These are the
preliminary
suggestions and considerations
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Fichte - Nature of the Scholar
Religion does not consist
in that wherein it is placed by the common mode of
thought,--namely in this, that man should believe, be of
opinion, and rest satisfied, because no one has the hardihood
to assert the opposite,--his belief resting wholly on hearsay
and outward assurance,--that there is a God:--this is a
vulgar superstition by which, at most, a defective police
system may be remedied, while the inward nature of man
remains as bad as before, and indeed frequently is made
worse, since he forms this God after his own image, and in
him only manufactures a new prop for his own corruption.
But^Jierein, Religion does consist, that man in his own per-
son and not in that of another, with his own spiritual eye
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? 40G
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
and not through that of another, should immediately behold,
have, and possess God. This, however, is possible only by
means of pure, independent Thought, for only through this
does man assume true and real personality, and this alone is
the eye to which God can become visible. Pure Thought is
itself the Divine Existence; and, on the other hand, the
Divine Existence, in its immediate essence, is nothing else
than pure Thought.
Besides, to look at this matter historically, the assumption
that absolutely all men without exception may come to the
knowledge of God, as well as the effort to raise them all to
this knowledge, is the assumption and the effort of Chris-
tianity; and, since Christianity is the developing principle
and peculiar characteristic of modern time, this assumption
and this effort form the peculiar spirit of the Age of the
New Testament. Now the two expressions,--to elevate all
men without exception to the knowledge of God,--and, to
communicate to mankind at large the deepest elements and
foundations of knowledge in another way than that of sys-
tematic instruction,--mean strictly and entirely one and the
same thing. It is clear, therefore, that every one who does
not wish to return to the ancient times of Heathendom
must admit not only the possibility, but the irremissible
duty, of communicating to men the profoundest principles
of knowledge in a generally comprehensible form.
But,--to close this argument for the possibility of a popu-
lar exposition of the profoundest truth with the most deci-
sive proof, that of facts :--Has then this knowledge,--which
we have undertaken, by means of these lectures, to unfold
in those who as yet have it not, and to strengthen and
purify in those who already possess it,--has it never until our
time been present in the world, and do we pretend now to
introduce something wholly new and hitherto nowhere dis-
coverable? We would not wish to think that this latter
had even been said of us; but, on the contrary, we maintain
that this knowledge, in all its clearness and purity, which we
can by no means surpass, and in every age from the origin of
Christianity downwards, although for the most part unre-
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? LECTURE II.
407
cognised, and even persecuted by the dominant church, has
yet, here and there, secretly ruled the minds of men and
disseminated itself abroad. On the other hand, we do not
hesitate to declare that the method of regular, systematic,
and scientific investigation, by which we for our part have at-
tained to this knowledge, has in former times, not indeed in
respect of trial, but certainly in respect of success, been un-
known in the world; and that, under the guidance of the
spirit of our great forefathers, it has been for the most part
our own work. If, then, this scientific, philosophical insight
was before awanting, in what way did Christ, or--since, in
his case, some will assume for it a miraculous, supernatural
origin, which I will not here dispute,--in what way did
Christ's Apostles,--in what way did all those who, from their
time down to our own, have possessed this knowledge,--in
what way did they actually acquire it! Among the former,
as among the latter, there were many very unlearned per-
sons, wholly ignorant of philosophy or even opposed to it;
the few among them who meddled with philosophy at all,
and with whose philosophy we are acquainted, so philoso-
phized that it is easy for the educated man to perceive that
it was not to their philosophy that they owed their insight.
But to say, that they did not obtain that insight by way of
philosophy, is just to say, that they did obtain it in a popu-
lar way. Why then should that which has been possible
heretofore, in an unbroken sequence for nearly two thousand
years, be now impossible? Why should that which was pos-
sible with very imperfect aids, at a period when general
enlightenment was nowhere to be found in the world, be no
longer possible, now when the needful aids have been per-
fected, and, at least in philosophy, the requisite enlightenment exists? Why should that which was possible when
religious faith and natural understanding were yet at vari-
ance to a certain extent, become impossible now that they
have been reconciled to each other, and, forgetting their
former disunion, pursue in friendship one and the same end?
That which follows most decisively from all these con-
siderations is the duty incumbent upon every man who is
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? 408
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
penetrated by this higher knowledge to exert all his powers
to communicate that knowledge, wherever possible, to the
whole brotherhood of humanity; presenting it to each indi-
vidual in that form in which he is most open to its recep-
tion; never debating with himself, nor wavering in doubt,
whether or not it may succeed, but labouring as if it must
of necessity succeed; and after each completed effort, rising
with new and fresh vigour as if nothing had yet been at-
tained ;--and, on the other hand, the duty of each indivi-
dual who is not yet in possession of this knowledge, or who
does not possess it in fitting clearness and freedom and as
an ever-present possession, to devote himself wholly and un-
reservedly to the instruction thus offered to him, as if it
were destined for him especially, and belonged to him, and
must of necessity be understood by him; not fearfully and
timidly exclaiming "Ah! shall I indeed understand it? " or,
"Do I then understand it rightly? " Understand it rightly,
in the sense of perfect comprehension, would be saying
much ;--in this sense, these lectures may perhaps be under-
stood fully only by such as could themselves have spoken
them. But to understand, and that not erroneously, lies
within the power of every one who, moved by these dis-
courses, is elevated above the common view of the world,
and inspired with exalted sentiments and resolves. The
reciprocal obligation to both these duties lies at the founda-
tion of the contract we entered into at the beginning of
these lectures. I will unweariedly search for new forms,
applications, and combinations, as if it were impossible to
make myself fully intelligible to you:--do you on the other
hand, that is, you who seek instruction here--for to the
others I willingly limit myself to counsel--do you proceed
with earnestness and courage to the business, as if you had
to understand me by half words only;--and in this way I
believe that we shall agree well together.
These considerations on the possibility and necessity of a
generally comprehensible exposition of the deepest elements
of knowledge acquire a new significance and convincing
power, when we examine more strictly the peculiar and
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? LECTURE II.
409
characteristic distinction between the Popular and the
Scientific discourse;--a distinction which in my opinion is
virtually unknown, and which, in particular, lies wholly con-
cealed from those who talk so readily of the possibility and
impossibility of popular expositions. The Scientific dis-
course eliminates truth from among the errors which sur-
round and oppose it on all sides and in every form; and, by
demolition of these opposing view as error and as impos-
sible to true thought, shows the truth as that which alone
remains after their withdrawal, and therefore as the only
possible truth:--and in this separation of opposites, and
elucidation of the truth from the confused chaos in which
truth and error lie mingled together, consists the peculiar
and characteristic nature of the Scientific discourse. By
this method truth emerges before our eyes out of a world
full of error. Now it is obvious that the philosopher, before
such sifting of truth, before he could either project or begin
it and therefore independent of scientific proof, must al-
ready possess truth. But how could he attain possession of
it except by the guidance of a natural sense of truth which
exists in him with higher power than in his contempora-
ries ? --and in what other way, then, has he at first attained
it but by the unartificial popular way? To this natural sense
of truth, which is thus seen to be the starting-point even of
scientific philosophy, the Popular discourse addresses itself
immediately without calling aught else to its aid,--setting
forth the truth, and nothing but the truth, purely and sim-
ply, as it is in itself and not as it stands opposed to error,--
and calculates upon the spontaneous assent of this natural
sense of truth. This discourse cannot indeed prove any-
thing; but it must certainly be understood; for intelligence
itself is the only organ whereby we can apprehend its im-
port, and without this it cannot reach us at all. The Scien-
tific discourse presupposes in the hearer an entanglement in
the meshes of error, and addresses itself to a diseased and
perverted spiritual nature;--the Popular discourse presup-
poses an open and candid mind, and appeals to a healthy,
although not sufficiently cultivated, spiritual nature. After
ub
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? '410
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
all this, how can the philosopher entertain a doubt that the
natural sense of truth in man is sufficient to lead him to
the knowledge of truth, since he himself has attained to
that knowledge by this means and no other?
But notwithstanding that the comprehension of the deep-
est truths of Reason, by means of a popular exposition, is
possible,--notwithstanding further that this comprehension
is a necessary purpose of humanity towards the attainment
of which every power ought to be directed,--we must never-
theless acknowledge that there are, in the present age,
greater hindrances to the accomplishment of this purpose
than have existed at any previous time. In the first place,
the very form of this higher truth,--this strictly determi-
nate, settled, absolutely unchanging and unchangeable form,
--comes into collision, and that in a two-fold manner, with
the hesitating modesty which this age--has not indeed in
itself but yet--would exact from every one who undertakes
to deal with it. It is not to be denied that this knowledge
assumes itself to be true, and alone true, and true only in
the sharp and complete precision in which it is thus an-
nounced,--and everything opposed to it, absolutely and
without exception or mitigation, to be false;--that therefore
it seeks, without forbearance, to subdue all weak partiali-
ties, all vagrant fancies, and wholly disdains to enter into any
treaty or compromise with the other side. The men of these
days are offended at this severity, as if they were thereby
grievously ill-treated;--they would be deferentially saluted,
and consulted as to whether they will lend their sanction to
such a matter; would make conditions on their side, and
there should be some elbow-room left for their tricks of le-
gerdemain. Others are dissatisfied with this form of truth,
because it requires them at once to take their part for or
against, and to decide on the instant yes or no. For they
are in no haste to know for certain about that which never-
theless is alone worth knowing, and would willingly suspend
their voices, in case it should afterwards turn out to be
wholly otherwise; and besides it is very convenient to con-
ceal their want of understanding under the fashionable and
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? LECTURE II.
411
high-sounding name of Scepticism, and to allow mankind
to believe that there, where in fact they have been found
wanting in power to comprehend that which lies clear
before them, it has been their superior acuteness and pene-
tration which has disclosed to them certain unheard-of, and
to all other men inaccessible, grounds for doubt.
Again, there is a hindrance to the successful issue of our
undertaking in this age, in the monstrously paradoxical,
strange, and unheard-of appearance of our doctrine, since it
turns into falsehood precisely those things which the age
has hitherto prized as the most precious and sacred results
of its culture and enlightenment. Not as if our doctrine
were in itself new and paradoxical. Among the Greeks,
Plato held the same faith. The Johannean Christ said
precisely the same things which we teach and prove, and
even said them in the same language which we here
employ; and in these very times, and among our own
nation, two of our greatest Poets have given expression to
the same truth in manifold applications and under many
forms. But the Johannean Christ has been superseded by
his less spiritual followers; and Poets, it is thought, desire
only to utter fine words and to produce musical sounds.
That this ancient doctrine, which has thus been renewed
from age to age down even to these later times, should yet
seem so wholly new and unheard-of arises in this way.
