]
presupposes
the State, it needs it existence in order to survive" (Rph no.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
?
322 Hegel was right
peoples appeal essentially to it. So this is what is rational, the most rational that is and that it could be. "In contrast with all this, which is by itself and for itself the universal and substantial, everything else is subordinate and works as mere means. " (VG 87)
The second half, "and the real is rational" (Rph xix) has provoked a sensational scandal among political thinkers and moralists. Against it they allude to alleged irrational empirical facts. Hegel replies: "Who is not cleaver enough to see that around him lots of things are not as they should be? " (EPW no. 6 A) The objectors believe that Hegel was some kind of fool unable to see what they see. On the contrary, they should wonder if they have actually understood Hegel's phrase. But "a sensi- ble consideration of the world distinguishes, throughout the vast realm of interior and exterior existence, what is a mere apparent, transitory and insignificant phenomenon, from what in itself deserves to be called reality" (EPW no. 6).
The objectors overlook that it is about universal history. If the abstract intellect moors to its conceptual stiffness, even the flight of a fly is real: but since when a merely anecdotic, fortuitous and inconsequential event deserves to be called 'historic reality'? Beside all this, there is the fact that the objectors cannot define 'real', which is the most ludicrous thing of all this issue.
Hegel's renowned phrase also makes sense in the epistemological setting of the preceding chapters. True reality, from which the concept of 'real' is originally extracted, is reason, spirit (cf. III, 3); in this sense the rational is the more real that exists. On the other hand, it is just from the concepts of reason that we have access to reality; sensibility does not apprehends being. "No sooner man speaks; there is already a concept there" (GP I 336). In this sense, whatever is real for us is auto- matically rational.
A last word should be said in this fourth section. A good deal of historians of political ideas have been unable to understand the true common denominator of every iusnaturalist. Plato, e. g. , is a iusnatu- ralist and does not appeal to nature but to eternal ideas of good and evil. Descartes is too a iusnaturalist and he does not appeal to nature but to innate ideas of good and evil. Also Sua? rez too, but his criterion is reason, not the whole human nature. Obviously, for iusnaturalism it should be understood the following: the fair or unfair, good or evil character of an action does not depend on any positive law. Every iusnaturalism shares this unique thesis; the name 'iusnaturalism' is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 323
completely accessory. The name produces equivocation, as if Right and morals have anything to do with nature, but it is too late to coin a new name since no one would pay attention to me.
Now, since Hegel's attack against natural is implacable, some su- perficial authors have believed that Hegel rejected iusnaturalism. They overlook that Hegel, while professing vehemently the content, he was aware of its name inadequacy and actually said where this inadequacy came from: "Those that cannot reach the universal take what is by itself to be something natural, just as they take the necessary elements of Spirit to be innate ideas. " (GP II 107; my emphasis)
The science of fundamental concepts of Right has been called natural Right, as if there was a Right that could concern man because of nature, and a Right, different from the latter, that originates in society; in the sense that society had to sacrifice natural Right as the true one. But in fact, [. . . ] society is the suppression of the unilaterality of such principle and the true realiza- tion of it (NH 60s; my emphasis).
The expression natural Right, which has been common within the philo- sophical doctrine of Right, leads to the ambiguity of whether Right exists naturally and immediately or if it is determined by the nature of the thing, i. e. , by the concept. The former was the common usage and with it was created the fictitious state of nature in which natural Right would prevail. While, on the contrary, the condition of society and State would demand and bring with it a limitation of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. When the truth is that Right and all its decisions are founded only on free person- hood, a self-determination which is rather the contrary of determination by nature (EPW no. 502 A).
It could not be said clearer that Hegel champions the true content of natural Right ("true realization of it"), but obliterating the equivo- cation of the expression; and also being quite aware of the fact that objective rights exist only in virtue that man is person, self-determi- nation, which is achieved only thanks to intersubjectivity, society, as I have said (III, 7). It is about, Hegel says, "laws and institutions that exist by themselves and for themselves" (Rph no. 144). When I was talking about ethics I alluded to them and I said that they are innumerable, they are imperatives such as "You shall not murder", "you shall not deceive", etc. , which are necessary for life in common.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 324 Hegel was right
We have a system of ethical relations; these are duties and are within a system; every determination in place, subordinated one to other and the higher rules over the rest. This is how consciousness, which is higher than Stoic freedom, is obliged; determinations are secured to the Spirit; objective determinations called duties are kept as state of rights and they are valid in consciousness as firm determinations (GP II 295).
