No More Learning

Treasure creation man- ifests itself empirically as an effect of communication and shapes the fund by organizational means. The critical moment for such transitions consists in the transformation of an assembled value and energy into a quantity that can be invested.
A consideration of rage-treasure creation in the main capitalistic coun- tries during the second half of the nineteenth century makes it self-evident why the chronic liaison of economic misery and the political repression of the "masses" under the grip of capitalism were responsible for the abun- dance of raw material for rage and indignation. These amorphous, barely articulate impulses of dissidence were initially in the hands of their individ- ual owners. They were for the most impotent until taken up by interested organizations, which collected and transformed them into the corporate capital of a progressive politics of rage-based opposition.
At this stage of my investigation, it can be seen clearly how the politi- cal alliances and parties of the old left had to accept the role of collection points of dissidence. It is part of the function of leftist parties to organize the
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thymos of the disadvantaged. They provide the liaison between rage capaci- ties and a desire for dignity, and they grant the struggle a pragmatic, medi- ated, and political shape. Their contract is based on a promise to their cli- ents to disburse a thymotic return in the form of increased self-respect and a more powerful grasp on the future, provided that the clients refrain from independent utilization of their rage. The gains are earned through the polit- ical operations of the rage banks, which extend the existential possibilities of their clients in a material as well as symbolic manner. Because collection institutes pursue diverse strategies for investing rage, it initially remains to be seen how the leftist banks will work with the deposits entrusted unto them.
During the last third of the nineteenth century there emerged at least three distinct styles of operating with rage and protest: the anarchic- terrorist, the communist-centralist, and the social-democratic-reformist (and syndicalist) styles. These naturally present themselves in countless compromises, and their intermixture with forms of collection from the right has led to further complications. For all three procedures it was evident that. the initially obligatory regional and national forms of rage collection had a pragmatic and preliminary character. The anticapitalist impulse could maintain the level of its enemy only if it reached the same supranational level as the enemy in terms of organization and operation. This insight led to the internationalist pathos, which has been binding for all authentic parties on the left since the days of the International Workers Association (1864-1876) and the second International (1889-1914; and then again as the Socialist International from 1923 until today).
In historical accounts of the twentieth century, August 1914 was unani- mously depicted as the fateful moment of political modernity, for reasons that are all too obvious. With a similar consensus it was remarked that the entry of the imperial nations of Europe into the First World War resulted in the catastrophe of socialist internationalism because the vast majority of the moderate left parties underwent a conversion toward prioritizing national motivations for war in light of the imminent military confrontation. The infamous remark from Wilhelm Ifs speech on August 4, 1914, from the throne in the Berlin Parliament, that he does not know any parties anymore but only Germans (similar to comments from his second balcony speech in front of the people on July 31) proclaims—and at the same time registers, by focusing on the German example—the complete collapse of transnational solidarities. In fact, there was almost everywhere an integration of primarily social-democratic and accommodated workers' movements in the euphoric
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mobilizations of nationalistic and imperial states. As the sources prove, the approval of the bonds issued to support the war by the Social Democratic Party created a moral shock for many people affiliated with the left.
In my thymotic terms, the fatality of these processes can be described as a form of an inevitable bank crisis. The rage deposits of the "masses" in internationally operating banking houses are put at the disposal of the polemical deals of national political leadership by the managers. By with- drawing decades' worth of accumulated quantities of rage and dissidence from the frontline against the capitalist order and making it available for the war between imperial nations, the leaders of the moderate workers move- ment committed a "white-collar crime" of unparalleled extent. However, they were able to at least partially apologize for the giant misuse of rage capital by pointing toward the war-mongering enthusiasm of their custom- ers. In fact, even after almost a hundred years, the enthusiastic images of August 1914 remain a scandal not only from a political but also from an anthropological point of view.
Seen from a cultural-theoretical perspective, the shift in rage from inter-
nationalism to nationalism means a return to historical formations of polit-
ical stress groups that can shoulder the consequences of war. The Second
International remained too loosely connected to be able to pull together
its members under conditions of real pressure and become an effective war
collective (using the terminology of Heiner Muhlmann, a maximal-stress
39
cooperation).
that could withstand the burdens of war. Under the threat of war, symboli- cally secure Internationalists enlisted almost automatically into the national fronts; for the time being their emotional boundaries were identical with the political collectives for the processing of stress—with the exception of those rare fellows who wore the curse "unpatriotic scoundrel" as a philosophical mark of honor. Since the nineteenth century the capacity for national self- preservation was reinforced through armies of draftees, organized around centers of regular soldiers. By the way, one needed to wait to the begin- ning of the twenty-first century before it was possible to politically organize postnational military units in Europe. The fact that these processes were so cumbersome and so slow gives us insight into the strength of the equation of the nation with the ultimate political unit of survival, an equation that continues to have an effect even today.
It was completely incapable of constituting a political body
The perpetually loose coordination of the national components of the Second International reveal the deep dissatisfaction of the radical wing of
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the workers' movement after August 1914 as a sign of naivete or hypocrisy. After all, one could not seriously expect that the majority of the proletariat of France, England, Germany, and so on could remain distant from their respective national mobilizations in a time of war. But from the events of 1917, it is obvious that the "imperialist war" directly supported the radical position. The hope that there would be a world war as the last chance for revolutionary aspirations, which Bakunin had diagnosed in 1875, was real- ized a little more than forty years later.
For the political processing of popular thymotic impulses, the eruption of war in 1914 constituted a serious break. Its immediate result consisted in the abrupt transformation of the largest portion of anticapitalist rage values into acute national antagonisms. The psychopolitical consequences of this are reflected in the complex of events referred to as the "age of extremes. " This age was, first, determined by the Leninist attempt to violently reac- quire the rage that had been lost. This attempt needs to be seen primarily as a realpolitik of the revolution at all costs. The second feature was the enduring amalgamation of rage with militant national movements, which stirred up the political scene in Europe after World War I. The struggle for the betrayed rage of the proletariat helped to position the two formations of extremist militancy. Their match constituted the heavyweight confronta- tion of world politics between 1917 and 1945.