After the revival of learning in Modern Europe, and particu-
larly since, by means of the Church Reformation, the evi-
dence of the highest religious truth was freely presented to
the mind, there gradually arose a philosophy which made
the experiment whether the books of Nature and of Know-
ledge, which were to it unintelligible, might not assume a
meaning when read backwards; whereby indeed everything
without exception was taken out of its natural position, and
set head downwards. This philosophy took possession, as
every prevalent philosophy necessarily does, of all the
avenues of public instruction,--catechisms, schoolbooks, pub-
lic religious discourses, literature. All our youthful culture
fell within this period. There is thus no wonder that, after
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? 412
THE DOCTIUSE OF RELIGION.
the unnatural had become to us natural, Nature herself
should seem to us unnatural; and that, after we had been
accustomed to see all things upside-down, we should ima-
gine them to be inverted when we beheld them restored to
their true position. This indeed is an error which will dis-
appear with the age which produced it; for we, who explain
death by life, the body by the soul,--and not the reverse as
these moderns do,--we are the true followers of the
Ancients; ouly that we see clearly what remained dark to
them; while the philosophy which we have alluded to above
is not even an advance in time, but only a ludicrous inter-
lude, a petty appendix to thorough barbarism.
Lastly, those who might perchance of themselves over-
come the two hindrances now pointed out, may yet be
scared back by the hateful and malicious objections urged
by the fanatics of perversity. It may indeed be wondered
at that such perversity, not satisfied with being in its own
person perverse, should besides exhibit a fanatical zeal for
for the maintenance and diffusion of the same perversity in
others. Yet even this may be readily explained, and in
this way. When these fanatics had reached the years of
reflection and self-knowledge, and had thoroughly examined
themselves and their own inward being, and found nothing
there but the impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being,
had not felt the slightest desire either to discover within
themselves, or to acquire from without, anything but what
they found there,--then they have looked around upon their
fellow-men, observed them, and fancied that neither was
there anything to be met with in them higher than this same
impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being. Hereupon
they have satisfied themselves that in this consists the es-
sential nature of humanity; and having cultivated this na-
ture in themselves with unremitting care and to the highest
possible perfection, they have necessarily become in their
own eyes the most preeminent and distinguished among
men, since they were conscious of being virtuosi in those
things wherein the worth of humanity consists. Thus have
they thought and acted throughout life. But should it ap-
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? LECTURE II.
413
pear that they have been mistaken- in the major proposition
of their syllogism,--if in others of their species there has
been manifested something else, and in this case something
undeniably higher and more divine than the mere impulse
towards personal, sensuous, well-being,--then they who had
hitherto held themselves to be men of distinguished preemi-
nence would be found to belong to a lower race, and instead
of as before esteeming themselves higher than all others,
they would be compelled thenceforward to despise and reject
themselves. They cannot do otherwise than angrily oppose
this conviction of a higher nature in man, which brings only
disgrace to them, and all phenomena which confirm this
conviction; they must necessarily do everything in their
power to keep such phenomena at a distance from them-
selves, and even to suppress them altogether; they struggle
for life,--for the most delicate and innermost root of their
life,--for the possibility of self-endurance. All fanaticism,
and all its angry exhibitions, from the beginning of the
world down to the present day, have proceeded from this
principle:--"If my opponent be right, then am I a miserable
man. " Where this fanaticism can wield fire and sword, with
fire and sword it assails its detested adversary; where these
instruments are beyond its reach, it has still the tongue left,
--which, if it do not kill the foe, is yet frequently able to
cripple his activity and influence with others. One of the
most favourite and customary tricks of tongue-fence among
these fanatics is this:--to give to the thing which is hateful
only to them, a name which is hateful to all men, in order
thereby to decry it and render it suspected. The existing
store of such tricks and nicknames is inexhaustible, and is
constantly enriched by fresh additions; and it would be in
vain to attempt here any complete enumeration of them. I shall notice only one of the most common of these odious
nicknames,--i. e. the charge that this doctrine which we
teach is Mysticism.
Observe, in the first place, with reference to the form of
this accusation, that should any candid unprejudiced person
answer:--" Well, let us suppose that it is Mysticism, and
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? 4U
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
that Mysticism is an erroneous and dangerous thing; let
him for that very reason bring forward his doctrine, and we
will hear him: if it is erroneous and dangerous, this will
come to light when the opportunity is given;"--these fana-
tics must reply, in accordance with the peremptory decision
by which they believe they have got rid of us ;--" There is
nothing more to hear;--Mysticism has long ago, for some
generations back, by the unanimous voice of all our literary
Councils, been decreed to be heresy and placed under ex-
communication. "
Further--to proceed from the form of this accusation to
its substance;--What then is this Mysticism whicb tbey
lay to our charge? We shall not indeed receive a distinct
answer to this question from them :--for as they never pos-
sess a clear idea, but only think about high-sounding
phrases, so in this case they have no conception answering to
their words;--we must therefore help ourselves. There is,
unquestionably, a view of spiritual and sacred things which,
although correct in the main, is nevertheless afflicted with
a grievous infirmity, and thereby rendered impure and noxi-
ous. In my lectures of last year,* I took occasion, in pass-
ing, to delineate this view, and I may perhaps find an op-
portunity this season to return to the subject. This view,
which in part is certainly a much perverted one, is properly
distinguished from the true religious view by the name of
Mysticism;--I myself am wont to make this distinction,
employing the names just mentioned; and from this Mys-
ticism my doctrine is far removed, and indeed wholly op-
posed to it. Thus, I say, do I regard the matter. But what
would the fanatics? The distinction I have mentioned is
completely concealed from their eyes, as well as from the
eyes of that philosophy which they follow;--according to
their unanimous resolutions, their criticisms, their discus-
sions, their favourite works, and all their public manifesta-
tions without exception,--which he who can may examine
for himself, and the others may believe me upon trust,--ac-
"Characteristics of the Present Age," Lecture VIII.
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? LECTURE II.
415
cording to these unanimous resolutions, it is always the True
Religion, the Knowledge of God in spirit and in truth, which
they call Mysticism, and against which in fact, under this
name, they hurl their anathema. Their warnings against this
doctrine, as Mysticism, therefore mean nothing else than
what may be thus paraphrased:--"Yonder they will tell you
of the existence of a spiritual world, revealed to no outward
sense, but to be apprehended only by pure thought:--you are
lost if you allow yourselves to be persuaded of this, for there is absolutely no existence but that which we can grasp with our hand, and we have nothing else to care for; all else are
mere abstractions from the substantial realities we can
handle, which in themselves have no substance and which
these enthusiasts confound with palpable reality. They will
tell you of the reality, the inward independence, the creative
power of thought:--you are lost to real life if you believe
them; for there is nothing really existing but, in the first
place, the stomach, and then that which supports it and
supplies it with food; and it is only the gases that have
their birth in it which these dreamers call ideas. " We ad-
mit the whole accusation, and willingly confess, not without
joyful and exulting feelings, that, in this sense of the word,
our doctrine is indeed Mysticism. With these we have
therefore no new controversy to begin, but find ourselves
in the old controversy, which has never been solved nor
reconciled; t. e. --they say that all Religion--truly it may
be said of the vulgar superstition we have alluded to above
--is something in the highest degree objectionable and per-
nicious, and must be extirpated from the earth, root and
branch; and so the matter remains with them ;--while we
say that True Religion is something in the highest degree
blessed, and that which alone gives true existence, worth,
and dignity to man, here below and throughout eternity;
and that every power must be put forth in order that this
Religion may, wherever it is possible, be made known to
all men; this we recognise with absolute certainty, and
thus the matter remains on our side.
Meanwhile, that these persons should rather choose to say
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? 410
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
"That is Mysticism," than, as they ought to say, " That is
Religion," arises, among other causes which do not belong to
our present subject, from the following:--They desire by
this language, in the first place, imperceptibly to induce a
fear that, by means of this our doctrine, there may be intro-
duced intolerance, desire of persecution, insubordination, and
civil disturbance; or that, in one word, this doctrine is dan-
gerous to the State :--secondly and chiefly, they wish to
create alarm, in those who may enter upon inquiries like
the present, as to their continuance in possession of a sound
mind, and to give them to understand that in this way they
may come at last to see ghosts in broad daylight--which
would be a very great misfortune indeed. As to the first,
the danger to the State :-- they violently appropriate and
pervert the description of that from which danger may be
feared, and they doubtless calculate quite securely that no
one will be found to discover the change; for neither that
which they call Mysticism--the True Religion--nor that
which we call by that name, has ever been known to perse-
cute, to show intolerance, or to stir up civil commotion ;--
throughout the whole history of Churches, heresies, and per-
secutions, the persecuted party have ever occupied a propor-
tionally higher, and the persecutors a lower position; the
latter fighting, as we said above, for life. No ! intolerance,
desire of persecution, insubordination toward the State,
belong only to that spirit by which they themselves are ani-
mated, the fanaticism of perversity; and, if it were other-
wise advisable, I would willingly have the fetters struck off
this very day from the enslaved, that it might be seen what
course they would take. As to the second object of solici-
tude, the preservation of a sound mind:--this depends in
the first instance on physical organization; and against in-
fluences of this kind, even the shallowest inanity, the lowest
vulgarity of soul, is by no means a safe-guard;--hence there
is no occasion to throw ourselves into the arms of these
fanatics in order to escape the threatened danger. So far as
I know, or have known, those who live amid those investi-
gations of which we now speak, and find in them their uniu-
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? LECTUKE II.
417
terrupted daily labour, are by no means exposed to these
distractions, see no ghosts, and are as healthy, in mind and
body, as others. If, sometimes in life, they do not what
most other men in their place would have done, or do what
most other men in the same place would have left undone,
it is not because they are deficient in acuteness to perceive
the possibility of the one course of action, or the conse-
quences of the other,--as those who, in their place, would
certainly have done otherwise cannot refrain from thinking,
--but for other reasons. If there must always be diseased
spiritual natures, who as soon as they quit their housekeep-
ing books, or whatever other morsel of reality gives employ-
ment to their faculties, forthwith fall into the mazes of
error, let such remain by their housekeeping books ! --but I
trust that the general rule may not be taken from them,
who, it is to be hoped, are the smaller number, and are cer-
tainly of the lower species; nor, because there are feeble
and diseased creatures among men, the whole human race
be treated as if they were feeble and diseased. That we
have interested ourselves in the deaf, dumb, and blind, and
have invented a way whereby instruction may be communi-
ted to them, is deserving of all thanks;--from the deaf and
dumb, namely, and the blind. But if we were to make this
method of instruction the universal plan of education for
persons without these defects, because such persons may en-
counter deaf, dumb, and blind people, and we should thus be
sure that we had provided for every such contingency; if
he who can hear should, without regard to his hearing, be
made to talk by the same laborious process as the deaf and
dumb, and require to learn to detect the words upon the
lips; and he who can see should, without regard to his see-
ing, be taught to read the letters by the touch ;-^this would
deserve little thanks indeed from those who have no defect
in sense, notwithstanding that such an arrangement would
certainly be adopted as soon as the direction of public in-
struction should be made dependent on the opinion of the
deaf and dumb and the blind.
