--Here Nietzsche returns to
Christian
virtue which is negative and moral.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
B.
--Refer to Jewish "holiness" and its natural basis.
The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called "Idealisation"):--
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge, then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
3OO.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality. --Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtu`.
3OI.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
emancipated
from its real nature (until it is almost the opposite of Nature).
? ? ? ? 248
THE WILL TO POWER.
3O2.
Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right --as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo sopher to admire even this "nothing" (Wil admirari).
3O3.
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
? which--fortunately--has time.
Life general
on earth matter moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which no importance whatever the general
character the earth; the earth itself like
every star, hiatus between two nonentities, an event without plan, without reason, will, self
necessity-- foolish necessity. Something rebels
consciousness--the worst kind
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers
our hearts, "All this must be false because revolting. Could not all this appearance?
And man spite all, use Kant's words"--
How VIRTUE MADE TO DOMINATE. 3O4.
Concerning
treatise we wish speak
-
the ideal
the moralist--In this
the great politics
? ? of of
of
is to
4.
to of.
IS
. to
of
a its
in. aofof is . aa
be
in of us
to
in
or it
is,
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
* virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
? any other dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with -
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which pur, sans me? lange, cru, vert, dans toute
force, dans toute son a^prete? , superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never achieved by
approximate Even this narrower kind politics--in the
man--the most he can do
politics
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon
virtue--the ideal never seems have
? ? it.
it.
sa
is, of
of in
is
to
is
is
of to
be
*
y
? 250
THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter: systematic self denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
? self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist among other things, necessarily great actor; his only danger
that his pose may unconsciously become
second nature, just like his ideal, which keep
his esse and his operari apart divine way;
everything does must be done sub specie boni --a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal divine
ideal And, matter fact, they say that
the moralist's canon and of his
? ? !
he as
a
a
of
in a
is,
A
a
is to
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
25 I
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under
good
stands how to remain what He the God.
3O5.
by means virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re
The dominion virtue not established nounces power, one loses the Will Power.
306.
The victory moral ideal achieved by the
same "immoral" means any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
? -
3O7.
He who knows the way fame originates will suspicious even the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality just "immoral" any other
thing earth; morality immorality.
itself form
The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity all phenomena saved--
3O9.
There are some who seek for the immoral side things. When they say: "this
? ? of of
on
. of .
is
is of be
is in
as
is to
as a
is,
is
of
of a
of
as
is
? 252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover recover my equanimity.
IO.
A. The ways which lead power: the presenta tion of the new virtue under the name of an old one,--the awakening "interest" concerning ("happiness" declared its reward, and vice versa? ),--artistic slandering
its way,--the exploitation advantages and accidents with the view glorifying it,-the con
version adherents into fanatics means
? sacrifices and grand scale.
separations,--symbolism
Power attained: (1) Means virtue; (2) seductive means (court) etiquette virtue.
II.
constraint virtue; (3) the
By what means does virtue attain power? -- With precisely the same means political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining opposing virtues that happen be already power, the changing
and scorn;
"immorality. "
How does
desire behave towards itself in
their names, systematic persecution short, means acts of general
that stands
? ? in of a
of its
by
to
of a
as of a
of
in
of
of
to
3
toof 3
of B.
I
of
on
ainit it,
by
of
of of be all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue? --A process of re christening; systematic denial of intentions;
practice misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards adversaries. possible, too, the protection sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also intoxicated and fired with A enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and
party must be won, which either triumphs perishes--one must unconscious and naif.
I2.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, that we no longer recognise
such. The same has happened the love
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease the nervus sympathicus, for instance,
eulogised Pessimism, Pascalism, Carlylism, etc.
We should begin entertain doubts concerning
man we heard that he required reasons order remain respectable: we should, any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
we should hear, course time, that such-and such an aspirant for virtue was need bad reasons order remain respectable, would not
? the sexes which has become
the slavish attitude mind appears Christian
"for" certain cases
sometimes single "for" enough refute one.
amour-passion;
may compromising;
? ? in
in a
to if
as of
in
to
in
so
of
its
it
of
to
Ifa ofita as
is of
3.
in
to
or
as
its
be
If
to of be 3I 3
be
in
inis or
Z
? 254
THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him. But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my bad reasons,--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc. ,
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue. . . Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent
the moralisation of the masses. "
3I4.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.
