On the
importance
of Racak as a basis for mobilizing U.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
controllers in 1981 "put the government seal of approval on strike-breaking and a new era of industrial relations opened.
"I22 But you would hardly know this from reading or listening to the mainstream media.
An exceptional t994 Busi- ness week article noted that "over the past dozen years .
.
.
U.
S.
industry has conducted one of the most successful union wars ever," helped by "illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their right to organ- ize," with unlawful firings occurring in "one-third of all representation elections in the late '80S.
"123 But this successful war was carried out quietly, with media cooperation.
The decertification of unions, use of replacement workers, and long, debilitating strikes like that involving Caterpillar were treated in a very low key manner.
In a notable illustra- tion of the applicability of the propaganda model, the nine-month-long Pittston miners' strike that began in April 1989 was accorded much less attention, and less friendly treatment, than the Soviet miners' strikes of the summer of that same year,124
From 1977 through 1999, while the incomes of the top 1 percent of households grew by 84. 8 percent and the top 10 percent by 44. 6 percent, the bottom 60 percent lost ground and the income of the lowest 20 percent fell by 12. 5 percent. 125 Real hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees (i. e. , the 80 percent of the workforce that holds working-class jobs) fell by 4. 8 percent between 1973 and 1999. 226 This, along with the adverse trend of social indicators in the same period,127 suggests that the welfare of the majority declined in this era of high employment, a "new economy," and a spectacular upswing in the stock market. In its euphoria phase, which ended abruptly with the col- lapse of the dot. com market in 1999 and 2000, the mainstream media hardly noticed that only a minority had been the beneficiaries;128 they briefly discovered this issue only under the impetus of Pat Buchanan's right-wing populist outcries during the 1996 presidential election cam-
INTRODUCTION xlv
xlvi IN,RODucnON
paign. In the 2000 electoral campaign, once again the twO major party candidates said nothing about the failure of the majority to be lifted in the supposed "rising tide" that would benefit everybody; only Ralph Nader and other marginalized candidates did, and as noted, the domi- nant media found that the agenda of the major parties was all that they could ask for.
Another strilcing application of the propaganda model can be seen in the media's treatment of the chemical industry and its regulation. Be- cause of the industry's power, as well as the media's receptivity to the demands of the business community, the media have normalized a system described by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring as "deliberately poi- soning us, then policing the results. "lZ9 Industry is permitted to produce and sell chemicals (and during the 1990s, bioengineered foods) without independent and prior proof of safety, and the "policing" by the Environ- mental Protection Agency (EPA) has been badly compromised by under- funding and political limits on both law enforcement and testing. no A major National Research Council study of 1984 found that there was no health hazard data available for 78 percent ofthe chemicals in commerce, and an Environmental Defense Fund update found little change had occurred a dozen years laler. The federal government's National Toxicol- ogy Program tests about ten to twenty chemicals a year for carcinogenic- ity (but not for the numerous other possible adverse effects ofchemicals); but meanwhile five hundred to a thousand new chemicals enter com- merce annually, so our knowledge base steadily declines. 131
This system works well for industry, however, as it wants to sell with- out interference, and leaving virtually aU of the research and testing for safety in its hands, with its members to decide when the results are worthy of transmission to the EP A, is a classic "fox guarding the chick- ens" arrangement. The system has worked poorly for the public, and its inadequacy has been reinforced by the industry's power to influence, sometimes even capture, the EPA. 132 Nevertheless, the industry often contends that the safety of chemicals is assured by EP A (or FDA) regula- tion, 133 which industry does its best to keep weak and which, as noted, has failed to deal in any way with the great majority of chemicals in the marker.
With the media's help, the chemical industry has also gained wide acceptance of its view that chemicals should be evaluated individually on the basis of an analysis of their risks to individuals and individual tolerances. But it is very hard to measure such risks and tolerances for humans----controlled experiments are not possible, damage may show up only after many years, the forms of damage are hard to know in advance, chemicals may interact with others in the environment, they may be bio-
accumulative, and the breakdown products of chemicals may have their own dangers. Furthermore, if thousands of chemicals enter the environ- ment, many long-lasting, bioaccumulative, and interacting with other chemicals, a public policy that ignores their additive and interactive ef- fects on people and the environment is deeply flawed and irresponsible.