The primary adversary on the left, a Third International dominated by Leninism, seemed for the first time capable of presenting itself with a legiti- mate claim to become a world rage bank. Bolstered by the victory of the October Revolution, the board of directors and supervisors of this company thought that they could take command of a new organ of collective rage. It would become a unified organization of globally dispersed potentials of dis- sidence, a unified antibourgeois, anticapitalist, and anti-imperialist politics with high dividends calculated for the activated "masses. "
The tragedy of this new collection began during the first days of the Rus- sian Revolution, when it became clear that Lenin's dispassionate sense of reality morally demystified the radical left. More than one generation was necessary to accept this demystification. Already during the fall of 1918, workers in Petrograd were called on to commit massacres against Russian social democrats: "Comrades, fight the right-wing social revolutionaries without grace, without pity. Court procedures and tribunals are not nec- essary. The rage of workers will ravage Wipe the enemies out physi- cally. "40 During the defeat of the sailors, the most loyal followers of Lenin
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demanded the rule of councils against the monopolization of the revolution through the Bolshevist leadership. It was consequently obvious where the revolutionary journey was headed. The fact that the organizer of the Red Army and the subsequent great hope of anti-Stalinist illusions, Leo Trotsky, excelled in the slaughter of the Kronstadt opposition reveals the slippery slope that the cause of the left in Russia had entered onto. Another sign for its misdirection was the fact that Lenin himself did not feel embarrassed to denounce the large majority of bona-fide socialist insurgents as petit bour- geois counterrevolutionaries during the tenth convention of the Commu- nist Party, which took place at the same time as the slaughter of the sailors.
Lenin had already committed himself publicly to the dogma that the struggle against barbarism ought not to refrain from using barbarous methods. With that turn of phrase he included the anarchistic externaliza- tion of horror in communism. The man who in the moment of coming to power had written, "history will not forgive us, if we do not assume power now" and "procrastination is becoming positively criminal,"41 was obviously not willing to give up the opportunity, even if the crude means of conquest and the monopolization of power were in stark contrast to the noble goals of the overall project. It could have already been anticipated that the revolu- tion had become a constant putsch, which required an ever-more grotesque effort in order to pretend fidelity to the program. By postulating mass terror as the recipe for success for the revolutionary state, Leninism exploded the dynamic liaison of indignation and idealism, which had been the politico- Utopian privilege of the left until 1917.
This had far-reaching consequences for what was later referred to as the "political suspension of morality. " Every contemporary was able to under- stand in 1917 that an epoch of states of exceptions had just started. What was also certain was that in times of convulsive beginnings, the indignation of beautiful souls over unfortunate circumstances was no longer sufficient. At the same time, no one was prepared for the culmination of revolutionary exterminism, which almost from the first day of battle entered the scene in full armor. According to Lenin, it was the first duty of the revolutionary to get his hands dirty. Based on an obvious intuition concerning the new con- ditions, the Bolshevists announced their program in their mouthpiece, the newspaper Pravda, on August 31,1918, with the following words: "The hymn of the working class will from now on be the song of hatred and of revenge! " Explicitly canceling the fifth commandment, "Thou shall not kill," Lenin's teaching led from the necessity of revolutionary brutality to an open break
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(although it was still presented as provisional) with the Judeo-Christian and civil moral tradition of old Europe. Revealing the consistency of a fanatic convert, Georg Lukacs already by 1920 proposed rethinking these new rules for murdering in the name of the Good from the perspective of a "second ethics. "42 The "second" was supposed to mean in this context that although one still remembers the first ethics, that is, the ethics of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which is against killing, one suspends it deliberately in order to enter the stage of revolutionary action without any reservations. The abso- lute idealism of revolutionary engagement unleashed total instrumentalism in the elimination of obstacles hindering the new. For both Lenin and Lukacs it was clear that the revolution was assigned a purgatorial mission. From the logic of the intermediary domain in between class society and communism necessarily resulted the pattern of "cleansing. " Because world history had become the world court of judgment, the true revolutionary had to show all the necessary strength against the residues of the past. It is not accidental that the motto of Russian avant-gardism was, "Time is always right. " When the future knocks on the door, it enters through the gate of horror.
In less subtle contexts, this political suspension of morality or, more sim-
ply, the duty to commit crimes, referred to a simple quantitative reflection:
in order to save the lives of millions of human beings, one had to accept
that a few thousand people would have to be sacrificed. No person with
the power of judgment, it was claimed, could deny this argument. Only a
short time later, one could witness how millions were sacrificed so that a
few thousand, and ultimately only a few dozen, could stay in power, while
being led by a suspicious philosopher-king. The few continued to claim, of
course, that they exercised their power in the interest of the most sublime
hopes of humanity. The paradox of egalitarianism had never been exagger-
ated more convincingly than during the heyday of Bolshevism: the alpha
dogs of classlessness achieved their plan to accumulate all of the power in
43
on. In Lenin's immediate proximity one could hear theses such as, "When it comes to such a numerically rich people such as the Russians, one may sacrifice one-tenth without much ado, if it would be possible to continue to collaborate with the rest. "44 Lenin's closest collaborator, Zinoviev, the author of these class-genocidal fantasies, certainly would have never expressed these theses if he could not have been assured that the leader of the revolution would have approved of them. Since 1918, the archetype of
their hands.
In addition to these tragic calculations, cruder ones were voiced early
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decimation haunted the decrees of the party leader: if one would eliminate every tenth person here and there, the rest would be almost automatically
45
transformed into a malleable mass.
while a commander of the Red Army he used even the most insignificant occasion to let every tenth soldier be executed. Lenin's remark that repres- sion would only be necessary during the period of transition from capital- ism to communism was never much more than a slogan to suffocate moral concerns. The occasionally added argument that this time it was a sup- pression of the minority through the majority, which was said to present a promising novelty and was appropriate to the fighting style of "socialist humanism," turned out to be a conciliatory phrase. It was supposed to save the activists from understanding the fatal drift of their project. In hindsight, everyone who does not have reasons for not wanting to know can clearly see why communism, once in power, remained from the first to the last a
46
transfer the energy of the war socialisms into the life-forms of postwar
society, it is impossible to deny the following: Lenin's directives from the
late fall of 1917 onward initiated the first authentic fascist initiatives of the
twentieth century. Mussolini and his clones could only react as epigones to
47
The characteristic features of the new political style Lenin introduced, which never concealed its origin in the realism of the First World War, were distinctly revealed in the left-fascist original of this myth. The following fac- tors need to be mentioned here: the latent or manifest monological concep- tion of the relationship between leader and followers; the mobilizing of a constant agitation of "society"; the transference of the military habitus to economic production; the rigorous centralism of the executive staff; the cult of militancy as a form of life; ascetic collectivism; hatred for liberal manners of conduct; compulsive enthusiasm for the sake of the revolutionary cause; the monopolization ofpublic space through party propaganda; total rejection of the bourgeois culture of civility; submission of the sciences to partisan- ship; disdain for pacifist ideals; mistrust of individualism, cosmopolitanism,
transition from the bad to worse.
If one agrees that "fascism" was, during its initial phase, an attempt to
these initiatives.
example, the Action Francaise, present little more than light-handed brico- lages made out of the widely available socialist and nationalist copies. Even Georges Sorel's appeals to the fighting proletariat were only some of the more successful among the commonplace hymns to violence as a remedy for the liberal "culture of cowardice. "
We know about Trotsky as well that
The approaches of the older militant right before 1914, for
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and pluralism; constant spying on one's own following; the determinis- tic mode of dealing with the political enemy; and, finally, the temptation, which had been inherited from Jacobin Terror, to give the enemy short shrift, a trial process in which the accusation already entails the sentence.
