Whether I have succeeded in what I
professed
to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges.
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
IV.
-- The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
47 S
by
Speculative
? ? ? CONTENT*.
CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
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The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
? ? ? ? rviii
PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine nn introduced the reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organised them selves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small ; atid thus they could not entirely put a slop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that, --although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims, --as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into t he antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, un avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the
? We very often hear complaints of the shallowneu of the present age.
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITIOJT. xii
age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory ' knowledge. It in fact, call to reason, again tc undertake the most laborious of all tasks --that of self-examination, and to establish tribunal, which may secure in its well-grounde claims, while pronounces against all baseless assumption* and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal nothing less than the Critical Jnreetiyation of Pure Reason.
do not mean this criticism of books and systems, but critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to
the cognitions to which strives to attain without the aid experience in other words, the solution of the question re garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. -- --
This path the only one now remaining has been entered upon me and flatter myself that have, in this way, dis covered the cause of -- and consequently the mode of removing --all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind have, on the contrary, examined them completely
the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. true, these ques tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies
and of the decay of profound science. Bat do not think that those which rest upon secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, 4c. , in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of pro found habit of thought. Our age the age of criticism, to which every thing must he subjected. The sacrednesa of religion, and the authority of legislation, are many regarded as grounds of exemption froni the examination of this tribunal. But, they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the . <<t of free and public examination.
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and desires, Lad expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers ; and it was the d<<ty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those
? to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi ciency in the case of the others.
While say this, think see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced the commonest author of the commonest philo sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of primal being. Such dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience while
humbly confess that this completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, confine myself to the exami
nation of reason alone and its pure thought and do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because has its seat my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason and my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.
-'""So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary the execution of the present task. The aims set before ua
are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The above remarks relate to the mattur of our critical in-
questions
As regards the form, there are two indispensable con- itioni, which any one who undertakes sc difficult task as
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that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in
this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypo thesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary ; much more is this the case with an at tempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the standard --and consequently an example --of all npodeictic (philosophical) certitude.
Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may be come the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise pro duce, -- he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not con cern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgment of the work as a
whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.
I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight
into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ; and they have also cost me by far the greatest labour--labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides. The one re lates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective
validity of its a priori conceptions ; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition -- that is, from a subjective point of view ; and, al
though this exposition is of great importance, it does not be long essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the
? ? ? ? zxh PREFACE TO THE TIRST EJ)1T10S.
grand question what and how much can reason and under standing, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how the faculty of thought itself possible As the latter an inquiry
into the cause of given effect, and has thus in some sem blance of an hypothesis (although, as shall show on another occasion, this really not the fact), would seem that, in the present instance, had allowed myself to enounce mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold
different opinion. But beg to remind him, that, my sub jective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work properly concerned, in every
respect satisfactory.
As regards clearness, the reader has right to demand,
the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or esthetic clear ness, means of intuitions, that is, examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. have done what could for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose and thus became the accidental cause of my in ability to do complete justice to the second requirement.
have been almost always at loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems with which should be engaged and, as
perceived that this critical investigation would, even de livered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, found uuadvisable to enlarge still more with examples and
explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. was induced to take this course from the consider ation also, that the present work not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, aud that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abb6 Ter-
rasson remarks with great justice, that we estimate the siie of work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of may be said of many book -- that would be much shorter,
wre ho! si short. On the other bund, as regards the com
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? PREFACE TO THE FMST EDITION. XXtH
prehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice -- many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been in tended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples,
and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole ; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and em bellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its arti culation or organization, --which is the most important con sideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.
The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co
operate with the present author, if he has formed the intention
of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him. Meta physics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion -- and with little labour, if it is united, in a ihort time ; so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically.
For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. No thing can escape our notice ; for what reason produces from iUelf cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by re-aon itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this com
pleteness not only practicable, but also necessary. Tecum habits, et noris quam sit tibi curta snpellex. ?
Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature. ^ The content of this work, (which will not be half so long,) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique, which
' Perrius.
t In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethical This work >>ai ? ever published. See page 509. -- IV.
