(The instinctive proof, " cannot have two opposite
sensations
at once,"
quite coarse and false.
quite coarse and false.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
22 THE WILL TO POWER.
a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclu sion! As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!
498
To what extent is our intellect also a result of the conditions of life P--We should not have it did we not need to have and we should not have
we did not need as we need we could live otherwise.
499
" Thinking " in
bersevere in forms, as in the case of the crystal--In our thought, the essential factor the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (= Pro crustes' bed), the assimilation of the unfamiliar.
500.
The perception" of the senses projected out wards: " inwards and " outwards "--does the
body command here?
The same equalising and Ordering power which
rules in the idioplasma, also rules in the incorpora tion of the outer world: our sensual perceptions are already the result of this process of adaptation
as we have --that to say,
? primitive (inorganic) state to
_
? ? is
a
if if
it,
is
it it
is
it,
it
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
and harmonisation in regard to all the past in us; they do not follow directly upon the "impression. "
501.
All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of comparing,' has as a first condition the act of equalising, and earlier still the act of "making equal. " The process of making equal is the same as the assimilation by the amoeba. 0f the nutritive matter it appropriates.
" Memory " late, in so far as the equalising in stinct appears to have been suoa'uea' : the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of classification and collocation; active--who?
23
? 502.
In regard to the memory, we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul," which, irre spective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again, etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the memory"; I have noth ing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is inactive in regard to as in the case of the coming and going of a thought. Something happens, of which become conscious: now some
thing similar comes--who has called forth? Who has awakened it?
* The German word verglez'clzen, meaning " to compare,' contains the ruOt "equal" (glez'e/z) which cannot be rendered in English--TR.
? ? it
I
it,
? 24
THE WILL TO POWER.
503.
The whole apparatus of knowledge is an ab stracting and simplifying apparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the appropriation of things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the
essence of this apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the " means " a process is appro priated (--a process is invented which may be grasped)," but by "concepts" one appropriates the
" things which constitute the process.
504.
Consciousness begins outwardly as co-ordina tion and knowledge of impressiofis,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the biological centre of the individual ; but it is a process which deepens and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually approaching nearer to the centre.
505.
Our perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all those perceptions the con sciousness whereof was useful and essential to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical ones) ;---that is to say, we have senses only for a definite selection of perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a
view to our self-preservation. Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful. There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely per
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
25
meated by valuations (useful or harmful--conse
quently, pleasant or painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a value to us (although we seldom admit or do so only after has affected us exclusively for long time, as in the case of convicts in gaol or lunatics). In sects likewise react in different ways to different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are case in point.
506.
In the beginning images--how images originate in the mind must be explained. Then words, ap plied to images. Finally conceots, possible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures into whole which not for the eye but for the ear (word). The small amount of emotion which the "word " generates,----that then,' which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word used,--this simple emotion the common factor, the basis of a concept That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, as the same,
the fundamental fact. There therefore con fusion of two very intimately associated feelings the ascertainment of these feelings ;--but who
that ascertains? Faith the very first step in
? every sensual impression:
the first intellectual activity
to-be-true " the beginning.
therefore, to explain how the "holding-of-a-thing
to-be-true" arose! the comment " true
" What sensation lies beneath a.
sort of yea-saying A " holding-a-thing
were our business,
? ? P
is
is !
a It
is
is
is
it in
is
is
it, a
a
is
is
a
it a
is,
? 26 THE WILL TO POWER.
507.
The valuation, "I believe that this and . that is so," is the essence of "truth. " In all valuations, the conditions of preservation and of growth find expression. All our organs and senses of know ledge have been developed only in view of the con ditions of preservation and growth. The trust in reason and its categories, the trust in dialectics, and also the valuation of logic, prove only that ex
perience has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not their "truth. "
The pre-requisites of all living things and of their lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should be possible to pass definite
judgments on things, and that there should be no doubt at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is necessary that something should be assumed to be true, not that it is true. "--
" The real world and the world of aflearance
I trace this contrast to the relation of values. We have posited our conditions of existence as the attri butes of being in general. Owing to the fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief,
we developed the idea that the real world was 'neither a changing nor an evolving one, but a
world of being.
(e) THE ORIGIN OF_REASON AND LOGIC.
508.
Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able to stand side by side
? ? ? ? THE WILL'TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
27
remained over, the greater number perished--and are still perishing.
509.
The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew the gregarious instinct in the background. The assumption of similar facts the first condition for " similar souls. " For the purpose of mutual understanding andgovernment.
510.
Concerning the origin oflogic. The fundamental proneness to equalise things and to see them equal, gets to be modified, and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what useful or harmful--in fact, by considerations of success then becomes adapted in suchwise as to be gratified in milder way, without at the same time denying life or en dangering it. This whole process corresponds entirely with that external and mechanical process
? its symbol) by which the protoplasm con tinually assimilates, makes equal to itself, what appropriates, and arranges according to its own forms and requirements.
511.
Likeness and Similarity.
1. The coarser the organ the more apparent
likenesses sees;
2. The mind will have likeness--that to say,
the identification of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the body assimilates inorganic matter.
(which
? ? it
is a it
:
it
is
is
: it
is
-_'-~---, ' P
? 28 THE WILL TO POWER.
For the understanding of Logic :--
The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is
- the will to power--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a judgment), is the result ofa will which would fain have it as similar as possible.
512.
Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted that identical eases exist. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a logical fashion, this condition must first be assumed. That is to say, the will to logical truth cannot be consummated before a fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which it follows that an in
stinct rules here, which is capable of employing both means: first, falsification; and secondly,thecarrying out of its own point of view : logic does not spring from a will to truth.
513
The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of signs, sounds, and abbreviations. ---" Substance," " subject," " object," " Being," " Becoming," are not matters of meta physical truth. It was the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the powerful,
it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the categories.
514.
A moral--that is to say, a method of living which . long experience and experime'nt have tested and
? ? ? ? a- . .
proved efiicient, at last enters consciousness as law, as dominant. And then the whole group of related values and conditions become part of it:
becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution that its origin should be forgotten. . That sign that has become master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have proved true through relative usefulness.
A stage was reached when they were grasped as whole, and when they appealed to consciousness as
whole,-when belief in them was commanded,-- that to say, when they acted as they com manded. From that time forward they passed as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they may have been the expression of no more than certain practicality answering the ends of race and species,--their usefulness alone their "truth. "
515
The object not " to know," but to schematise, --to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require.
In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, was a need in us that was the . determining power: not the need "to know," but
to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things,-- the same process, which every sensual impression
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
29
? ? ? it a . is,
. . .
is
is
a a
. .
,Wv
. .
if
a
it
. a
.
it
a
? MWW
is is a
? 30
THE \VILL TO POWER.
undergoes, is the development of reason! ) No
"idea" had anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly as equal. . . . Finality in reason is
an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant at tempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason ;--for Life would then become too obscure,--too unequal.
The categories are " truths " only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth. " (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one idiosyn crasy alone among many others. . .
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of
concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we are almost this instinct. . . . But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth! . . . The inability to
contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth. "
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least " necessary," but only a sign ofinaoility.
pre-existing
? ? ? ? _.
have mere world of appearance as its first condition. As matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endless
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
If, according to Aristotle, the princzpium contra dictwnzls the most certain of all principles;
the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; the principle of every other
axiom lie within' it: then one should
all the more severely, in order to discover how
many assumptions already lie at its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as these had become known in some other sphere--that to say, as were impossible to ascribe the opposite attributes to or the proposi tion means: that the opposites should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not directed at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world which must seem true to us.
In short, the question debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can create realities, or the concept " reality "P In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require previous knowledge of Being; which certainly not the case. The pro
position therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A
identical with itself, as every logical
(and proposition presupposes, and that
mathematical)
A in itself an appearance, then logic would
analyse
31
? ? ? a
is
is
is if
is a
if
____. ~_,' _
a
is a
if it
. . .
it ;
it
is
if it
? 32
THE WILL TO POWER.
empiricism which seems to confirm it every minute. The " thing "--that is the real sub stratum of A; our belief in things is the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic
is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the "thing. " . . . By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion of real being, we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc. , as realities--that is to say, the conception of a metaphysical world or a " real world " (--this however, once more the world of appearance .
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of thing for true, and the holding of thing for not true,--in so far as they do not only presuppose mere habit, but the very right 'to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by belief, that there such a thing as knowledge for us, and that judgments can really hit the truth: in short, logic never doubts that able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that to say, that to the thing which in itself true, no _opposite attributes can
be ascribed).