These are the preliminary suggestions and considerations
Hb
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? 418
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
which I have thought it advisable to communicate to you
to day. Eight days hence I shall endeavour to set forth, in
a new light and upon a new side, the foundation-principles
of these lectures, which are at the same time the foundation-
principles of all knowledge ;--and to this I respectfully in-
vite you.
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? 419
LECTURE III.
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE COMMON MODE OF
THOUGHT :--DEFINITION OF BEING (SEYN)
AND SX-ISTENCE (DASEYN. )
In the first of these lectures we maintained that not every-
thing which seems to be living does really and truly live;
and in the second we said that a large portion of mankind,
throughout their whole Life, never attain to true and proper
Thought, but remain within the circle of mere Opinion. It
might well be, and indeed it has already become obvious
from other remarks which we made on that occasion, that
the phrases Thought and Life--Thought-lessness and Death,
mean precisely one and the same thing; we have already
shown that Thought is the element of Life, and consequent-
ly the absence of Thought must be the source of Death.
An important difficulty stands in the way of this asser-
tion, to which I must now direct your attention, namely the
following :--If Life be an organic whole, determined by one
universally efficient law, then it seems at first sight impos-
sible that any one part appertaining to Life should be ab-
sent where the others are present; or that any one indivi-
dual part should exist without all the parts proper to Life,
and consequently without Life itself as a whole, in its com-
plete organic unity. In solving this difficulty, we shall also
be able to exhibit to you clearly the distinction between
true Thought and mere Opinion, which was the first busi-
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THE DOCTHINE OF RELIGION.
ncss announced for to-day in our last discourse, before we
proceed to the fulfilment of our other purpose in this lec-
ture, namely, to begin the application of pure Thought it-
self to the elements of all Knowledge.
The supposed difficulty is thus solved :--Wherever spiri-
tual Life is to be found, everything, without exception, that
belongs to this Life, follows wholly and unreservedly, accord-
ing to the established law of its being :--but all this, which
follows with absolute mechanical necessity, does not neces-
sarily enter into consciousness; it is there indeed a Life
according to the law, but not our Life, not the Life which is
properly and peculiarly ours. Our Life is only that part of
the Life according to the law which we embrace in clear
consciousness, and, in this clear consciousness, love and en-
joy. "Where Love is, there is individual Life," we said
once;--Love, however, exists only where there is clear con-
sciousness.
The development of this conscious Life--which in these
lectures is all to which we shall give the name of Life--
within the whole mass of Life which has an existence ac-
cording to the law, proceeds precisely like that of physical
death. As this, in its natural progress, begins at first in the
remoter members, those farthest removed from the central
seat of life, and from them spreads itself gradually to the
inward parts, until at last it reaches the heart; so does the
spiritual Life, filled with consciousness, love, and enjoyment
of itself, begin at first in the extremities and remoter out-
works of Life, until it also, with God's good pleasure, reaches
the true foundation and central point of alL An ancient
philosopher maintained that the animals had arisen from
the earth; "as happens," he added, "even to the present
day in miniature, since every spring, particularly after a
warm rain, we may observe frogs, for example, in whom
some particular part, perhaps the fore-feet, may be quite
perfectly developed, while the other members still remain a
rude and undeveloped clod of earth. " The half-animals of
this philosopher, although they scarcely afford sufficient
evidence of what they were designed to prove, yet present a
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? LECTURE III.
421
very striking illustration of the spiritual Life of ordinary
men. The outward members of this Life are in themselves
perfectly formed, and warm blood flows through the ex-
tremities; but when we look to the heart, and the other
nobler organs of life,--which, in themselves and according
to the law, are indeed there, and must necessarily be there,
since otherwise even the outward members themselves could
not have been,--in these organs, I say, they are found to be
still unsentient clods--frozen rocks.
I shall, first of all, convince you of this by a striking
example; to which, although I shall express myself with
strict precision, I must yet require your particular attention,
on account of the novelty of the observation. We see, hear,
feel--outward objects; and along with this seeing, &c. , we
also think these objects, and are conscious of them by means
of our inward sense; just as we are conscious, by the same
inward sense, of our seeing, hearing, and feeling of these ob-
jects. I hope that no one who is possessed even of the com-
monest power of reflexion will maintain that he can see,
hear, or feel an object without being at the same time in-
wardly conscious both of the object itself, and of his seeing,
hearing, or feeling of it;--that he can see, hear, or feel any-
thing definite without consciousness. This co-existence, this
inseparability of the outward, sensible perception and the in-
ward thought or conception,--this co-existence, I say, and
nothing more than this, lies in practical self-observation, or
the fact of Consciousness; but this fact of consciousness does
by no means contain,--and I beg you to note this well,--
this fact of consciousness does by no means contain any re-
lation between these two elements,--the outward Sense and
the inward Thought,--a relation of the one to the other,--
it may be as Cause and Effect, or as Essential and Acci-
dental . If any such relation between the two be assumed,
this is not done in consequence of practical self-observation,
and it does not lie in the fact of consciousness :--this is the
first thing that I beg of you to understand and keep in
mind.
Now, in the second place, should such a relation be as-
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? 422
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
sumed upon some other ground than that of self-observa-
tion,--which other possible ground we put in the place of
consciousness,--should such a relation between the two
elements be, upon such a ground, supposed and accepted,--
then it appears, at first sight, that the two elements, as co-
existent and inseparable from each other, must be held to
be of equal rank; and thus the inward thought may as well
be regarded as the foundation, the essential,--and the out-
ward perception as the superstructure, the accident,--as the
reverse; and in this way an insoluble doubt would neces-
sarily arise between the two suppositions, which would for
ever prevent any final decision respecting the assumed re-
lation. Thus, I say, it is at first sight;--but should any
one look deeper into the matter, then,--inasmuch as the
inward consciousness embraces even the outward sense it-
self,--since we are conscious of the seeing, hearing, or feel-
ing, but can by no means, on the other hand, see, hear, or
feel our consciousness,--and thus, even in the immediate
fact, consciousness assumes the higher place:--then, I say,
such an one would find it much more natural to make the
internal Consciousness the chief thing, and the external
Sense the subordinate thing; to explain the latter by the
former; to control and try the latter by the former;--and
not the reverse.
Now how does the common mode of thought proceed in
this matter? To it, the outward Sense is, without further
inquiry, the first thing, the immediate touchstone of truth:
--whatever is seen, heard, or felt, that is, just because it is
seen, heard, or felt. The Thought, or inward consciousness
of the object, comes afterwards, as an empty addition which
is scarcely to be noticed at all, and is quite willingly dis-
pensed with if it do not force itself upon our observation;
and a thing is never seen or heard because it is thought, but
it is thought because it is seen or heard, and that under the
guidance and control of this seeing and hearing. The per-
verse and absurd modern philosophy referred to in our last
lecture, as the peculiar organ and voice of common opinion,
comes forward and unblushingly declares:--" Outward sense
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? LECTURE III.
423
is the only source of reality, and all our knowledge is found-
ed upon experience alone;"--as if this were an axiom to
which no one could adduce a single objection. How is it
that this common mode of thought, and its guardians, have
so easily got over the causes of doubt which we have just
noticed, and even the positive grounds for the adoption of
the opposite view, as if they had not even an existence?
Why does the opposite view, which, even at the first glance,
and as yet without any deeper investigation, recommends
itself as much more natural and probable,--that the whole
outward Sense, and all its objects, are founded upon univer-
sal Thought, and that a sensible perception is possible only
in Thought, and as something thought, as a determination
of the general consciousness, but by no means in itself and
separated from consciousness,--I mean, the view that it is
not true that we see, hear, and feel absolutely, but only
that we are conscious of seeing, hearing, feeling,--why does
this view which we profess, and which we recognise with
absolute certainty to be the only right one, while we also
clearly perceive its opposite to be a palpable absurdity,--
why does this view, or even the possibility of it, remain
wholly concealed from the common mode of thought? It
may easily be explained:--The judgment of this mode of
thought is the necessary expression of its actual degree of
life. For those who cannot go beyond this mode of thought,
Life dwells, in the meantime, only in outward Sense, the re-
motest extremity of the nascent spiritual Life; in outward
Sense they have their whole round of being, their most vital
existence; in it alone they feel, love, and enjoy; and, of ne-
cessity, where their heart is, there is their faith also:--in
Thought, on the contrary, Life does not spring forth before
them directly as living flesh and blood but seems rather an
inchoate mass; and therefore Thought appears to them to
be a heterogeneous mist, belonging neither to themselves
nor to the matter in hand. Should they ever come so far
as to attain a more intense existence in Thought than in
seeing or hearing, and to feel and enjoy in it more keenly
than in Sense, then would their judgment also be different
from what it is.
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? 424
THE DOCTRINE OF HKLIUION.
Thus is Thought, even in its lowest manifestation, degraded and made of no account by the common view of
things, because this common view does not place the seat of
its Life in Thought,--has not even extended its spiritual
feelers thus far. Thought in its lowest manifestation, I said;
--for that, and nothing more, is this thought of an external
object, which has an antitype, a competitor for truth, in an
outward sensible perception. Thought, in its high and
proper form, is that which creates its own purely spiritual
object absolutely from itself, without the aid of outward
sense, and without any reference whatever to outward sense.
In ordinary life this mode of thought presents itself when,
for example, the question arises with regard to the origin of
the World, or of the Human Race; or regarding the inter-
nal laws of Nature; where, in the first case, it is clear that
at the creation of the world, and before the appearance of
the human race, there was no observer present whose expe-
rience could be cited; and, in the second case, the question
is not regarding specific phenomena, but regarding that in
which all individual phenomena coincide; and that which is
to be evolved is not any visible event, but a mental neces-
sity, which not only is, but is thus, and cannot be otherwise:--
that is, an object proceeding entirely from Thought itself:--
which first point I beg of you thoroughly to understand and
recognise.
In matters pertaining to this higher Thought, the adher-
ents of the common view proceed after this wise:--they let
others invent, or, where they are possessed of greater power,
they invent for themselves, by means of vagrant and law-
less thought, or, as it is called, fancy, one out of many
possible ways in which the actual fact in question may have
arisen ;--in the language of the schools they make an hypo-
thesis :--they then consult their desire, fear, hope, or what-
ever may be their ruling passion for the time, and, should it
assent, the fiction becomes established as a firm and unal-
terable truth. One of the many possible ways, I said; and
this is the leading characteristic of the proceeding we have
described :--but it is necessary that this expression should
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? LECTURE III.