Policy based on the "precautionary principle," bitterly opposed by the chemical industry, with the support of the U. S. government,134 would nor allow chemicals to enter the environment without full tesring, would prohibit the use of chemicals that accumulate in human tissues and whose breakdown products are threatening or unknown, and would compel the use of nonthreatening alternatives for untested and known- to-be-risky chemicals where such alternatives can be found or developed at reasonable cOSt. l35
In successfully avoiding application of the precautionary principle, industry spokespersons have argued that the existing system is based on "sound science. " But science does not tell us that industry has any right to put chemicals into the environment that have any risk at all, let alone telling us what risks are acceptable-these are political decisions. Fur- thermore, if the chemicals in the environment have not been tested for all the variables that are relevant to social choices, such as their long-term effects on immune systems and reproduction as well as any cancer threat, and the effects of their breakdown products on the environment-and none of them have been so tested-the political, not scientific, basis of "sound science" is evident.
The chemical industry has produced, and long denied any harm from, innumerable products-from tetraethyl lead in gasoline and PCBs in batteries to asbestos, DDT, and Agent Orange-that are now well estab- lished as seriously harmful, only withdrawing them (often only from domestic use) under overwhelming legal and regulatory pressure. For the products they have wanted to sell, they have always found scientists who would testify to their harmlessness (or that claims of harm were not scientifically proven). There has been a consistent sharp difference bet\Veen the results of industry-sponsored science and those of inde- pendent researchers working the same terrain. l3o And there have been numerous cases of fraud in industry testing, industry use of testing labs that arranged the data to find industry products acceptable, and political manipulation to weaken regulatory standards. 137
Despite these industry abuses of science, the media have largely ac- cepted the industry's claim that it supports "sound science," in contrast with its critics' use of "junk. science. " From 1996 through September 1998, 258 articles in mainstream newspapers used the phrase "junk sci- ence"; but only 21, or 8 percent, used it to refer to corporate abuses of
INTRODUCTION xlvii
xlviii INTRODUCTION
science, whereas 160, or 62 percent, applied it to science used by envi- ronmentalists, other corporate critics, or tort lawyers suing corporations (77, or 30 percent, didn't fit either of these categories). 138 In short, the media have internalized industry's self-legitimizing usage, just as they have normalized a status quo of caveat emptor (buyer beware) rather than of safety first.
The media have also regularly gotten on board in dismissing concerns about chemical threats as unwarranted "scares," such as the alleged scares over dioxin and the danger of Alar on apples. But these and other scares often turn out to be based on genuine health hazards. J3Q Meanwhile, the media rarely report and examine in any depth the frequent evidence of the inadequacy of regulation and testing and of the real costS of chemical- ization of the environmenr. J4O For example, the International Joint Com- mission (lIC), a joint Canadian-U. S. venture dating back to 1978, was given the formidable task oftrying to halt the flow oftoxic chemicals into the Great Lakes. It reports each year that it is failing, and since t992 has called for the ending of the manufacture of chlorine as essential to fulfill- ing its task. The national media virtually ignore this appeal, and the IJC's US. cochairman Gordon Durnil has remarked that "we have a societal problem about how to deal with this, but 90 percent of the population doesn't even know there is anything to worry about. "J41 We believe that the propaganda model helps understand this lack ofknowledge.
