No More Learning

~ 7. Instantaneously in a cloudless sky
~ A circle of clouds appears,
~ But try to find from where they came --
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ~.
~ 8. Like mirages and smell-eaters' cities,
~ Like magical illusions and like dreams,
~ Objects of meditation are empty of a real entity.
~ Understand all phenomena are like this. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
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\ ###
\ Thus in the illusory city of the three false worlds
\ Manipulated by the puppeteer of karmic action
\ The smell-eater maiden performs her illusory dance.
\ Amazing that desire should chase a mirage!
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(i. e. It is about directly seeing the real nature of the three inseparable worlds: All the objects of the three worlds (desire, form, formless; or body, speech and mind; or the seven consciousnesses, the alayavijnana and the neutral alaya) are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. There is no direct perception of anything. All perceptions are dependent on accumulated karma. Everything in samsara is like an illusion. -- Our goal is to follow a gradual path of more and more subtle methods and wisdom that will permit us to directly realize the real nature of the objects of the three realms, and their inseparability. This threesome purification of our body, speech and mind is what can lead us to the inseparable trikaya of a Buddha. Once we directly realize the real non-dual nature of our own mind, and thus of everything in the three realms, then automatically all attachments and fears are dropped off, no more karma is produced and we are free from any accumulated karma because we see its real nature. Then seeing the non- duality of everything, everything is seen as pure, the Buddha-nature is directly seen and it is true Nirvana. )
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\ ###
\ This is the thirteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects.
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This concludes the commentary on the thirteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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L2: [Chapter 14 - Refuting Extreme Conceptions [of inherent existence and complete non-existence . . . ] -
The perfection of wisdom: non-duality of dependent origination and emptiness - P. 265]
-- SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF EXTREME CONCEPTIONS. -- Refuting extreme conceptions.
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L3: [I. Proving that functional things are empty of inherent existence] L4: [A. Brief exposition]
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\ ###
\ 326.
\ IF A THING DID NOT DEPEND
\ ON ANYTHING ELSE AT ALL
\ IT WOULD BE SELF-ESTABLISHED,
\ BUT SUCH A THING EXISTS NOWHERE.
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(i. e. Everything in the three realms is dependently arisen, thus everything is empty of inherent existence. There is no exception at all - not even for the permanent basic elements described in the Abhidharma, not even for karma, dependent origination or emptiness itself, not even for the Buddha-nature, not even for the a primary awareness. Dependently arisen means dependent on its causes and conditions, on its parts or characteristics, on the mind perceiving or labeling it, on accumulated karma. Empty of inherent existence doesn't mean complete non-existence; that would be jumping to the other extreme: nihilism. Nor does it mean both existence and non-existence together (dualism), nor neither existence nor non-existence (monism). Everything is merely imputed by the mind, but still not from the mind only. The Middle Way between all extremes consists of staying away from all extreme conceptions, thinking that any view is the absolute final truth, or rejecting them all thinking they are all useless (that is also an extreme). )
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(-- The fourteenth chapter continues by refuting extreme conceptions of reified existence and total non-existence. If phenomena were inherently existent, they should be independent and findable when sought by a reasoning consciousness analyzing their final mode of existence, but they are neither. Emphasis is placed on the fact that ultimate or inherent existence is being refuted, and that this should not be misinterpreted to mean that things do not have valid conventional existence. The reason of not being inherently one or many is first presented concisely and then applied to refute non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist contentions, in order to establish that neither what is imputed nor its basis of imputation has true existence.
-- Question: If, like the ring formed by a firebrand and so forth, worldly existence, because of being dependent arising, does not exist inherently, what has inherent existence?
-- Answer: Not the slightest thing has inherent existence.
-- Anything existing by way of its own entity would not rely on anything else at all, but not the least thing is independent or exists without relying on something else. If anything existed inherently, independence would be established as its nature when examined by the reasoning which investigates the ultimate, yet this does not exist anywhere. A mode of existence of phenomena not merely posited by nominal convention is known as independent existence, existence by way of their entity, existence by way of their character, inherent existence and true existence. This clearly indicates the object of negation through whose refutation there is no focus for conceptions of true existence. Since Candrakirti's commentary repeatedly mentions qualifying the object of negation when refuting fabrications of true existence, one should not deprecate the Madhyamika view. )
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L4: [B. Extensive explanation]
L5: [1. Refuting a truly existent composite by examining the four possibilities [same, different, one owning the other or vice versa]]
L6: [a. Exposition]
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\ ###
\ 327.
\ "The form is a pot" -- they are not one.