3 I 5.
Morality in the valuation of races and classes. -- In view of the fact that the passions and funda mental instincts in every race and class express
preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them "virtuous" practically means: That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.
It means that they should cease from differen
tiating themselves from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, that they are declining. . . .
It means that the will to one kind of morality
? the means which enable the latter to
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
255
is merely the tyranny of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the under
mining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them: but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.
The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very
particular kind of instinct--the gregarious instinct.
"The equality of men": this is what lies concealed
behind the tendency of making ever more and more men alike as men.
The "interested nature" of the morality of
? ordinary people.
great passions for power and property to the positions of protectors of virtue. )
(The trick was to elevate the
? ? ? 256
THE WILL TO POWER.
To what extent do all kinds of business men
and money-grabbers--all those who give and
take credit--find it necessary to promote the levelling of all characters and notions of value? the commerce and the exchange of the world leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.
The State exercises the same influence, as does
also any sort of ruling power at the head of
officials and soldiers; science acts in the same
way, in order that it may work in security and
economise forces. And the priesthood does the same.
Communal morality thus promoted here,
because advantageous; and, order make triumph, war and violence are waged against immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but accordance with
the instinct self-preservation. The same classes avail themselves immorality when
? serves their purpose
Observe the hypocritical colour which all
civil institutions are painted, just they were
the offshoots morality--for instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and
rights. But they were all established
favour the most mediocre
type man,
do so.
316.
protect him from exceptions and the need exceptions, one must not surprised find them sown with lies.
? ? be
of
in
is
to
of
as if
in to
of
of
it
of to in
it
as
of
to
it
is
its
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
257
much those are worth whom say, that on the whole
and indecent: no priest anything else
317.
Virtue must be defended against preachers: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue an ideal for all; they divest virtue the
charm which consists its rareness, its inimit ableness, its exceptional and non average
character--that say, its aristocratic charm. stand must also be made against those embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied hear them ring hollow: what in
genuousness! --to demand great and rare things, and then declare, with anger and contempt
one's fellows, that they do not exist! --It obvious, for instance, that marriage worth only
? Virtue has the man against it:
prudent, and isolates.
and not very accessible
character, the head, and the senses--always,
course, subject the medium standard men; provokes hostility towards order, and towards
the lies which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and all reality--when seen
the light its pernicious influence upon others, the worst of vices.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --Virtue used here, course, the sense "the excellence man,' not the sense
the Christian negative virtue. WOL.
joins--that something wretched registrar can make
instincts the not profitable,
related reason;
not passion, spoils the
average
? ? I.
as *
R
of
to It is
or it is
in
in* it is
it
to
A as
of
of
to
to
in
of
to it is
is
-
is
it is
to
is
a
is to
it
of
its
of
ofinof isasof
of
it
of it allit.
of
? 258
THE WILL TO POWER.
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does not suffer from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it
makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally
forbidden: virtue as I understand it is the actual vetitum within all gregarious legislation; (7) in
short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the
Renaissance style--virtu`-free from all moralic acid. . . .
3. 18.
In the first place," Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you
have no superiority over us; we should like to make you take modesty a little more to heart:
it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your bodies you
would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are obliged to make,
--that is to say, what your circumstances force you to make,--partly what suits your pleasure and
partly what seems useful to you. But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations,
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian virtue which is negative and moral.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
259
or what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought neither to praise your
selves nor let others praise you ! . . . One is a thoroughly puny kind of man when one is only virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this regard | Men who have to be considered at all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the multitude are on your side: and because you tyrannise over us, we shall,fight you. . . .
3 IQ.
A virtuous man is of a lower species because,
in the first place, he has no "personality," but
acquires his value by conforming with a certain human scheme which has been once and for ever
fixed. He has no independent value: he may
be compared; he has his equals, he must not be an individual.
Reckoning up the qualities of the good man, why is it they appear pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, our good nature, and our levity, have a good time. This, our feeling of
well-being, is what we project into the good man
in the form of a quality, in the form of a valuable possession,
? ? ? ? 260 THE WILL TO POWER.
32O.
Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of stupidity: who could blame her for it? And this form of virtue has not
been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all
classes of society, and which one cannot meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks
to-day that everything is in good hands--that is
to say, in "God's hands": and when it supports
this proposition with that same modest assurance as that with which it would assert that two and
2
? i |
two are four, we others naturally refrain from contradiction.