Those are the determinations that do not depend on any authority legislating or not, because the existence itself of society and persons requires them. The prototype of such contents is the small set of laws called the Decalogue: "The Universal Law was all the time the Ten Commandments," (Rph no. 216 Z) "the Ten Commandments which are the fundamental, universal, ethic and legal determinations of legis- lation and morality. " (PR II, II 96)
Hegel highlights the iusnaturalist character of the innumerable set of duties and laws we are dealing with, i. e. , its independence from any positive legislator, when discussing something about constitutions: "The mere existence of a people [. . . ] presupposes a constitution, an organic condition, an ordered life of the people itself" (NH 530). This is why Hegel finds ludicrous the question that asks for the maker of a constitution: "It is easy to put forward the question: Who should make the constitution? It seems a clear question, but when we look closer, it shows immediately senseless. This is so because it presupposes that there is no constitution and that, hence, we only have an atomistic collec- tion of individuals. " (Rph no. 273 A) "Great laws, those properly signifi- cant, already exist; whatever is missing is insignificant" (WG 623).
"A constitution is not something merely done; is the effort of centu- ries and the idea and consciousness of the rational inasmuch as it has developed by a people" (Rph no. 274 Z).
Regarding the set of indispensable duties and institutions Hegel says: "Those institutions conforms the constitution, i. e. , rationality de- veloped and realized in the particular, and that is why they are sustain of the State" (Rph no. 265).
The content of iusnaturalism is present not only in the Hegelian sys- tem: it is the content of the system itself and it is devoid of the myth of natural man which made it vulnerable. If Hegel claims that the State is end in itself, it is because the State consists of the set of my neighbors: "The reality of State is the self-conscious individuals," (WL II 410) "the essence of the State is the alive ethical" (VG 112).
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Someone could say that the State is end in itself and that citizens are its means. But here the means-end relationship is absolutely inappropriate. The State is not something abstract, in front of the citizens. These are rather its constituents as in organic life, where no member is an end in itself and none is means either (VG 112).
"[. . . ] individuals have something absolutely unsubordinated, some- thing that is in itself eternal and divine [. . . ] they are part of the end of reason itself, therefore they are ends in themselves [. . . ] Man is an end in itself only due to the divine that is within him" (VG 106).
"Particular interest should not be ruled out and much least re- pressed, but harmonized with the universal, so that both it and the universal can be preserved" (Rph no. 261 A).
5. famiLy, Society, State
Every confusion and debate about the relationship between civil society and State fade away once we consider that the State is not the government but "the State in itself and by itself is the set of the ethical," (Rph no. 258 Z), "the universe of the ethical" (Rph xxii).
In so far as they surpass animality and constitute a human phenome- non, i. e. , an ethical phenomenon, family and civil society are part of such universe of the ethical which is the State. Just as morality and Right are true because of their ethicity and only that is the true morality and the true Right, so family and society are true because of the State and only in it they are true family and true society. "Every relation that due to form is private Right, are conceptually part of the State" (WG 917).
In civil society: "agents have in their activity finite ends, particular interests; but they also know and think. Therefore the content of their ends is pervaded by essential and universal determinations of Right, of duty, of the good. The mere desire, savagery and coarseness of will are left out of the stage and scope of universal history" (VG 95).
Even within the most basic economical relation --apparently pure egoism and the search of own benefits- there is and operating ethical relation: at least the ones required for communication through lan- guage (Cf. VI, 3), the one of not attacking, not fooling and 'keeping one's word'. A minimum degree of trust and gullibility is essentially required. Transactions are not between two savages carrying spears
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 326 Hegel was right
that with their free hand give and receive the object of trade. The day laborer is not paid after each stroke of their shovel; he has to trust and believe in his employer's word all day long. Workers are not paid every hour and not even every day; it is not give-and-take between belligerent parties. The entrepreneur believes too in the worker's im- plicit word that he wants to work and not to destroy the means of pro- duction. Without the ethical there would not be any collaboration or coexistence, without the State there would not be society.
Abstractly speaking, civil society is distinguished from the State, since "within civil society everyone is an end for his/herself and everything else is nothing" (Rph no. 182 Z), in civil society "all the waves of pas- sion overflow" (ibid. ).
Nevertheless, in reality civil society and the State are the same, since without the warp of the ethical, i. e. , the State, without the entwine- ment of individuals by duties and rights, civil society would scatter, would stop existing, it would not be society. "Particularity gives the impression to subsist by itself, but it is supported and maintained by the whole" (Rph no. 270 Z).
This was showed perfectly clear by Plato (Rep II 361C; Laws VII 790B; 793B) and Aristotle almost twenty five centuries ago. Modern man should not be amazed that Hegel claims the same; thing are just like that. For example, Aristotle remarks: "In every association there is some Right;" (EthNic VIII, ix 1) from which follows that "it seems that every association are part of the State association. " (Ibid 6) And it is what I was saying: as far as they constitute a human phenomenon and not a merely animal one, family and society are parts of the State.
Hegel puts it as follows: "In reality it is rather the State absolutely the first; only within it family develops in civil society; it is the idea itself of State which divides into these two elements" (Rph no. 256 A).
"The State is the self-conscious ethical substance--the unification of the principle of family and civil society" (EPW no. 535).