\ The pot that has form is not separate.
\ The pot does not have form,
\ Not does the form have a pot.
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(i. e. Interdependence of an object and its basic characteristics or parts: We usually assume there is a real object existing on its own out there, and that it has real characteristics that we can directly perceived. By analyzing the relations between the object and its characteristics with these assumptions we find that it turns into complete absurdity. Taking the pot and its form as example, we find that a pot cannot first exist on its own and then have a form that could also exist on its own. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. So there is no inherently existing (independent) object or characteristics. Everything is dependently arisen, thus empty of inherent existence. )
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(The pot and the form, not one, not separate:
-- The text first examine whether the pot and its constituents, like visual form, are inherently one or different. If they were inherently one, there should be a pot wherever there is a visual form. Alternatively, if the pot possessed visual form as something inherently different from itself, the two would be unrelated, and we should be able to see a pot without necessarily seeing its form.
-- If the composite known as "pot" exists by way of its own entity, are the visible form and the pot one or different?
-- In the first case it follows that the pot in the statement "The form is a pot" are not inherently one, otherwise there would be a pot wherever there was a visible form. One might think that the pot which is something distinct from visible form possessed form the way Devadatta possesses a cow, as something separate. However it follows that the pot which has form is not inherently separate from the form, otherwise it would be apprehensible independently of its form. The pot does not have form as something apart which depends upon it, nor does the form have a pot dependent upon it, like a dish and its contents, because neither exists inherently. )
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L6: [b. Explanation]
L7: [(1) Refuting other sectarians]
L8: [(a) Refuting the characteristics]
L9: [1: Refuting the substantial entity as basis for a distinct generality]
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\ ###
\ 328.
\ Since the two are seen to have dissimilar
\ Characteristics, if the pot is separate
\ From existence, why would existence
\ Not also be separate from the pot?
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(i. e. The case of an object and existence: Another example of an object and its basic characteristics: "existence". A pot cannot exist or not and then have the characteristic of "existence" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
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(The pot and "existence", not one, not separate:
-- In developing this examination of the relationship between the pot and its parts, the text investigates Vaisesika contention regarding the relationship between the generality "existence" and specific instances such as a pot. Here, the relationship between a substantial entity (a pot) and its attributes and the relationship between one attribute and another are also investigated.
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According to Vaisesika contentions one would not be able to say that the pot exists because the pot and existence are inherently different and thus unrelated.
-- Vaisesika assertion: Though the pot and its form are not different substantial entities, existence and the pot are. The pot is a substantial entity and is said to exist through its connection with the great generality "existence," which is something separate from it.
-- Answer: Existence and the pot are seen to have the dissimilar characteristics of a generality and of a specific. It is not feasible for the pot to be a substantial entity which is separate from existence, for if it were, why would existence not be a separate entity from the pot? It follows that it would be. If this is accepted, the pot is non-existent. )
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L9: [2: Refuting it as a basis for distinct attributes] L9: [a: Actual meaning]
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\ ###
\ 331.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ ###
\ 329.
\ If one is not accepted as the pot
\ The pot is not one.
\ Moreover possession is not reciprocal,
\ Therefore also it is not one.
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(i. e. The case of an object and its numerator: Another example of an object and its basic characteristics: "one" or "two". A pot cannot exist and then have the characteristic of "one" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts)
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(The pot and "one", not one, not separate:
-- Neither could one say "one pot", since a substantial entity and its attributes, in this case the pot and one, are asserted to be inherently different and possession between them not reciprocal.
-- Assertion: The substantial entity, the pot, exists because it acts as a basis for attributes, such as one or two, which are distinct from it.
-- Answer: "Attribute" and "substantial entity" are different words and have different meanings.
-- ab: If the number one is not accepted as the pot, the pot is not one either because, like two and so forth, these are different words and have different meanings. if this is accepted, the term and thought "one" do not validly apply to the pot.
-- Assertion: The pot is one by virtue of possessing the attribute one, but one is not the pot.
-- Answer cd: Possession occurs between two similar things, as in the case of consciousness, and not between dissimilar things. Moreover there is no reciprocal possession between the pot and one, since the pot possesses one, but one does not possess the pot. The pot is also not one because of being a separate entity from one. )
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L9: [b: Inconsistency with the assertion that one attribute cannot rely on another attribute]
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\ ###
\ 330.
\ If the form is the size of the substance,
\ Why is the form not large?
\ If the opponent were not different
\ Scriptural sources could be cited.