In the health insurance controversy of 1992-93, the media's refusal to take the single-payer option seriously, despite apparent widespread public support and the effectiveness of the system in Canada, served well the interests of the insurance and medical service complex. 142 The un- critical media reponing and commentary on the alleged urgency of fiscal restraint and a balanced budget in the years 1992-96 fit well the business community's desire to reduce the social budget and weaken reguls- tion. 143 The media's gullibiliry in accepting the claim of a Social Security system "crisis," which would require policy action some thirty-seven years ahead if certain conservative guesses were true and a number of easy corrections were ruled out, served the interests ofconservative ideo- logues anxious to weaken a highly successful government program and a security industry eager to benefit from the partial or full privatization of Social Security. 144 The applicability of the propaganda model in these and other cases, including the media's handling of the "drug wars," seems clear. \45
i
CONCLUDING NOTE
The propaganda model remains a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the workings of the mainstream media-perhaps even more so than in 1988. As we noted above, the changes in structural con- ditions that underlie the model, and that we believe strongly and often decisively influence media behavior and performance, have tended to increase the model's salience. We noted in the Preface to the first edition and in chapters 2 and 3, in reference to the media's coverage of the wars and elections in Central America in the I980s, that the media's perform- ance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government propaganda demands. This was at least equally true of their performance in covering the 1991 war against Iraq and NATO's war against Yugo- slavia in 1999, as we have described earlier and briefly in regard to Yugoslavia and in detail elsewhere. 146
In our conclusion to the first edition, we emphasized that, as the nega- tive performance effects of the media result primarily from their struc- ture and objectives, real change in performance calls for substantial changes in underlying media organization and goals. In the years since 1988, structural changes have not been favorable to improved perform- ance, but it remains a central truth that democratic politics requires a democratization of information sources and a more democratic media. Along with trying to contain and reverse the growing centralization of the mainstream media, grassroots movements and intermediate groups that represent large numbers of ordinary citizens should put much more energy and money into creating and supporting their own media-as they did with the Independent Media Centers brought into existence during the Seattle and Washington, D. C. , protests of 1999 and 2000. These, and other nonprofit community-based broadcasting stations and networks, and a better use of public-access channels, the Internet, and independent print media, will be essential for the achievement of major democratic social and political successes.
Notes to Introduction
1. On a number of issues, such as trade agreements, health care, and the appropriate size of the military budget, there is a sharp division between media personnel and the elite on the one hand and the general population on the other hand, as we discuss below under "Further Applications. "
INTRa Due T ION xlix
INTRODUCTION
2. This was even true in the Soviet Union, where the media's disclosure of inconvenient facts on the Afghan war caused the Soviet defense minister to denounce the press as unpatriotic; see Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press Harms Army," lv. Tew YOrk Times, January 21, 1988.
3. For an accounr of critiques, and the present writers' replies, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989), appendix I; Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," in The Myth of the Liberal Media (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
4- Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. xxi.
5. Ibid.
6. Edward S. Herman and Robert McChesney, The Global Media (London: Cassell, 1997).
7. Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 108.
8. Ibid. , p. 109.
9. James Ledbetter, "Public Broadcasting Sells; (Out? )," The Nation, Decem- ber I, 1997.
10. Ibid.
II. Stephanie Strom, "Japanese Sites for Women Aim for Empowerment," New "York Times, December 25, 2000.
12. J\1ark Fineman, "Military Can't Outflank Rebels in War of Words," Los
Angeles Times, February 21, 1995; Leonard Doyle, "Rebels Try to Advance via Internet," The Indepemknt, March 7, 1995.
13. Jim Shultz, "Bolivia's Water War Victory," Earth Island Journal, Septem- ber 22, 2000; "Bolivia-The Last Word," April 13, 2000, JShultz@democra- cyar. org; "How the Internet Helped Activists," Straits Times (Singapore), May 25, 1998; Marshall Clark, "Cleansing the Earth," Inside Indonesia (Octo- ber-December 1998).
14. Madelaine Drohan, "How the Net Killed the . MAl," Globe and Mail, April 29,1998.
IS. Kayte Van Scoy, "How Green Was My Silicon Valley," PC/Computing, March I, 2000; Keith Perine, "Power to the (\Veb-Enabled) People," Industry Standard, April 1 0 , 2000. See also "Further Applications" below.
16. James Ledbetter, "Some Pitfalls in Portals," Columbia Journalism Review . ~ (November-December 1999)? 1 17. Quoted in ibid.
18. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of DemoCTa<:y (Urbana: University ofIlli~ . . nois Press, 1997); John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good 1
for "You. ' (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995); Stuart Ewen, PR'
A Social History ofSpin (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
19. Mark Dowie, "Introduction," Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge. ? 20. See Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade:America and the Tragedy of Posr-Com- 1 munist Russia (New York: Norton, 2000). See also Thomas Frank, One Mar-
ker Under God (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
21. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technocu1ture (London: Routledge, I999), p. 127.
22. Patricia Aufderheide, "Journalism and Public Life Seen Through the
'Net,'" in Aufderheide, The Daily Planet (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2000); Joseph Turow, Breaking Up Amen'ca (Chicago: Univer- siryofChicago Press, 1997).
23. Herman and McChesney, Global Media, chapter 5.
24. On the ideological messages borne in commercials, see Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 2, chapter t.
25. See Robert McChesney, 'Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy (New York: Oxford, 1993).
26. See Herman, Myth ofthe Liberal Media, pp. 32-33.
27. For some dramatic evidence on the mainstream media's neglect of these credible sources, see below, pp. 76-79.
28. Peter Galbraith, "How the Turks Helped Their Enemies," New lOrk Times, February 20, 1999.
29. During the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein was a u. s. ally and recipient of U. S. aid, his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Iraq, which killed thousands in 1988, did not interfere with support by the Bush administration, which continued up to the moment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 30, 1990. See Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq; How the u. s. and Britain Secretly
Built Saddam's war Machme (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997); Miron Rezun, Saddam Hussein's Gulf W&rs; Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East (Westport Conn. : Praeger, 1992).
30. The CIA itself designated the 1965-66 slaughters in Indonesia as "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century" (quoted in Robert Cribb, ed. , The Indonesian Killings of1965-1966 [Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21,1991]). The figure of 500,000 victims in this slaughter, given by the head oflndonesian state security, must be taken as an absolute minimal figure. For other estimates that run up to 2 million, see Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The W&shington Connection and Third World FasCISm (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 208-9; Benedict Anderson, "Fetrus Dadi Ratu," Ne1JJ Left Review (May-June, 2000).
31. Former U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan brags in his autobiography of how back in I975 he protected Indonesia from any effective international action that might have interfered with its aggression: "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly inef- fective in whatever measures it took [regarding the Indonesian invasion of East Timor]. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no in- considerable succeSs. " He added, without the slightest expression of regret, that within a few weeks 60,000 people had been killed in this aggression that he was protecting. A Dangerous Place (New York: little, Brown, 1978), p. 19. 32. For accounts of this shift, seeJohn Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vin- tage, 1998), pp. 33-34; Chomsky, Necessary ntuslOns, pp. 109-10. For the ear- lier media treatment of Indonesia in East Timor, see Washington Connection, pp. 129-204.
33. John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1999), p. 43?
34. UNICEF, "Iraq Surveys Show 'Humanitarian Emergency,'" Press Release, August 12, 1999.
35. Leslie Stahl interviewing Madeleine Albright, "60 Minutes," CBS News Transcript, May 12, 1996.
36. Many KLA. and Serb fighters died in Kosovo, and civilians were killed by
lNTRODUCTIOK li
I i i I~TRODUCTION
NA TO bombs and military actions not aiming to kill civilians. See Jonathan Steele, "Figures Put on Serb Killings Too High," Guardian (August 18, 2000). For a fuller discussion, Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line (London:Verso, 2000), chapter 3.
37. John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of FreerkJm (London: Zed, 1999). See also Arnold Kohen, "Beyond the Vote: The World Must Remain Vigilant Over East Timor," washington Post, September 5, 1999.
38. The source is Western investigators on the scene, including U. S. military personnel: Lnds! IY Murdoch, "Horror Lives on for Town of Lquica," The Age (Australia), April 8, 1999; Barry Wain, "Will Justice Be Served in East Timor? " Wall Street Journal (Asia edition), April n, 2000.
39.