Why disturb this pure foolery; Why darken
it with our cares concerning man, people, goals,
the future? Even if we wished to do so, we
shouldn't succeed. In all things these people see
the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and
goodness (in them the old God--deus myops--
still lives); we others see something else in everything: our problematic nature, our contra
dictions, our deeper, more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.
32 I.
He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue attained. As
soon man has reached virtue, he jumps out
it--whither? Into devilry.
Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tend
? ? > of
as a
is it.
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 261
fishhooks of knowledge |
322.
The idea is to associate vice with something so
terrible that at last one is obliged to run away
from it in order to be rid of associations. This the well-known case of Tannha? user.
Tannha? user, brought his wits' end by Wagner ian music, cannot endure life any longer even
encies and impulses have become ! What an
a- inquisitiveness
amount of scientific torments them !
? the company begins have virgin goes up
still, he shows bach's melody.
Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue charm for him; Thuringian
price, and what even worse liking for Wolfram von Eschen
323.
Virtue. --Lust property, lust
The Patrons
power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things
are interested virtue; that why stands securely.
324.
Virtue no longer believed in; its powers
attraction are dead; what needed some one
who will once more bring into the market the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of
dissipation. exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers to allow of conscience not being against to-day. Certainly,
for people without either consciences scruples,
? ? or
is
it
it is
is
It
in . a of of . ina
in
of
so
in
of is
to
is
of it
is a
its
.
to
? 262 THE WILL TO POWER.
this may constitute its new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice.
325.
326.
Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as
they are allowed to rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as qualities one
develops one's self. The latter is the only right
way; they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual needs--the determin
ing factors of precisely our existence and growth, which we recognise and acknowledge independ
ently of the question whether others grow with us
with the help of the same or of different principles.
This view of the danger of the virtue which is
understood as impersonal and objective also holds good of modesty: through modesty many of the
choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty
is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that
they become hard betimes.
327.
The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be drawn into the light of day and honoured, after
/\
remain so !
Virtue is still the most expensive vice: let it
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
263
they have lain all this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which
one can dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a
way as to be reminiscent of virta`--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from moralic acid. But
for the moment--how remote this ideal seems |
The reduction of the domain of morality is a sign of its progress. Wherever, hitherto, thought
has not been guided by causality, thinking has taken a moral turn.
328.
After all, what have I achieved ? Let us not
close our eyes to this wonderful result: I have lent new charms to virtue--it now affects one
in the same way as something forbidden. It has our most subtle honesty against salted
? the "cum grano salis"
conscience. savours fashion, and thus
the scientific pang antiquity and old
last beginning draw make them inquisitive--in
refined people and
short, affects like vice. Only after we have once recognised that everything consists lies and appearance, shall have again earned the right
uphold this most beautiful all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further reason to de
prive ourselves it: only when we have shown
? ? of
we
It us
to
it
it a tois
at of of of
of
to of
is
of in
it, it
? 264
THE WILL TO POWER.
virtue to be a form of immorality do we again justify it--it then becomes classified, and likened,
in fundamental features, the profound and general immorality all existence, which
then shown part. appears form luxury the first order, the most arrogant, the
dearest, and rarest form vice. We have robbed grimaces and divested its drapery;
we have delivered from the importunate famili arity the crowd; we have deprived its
ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and its hieratic muscles.
? And any harm
supposed
329.
that have thereby done Just little anar Only since they have been
virtue? princes.
chists
shot at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones. For thus has always been and
will ever be: one cannot do thing
service than persecute and run This--I have done.
THE MORAL IDEAL.
A. Criticism of Ideals.
33O.
were the thing begin this criticism
better earth.
wise
criticism of desiderata.
do away with the word "Ideal":
such
? ? as to
. . .
do is to to it
of its
of
a
it of is
. it It. of
its
in
it
to a as
it of
as of a
to A be
5. to
it a
to . of
to a
as
it of
. it .
of
it
I
It
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
33 I.
265
Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the standpoint of desirability, in
every "thus should it be, but it is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of opinion involve a condemnation of the whole
nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the
whole nature of the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which is directed at
the smallest part of Now granting that the moral norm--even as Kant understood it--is
never completely fulfilled, and remains like sort Beyond hanging over reality without ever
falling down it; then morality would contain itself judgment concerning the whole, which
would still, however, allow the question: whence
does get the right thereto How does the part come acquire this judicial position relative
the whole And some have declared, this
course of events. For there is
? with, reality, an ineradicable instinct, not possible
moral condemnation and dissatisfaction
that this instinct may perhaps belong the
ineradicable stupidities and immodesties our, species? --But saying this, we are doing pre
cisely what we deprecate; the point view
desirability and part and parcel phenomena just
unauthorised fault-finding
the whole character worldly every injustice and imperfection
is--it our very notion "perfection" which never gratified. Every instinct which desires
? ? to is
is of
to
is
is
to it
a
to
as of of of
in
of
of
of to
is it
if, of,as
it.
