powerful army which, even after
making all allowance for Arab exaggeration, must have amounted
to some 50,000 men. Khalid immediately relinquished not only Emesa
but even Damascus and caused all the Arab fighting forces to be concen-
trated at a point between the northern and southern positions of the
Arabs in the country east of the Jordan, to the south-east of the deep
Yarmuk valley, and to the north of what is now known as Der'at, a point
admirably adapted to his purpose. Here the Arabs were in the most
fertile part of Syria, where the most important highways crossed leading
to the southern portion of the country east of the Jordan and to Central
Palestine; they were moreover protected in the rear by the deeply
hollowed valleys of the Yarmuk tributaries. Should they be defeated
here a retreat was under all circumstances secured either into the desert or
to Medina. The hurried retirement of the Arabs to this district proves
how critical affairs appeared to them: against the huge advancing army of
the enemy, they could only oppose about 25,000, scarcely half the number.
The Roman army did not approach by way of Damascus but
through Coelesyria and across the Jordan, and probably took up
their position near Jillln, the Jillik of the sources. The two armies
must have remained confronting each other for a considerable period;
the Arabs were waiting for reinforcements, whilst the Byzantine
army was hampered by the petty jealousies of its leaders and by
insubordination in the ranks. Several battles were fought in which
Theodorus appears to have been at the outset defeated and Baanes was
then proclaimed emperor by the troops. The Arabian auxiliaries


## p. 344 (#376) ############################################

V
344 Abu 'Ubaida as Commander-in-chief [636-646
deserted, and under all these circumstances the Arabs had no longer
cause to fear the numerical superiority of their opponents. They
appear to have outflanked the Byzantines from the eastern side, cut
their line of communication with Damascus, and by occupying the
bridge over the Wadi-r-Rukkad frustrated also their chances of retreat
to the westward. Finally they forced them into the angle between the
Yarmuk and the Wadi-r-Rukkad. Those who were not killed here
plunged down into the steep and deeply cut beds of the rivers, and
those of the latter who had finally managed to escape across the rivers to
Jakutha were annihilated by the Arabs on the other side, as, by occu-
pying the bridge, they were enabled with ease to cross the Wadi-r-Rukkad.
The decisive stroke in these fights, extending over months, happened on
20 Aug. 636. With this terrible defeat of the Byzantines on the Yarmuk
the fate of Syria was permanently decided. The last troops of Heraclius,
collected with much trouble, had been thus completely destroyed, and
the immediate advance of the Arabs on Damascus rendered impossible
every attempt to collect others. Thus Damascus was occupied a second
time by the Arabs in the autumn of the same year, and this time finally*.
The government of Medina had, as we have already seen, attempted
for about the space of a year to introduce a systematic occupation of the
country in place of the former planless raids. This policy made it
necessary that the army of occupation should have a supreme com-
mandant, who should at the same time act as vicegerent of the Caliph.
At the outset Khalid, who on account of his qualities had acquired the
senior rank, was confirmed in this position, but in the brilliant general
there was entirely wanting the diplomatic art of a pacificator attaining
his ends by statesmanlike compromises. For this position one of the
foremost men of the theocracy was required, an absolute confidant of the
Caliph. Omar selected Abu 'Ubaida, one of the oldest and most esteemed
of his companions, of whom we know that, for instance at the death of
the prophet, he had played an important part. His task in face of the
autocratic army-leaders was a difficult one; he arrived in Syria just
before the battle of the Yarmuk, but was prudent enough to leave at
this critical stage the supreme command for this battle to Khalid, who
was so minutely acquainted with the conditions. Thereupon however
he himself intervened, distributed the various military commandants
throughout the entire land, and then personally advanced, in company
with Khalid, towards the North. Baalbek, Emesa, Aleppo, Antioch and
the Arabian tribes residing in the north of Syria, put no difficulties in
the way of the conquest. The town of Kinnasrin (Kalchis) alone was
less easily dealt with. From northern Syria 'Iyad ibn Ghanm was then
subsequently detached to the East, and he subjected Mesopotamia
(639-646) without meeting with much opposition. To the North, how-
ever, the Amanus formed for centuries the more or less constant
boundary of the Caliph's dominions.