In this belief there reigns the sensual and coarse
prejudice that our sensations teach us truths concerning things,--that cannot at the same
? moment of time say of one and the same
that hard and soft.
(The instinctive proof, " cannot have two opposite sensations at once,"
quite coarse and false. ) ,
That all contradiction in concepts should be
thing
? ? is I
is
it is
it
is
is I
a
a
is
a
a
.
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
forbidden, the result of belief, that we are able to form concepts, that concept not only character ises but also holds the essence of thing. . . . As matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of assumed existences which we have
created. Logic the attempt on our part to under stand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised ourselves or, more exactly, our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own
purposes.
517
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, necessary to acknowledge that
~which exists: logic only deals with formula: for things which are constant. That why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which " part of our optics. The "ego" regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
The assumed world of subject, substance, "reason,"etc. , necessary: an adjusting, simplify ing, falsifying, artificially-separating power resides in us. " Truth " the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness;
in the " true nature " of things
Becoming not susceptible of formulation;
~ " false " and " contradicts itself. " Knowledge and
VOL. II.
regard
phenomena
The character of the world in the process of
as real).
(we
33
? the will to classify phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief
? ? C
is is
;
a
a
is
. .
is
it
is is
it is
it
is
is
it . is
by
is
is
'_. . _
,_ ,____. . __r-. . -'-_.
a
a
? 34
THE WILL TO POWER.
the process of evolution exclude each other.
must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create
Consequently, knowledge the illusion of Being.
518.
If our " ego " is the only form of Being, accord ing to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether an illusion of perspective were not active here--the apparent unity which every thing assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which is richer and more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, know ledge is onlypossible when based on a belief in Being.
519.
If there is " only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: in addition, the "ego" shown to
be something that evolving: then--
? ? ? if, is
is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
35
_ 520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc. ; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should know no thing of time or of movement, in rough way, We did not believe we saw things " standing still " behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space " we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity based on the
"fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. Strictly speaking, would not be possible to " understand " and " know " an evolving world something which called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the " understanding " and " knowing " intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of host of mere appearances, but become fixed to the extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent " knowledge " possible--that to say, as measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
521.
Concerning "logical appearance. "---The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "Species" only expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their
? ? ? _. \_e\~'--
is
a
is
is
it
a
;
is
if, a
? 36
THE WILL TO POWER.
further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium seem to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the error of supposing that an actual goal has been reached--and that evolution had a goal . .
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form attained," does not signify that
the same form,--because something new always appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of " form. " As type had to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose--the same fault
made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving false realism to piece of fiction: as all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit--an artificial distinction here made between that which acts and that which
I
? action (but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not " facts
We should not interpret this constraint in our selves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("a world of identical cases as we were in position to construct real world; butias
guides
? ? a if
if a
a
").
it it
") if
(5
is
a
a
is
it is
. ). is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
constraint to adjust world by means of which our existence will be ensured: we thereby create
world which determinable, simplified, com
etc. , for us.
The very same constraint active in the
functions of the senses which support the reason--- by means of simplification, coarsening, accentua tion, and interpretation whereon all " recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance " always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of reality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic,
expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing
save introduce its postulates into the nature things: now we find ourselves in their presence,-- we can no longer help it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint guarantee of " truth. " We was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the ob
ject,the substance,and the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplify ing as far as possible. The world seems logical to us, because we have already made logical.
522.
Fundamental solution. --We believe in reason: 'this however, the philosophy of colourless concepts. Language built upon the most naif
prejudices.
prehensible,
37
? of
? ? is
is ;a
is,
it
it
. . . w,_vWN_
is a
is aa
is
? ' THE WILL TO POWER.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to think only in the form of language--we also believe in the " eternal truth " of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc. )
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt con cerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
(f) CONSCIOUSNESS.
