Objection
3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign
Good.
Good.
Summa Theologica
xii, 35), the soul "has a
natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held
back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward
journey," i. e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul
cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls
desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet
desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the
soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord. "
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now
it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this
life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the
intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the
intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a
bodily organ, as was shown in the [1022]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7.
Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in
a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the
vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul
separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when
separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the
Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And
this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By
authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of
this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight. " Now from
this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight,
bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the
Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in
God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and
have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present
with the Lord. " Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints,
separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of
God, wherein is true Happiness.
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the [1023]FP, Q[84],
A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means
of phantasms, as stated in the [1024]FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since
man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence,
it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul
can be happy.
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof;
thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary
for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection
belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong
in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in
the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its
proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine,
after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness
can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,"
answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the
blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or
because they have a natural desire to rule the body. "
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the
part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the
organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form
of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in
respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that
natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same
as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any
individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,
when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the
animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the
whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after
the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is
the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite.
Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the [1025]FP,
Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the
body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect
operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his
intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have
Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is
said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways.
First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and
such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by
way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has
not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a
hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents
it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from
the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God
in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as
far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the
fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has,
in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its
share.
Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at
rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which
suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the
desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would
wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed,
Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the
effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,"
is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because
even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of
the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it
refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the
lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have,
whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary
for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
good. But it has been shown above ([1026]Q[2]) that Happiness does not
consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body
is necessary for man's Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part
in this operation, as shown above [1027](A[5]). Therefore no
disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the
body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the
most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be
abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a
disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them. " But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is
written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and
your bones shall flourish like a herb. " Therefore good disposition of
the body is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of
the body, from every operation of virtue.
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal. " But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the
soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of
the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is
difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and
weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the
highest heaven. " Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the
angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden. "
Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an
overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. ) that "God gave the soul such a
powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor
of incorruption overflows into the lower nature. "
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its
object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to
Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation
of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires
indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body
which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will
be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the
Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq. ).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance,
food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That
you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mat. 6:20): "Lay
up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mat. 25:34): "Come, ye
blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom. " Therefore external
goods are necessary for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness
is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But some
of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary
for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): "Your reward is very
great in heaven. " But to be in heaven implies being in a place.
Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth? " As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God. "
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists
in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in
this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life,
which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect
Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul
separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are
nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the
animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as
being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the
likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of
these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy
Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture
is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal,
in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things
unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang. ). Thus food and drink
signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for
man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are
incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness
consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of
all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we
shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the
saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods.
Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be
appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of
a certain fitness and adornment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.
For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the
name of "glory. " But glory consists in man's good being brought to the
notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no
delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it
with us. " But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship
of friends is also necessary.
Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity
includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that
fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with divine wisdom, which consists in
contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for
Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man
needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them,
since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for
the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that
he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped
by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
needs the fellowship of friends.
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly
Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;
since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the
fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures
receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth,
and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and
rejoice in God, at their fellowship. "
Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is
that which man has, not with man but with God.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession
of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the
question under consideration; because man possesses in God a
sufficiency of every good.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness,
as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor.
Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy,
though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be
there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently,
friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher
creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may
obtain Happiness of God?
(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can attain happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just
as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is
above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in
several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature
only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither
can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual
nature, which is Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is
pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign
Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is
midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain
Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom
Thou shalt instruct, O Lord. "
I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good.
Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain
Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both
because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and
because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness.
This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing
God, as stated in [1028]FP, Q[12], A[1]: in which vision, as we stated
above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
Reply to Objection 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature,
otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the
rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its
knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the
universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the
intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing
the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps
forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of
reason, as was made clear in the [1029]FP, Q[58], A[3]; [1030]FP,
Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that
which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain
Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but
otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith
after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a
time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
Reply to Objection 2: To man in the present state of life the natural
way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after
this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
[1031]FP, Q[84], A[7] ; [1032]FP, Q[89], A[1].
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of
nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an
operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the
angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he
will be perfectly happy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can be happier than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another.
For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue;
because it is written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard
"received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in
Evang. ), "each was equally rewarded with eternal life. " Therefore one
man cannot be happier than another.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can
surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
by another's.