I have just mentioned why civil society, which is in the abstract a war of all against all and the mere quest of own benefits, in the concrete requires duties and rights to exist. This explains why Hegel claims: "Wherever there is civil society there is State [. . . ]. " (EPW no. 527 A). And also: "Civil society [. . .
] presupposes the State, it needs it existence in order to survive" (Rph no. 182 Z).
Regarding family it might seem prima facie that such relation is not so obvious. But, if it is not an animal family, it is undeniable that among
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its members there are duties and rights and that it is in such ethical relation that the consistency of family as such really lies. I have already said (VI, 2 fine) that the relation between husband and wife is some- thing quite superior to mere sexual instinct, and it is self-evident that if such tie were just sexual, the relation would not be stable nor conjugal society would properly exist. It is also evident that the duty of feeding, educating and looking after the children demands from the parents lots of things which cannot be in any sense reduced to the search of their own benefit. "It is through family that mans gets inside society, thanks to the reciprocal relation of social dependency, and this tie is ethical" (WG 888). Aristotle claims: "the State is essentially prior to household (oiki? a) and even to each one of us" (Pol I 1253a19).
It does not matter that marriage has to do with love and sentiment; it is distinguished from the natural sensation of love, since it recognizes well- known duties independent from it even when love is gone. The concept and awareness of the substantiality of marital live [. . . ] constitutes the beginning of the State as a realization of the rational and free will (A? sth II 496).
There is no need to insist more after the accurate analysis of Aris- totle: in every human group a relation of justice takes part, and hence every group is part of the State. If this scandalizes some theoreticians it is because, infected with legal positivism, they believe it has something to do with the government; it is because they imagine that there are no duties and rights until they are in black and white and positively decreed by some authority.
In fact, "the State [. . . ] is alive in so far as its two components --family and civil society-- are developed within it. The laws that govern these components are institutions of rationality that shine in them" (Rph no. 263 Z).
"Life of civil society constitutes the ground of duty; individuals have their vocation pointed out, hence their duty is pointed out; their morality consists in behaving according to it" (VG 95).
Hegel does not admit that State is reduced to civil society (cf. Rph no. 182 Z), i. e. , that a State is conceived following the abstract con- cept of civil society, whose content is the quest of one's own benefit and having each one as an end in itself. Plato and Aristotle already insisted in the fact that the State is not a means for the satisfaction of material necessities; the value of the State is not merely instrumental.
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Such a conception of the State would mingle it with a private company or a military alliance. Holding that the State is a means would be pure and sheer immorality since the State is my fellowmen. Intersub- jectivity and bonds among people is an end in itself, not means for something else:
Unification as such is itself the true content and end, and the fate of indi- viduals is to realize a universal life; this, which constitutes the substantially and universally valid, constitutes both the starting point and the upshot of any other particular desire or activity or behavior (Rph no. 258 A).
"The State is not one of those unions whimsically decided by indi- viduals" (GP III 307).
Theoreticians like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau explain the ori- gin of the State by means of a contract, they never understood that the State essentially precedes man, but they never understood that the State makes the man, not vice versa. They never understood that by nature man would be animal and not man, they did not even under- stood that language, which is required for making the contract, is al- ready a result of the organic intersubjectivity called State and it is even a constitutive part of the it.
"The highest duty of an individual is to be member of the State;" (Rph no. 258); "only from a spiritless perspective the State could be something merely finite" (Rph no. 270 Z).
"Today is known that the ethical and fair in the State is also the di- vine and God's commandment; and regarding its content there I nothing higher or holier" (WG 888). The State is an end.
Let us repeat it: the distinction between civil society and the State is abstract. In concrete reality civil society is identified with the State: "Wherever there is civil society there is State [. . . ]" (EPW no. 527 A).
Now, it would be a mistake to believe that this depends on the defi- nitions each one wants to come up with. The work of Plato, Aristotle and Hegel are science, not literature. They explain how things are.
On one hand, I showed (VI, 4) that the existence of the State does not depend on the existence of a government or on the existence of posi- tive laws, but, on the contrary, it is presupposed for government and positive legislation can exist. Therefore, the State consists on the set of duties and rights that tie persons or, if one prefers, on a set of persons in so far as they are tied by duties and rights.
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On the other hand, a mere cluster of individuals is not a society, and the intertwinement by mere economic relations or transactions is no way enough for constituting a society. For example, the inhabitants of Mexico's Northern borderline zone have greater economic rela- tions with Americans than with Mexicans, but they still form part of Mexican civil society. Aristotle already defended this: Etruscans and Carthaginians which make continuous economic transactions among them would be one and the same society. (Pol III 1280a31ss). Material self-sufficiency is neither enough nor required in order to constitute a society, since nowadays almost no society is self-sufficient. Racial, linguistic or moral homogeneity cannot be imagined as the essential trait of a civil society or a State; it would be too easy to refute through facts. Territorial unity, whatever that means, cannot be postulated as an essential trait either; the existence of Pakistan refutes it. But, more importantly, one cannot make sense of the expression 'territorial unity': even when divided by the sea or the mountains, persons can form part of the same civil society. Mexico and the Philippines demonstrate it. Saying that people should not cross over a territory pertaining to an- other civil society would be a definition where the definiendum appears in the definiens making it a circular definition that defines nothing.