? ? ? ? XXIV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITTOW.
has to discover the sources of this cognition mil expose th<< conditions of its possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a judge ; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a co- labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually discovered ; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the pro posed work, the same should be the case with their analysis But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. -- (1787. )
Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge
which lies within the province of pure reason, advances with
that undeviating certainty which characterises the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those
who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow ; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invari ably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and com pelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress, and may rather be snid to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circum stances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results, --even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.
That Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological
? ? ? ? P UE FACE TO THE 9F. COTTD ED1TI3K. XXV
discussions on the mental faculties, such ns imagination nnd wit, metaphysical discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the objects (Idealism, Scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies : this at tempt, on the part of these authors, only shews their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlanre, but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respecti\e limits, and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear defini tion ; it is a science which has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of theformal laws of all thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties -- natural or accidental -- which it encounters in the human mind.
The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It
much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself. Hence, logic properly only a propedeutic -- forms, asit were, the vestibule ot the sciences and while necessary to enable us to form correct judgment with regard to the various branches of know ledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge to be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that
the objective sciences.
Now these sciences, they can be termed rational at all, must contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cogni tion may stand in two-fold relation to its object. Either may have to determine the conception of the object --which must be supplied extraneously, or may have to establish its reality. The former theoretical, the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished from that which supplied from other sources. Any other method can only lead to irremediable confusion.
Mathematics and Physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects a priori. The former purely priori, the latter partially so, but also de
pendent on other sources of cognition.
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? XXVI PBEfACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
In the earliest times of which history affords us any record, mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have remained long -- chiefly among the Egyptians--in the stage of blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionised by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual revolution--much more important in its results than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope -- and of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming tne supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration --ele ments which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not even require to be proved -- makes it apparent that the change in troduced by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that nge, and it has thus been secured against the chance of ob livion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of as existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the know ledge of its properties, but that was necessary to produce these properties, as were, positive a priori construction and that, in order to arrive with certainty at priori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had him self, in accordance with his conception, placed in the object.
? much longer period elapsed before Physics entered on the highway of science. For only about a century ami a- half since the wise Bacon gave new direction to physical studies, or rather --as others were already on the right track -- in'parted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find evidence
rapid intellectual revolution. --In the remarks which follow shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science.
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? PBEIACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXVtt
When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane, when ToBRiOELLr caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water, or when Stahl, at a later period, converted metals into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and subtraction of certaiu elements ;* a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it pro duces after its own design ; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgment according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply to its questions. For accidental observations, made ac cording to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles, that it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from not, however, in the character of pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress.
We come now to metaphysics, purely speculative science, which occupies completely isolated position, and entirely independent of the teachings of experience. deals with mere conceptions --not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition --and in reason the pupil of itself alone. the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all- destroying barbarism. But has not yet had the good for tune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be ap parent, we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset.
We find that reason perpetually comes to stand, when attempts to gain a priori the perception even of those lav
do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental awtbod, of which, i"leed, the first c[n are iinuKed in some obscurity.
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which the most common experience confirms. We find i< compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being alilc to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests -- a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, ia which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.
This leads us to enquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is impossible to discover it ? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after
as were one of our weightiest concerns Nay, more, how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason,
abandons us in matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the truth -- and not only so, but even allures us
to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the end Or, the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications
do we possess to guide us in renewed investigation, and to
enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot
of our predecessors
appears to me that the examples of mathematics and
natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by sudden revolution, are suffi ciently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circum stances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. has hitherto been as sumed that our cognition must conform to the objects but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to ac cord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in viewi that to say, of arriving at the cognKiou ot
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objects a }inon, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to os. We here propose to do just what Cofernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now ns I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but--if they are to be come cognitions -- must refer them, ns representations, to some thing, as object, and must determine the latter by means of t lie former, here again there are two courses open to me.
Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to the object --and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before ; or secondly,
I inny assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects, they are cog nized, conform to my conceptions --and then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a modt of cognition which requires understanding. Before objects are given to me, that a priori, must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experi ence must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given
experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which based on the principle that we only cognize in things priori that which we ourselves place 111 them. *
This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural ohilosopher, conniats in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admin of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the proposition! of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limit* of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their nbjectt, as in natural science Hence, with regard to those conctptvtm
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This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and pro* muses to metaphysics, in its first part -- that where occupied with conceptions priori, of which the correspond ing objects may be given in experience --the certain course of science. For this new method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of priori cognition, and, what more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie prion at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of ex perience --neither of which was possible according to the pro cedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of priori cognition in the first part of Metaphysics, we derive surprising result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against the great end of Metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition unable to transcend the limits of pos sible experience and yet this precisely the most essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational cognition
priori at which we arrive that has only to do with phse- nomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing real existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phsenomena, the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to com plete the series of conditions. Now, appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears we
and prinripiet which we assume priori, our only course will lie to view them fium two different sides. We must regard one and the same con ception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from single point of view, reason involved seif-contrjdiction, then the experiment will esuMi>li it. e correctness of this distinction
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? niEFACE TO THB SECOND EDITION.
XXD
iliall then be convinced of the truth of that which we bcgnr.
by assuming for the sake of experiment ; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in thing* ns we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things hs they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition. *
But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative
reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensi ble, it still remains for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition, which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a practical
point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphy sics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such an extension of our knowledge ; and, if it must leave this space vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can, by means of practical data--nay, it even challenges us to make the attempt. f
This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the pro cedure of metaphysics, after the example of the Geometri cians and Natural Philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the
* This experiment of pure reason hu a great similarity to tbat of tlie Chemtitt, which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more usualh , the synthetic process. The analyiu of the metaphysician separates pure cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements, viz. , the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with the necessary rational idea of the uncon ditioned, and finds that this harmony never results except through the above distinction, which therefore, concluded to be just.
So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies es tablished the truth of that which Copernicus, at first, assumed only as hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible force
Newtonian attraction) which holds tbe universe together. The latter would have remained for ever undiscovered, Copernicus had not ven tured on the experiment -- contrary to the senses, but still just-- of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spec tator. In tbia Preface treat the new metaphysical method as hypothesis with the vvw of rendering apparent the first attempts at such change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique itself will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature our representations of space and time, and from the elementary concep tions of the understanding.
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external boundaries and the internal structure of this Science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enu meration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be at tributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organised body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it at the same time, viewed in relation to the totnl nse of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage --an advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do with objects--that, once con ducted into the sure path of science, by means of this criti cism, can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave for the use of posterity, as capital which can never receive fresh acces sions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as determined these principles. To this perfection therefore, bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to the maxim may
justly be applied --
Nii actum reputans, quid anperestct agendum.
But, will be asked, what kind of treasure this that we propose to bequeath to posterity What the real value of this system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to permanent condition cursory view of the present work will lead to the supposition that its use merely negative, that only serves to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits of experience. This
in fact, its primary use. But this, at once, assumes positive value, when we observe that the principles with which specu lative reason endeavours to transcend its limits, lead inevitably, not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sen sibility, which their proper sphere, over the entire realm M
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CHAP. n. --The Canon of Pure Reason 482 Sect. I. --Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason 483 Sect. II. --Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure
-- Reason 487 Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 498
CHAP. III. --The Architectonic of Pure Reason 503 CHAP. IV. --Tub History of Pure Reason 616
? ? ? ? TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Kritik der reinen Vermmft intelligible to the English student.
The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of
Verba pravisam rem non invita sequentur,
will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve
? ? ? ? tkanslatob' a freface.
years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcmigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso phy, and to enounce ideas th. -. t were entirely to revolutionise European thought . On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought ; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.
A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.
? Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, -- it has been his lot to be either
hended, or entirely neglected. Duguld Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy -- as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Kitsch* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"
? A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1706.