On the importance of Racak as a basis for mobilizing U. S. allies and the
public for war, see Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United I States and Its Allies Went to War," Washington Post, April 18, 1999; Madeleine
Albright referred to Racak as a "galvanizing incident" (quoted in Bo Adam,
Roland Heine, and Claudius Technau, "I Felt that Something Was Wrong,"
Berliner Zeitung, April 5, 2000).
40. See Edward Herman and David Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War
Globally," in Philip Hammond and Edward Herman, eds. , Degraded Capabil-
ity:The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto, 2000), Pl'. 117-19. More
recently, three Finnish forensic experts, who were members of a panel that
examined the forry bodies found at Racak, disclosed that their team found
no support for the alleged mutilations by the Serbs, and the data presented
in the article casts further doubt on the claim that all the victims were exe-
cuted. 0. Raina et a1. , "Independent Forensic Autopsies in Armed Conflict Investigation ofVictims from Racak, Kosovo," Forensic SCience InternatIOnal,
vol. 16 (2001), pp. 171-85. ) It is a notable fact that the OSeE has not yet seen I fit to release the original forensic report from which this article's data is
drawn.
41. Herman and Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War Globally. "
42. Editorial, "Election Risks in Cambodia," New York Times, November 28,
1997?
43. "Gathering Storm in Serbia? " editori! Il, washington Post, September II,
2000; "Repudiating Mr. Milosevic," editorial, New \0rk Time~,September 26,
2000.
44. Editorial, "Kenya's Flawed Election," New 10rk Times, December 31,
1997?
45. Editorial, "Mexico's Radical Insider," New \ilrk Times, July 3, 1988.
46. Editorial, "The Missing Reform in Mexico," New 10rk Times, August 24,
1991.
47. Editorial, "Turkey Approaches Democracy," New 10rk Times, November
II, 1983.
48. Editorial, "Victories for Voters in Latin America: Uruguay's Slow Boat to Democracy," New 10rk Times, December I, 1984.
49. Editorial, "A Victory for Russian Democracy," New 10Tk Times, July 4,
1996.
50. "And the Winner Is? " MOSCOUl Times, September 9, 2000. See also Matt
Taibbi, "OSCE-The Organization for Sanctioning Corrupt Elections;' The
Exile, Issue no. 18/99, September 14-28, 2000.
INrRoDucrlON ! iii
I
5I. Of the major mainstream media, only the Los Angeles Times addressed its findings, with the article "Russia Election Chief Rejects Fraud Claims in PresidentialVote" (September 13, 2000); a title that features the rejoinder of Russian officials, not the charges themselves. For a discussion of trus artide see Taibbi, "OSCE".
52. On the overall atrocious mainstream media reporting on the Russian eco- nomic and social collapse, as well as on the elections, see Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade, chapter I.
53. The Soviet Union did undoubtedly mistreat its own and dient-state peoples, although the treatment of Russians by the Western-ba<:ked "refonn- ers" since 1991 has hardly been an improvement. However the charge of sponsorship ofinternational terrorism was inflated and hypocritical given the West's support of its own very impressive terror networks. See Edward Her- man, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, X982); Noam Chomsky; Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real WOrld (New York: Claremont Research, 1986).
54. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall ofthe Bul- garian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1986), chapter 5.
55. The only mainstream report on Weinstein's return with "no startling reve- lations" (i. e. , nothing), was R. C. Longworth, "Probe into '81 Pope Attack Shon of Funds," Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1994.
56. See "The Gates Hearings: Excerpts from Senate Hearing of Nomination ofC. I. A. Chief," . -"lewYork Times, October 2, I 99I.
57. See Edward S. Herman and Howard Friel, '''Stacking the Deck' on the Bulgarian Connection," Lies of Our Times (November 1991); Michael Ross, "Gates Corrupted CIA Intelligence, Ex-Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1991; Benjamin Weiser, "Papal-Shooting Analysis: Case Study in Slanting? " Washington Post, October I, 1991.