523
There is no greater error than that of making
psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "substance" is utterly useless as a means of explana tion. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, prob
ably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism--
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the
38
? Of the inner mind we draw conclufions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation
were adequate for the purpose.
appearance
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
For this inner world we have no finer organs,
and that why complexity which
reaches our consciousness as simple entity, and we invent process ofcausation in despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with chain of causes
not worthy of belief: consciousness never com municates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
The part " consciousness " plays. ---It essential that one should not mistake the part that "con sciousness" plays: our relation to the outer world; was the outer world that developed it. On the other hand, the direction--that to say, the care and cautiousness which concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does not enter into our consciousness any more than does the storing activity of the intellect: that there
superior controlling force at work these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing com mittee, in which the various leading desires make their votes and their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are also acts of will and ideas.
In short: That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does
thousandfold
39
? ? ? -_. _. 4
sw-"_. __
_, _
is a
is
in
is
is
a
a
is
it
a
is a
it is
is
is
it,
? THE WILL TO POWER.
40
not signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it is so apparently, however, in the highest degree. We have hased the whole of our notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. , upon this apparent truth (all these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then projected the latter into and behind all things!
As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the in terests of intercourse. . . . " Intercourse " is under; stood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world upon us and our necessary response to as also our actual influence upon the outer world. It not the conducting force, but an organ of the latter.
525.
My principle, compressed into formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, " God spirit," God as perfection denied. . . .
526.
Wherever people have observed certain unity in the grouping of things, spirit has always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lack ing. Why should the idea of a complex fact be
one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should
? ? ? a
a
is
it, is
is
? TIIE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining finality by the spirit : there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar of organising and systematising. The
power
domain of the nervous system is much more ex tensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systema tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527
like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases in value in proportion as
it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the first order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value determined P--In regard to the discharge of will-power the most superficial and most simple thought is the most useful--it might therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives
latter is led by the deeper instinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower hind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our con
wfl'" *--
41
? over).
Physiologists,
. Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted and often uncertain judgments of caution: the
sciousness and which is therefore nhrrure
? ? ? 42
THE WILL TO POWER.
that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact
that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness
529
The great misapprehensions :--
(I) The senseless overestimation of consciousness, its elevation to the dignity of an entity: " a spirit," " a soul," something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a cause, especially where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
'
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as " God ";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The " real world " regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by means of the facts of con sciousness ;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences :--
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon the passions and senses--
as a state of animalism. . .
Man approaches reality and " real being "
through dialectics: man departs from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism.
To convert man into spirit, would mean to make god of him: spirit, will, goodness--all one.
? -
? ? a
a
. ).
.
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
43
All goodness must take its root in spirituality, must be fact of consciousness.
Every step made towards something better can be only step forward in consciousness.
TRUE--FALSE.
530
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmat
ism,his moraloutlook,ruled,guided,and directed him.
The 'n'pc'b'Tov \Ireii'o'oq: how the fact knowledge
(g) JUDGMENT.
Is knowledge fact at all? What knowledge? we do not know what knowledge we cannot possibly reply to the question, " Is
there such a thing as knowledge? "--Veryfine-l But do not already " know " whether there or can be, such thing as knowledge, cannot reason ably ask the question, " What knowledge ? " Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: What he requires
" piece of naivete': the knowledge of knowledge! Knowledge judgment. " But judgment
belief that something this or that! And not knowledge! " All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments " which have the character of being universally true (the fact so in all cases, and does not change), and which have the character of being necessary (the reverse of the proposition
'
cannot be imagined to exist).
The validity of a belief in knowledge always
taken for granted; as also the validity of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here moral ontology the ruling bias.
possible?
? ? ? is
a
is
is
. e. .
a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclu sion! As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!
498
To what extent is our intellect also a result of the conditions of life P--We should not have it did we not need to have and we should not have
we did not need as we need we could live otherwise.
499
" Thinking " in
bersevere in forms, as in the case of the crystal--In our thought, the essential factor the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (= Pro crustes' bed), the assimilation of the unfamiliar.
500.
The perception" of the senses projected out wards: " inwards and " outwards "--does the
body command here?
The same equalising and Ordering power which
rules in the idioplasma, also rules in the incorpora tion of the outer world: our sensual perceptions are already the result of this process of adaptation
as we have --that to say,
? primitive (inorganic) state to
_
? ? is
a
if if
it,
is
it it
is
it,
it
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
and harmonisation in regard to all the past in us; they do not follow directly upon the "impression. "
501.
All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of comparing,' has as a first condition the act of equalising, and earlier still the act of "making equal. " The process of making equal is the same as the assimilation by the amoeba. 0f the nutritive matter it appropriates.