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(i. e. The case of characteristics of characteristics - like part of parts: As for the relations between the so called basic characteristics of the same object. If we assume those characteristics are really existing on their own - independently of each other - inherently existing, then it also ends up in much absurdity. Taking the example of form and size, a form cannot exist and then have the characteristic of "being large or not" added to it. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. So those characteristics are more like parts and sub- parts, and not independent of each other. )
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(-- When we say a "large pot" we mean its form is large. According to the Vaisesikas, however, both form and size are attributes and one attribute cannot qualify another, with the absurd consequence that a large pot could not exist.
-- ab: Furthermore, your contention that attributes qualify substantial entities but that one attribute does not qualify another is contradictory.
-- If the size of the substantial entity, the pot, and the size of its visible form are the same, why is the attribute form not large just as the substantial entity is large? One must accept that the form has a separate attribute "large".
-- Objection: Small and large cannot qualify form, for according to our textual system, one attribute does not qualify another.
-- Answer cd: If your opponents were not from a school other than your own, you could cite your textual system to fault their argument, but it is inappropriate here, since we are engaged in rejecting these very tenets. )
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L8: [(b) Refuting that which is characterized]
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\ BY VIRTUE OF ITS CHARACTERISTIC
\ THE CHARACTERIZED DOES NOT EXIST.
\ Such a thing has no existence
\ As something different from number and so forth.
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(i. e. Emptiness of the characterized and of the characteristics because co-dependently arisen: So, the characterized is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its characteristics (numerator, form, color, size, existence, . . . ), like it is dependent on its parts. And vice versa, the characteristics are empty of inherent existence because they cannot exist without the characterized as shown above. The characteristics and the characterized are interdependent, one cannot exist without the other. They are not two, but still not one; not different or separate, but still not the same. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts, all merely imputed by the mind. )
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(The characteristics and the characterized: not one, not separate, both empty:
-- Next Sautrantika assertions regarding the relationship between characteristics and what they characterize is examined. -- Assertion: Even if distinct attributes like separateness are refuted, the pot which they characterize is not refuted and thus exists by way of its own entity.
-- Answer: If one contends that existence and so forth have the characteristic of accompanying things while the pot has the opposite characteristic, then by virtue of this opposite characteristic the pot it characterizes does not exist anywhere by way of its own entity. Such a thing, distinct from numbers like one, two and so forth, has no existence as a pot established by way of its own entity. In brief, something characterized which is a different entity from its characteristics and characteristics which are different entities from that which they characterize cannot be found. )
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L7: [(2) Refuting our own sectarians]
L8: [(a) Extensively refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit] L9: [1: Refutation by examining for oneness or difference]
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\ ###
\ 332.
\ Because the pot is not separate
\ From its characteristics, it is not one.
\ If there is not a pot for each,
\ Plurality is not feasible.
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(i. e. The case of the plurality: If the is no "one" inherently existing object because it depends on its own characteristics or parts, then there cannot be "many" inherently existing objects, and the whole composed of assembling many empty objects (plurality) is also empty of inherent existence. -- So, the whole mathematical system is empty of inherent existence, but still not completely non-existent, or useless, or meaningless (that is evident by looking at its relative efficiency). So, we have to stay away from both extremes conceptions. - see also verse 344. )
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(-- The pot, for instance, is not a truly existent single unit, since it is composed of eight constituents with their own individual properties. Nor is it a truly existent plurality, since there is not a separate pot for each of these constituents. -- Sautrantika assertion: The pot and its eight substantial particles are one truly existent entity.
-- Answer ab: It follows that the pot would be a truly single unit, because it is, by way of its own entity, one with and not separate from its eight substantial particles which have diverse characteristics.
-- Assertion: The pot is a plurality.
-- Answer cd: In that case there should be a pot for each of the eight substantial particles. Since there is no pot for each, the pot is not feasible as a plurality. )
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L9: [2: Refuting the composite as a truly existent single unit through the coming together of its constituents]
L9: [a: Actual refutation]
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\ ###
\ 333.
\ The tangible and the intangible
\ Cannot be said to coalesce.
\ Thus it is in no way feasible
\ For these forms to coalesce.
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(i. e. The case of the whole: An object composed of different parts and characteristics that are themselves empty of inherent existence, is also empty of inherent existence. The parts and characteristics do not coalesce to form an inherently existing whole. )
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(-- The opponents argues that the constituents combine to form a truly existent pot. Yet how do tangible constituents such as the four elements combine with intangible one such as visual form?
-- Assertion: The pot is a single unit through the coming together of the eight substantial particles.