No single physical datum is useful for corroborating the existence of civil society. Therefore, it is impossible to define civil society except as a set of persons intertwined by specific duties and rights. And that is the definition of State.
6. two iSSueS about humanity
I will talk about a theological and an epistemological issue quite close related with what I have said in the present chapter as to leave them aside.
It could be thought that the idea of salvation does not concern us [philoso- phers], because salvation is a future end, one of the afterlife. But then, the existence in this life would be just a preparation for that end. [. . . ] Individu- als would have no alternative but to see as a mere means whatever leads them to salvation. But things are absolutely not like this, we should defi- nitely rather conceive it as the absolute. Now, according to religion the end --both the natural existence and the spiritual activity-- is God's glorification.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 330 Hegel was right
And, indeed, that is the most praiseworthy end of spirit and history. [. . . ] The end of spirit is to achieve consciousness of the Absolute, in such a way that this consciousness is the only truth and everything is arranged according to it, so that it is what reigns and has reigned in universal his- tory. To know this as a matter of fact is what is called praise God or glorify the truth (VG 181s).
There cannot be two ends in the proper sense of the word. When the mind focuses on one, the other one turns into means. To call 'sub- ordinated end' something that really is means would be a linguistic chicanery with no content, since subordination consists precisely in it being means. But a philosophy that goes deep into morality cannot ac- cept that the State and universal history become means, because both the State and history are my fellowmen, the set of my fellowmen.
I explained (VI, 2) that the 'other' end, which theologians have in- vented despite it contradicts the Bible, is simply impossible.
Now, on that other end is based the notion of supernatural: super- natural is defined as whatever has to do with that other end.
If anything has been demonstrated in the previous pages is that man as man, precisely in as much as it differs from animals, has no nature. But then the idea of something supernatural for man is based on a false supposition: its content pretends to be something in contrast with man's nature, something that is over and above what is natural in man. But what is natural in man is not human but animal, man as such is always over and above and in contrast with what is natural, if not he would not be man.
We discussed (VI, 1) that naturalness is egoism, and sin consists in "deepening-on-self in nature", and every man commits that sin in his first free action. Every man needs irreplaceably divine assistance, divine imperative appeal, for being man and not animal. Abstract theology, on the contrary, makes the original sin to consist in the lack of a 'super- natural' grace which is not required for being man. Such conception in untenable, since it can only be called sin the lack of whatever man ought to be.
Such a theology, in the end, attributes to God a sin which pertains to man, since man is not liable for lacking such blessed supernatural grace. What really happens is that theologians do not accept the origi- nal sin; they do not admit that man is evil from the first moment. The Jahwist undoubtedly would say to them: Abandon all excuses and
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self-justifications, the truth is that I sinned of egoism from the first mo- ment, I am the sinner; I deepened voluntarily my animality; it is not that such sin is attributed to me, but I rather personally committed it myself.
If it was not tragic for the historical consequences it has had, what happens with such theology would be funny: it turns out humanity needs Christ only to be able to convince God to stop attributing to us a sin that we did not commit but that God fancied to attribute to us.
The reader might allow me the following incidental remark that does not pretend to point out the cause of this theology: capitalism has been benefited by theologians' consideration that natural egoism is not sinful, the search of one's own benefit. Such egoism is what capitalism uses as the engine of the whole system, and justifies it based on its pre- sumed lack of culpability.
In one of the deepest ever written paragraphs, Hegel calls pantheism the traditional denial of the original sin:
If man is God immediately, i. e. , if as an individual he considers himself God, that is pantheism. It is coherent with this the opinion that man is good by nature, that as an individual he is affirmative [. . . ] This is why it has been said of such self that God is not within him nor he is within God, and that is has to do with God just in an extrinsic fashion (PR I 255).
In other words: if I am not evil, I am the true God; I do not need God for anything. If my self am self-sustained, that is, if my self-conscious- ness gets to exist without God's intervention, I am not a creature, I am God.
It is worth noticing that still during the fifth century the Church taught that grace and divine assistance are required for fulfilling the commandments, which means in order that man can truly be man. (See Denzinger 137-138). Under this conception, faithful to the Scripture, grace is not conducive to a 'supernatural' end.