Willich's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, Svo. 1708.
unappreciated, misappre
? ? ? TBANSLATOTl'B PREPACK.
xiU
him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : -- a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics. " All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapahle of understanding him. *
The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise as he had
perceived to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading that hardly one-fifth of the original
? MS. remained. therefore,
laid entirely aside, and com menced df novo. These eighty pages did not cancel, be
cause the careful examination
made them, as believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.
It curiam to observe, in all the English works written spe cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators "Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of Beck's Principle* of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator** Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated bis Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The snne
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises,"
London, 1798. ) This person has written preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there at his own few being then able to detect the plagiarism.
which they had undergone,
the vols. 8vo.
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The second edition of the Kritik, from which all tha sub sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlbrvnbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, " in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work. " I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,--
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455-- 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the"outcry of preju diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.
No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. -- Rosenkranz hu
* Of the preient translation.
? ? ? ? preface.
suae a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.
It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im possible to translate the Eritik with the aid of the philoso phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim -- parch detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for dot Mannig- faltige der Amchauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.
Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics --whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, --the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.
J. M. D. M.
translator's
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TI0N. -O781. )
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, aa they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphyric.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now. it is the fashion of the time to heap con tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,
" Modo maxima rerura, Tot generis, natisque poteni . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inopa. "*
At first, her government, under the administration of the
? Ovid, Metamorphoses.
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PREFAOK TO TM FtRST EDITION.
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine nn introduced the reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organised them selves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small ; atid thus they could not entirely put a slop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that, --although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims, --as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into t he antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, un avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the
? We very often hear complaints of the shallowneu of the present age.
? ? ? ? PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITIOJT. xii
age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory ' knowledge. It in fact, call to reason, again tc undertake the most laborious of all tasks --that of self-examination, and to establish tribunal, which may secure in its well-grounde claims, while pronounces against all baseless assumption* and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal nothing less than the Critical Jnreetiyation of Pure Reason.
do not mean this criticism of books and systems, but critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to
the cognitions to which strives to attain without the aid experience in other words, the solution of the question re garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. -- --
This path the only one now remaining has been entered upon me and flatter myself that have, in this way, dis covered the cause of -- and consequently the mode of removing --all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind have, on the contrary, examined them completely
the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. true, these ques tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies
and of the decay of profound science. Bat do not think that those which rest upon secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, 4c. , in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of pro found habit of thought. Our age the age of criticism, to which every thing must he subjected. The sacrednesa of religion, and the authority of legislation, are many regarded as grounds of exemption froni the examination of this tribunal. But, they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the . <<t of free and public examination.
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and desires, Lad expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers ; and it was the d<<ty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those
? to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi ciency in the case of the others.
While say this, think see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced the commonest author of the commonest philo sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of primal being. Such dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience while
humbly confess that this completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, confine myself to the exami
nation of reason alone and its pure thought and do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because has its seat my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason and my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.
-'""So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary the execution of the present task. The aims set before ua
are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The above remarks relate to the mattur of our critical in-
questions
As regards the form, there are two indispensable con- itioni, which any one who undertakes sc difficult task as
airy.
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that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in
this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypo thesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary ; much more is this the case with an at tempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the standard --and consequently an example --of all npodeictic (philosophical) certitude.
Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may be come the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise pro duce, -- he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not con cern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgment of the work as a
whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.
I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight
into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ; and they have also cost me by far the greatest labour--labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides. The one re lates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective
validity of its a priori conceptions ; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition -- that is, from a subjective point of view ; and, al
though this exposition is of great importance, it does not be long essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the
? ? ? ? zxh PREFACE TO THE TIRST EJ)1T10S.
grand question what and how much can reason and under standing, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how the faculty of thought itself possible As the latter an inquiry
into the cause of given effect, and has thus in some sem blance of an hypothesis (although, as shall show on another occasion, this really not the fact), would seem that, in the present instance, had allowed myself to enounce mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold
different opinion. But beg to remind him, that, my sub jective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work properly concerned, in every
respect satisfactory.