-- Answer: The pot's composite can in no way be a truly existent single unit due to the coalescence of the eight substantial particles such as visible form and so forth, because the four elements which are tangible, and visible form, smell and so forth which are intangible cannot touch and coalesce. )
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L9: [b: Refuting the rejoinder]
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\ ###
\ 334.
\ Form is a component of the pot
\ And thus, for a start, is not the pot.
\ SINCE THE COMPOUND DOES NOT EXIST,
\ NEITHER DO THE COMPONENTS.
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(i. e. The whole and the parts / characteristics are not different, not the same, because the objects and its parts or characteristics are never the same, even if never separate or different. One cannot be found without the other, but they still represent different things. They are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts. That is why both are empty of inherent existence. )
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(-- These constituents are merely components and not the compound itself. If the compound is not truly existent because it depends on its parts, neither are the components, since they too depend on their parts.
-- Assertion: Even though there is no mutual contact, their combination is the "truly existent" pot.
-- Answer ab: The pot's visible form is a component or part of the pot and thus, for a start, is not the pot, just as smell and so forth are not.
-- Assertion: Since a compound reliant upon components exists, that is the pot.
-- Answer cd: Since visible form, smell and so forth do not each have a pot, the compound pot does not exist by way of its own entity. The components, too, therefore do not exist by way of their own entity, because they have parts. )
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L9: [3: Showing other reasoning which refutes the composite as a truly existent single unit] L9: [a: Consequence that everything is a pot if the pot has true existence]
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\ ###
\ 335.
\ If the definition of form
\ Applies without incongruity
\ To all forms, for what reason
\ Is one a pot and not all others?
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(i. e. Another reason - form cannot be a true basic characteristic: When we say a pot has the truly inherently existing characteristic of "form", then what makes it a pot and nothing else since everything has form. The fact is that "form" is not an inherently existent characteristics, it is just a fuzzy concept that regroup many different other characteristics, and so on. And because of this dependency, it is not existing on its own. )
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(-- If form is truly existent, why is one form a pot and another not a pot?
-- Why are some things that have form pots and other things that have form no pots? It follow that all should equally be pots, for if the definition that form is simply that which is appropriate as form applies without any incongruity to all forms such as smell, taste and so forth as well as pots and woolen cloth, truly existent things with form should be the same in all respects. )
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L9: [b: Consequence that the eight substantial particles of the pot are one]
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\ ###
\ 336.
\ If you assert that form is distinct from
\ Taste and so forth but not from the pot,
\ How can that which does not exist
\ Without these not be distinct from form?
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(i. e. The characteristics are not the same as the characterized: From is not the same as pot, no more than smell is the pot . . . )
.
(-- Surely all forms should be pots, since distinctions would indicate dependence on other factors.
-- It follows that form, smell and so forth would also be one, because of being one with the pot.
-- Objection: Form, smell and so forth are different.
-- Answer: You assert that smell, taste, and so forth are distinct from visible form because they are objects apprehended by different senses, but that visible form is not distinct from the pot. Yet how can the pot that cannot be posited without taste and so forth, which are distinct from form, not be distinct from form? It follows that it should be, because the pot is different from form, smell and so forth by way of its own entity. )
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L9: [4: Refuting truly existent production of the pot from its causes]
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\ ###
\ 337.
\ The pot has no causes
\ And is itself not an effect.
\ Thus there is no pot at all
\ Apart from form and so forth.
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(i. e. The Middle Way about existence: A truly inherently existent object cannot exist, but a conventional object do exist: A non-functional pot that would be without causes and conditions, and that would have no effect, would be as good as totally non-existent. It would not be perceptible at all. But the pot we know is merely a concept based on a valid basis composed of parts and characteristics. It is a conventional truth, empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen -- dependent on its characteristics and parts, on its causes and conditions, on the mind perceiving or labeling it, on accumulated karma . . . )
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(-- Since form and so forth are not the pot's causes by way of their own entity, the pot is not an effect existent by way of its own entity. Thus there is nowhere a pot that exists by way of its own entity apart from its components like visible form and so forth. Since a pot cannot be found isolated from its components, a pot which is a different entity from them does not exist. )
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L9: [5: Refuting truly existent production by virtue of dependence on parts]
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\ ###
\ 338.
\ If the pot exists by virtue of its causes
\ And those causes by virtue of others,
\ How can that which does not exist
\ By virtue of itself produce something disparate?
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(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - empty causes can only produce an empty result: An inherently existing object cannot be produced by empty causes and condition - that are themselves dependent on other causes and condition, ad infinitum. Everything is like that, and beginningless and endless chain of empty causes and effects. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. All empty but still dependently arisen and functional. That is the meaning of the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the inseparability of the Two Truths, of dependent origination and emptiness. )
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(-- A pot comes into existence through causes which require their own causes. How can anything which is produced in this way be truly existent?