" Memory " late, in so far as the equalising in stinct appears to have been suoa'uea' : the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of classification and collocation; active--who?
23
? 502.
In regard to the memory, we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul," which, irre spective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again, etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the memory"; I have noth ing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is inactive in regard to as in the case of the coming and going of a thought. Something happens, of which become conscious: now some
thing similar comes--who has called forth? Who has awakened it?
* The German word verglez'clzen, meaning " to compare,' contains the ruOt "equal" (glez'e/z) which cannot be rendered in English--TR.
? ? it
I
it,
? 24
THE WILL TO POWER.
503.
The whole apparatus of knowledge is an ab stracting and simplifying apparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the appropriation of things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the
essence of this apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the " means " a process is appro priated (--a process is invented which may be grasped)," but by "concepts" one appropriates the
" things which constitute the process.
504.
Consciousness begins outwardly as co-ordina tion and knowledge of impressiofis,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the biological centre of the individual ; but it is a process which deepens and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually approaching nearer to the centre.
505.
Our perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all those perceptions the con sciousness whereof was useful and essential to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical ones) ;---that is to say, we have senses only for a definite selection of perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a
view to our self-preservation. Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful. There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely per
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
25
meated by valuations (useful or harmful--conse
quently, pleasant or painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a value to us (although we seldom admit or do so only after has affected us exclusively for long time, as in the case of convicts in gaol or lunatics). In sects likewise react in different ways to different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are case in point.
506.
In the beginning images--how images originate in the mind must be explained. Then words, ap plied to images. Finally conceots, possible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures into whole which not for the eye but for the ear (word). The small amount of emotion which the "word " generates,----that then,' which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word used,--this simple emotion the common factor, the basis of a concept That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, as the same,
the fundamental fact. There therefore con fusion of two very intimately associated feelings the ascertainment of these feelings ;--but who
that ascertains? Faith the very first step in
? every sensual impression:
the first intellectual activity
to-be-true " the beginning.
therefore, to explain how the "holding-of-a-thing
to-be-true" arose! the comment " true
" What sensation lies beneath a.
sort of yea-saying A " holding-a-thing
were our business,
? ? P
is
is !
a It
is
is
is
it in
is
is
it, a
a
is
is
a
it a
is,
? 26 THE WILL TO POWER.
507.
The valuation, "I believe that this and . that is so," is the essence of "truth. " In all valuations, the conditions of preservation and of growth find expression. All our organs and senses of know ledge have been developed only in view of the con ditions of preservation and growth. The trust in reason and its categories, the trust in dialectics, and also the valuation of logic, prove only that ex
perience has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not their "truth. "
The pre-requisites of all living things and of their lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should be possible to pass definite
judgments on things, and that there should be no doubt at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is necessary that something should be assumed to be true, not that it is true. "--
" The real world and the world of aflearance
I trace this contrast to the relation of values. We have posited our conditions of existence as the attri butes of being in general. Owing to the fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief,
we developed the idea that the real world was 'neither a changing nor an evolving one, but a
world of being.
(e) THE ORIGIN OF_REASON AND LOGIC.
508.
Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able to stand side by side
? ? ? ? THE WILL'TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
27
remained over, the greater number perished--and are still perishing.
509.
The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew the gregarious instinct in the background. The assumption of similar facts the first condition for " similar souls. " For the purpose of mutual understanding andgovernment.
510.
Concerning the origin oflogic. The fundamental proneness to equalise things and to see them equal, gets to be modified, and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what useful or harmful--in fact, by considerations of success then becomes adapted in suchwise as to be gratified in milder way, without at the same time denying life or en dangering it. This whole process corresponds entirely with that external and mechanical process
? its symbol) by which the protoplasm con tinually assimilates, makes equal to itself, what appropriates, and arranges according to its own forms and requirements.
511.
Likeness and Similarity.
1. The coarser the organ the more apparent
likenesses sees;
2. The mind will have likeness--that to say,
the identification of one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the body assimilates inorganic matter.
(which
? ? it
is a it
:
it
is
is
: it
is
-_'-~---, ' P
? 28 THE WILL TO POWER.
For the understanding of Logic :--
The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is
- the will to power--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a judgment), is the result ofa will which would fain have it as similar as possible.
