And so also the evil of punishment was
established by God's justice for God's glory.
established by God's justice for God's glory.
Summa Theologica
Monach.
):
"So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric"; but not
conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If,
however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred
ministry, they have this in common with canons regular coupled with
greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass from an
order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided withal that one
seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. Statuimus).
Reply to Objection 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a
less strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person
is bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person
were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed
in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has taken
on entering a more severe order.
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Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to enter
religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that
"those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but
spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and Cassian has the
same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore is it
lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15): "Woe to you . . .
because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte,
and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than
yourselves. " Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to
enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.
Objection 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his
prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes take
harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a
stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce
others to enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes the
sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other. " Therefore one
man should draw another to God's service.
I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do
not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20): "He
who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall
save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins"; and
(Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for
all eternity. "
Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold
inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter
religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap.
Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally to
enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the
Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the
case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by educating him
in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one
gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship.
Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared
that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived,
and thus "the last state of that man" may become "worse than the first"
(Lk. 11:26).
Reply to Objection 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have
still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of
religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth. ) this
saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews,
after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to
observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell,
because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they
committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the
guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing
to do with the case in point.
According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of
Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet
lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they
converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw
the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming
a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery. " Hence it is
manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of
God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to
the person converted, whence he becomes worse.
Reply to Objection 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore
a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be
lawfully induced to enter a greater one. unless there be some special
obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in
the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to
enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser
order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the
superior's dispensation.
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Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many,
and previously deliberating for a long time?
Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without
taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.
For it is written (1 Jn. 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try the
spirits if they be of God. " Now sometimes a man's purpose of entering
religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his
leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,39): "If this
counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow it. " Therefore it
would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with
thy friend. " Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that
concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought
not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's friends.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making a comparison with
a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit
down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have
wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for
that "this man began to build and was not able to finish. " Now the
wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum
ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his
possessions. " Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor
keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is
stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for
he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to
enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel
of many.
On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon our Lord's calling
them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets, followed Him. "
Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth. ): "Such obedience as this does
Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment. "
I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in
great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while
advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with
regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the
entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is
certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt
about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. c, 2): "The East," that is Christ,
"calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West," namely mortal and
fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in
relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here
again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since
those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own
power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Is.
40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they
shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall
walk and not faint. " Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as
bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man
must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and
not hinder him. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man
without religion concerning holiness [*The Douay version supplies the
negative: 'Treat not . . . nor with . . . '], with an unjust man
concerning justice," meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the
text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), "Give no heed to these in any matter
of counsel, but be continually with a holy man. " In these matters,
however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says
(Ep. and Paulin. liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than
loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore. " Thirdly, we may
consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to
enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who
will not stand in one's way.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God,"
applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;
thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers
himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by
hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by
the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be
no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart
has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit "that
leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps. 142:10).
Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since
not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures
would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have
grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel"
whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is
imperishable according to Is. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all My
will shall be done. " Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not
to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further
demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,
according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own household. "
Wherefore Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, "Let me first take my leave of
them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's Catena Aurea]: "By
asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows
he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbors,
and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an
indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say:
'No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
the kingdom of God,' because he looks back who seeks delay in order to
go home and confer with his kinsfolk. "
Reply to Objection 3: The building of the tower signifies the
perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions
is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or
deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is
able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come
under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need
not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that
one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to
perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which
one is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since
unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot,
as the text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to
build the tower.
The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to
attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to
be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On that
side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there
appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly alluring
me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace
me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. There were so
many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age,
grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at me with a
persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what these youths
and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather
in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so
standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw
Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He
will receive and will heal thee. "
The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of
Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the
Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of
Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay
on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome
desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this
world? "
To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises
the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their
souls.
To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our Lord,
"Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen. "
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THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)
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PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His
people from their sins" (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed
unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to
the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to
complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of
human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the
consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by
Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal
life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our
salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by
our Saviour---i. e. God incarnate.
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TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)
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OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than
actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the
beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of
the world?
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Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness,
it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from
all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting
for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God
to become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are
infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were
"to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head
of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet. , line 1]. But God and flesh are
infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most
composite---especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that
God should be united to human flesh.
Objection 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as
evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God,
Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not
fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Objection 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the
greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom
rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But
God---Who takes care of the whole world---the whole universe of things
cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be
hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison
with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this
Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government
of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to
Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the
invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the
whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20):
"For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made. " But, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at
once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of
God---"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to
be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men
forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for
a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing
greater than for God to become incarnate . . . "
I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by
reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this
belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature
of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence,
what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to
the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain
from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the
highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the
creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created
nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three---the Word,
a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is
manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed
through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had
been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the
creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should
not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be,
although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not
fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it
was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason
of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's
salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature
whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's
wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated,
immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures
for His own goodness.
And so also the evil of punishment was
established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is
committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the
order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God
to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii):
"The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human
flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe.
This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things
. . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of
His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing
word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it
incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once? "
Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.
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Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word
of God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation
of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For
since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said ([3850]FP, Q[4],
AA[1],2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh.
Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could
also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Objection 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had
fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should
satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for
God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more
inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to
man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act.
Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that
the Word of God should become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's
salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father,
where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear? " But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far
beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is high
above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on:
"Who is as the Lord our God? " which pertains to reverence. Therefore it
would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like
unto us by assuming flesh.
On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary
for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such;
according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His
only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
may have life everlasting. " Therefore it was necessary for man's
salvation that God should become incarnate.
I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two
ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary
for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained
better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In
the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for
the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power
could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second
way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the
restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10):
"We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose
power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more
fitting way of healing our misery. "
Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good. "
First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing
God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the
Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established
and founded faith. " Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby
greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing
was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God
loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that
the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature? "
Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this;
hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is
there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us? " And he
afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten
to love in return. " Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He
set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp. ):
"Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that
He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man. " Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the
Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a
sermon (xiii de Temp. ): "God was made man, that man might be made God. "
So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil. " First, because
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor
him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17):
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they
have no bodies. " Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is
man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human
nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a
true man. " And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature,
refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. " Thirdly,
because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God
is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride,
which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the
same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin,
which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such
a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus
Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man
could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not
bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and
man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by
strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that
one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in
the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He
would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
have set an example. "
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of
necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human
nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or
persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole
of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind
of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for
condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one
satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man.
Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly---i. e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty;
and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which
is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
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Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still
have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution
from sin"; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if
man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power
to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested
in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are
united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in
this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch
as the last creature---viz. man---is united to the first
principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of
grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which
is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from
human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not
sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said
of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power. "
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to
the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even
if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and
to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the
Son of Man would not have come. " And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. "
I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent
ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy
for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have
been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not
sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in
order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on
deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that
God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the
remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals
thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode
of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God
in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human
nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is
always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its
natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine
power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is
false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace
did more abound. " Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we
say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! "
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of
future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to
be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to
one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than
to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the
lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed
to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but
merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But
Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction
for sins---and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii,
3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though
they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and
delivered Himself for me. '" But our individual sins are actual sins;
for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this
conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg. : 'sin'] of the world. "
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do
not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into
the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because
He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is
written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . .
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
offenses unto justification. "
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of
the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than
any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect
Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be
meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original
sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and
the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6):
"The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does
it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are
as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than
yourself? " And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as
given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to
others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of
the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the
nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him
alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to
all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
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Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of
the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ. " But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I
will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. " Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners. " But more would have been saved had
God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their
sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the
work of nature.
"So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric"; but not
conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If,
however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred
ministry, they have this in common with canons regular coupled with
greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass from an
order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided withal that one
seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. Statuimus).
Reply to Objection 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a
less strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person
is bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person
were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed
in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has taken
on entering a more severe order.
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Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to enter
religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that
"those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but
spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and Cassian has the
same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore is it
lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15): "Woe to you . . .
because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte,
and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than
yourselves. " Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to
enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.
Objection 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his
prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes take
harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a
stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce
others to enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes the
sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other. " Therefore one
man should draw another to God's service.
I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do
not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20): "He
who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall
save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins"; and
(Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for
all eternity. "
Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold
inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter
religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap.
Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally to
enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the
Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the
case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by educating him
in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one
gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship.
Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared
that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived,
and thus "the last state of that man" may become "worse than the first"
(Lk. 11:26).
Reply to Objection 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have
still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of
religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.
Reply to Objection 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth. ) this
saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews,
after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to
observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell,
because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they
committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the
guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing
to do with the case in point.
According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of
Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet
lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they
converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw
the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming
a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery. " Hence it is
manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of
God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to
the person converted, whence he becomes worse.
Reply to Objection 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore
a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be
lawfully induced to enter a greater one. unless there be some special
obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in
the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to
enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser
order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the
superior's dispensation.
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Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many,
and previously deliberating for a long time?
Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without
taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.
For it is written (1 Jn. 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try the
spirits if they be of God. " Now sometimes a man's purpose of entering
religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his
leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,39): "If this
counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow it. " Therefore it
would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering
religion.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with
thy friend. " Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that
concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought
not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's friends.
Objection 3: Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making a comparison with
a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit
down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have
wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for
that "this man began to build and was not able to finish. " Now the
wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum
ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his
possessions. " Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor
keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is
stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for
he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to
enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel
of many.
On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon our Lord's calling
them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets, followed Him. "
Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth. ): "Such obedience as this does
Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment. "
I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in
great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while
advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with
regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the
entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is
certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt
about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. , Serm. c, 2): "The East," that is Christ,
"calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West," namely mortal and
fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in
relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here
again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since
those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own
power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Is.
40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they
shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall
walk and not faint. " Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as
bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man
must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and
not hinder him. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man
without religion concerning holiness [*The Douay version supplies the
negative: 'Treat not . . . nor with . . . '], with an unjust man
concerning justice," meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the
text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), "Give no heed to these in any matter
of counsel, but be continually with a holy man. " In these matters,
however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says
(Ep. and Paulin. liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than
loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore. " Thirdly, we may
consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to
enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who
will not stand in one's way.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God,"
applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;
thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers
himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by
hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by
the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be
no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart
has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit "that
leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps. 142:10).
Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since
not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures
would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have
grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel"
whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is
imperishable according to Is. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all My
will shall be done. " Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not
to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further
demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things. "
Reply to Objection 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,
according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own household. "
Wherefore Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, "Let me first take my leave of
them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's Catena Aurea]: "By
asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows
he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbors,
and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an
indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say:
'No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
the kingdom of God,' because he looks back who seeks delay in order to
go home and confer with his kinsfolk. "
Reply to Objection 3: The building of the tower signifies the
perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions
is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or
deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is
able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come
under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need
not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that
one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to
perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which
one is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since
unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot,
as the text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to
build the tower.
The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to
attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to
be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On that
side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there
appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly alluring
me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace
me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. There were so
many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age,
grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at me with a
persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what these youths
and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather
in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so
standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw
Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He
will receive and will heal thee. "
The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of
Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the
Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of
Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay
on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome
desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this
world? "
To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises
the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their
souls.
To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our Lord,
"Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen. "
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THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)
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PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His
people from their sins" (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed
unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to
the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to
complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of
human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the
consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by
Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal
life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our
salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by
our Saviour---i. e. God incarnate.
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TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)
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OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than
actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the
beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of
the world?
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Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness,
it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from
all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting
for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God
to become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are
infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were
"to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head
of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet. , line 1]. But God and flesh are
infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most
composite---especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that
God should be united to human flesh.
Objection 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as
evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God,
Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not
fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Objection 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the
greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom
rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But
God---Who takes care of the whole world---the whole universe of things
cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be
hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison
with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this
Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government
of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to
Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the
invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the
whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20):
"For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made. " But, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at
once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of
God---"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to
be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men
forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for
a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing
greater than for God to become incarnate . . . "
I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by
reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this
belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature
of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence,
what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to
the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain
from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the
highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the
creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created
nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three---the Word,
a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is
manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed
through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had
been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the
creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should
not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be,
although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not
fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it
was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason
of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's
salvation.
Reply to Objection 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature
whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's
wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated,
immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures
for His own goodness.
And so also the evil of punishment was
established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is
committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the
order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God
to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii):
"The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human
flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe.
This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things
. . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of
His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing
word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it
incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once? "
Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.
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Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word
of God should become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation
of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For
since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said ([3850]FP, Q[4],
AA[1],2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh.
Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could
also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Objection 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had
fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should
satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for
God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more
inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to
man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act.
Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that
the Word of God should become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's
salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father,
where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear? " But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far
beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is high
above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on:
"Who is as the Lord our God? " which pertains to reverence. Therefore it
would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like
unto us by assuming flesh.
On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary
for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such;
according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His
only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but
may have life everlasting. " Therefore it was necessary for man's
salvation that God should become incarnate.
I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two
ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary
for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained
better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In
the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for
the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power
could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second
way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the
restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10):
"We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose
power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more
fitting way of healing our misery. "
Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good. "
First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing
God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the
Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established
and founded faith. " Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby
greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing
was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God
loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that
the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature? "
Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this;
hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is
there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us? " And he
afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten
to love in return. " Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He
set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp. ):
"Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that
He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown
to man. " Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the
Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a
sermon (xiii de Temp. ): "God was made man, that man might be made God. "
So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil. " First, because
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor
him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17):
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let
not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they
have no bodies. " Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is
man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says
(De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human
nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a
true man. " And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn,
O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature,
refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. " Thirdly,
because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God
is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride,
which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be
convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the
same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin,
which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such
a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus
Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man
could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not
bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and
man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by
strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that
one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in
the other---for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He
would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not
have set an example. "
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of
necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human
nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or
persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole
of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind
of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the
greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for
condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one
satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man.
Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly---i. e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction
of Christ.
Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty;
and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which
is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
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Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still
have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things
are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution
from sin"; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if
man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power
to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested
in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are
united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in
this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch
as the last creature---viz. man---is united to the first
principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would
have become incarnate.
Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of
grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which
is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from
human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not
sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Objection 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said
of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power. "
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to
the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels
could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even
if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and
to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the
Son of Man would not have come. " And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. "
I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent
ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy
for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have
been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not
existed, God could have become incarnate.
Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not
sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and
would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in
order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on
deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that
God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the
remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh,"
St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals
thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode
of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God
in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human
nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is
always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its
natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine
power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak
of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is
false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after
sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good
therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace
did more abound. " Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we
say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer! "
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of
future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to
be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to
one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows
the cause.
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Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than
to take away original sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became
incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the
lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra
Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed
to taking away actual sins.
Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but
merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But
Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction
for sins---and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii,
3): "This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though
they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself
alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and
delivered Himself for me. '" But our individual sins are actual sins;
for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this
conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg. : 'sin'] of the world. "
I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do
not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into
the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because
He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is
written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . .
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many
offenses unto justification. "
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of
the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than
any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect
Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the
good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.
Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be
meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original
sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and
the like in Himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6):
"The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but
that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does
it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are
as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than
yourself? " And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as
given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to
others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of
the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the
nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him
alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to
all ought to be accounted his own by each one.
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Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of
the human race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath
quickened us together in Christ. " But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I
will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. " Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came
into this world to save sinners. " But more would have been saved had
God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their
sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the
work of nature.