P
?
of
in
of
a
? 266 THE WILL TO POWER.
be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction
with the present state of things: how? Is the
whole perhaps made up of a host of dissatisfied
parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is
the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away from reality"--that is to
say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is the concep tion of desiderata perhaps the essential motive power of all things? Is it--deus *
>k
It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves of the notion of the whole,
of an entity, and of any kind of power or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able
to resist the temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening it "God. "
The "All " must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect for and reappropriate that which
? imaginary entity, for the purposes our neighbour and our selves. Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two
things remain for ever worthy honour" (at the
close his Practical Reason)--to-day we should prefer say: "Digestion more worthy
honour. " The concept, "the All," will always
we have lent the unknown and an
give rise the old problems, possible? " etc. Therefore, there
there great sensorium power-magazine.
332. just bad taste as: "A tree
man he ought
"How evil "All,"
inventarium
this sounds me ought be. "
? ? A as
is no
to of
as
to
to
of is
be :
as or it
of
no to to
is
in or of
is
it,
? A. CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
333.
267
Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability. "-- "Things ought to be otherwise," "things ought to become different": dissatisfaction would thus seem the heart of ethics.
One could find a way out of first, by select ing only those states which one free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence and stupidity
the attitude mind: for desire that something should be otherwise than
means desire that everything should different --it involves damaging criticism the whole. But life itself consists such desiring
To ascertain what exists, how exists seems an ever much higher and more serious matter than every "thus should be," because the latter,
piece human criticism and arrogance, appears to be condemned as ludicrous from the start.
? expresses
organisation the world correspond with our
need which would fain have the
human well-being, and which directs the will much possible towards the accomplishment
that relationship.
On the other hand, this desire, "thus ought
be," has only called forth that other desire, "what exists f" The desire knowing what exists, already consequence the question, "how? possible? Why precisely so? " Our wonder
the disagreement between our desires and the course the world has led our learning know the course the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the expression,
? ? of
it
at is is it
to
a
of
a
of
a of
of of to
it
it,
to
ofas
It as
it is,
it
to
as
of
so
to
a
in
of
in
/
of
be
is
? 268 THE WILL TO POWER.
"thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our desire to overcome the world
3. 34.
To-day when every attempt at determining how
man should be--is received with some irony, when
we adhere to the notion that in spite of all one
only becomes what one is (in spite of all--that
say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, how to
is to
reverse the relation of cause and effect.
? perhaps distinguishes
Nothing
us more than this from the
ancient believers in morality. We no longer say,
for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with
virtue because it brings a long life and happiness. " Our minds to-day are much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes but only effects. A man becomes a respectable member of society because he was a respectable man from the start--that is to say, because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous pro
pensities. . . . Should a man enter the world poor,
and the son of parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible of being improved--
that is to say, he is only for the prison the madhouse. To-day we are no longer able separate moral from physical degeneration: the former merely complicated symptom the latter; man necessarily bad just he
necessarily
Bad: this word here stands
? ? ill.
. . .
a is
. isa .
as
or
is
to
of
fit
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
269
for a certain lack of capacity which is related physiologically with the degenerating type--for
instance, a weak will, an uncertain and many-sided
personality, the inability to resist reacting to a
stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain constraint resulting from every suggestion pro
ceeding from another's will. Vice is not a cause;
arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting from physio logical degeneracy. A general proposition such
as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and pre vails, the proposition holds good: for then the
existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate
it is an effect. . . . Vice is a somewhat
? - territory--is
demonstrated.
3.
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality (or so-called "Idealisation"):--
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge, then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
3OO.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality. --Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtu`.
3OI.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality? Intellectual harm, etc.
emancipated
from its real nature (until it is almost the opposite of Nature).
? ? ? ? 248
THE WILL TO POWER.
3O2.
Why are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right --as routinary values? Many species of animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo sopher to admire even this "nothing" (Wil admirari).
3O3.
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
? which--fortunately--has time.