Theology, like other particular and specialized disciplines, did not bother to criticize its own concepts and to ascertain if they have meaning or not (cf. II, 7 initio). Human nature would be the same as human essence, but as a principle of activity, not as a principle of being. It is an explicative concept, not a descriptive one. But I have already established (V, 4) that those explicative words, specially 'essence', are just tautologies and smokes and mirrors. Regarding man, however, the
? ? ?
peoples appeal essentially to it. So this is what is rational, the most rational that is and that it could be. "In contrast with all this, which is by itself and for itself the universal and substantial, everything else is subordinate and works as mere means. " (VG 87)
The second half, "and the real is rational" (Rph xix) has provoked a sensational scandal among political thinkers and moralists. Against it they allude to alleged irrational empirical facts. Hegel replies: "Who is not cleaver enough to see that around him lots of things are not as they should be? " (EPW no. 6 A) The objectors believe that Hegel was some kind of fool unable to see what they see. On the contrary, they should wonder if they have actually understood Hegel's phrase. But "a sensi- ble consideration of the world distinguishes, throughout the vast realm of interior and exterior existence, what is a mere apparent, transitory and insignificant phenomenon, from what in itself deserves to be called reality" (EPW no. 6).
The objectors overlook that it is about universal history. If the abstract intellect moors to its conceptual stiffness, even the flight of a fly is real: but since when a merely anecdotic, fortuitous and inconsequential event deserves to be called 'historic reality'? Beside all this, there is the fact that the objectors cannot define 'real', which is the most ludicrous thing of all this issue.
Hegel's renowned phrase also makes sense in the epistemological setting of the preceding chapters. True reality, from which the concept of 'real' is originally extracted, is reason, spirit (cf. III, 3); in this sense the rational is the more real that exists. On the other hand, it is just from the concepts of reason that we have access to reality; sensibility does not apprehends being. "No sooner man speaks; there is already a concept there" (GP I 336). In this sense, whatever is real for us is auto- matically rational.
A last word should be said in this fourth section. A good deal of historians of political ideas have been unable to understand the true common denominator of every iusnaturalist. Plato, e. g. , is a iusnatu- ralist and does not appeal to nature but to eternal ideas of good and evil. Descartes is too a iusnaturalist and he does not appeal to nature but to innate ideas of good and evil. Also Sua? rez too, but his criterion is reason, not the whole human nature. Obviously, for iusnaturalism it should be understood the following: the fair or unfair, good or evil character of an action does not depend on any positive law. Every iusnaturalism shares this unique thesis; the name 'iusnaturalism' is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 323
completely accessory. The name produces equivocation, as if Right and morals have anything to do with nature, but it is too late to coin a new name since no one would pay attention to me.
Now, since Hegel's attack against natural is implacable, some su- perficial authors have believed that Hegel rejected iusnaturalism. They overlook that Hegel, while professing vehemently the content, he was aware of its name inadequacy and actually said where this inadequacy came from: "Those that cannot reach the universal take what is by itself to be something natural, just as they take the necessary elements of Spirit to be innate ideas. " (GP II 107; my emphasis)
The science of fundamental concepts of Right has been called natural Right, as if there was a Right that could concern man because of nature, and a Right, different from the latter, that originates in society; in the sense that society had to sacrifice natural Right as the true one. But in fact, [. . . ] society is the suppression of the unilaterality of such principle and the true realiza- tion of it (NH 60s; my emphasis).
The expression natural Right, which has been common within the philo- sophical doctrine of Right, leads to the ambiguity of whether Right exists naturally and immediately or if it is determined by the nature of the thing, i. e. , by the concept. The former was the common usage and with it was created the fictitious state of nature in which natural Right would prevail. While, on the contrary, the condition of society and State would demand and bring with it a limitation of freedom and a sacrifice of natural rights. When the truth is that Right and all its decisions are founded only on free person- hood, a self-determination which is rather the contrary of determination by nature (EPW no. 502 A).
It could not be said clearer that Hegel champions the true content of natural Right ("true realization of it"), but obliterating the equivo- cation of the expression; and also being quite aware of the fact that objective rights exist only in virtue that man is person, self-determi- nation, which is achieved only thanks to intersubjectivity, society, as I have said (III, 7). It is about, Hegel says, "laws and institutions that exist by themselves and for themselves" (Rph no. 144). When I was talking about ethics I alluded to them and I said that they are innumerable, they are imperatives such as "You shall not murder", "you shall not deceive", etc. , which are necessary for life in common.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 324 Hegel was right
We have a system of ethical relations; these are duties and are within a system; every determination in place, subordinated one to other and the higher rules over the rest. This is how consciousness, which is higher than Stoic freedom, is obliged; determinations are secured to the Spirit; objective determinations called duties are kept as state of rights and they are valid in consciousness as firm determinations (GP II 295).