425
be correctly understood. For, in itself, it is not true that
anything whatever is possible in many different ways; but
everything that is, is possible, actual, and necessary, at the
same time only in one perfectly fixed and definite way:--
and herein, indeed, lies the fundamental error of this pro-
ceeding, that it assumes many different possibilities, from
which it proceeds to select one for adoption, without being
able to verify this one by anything but its own caprice.
This proceeding is what we call Opinion, in opposition
to true Thought. Opinion, like Thought itself, possesses,
as its domain, the whole region lying beyond sensuous
experience; this region it fills with the productions of fan-
cy, either that of others or its own, to which desire alone
gives substance and duration; and all this happens simply
and solely because the seat of its spiritual Life is as yet no
higher than in the extremities of blind desire or aversion.
True Thought proceeds in a different way in filling up
this super-sensual region. It does not invent, but spon-
taneously perceives,--not one possibility among many,--but
the one and only possible, actual, and necessary mode; and
this does not seek its confirmation in a proof lying beyond
itself, but it contains within itself its own confirmation;
and, as soon as it is conceived, becomes evident to Thought
itself as the only possible and absolutely certain Truth,
establishing itself in the soul with an immoveable certainty
and evidence that completely destroys even the possibility
of doubt. Since this certainty, as we have said, attaches it-
self at once to the living act of Thought in its immediate
vitality, and to this only, it follows that every one who
would become a partaker in this certainty, must himself,
and in his own person, think the Truth, and cannot commit
to any other the accomplishment of this business in his
stead. Only this preliminary remark I desired to make be-
fore proceeding, as I now do, to our mutual realization of
true Thought in the highest elements of Knowledge.
The first task of such Thought is to conceive of Being in
itself with strict exactitude. I approach this conception thus;
I say:--Being (Seyn), proper and true Being, does not arise,
ib
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? 426
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
does not proceed, does not come forth out of nothingness.
For everything which thus arises, you are compelled to as-
sume a previous causal being, by virtue of which the other
at first arose. If you hold that at some earlier period this
second being has itself arisen in its turn, then you are again
compelled to assume a third being by virtue of which the
second arose; and should you attribute a beginning to the
third then you are compelled to assume a fourth,--and so on
for ever. You must, in every case, at last arrive at a Being
that has not thus arisen, and which therefore requires no
other thing to account for its being, but which is absolutely
through itself, by itself, and from itself. On this Being, to
which you must at last ascend from out the series of created
things, you must now and henceforward fix your attention;
and then it will become evident to you, if you have entered
fully with me into the preceding thoughts, that you can
only conceive of the true Being as a Being by itself, from it-
self, and through itself.
In the second place I add:--that within this Being no-
thing new can arise, nothing can alter its shape, nor shift
nor change; but that as it is now, so has it been from all
eternity, and so it endures unchangeably in all eternity.
For, since it is through itself alone, so is it,--completely,
without division, and without abatement,--all that, through
itself, it can be and must be. Were it in time to become
something new, then must it either have been previously
hindered, by some being foreign to itself, from becoming
this something; or it must become this something new
through the power of a being foreign to itself, which now
for the first time begins to exert an influence upon it:--
both of which suppositions stand in direct contradiction to
its absolute independence and self-sufficiency. And thus it
will become evident to you, if you have thoroughly compre-
hended these thoughts, that Being can be conceived of only
as absolutely One, not as Many; only as a self-comprehen-
sive, self-sufficient, and absolutely unchangeable Unity.
By this course of thought--and this is my third point
--you arrive only at a Being (Seyn) shut up, concealed,
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? LECTURE III. 427
wholly comprehended in itself;--you do not, by any means,
arrive at an Ex-istence (Daseyn;*)--I say to an Ex-istence,
manifestation, or revelation of this Being. I am most anx-
ious that you should understand this at once; and you will
undoubtedly do so, when you have strictly considered this
idea of Being, now for the first time set forth, and have so
become conscious in yourselves of what is contained in this
thought, and what is not contained in it. The natural il-
lusion which may obscure your minds against the desired
insight, I shall very soon examine.
To explain this more fully:--You perceive that I dis-
tinguish Being (Seyn)--essential, self-comprehended Being
--from Ex-istence (Daseyn), and represent these two ideas
as entirely opposed to each other,--as not even indirectly
connected with each other. This distinction is of the weigh-
tiest importance; and only through it can clearness and cer-
tainty be attained in the highest elements of Knowledge.
What Ex-istence (Daseyn) really is, will best be made evi-
dent by actual contemplation of this Ex-istence. I say,
therefore:--Essentially and at the root, the Ex-istence of
Being is the consciousness or conception of Being; as may
be made clear at once in the use of the word "is" when ap-
plied to any particular object,--for example, to this wall.
For, what is this "is" in the proposition, "The wall isV
It is obviously not the wall itself and identical with it; it
does not even assume that character, but it distinguishes
the wall, by the third person, as independent; it thus only
assumes to be an outward characteristic of essential Being,
an image or picture of such Being,--or, as we have ex-
pressed it above, and as it is most distinctly expressed, the
immediate, outward Ex-istence of the wall,--as its Being out
of its Being. (It is admitted that the whole of this experi-
* The English language does not contain terms by which the opposition of
the German "Heyn" and "Daseyn" can be expressed with the distinctness
of the original. "Being" and "ii'x-istence" are here adopted as the nearest
approach to a correct translation that our language admits of, although the
awkwardness of the expression is obvious, and the strict philosophical mean-
ing here attached to those terms is unknown in their common use. -- 7V.
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? 428
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
ment demands the most subtle abstraction and the keenest
inward observation; and it may be added, as the proof, that
no one has thoroughly performed the task, to whom it has
not become evident that the whole, and particularly the last
expression, is perfectly exact. )
The common mode of thought, it is true, is not wont to
remark this distinction; and it may well be that what I
have now said may seem to many something wholly new
and unheard of. The reason of which is, that their love and
affection are attracted directly to the object itself, interested
with it exclusively, and wholly occupied with it; and that
thus they have no time to tarry by the "is," or to consider
its significance, so that to them it is wholly lost . Hence it
usually happens that, leaping over the Ex-istence (Daseyn),
we believe that we have arrived at Being (Seyn) itself;
while nevertheless we forever remain in the fore-court, in
the Ex-istence:--and this common delusion may render the
proposition which we have submitted to you above, at first
sight, dark and unintelligible. In our present inquiry, how-
ever, everything depends on our comprehending this pro-
position at once, and henceforth giving it due attention.
We said that the Consciousness of Being, the "is" to the
Being, is itself the Ex-istence (Daseyn):--leaving out of
sight, in the mean time, the supposition that Consciousness
may be only one among other possible forms, modes, and
kinds of Ex-istence, and that there may be many other, per-
haps an infinite variety of, such forms, modes, and kinds of
Ex-istence. This supposition, however, must be dismissed:
--in the first place, because we here desire not to accumu-
late mere opinions, but truly to think; and secondly, with
reference to its consequences,--for with such a possibility
remaining, our union with the Absolute, as the only source
of Blessedness, could never be attained; but there would
rather be placed, between the Absolute and us, an immea-
surable chasm, as the true source of all Unblessedness.
We have therefore to make it manifest to you in thought,
--which is our fourth point--that the Consciousness of
Being is the only possible form and mode of the Ex-istence
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? LECTURE III.
429
{Daseyri) of Being; and, consequently, is itself immediately
and absolutely this Ex-istence of Being. We conduct you
to this insight in the following way:--Being (Seyn)--as
such, as Being, as abiding, unchangeable Being, without in
any respect laying aside its absolute character and inter-
mingling or blending itself with Ex-istence--must ex-ist.
Hence it must, in itself, be distinct from Ex-istence, and op-
posed to it; and indeed--since besides the absolute Being
(Seyn) itself there is nothing else whatever but its Ex-
istence (Daseyn)--this distinction and opposition must be
manifest in the Ex-istence (Daseyn) itself; and this, more
clearly expressed, is equivalent to the following:--Ex-ist-
ence (Daseyn) must apprehend, recognise, and image forth
itself as mere Ex-istence: and, opposed to itself, it must as-
sume and image forth an absolute Being (Seyn), whose mere
Ex-istence it is; it must thus, by its own nature, as opposed
to another and an absolute existence, annihilate itself:--
which is precisely the character of mere representation, con-
ception, or Consciousness of Being, as you have already seen
in our exposition of the "is. " And thus it is clear, if we
have succeeded in making these ideas thoroughly intelligible
to you, that the Ex-istence of Being must necessarily be--
cannot be other than--a Consciousness of itself--of Ex-
istence--as a mere image or representation of Absolute,
Self-existent Being.
That such is the case, and that Knowledge* or Conscious-
ness is the absolute Ex-istence (Daseyn),--or, as you may
now rather wish to say,--the manifestation and revelation
of Being (Seyn), in its only possible form:--this may be
distinctly understood and seen by Knowledge itself, as we
have now seen it. But--and this is our fifth point--this
Knowledge can, by no means, in itself, understand or see
how itself arises, and how from out the inward, self-compre-
hensive Being (Seyn) an Ex-istence (Daseyri), manifestation
* The reader will observe that in this and the succeeding lectures the word
"Wissen,"" which is here rendered by " Knowledge," is used in the sense of
"Cognition," to express the conscious act of Knowing, and not either the object or the result of that act. -- Tr.
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? 430
THE DOCTRINE OF KELIGION.
or revelation of itself can proceed;--as indeed we may dis-
tinctly perceive, by reference to our third point, that such
a sequential evolution is wholly beyond our power. The
reason of this is, that Ex-istence, as we have already shown,
cannot be without apprehending, recognising, and assuming
itself, because such self-conception is inseparable from its
nature; and thus Knowledge, by the very absoluteness of
its Ex-istence and its dependence on that Ex-istence, is cut
off from all possibility of passing beyond it, or of conceiving
and tracing itself prior to that Ex-istence. It is, for itself
and in itself, and so far well;--but wherever it is, it finds
itself already there in a certain determinate mode, which it
must accept just as it is presented to it, but which it can
by no means explain, nor declare how and whereby it has
become so. This unchangeably determined mode of the
Ex-istence of Knowledge, which can be apprehended only
by immediate comprehension and perception, is the essen-
tial and truly real Life of Knowledge.