58. Editorial, "The Fingerprints on Agca's Gun," New YOrk Times, October 30, 1984?
59. Barbara Crossette, "Hanoi Said to Vow to Give M. I. A. Data," New York Times, October 24, 1992.
60. For many years U. S. officiaJs used the claim that VieOlam had noI ac- counted for all U. S. prisoners of war and M. I. A. s to justify hostile actions toward that country. This is discussed later in this Introduction, under "Re- writingViernam W'ar History," and in the main text, pp. 240-41.
61. Leslie Gelb, "When to Forgive and Forget: Engaging Hanoi and Other Outlaws," New YOrk Times, April IS, 1993.
62. Quoted in William Buckingham, Jr. , Operation Ranch Hand: TheAir Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 196I~I97I (Washington: U. S. Air Force, 1982), p. 82.
63. See Arthur Westing, ed. , Herbuides in war: The Long-Term EcologUal and HumcJ. n Consequences (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1984), pp. 5ff. ; Hatfield Consul- rants Ltd. , Development of Impact Mitigation Strategies Related to the Use of Agent Orange HerbUide in the Aluoi Hl:lley, Viet Nam, vol. I (West Vancouver, B. c. ,April 2000).
64. Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, p. 127.
65? Cited in Seymour Hersh, Chemical and BiologUal Waifare (Indianapo- lis: Babbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 153. See also J. B. Neilands et al. , Harvest of
liv INTRODUCTION
Death: Chemical Waifare in Vl? tnam and Cambodia (New York: Free Press, 1972).
66. First use of chemicals is contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and food crop destruction violates numerous international rules ofwar. The latter was even illegal according to the rules lsid out in the U. S. Army's own field manual in use during the Vietnam war. See Edward Herman, Atrocities in Vietnam (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1910), pp. 81-83.
67. Harvard University physician Jean Mayer, "Crop Destruction in Viet- nam," Science (April 15, 1966).
68. Alistair Hay, The Chemical Scythe: Lessons O! 2,4,5-T and Dioxin (New York: Plenum Publishing, 1982), pp. 187-94.
69. General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV), December 16, 1969, "viewed with horror" and strongly condemned the U. S. chemical war.
70. Peter Waldman, "Body Count: In Vietnam, the Agony of Birth Defects Calls an Old War to Mind," Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1997.
71. Barbara Crossette, "Study of Dioxin's Effect in Vietnam Is Hampered by Diplomatic Freeze," New 10rk Times, August 19, 1992.
72. Matthew Meselson, Julian Robinson and Jeanne Guillemin, "Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses," Foreign Policy (Fall 1987), pp. 100-117; Edward S. Herman, "The \XTall Street Journal as a Propaganda Agency," in Herman, Myth of the Liberal Media, pp. 103-10.
73. Peter Kann, "Clinton Ignores History's Lessons in Vietnam," Wall Street Journal, September 9, 1992.
74. 'When Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and his indigenous Kurds in the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations made no protests and continued to treat him as a valued ally. It was only after he invaded Kuwait in 1990 that he became a menace and his possession of "weapons of mass destruction" was deemed intolerable. See citations in note 29 above.
75. In 1999, Uoyd Gardner found that the Barnes & Noble Web site con- tained 1,920 titles on some aspect of the Vietnam war and over 8,000 out-of- print and used books on that topic. "Going Back to Vietnam for a Usable Past," Newsday, November 14, 1999 (a review of Michael Lind's Necessary
War).
76. For this viewpoint, see Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975).
77. Robert McNamara, In Rerrospect:The Tragedy and Lessons of Viemam (New York:Vintage Books, 1996).
78. For details and analysis of this onslaught on the people of South Vietnam, see Eric Bergerud, The DynamiCs of Defeat (Boulder, Colo: W'estview, 1991); Chomsky and Herman, washmgron Connection, chap. 5; Bernard Fall, "2000 Years of War in Vietnam," HorIZon (Spring 1967), reprinted in Fall, Last Reflections on a war (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967);Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jonathan Schell, The Military Hall An Account of DestructIOn m Quang Nga! and Quang Tin (New York:Vintage, 1968).