Life general
on earth matter moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which no importance whatever the general
character the earth; the earth itself like
every star, hiatus between two nonentities, an event without plan, without reason, will, self
necessity-- foolish necessity. Something rebels
consciousness--the worst kind
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers
our hearts, "All this must be false because revolting. Could not all this appearance?
And man spite all, use Kant's words"--
How VIRTUE MADE TO DOMINATE. 3O4.
Concerning
treatise we wish speak
-
the ideal
the moralist--In this
the great politics
? ? of of
of
is to
4.
to of.
IS
. to
of
a its
in. aofof is . aa
be
in of us
to
in
or it
is,
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
* virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these, indeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
? any other dominion, in any case not by means of virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with -
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is in politics; it
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism which pur, sans me? lange, cru, vert, dans toute
force, dans toute son a^prete? , superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can never achieved by
approximate Even this narrower kind politics--in the
man--the most he can do
politics
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon
virtue--the ideal never seems have
? ? it.
it.
sa
is, of
of in
is
to
is
is
of to
be
*
y
? 250
THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist--whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter: systematic self denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
? self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain to his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the sake of making morality dominate--that is the canon. Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist among other things, necessarily great actor; his only danger
that his pose may unconsciously become
second nature, just like his ideal, which keep
his esse and his operari apart divine way;
everything does must be done sub specie boni --a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal divine
ideal And, matter fact, they say that
the moralist's canon and of his
? ? !
he as
a
a
of
in a
is,
A
a
is to
is
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
25 I
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under
good
stands how to remain what He the God.
3O5.
by means virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re
The dominion virtue not established nounces power, one loses the Will Power.
306.
The victory moral ideal achieved by the
same "immoral" means any other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.
? -
3O7.
He who knows the way fame originates will suspicious even the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality just "immoral" any other
thing earth; morality immorality.
itself form
The great relief which this conviction brings. The contradiction between things disappears, the unity all phenomena saved--
3O9.
There are some who seek for the immoral side things. When they say: "this
? ? of of
on
. of .
is
is of be
is in
as
is to
as a
is,
is
of
of a
of
as
is
? 252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover recover my equanimity.
IO.
A. The ways which lead power: the presenta tion of the new virtue under the name of an old one,--the awakening "interest" concerning ("happiness" declared its reward, and vice versa? ),--artistic slandering
its way,--the exploitation advantages and accidents with the view glorifying it,-the con
version adherents into fanatics means
? sacrifices and grand scale.
separations,--symbolism
Power attained: (1) Means virtue; (2) seductive means (court) etiquette virtue.
II.
constraint virtue; (3) the
By what means does virtue attain power? -- With precisely the same means political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining opposing virtues that happen be already power, the changing
and scorn;
"immorality. "
How does
desire behave towards itself in
their names, systematic persecution short, means acts of general
that stands
? ? in of a
of its
by
to
of a
as of a
of
in
of
of
to
3
toof 3
of B.
I
of
on
ainit it,
by
of
of of be all
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue? --A process of re christening; systematic denial of intentions;
practice misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards adversaries. possible, too, the protection sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also intoxicated and fired with A enthusiasm; idealistic humbug must be used, and
party must be won, which either triumphs perishes--one must unconscious and naif.
I2.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, that we no longer recognise
such. The same has happened the love
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease the nervus sympathicus, for instance,
eulogised Pessimism, Pascalism, Carlylism, etc.
We should begin entertain doubts concerning
man we heard that he required reasons order remain respectable: we should, any case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
we should hear, course time, that such-and such an aspirant for virtue was need bad reasons order remain respectable, would not
? the sexes which has become
the slavish attitude mind appears Christian
"for" certain cases
sometimes single "for" enough refute one.
amour-passion;
may compromising;
? ? in
in a
to if
as of
in
to
in
so
of
its
it
of
to
Ifa ofita as
is of
3.
in
to
or
as
its
be
If
to of be 3I 3
be
in
inis or
Z
? 254
THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him. But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: "You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot believe in my bad reasons,--that is to say, in my God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc. ,
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue. . . Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent
the moralisation of the masses. "
3I4.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.
3 I 5.
Morality in the valuation of races and classes. -- In view of the fact that the passions and funda mental instincts in every race and class express
preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them "virtuous" practically means: That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.
It means that they should cease from differen
tiating themselves from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations--or, more exactly, that they are declining. . . .