On the top of the list of characteristics typical for fascism is the explicit abrogation of the fifth commandment, even if only for the duration of a "time of transition. " This time of transition lasts until the class enemy (ini- tially referred to as the "enemy of the people") has been eradicated. Excep- tions to the prohibition on killing from the Old Testament had long been granted to Jewish fighters and Christian soldiers, but this time the beneficia- ries belonged to a semi-civil elite that did not have to abide by moral laws because it was the avant-garde that practiced revenge in the name of human- ity. The expression "professional revolutionaries," which Lenin invented, marked the transition to a praxis of morally motivated amoralism. Albert Camus noted in his clever summary of Hegel's amoralizing influence on the thought of revolutionaries during the nineteenth and twentieth centu- ries that "all of morality becomes provisional. "48 This reveals the increasing alienation of revolutionary activism from its idealist origins. The pragmatic reasons for the becoming provisional of morality in times of permanent struggles were revealed in the modus operandi of the Russian Revolution, when murder for the Good took on chronic, professional, and institutional traits. After a short period of time, practices of killing became habit, sys- tematized and bureaucratized, without ever losing their erratic character. Because no one was capable of saying whether the moral state of exception would ever come to an end, it is not surprising that after a while there was a lack of voices of protest, which more or less directly recommended a moral- ity that would be appropriate for perpetual war.
The activists were convinced that killing in the service of the great cause meant a tragic surrender of virtue. Some saw in it a sacrifice of their per- sonal morality for the sake of the goddess of revolution. Among the com- missionaires the ability to kill was celebrated like a sacred competence that
49
The subsequent fascist movements from a nationalist wing were not at all in danger of being too sensitive. They only needed to exchange the
distinguished the revolutionary from the bourgeois.
kill was, in the eyes of the activists, the most obvious sign of a continuing bourgeois indolence. We know that part of the legend of Lenin includes a grain of kitsch, and the paradigm of such kitsch was presented by Gorki's hymns of praise for the revolutionary leader too sensitive for his mission.
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The unwillingness to
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declaration of war on the class enemy for the declaration of war on the enemy of the people and the race in order to apply Lenin's model to nation- alist movements in middle and southern Europe. Their fury was undeni- ably not simply imitative. The genuine contributions of the German, Ital- ian, Romanian, Croatian, and other radical nationalist parties for the entire complex of exterminist movements in Europe are, after all, large enough, should one take stock. It suffices to say that common morality is overbur- dened by the task of evaluating macro-criminal complexes. The statistics reveal that we have to assume that for every execution in the name of race during the twentieth century, there were two or three in the name of class.
The so-called fascist movements in Italy and elsewhere emerged from
the antibourgeois models of militant nationalism, which one could also call
socialism. These movements can best be characterized, in the context of
this investigation, as peoples' banks of rage. Their basic function also made
them into collection points of protest that clearly reveal functional similari-
ties with parties on the left while accentuating folk, regional, and nationalist
ideals. Their display of anticapitalism always remained a mere facade. The
widely noticed similarities between the communist and fascist movements
become easily understandable after a psychopolitical analysis: in both cases,
there are accumulations of rage that reach the dimension of large banks.
Fascism is socialism in one country, without the intention of internationalist
additions. Focusing on the collectivism of the front and the egalitarianism
of production, it needs to be noted that fascism is socialism without a prole-
50
or egalitarianism with a folk basis. Its modus operandi is the melting
tariat,
of the population into one thymotically mobilized pack, which takes itself to be unified in its claim to the greatness of the national collective.
The national banks of rage accumulation enjoyed the psychopolitical advantage of being able to work directly with the impulses of patriotic thy- mos without having to take a detour through universalistic ideas or other exhausting fictions. This had a decisive effect on the success of the militant movements of resentment in the countries defeated in World War I. The effects on Germany were the most significant because the demand for the transformation of humiliation into self-affirmation was understandably the strongest there. Considering that postwar periods have always played a key function in the cultural reorientation of combat collectives, it is possible to understand the fatal drift that took hold of the German right after 1918, when it refused to accept its assigned lesson. Italy also did not take on the task of readjusting the body of rules governing its own culture in the light
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of its war experience. By opening the door to the Italians to join the win-
ning side in the last minute, the Allied forces allowed them the possibility of
skipping the labor of stressful revision and escaping into a feeling of heroic
51
two major enterprises in the area of the political economy of rage identified each other as competitors. Soon each declared the struggle against the other party its primary reason of existence. The anti-Bolshevism of the fascist movements and the anti-fascism of the Comintern underwent an almost a priori process of entanglement. The so-called fascisms presented their business goals from the beginning in an anti-Bolshevik register because of the temporal as well as substantive priority of communist phenomena: the radicals on the right had the example of the left rival in mind when begin- ning to copy its formulas for success. What remained troubling for fascist leaders was that their Eastern rival was ahead with regard to the most cru- cial dimension of the new politics: mass murder. Communism, on the other hand, waited a while before recognizing its chance to mobilize all its forces for the struggle against its competitors from the right.
Actually, Stalin's directives against the radical movements on the right in
Europe exerted almost irresistible moral constraints. By presenting himself
in front of the world as the guarantor of resistance against Nazi Germany,
the leader of the Bolshevists forced upon all enemies of Hitler of whatever
orientation "antifascism" as the sole morally justifiable option of the age. In
this way he immunized the Soviet Union against its critics from within and
52
Be that as it may, let's take a step back to observe the formation of revo- lutionary thymos during one of its early stages. Since Lenin's "decrees con- cerning the red terror" from September 5,1918, the taking of hostages and mass executions of "antirevolutionary elements" became acts of revolu- tionary duty. In 1919 alone there are supposed to have been half a million executions. Terror had already reached a massive scale in the year before. The Cheka especially enjoyed publishing the lists of those who had been executed in order to indoctrinate the population according to the general tendency of the new measures. The transition from a revolt against the old
self-elevation.
What needed to happen did indeed happen. It was inevitable that the
without.
as soon as they raised the slightest objection to Stalin's politics. The pro- paganda, which Stalin was responsible for, showed how justified this worry was. It mentioned Trotsky and Hitler in the same breath in order to identify the personified dangers for the fatherland of the world proletariat.