79. H. Bruce Franklin, "Antiwar and Proud oflt," The Natum, December II, 2000.
80. Both Time and Newsweek, in their twenty-fifth-anniversary retrospectives on the war, featured the exit at war's end and the "desperate South Viet- namese" seeking escape from "the invading North Vietnamese. " Douglas Brinkley, "Of Ladders and Letters," Time, April 24, 2000; also, Evan Thomas, "The Last Days of Saigon," Newsweek, May I, 2000. A 1995 Wash- ington Post editorial speaks of the Vietnam war as a "defeat to the Vietnamese. They bled, died and finally fled in great numbers from a Communist regime. . . . " (April 30, 1995), characteristically not allowing the vast majority ofpeo- pie in South Vietnam to be "South Vietnamese. "
81. McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 319.
82. Full analyses of this history, and the lack of evidence, are provided in H. Bruce Franklin, M. f. A. , or, Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, N. Y: Law- rence Hill Books, 1992), and Viernam and Other American Fantasws (Am- herst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).
83. Franklin, Vietnam and OtherAmerican Fantasies, p. 183.
84. For a discussion, which stresses the underreported dissident movement within the armed forces, see ibid. , pp. 61-62.
85. M. ichael Lind, The Necessary war (New York: Free Press, 1999).
86. Gardner, "Going Back toVietnam for a Usable Past. "
87. Barry Wain, "The Deadly Legacy of War in Laos," ASian Wall StreetJour- nal, January 24, I997; Ronald Podlaski, Veng Saysana, and James Forsyth,
Accidental Massacre:American Air-Dropped Somblers Have Continued to Maim and Slaughter Thousands of Innocent Victims, Mainly Children, for the Last 2] %ars in Indochina (Humanitarian Liaison Services, Warren, Vr. 1997). These three authors, who have worked in Laos, believe the official figure of 20,000 annual casualties is too low.
88. Daniel Pruzin, "US. Clears Laos of the Unexploded," Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1996.
89.
From 1977 through 1999, while the incomes of the top 1 percent of households grew by 84. 8 percent and the top 10 percent by 44. 6 percent, the bottom 60 percent lost ground and the income of the lowest 20 percent fell by 12. 5 percent. 125 Real hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees (i. e. , the 80 percent of the workforce that holds working-class jobs) fell by 4. 8 percent between 1973 and 1999. 226 This, along with the adverse trend of social indicators in the same period,127 suggests that the welfare of the majority declined in this era of high employment, a "new economy," and a spectacular upswing in the stock market. In its euphoria phase, which ended abruptly with the col- lapse of the dot. com market in 1999 and 2000, the mainstream media hardly noticed that only a minority had been the beneficiaries;128 they briefly discovered this issue only under the impetus of Pat Buchanan's right-wing populist outcries during the 1996 presidential election cam-
INTRODUCTION xlv
xlvi IN,RODucnON
paign. In the 2000 electoral campaign, once again the twO major party candidates said nothing about the failure of the majority to be lifted in the supposed "rising tide" that would benefit everybody; only Ralph Nader and other marginalized candidates did, and as noted, the domi- nant media found that the agenda of the major parties was all that they could ask for.
Another strilcing application of the propaganda model can be seen in the media's treatment of the chemical industry and its regulation. Be- cause of the industry's power, as well as the media's receptivity to the demands of the business community, the media have normalized a system described by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring as "deliberately poi- soning us, then policing the results. "lZ9 Industry is permitted to produce and sell chemicals (and during the 1990s, bioengineered foods) without independent and prior proof of safety, and the "policing" by the Environ- mental Protection Agency (EPA) has been badly compromised by under- funding and political limits on both law enforcement and testing. no A major National Research Council study of 1984 found that there was no health hazard data available for 78 percent ofthe chemicals in commerce, and an Environmental Defense Fund update found little change had occurred a dozen years laler. The federal government's National Toxicol- ogy Program tests about ten to twenty chemicals a year for carcinogenic- ity (but not for the numerous other possible adverse effects ofchemicals); but meanwhile five hundred to a thousand new chemicals enter com- merce annually, so our knowledge base steadily declines. 131
This system works well for industry, however, as it wants to sell with- out interference, and leaving virtually aU of the research and testing for safety in its hands, with its members to decide when the results are worthy of transmission to the EP A, is a classic "fox guarding the chick- ens" arrangement. The system has worked poorly for the public, and its inadequacy has been reinforced by the industry's power to influence, sometimes even capture, the EPA. 132 Nevertheless, the industry often contends that the safety of chemicals is assured by EP A (or FDA) regula- tion, 133 which industry does its best to keep weak and which, as noted, has failed to deal in any way with the great majority of chemicals in the marker.