-- Assertion: The pot is the effect of its components, such as clay, and they are its causes.
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-- Answer: If the pot exists by virtue of its causes, and those causes exist by virtue of other causes, how can that which does not exist by virtue of its own entity produce a disparate effect? Anything, therefore, that needs to rely on causes does not exist by way of its own entity. If it existed by way of its own entity, it follows that it would be causeless. This reasoning which refutes the existence of a pot by way of its own entity should be applied to all effects. )
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L8: [(b) Briefly refuting that though there are many components, the composite is a truly existent single unit]
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\ ###
\ 339.
\ Though they meet and come together
\ Form cannot be smell.
\ Therefore like the pot
\ The composite cannot be one.
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(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - empty parts and characteristics can only define an empty whole: the parts and characteristics keep their own individual parts, characteristics and functions. They do not become "one and the same" with the whole. The whole and its parts, or characteristics, or causes and conditions, are not different or separate, but still not the same. Not two, but still not one. They are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts. )
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(-- When the components retain their own particular properties, how can their combination form a truly existent unit?
-- Assertion: Though it has many components, the pot is a truly existent single unit.
-- Answer: Though visible form, smell and so forth meet and combine, form cannot be smell, for things that create the composite do not give up their different characteristics. Though form, smell and so forth combine they do not have one nature. Thus just as the pot as a truly existent single unit was refuted by the words [in stanza 332],
~ Because the pot is not separate from
~ Its characteristics, it is not one,
the composite too cannot be a truly existent single unit. ) .
L5: [2. Refuting truly existent components]
L6: [a. Just as a composite does not exist truly apart from visible form, smell and so forth, t here are no truly existent elemental derivatives that do not rely on the elements]
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\ ###
\ 340.
\ Just as the pot does not exist
\ Apart from form and so forth,
\ Likewise form does not exist
\ Apart from air and so forth.
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(i. e. Emptiness of basic characteristics or elementary components: Even the most basic elementary components or characteristics we can imagine is also dependently arisen, dependent on its own characteristics, on what it characterize, on other so called elementary characteristics or components . . . There is no basic or primary cause that is not itself an effect, part that have no parts itself, characteristics that are not dependent on something else, or anything that is not dependent on the mind and its accumulated karma. Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. )
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(-- The components themselves, for instance visual form, depend on their constituents, such as the four elements; the elements too exists only in dependence upon each other and not in and of themselves.
-- Just as the previously explained reasoning shows that there is no truly existent pot apart from form, smell and so forth, there is no truly existent component visible form apart from the great elements such as air, for it is imputed in dependence upon these. )
.
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\ ###
\ 341.
\ That which is hot is fire but how
\ Can that burn which is not hot?
L6: [b. Refuting truly existent elements]
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\ Thus so-called fuel does not exist,
\ And without it fire too does not.
.
(i. e. The case of the basic element of fire and its fuel: A fire cannot exist and then have its fuel added to it. We do not call fuel of a fire something that is not already in burning. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- Even elemental particles, when subjected to similar scrutiny, are found to depend on their parts and other factors. -- Just as visible form, smell and the like cannot exist without air and so forth, the great elements too do not exist by way of their own entity without relying on each other. Thus fire is that which burns and the other three elements that which is burnt.
Fire burns only fuel whose nature is the other three elements, yet hot fuel is fire and no longer fuel to be burnt. If it is not hot, since it is unrelated to fire how will it burn? Thus fuel independent of fire does not exist by way of its own entity and because of this, fire independent of fuel does not exist by way of its own entity either. )
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L6: [c. Refuting the rejoinder]
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\ ###
\ 342.
\ Even if it is hot only when
\ Overpowered, why is it not fire?
\ Yet if not hot, to say fire contains
\ Something else is not plausible.
.
(i. e. see previous verse)
.
( -- Assertion: Fuel is hard and so forth but not hot by nature. When it is overpowered by fire, it grows hot and is that which is burnt.
-- Answer: Even if fuel grows hot only when overpowered by fire, why is it not fire? It follows that it should be fire because it is hot and burns. Yet if fuel is not hot at the same time, it is implausible to claim that something else which is not hot is present in fire. In that case just heat divorced from the other three elements would be fire, but if one of the great elements does not exist the others cannot exist either. Moreover it contradicts the statement, "Things that arise simultaneously are reciprocal effects like the elements.