These critics had to be afraid of being denounced as profascist
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rule to terror against one's own people and subsequently also against one's own half-hearted following created a climate that approached the kind of "amorphism" that Bakunin had called for. In August 1918, Lenin, quickened by the activist fever, sent telegrams to the entire country in which he called for mass hangings of reluctant farmers—"do it in such a way that the people will see it from afar and shiver. "53 In the same spirit, Krylenko, the people's commissioner for the judiciary, demanded from his subordinates that they should liquidate obvious innocents. Only such a practice would sufficiently impress the "masses. "
The strategy that led to this remark by the commissionaire did not suffer from a lack of depth: would it not one day be necessary to conclude from the quantity of excesses that the project was one of justice for which these kinds of sacrifices were necessary? The Polish poet Alexander Wat revealed the logic of cold-blooded fury in his conversations with Czeslaw Milosz: "But blood in the abstract, blood you don't see, blood on the other side of the wall. . . blood spilled on the other side of the river. How pure and great must be the cause for which so much blood is spilled, innocent blood. That was terribly attractive. "54 Where everything revealed a tendency to be excessive and voluptuous, similar proportions were easy to choose when it came to the destruction of enemies. Osip Mandelstam understood already in 1922 that the Soviet Union was about to transform itself into an oriental despotism. "Perhaps we really are Assyrians. Is this why we can look on with such indifference at mass reprisals against slaves, captives, hostages and her- etics. "55 The statistics on executions that historians have come up with pro- vide us with the information that during one week under the rule of Lenin, more people were summarily executed than during the entire previous cen- tury under the czar's regime after due process.
These are the parameters for the ambivalent space in which countless compagnons de route of real communism became lost. The concept of com- panionship, it could be argued, is the political form of what Heidegger referred to from the perspective of fundamental ontology as "errance" (die Irre). Whenever people "err" they move within an intermediary zone situ- ated in between wilderness and route. Heidegger himself was an eminent witness of this, as a matter of fact, because of his periodic preference for the Nazis. Because errance signals a middle course between passage and drift, the travelers will inevitably get to a place that is different from where they wanted to go at the beginning of their journey. "Wayfaring" (das Gehen) with communism turned into an odyssey of comrades because it presup-
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posed what should have never been assumed: that the communist actors were pursuing a more or less civilized road to destinations that could be reached. In reality, they supported a developing dictatorship that used excessive, idealistic, and exaggerated violence to bring about what a liberal state could have achieved in less time in a more spontaneous, more effec- tive, and, to a large extent, bloodless manner.
It was because of the chronological course of events that Lenin failed to learn to use the jargon of antifascism. When Mussolini organized the "march on Rome" in October 1922 (his party had been in the Italian parlia- ment for only one year), Lenin had just returned to his desk after suffering two strokes. When "il Duce" elevated himself to dictator of Italy, the leader of the revolution had already died after suffering a third stroke. Stalin's pro- paganda machine, on the other hand, discovered in due course its epochal chance in the proclamation of antifascism. In reality, both "fascism" and "National Socialism" were for the early Comintern not of primary concern. During the 1920s they were overshadowed by the caricature of the socialist or social-democratic rival in the West. The communist movement had spe- cialized in denouncing this rival through derogatory labels such as "social chauvinism. " Furthermore, they attempted to accuse and thus smash it as being "half-hearted, mendacious, and rotten. "56
This was only possible because hatred of the moderate left had turned into an obsession. In the midst of the chaos of the fall of 1918, Lenin took the time to write an almost hundred-page-long tirade. Writing in a professorial style against the "renegade Kautsky," the head of the parliamentary Euro- pean left, Lenin voiced the famous accusation that Kautsky aimed for a "rev- olution without revolution. " This clearly shows that, already, Lenin equated
57
practical overthrow with the unlimited exercise of violence.
who publicly committed to the duty of fighting social democracy as the pri- mary enemy could become members of the Third International, which was constituted in March 1919. Only after the time for effective defensive alli- ances against the victorious national revolutionary movements had run out did the communist leadership in Moscow change its point of focus to the rage accumulation in national socialisms. At this point, social democrats and communists were already crowded together in concentration camps.
Reflexes of the struggle for the thymos monopoly also entered the thoughts of the more subtle minds of the West. In his reflections "On the Concept of History," written in 1940, Walter Benjamin criticized social democracy for believing that future generations should profit one day from
155
Only those
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improved living conditions. Orientation to future successes, he objected, cuts "the sinews of [the working class's] greatest strength" because by being educated to practice evolutionary patience it forgets its "hatred and its spirit of sacrifice. "58 With arguments of such a quality, the author of the histori- cal-messianic theses wanted to uplift class hatred, which was cherished by the communists. To understand the power of the left-fascist seduction— and the discreet charm of the theological overinterpretation of past events {geschehener Geschichte)—it is necessary to acknowledge that even an author of Benjamin's stature could be won over to such philo-Soviet remarks and the sanctification of violence.
However, the consequences of overinterpretation cheerfully transcend- ing the threshold of indolence are plain beginning in the 1920s, in particu- lar among political theologians. Paul Tillich, for example, took himself to be sufficiently inspired to dare to announce that the decision for socialism would, in a specific period, become equivalent to the decision for the king- dom of God. The "specific period" was for Tillich identical with the era after Lenin's death. In the year 1932 the resolute German protestant himself felt called upon to understand and affirm Stalin's kairos.
It has been well documented by the history of religion that when the Holy Spirit blows through, it occasionally reaches high wind speeds. The front man Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy had the honor of demonstrating how it can provide for ordained hurricanes when he told the history of Europe, without further ado, as the epic of the Holy Spirit become creative through revolutions. In the year 1931, this phosphorescent lay-theologian thought that it was appropriate to lecture on the Soviet Union: "We will be recre- ated and revolutionized by Russia, because the story of the creation of the human being is continued there In Moscow there are the new dogmatic popes who decide about the salvation of our lives.
"59 Such remarks can only be made plausible by illuminated interpreters insisting on their right even under the most difficult of circumstances to interpret world history to the last detail as a history of salvation. Profane observers of such victories over probability reach the conclusion that theology and acrobatics must have one and the same root.
THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL, WHICH WAS FOUNDED IN 1919, PRESENTED itself from the beginning as the executive organ of Leninism, which asserted that its aim was "to connect the truly revolutionary parties of the world
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proletariat. " The Third International proclaimed that it would use its coun- cils to create "its own apparatus," which would be capable of replacing the bourgeois state. Hereby nothing less than a system of proletarian Catholi- cism entered the world stage. The relationship between the party and the councils was unequivocally modeled on the Roman Church and its local parishes. However, what became clear after a few yeas was that nothing but the promise that the battles would be continued remained from the spar- kling promises of the Manifesto of the Communist International to the Global Proletariat, dated March 6,1919. Even the concept of an army of councils, which had been proclaimed in the manifesto, quickly gave way to a conven- tional military machinery in the hands of a monological party leadership.