## p. 345 (#377) ############################################

636-640] Capitulation of Jerusalem 345
In the meantime, i. e. , in the course of the years 636 and 637,
Shurahbil and Yazld had finally occupied the remainder of the interior,
and most of the towns on the coast. 'Amr was less fortunate, and
invested Jerusalem in vain. The stubborn Caesarea also remained for a
time closed to the Arabs. It is no matter of chance that just these
two strongly Hellenised towns should have held out. Their resistance
gives us a clue to explain the rapid successes of the Arabs. The
military power of the Emperor was certainly broken, and he lacked both
men and money; but it was of much greater moment that everywhere in
Syria, where Semites dwelt, the Byzantine rule was so deeply hated that
the Arabs were welcomed as deliverers, as soon as there was no need
further to fear Heraclius. To cover his enormous debts Heraclius had
been compelled to put on the fiscal screw to its utmost tension. In
addition to this domestic pressure there was added that of religion; the
church policy of Heraclius, the introduction of the Monotheletic
Irenicon, became a persecution of Monophysites and Jews. In addition
to this religious division there was now further the natural reaction
of the Semitic element against the foreign rule of the Greeks. In
the Muslims on the other hand the numerous Christian Arab tribes,
and even the Aramaeans too, welcomed blood relations; the tribute
moreover demanded by the Arabs was not heavy, and finally the Arabs
permitted complete religious freedom; in fact, for political reasons, they
rather encouraged heterodox tendencies. Thus, after the Arabs had
vanquished the tyrants, the land fell peacefully into their own possession.
The resistance of Jerusalem and Caesarea affords the test of this theory,
for both of these towns were entirely Hellenic and orthodox. Even
these towns however were unable to maintain their position for any
length of time, and Jerusalem capitulated as early as 638; Caesarea
did not fall until October 640 into the hands of Mu'awiya, and then only
through treachery.
Even before the fall of Jerusalem the Caliph Omar had paid a visit
to Syria. His appearance there was the result of the policy of
occupation followed by Medina. The head-quarters of the Muslim army
was at that time still at Jabiya, a little to the north of the Yarmuk
battle-field. To this spot Omar summoned all his military commanders,
presumably to support Abu 'Ubaida in his difficult task with the
authority of the Caliph. Apart from this however it was desired to lay
down uniform principles for the treatment of the subjected peoples, i. e. ,
to define the difficult problem which we of modern times call native
policy. Further, the disposition of the money coming in and the whole
administration needed an initial regulation, or rather sanction. Later
tradition considers Omar the founder of the theoretical system of the
ideal Muslim State, but incorrectly so, as will be shewn later. At
the same time an initial regulation then certainly took place. On the
termination of his work of reorganisation Omar visited Jerusalem,


## p. 346 (#378) ############################################

346 First battles against Persia [635-639
proceeding thence on his return journey to Medina. Abu 'Ubaida
remained in the country as Omar's representative, but was not destined
to remain in office much longer, for in the year 639, when many
thousands from the ranks of the victors succumbed to a fearful epidemic
of plague, Abu 'Ubaida was also carried off by it, as was also his successor
in office, Yazld, a short time later. Yazld's brother, Mu'awiya ibn Abl
Sufyan, was then nominated to the succession by Omar, and in him the
man appears at the head of Syria who was destined later in his own
person to transfer the Caliphate to Damascus, a development which in
its slow preparation is as clear as noonday.
m / The whole course of the Muslim expeditions in 'Irak shews that the
*\J policy of the Caliphs was entirely determined by consideration for Syria.
After the unfortunate battle of the Bridge not only the government but
also the tribes were still more cautious towards 'Irak expeditions. It
was only the eager efforts of Muthanna, of the Bakr tribe, that finally
succeeded in gaining the sanction of the Caliph to a new raid, and
then only after the first conquest of Damascus. But there was a dearth
of warriors; none cared much to proceed to 'Irak, and it was only
on the grant of special privileges that a few Yamanites consented
to prepare for the march. In the meantime the Persians, who for over
a year had not followed up their advantage in the battle of the Bridge,
had crossed the Euphrates under Mihran; but Muthanna, with his
auxiliaries from Medina, succeeded in defeating them at Buwaib (Oct. or
Nov. 635). With his weak forces he could not however think of following
up this small victory, and Omar at that time required all available
troops for Syria, where the great army of Heraclius was advancing
towards the battle of the Yarmuk. It was not until after this latter
decisive victory that the Caliph paid greater attention to the 'Irak.
Here also the first thing to be done was the despatch of a general
representative, or vicegerent, for which position Sa'd ibn Abl Wakkas
was selected. To get the necessary troops however for an energetic
attack was still attended with great difficulty. Sa'd took the whole of
the winter 636-637 to assemble a few thousand men around him. Of
the Arabian hordes, incited by religious enthusiasm, according to the
customary European traditions, we can find but little trace.
In the meantime the Persians, alarmed by their own defeat at Buwaib,
and still more by the terrible collapse of the Byzantine rule in Syria,
decided to take energetic steps against the Arabs. The administrator
of the kingdom, Rustam, assumed the command personally, and crossed
the Euphrates. On the borders of the cultivated land, at Kadisiya, Sa'd
and Rustam stood for a long time facing each other. Of the size of their
respective armies we know nothing positive; the Arabs were certainly
not more than 5—6000 strong, including Christians and heathens, and
the numerical superiority of the Persians cannot have been considerable.
More by chance than from any tactical initiative the two armies became