As regards clearness, the reader has right to demand,
the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or esthetic clear ness, means of intuitions, that is, examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. have done what could for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose and thus became the accidental cause of my in ability to do complete justice to the second requirement.
have been almost always at loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems with which should be engaged and, as
perceived that this critical investigation would, even de livered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, found uuadvisable to enlarge still more with examples and
explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. was induced to take this course from the consider ation also, that the present work not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, aud that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abb6 Ter-
rasson remarks with great justice, that we estimate the siie of work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of may be said of many book -- that would be much shorter,
wre ho! si short. On the other bund, as regards the com
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prehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice -- many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been in tended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples,
and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole ; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and em bellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its arti culation or organization, --which is the most important con sideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.
The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co
operate with the present author, if he has formed the intention
of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him. Meta physics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion -- and with little labour, if it is united, in a ihort time ; so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically.
For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. No thing can escape our notice ; for what reason produces from iUelf cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by re-aon itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this com
pleteness not only practicable, but also necessary. Tecum habits, et noris quam sit tibi curta snpellex. ?
Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature. ^ The content of this work, (which will not be half so long,) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique, which
' Perrius.
t In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethical This work >>ai ? ever published. See page 509. -- IV.
? ? ? ? XXIV PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITTOW.
has to discover the sources of this cognition mil expose th<< conditions of its possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a judge ; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a co- labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually discovered ; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the pro posed work, the same should be the case with their analysis But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. -- (1787. )
Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge
which lies within the province of pure reason, advances with
that undeviating certainty which characterises the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those
who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow ; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invari ably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and com pelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress, and may rather be snid to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circum stances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results, --even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.
That Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological
? ? ? ? P UE FACE TO THE 9F. COTTD ED1TI3K. XXV
discussions on the mental faculties, such ns imagination nnd wit, metaphysical discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the objects (Idealism, Scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies : this at tempt, on the part of these authors, only shews their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlanre, but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respecti\e limits, and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear defini tion ; it is a science which has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of theformal laws of all thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties -- natural or accidental -- which it encounters in the human mind.
The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It
much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself. Hence, logic properly only a propedeutic -- forms, asit were, the vestibule ot the sciences and while necessary to enable us to form correct judgment with regard to the various branches of know ledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge to be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that
the objective sciences.
Now these sciences, they can be termed rational at all, must contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cogni tion may stand in two-fold relation to its object. Either may have to determine the conception of the object --which must be supplied extraneously, or may have to establish its reality. The former theoretical, the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished from that which supplied from other sources. Any other method can only lead to irremediable confusion.
Mathematics and Physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects a priori. The former purely priori, the latter partially so, but also de
pendent on other sources of cognition.
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In the earliest times of which history affords us any record, mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have remained long -- chiefly among the Egyptians--in the stage of blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionised by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual revolution--much more important in its results than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope -- and of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming tne supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration --ele ments which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not even require to be proved -- makes it apparent that the change in troduced by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that nge, and it has thus been secured against the chance of ob livion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of as existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the know ledge of its properties, but that was necessary to produce these properties, as were, positive a priori construction and that, in order to arrive with certainty at priori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had him self, in accordance with his conception, placed in the object.
? much longer period elapsed before Physics entered on the highway of science. For only about a century ami a- half since the wise Bacon gave new direction to physical studies, or rather --as others were already on the right track -- in'parted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find evidence
rapid intellectual revolution. --In the remarks which follow shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science.
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When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane, when ToBRiOELLr caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water, or when Stahl, at a later period, converted metals into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and subtraction of certaiu elements ;* a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it pro duces after its own design ; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgment according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply to its questions. For accidental observations, made ac cording to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles, that it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from not, however, in the character of pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress.
We come now to metaphysics, purely speculative science, which occupies completely isolated position, and entirely independent of the teachings of experience. deals with mere conceptions --not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition --and in reason the pupil of itself alone. the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all- destroying barbarism. But has not yet had the good for tune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be ap parent, we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset.
We find that reason perpetually comes to stand, when attempts to gain a priori the perception even of those lav
do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental awtbod, of which, i"leed, the first c[n are iinuKed in some obscurity.