Those are the determinations that do not depend on any authority legislating or not, because the existence itself of society and persons requires them. The prototype of such contents is the small set of laws called the Decalogue: "The Universal Law was all the time the Ten Commandments," (Rph no. 216 Z) "the Ten Commandments which are the fundamental, universal, ethic and legal determinations of legis- lation and morality. " (PR II, II 96)
Hegel highlights the iusnaturalist character of the innumerable set of duties and laws we are dealing with, i. e. , its independence from any positive legislator, when discussing something about constitutions: "The mere existence of a people [. . . ] presupposes a constitution, an organic condition, an ordered life of the people itself" (NH 530). This is why Hegel finds ludicrous the question that asks for the maker of a constitution: "It is easy to put forward the question: Who should make the constitution? It seems a clear question, but when we look closer, it shows immediately senseless. This is so because it presupposes that there is no constitution and that, hence, we only have an atomistic collec- tion of individuals. " (Rph no. 273 A) "Great laws, those properly signifi- cant, already exist; whatever is missing is insignificant" (WG 623).
"A constitution is not something merely done; is the effort of centu- ries and the idea and consciousness of the rational inasmuch as it has developed by a people" (Rph no. 274 Z).
Regarding the set of indispensable duties and institutions Hegel says: "Those institutions conforms the constitution, i. e. , rationality de- veloped and realized in the particular, and that is why they are sustain of the State" (Rph no. 265).
The content of iusnaturalism is present not only in the Hegelian sys- tem: it is the content of the system itself and it is devoid of the myth of natural man which made it vulnerable. If Hegel claims that the State is end in itself, it is because the State consists of the set of my neighbors: "The reality of State is the self-conscious individuals," (WL II 410) "the essence of the State is the alive ethical" (VG 112).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 325
Someone could say that the State is end in itself and that citizens are its means. But here the means-end relationship is absolutely inappropriate. The State is not something abstract, in front of the citizens. These are rather its constituents as in organic life, where no member is an end in itself and none is means either (VG 112).
"[. . . ] individuals have something absolutely unsubordinated, some- thing that is in itself eternal and divine [. . . ] they are part of the end of reason itself, therefore they are ends in themselves [. . . ] Man is an end in itself only due to the divine that is within him" (VG 106).
"Particular interest should not be ruled out and much least re- pressed, but harmonized with the universal, so that both it and the universal can be preserved" (Rph no. 261 A).
5. famiLy, Society, State
Every confusion and debate about the relationship between civil society and State fade away once we consider that the State is not the government but "the State in itself and by itself is the set of the ethical," (Rph no. 258 Z), "the universe of the ethical" (Rph xxii).
In so far as they surpass animality and constitute a human phenome- non, i. e. , an ethical phenomenon, family and civil society are part of such universe of the ethical which is the State. Just as morality and Right are true because of their ethicity and only that is the true morality and the true Right, so family and society are true because of the State and only in it they are true family and true society. "Every relation that due to form is private Right, are conceptually part of the State" (WG 917).
In civil society: "agents have in their activity finite ends, particular interests; but they also know and think. Therefore the content of their ends is pervaded by essential and universal determinations of Right, of duty, of the good. The mere desire, savagery and coarseness of will are left out of the stage and scope of universal history" (VG 95).
Even within the most basic economical relation --apparently pure egoism and the search of own benefits- there is and operating ethical relation: at least the ones required for communication through lan- guage (Cf. VI, 3), the one of not attacking, not fooling and 'keeping one's word'. A minimum degree of trust and gullibility is essentially required. Transactions are not between two savages carrying spears
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that with their free hand give and receive the object of trade. The day laborer is not paid after each stroke of their shovel; he has to trust and believe in his employer's word all day long. Workers are not paid every hour and not even every day; it is not give-and-take between belligerent parties. The entrepreneur believes too in the worker's im- plicit word that he wants to work and not to destroy the means of pro- duction. Without the ethical there would not be any collaboration or coexistence, without the State there would not be society.
Abstractly speaking, civil society is distinguished from the State, since "within civil society everyone is an end for his/herself and everything else is nothing" (Rph no. 182 Z), in civil society "all the waves of pas- sion overflow" (ibid. ).
Nevertheless, in reality civil society and the State are the same, since without the warp of the ethical, i. e. , the State, without the entwine- ment of individuals by duties and rights, civil society would scatter, would stop existing, it would not be society. "Particularity gives the impression to subsist by itself, but it is supported and maintained by the whole" (Rph no. 270 Z).
This was showed perfectly clear by Plato (Rep II 361C; Laws VII 790B; 793B) and Aristotle almost twenty five centuries ago. Modern man should not be amazed that Hegel claims the same; thing are just like that. For example, Aristotle remarks: "In every association there is some Right;" (EthNic VIII, ix 1) from which follows that "it seems that every association are part of the State association. " (Ibid 6) And it is what I was saying: as far as they constitute a human phenomenon and not a merely animal one, family and society are parts of the State.
Hegel puts it as follows: "In reality it is rather the State absolutely the first; only within it family develops in civil society; it is the idea itself of State which divides into these two elements" (Rph no. 256 A).
"The State is the self-conscious ethical substance--the unification of the principle of family and civil society" (EPW no. 535).