## p. 347 (#379) ############################################

637-641] Fall of Ctesiphon 347
engaged in combat, and in one day tl-e Persian army was routed, and its
leaders slain (May—June 637). \
And now the fertile black land (Sawad) of 'Irak lay open to the
Arabs. Conditions exactly similar to those in Syria caused the Aramaic
peasants to greet the Arabs as deliverers. Without meeting with any
noteworthy opposition the Saracens pushed on as far as the Tigris,
whither they were attracted by the rich treasures of the Persian capital
Ctesiphon, or as the Arabs called it the "city-complex" or Madtfin.
The right bank of the Tigris was abandoned and the floating bridges
broken up. A ford having been disclosed to the Arabs the residue
of the garrison followed in the wake of Yezdegerd and his court,
who immediately after the battle had sought the protection of the
Iranian mountains. The city opened its gates and fabulous booty fell
into the hands of the Arabs. After a few weeks of quiet and no doubt
somewhat barbaric enjoyment, they had again to make one more stand
on the fringe of the mountains at Jalula; this also ended victoriously
for them, and with that the whole of 'Irak was thus in their hands.
Here also it was no matter of chance that the expansion of the
Arabs first came to a standstill at the mountains, where the line was
drawn between the Semitic and the Aryan elements of the population.
Only the province of Khuzistan, the ancient Elam, caused some trouble
still. Hither the Arabs appear to have proceeded from the south of the
marsh district, when the insignificant raids of the boundary tribes there,
encouraged by Medina, assumed after the battle of Kadisiya a more
serious character, starting from the newly founded base at Basra. The
chief seat of government was not placed at Ctesiphon, but, by express
command of the Caliph, at Kfifa (near Hlra): and this was developed
into a great Arabian military camp, intended to form the main citadel
of Muslim Arabianism as against foreign Persian culture. Later the
ancient Basra attained an independent position alongside of Kufa. The
rivalry of the two places sets its impress both on the politics and on the
intellectual life of the following century.
It was not until after these stupendous victories of Yarmuk and
Kadisiya that the great Arabian migrations assumed their full develop-
ment, for now even those tribes who were but little disposed to Islam
were compelled to wander forth in order to seek their happiness in those
cultivated lands which as rumour told them were only to be compared
with Paradise itself. Now it was that the momentous change took place
to which reference has been made at the outset; now it was that Islam
no longer represented dependence on Medina, as it did in the time of
Mahomet and Abu Bakr, but from this time forward it represented
the ideal of the common universal empire of the Arabs. And at this
stage the further expeditions became systematic conquests, in which
usually whole tribes participated. A first step in this direction was to
round off the empire, combining the Syrian and 'Irak provinces by
OH. XI.