512.
Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted that identical eases exist. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a logical fashion, this condition must first be assumed. That is to say, the will to logical truth cannot be consummated before a fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which it follows that an in
stinct rules here, which is capable of employing both means: first, falsification; and secondly,thecarrying out of its own point of view : logic does not spring from a will to truth.
513
The inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service of our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of signs, sounds, and abbreviations. ---" Substance," " subject," " object," " Being," " Becoming," are not matters of meta physical truth. It was the powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the powerful,
it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the categories.
514.
A moral--that is to say, a method of living which . long experience and experime'nt have tested and
? ? ? ? a- . .
proved efiicient, at last enters consciousness as law, as dominant. And then the whole group of related values and conditions become part of it:
becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution that its origin should be forgotten. . That sign that has become master. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories of reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have proved true through relative usefulness.
A stage was reached when they were grasped as whole, and when they appealed to consciousness as
whole,-when belief in them was commanded,-- that to say, when they acted as they com manded. From that time forward they passed as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they may have been the expression of no more than certain practicality answering the ends of race and species,--their usefulness alone their "truth. "
515
The object not " to know," but to schematise, --to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require.
In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, was a need in us that was the . determining power: not the need "to know," but
to classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things,-- the same process, which every sensual impression
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
29
? ? ? it a . is,
. . .
is
is
a a
. .
,Wv
. .
if
a
it
. a
.
it
a
? MWW
is is a
? 30
THE \VILL TO POWER.
undergoes, is the development of reason! ) No
"idea" had anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things can be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly as equal. . . . Finality in reason is
an effect, not a cause: Life degenerates with every other form of reason, although constant at tempts are being made to attain to those other forms of reason ;--for Life would then become too obscure,--too unequal.
The categories are " truths " only in the sense that they are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional "truth. " (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are absolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen to be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one idiosyn crasy alone among many others. . .
The subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here, is a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility of
concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we are almost this instinct. . . . But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this fact that we possess an absolute truth! . . . The inability to
contradict anything is a proof of impotence but not of "truth. "
516.
We are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least " necessary," but only a sign ofinaoility.
pre-existing
? ? ? ? _.
have mere world of appearance as its first condition. As matter of fact, we believe in that proposition, under the influence of an endless
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
If, according to Aristotle, the princzpium contra dictwnzls the most certain of all principles;
the most ultimate of all, and the basis of every demonstration; the principle of every other
axiom lie within' it: then one should
all the more severely, in order to discover how
many assumptions already lie at its root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being, as these had become known in some other sphere--that to say, as were impossible to ascribe the opposite attributes to or the proposi tion means: that the opposites should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not directed at the knowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world which must seem true to us.
In short, the question debatable one: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone we can create realities, or the concept " reality "P In order to affirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen, require previous knowledge of Being; which certainly not the case. The pro
position therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should pass as true.
Supposing there were no such thing as A
identical with itself, as every logical
(and proposition presupposes, and that
mathematical)
A in itself an appearance, then logic would
analyse
31
? ? ? a
is
is
is if
is a
if
____. ~_,' _
a
is a
if it
. . .
it ;
it
is
if it
? 32
THE WILL TO POWER.
empiricism which seems to confirm it every minute. The " thing "--that is the real sub stratum of A; our belief in things is the first condition of our faith in logic. The A in logic
is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the "thing. " . . . By not understanding this, and by making logic into a criterion of real being, we are already on the road to the classification of all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc. , as realities--that is to say, the conception of a metaphysical world or a " real world " (--this however, once more the world of appearance .
The primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding of thing for true, and the holding of thing for not true,--in so far as they do not only presuppose mere habit, but the very right 'to postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by belief, that there such a thing as knowledge for us, and that judgments can really hit the truth: in short, logic never doubts that able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that to say, that to the thing which in itself true, no _opposite attributes can
be ascribed).
In this belief there reigns the sensual and coarse
prejudice that our sensations teach us truths concerning things,--that cannot at the same
? moment of time say of one and the same
that hard and soft.