I have just mentioned why civil society, which is in the abstract a war of all against all and the mere quest of own benefits, in the concrete requires duties and rights to exist. This explains why Hegel claims: "Wherever there is civil society there is State [. . . ]. " (EPW no. 527 A). And also: "Civil society [. . .
] presupposes the State, it needs it existence in order to survive" (Rph no. 182 Z).
Regarding family it might seem prima facie that such relation is not so obvious. But, if it is not an animal family, it is undeniable that among
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its members there are duties and rights and that it is in such ethical relation that the consistency of family as such really lies. I have already said (VI, 2 fine) that the relation between husband and wife is some- thing quite superior to mere sexual instinct, and it is self-evident that if such tie were just sexual, the relation would not be stable nor conjugal society would properly exist. It is also evident that the duty of feeding, educating and looking after the children demands from the parents lots of things which cannot be in any sense reduced to the search of their own benefit. "It is through family that mans gets inside society, thanks to the reciprocal relation of social dependency, and this tie is ethical" (WG 888). Aristotle claims: "the State is essentially prior to household (oiki? a) and even to each one of us" (Pol I 1253a19).
It does not matter that marriage has to do with love and sentiment; it is distinguished from the natural sensation of love, since it recognizes well- known duties independent from it even when love is gone. The concept and awareness of the substantiality of marital live [. . . ] constitutes the beginning of the State as a realization of the rational and free will (A? sth II 496).
There is no need to insist more after the accurate analysis of Aris- totle: in every human group a relation of justice takes part, and hence every group is part of the State. If this scandalizes some theoreticians it is because, infected with legal positivism, they believe it has something to do with the government; it is because they imagine that there are no duties and rights until they are in black and white and positively decreed by some authority.
In fact, "the State [. . . ] is alive in so far as its two components --family and civil society-- are developed within it. The laws that govern these components are institutions of rationality that shine in them" (Rph no. 263 Z).
"Life of civil society constitutes the ground of duty; individuals have their vocation pointed out, hence their duty is pointed out; their morality consists in behaving according to it" (VG 95).
Hegel does not admit that State is reduced to civil society (cf. Rph no. 182 Z), i. e. , that a State is conceived following the abstract con- cept of civil society, whose content is the quest of one's own benefit and having each one as an end in itself. Plato and Aristotle already insisted in the fact that the State is not a means for the satisfaction of material necessities; the value of the State is not merely instrumental.
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Such a conception of the State would mingle it with a private company or a military alliance. Holding that the State is a means would be pure and sheer immorality since the State is my fellowmen. Intersub- jectivity and bonds among people is an end in itself, not means for something else:
Unification as such is itself the true content and end, and the fate of indi- viduals is to realize a universal life; this, which constitutes the substantially and universally valid, constitutes both the starting point and the upshot of any other particular desire or activity or behavior (Rph no. 258 A).
"The State is not one of those unions whimsically decided by indi- viduals" (GP III 307).
Theoreticians like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau explain the ori- gin of the State by means of a contract, they never understood that the State essentially precedes man, but they never understood that the State makes the man, not vice versa. They never understood that by nature man would be animal and not man, they did not even under- stood that language, which is required for making the contract, is al- ready a result of the organic intersubjectivity called State and it is even a constitutive part of the it.
"The highest duty of an individual is to be member of the State;" (Rph no. 258); "only from a spiritless perspective the State could be something merely finite" (Rph no. 270 Z).
"Today is known that the ethical and fair in the State is also the di- vine and God's commandment; and regarding its content there I nothing higher or holier" (WG 888). The State is an end.
Let us repeat it: the distinction between civil society and the State is abstract. In concrete reality civil society is identified with the State: "Wherever there is civil society there is State [. . . ]" (EPW no. 527 A).
Now, it would be a mistake to believe that this depends on the defi- nitions each one wants to come up with. The work of Plato, Aristotle and Hegel are science, not literature. They explain how things are.
On one hand, I showed (VI, 4) that the existence of the State does not depend on the existence of a government or on the existence of posi- tive laws, but, on the contrary, it is presupposed for government and positive legislation can exist. Therefore, the State consists on the set of duties and rights that tie persons or, if one prefers, on a set of persons in so far as they are tied by duties and rights.
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On the other hand, a mere cluster of individuals is not a society, and the intertwinement by mere economic relations or transactions is no way enough for constituting a society. For example, the inhabitants of Mexico's Northern borderline zone have greater economic rela- tions with Americans than with Mexicans, but they still form part of Mexican civil society. Aristotle already defended this: Etruscans and Carthaginians which make continuous economic transactions among them would be one and the same society. (Pol III 1280a31ss). Material self-sufficiency is neither enough nor required in order to constitute a society, since nowadays almost no society is self-sufficient. Racial, linguistic or moral homogeneity cannot be imagined as the essential trait of a civil society or a State; it would be too easy to refute through facts. Territorial unity, whatever that means, cannot be postulated as an essential trait either; the existence of Pakistan refutes it. But, more importantly, one cannot make sense of the expression 'territorial unity': even when divided by the sea or the mountains, persons can form part of the same civil society. Mexico and the Philippines demonstrate it. Saying that people should not cross over a territory pertaining to an- other civil society would be a definition where the definiendum appears in the definiens making it a circular definition that defines nothing.