It means that the will to one kind of morality
? the means which enable the latter to
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
255
is merely the tyranny of the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species: it means a process of annihilation or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the
"Abolition of Slavery"--a so-called tribute to "human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of a fundamentally different species (the under
mining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them: but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we are such as can be useful to them.
The insistence upon spreading "humaneness" (which guilelessly starts out with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula "What is human") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite type of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very
particular kind of instinct--the gregarious instinct.
"The equality of men": this is what lies concealed
behind the tendency of making ever more and more men alike as men.
The "interested nature" of the morality of
? ordinary people.
great passions for power and property to the positions of protectors of virtue. )
(The trick was to elevate the
? ? ? 256
THE WILL TO POWER.
To what extent do all kinds of business men
and money-grabbers--all those who give and
take credit--find it necessary to promote the levelling of all characters and notions of value? the commerce and the exchange of the world leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.
The State exercises the same influence, as does
also any sort of ruling power at the head of
officials and soldiers; science acts in the same
way, in order that it may work in security and
economise forces. And the priesthood does the same.
Communal morality thus promoted here,
because advantageous; and, order make triumph, war and violence are waged against immorality--with what "right"? Without any right whatsoever; but accordance with
the instinct self-preservation. The same classes avail themselves immorality when
? serves their purpose
Observe the hypocritical colour which all
civil institutions are painted, just they were
the offshoots morality--for instance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and
rights. But they were all established
favour the most mediocre
type man,
do so.
316.
protect him from exceptions and the need exceptions, one must not surprised find them sown with lies.
? ? be
of
in
is
to
of
as if
in to
of
of
it
of to in
it
as
of
to
it
is
its
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
257
much those are worth whom say, that on the whole
and indecent: no priest anything else
317.
Virtue must be defended against preachers: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue an ideal for all; they divest virtue the
charm which consists its rareness, its inimit ableness, its exceptional and non average
character--that say, its aristocratic charm. stand must also be made against those embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied hear them ring hollow: what in
genuousness! --to demand great and rare things, and then declare, with anger and contempt
one's fellows, that they do not exist! --It obvious, for instance, that marriage worth only
? Virtue has the man against it:
prudent, and isolates.
and not very accessible
character, the head, and the senses--always,
course, subject the medium standard men; provokes hostility towards order, and towards
the lies which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and all reality--when seen
the light its pernicious influence upon others, the worst of vices.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. --Virtue used here, course, the sense "the excellence man,' not the sense
the Christian negative virtue. WOL.
joins--that something wretched registrar can make
instincts the not profitable,
related reason;
not passion, spoils the
average
? ? I.
as *
R
of
to It is
or it is
in
in* it is
it
to
A as
of
of
to
to
in
of
to it is
is
-
is
it is
to
is
a
is to
it
of
its
of
ofinof isasof
of
it
of it allit.
of
? 258
THE WILL TO POWER.
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does not suffer from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it
makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally
forbidden: virtue as I understand it is the actual vetitum within all gregarious legislation; (7) in
short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the
Renaissance style--virtu`-free from all moralic acid. . . .
3. 18.
In the first place," Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you
have no superiority over us; we should like to make you take modesty a little more to heart:
it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest your virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your bodies you
would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are obliged to make,
--that is to say, what your circumstances force you to make,--partly what suits your pleasure and
partly what seems useful to you. But if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations,
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.
--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian virtue which is negative and moral.
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
259
or what necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought neither to praise your
selves nor let others praise you ! . . . One is a thoroughly puny kind of man when one is only virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this regard | Men who have to be considered at all, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that which determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning thus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more full of wisdom to you than virtue. But the multitude are on your side: and because you tyrannise over us, we shall,fight you. . . .
3 IQ.
A virtuous man is of a lower species because,
in the first place, he has no "personality," but
acquires his value by conforming with a certain human scheme which has been once and for ever
fixed. He has no independent value: he may
be compared; he has his equals, he must not be an individual.
Reckoning up the qualities of the good man, why is it they appear pleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness, our good nature, and our levity, have a good time. This, our feeling of
well-being, is what we project into the good man
in the form of a quality, in the form of a valuable possession,
? ? ? ? 260 THE WILL TO POWER.
32O.
Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of stupidity: who could blame her for it? And this form of virtue has not
been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all
classes of society, and which one cannot meet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks
to-day that everything is in good hands--that is
to say, in "God's hands": and when it supports
this proposition with that same modest assurance as that with which it would assert that two and
2
? i |
two are four, we others naturally refrain from contradiction.