But notwithstanding that this true and real Life of Know-
ledge cannot explain the definite mode in which it has a-
risen, it is yet susceptible of a general interpretation; and
we may understand and perceive with absolute certainty
what it is according to its essential inward nature;--which is
our sixth point.
in that wherein it is placed by the common mode of
thought,--namely in this, that man should believe, be of
opinion, and rest satisfied, because no one has the hardihood
to assert the opposite,--his belief resting wholly on hearsay
and outward assurance,--that there is a God:--this is a
vulgar superstition by which, at most, a defective police
system may be remedied, while the inward nature of man
remains as bad as before, and indeed frequently is made
worse, since he forms this God after his own image, and in
him only manufactures a new prop for his own corruption.
But^Jierein, Religion does consist, that man in his own per-
son and not in that of another, with his own spiritual eye
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? 40G
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
and not through that of another, should immediately behold,
have, and possess God. This, however, is possible only by
means of pure, independent Thought, for only through this
does man assume true and real personality, and this alone is
the eye to which God can become visible. Pure Thought is
itself the Divine Existence; and, on the other hand, the
Divine Existence, in its immediate essence, is nothing else
than pure Thought.
Besides, to look at this matter historically, the assumption
that absolutely all men without exception may come to the
knowledge of God, as well as the effort to raise them all to
this knowledge, is the assumption and the effort of Chris-
tianity; and, since Christianity is the developing principle
and peculiar characteristic of modern time, this assumption
and this effort form the peculiar spirit of the Age of the
New Testament. Now the two expressions,--to elevate all
men without exception to the knowledge of God,--and, to
communicate to mankind at large the deepest elements and
foundations of knowledge in another way than that of sys-
tematic instruction,--mean strictly and entirely one and the
same thing. It is clear, therefore, that every one who does
not wish to return to the ancient times of Heathendom
must admit not only the possibility, but the irremissible
duty, of communicating to men the profoundest principles
of knowledge in a generally comprehensible form.
But,--to close this argument for the possibility of a popu-
lar exposition of the profoundest truth with the most deci-
sive proof, that of facts :--Has then this knowledge,--which
we have undertaken, by means of these lectures, to unfold
in those who as yet have it not, and to strengthen and
purify in those who already possess it,--has it never until our
time been present in the world, and do we pretend now to
introduce something wholly new and hitherto nowhere dis-
coverable? We would not wish to think that this latter
had even been said of us; but, on the contrary, we maintain
that this knowledge, in all its clearness and purity, which we
can by no means surpass, and in every age from the origin of
Christianity downwards, although for the most part unre-
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? LECTURE II.
407
cognised, and even persecuted by the dominant church, has
yet, here and there, secretly ruled the minds of men and
disseminated itself abroad. On the other hand, we do not
hesitate to declare that the method of regular, systematic,
and scientific investigation, by which we for our part have at-
tained to this knowledge, has in former times, not indeed in
respect of trial, but certainly in respect of success, been un-
known in the world; and that, under the guidance of the
spirit of our great forefathers, it has been for the most part
our own work. If, then, this scientific, philosophical insight
was before awanting, in what way did Christ, or--since, in
his case, some will assume for it a miraculous, supernatural
origin, which I will not here dispute,--in what way did
Christ's Apostles,--in what way did all those who, from their
time down to our own, have possessed this knowledge,--in
what way did they actually acquire it! Among the former,
as among the latter, there were many very unlearned per-
sons, wholly ignorant of philosophy or even opposed to it;
the few among them who meddled with philosophy at all,
and with whose philosophy we are acquainted, so philoso-
phized that it is easy for the educated man to perceive that
it was not to their philosophy that they owed their insight.
But to say, that they did not obtain that insight by way of
philosophy, is just to say, that they did obtain it in a popu-
lar way. Why then should that which has been possible
heretofore, in an unbroken sequence for nearly two thousand
years, be now impossible? Why should that which was pos-
sible with very imperfect aids, at a period when general
enlightenment was nowhere to be found in the world, be no
longer possible, now when the needful aids have been per-
fected, and, at least in philosophy, the requisite enlightenment exists? Why should that which was possible when
religious faith and natural understanding were yet at vari-
ance to a certain extent, become impossible now that they
have been reconciled to each other, and, forgetting their
former disunion, pursue in friendship one and the same end?
That which follows most decisively from all these con-
siderations is the duty incumbent upon every man who is
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? 408
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
penetrated by this higher knowledge to exert all his powers
to communicate that knowledge, wherever possible, to the
whole brotherhood of humanity; presenting it to each indi-
vidual in that form in which he is most open to its recep-
tion; never debating with himself, nor wavering in doubt,
whether or not it may succeed, but labouring as if it must
of necessity succeed; and after each completed effort, rising
with new and fresh vigour as if nothing had yet been at-
tained ;--and, on the other hand, the duty of each indivi-
dual who is not yet in possession of this knowledge, or who
does not possess it in fitting clearness and freedom and as
an ever-present possession, to devote himself wholly and un-
reservedly to the instruction thus offered to him, as if it
were destined for him especially, and belonged to him, and
must of necessity be understood by him; not fearfully and
timidly exclaiming "Ah! shall I indeed understand it? " or,
"Do I then understand it rightly? " Understand it rightly,
in the sense of perfect comprehension, would be saying
much ;--in this sense, these lectures may perhaps be under-
stood fully only by such as could themselves have spoken
them. But to understand, and that not erroneously, lies
within the power of every one who, moved by these dis-
courses, is elevated above the common view of the world,
and inspired with exalted sentiments and resolves. The
reciprocal obligation to both these duties lies at the founda-
tion of the contract we entered into at the beginning of
these lectures. I will unweariedly search for new forms,
applications, and combinations, as if it were impossible to
make myself fully intelligible to you:--do you on the other
hand, that is, you who seek instruction here--for to the
others I willingly limit myself to counsel--do you proceed
with earnestness and courage to the business, as if you had
to understand me by half words only;--and in this way I
believe that we shall agree well together.
These considerations on the possibility and necessity of a
generally comprehensible exposition of the deepest elements
of knowledge acquire a new significance and convincing
power, when we examine more strictly the peculiar and
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? LECTURE II.
409
characteristic distinction between the Popular and the
Scientific discourse;--a distinction which in my opinion is
virtually unknown, and which, in particular, lies wholly con-
cealed from those who talk so readily of the possibility and
impossibility of popular expositions. The Scientific dis-
course eliminates truth from among the errors which sur-
round and oppose it on all sides and in every form; and, by
demolition of these opposing view as error and as impos-
sible to true thought, shows the truth as that which alone
remains after their withdrawal, and therefore as the only
possible truth:--and in this separation of opposites, and
elucidation of the truth from the confused chaos in which
truth and error lie mingled together, consists the peculiar
and characteristic nature of the Scientific discourse. By
this method truth emerges before our eyes out of a world
full of error. Now it is obvious that the philosopher, before
such sifting of truth, before he could either project or begin
it and therefore independent of scientific proof, must al-
ready possess truth. But how could he attain possession of
it except by the guidance of a natural sense of truth which
exists in him with higher power than in his contempora-
ries ? --and in what other way, then, has he at first attained
it but by the unartificial popular way? To this natural sense
of truth, which is thus seen to be the starting-point even of
scientific philosophy, the Popular discourse addresses itself
immediately without calling aught else to its aid,--setting
forth the truth, and nothing but the truth, purely and sim-
ply, as it is in itself and not as it stands opposed to error,--
and calculates upon the spontaneous assent of this natural
sense of truth. This discourse cannot indeed prove any-
thing; but it must certainly be understood; for intelligence
itself is the only organ whereby we can apprehend its im-
port, and without this it cannot reach us at all. The Scien-
tific discourse presupposes in the hearer an entanglement in
the meshes of error, and addresses itself to a diseased and
perverted spiritual nature;--the Popular discourse presup-
poses an open and candid mind, and appeals to a healthy,
although not sufficiently cultivated, spiritual nature. After
ub
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? '410
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
all this, how can the philosopher entertain a doubt that the
natural sense of truth in man is sufficient to lead him to
the knowledge of truth, since he himself has attained to
that knowledge by this means and no other?
But notwithstanding that the comprehension of the deep-
est truths of Reason, by means of a popular exposition, is
possible,--notwithstanding further that this comprehension
is a necessary purpose of humanity towards the attainment
of which every power ought to be directed,--we must never-
theless acknowledge that there are, in the present age,
greater hindrances to the accomplishment of this purpose
than have existed at any previous time. In the first place,
the very form of this higher truth,--this strictly determi-
nate, settled, absolutely unchanging and unchangeable form,
--comes into collision, and that in a two-fold manner, with
the hesitating modesty which this age--has not indeed in
itself but yet--would exact from every one who undertakes
to deal with it. It is not to be denied that this knowledge
assumes itself to be true, and alone true, and true only in
the sharp and complete precision in which it is thus an-
nounced,--and everything opposed to it, absolutely and
without exception or mitigation, to be false;--that therefore
it seeks, without forbearance, to subdue all weak partiali-
ties, all vagrant fancies, and wholly disdains to enter into any
treaty or compromise with the other side. The men of these
days are offended at this severity, as if they were thereby
grievously ill-treated;--they would be deferentially saluted,
and consulted as to whether they will lend their sanction to
such a matter; would make conditions on their side, and
there should be some elbow-room left for their tricks of le-
gerdemain. Others are dissatisfied with this form of truth,
because it requires them at once to take their part for or
against, and to decide on the instant yes or no. For they
are in no haste to know for certain about that which never-
theless is alone worth knowing, and would willingly suspend
their voices, in case it should afterwards turn out to be
wholly otherwise; and besides it is very convenient to con-
ceal their want of understanding under the fashionable and
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? LECTURE II.
411
high-sounding name of Scepticism, and to allow mankind
to believe that there, where in fact they have been found
wanting in power to comprehend that which lies clear
before them, it has been their superior acuteness and pene-
tration which has disclosed to them certain unheard-of, and
to all other men inaccessible, grounds for doubt.
Again, there is a hindrance to the successful issue of our
undertaking in this age, in the monstrously paradoxical,
strange, and unheard-of appearance of our doctrine, since it
turns into falsehood precisely those things which the age
has hitherto prized as the most precious and sacred results
of its culture and enlightenment. Not as if our doctrine
were in itself new and paradoxical. Among the Greeks,
Plato held the same faith. The Johannean Christ said
precisely the same things which we teach and prove, and
even said them in the same language which we here
employ; and in these very times, and among our own
nation, two of our greatest Poets have given expression to
the same truth in manifold applications and under many
forms. But the Johannean Christ has been superseded by
his less spiritual followers; and Poets, it is thought, desire
only to utter fine words and to produce musical sounds.
That this ancient doctrine, which has thus been renewed
from age to age down even to these later times, should yet
seem so wholly new and unheard-of arises in this way.