## p. 348 (#380) ############################################

348 Conquest of Persia [641-652
the conquest of Mesopotamia. Tfhe expedition, begun from Syria as
a starting-point, was completed ,rom 'Irak by the capture of Mausil
(Mosul) (641). ,;
A systematic conquest of this description was especially called for in
regard to 'Irak; for this province could not be regarded as secure as
long as its recovery might be attempted. And at this juncture a strong
reaction against the Arabs actually set in. The opposition which the
Basris in Khuzistan met with, and which only ceased on the conquest of
Tustar (641), was probably in connexion with the activity of the fleeing
Yezdegerd and his followers, who summoned the whole of the Iranians
to battle against the Arabs. The Basris and troops from Kufa had
already co-operated systematically in Khuzistan, and similar tactics
followed now on Persian soil, where the decisive battle was fought in the
year 641 at Nihawand in the neighbourhood of the ancient Ekbatana.
The Arabs gained a great victory; the dense garland of praise which
legendary lore has woven around it shews how much depended for the
Muslims on this victory. But even after this victory the Arabs were
not yet masters of the great Median towns, as Hamadhan, Rayy and
Ispahan; these were but slowly conquered during the next few years.
Here in fact, where they were not greeted as deliverers by kindred
Semites, the Arabs had to withstand a stubborn national opposition.
Yezdegerd himself certainly caused them no difficulties; after the battle
of Nihawand he had fled further and further away and had finally gone
from Istakhr to Marw in Khorasan. His satrap there was too narrow-
minded to support his fallen superior, and in fact he treated him as an
enemy, and in 651-652 the deserted and unfortunate potentate appears
to have been assassinated.
The Arabs did not reach Khorasan until the province of Fars, the
actual Persia, was conquered. Fare could be reached most conveniently
from the Persian Gulf. This expedition had therefore been undertaken,
with Bahrain as starting-point, soon after the battle of Kadislya. This
made the third base of attack, together with Ctesiphon (Kufa) and
Basra, from which the Arabs pushed forward into Iran. Later on the
conduct of this expedition passed into the hands of the troops coming
from Basra. But also in Fare the same stubborn resistance was met
with, which was not broken till after the conquest of Istakhr in the year
649-650 by 'Abdallah ibn 'Amir. Following this up 'Abdallah, especially
assisted by the Tamlm and Bakr tribes, began in the following year an
advance, the first successful one, towards Khorasan. This first and
incomplete conquest of Persia took therefore more than ten years,
whilst Syria and 'Irak fell in an astonishingly short time into the hands
of the Arabs. In Persia Arabianism has never become national, and,
"whilst a few centuries later the other countries spoke the Arabian tongue,
the Persian vernacular and the national traditions were still maintained
in Persia. The religion of Islam moreover underwent later in Persia a


## p. 349 (#381) ############################################

631-640] Egypt before the Conquest 349
development completely differing from the orthodox Islam. Even
to-day Persia is the land of the Shi'a.
By reason of the great conquests in Syria and 'Irak the capital,
Medina, was no longer the centre of the new empire. Byzantine Egypt
lay close by, and from Egypt a reconquest of Syria, even an attack on
Medina itself might be regarded as by no means impossible. Besides
Alexandria the town of Klysma (Kulzum, Suez) appears to have been a
strong naval port. Probably all Egypt was then an important base for
the fleet of the Byzantines and one of their principal dockyards; for the
Arabians of the earlier times it decidedly became such, and it appears not
improbable that their conquest of Egypt was connected with the recog-
nition that only the possession of a fleet would ensure the lasting
retention of the new acquisitions, the Syrian coast towns, for instance.
After the fruitless efforts to take Caesarea this recognition was a matter
of course. Apart from this Egypt, a land rich in corn, must have been
a more desirable land for the central government than the distant 'Irak
or Mesopotamia, for we find that soon after the conquest the growing
needs of Medina were supplied by regular imports of corn from Egypt.
It is therefore without doubt a non-historical conception, when an
Arabian source represents Egypt as having been conquered against the
wishes of the Caliph. The conquest of Egypt falls in a period during
which the occupation of new territories was carried out systematically,
instead of by the former more or less casual raids.
How much this undertaking was helped by the conditions in Egypt
at the time was probably scarcely imagined in the Muslim camp. After
the victories of Heraclius a strong Byzantine reaction had followed the
Persian rule, which had lasted about ten years. Heraclius needed money,
as we have already seen, and further, he hoped by means of a formula
of union to put an end to the perpetual sectarian discord between the
Monophysites and their opponents, and thereby to give to the reunited
kingdom one sole church. But the parties were already too strongly
embittered one against the other, and the religious division had already
been connected so closely with the political that the Irenicon remained
without effect. The Monophysite Egyptians probably never understood
the proposed Monothelete compromise at all, and always thought that it
was desired to force the hated Chalcedonian belief on them. It was
certainly no apostle of peace who brought the Irenicon to the Egyptians,
but a grand-inquisitor of the worst type. Soon after the re-occupation
of Egypt Heraclius, in the autumn of 631, sent Cyrus, the former bishop
of Phasis in the Caucasus, to Alexandria as Patriarch, and at the
same time as head of the entire civil administration. In a struggle
extending over ten years this man sought by the severest means to
convert the Coptic Church to the Irenicon; the Coptic form of worship
was forbidden, and its priests and organisations were cruelly persecuted.