Why disturb this pure foolery; Why darken
it with our cares concerning man, people, goals,
the future? Even if we wished to do so, we
shouldn't succeed. In all things these people see
the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and
goodness (in them the old God--deus myops--
still lives); we others see something else in everything: our problematic nature, our contra
dictions, our deeper, more painful, and more suspicious wisdom.
32 I.
He who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue attained. As
soon man has reached virtue, he jumps out
it--whither? Into devilry.
Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tend
? ? > of
as a
is it.
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY. 261
fishhooks of knowledge |
322.
The idea is to associate vice with something so
terrible that at last one is obliged to run away
from it in order to be rid of associations. This the well-known case of Tannha? user.
Tannha? user, brought his wits' end by Wagner ian music, cannot endure life any longer even
encies and impulses have become ! What an
a- inquisitiveness
amount of scientific torments them !
? the company begins have virgin goes up
still, he shows bach's melody.
Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue charm for him; Thuringian
price, and what even worse liking for Wolfram von Eschen
323.
Virtue. --Lust property, lust
The Patrons
power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things
are interested virtue; that why stands securely.
324.
Virtue no longer believed in; its powers
attraction are dead; what needed some one
who will once more bring into the market the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of
dissipation. exacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers to allow of conscience not being against to-day. Certainly,
for people without either consciences scruples,
? ? or
is
it
it is
is
It
in . a of of . ina
in
of
so
in
of is
to
is
of it
is a
its
.
to
? 262 THE WILL TO POWER.
this may constitute its new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice.
325.
326.
Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as
they are allowed to rule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as qualities one
develops one's self. The latter is the only right
way; they should be the most personal means of defence and most individual needs--the determin
ing factors of precisely our existence and growth, which we recognise and acknowledge independ
ently of the question whether others grow with us
with the help of the same or of different principles.
This view of the danger of the virtue which is
understood as impersonal and objective also holds good of modesty: through modesty many of the
choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty
is the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that
they become hard betimes.
327.
The domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the names of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be drawn into the light of day and honoured, after
/\
remain so !
Virtue is still the most expensive vice: let it
? ? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
263
they have lain all this time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of respect for one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever more and more imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny and "explain away" all natural instincts. The extent to which
one can dispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may be imagined where the notion "virtue" is understood in such a
way as to be reminiscent of virta`--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from moralic acid. But
for the moment--how remote this ideal seems |
The reduction of the domain of morality is a sign of its progress. Wherever, hitherto, thought
has not been guided by causality, thinking has taken a moral turn.
328.
After all, what have I achieved ? Let us not
close our eyes to this wonderful result: I have lent new charms to virtue--it now affects one
in the same way as something forbidden. It has our most subtle honesty against salted
? the "cum grano salis"
conscience. savours fashion, and thus
the scientific pang antiquity and old
last beginning draw make them inquisitive--in
refined people and
short, affects like vice. Only after we have once recognised that everything consists lies and appearance, shall have again earned the right
uphold this most beautiful all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further reason to de
prive ourselves it: only when we have shown
? ? of
we
It us
to
it
it a tois
at of of of
of
to of
is
of in
it, it
? 264
THE WILL TO POWER.
virtue to be a form of immorality do we again justify it--it then becomes classified, and likened,
in fundamental features, the profound and general immorality all existence, which
then shown part. appears form luxury the first order, the most arrogant, the
dearest, and rarest form vice. We have robbed grimaces and divested its drapery;
we have delivered from the importunate famili arity the crowd; we have deprived its
ridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and its hieratic muscles.
? And any harm
supposed
329.
that have thereby done Just little anar Only since they have been
virtue? princes.
chists
shot at, have they once more sat securely on their thrones. For thus has always been and
will ever be: one cannot do thing
service than persecute and run This--I have done.
THE MORAL IDEAL.