After the revival of learning in Modern Europe, and particu-
larly since, by means of the Church Reformation, the evi-
dence of the highest religious truth was freely presented to
the mind, there gradually arose a philosophy which made
the experiment whether the books of Nature and of Know-
ledge, which were to it unintelligible, might not assume a
meaning when read backwards; whereby indeed everything
without exception was taken out of its natural position, and
set head downwards. This philosophy took possession, as
every prevalent philosophy necessarily does, of all the
avenues of public instruction,--catechisms, schoolbooks, pub-
lic religious discourses, literature. All our youthful culture
fell within this period. There is thus no wonder that, after
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? 412
THE DOCTIUSE OF RELIGION.
the unnatural had become to us natural, Nature herself
should seem to us unnatural; and that, after we had been
accustomed to see all things upside-down, we should ima-
gine them to be inverted when we beheld them restored to
their true position. This indeed is an error which will dis-
appear with the age which produced it; for we, who explain
death by life, the body by the soul,--and not the reverse as
these moderns do,--we are the true followers of the
Ancients; ouly that we see clearly what remained dark to
them; while the philosophy which we have alluded to above
is not even an advance in time, but only a ludicrous inter-
lude, a petty appendix to thorough barbarism.
Lastly, those who might perchance of themselves over-
come the two hindrances now pointed out, may yet be
scared back by the hateful and malicious objections urged
by the fanatics of perversity. It may indeed be wondered
at that such perversity, not satisfied with being in its own
person perverse, should besides exhibit a fanatical zeal for
for the maintenance and diffusion of the same perversity in
others. Yet even this may be readily explained, and in
this way. When these fanatics had reached the years of
reflection and self-knowledge, and had thoroughly examined
themselves and their own inward being, and found nothing
there but the impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being,
had not felt the slightest desire either to discover within
themselves, or to acquire from without, anything but what
they found there,--then they have looked around upon their
fellow-men, observed them, and fancied that neither was
there anything to be met with in them higher than this same
impulse towards personal, sensuous, well-being. Hereupon
they have satisfied themselves that in this consists the es-
sential nature of humanity; and having cultivated this na-
ture in themselves with unremitting care and to the highest
possible perfection, they have necessarily become in their
own eyes the most preeminent and distinguished among
men, since they were conscious of being virtuosi in those
things wherein the worth of humanity consists. Thus have
they thought and acted throughout life. But should it ap-
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? LECTURE II.
413
pear that they have been mistaken- in the major proposition
of their syllogism,--if in others of their species there has
been manifested something else, and in this case something
undeniably higher and more divine than the mere impulse
towards personal, sensuous, well-being,--then they who had
hitherto held themselves to be men of distinguished preemi-
nence would be found to belong to a lower race, and instead
of as before esteeming themselves higher than all others,
they would be compelled thenceforward to despise and reject
themselves. They cannot do otherwise than angrily oppose
this conviction of a higher nature in man, which brings only
disgrace to them, and all phenomena which confirm this
conviction; they must necessarily do everything in their
power to keep such phenomena at a distance from them-
selves, and even to suppress them altogether; they struggle
for life,--for the most delicate and innermost root of their
life,--for the possibility of self-endurance. All fanaticism,
and all its angry exhibitions, from the beginning of the
world down to the present day, have proceeded from this
principle:--"If my opponent be right, then am I a miserable
man. " Where this fanaticism can wield fire and sword, with
fire and sword it assails its detested adversary; where these
instruments are beyond its reach, it has still the tongue left,
--which, if it do not kill the foe, is yet frequently able to
cripple his activity and influence with others. One of the
most favourite and customary tricks of tongue-fence among
these fanatics is this:--to give to the thing which is hateful
only to them, a name which is hateful to all men, in order
thereby to decry it and render it suspected. The existing
store of such tricks and nicknames is inexhaustible, and is
constantly enriched by fresh additions; and it would be in
vain to attempt here any complete enumeration of them. I shall notice only one of the most common of these odious
nicknames,--i. e. the charge that this doctrine which we
teach is Mysticism.
Observe, in the first place, with reference to the form of
this accusation, that should any candid unprejudiced person
answer:--" Well, let us suppose that it is Mysticism, and
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? 4U
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
that Mysticism is an erroneous and dangerous thing; let
him for that very reason bring forward his doctrine, and we
will hear him: if it is erroneous and dangerous, this will
come to light when the opportunity is given;"--these fana-
tics must reply, in accordance with the peremptory decision
by which they believe they have got rid of us ;--" There is
nothing more to hear;--Mysticism has long ago, for some
generations back, by the unanimous voice of all our literary
Councils, been decreed to be heresy and placed under ex-
communication. "
Further--to proceed from the form of this accusation to
its substance;--What then is this Mysticism whicb tbey
lay to our charge? We shall not indeed receive a distinct
answer to this question from them :--for as they never pos-
sess a clear idea, but only think about high-sounding
phrases, so in this case they have no conception answering to
their words;--we must therefore help ourselves. There is,
unquestionably, a view of spiritual and sacred things which,
although correct in the main, is nevertheless afflicted with
a grievous infirmity, and thereby rendered impure and noxi-
ous. In my lectures of last year,* I took occasion, in pass-
ing, to delineate this view, and I may perhaps find an op-
portunity this season to return to the subject. This view,
which in part is certainly a much perverted one, is properly
distinguished from the true religious view by the name of
Mysticism;--I myself am wont to make this distinction,
employing the names just mentioned; and from this Mys-
ticism my doctrine is far removed, and indeed wholly op-
posed to it. Thus, I say, do I regard the matter. But what
would the fanatics? The distinction I have mentioned is
completely concealed from their eyes, as well as from the
eyes of that philosophy which they follow;--according to
their unanimous resolutions, their criticisms, their discus-
sions, their favourite works, and all their public manifesta-
tions without exception,--which he who can may examine
for himself, and the others may believe me upon trust,--ac-
"Characteristics of the Present Age," Lecture VIII.
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? LECTURE II.
415
cording to these unanimous resolutions, it is always the True
Religion, the Knowledge of God in spirit and in truth, which
they call Mysticism, and against which in fact, under this
name, they hurl their anathema. Their warnings against this
doctrine, as Mysticism, therefore mean nothing else than
what may be thus paraphrased:--"Yonder they will tell you
of the existence of a spiritual world, revealed to no outward
sense, but to be apprehended only by pure thought:--you are
lost if you allow yourselves to be persuaded of this, for there is absolutely no existence but that which we can grasp with our hand, and we have nothing else to care for; all else are
mere abstractions from the substantial realities we can
handle, which in themselves have no substance and which
these enthusiasts confound with palpable reality. They will
tell you of the reality, the inward independence, the creative
power of thought:--you are lost to real life if you believe
them; for there is nothing really existing but, in the first
place, the stomach, and then that which supports it and
supplies it with food; and it is only the gases that have
their birth in it which these dreamers call ideas. " We ad-
mit the whole accusation, and willingly confess, not without
joyful and exulting feelings, that, in this sense of the word,
our doctrine is indeed Mysticism. With these we have
therefore no new controversy to begin, but find ourselves
in the old controversy, which has never been solved nor
reconciled; t. e. --they say that all Religion--truly it may
be said of the vulgar superstition we have alluded to above
--is something in the highest degree objectionable and per-
nicious, and must be extirpated from the earth, root and
branch; and so the matter remains with them ;--while we
say that True Religion is something in the highest degree
blessed, and that which alone gives true existence, worth,
and dignity to man, here below and throughout eternity;
and that every power must be put forth in order that this
Religion may, wherever it is possible, be made known to
all men; this we recognise with absolute certainty, and
thus the matter remains on our side.
Meanwhile, that these persons should rather choose to say
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? 410
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
"That is Mysticism," than, as they ought to say, " That is
Religion," arises, among other causes which do not belong to
our present subject, from the following:--They desire by
this language, in the first place, imperceptibly to induce a
fear that, by means of this our doctrine, there may be intro-
duced intolerance, desire of persecution, insubordination, and
civil disturbance; or that, in one word, this doctrine is dan-
gerous to the State :--secondly and chiefly, they wish to
create alarm, in those who may enter upon inquiries like
the present, as to their continuance in possession of a sound
mind, and to give them to understand that in this way they
may come at last to see ghosts in broad daylight--which
would be a very great misfortune indeed. As to the first,
the danger to the State :-- they violently appropriate and
pervert the description of that from which danger may be
feared, and they doubtless calculate quite securely that no
one will be found to discover the change; for neither that
which they call Mysticism--the True Religion--nor that
which we call by that name, has ever been known to perse-
cute, to show intolerance, or to stir up civil commotion ;--
throughout the whole history of Churches, heresies, and per-
secutions, the persecuted party have ever occupied a propor-
tionally higher, and the persecutors a lower position; the
latter fighting, as we said above, for life. No ! intolerance,
desire of persecution, insubordination toward the State,
belong only to that spirit by which they themselves are ani-
mated, the fanaticism of perversity; and, if it were other-
wise advisable, I would willingly have the fetters struck off
this very day from the enslaved, that it might be seen what
course they would take. As to the second object of solici-
tude, the preservation of a sound mind:--this depends in
the first instance on physical organization; and against in-
fluences of this kind, even the shallowest inanity, the lowest
vulgarity of soul, is by no means a safe-guard;--hence there
is no occasion to throw ourselves into the arms of these
fanatics in order to escape the threatened danger. So far as
I know, or have known, those who live amid those investi-
gations of which we now speak, and find in them their uniu-
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? LECTUKE II.
417
terrupted daily labour, are by no means exposed to these
distractions, see no ghosts, and are as healthy, in mind and
body, as others. If, sometimes in life, they do not what
most other men in their place would have done, or do what
most other men in the same place would have left undone,
it is not because they are deficient in acuteness to perceive
the possibility of the one course of action, or the conse-
quences of the other,--as those who, in their place, would
certainly have done otherwise cannot refrain from thinking,
--but for other reasons. If there must always be diseased
spiritual natures, who as soon as they quit their housekeep-
ing books, or whatever other morsel of reality gives employ-
ment to their faculties, forthwith fall into the mazes of
error, let such remain by their housekeeping books ! --but I
trust that the general rule may not be taken from them,
who, it is to be hoped, are the smaller number, and are cer-
tainly of the lower species; nor, because there are feeble
and diseased creatures among men, the whole human race
be treated as if they were feeble and diseased. That we
have interested ourselves in the deaf, dumb, and blind, and
have invented a way whereby instruction may be communi-
ted to them, is deserving of all thanks;--from the deaf and
dumb, namely, and the blind. But if we were to make this
method of instruction the universal plan of education for
persons without these defects, because such persons may en-
counter deaf, dumb, and blind people, and we should thus be
sure that we had provided for every such contingency; if
he who can hear should, without regard to his hearing, be
made to talk by the same laborious process as the deaf and
dumb, and require to learn to detect the words upon the
lips; and he who can see should, without regard to his see-
ing, be taught to read the letters by the touch ;-^this would
deserve little thanks indeed from those who have no defect
in sense, notwithstanding that such an arrangement would
certainly be adopted as soon as the direction of public in-
struction should be made dependent on the opinion of the
deaf and dumb and the blind.