By presenting itself as the "International of action," the Comintern under- lined its claim to accumulate the dispersed dissidence potentials of the pro- letarian "masses" in a world rage bank. It promised its customers it would invest their thymotic capital in revolutionary projects in order to use it for the purpose of a global, literally catholic project, which was justified in the interest of "the totality. " The successes of this bank would have consisted in the creation of a proud proletariat and in the global improvement of its con- ditions of living—insofar as effective returns from the thymotic investments of the "masses" express themselves in the transformation of vengeful inclina- tions to pride and self-affirmations. Why this did not come about does not need to be laid out in detail. It is well known that Lenin assumed that the Russian Revolution would soon function as a trigger for world-revolutionary upheavals, in particular with regard to the German proletariat, which had been assigned a key role by Lenin. This assessment was plausible: there was indeed large potential for protest in the Western hemisphere. Moreover, the German question was without a doubt the most essential one. However, the dissident energies took on the shape of national-revolutionary accumulation movements, in particular in Mussolini's Italy and among the political spec- trum on the right in the unfortunate Weimar Republic—and the reasons for this become clear in light of psychopolitical analysis.
The early terrorist turn of the Russian events makes one thing unmistak- ably clear from the beginning: the new central bank could at no time be satis- fied with the real investments of its clients. Because the effective rage depos- its of the Soviet proletarians were much too small for the intended project, the necessary assets had to be raised by force from the huge "masses" of the country's farmers. However, nothing suggested that this potential would have accrued to the communist fund because the interests of the rural poor
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hardly had a common denominator with the marginal Marxist working force, not to mention with the dictating commissionaires.
In this situation the directorship of the massively undercapitalized world bank of rage resorted to the strategy of blackmailing the reluctant "masses" of farmers to deposit their thymotic savings. The managerial secret of the Russian Revolution consisted in procuring the missing quantities of rage in the form of mandatory credit loans. Consequently, the Soviets created enor- mous amounts of exploitable anxiety, which was connected to the extorted willingness to feign support for the projects of the revolutionary rage bank. With regard to this point, the analogies between the Catholic politics of redemption and the communist version of the gospel are impressive.
The greatest success of the Russian Revolution was probably its ability to enforce a broad current of simulated assent. It is thanks to this that it was discovered that class hatred, which is the precondition for legitimizing revo- lutionary politics, does not necessarily need to be present—as little as insti- tutionalized religion always presupposes true faith. The affect could just as much be brought about by artificial means, whether by agitation and mea- sures for the sake of mobilization or through the enforcement of applause for the projects of the party. Instead of basing his theory of the simulacrum on contemporary cultural life, Jean Baudrillard could have derived it just as well from investigating communist power.
Because the extortion of assent by way of instilling fear was by itself not able to support the Soviet developmental dictatorship, it was necessary to create a catalogue with positive images into which those that had initially only been passively affected by the revolution could invest their own ambi- tions and fantasies. This task was taken up by the directors of Bolshevik psychopolitics not without a sense for thymotic realities. In order to create the necessary degree of collective pride, they activated some of the most powerful mythic models of modernity—the Prometheus complex ranked first, which has always been characteristic for the technophile disposition of bourgeois modernity, then pride in the great achievements of Soviet technology and its urban development—think of the cult surrounding the Moscow subway—and finally the figure of the athlete who defends the honor of the collective through his achievements. The turning of industrial achievements into sport went so far in Soviet ideology that in the case of the famous Sakharov workers, thoseintense athletes of plan fulfillment, the figure of the proletarian was equated to a winner of an athletic competition in a stadium. And nevertheless it was impossible for the artificially ignited
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rage of the Komsomolets, the members of the youth organization who had been sworn into Stalinism and who deliberately signed up for the battle of production, to let one forget about the shabbiness of the conditions. The vulnerability of the functionaries to the slightest bit of critique betrayed the instability of the situation. At times a seemingly harmless and substan- tively fitting remark, such as the statement that Soviet shoes would be of an inferior quality, sufficed to have its author confined to one of the countless prison camps.
The decisive characteristic of the new affective economy consisted in restraining the clients to the institute of accumulation. Because of the abol- ishment of any opposition, they could no longer take out their rage assets from the party to deposit them in a different corporation. If the bank had paid back the loans of fear to thus allow their clients to make a free decision, the Soviet investors would have withdrawn their assets from the Commu- nist institutions in order to invest them in less despotic projects. Because the situation was as it was, closing one's account would have meant break- ing with the party—and suffering the consequences. This coercive manipu- lation of investors through the revolutionary system of restraining custom- ers has received the not unfitting, although otherwise questionable, name "totalitarianism. " "Totalitarian" refers to the retransformation of the cus- tomer into a slave of the corporation.
All this explains why the red terror was never simply a necessary bad feature of a "time of transition"—independent of whether this period was conceived of as an episode or as an epoch. The Soviet regime was in prin- ciple dependent on the steady regeneration of horror. Without the confis- cation of thymotic potentials of large strata of society, the Bolshevist cad- res would have been able to remain in power for barely half a year. One should therefore certainly not make Lenin's stubborn character exclusively responsible for the success of the rigid line, however often the abnormal intolerance of the party and revolutionary leader has been documented by its witnesses and victims. The suppression of any form of opposition was in reality a simple business necessity if the party did not want to give up its claim to be the sole representative for the thymotic energies of the "masses. " This is why the collapse of the Communist system was imminent when its universal autohypnosis faded away. As long as it stayed in power, it had to confiscate all means of expressing self-respect. Since there is an evident connection between property and self-respect, the destruction of property was the most secure way of humiliating the comrades of the Soviet empire.
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If the system was supposed to rule successfully, no non-Bolshevik nucleus
for thymos articulations was allowed in the country. In order to implement
the monopoly of communism with regard to rage, pride, and the dissidence
assets of the populations it covered, it was absolutely necessary to cut off
the individual as well as groups from any access to alternative sources of
60
atmospherically present in the post-communist universe, even today after
decades of thaw and de-Sovietization. Because of a despotism to which
the rage expropriation, the breaking of pride, and the destruction of the
opposition over many generations were endemic, a climate of deeply
destructive humiliation was created in the reigns of Lenin and Stalin, a
climate that recalls Oswald Spengler's dark diagnoses about the fellahs
emerging from devastated civilizations. Its common reality was popular
resignation. The political regime was tolerated as a vicious addition of
destiny to the terrible Russian winters. If one wanted to trace back the
Soviet climate to individual contributions of actors, one would discover,
among other things, a civil servant such as Lazar Kaganovich, one of the
most monstrous creatures of Stalin, who demanded from revolutionaries
with a solemn tone of voice that they surrender their self-respect and their
61
self-respect.