(The instinctive proof, " cannot have two opposite sensations at once,"
quite coarse and false. ) ,
That all contradiction in concepts should be
thing
? ? is I
is
it is
it
is
is I
a
a
is
a
a
.
is,
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
forbidden, the result of belief, that we are able to form concepts, that concept not only character ises but also holds the essence of thing. . . . As matter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of assumed existences which we have
created. Logic the attempt on our part to under stand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised ourselves or, more exactly, our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own
purposes.
517
In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, necessary to acknowledge that
~which exists: logic only deals with formula: for things which are constant. That why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: "that which " part of our optics. The "ego" regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).
The assumed world of subject, substance, "reason,"etc. , necessary: an adjusting, simplify ing, falsifying, artificially-separating power resides in us. " Truth " the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness;
in the " true nature " of things
Becoming not susceptible of formulation;
~ " false " and " contradicts itself. " Knowledge and
VOL. II.
regard
phenomena
The character of the world in the process of
as real).
(we
33
? the will to classify phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief
? ? C
is is
;
a
a
is
. .
is
it
is is
it is
it
is
is
it . is
by
is
is
'_. . _
,_ ,____. . __r-. . -'-_.
a
a
? 34
THE WILL TO POWER.
the process of evolution exclude each other.
must be something else: it must be preceded by a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must create
Consequently, knowledge the illusion of Being.
518.
If our " ego " is the only form of Being, accord ing to which we make and understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very proper to doubt whether an illusion of perspective were not active here--the apparent unity which every thing assumes in our eyes on the horizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted by such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is allowable to use that phenomenon which is richer and more easily studied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.
Finally: admitting that all is Becoming, know ledge is onlypossible when based on a belief in Being.
519.
If there is " only one form of Being, the ego," and all other forms of Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the "ego," together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: in addition, the "ego" shown to
be something that evolving: then--
? ? ? if, is
is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
35
_ 520.
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the "individual," etc. ; the "number" of beings itself fluctuates. We should know no thing of time or of movement, in rough way, We did not believe we saw things " standing still " behind or in front of things moving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect, and without the erroneous idea of "empty space " we should never have arrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity based on the
"fact of appearance" that there are some things alike. Strictly speaking, would not be possible to " understand " and " know " an evolving world something which called "knowledge" exists only in so far as the " understanding " and " knowing " intellect already finds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of host of mere appearances, but become fixed to the extent in which this kind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent " knowledge " possible--that to say, as measuring of earlier and more recent errors by one another.
521.
Concerning "logical appearance. "---The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and only apparent. "Species" only expresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at the same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their
? ? ? _. \_e\~'--
is
a
is
is
it
a
;
is
if, a
? 36
THE WILL TO POWER.
further transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long time: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are of no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of evolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium seem to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the error of supposing that an actual goal has been reached--and that evolution had a goal . .
The form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable; but the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often "the same form attained," does not signify that
the same form,--because something new always appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as resembles the latter, and embody the two in the unity of " form. " As type had to be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose--the same fault
made in respect of all these concepts, namely, that of giving false realism to piece of fiction: as all phenomena were infused with some sort of obedient spirit--an artificial distinction here made between that which acts and that which
I
? action (but both these things are only fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they are not " facts
We should not interpret this constraint in our selves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws ("a world of identical cases as we were in position to construct real world; butias
guides
? ? a if
if a
a
").
it it
") if
(5
is
a
a
is
it is
. ). is
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
constraint to adjust world by means of which our existence will be ensured: we thereby create
world which determinable, simplified, com
etc. , for us.
The very same constraint active in the
functions of the senses which support the reason--- by means of simplification, coarsening, accentua tion, and interpretation whereon all " recognition," all the ability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise, that the "same world of appearance " always returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of reality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic,
expressive only of the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing
save introduce its postulates into the nature things: now we find ourselves in their presence,-- we can no longer help it,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint guarantee of " truth. " We was who created the "thing," the "same thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the ob
ject,the substance,and the form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplify ing as far as possible. The world seems logical to us, because we have already made logical.
522.
Fundamental solution. --We believe in reason: 'this however, the philosophy of colourless concepts. Language built upon the most naif
prejudices.
prehensible,
37
? of
? ? is
is ;a
is,
it
it
. . . w,_vWN_
is a
is aa
is
? ' THE WILL TO POWER.
Now we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to think only in the form of language--we also believe in the " eternal truth " of "wisdom" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc. )
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt con cerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
(f) CONSCIOUSNESS.