These are the preliminary suggestions and considerations
Hb
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? 418
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
which I have thought it advisable to communicate to you
to day. Eight days hence I shall endeavour to set forth, in
a new light and upon a new side, the foundation-principles
of these lectures, which are at the same time the foundation-
principles of all knowledge ;--and to this I respectfully in-
vite you.
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? 419
LECTURE III.
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE COMMON MODE OF
THOUGHT :--DEFINITION OF BEING (SEYN)
AND SX-ISTENCE (DASEYN. )
In the first of these lectures we maintained that not every-
thing which seems to be living does really and truly live;
and in the second we said that a large portion of mankind,
throughout their whole Life, never attain to true and proper
Thought, but remain within the circle of mere Opinion. It
might well be, and indeed it has already become obvious
from other remarks which we made on that occasion, that
the phrases Thought and Life--Thought-lessness and Death,
mean precisely one and the same thing; we have already
shown that Thought is the element of Life, and consequent-
ly the absence of Thought must be the source of Death.
An important difficulty stands in the way of this asser-
tion, to which I must now direct your attention, namely the
following :--If Life be an organic whole, determined by one
universally efficient law, then it seems at first sight impos-
sible that any one part appertaining to Life should be ab-
sent where the others are present; or that any one indivi-
dual part should exist without all the parts proper to Life,
and consequently without Life itself as a whole, in its com-
plete organic unity. In solving this difficulty, we shall also
be able to exhibit to you clearly the distinction between
true Thought and mere Opinion, which was the first busi-
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? 420
THE DOCTHINE OF RELIGION.
ncss announced for to-day in our last discourse, before we
proceed to the fulfilment of our other purpose in this lec-
ture, namely, to begin the application of pure Thought it-
self to the elements of all Knowledge.
The supposed difficulty is thus solved :--Wherever spiri-
tual Life is to be found, everything, without exception, that
belongs to this Life, follows wholly and unreservedly, accord-
ing to the established law of its being :--but all this, which
follows with absolute mechanical necessity, does not neces-
sarily enter into consciousness; it is there indeed a Life
according to the law, but not our Life, not the Life which is
properly and peculiarly ours. Our Life is only that part of
the Life according to the law which we embrace in clear
consciousness, and, in this clear consciousness, love and en-
joy. "Where Love is, there is individual Life," we said
once;--Love, however, exists only where there is clear con-
sciousness.
The development of this conscious Life--which in these
lectures is all to which we shall give the name of Life--
within the whole mass of Life which has an existence ac-
cording to the law, proceeds precisely like that of physical
death. As this, in its natural progress, begins at first in the
remoter members, those farthest removed from the central
seat of life, and from them spreads itself gradually to the
inward parts, until at last it reaches the heart; so does the
spiritual Life, filled with consciousness, love, and enjoyment
of itself, begin at first in the extremities and remoter out-
works of Life, until it also, with God's good pleasure, reaches
the true foundation and central point of alL An ancient
philosopher maintained that the animals had arisen from
the earth; "as happens," he added, "even to the present
day in miniature, since every spring, particularly after a
warm rain, we may observe frogs, for example, in whom
some particular part, perhaps the fore-feet, may be quite
perfectly developed, while the other members still remain a
rude and undeveloped clod of earth. " The half-animals of
this philosopher, although they scarcely afford sufficient
evidence of what they were designed to prove, yet present a
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? LECTURE III.
421
very striking illustration of the spiritual Life of ordinary
men. The outward members of this Life are in themselves
perfectly formed, and warm blood flows through the ex-
tremities; but when we look to the heart, and the other
nobler organs of life,--which, in themselves and according
to the law, are indeed there, and must necessarily be there,
since otherwise even the outward members themselves could
not have been,--in these organs, I say, they are found to be
still unsentient clods--frozen rocks.
I shall, first of all, convince you of this by a striking
example; to which, although I shall express myself with
strict precision, I must yet require your particular attention,
on account of the novelty of the observation. We see, hear,
feel--outward objects; and along with this seeing, &c. , we
also think these objects, and are conscious of them by means
of our inward sense; just as we are conscious, by the same
inward sense, of our seeing, hearing, and feeling of these ob-
jects. I hope that no one who is possessed even of the com-
monest power of reflexion will maintain that he can see,
hear, or feel an object without being at the same time in-
wardly conscious both of the object itself, and of his seeing,
hearing, or feeling of it;--that he can see, hear, or feel any-
thing definite without consciousness. This co-existence, this
inseparability of the outward, sensible perception and the in-
ward thought or conception,--this co-existence, I say, and
nothing more than this, lies in practical self-observation, or
the fact of Consciousness; but this fact of consciousness does
by no means contain,--and I beg you to note this well,--
this fact of consciousness does by no means contain any re-
lation between these two elements,--the outward Sense and
the inward Thought,--a relation of the one to the other,--
it may be as Cause and Effect, or as Essential and Acci-
dental . If any such relation between the two be assumed,
this is not done in consequence of practical self-observation,
and it does not lie in the fact of consciousness :--this is the
first thing that I beg of you to understand and keep in
mind.
Now, in the second place, should such a relation be as-
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THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
sumed upon some other ground than that of self-observa-
tion,--which other possible ground we put in the place of
consciousness,--should such a relation between the two
elements be, upon such a ground, supposed and accepted,--
then it appears, at first sight, that the two elements, as co-
existent and inseparable from each other, must be held to
be of equal rank; and thus the inward thought may as well
be regarded as the foundation, the essential,--and the out-
ward perception as the superstructure, the accident,--as the
reverse; and in this way an insoluble doubt would neces-
sarily arise between the two suppositions, which would for
ever prevent any final decision respecting the assumed re-
lation. Thus, I say, it is at first sight;--but should any
one look deeper into the matter, then,--inasmuch as the
inward consciousness embraces even the outward sense it-
self,--since we are conscious of the seeing, hearing, or feel-
ing, but can by no means, on the other hand, see, hear, or
feel our consciousness,--and thus, even in the immediate
fact, consciousness assumes the higher place:--then, I say,
such an one would find it much more natural to make the
internal Consciousness the chief thing, and the external
Sense the subordinate thing; to explain the latter by the
former; to control and try the latter by the former;--and
not the reverse.
Now how does the common mode of thought proceed in
this matter? To it, the outward Sense is, without further
inquiry, the first thing, the immediate touchstone of truth:
--whatever is seen, heard, or felt, that is, just because it is
seen, heard, or felt. The Thought, or inward consciousness
of the object, comes afterwards, as an empty addition which
is scarcely to be noticed at all, and is quite willingly dis-
pensed with if it do not force itself upon our observation;
and a thing is never seen or heard because it is thought, but
it is thought because it is seen or heard, and that under the
guidance and control of this seeing and hearing. The per-
verse and absurd modern philosophy referred to in our last
lecture, as the peculiar organ and voice of common opinion,
comes forward and unblushingly declares:--" Outward sense
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? LECTURE III.
423
is the only source of reality, and all our knowledge is found-
ed upon experience alone;"--as if this were an axiom to
which no one could adduce a single objection. How is it
that this common mode of thought, and its guardians, have
so easily got over the causes of doubt which we have just
noticed, and even the positive grounds for the adoption of
the opposite view, as if they had not even an existence?
Why does the opposite view, which, even at the first glance,
and as yet without any deeper investigation, recommends
itself as much more natural and probable,--that the whole
outward Sense, and all its objects, are founded upon univer-
sal Thought, and that a sensible perception is possible only
in Thought, and as something thought, as a determination
of the general consciousness, but by no means in itself and
separated from consciousness,--I mean, the view that it is
not true that we see, hear, and feel absolutely, but only
that we are conscious of seeing, hearing, feeling,--why does
this view which we profess, and which we recognise with
absolute certainty to be the only right one, while we also
clearly perceive its opposite to be a palpable absurdity,--
why does this view, or even the possibility of it, remain
wholly concealed from the common mode of thought? It
may easily be explained:--The judgment of this mode of
thought is the necessary expression of its actual degree of
life. For those who cannot go beyond this mode of thought,
Life dwells, in the meantime, only in outward Sense, the re-
motest extremity of the nascent spiritual Life; in outward
Sense they have their whole round of being, their most vital
existence; in it alone they feel, love, and enjoy; and, of ne-
cessity, where their heart is, there is their faith also:--in
Thought, on the contrary, Life does not spring forth before
them directly as living flesh and blood but seems rather an
inchoate mass; and therefore Thought appears to them to
be a heterogeneous mist, belonging neither to themselves
nor to the matter in hand. Should they ever come so far
as to attain a more intense existence in Thought than in
seeing or hearing, and to feel and enjoy in it more keenly
than in Sense, then would their judgment also be different
from what it is.
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? 424
THE DOCTRINE OF HKLIUION.
Thus is Thought, even in its lowest manifestation, degraded and made of no account by the common view of
things, because this common view does not place the seat of
its Life in Thought,--has not even extended its spiritual
feelers thus far. Thought in its lowest manifestation, I said;
--for that, and nothing more, is this thought of an external
object, which has an antitype, a competitor for truth, in an
outward sensible perception. Thought, in its high and
proper form, is that which creates its own purely spiritual
object absolutely from itself, without the aid of outward
sense, and without any reference whatever to outward sense.
In ordinary life this mode of thought presents itself when,
for example, the question arises with regard to the origin of
the World, or of the Human Race; or regarding the inter-
nal laws of Nature; where, in the first case, it is clear that
at the creation of the world, and before the appearance of
the human race, there was no observer present whose expe-
rience could be cited; and, in the second case, the question
is not regarding specific phenomena, but regarding that in
which all individual phenomena coincide; and that which is
to be evolved is not any visible event, but a mental neces-
sity, which not only is, but is thus, and cannot be otherwise:--
that is, an object proceeding entirely from Thought itself:--
which first point I beg of you thoroughly to understand and
recognise.
In matters pertaining to this higher Thought, the adher-
ents of the common view proceed after this wise:--they let
others invent, or, where they are possessed of greater power,
they invent for themselves, by means of vagrant and law-
less thought, or, as it is called, fancy, one out of many
possible ways in which the actual fact in question may have
arisen ;--in the language of the schools they make an hypo-
thesis :--they then consult their desire, fear, hope, or what-
ever may be their ruling passion for the time, and, should it
assent, the fiction becomes established as a firm and unal-
terable truth. One of the many possible ways, I said; and
this is the leading characteristic of the proceeding we have
described :--but it is necessary that this expression should
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? LECTURE III.