The long-term consequences of these psychic expropriations are still
sensibility.
a collectivity of passive mystics for whom the state made it easier to aban- don themselves. The artist Ilya Kabakov evoked the general attitude of the Russian "society" before and after Stalin's death in an autobiographical conversation with Boris Groys: "The Soviet Union was accepted as one accepts a snow storm or a climate catastrophe. " "In spite of the nightmare of the life back then we had the sweet feeling that everyone was living this way. "62
In this atmosphere the Russian people were transformed into
The re-thymotization of post-Soviet "society" turns out to be a pro-
tracted endeavor because of the scarcity of psychic and moral resources.
Initially it could only get under way via nationalism—a rather novel idea for
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Russia.
Russian "society" does not currently indulge itself in consumerism without limitations, as one might expect, but that it is committed to a daily helium omnium contra omnes. The return to self-affirmative lifestyles happens in the form of a generalized mobbing. This diagnosis allows for a promising prediction. In a country in which everybody had lost respect for everybody else because everybody witnessed everybody else in situations that were
People who know about the contemporary situation observe that
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humiliating, the flourishing of a meanness of all against all could resemble a sign of recovery.
ACQUIRING RAGE THROUGH WAR BONDS
THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS HAVE ELUCIDATED WHY LENIN'S PROJECT of revolution was marked by a severe lack of thymotic capital. The unavoid- ability of this lack resulted from the historical situation. True, there was not a lack of affect against czarism around 1917. Furthermore, it can be assumed that there was a large reservoir of aspirations for democracy, self- administration, permissiveness, and the redistribution of land. However, these tendencies, which could be aroused and increased easily, were far from harmonized with the coercive capitalist conceptions of development that were characteristic of Leninist theory during the period of transition. In the language of revolutionary insiders, these features were verified by pointing to the still missing "class consciousness. " Of course these circumstances could not have remained unknown to Lenin. In order to keep his visions coherent, he was thus dependent on the expectation of an imminent proletarian revo- lution in Germany, from which he expected an increase in the insufficient Russian capital base. When this revolution failed to materialize and when its weak beginnings fully collapsed after the execution of its leaders, the need for alternative mobilizations of thymos in Russia became urgent.
I have already referred to the constitutive role that terror plays in acquir- ing common consent to the goals of revolution. Not long after the terror was established, a cultural-revolutionary front was added to it: the mass production of desired attitudes through the most intensive forms of pro- paganda, in combination with the monopolization of education (thanks to teachers and curricula), both of which were indoctrinated with Bolshevist ideology. The height of the Russian artistic avant-garde coincided with these campaigns. It was only with the new, rigidified cultural politics after Stalin's coming into power that this was put to an end. Yet more influential was the creation of combat-stress collectives, which brought about the desired state of thymotic homogenization by way of a shared perception of enemies.
Within the framework of psycho-political logic, one can claim without exaggeration that the Russian Revolution was rescued during its first years by the counterrevolution, just as the Chinese Revolution owed its triumph ultimately to the Japanese, who, following the invasion of China from 1937 to 1947, created the conditions under which the weak communist
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reserves were enforced by the massive influx of patriotic emotions. After the victory of his troops, Mao Zedong did not create a mystery surround- ing the fact that Chinese communism would have been a lost endeavor without the Japanese attack—he was humorous enough to explain to his Japanese visitors that China owed their country eternal gratitude for the invasion.
Observations such as these confirm the suspicion that thymotic realpo- litik follows completely different laws. The directors of the new world bank were condemned by stress biology and cultural dynamics to look for sup- port where it could be most easily discovered: in the sources of pride, rage, and self-assertion of the nationally synthesized combat communities. From the beginning it was thus necessary to widen the capital basis of the world bank of rage—apart from anxiety bonds from terror—through the mobi- lization of a patriotic thymotics. It was not accidental that Lenin liked to conjure up the image of Russia as a "besieged stronghold. " Although the Soviet experiment was conducted in a postnational horizon, the conception of a threatened fatherland was an indispensable matrix for the renewal of combative energies. At least the concept of the fatherland was always also interpreted from international perspectives because the Soviet Union, the "home of all workers," was a hybrid body, encompassing at the same time a territory and an idea. The ominous concept of "socialism in one country" did more than provide an emergency solution (Notlosung) in light of the persistent deferral of the world revolution. It entailed the concession that the desperately needed thymotic reserves could only be drawn from a seri- ously threatened combat-stress collective.
The war against the national enemy, to be sure, has always possessed the advantage of high plausibility. No one knew this better than Karl Marx, who sternly commented on the political adventures of the Paris communists of 1871 (who attempted their coup against the bourgeois government of France in the middle of the war against Prussia): "Any attempt at upsetting the new government in the present crisis, when the enemy is almost knock- ing at the doors of Paris, would be a desperate folly. The French workmen must perform their duty as citizens. "64 A civil war can also provide extreme motivation if the front against the enemies within has been clearly morally demarcated. Because the Bolshevists no longer had a sufficiently external enemy at their disposal after the end of the civil war in 1921, they had to internally refinance their thymotic war bonds and open a new front out of the spirit of pure mobilization.
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With this operation the darkest chapter of the tainted history of revolu- tionary rage transactions began: the intentional redirection of "mass rage" against the affluent farmers of the Soviet Union, in particular those of the Ukraine, who gained notoriety under the name of "kulaks. " They are still the largest collective of genocide victims in the history of humanity—at the same time, they constitute the group of victims that can do the least to struggle against the forgetting of the injustice committed against them.
According to Marxist teaching, the Soviet leadership should have regarded the peasantry of the country as a productive class that was, to a certain extent, analogous to the proletariat. Because it belonged to a prein- dustrial universe, however, it formed a category of producers of the wrong kind, producers condemned to fall. Thus the peasants of Russia and the other Soviet states entered the radar screen of the revolution in a twofold sense—on the one hand, they embodied a shocking backwardness, which could only be eradicated by means of forced modernization; on the other hand, they were the producers of the food that the revolutionary elements claimed for themselves from the first day of the riots. Lenin himself deter- mined the rough tone of the politics concerning the kulaks by consistently situating the independent farmers in the first row of those "classes" to be executed, next to the bourgeoisie, the clergy ("the more representatives of reactionary clergy we can shoot the better"), and the Menshevik reformers. It was only after a return to financing compromises (in the context of the new economic politics after 1921) that most of these groups were allowed to breathe a sigh of relief.