No single physical datum is useful for corroborating the existence of civil society. Therefore, it is impossible to define civil society except as a set of persons intertwined by specific duties and rights. And that is the definition of State.
6. two iSSueS about humanity
I will talk about a theological and an epistemological issue quite close related with what I have said in the present chapter as to leave them aside.
It could be thought that the idea of salvation does not concern us [philoso- phers], because salvation is a future end, one of the afterlife. But then, the existence in this life would be just a preparation for that end. [. . . ] Individu- als would have no alternative but to see as a mere means whatever leads them to salvation. But things are absolutely not like this, we should defi- nitely rather conceive it as the absolute. Now, according to religion the end --both the natural existence and the spiritual activity-- is God's glorification.
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And, indeed, that is the most praiseworthy end of spirit and history. [. . . ] The end of spirit is to achieve consciousness of the Absolute, in such a way that this consciousness is the only truth and everything is arranged according to it, so that it is what reigns and has reigned in universal his- tory. To know this as a matter of fact is what is called praise God or glorify the truth (VG 181s).
There cannot be two ends in the proper sense of the word. When the mind focuses on one, the other one turns into means. To call 'sub- ordinated end' something that really is means would be a linguistic chicanery with no content, since subordination consists precisely in it being means. But a philosophy that goes deep into morality cannot ac- cept that the State and universal history become means, because both the State and history are my fellowmen, the set of my fellowmen.
I explained (VI, 2) that the 'other' end, which theologians have in- vented despite it contradicts the Bible, is simply impossible.
Now, on that other end is based the notion of supernatural: super- natural is defined as whatever has to do with that other end.
If anything has been demonstrated in the previous pages is that man as man, precisely in as much as it differs from animals, has no nature. But then the idea of something supernatural for man is based on a false supposition: its content pretends to be something in contrast with man's nature, something that is over and above what is natural in man. But what is natural in man is not human but animal, man as such is always over and above and in contrast with what is natural, if not he would not be man.
We discussed (VI, 1) that naturalness is egoism, and sin consists in "deepening-on-self in nature", and every man commits that sin in his first free action. Every man needs irreplaceably divine assistance, divine imperative appeal, for being man and not animal. Abstract theology, on the contrary, makes the original sin to consist in the lack of a 'super- natural' grace which is not required for being man. Such conception in untenable, since it can only be called sin the lack of whatever man ought to be.
Such a theology, in the end, attributes to God a sin which pertains to man, since man is not liable for lacking such blessed supernatural grace. What really happens is that theologians do not accept the origi- nal sin; they do not admit that man is evil from the first moment. The Jahwist undoubtedly would say to them: Abandon all excuses and
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self-justifications, the truth is that I sinned of egoism from the first mo- ment, I am the sinner; I deepened voluntarily my animality; it is not that such sin is attributed to me, but I rather personally committed it myself.
If it was not tragic for the historical consequences it has had, what happens with such theology would be funny: it turns out humanity needs Christ only to be able to convince God to stop attributing to us a sin that we did not commit but that God fancied to attribute to us.
The reader might allow me the following incidental remark that does not pretend to point out the cause of this theology: capitalism has been benefited by theologians' consideration that natural egoism is not sinful, the search of one's own benefit. Such egoism is what capitalism uses as the engine of the whole system, and justifies it based on its pre- sumed lack of culpability.
In one of the deepest ever written paragraphs, Hegel calls pantheism the traditional denial of the original sin:
If man is God immediately, i. e. , if as an individual he considers himself God, that is pantheism. It is coherent with this the opinion that man is good by nature, that as an individual he is affirmative [. . . ] This is why it has been said of such self that God is not within him nor he is within God, and that is has to do with God just in an extrinsic fashion (PR I 255).
In other words: if I am not evil, I am the true God; I do not need God for anything. If my self am self-sustained, that is, if my self-conscious- ness gets to exist without God's intervention, I am not a creature, I am God.
It is worth noticing that still during the fifth century the Church taught that grace and divine assistance are required for fulfilling the commandments, which means in order that man can truly be man. (See Denzinger 137-138). Under this conception, faithful to the Scripture, grace is not conducive to a 'supernatural' end.
Theology, like other particular and specialized disciplines, did not bother to criticize its own concepts and to ascertain if they have meaning or not (cf. II, 7 initio). Human nature would be the same as human essence, but as a principle of activity, not as a principle of being. It is an explicative concept, not a descriptive one. But I have already established (V, 4) that those explicative words, specially 'essence', are just tautologies and smokes and mirrors. Regarding man, however, the
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