425
be correctly understood. For, in itself, it is not true that
anything whatever is possible in many different ways; but
everything that is, is possible, actual, and necessary, at the
same time only in one perfectly fixed and definite way:--
and herein, indeed, lies the fundamental error of this pro-
ceeding, that it assumes many different possibilities, from
which it proceeds to select one for adoption, without being
able to verify this one by anything but its own caprice.
This proceeding is what we call Opinion, in opposition
to true Thought. Opinion, like Thought itself, possesses,
as its domain, the whole region lying beyond sensuous
experience; this region it fills with the productions of fan-
cy, either that of others or its own, to which desire alone
gives substance and duration; and all this happens simply
and solely because the seat of its spiritual Life is as yet no
higher than in the extremities of blind desire or aversion.
True Thought proceeds in a different way in filling up
this super-sensual region. It does not invent, but spon-
taneously perceives,--not one possibility among many,--but
the one and only possible, actual, and necessary mode; and
this does not seek its confirmation in a proof lying beyond
itself, but it contains within itself its own confirmation;
and, as soon as it is conceived, becomes evident to Thought
itself as the only possible and absolutely certain Truth,
establishing itself in the soul with an immoveable certainty
and evidence that completely destroys even the possibility
of doubt. Since this certainty, as we have said, attaches it-
self at once to the living act of Thought in its immediate
vitality, and to this only, it follows that every one who
would become a partaker in this certainty, must himself,
and in his own person, think the Truth, and cannot commit
to any other the accomplishment of this business in his
stead. Only this preliminary remark I desired to make be-
fore proceeding, as I now do, to our mutual realization of
true Thought in the highest elements of Knowledge.
The first task of such Thought is to conceive of Being in
itself with strict exactitude. I approach this conception thus;
I say:--Being (Seyn), proper and true Being, does not arise,
ib
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? 426
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
does not proceed, does not come forth out of nothingness.
For everything which thus arises, you are compelled to as-
sume a previous causal being, by virtue of which the other
at first arose. If you hold that at some earlier period this
second being has itself arisen in its turn, then you are again
compelled to assume a third being by virtue of which the
second arose; and should you attribute a beginning to the
third then you are compelled to assume a fourth,--and so on
for ever. You must, in every case, at last arrive at a Being
that has not thus arisen, and which therefore requires no
other thing to account for its being, but which is absolutely
through itself, by itself, and from itself. On this Being, to
which you must at last ascend from out the series of created
things, you must now and henceforward fix your attention;
and then it will become evident to you, if you have entered
fully with me into the preceding thoughts, that you can
only conceive of the true Being as a Being by itself, from it-
self, and through itself.
In the second place I add:--that within this Being no-
thing new can arise, nothing can alter its shape, nor shift
nor change; but that as it is now, so has it been from all
eternity, and so it endures unchangeably in all eternity.
For, since it is through itself alone, so is it,--completely,
without division, and without abatement,--all that, through
itself, it can be and must be. Were it in time to become
something new, then must it either have been previously
hindered, by some being foreign to itself, from becoming
this something; or it must become this something new
through the power of a being foreign to itself, which now
for the first time begins to exert an influence upon it:--
both of which suppositions stand in direct contradiction to
its absolute independence and self-sufficiency. And thus it
will become evident to you, if you have thoroughly compre-
hended these thoughts, that Being can be conceived of only
as absolutely One, not as Many; only as a self-comprehen-
sive, self-sufficient, and absolutely unchangeable Unity.
By this course of thought--and this is my third point
--you arrive only at a Being (Seyn) shut up, concealed,
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? LECTURE III. 427
wholly comprehended in itself;--you do not, by any means,
arrive at an Ex-istence (Daseyn;*)--I say to an Ex-istence,
manifestation, or revelation of this Being. I am most anx-
ious that you should understand this at once; and you will
undoubtedly do so, when you have strictly considered this
idea of Being, now for the first time set forth, and have so
become conscious in yourselves of what is contained in this
thought, and what is not contained in it. The natural il-
lusion which may obscure your minds against the desired
insight, I shall very soon examine.
To explain this more fully:--You perceive that I dis-
tinguish Being (Seyn)--essential, self-comprehended Being
--from Ex-istence (Daseyn), and represent these two ideas
as entirely opposed to each other,--as not even indirectly
connected with each other. This distinction is of the weigh-
tiest importance; and only through it can clearness and cer-
tainty be attained in the highest elements of Knowledge.
What Ex-istence (Daseyn) really is, will best be made evi-
dent by actual contemplation of this Ex-istence. I say,
therefore:--Essentially and at the root, the Ex-istence of
Being is the consciousness or conception of Being; as may
be made clear at once in the use of the word "is" when ap-
plied to any particular object,--for example, to this wall.
For, what is this "is" in the proposition, "The wall isV
It is obviously not the wall itself and identical with it; it
does not even assume that character, but it distinguishes
the wall, by the third person, as independent; it thus only
assumes to be an outward characteristic of essential Being,
an image or picture of such Being,--or, as we have ex-
pressed it above, and as it is most distinctly expressed, the
immediate, outward Ex-istence of the wall,--as its Being out
of its Being. (It is admitted that the whole of this experi-
* The English language does not contain terms by which the opposition of
the German "Heyn" and "Daseyn" can be expressed with the distinctness
of the original. "Being" and "ii'x-istence" are here adopted as the nearest
approach to a correct translation that our language admits of, although the
awkwardness of the expression is obvious, and the strict philosophical mean-
ing here attached to those terms is unknown in their common use. -- 7V.
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? 428
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
ment demands the most subtle abstraction and the keenest
inward observation; and it may be added, as the proof, that
no one has thoroughly performed the task, to whom it has
not become evident that the whole, and particularly the last
expression, is perfectly exact. )
The common mode of thought, it is true, is not wont to
remark this distinction; and it may well be that what I
have now said may seem to many something wholly new
and unheard of. The reason of which is, that their love and
affection are attracted directly to the object itself, interested
with it exclusively, and wholly occupied with it; and that
thus they have no time to tarry by the "is," or to consider
its significance, so that to them it is wholly lost . Hence it
usually happens that, leaping over the Ex-istence (Daseyn),
we believe that we have arrived at Being (Seyn) itself;
while nevertheless we forever remain in the fore-court, in
the Ex-istence:--and this common delusion may render the
proposition which we have submitted to you above, at first
sight, dark and unintelligible. In our present inquiry, how-
ever, everything depends on our comprehending this pro-
position at once, and henceforth giving it due attention.
We said that the Consciousness of Being, the "is" to the
Being, is itself the Ex-istence (Daseyn):--leaving out of
sight, in the mean time, the supposition that Consciousness
may be only one among other possible forms, modes, and
kinds of Ex-istence, and that there may be many other, per-
haps an infinite variety of, such forms, modes, and kinds of
Ex-istence. This supposition, however, must be dismissed:
--in the first place, because we here desire not to accumu-
late mere opinions, but truly to think; and secondly, with
reference to its consequences,--for with such a possibility
remaining, our union with the Absolute, as the only source
of Blessedness, could never be attained; but there would
rather be placed, between the Absolute and us, an immea-
surable chasm, as the true source of all Unblessedness.
We have therefore to make it manifest to you in thought,
--which is our fourth point--that the Consciousness of
Being is the only possible form and mode of the Ex-istence
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? LECTURE III.
429
{Daseyri) of Being; and, consequently, is itself immediately
and absolutely this Ex-istence of Being. We conduct you
to this insight in the following way:--Being (Seyn)--as
such, as Being, as abiding, unchangeable Being, without in
any respect laying aside its absolute character and inter-
mingling or blending itself with Ex-istence--must ex-ist.
Hence it must, in itself, be distinct from Ex-istence, and op-
posed to it; and indeed--since besides the absolute Being
(Seyn) itself there is nothing else whatever but its Ex-
istence (Daseyn)--this distinction and opposition must be
manifest in the Ex-istence (Daseyn) itself; and this, more
clearly expressed, is equivalent to the following:--Ex-ist-
ence (Daseyn) must apprehend, recognise, and image forth
itself as mere Ex-istence: and, opposed to itself, it must as-
sume and image forth an absolute Being (Seyn), whose mere
Ex-istence it is; it must thus, by its own nature, as opposed
to another and an absolute existence, annihilate itself:--
which is precisely the character of mere representation, con-
ception, or Consciousness of Being, as you have already seen
in our exposition of the "is. " And thus it is clear, if we
have succeeded in making these ideas thoroughly intelligible
to you, that the Ex-istence of Being must necessarily be--
cannot be other than--a Consciousness of itself--of Ex-
istence--as a mere image or representation of Absolute,
Self-existent Being.
That such is the case, and that Knowledge* or Conscious-
ness is the absolute Ex-istence (Daseyn),--or, as you may
now rather wish to say,--the manifestation and revelation
of Being (Seyn), in its only possible form:--this may be
distinctly understood and seen by Knowledge itself, as we
have now seen it. But--and this is our fifth point--this
Knowledge can, by no means, in itself, understand or see
how itself arises, and how from out the inward, self-compre-
hensive Being (Seyn) an Ex-istence (Daseyri), manifestation
* The reader will observe that in this and the succeeding lectures the word
"Wissen,"" which is here rendered by " Knowledge," is used in the sense of
"Cognition," to express the conscious act of Knowing, and not either the object or the result of that act. -- Tr.
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? 430
THE DOCTRINE OF KELIGION.
or revelation of itself can proceed;--as indeed we may dis-
tinctly perceive, by reference to our third point, that such
a sequential evolution is wholly beyond our power. The
reason of this is, that Ex-istence, as we have already shown,
cannot be without apprehending, recognising, and assuming
itself, because such self-conception is inseparable from its
nature; and thus Knowledge, by the very absoluteness of
its Ex-istence and its dependence on that Ex-istence, is cut
off from all possibility of passing beyond it, or of conceiving
and tracing itself prior to that Ex-istence. It is, for itself
and in itself, and so far well;--but wherever it is, it finds
itself already there in a certain determinate mode, which it
must accept just as it is presented to it, but which it can
by no means explain, nor declare how and whereby it has
become so. This unchangeably determined mode of the
Ex-istence of Knowledge, which can be apprehended only
by immediate comprehension and perception, is the essen-
tial and truly real Life of Knowledge.
But notwithstanding that this true and real Life of Know-
ledge cannot explain the definite mode in which it has a-
risen, it is yet susceptible of a general interpretation; and
we may understand and perceive with absolute certainty
what it is according to its essential inward nature;--which is
our sixth point.