This was finally finished when Stalin around 1930 turned back the wheel to an exclusive command economy. From that point onward, the "destruc- tion of peasantry as a class" became the main priority on the revolutionary agenda. Because there was no arrangement in regular Marxism for using repressive measures against the peasantry as such, Stalin picked up Lenin's directives and had to extend the schema of the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat to such an extent that it now included a class struggle that had not been predicted: between the poorer and the less poor, sometimes even affluent strata of the rural population. The latter suddenly enjoyed the questionable honor of being declared a substitute for the exterminated bourgeoisie—even straightaway becoming a representative of "agricultural capitalism. " Consequently, the new mobilization was directed against those farmers who were still able to continue with their business in a relatively successful way in the midst of the general economic disaster (from 1917 until
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1921 the number of deaths from starvation in Lenin's empire climbed to more than 5 million). It is understandable that these "big farmers" were not excited when the functionaries of the revolutionary countries seized their harvests. Their hesitation in having to deliver their means of subsistence was identified as sabotage and was punished accordingly. The ominous col- lectivization of agriculture under Stalin pursued the goal of simplifying the confiscation of yields by starting with the production.
The "de-kulaking" during the early 1930s, which led to up to 8 million starvation deaths during the harsh winter of 1932-33, meant a psycho- political caesura in the business conduct of the rage bank management. From 1930 onward in Stalin's politics with regard to the kulaks, the dark aspects of popular thymos prevailed as the essential driving forces in the rev- olutionary rules of business: resentment, envy, the need to humiliate those who were allegedly or truly better off.
If it is appropriate to describe the history of events in the Soviet Union as a drama of the lost innocence of the revolution, the application of hatred against larger farmers—and after 1934 also against so-called midsized farm- ers (those who owned up to two cows)—marked the transition of the Stalinist U. S. S. R. to an open psychopolitics of dirty energies. In its course, the "class" of those semi-starved was sent into battle against the "class" of those barely able to survive—with the pretense that this would be the most contemporary form of revolutionary struggle in the fatherland of the world proletariat. Stalin himself provided the justification by contributing a new "class analysis" from the vantage point of somebody who was riding on the witch's broom of solitary illumination: according to this justification, it was legitimate to call for a "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" in the name of the Marxist classics. A kulak or "great farmer" was identified as somebody who produced enough in order to provide for his own family and a few laborers—with an occasional surplus sold at markets or in the city. This injustice against the working masses was not in the future allowed to remain unpunished. To avenge it, a demonstration was needed to show what "ter-
65
ing of the concept of "class struggle. " Suddenly it was no longer mentioned that the bourgeois epoch had "simplified" class oppositions in terms of a clear opposition of bourgeoisie and proletariat, as the Communist Manifesto stated. After Stalin had elevated the kulaks to the rank of a "class," and by calling them "counterrevolutionary," this class was ordered to be liquidated
rorism in one country" was capable of achieving.
The reason behind the events was concealed in the random broaden-
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overnight in substitution for the barely existing and quickly extinguished bourgeoisie. From that point on, it was evident for everybody who wanted to know that every form of "class analysis" entails the demarcation of fronts at which the executioners confront those to be executed. Mao Zedong also came up with a new "class analysis" when inciting the Chinese youth against the "class" of the old during the great Cultural Revolution.
It is important to realize that we are not merely talking about termino- logical finesse here. If one continues to speak about classes after Stalin and Mao, one makes an assertion concerning the perpetrators and the victims in a potential or actual (class) genocide. As smarter Marxists have always known, "class" is a descriptive sociological term only at the surface level. In reality, it is primarily strategic in nature because its content materializes only through the formation of a combat collective (a confessional or ideo-
67
What lends disturbing significance to the processes initiated by Stalin's improvisations is the ease with which the leaders of the Soviet Commu- nist Party were able to induce in countless participants the intoxication of a resentment that unites its bearers to serve as accomplices in extinguishing devalued "classes. " Research has provided vast information on the motives of Hitler's willing executioners; Stalin's armies of helpers remain hidden in the catacombs of history. What genocidal excesses in the name of class in fact reveal is the extent to which what sociologists refer to as "social ties" are also always woven out of a hatred that binds the disadvantaged to the seem- ingly or actually advantaged. When envy dons the gown of social justice, there arises a pleasure in belittling others, a pleasure that is already halfway to destruction.
The Bolshevist system would never have recovered from this defilement—which could hardly have been exceeded even by the Moscow trials—if Stalinism had not been rescued by the war that Hitler carried into the Soviet Union. The fury of idealizing, which its agents and sympathiz- ers shared, would never have sufficed to compensate for these darkenings (Verdunkelungen) of the Soviet experiment as a whole, if there had been an appropriate and timely enlightenment concerning the events in the coun- try. The anti-Hitler imperative of those years was responsible for the fact
66
matively and, eo ipso, performatively, one makes an assertion stating who is
logically formed maximum-stress-cooperation unit).
justified to extinguish whom under which kind of pretense.
ing ranks far above race thinking when it comes to the release of genocidal energies in the twentieth century.
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If one uses it affir-
Class think-
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that interest in not perceiving overshadowed the horrors of Stalinism, in particular for Western party supporters and sympathizers, who insisted on their high-minded immunity to the facts. For countless members of the New Left in the Western world, the phase of wishful blindness was to last until the Solzhenitsyn shock of 1974. Only with the appearance of The Gulag Archipelago and the works of the nouveaux philosophes was it possible for a modified perspective to come about, although some spokesmen of the eternal militancy were still then content with modernizing their protection of ignorance.
After July 22,1941, it was once more proven in the battle of the Russians against the German invaders that it is possible to set free the most powerful cooperative energies in a collective through provoking the national thymos, even if this collective had just suffered the most severe humiliations on the internal front—perhaps precisely then because the war between nations can bring about a certain recovery from ideological infamy. It was thus ini- tially consistent that Stalin's propaganda referred to the war against Hitler's armies as the great patriotic war—in deliberate analogy to the "patriotic war" of the Russians against Napoleon in 1812. The bitter irony of history was only revealed when the heroism and willingness of the Russian people and its allies to suffer entered into the books of "antifascism" after the battle was won.
As Boris Groys has demonstrated, communism constituted itself as a
68
mobilizing power exclusively within the medium of language.
not surprising that its successes consisted mainly in the enforcement of a strategic codification of language (Sprachregelung). For good reasons, these successes went far beyond the sphere of Soviet dictates. In the entire sphere of influence of Stalinism and beyond it in the New Left, the ingenious self- depiction of left fascism as antifascism became the dominant language game of the postwar era. This had long-term effects that can be traced to the present in dissident subcultures of the West, most importantly in France and Italy. It is not an exaggeration to identify the flight of the radical left to "antifascism" as the most successful maneuver of language politics in the twentieth century. That it remained, and remains to this day, the source for highly desired confusions follows from its premises.