Objection 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient
good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is
not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack
nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore
either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be
greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in
Joan. ) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal
life. " But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to
merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i. e. the
Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As
to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one
Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one
Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But
as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he
is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this
sense one man can be happier than another.
Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in
its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme
Good.
Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;
since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all
good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be
happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same
good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,
since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others
besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing
Thee alone. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one can be happy in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For
it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who
walk in the law of the Lord. " But this happens in this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.
Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good
does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be
happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in
this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man
can be happy in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:
since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does
not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this
life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy
that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries. " But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This
may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils
every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this
present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the
part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the
appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine
sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for
good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good,
which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have,
and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,
viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this
life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident
that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on
account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,
according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a
certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of
the Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due
to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,
which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the
nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part
of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way
in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the
true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as
stated above ([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken
from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness
to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true
Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is
a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature,
changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a
changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect;
and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
[1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal
ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired,
outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as
they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of
this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose
nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after
the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the
true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no
longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness. " It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.
Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i. e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him. " Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance. " But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.
Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i.
natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held
back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward
journey," i. e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul
cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls
desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet
desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii,
35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the
soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord. "
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in
this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now
it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this
life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the
intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the
intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a
bodily organ, as was shown in the [1022]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7.
Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in
a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the
vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul
separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when
separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the
Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And
this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By
authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the
body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of
this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight. " Now from
this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight,
bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the
Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in
God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and
have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present
with the Lord. " Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints,
separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of
God, wherein is true Happiness.
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the [1023]FP, Q[84],
A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means
of phantasms, as stated in the [1024]FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since
man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence,
it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul
can be happy.
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof;
thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary
for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection
belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong
in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in
the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the
more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its
proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine,
after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness
can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies,"
answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the
blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or
because they have a natural desire to rule the body. "
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the
part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the
organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form
of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in
respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that
natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same
as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any
individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,
when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the
animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the
whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after
the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is
the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite.
Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the [1025]FP,
Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the
body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect
operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his
intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have
Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is
said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways.
First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and
such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by
way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has
not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a
hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents
it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from
the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God
in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as
far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the
fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has,
in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its
share.
Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at
rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which
suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the
desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would
wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed,
Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.
Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the
effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,"
is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because
even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of
the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it
refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the
lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have,
whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary
for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily
good. But it has been shown above ([1026]Q[2]) that Happiness does not
consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body
is necessary for man's Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the
Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part
in this operation, as shown above [1027](A[5]). Therefore no
disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the
body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the
most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be
abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a
disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them. " But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is
written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and
your bones shall flourish like a herb. " Therefore good disposition of
the body is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect
virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of
the body, from every operation of virtue.
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal. " But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the
soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of
the soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is
difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and
weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the
highest heaven. " Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no
longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the
angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden. "
Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an
overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. ) that "God gave the soul such a
powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor
of incorruption overflows into the lower nature. "
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its
object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to
Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation
of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove
a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires
indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body
which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will
be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the
Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq. ).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance,
food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That
you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mat. 6:20): "Lay
up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mat. 25:34): "Come, ye
blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom. " Therefore external
goods are necessary for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness
is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. " But some
of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary
for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): "Your reward is very
great in heaven. " But to be in heaven implies being in a place.
Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth? " As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God. "
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists
in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in
this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life,
which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect
Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul
separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no
longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are
nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the
animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as
being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the
likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of
these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy
Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture
is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal,
in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things
unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang. ). Thus food and drink
signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for
man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are
incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness
consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of
all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we
shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the
saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods.
Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be
appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of
a certain fitness and adornment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.
For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the
name of "glory. " But glory consists in man's good being brought to the
notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no
delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it
with us. " But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship
of friends is also necessary.
Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity
includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that
fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with divine wisdom, which consists in
contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for
Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man
needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them,
since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for
the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that
he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped
by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
needs the fellowship of friends.
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly
Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;
since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the
fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures
receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth,
and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and
rejoice in God, at their fellowship. "
Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is
that which man has, not with man but with God.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession
of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the
question under consideration; because man possesses in God a
sufficiency of every good.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness,
as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor.
Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy,
though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be
there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently,
friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?
(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?
(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?
(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?
(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?
(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher
creature?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may
obtain Happiness of God?
(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can attain happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just
as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is
above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in
several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature
only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither
can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual
nature, which is Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is
pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material
things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the
phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign
Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.
Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is
midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain
Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom
Thou shalt instruct, O Lord. "
I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good.
Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain
Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both
because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and
because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness.
This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing
God, as stated in [1028]FP, Q[12], A[1]: in which vision, as we stated
above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.
Reply to Objection 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature,
otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the
rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its
knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the
universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the
intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing
the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps
forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of
reason, as was made clear in the [1029]FP, Q[58], A[3]; [1030]FP,
Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that
which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain
Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but
otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith
after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a
time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.
Reply to Objection 2: To man in the present state of life the natural
way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after
this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the
[1031]FP, Q[84], A[7] ; [1032]FP, Q[89], A[1].
Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of
nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an
operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the
angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he
will be perfectly happy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one man can be happier than another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another.
For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue;
because it is written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard
"received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in
Evang. ), "each was equally rewarded with eternal life. " Therefore one
man cannot be happier than another.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can
surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be surpassed
by another's.
Objection 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient
good" (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is
not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack
nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore
either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be
greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): "In My Father's house there
are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in
Joan. ) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal
life. " But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to
merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of
Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.
I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i. e. the
Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As
to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one
Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one
Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But
as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier
than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he
is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his
being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this
sense one man can be happier than another.
Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in
its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the
divers degrees of enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme
Good.
Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;
since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all
good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be
happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same
good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,
since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others
besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing
Thee alone. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one can be happy in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For
it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who
walk in the law of the Lord. " But this happens in this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.
Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good
does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be
happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in
this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man
can be happy in this life.
Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:
since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does
not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this
life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people happy
that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life.
Therefore one can be happy in this life.
On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, living
for a short time, is filled with many miseries. " But Happiness excludes
misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.
I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this
life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This
may be seen from a twofold consideration.
First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a
"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils
every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this
present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the
part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the
appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine
sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for
good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good,
which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass
away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have,
and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.
Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,
viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this
life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident
that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.
Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on
account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,
according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a
certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of
the Sovereign Good.
Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due
to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,
which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the
nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part
of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way
in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the
true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as
stated above ([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken
from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.
Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness
to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true
Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether happiness once had can be lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is
a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according
to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature,
changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a
changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect;
and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed
to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it
seems that it has an end.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they
shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
[1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal
ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain
occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed
so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness
principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired,
outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as
they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away
altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of
this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to
the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i,
10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but "as men," whose
nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after
the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has,
and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that
he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man
have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If
this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but
if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false
opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the
true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no
longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it
is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see
It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without,
is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its
stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of
which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills
the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all
goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall be satisfied when
Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i. e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like
manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation
hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness. " It is thus
evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord.
Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away
from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault;
and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the
will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above
([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent.
Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other
things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that
union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should
pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like
vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time
and movement.
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has
happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine
power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which
transcends all change.
Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things
which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural
necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is
unable not to wish to be happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition
of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of
the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the
beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from
another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so
necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore
this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness
by his natural powers.
Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But
irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much
more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs
to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the
imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is
subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own
actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i. e.
Happiness, by his natural powers.
On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his
intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,
surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into
the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love
Him. " Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.
I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be
acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in
whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on
(Q[63]). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]),
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every
creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural
knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his
substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii)
that "it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it,
according to the mode of its substance. " But every knowledge that is
according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision
of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final
Happiness by his natural powers.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,
although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it
provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with
which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it
fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal
to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him
free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.
"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by
ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although
it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble
condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains
some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better
disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help
of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the
perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the
purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not
capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.
Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow
of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that
can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection.
Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power,
is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's
happiness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the
action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a
twofold order in things---one, of the parts of the universe to one
another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside
the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end
(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is
dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the
order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the
parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the
lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness
consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,
i.