523
There is no greater error than that of making
psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance. By this means nothing is explained: the concept "substance" is utterly useless as a means of explana tion. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, prob
ably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect automatism--
When we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements of the speaker's lips. From the
38
? Of the inner mind we draw conclufions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could ascertain if our powers of observation
were adequate for the purpose.
appearance
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
For this inner world we have no finer organs,
and that why complexity which
reaches our consciousness as simple entity, and we invent process ofcausation in despite the fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of the change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings nothing more than their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with chain of causes
not worthy of belief: consciousness never com municates an example of cause and effect to us.
524.
The part " consciousness " plays. ---It essential that one should not mistake the part that "con sciousness" plays: our relation to the outer world; was the outer world that developed it. On the other hand, the direction--that to say, the care and cautiousness which concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does not enter into our consciousness any more than does the storing activity of the intellect: that there
superior controlling force at work these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing com mittee, in which the various leading desires make their votes and their power felt. "Pleasure" and "pain" are indications which reach us from this sphere: as are also acts of will and ideas.
In short: That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are completely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does
thousandfold
39
? ? ? -_. _. 4
sw-"_. __
_, _
is a
is
in
is
is
a
a
is
it
a
is a
it is
is
is
it,
? THE WILL TO POWER.
40
not signify that the order in which they come is a causal order: it is so apparently, however, in the highest degree. We have hased the whole of our notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. , upon this apparent truth (all these things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then projected the latter into and behind all things!
As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be the general sensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to the in terests of intercourse. . . . " Intercourse " is under; stood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover the action of the outer world upon us and our necessary response to as also our actual influence upon the outer world. It not the conducting force, but an organ of the latter.
525.
My principle, compressed into formula which savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept, " God spirit," God as perfection denied. . . .
526.
Wherever people have observed certain unity in the grouping of things, spirit has always been regarded as the cause of this co-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lack ing. Why should the idea of a complex fact be
one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should
? ? ? a
a
is
it, is
is
? TIIE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining finality by the spirit : there is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar of organising and systematising. The
power
domain of the nervous system is much more ex tensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systema tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527
like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases in value in proportion as
it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the first order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value determined P--In regard to the discharge of will-power the most superficial and most simple thought is the most useful--it might therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives
latter is led by the deeper instinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the indistinct idea as of a lower hind than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance from our con
wfl'" *--
41
? over).
Physiologists,
. Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted and often uncertain judgments of caution: the
sciousness and which is therefore nhrrure
? ? ? 42
THE WILL TO POWER.
that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact
that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness
529
The great misapprehensions :--
(I) The senseless overestimation of consciousness, its elevation to the dignity of an entity: " a spirit," " a soul," something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a cause, especially where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
'
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as " God ";
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The " real world " regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by means of the facts of con sciousness ;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences :--
Every step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every step backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded as a falling-back upon the passions and senses--
as a state of animalism. . .
Man approaches reality and " real being "
through dialectics: man departs from them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism.
To convert man into spirit, would mean to make god of him: spirit, will, goodness--all one.
? -
? ? a
a
. ).
.
? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
43
All goodness must take its root in spirituality, must be fact of consciousness.
Every step made towards something better can be only step forward in consciousness.
TRUE--FALSE.
530
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmat
ism,his moraloutlook,ruled,guided,and directed him.
The 'n'pc'b'Tov \Ireii'o'oq: how the fact knowledge
(g) JUDGMENT.
Is knowledge fact at all? What knowledge? we do not know what knowledge we cannot possibly reply to the question, " Is
there such a thing as knowledge? "--Veryfine-l But do not already " know " whether there or can be, such thing as knowledge, cannot reason ably ask the question, " What knowledge ? " Kant believes in the fact of knowledge: What he requires
" piece of naivete': the knowledge of knowledge! Knowledge judgment. " But judgment
belief that something this or that! And not knowledge! " All knowledge consists in synthetic judgments " which have the character of being universally true (the fact so in all cases, and does not change), and which have the character of being necessary (the reverse of the proposition
'
cannot be imagined to exist).
The validity of a belief in knowledge always
taken for granted; as also the validity of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here moral ontology the ruling bias.
possible?
? ? ? is
a
is
is
. e. .