The continuation of the game by the Western left after 1945 happened primarily because of the need for an encompassing self-amnesty. The so- called attempts to work through the past to search out the "sources" of fas- cism remained subordinate to this imperative—whereas the tracing back
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It is thus
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to Lenin's initial contribution remained blocked through a prohibition on thinking. It can be easily explained why the left needed this act of amnesty. Considering the devastating results of Stalinism, they needed to cover up, justify, and relativize an excess of mistakes, failed opportunities, and illu- sions. Well-meaning companions knew what they did not want to know— and did not hear anything during the critical times. (Sartre, for example, knew about the 10 million prisoners in Soviet camps and remained silent in order not to break with the front of antifascists. ) Their always problematic cooperation with the manipulators from Moscow, their acting blindly with regard to the first signs and the true extent of red terror, their one-eyed sympathizing with a communist cause that had been deeply compromised in theory and praxis long ago—all of this strongly called for understanding, romanticizing, and forgiveness. The left's absolution necessarily had to be granted by its own people and from its own fundus because independent instances, which could have pardoned them, were not available.
It is not correct to say that the far left in Europe after the Second World War concealed its emotions from itself. By perpetually raising its antifas- cist convictions, it proclaimed for itself that, apart from its basic historical legitimacy, it had intended grandiose plans and possessed the right to con- tinue where the revolutionaries before Stalin had stopped. A higher moral mathematics was invented according to which someone has to be taken to be innocent if he can prove that someone else was even more criminal. It was thanks to such strategic reflections that for many Hitler served as the savior of conscience. In order to distract oneself from the affinities of one's own engagement with the ideological premises of the most extensive acts of murder in the history of humanity, historical mock trials were staged, mock trials in which everything pointed towards the private first class of the war, to the person who completes the history of the West. Thanks to totaliz- ing forms of cultural criticism—for example, the tracing back of Auschwitz to Luther and Plato, or the criminalization of occidental civilization as a whole—it was attempted to cover how closely the West was affiliated with a class-genocidal system.
The smart redistribution of shame did not miss the intended effect. In fact, a point was reached in which almost every form of critique against communism was denounced as "anticommunism," which, in turn, was denounced as a continuation of fascism by liberal means. Although after 1945 there really were no publicly committed fascists anymore, there was an abundance of paleo-Stalinists, former communists, alternative communists,
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and radical innocents from the most extreme wings, who held their heads as high as if the crimes of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ceausescu, Pol Pot, and other communist leaders had been committed on planet Pluto. The thy- motic analysis makes it possible to understand these phenomena. The same human beings, who have convincing reasons to be too proud to engage with reality—"on a raison de se revolter"—sometimes, for less convincing rea- sons, are too proud for the truth.
MAOISM: ON THE PSYCHOPOLITICS OF PURE FURY
IF ONE BELIEVES THAT THE CONTROL OF THYMOTIC ENERGIES through the Stalinist management of rage reached the ultimate degree of realpolitik cold-bloodedness, one is disabused of this belief in a twofold manner by Maoism. The first lesson consists in the invention of a new kind of guerilla warfare that Mao Zedong advanced as China was confronted with a major challenge during the time of civil wars between 1927 and 1945; this kind of guerilla warfare later served as a source of inspiration for the many "liberation armies" of the Third World. The second lesson can be learned from the notorious cultural revolution of the 1960s. We have to remind ourselves that the struggle between social classes was replaced by the unleashing of the hatred of stoned adolescents against the older generation of tradition bearers. Here as well problems of rage management were at the heart of the matter. Mao's politics was from the outset characterized by a methodical substitution of collective fury for missing revolutionary ener- gies, which was provoked by the military-political leadership.
Mao Zedong's fame is primarily connected to his astounding achieve- ments as the strategic head of the civil war, which lasted twenty-five years. What was at stake in the struggle was the question of who was to have power in postfeudal China. The protagonists of this epic battle, the Kuomintang and the communists, initially cooperated from 1924 until 1927, then again from 1937 until 1945, first against the warlords in the provinces of the coun- try, and later against the Japanese invaders. Between 1927 and 1936, and between 1945 and 1949, they confronted each other, at times seemingly and at other times in reality, as fierce adversaries. Mao's military apprentice- ship began with the resistance of the communist troops against the dicta- torship of the national-revolutionary general Chiang Kai-shek, who seized complete power after his notorious strike in Shanghai against the (until then) allied communists. Andre Malraux chose as the background plot for
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his 1933 novel La condition humaine the attack of the Kuomintang fighters against the communists of Shanghai to depict a scene that was permeated by hatred and active despair. In light of this background, the idea of an absolute engagement gained focus, an idea that was about to cast its shadow over the European intelligentsia in its Sartrean variety after 1945.
Mao Zedong's strategic intuitions started with the assumption that the diffuse antifeudal rage of the Chinese "masses" of peasants constituted an insufficient basis for the mobilization of the ascetic-heroic troops he required. Because for Mao the organization of an industrial-proletarian movement was never an option—China was in this respect even more underdeveloped than Russia in 1917—he was faced early on with the prob- lem of how to create an efficient machinery of war from only agrarian ener- gies. The solution consisted in the conception of a guerilla doctrine designed for the war of small mobile troops against the massive units of the govern- ment. It rested on the easy, albeit effective principle that uses the superiority of the adversary as leverage to increase one's own forces. Mao observed that the brutality of the official military apparatus, which was led by Chiang Kai- shek, created enough despair in the agitated mass of the rural population that with appropriate guidance they could be prompted to defend them- selves against armed invaders on their own ground.
By drawing the ultimate consequences from this, Mao understood that for the weak, total mobilization was the key to success. He preached that this could not, of course, come about through a "revolutionary agrarian war" alone. A national war, he taught, was much more capable of bring- ing about the desired great mobilization—for which the Japanese invasion of 1937 was supposed to provide the desired conditions. Sebastian Haffher has explained that in the history of the war, the significant turn was the invention of the "total guerilla," which was a clear reference to Goebbels's hysteric proclamation of a "total war. " Mao proved nothing short of the fact that guerilla warfare can be taken to its specific extreme.
In a lucid commentary on Mao Zedong's writings about the theory of war, Sebastian Haffher exposes the exploitation of national war for the pur- poses of strengthening the revolutionary guerilla as Mao's epochal innova- tion. Its basic principle is the integral mobilization of radicalized fighters who confront a superior power of only moderately motivated troops. What makes the difference is the resolution of the leaders to cut off every possibil- ity of escape for their own troops in battle in order to expose them to a situ- ation of absolute stress. In this way, the war was supposed to be projected
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onto the molecular level. Even the smallest village that had been involved in the war had to transform itself according to the will of the commander into a reactor of despair, willing to sacrifice itself. Mao's apposite slogan is "China's strength lies in her very poverty. "69 The revolutionary war of the people wanted to be a daily plebiscite for excess.
While war, according to Clausewitz, is "an act of violence" in order to "force an enemy to fulfill what we wish for," Mao starts with the axiom that war is nothing but the procedure "to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy. " This is the definition of war of the biopolitical age, which sees the world stage as inhabited solely with competing life complexes.