A. Criticism of Ideals.
33O.
were the thing begin this criticism
better earth.
wise
criticism of desiderata.
do away with the word "Ideal":
such
? ? as to
. . .
do is to to it
of its
of
a
it of is
. it It. of
its
in
it
to a as
it of
as of a
to A be
5. to
it a
to . of
to a
as
it of
. it .
of
it
I
It
to
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
33 I.
265
Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the standpoint of desirability, in
every "thus should it be, but it is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of opinion involve a condemnation of the whole
nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the
whole nature of the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which is directed at
the smallest part of Now granting that the moral norm--even as Kant understood it--is
never completely fulfilled, and remains like sort Beyond hanging over reality without ever
falling down it; then morality would contain itself judgment concerning the whole, which
would still, however, allow the question: whence
does get the right thereto How does the part come acquire this judicial position relative
the whole And some have declared, this
course of events. For there is
? with, reality, an ineradicable instinct, not possible
moral condemnation and dissatisfaction
that this instinct may perhaps belong the
ineradicable stupidities and immodesties our, species? --But saying this, we are doing pre
cisely what we deprecate; the point view
desirability and part and parcel phenomena just
unauthorised fault-finding
the whole character worldly every injustice and imperfection
is--it our very notion "perfection" which never gratified. Every instinct which desires
? ? to is
is of
to
is
is
to it
a
to
as of of of
in
of
of
of to
is it
if, of,as
it.
P
?
of
in
of
a
? 266 THE WILL TO POWER.
be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction
with the present state of things: how? Is the
whole perhaps made up of a host of dissatisfied
parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is
the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away from reality"--that is to
say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is the concep tion of desiderata perhaps the essential motive power of all things? Is it--deus *
>k
It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves of the notion of the whole,
of an entity, and of any kind of power or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able
to resist the temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening it "God. "
The "All " must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect for and reappropriate that which
? imaginary entity, for the purposes our neighbour and our selves. Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two
things remain for ever worthy honour" (at the
close his Practical Reason)--to-day we should prefer say: "Digestion more worthy
honour. " The concept, "the All," will always
we have lent the unknown and an
give rise the old problems, possible? " etc. Therefore, there
there great sensorium power-magazine.
332. just bad taste as: "A tree
man he ought
"How evil "All,"
inventarium
this sounds me ought be. "
? ? A as
is no
to of
as
to
to
of is
be :
as or it
of
no to to
is
in or of
is
it,
? A. CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
333.
267
Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability. "-- "Things ought to be otherwise," "things ought to become different": dissatisfaction would thus seem the heart of ethics.
One could find a way out of first, by select ing only those states which one free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence and stupidity
the attitude mind: for desire that something should be otherwise than
means desire that everything should different --it involves damaging criticism the whole. But life itself consists such desiring
To ascertain what exists, how exists seems an ever much higher and more serious matter than every "thus should be," because the latter,
piece human criticism and arrogance, appears to be condemned as ludicrous from the start.
? expresses
organisation the world correspond with our
need which would fain have the
human well-being, and which directs the will much possible towards the accomplishment
that relationship.
On the other hand, this desire, "thus ought
be," has only called forth that other desire, "what exists f" The desire knowing what exists, already consequence the question, "how? possible? Why precisely so? " Our wonder
the disagreement between our desires and the course the world has led our learning know the course the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the expression,
? ? of
it
at is is it
to
a
of
a
of
a of
of of to
it
it,
to
ofas
It as
it is,
it
to
as
of
so
to
a
in
of
in
/
of
be
is
? 268 THE WILL TO POWER.
"thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our desire to overcome the world
3. 34.
To-day when every attempt at determining how
man should be--is received with some irony, when
we adhere to the notion that in spite of all one
only becomes what one is (in spite of all--that
say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster), in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way, how to
is to
reverse the relation of cause and effect.
? perhaps distinguishes
Nothing
us more than this from the
ancient believers in morality. We no longer say,
for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with
virtue because it brings a long life and happiness. " Our minds to-day are much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes but only effects. A man becomes a respectable member of society because he was a respectable man from the start--that is to say, because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous pro
pensities. . . . Should a man enter the world poor,
and the son of parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible of being improved--
that is to say, he is only for the prison the madhouse. To-day we are no longer able separate moral from physical degeneration: the former merely complicated symptom the latter; man necessarily bad just he
necessarily
Bad: this word here stands
? ? ill.
. . .
a is
. isa .
as
or
is
to
of
fit
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
269
for a certain lack of capacity which is related physiologically with the degenerating type--for
instance, a weak will, an uncertain and many-sided
personality, the inability to resist reacting to a
stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain constraint resulting from every suggestion pro
ceeding from another's will. Vice is not a cause;
arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting from physio logical degeneracy. A general proposition such
as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and pre vails, the proposition holds good: for then the
existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate
it is an effect. . . . Vice is a somewhat
? - territory--is
demonstrated.
3.