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which the most common experience confirms. We find i< compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being alilc to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests -- a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, ia which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.
This leads us to enquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is impossible to discover it ? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after
as were one of our weightiest concerns Nay, more, how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason,
abandons us in matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the truth -- and not only so, but even allures us
to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the end Or, the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications
do we possess to guide us in renewed investigation, and to
enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot
of our predecessors
appears to me that the examples of mathematics and
natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by sudden revolution, are suffi ciently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circum stances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. has hitherto been as sumed that our cognition must conform to the objects but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to ac cord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in viewi that to say, of arriving at the cognKiou ot
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objects a }inon, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to os. We here propose to do just what Cofernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now ns I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but--if they are to be come cognitions -- must refer them, ns representations, to some thing, as object, and must determine the latter by means of t lie former, here again there are two courses open to me.
Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to the object --and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before ; or secondly,
I inny assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects, they are cog nized, conform to my conceptions --and then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a modt of cognition which requires understanding. Before objects are given to me, that a priori, must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experi ence must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given
experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which based on the principle that we only cognize in things priori that which we ourselves place 111 them. *
This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural ohilosopher, conniats in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admin of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the proposition! of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limit* of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their nbjectt, as in natural science Hence, with regard to those conctptvtm
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This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and pro* muses to metaphysics, in its first part -- that where occupied with conceptions priori, of which the correspond ing objects may be given in experience --the certain course of science. For this new method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of priori cognition, and, what more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie prion at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of ex perience --neither of which was possible according to the pro cedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of priori cognition in the first part of Metaphysics, we derive surprising result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against the great end of Metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition unable to transcend the limits of pos sible experience and yet this precisely the most essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational cognition
priori at which we arrive that has only to do with phse- nomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing real existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phsenomena, the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to com plete the series of conditions. Now, appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears we
and prinripiet which we assume priori, our only course will lie to view them fium two different sides. We must regard one and the same con ception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from single point of view, reason involved seif-contrjdiction, then the experiment will esuMi>li it. e correctness of this distinction
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XXD
iliall then be convinced of the truth of that which we bcgnr.
by assuming for the sake of experiment ; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in thing* ns we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things hs they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition. *
But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative
reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensi ble, it still remains for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition, which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a practical
point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphy sics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such an extension of our knowledge ; and, if it must leave this space vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can, by means of practical data--nay, it even challenges us to make the attempt. f
This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the pro cedure of metaphysics, after the example of the Geometri cians and Natural Philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the
* This experiment of pure reason hu a great similarity to tbat of tlie Chemtitt, which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more usualh , the synthetic process. The analyiu of the metaphysician separates pure cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements, viz. , the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with the necessary rational idea of the uncon ditioned, and finds that this harmony never results except through the above distinction, which therefore, concluded to be just.
So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies es tablished the truth of that which Copernicus, at first, assumed only as hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible force
Newtonian attraction) which holds tbe universe together. The latter would have remained for ever undiscovered, Copernicus had not ven tured on the experiment -- contrary to the senses, but still just-- of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spec tator. In tbia Preface treat the new metaphysical method as hypothesis with the vvw of rendering apparent the first attempts at such change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique itself will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature our representations of space and time, and from the elementary concep tions of the understanding.
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external boundaries and the internal structure of this Science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enu meration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be at tributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organised body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it at the same time, viewed in relation to the totnl nse of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage --an advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do with objects--that, once con ducted into the sure path of science, by means of this criti cism, can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave for the use of posterity, as capital which can never receive fresh acces sions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as determined these principles. To this perfection therefore, bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to the maxim may
justly be applied --
Nii actum reputans, quid anperestct agendum.
But, will be asked, what kind of treasure this that we propose to bequeath to posterity What the real value of this system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to permanent condition cursory view of the present work will lead to the supposition that its use merely negative, that only serves to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits of experience. This
in fact, its primary use. But this, at once, assumes positive value, when we observe that the principles with which specu lative reason endeavours to transcend its limits, lead inevitably, not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sen sibility, which their proper sphere, over the entire realm M
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