With the media's help, the chemical industry has also gained wide acceptance of its view that chemicals should be evaluated individually on the basis of an analysis of their risks to individuals and individual tolerances. But it is very hard to measure such risks and tolerances for humans----controlled experiments are not possible, damage may show up only after many years, the forms of damage are hard to know in advance, chemicals may interact with others in the environment, they may be bio-
accumulative, and the breakdown products of chemicals may have their own dangers. Furthermore, if thousands of chemicals enter the environ- ment, many long-lasting, bioaccumulative, and interacting with other chemicals, a public policy that ignores their additive and interactive ef- fects on people and the environment is deeply flawed and irresponsible.
Policy based on the "precautionary principle," bitterly opposed by the chemical industry, with the support of the U. S. government,134 would nor allow chemicals to enter the environment without full tesring, would prohibit the use of chemicals that accumulate in human tissues and whose breakdown products are threatening or unknown, and would compel the use of nonthreatening alternatives for untested and known- to-be-risky chemicals where such alternatives can be found or developed at reasonable cOSt. l35
In successfully avoiding application of the precautionary principle, industry spokespersons have argued that the existing system is based on "sound science. " But science does not tell us that industry has any right to put chemicals into the environment that have any risk at all, let alone telling us what risks are acceptable-these are political decisions. Fur- thermore, if the chemicals in the environment have not been tested for all the variables that are relevant to social choices, such as their long-term effects on immune systems and reproduction as well as any cancer threat, and the effects of their breakdown products on the environment-and none of them have been so tested-the political, not scientific, basis of "sound science" is evident.
The chemical industry has produced, and long denied any harm from, innumerable products-from tetraethyl lead in gasoline and PCBs in batteries to asbestos, DDT, and Agent Orange-that are now well estab- lished as seriously harmful, only withdrawing them (often only from domestic use) under overwhelming legal and regulatory pressure. For the products they have wanted to sell, they have always found scientists who would testify to their harmlessness (or that claims of harm were not scientifically proven). There has been a consistent sharp difference bet\Veen the results of industry-sponsored science and those of inde- pendent researchers working the same terrain. l3o And there have been numerous cases of fraud in industry testing, industry use of testing labs that arranged the data to find industry products acceptable, and political manipulation to weaken regulatory standards. 137
Despite these industry abuses of science, the media have largely ac- cepted the industry's claim that it supports "sound science," in contrast with its critics' use of "junk. science. " From 1996 through September 1998, 258 articles in mainstream newspapers used the phrase "junk sci- ence"; but only 21, or 8 percent, used it to refer to corporate abuses of
INTRODUCTION xlvii
xlviii INTRODUCTION
science, whereas 160, or 62 percent, applied it to science used by envi- ronmentalists, other corporate critics, or tort lawyers suing corporations (77, or 30 percent, didn't fit either of these categories). 138 In short, the media have internalized industry's self-legitimizing usage, just as they have normalized a status quo of caveat emptor (buyer beware) rather than of safety first.
The media have also regularly gotten on board in dismissing concerns about chemical threats as unwarranted "scares," such as the alleged scares over dioxin and the danger of Alar on apples. But these and other scares often turn out to be based on genuine health hazards. J3Q Meanwhile, the media rarely report and examine in any depth the frequent evidence of the inadequacy of regulation and testing and of the real costS of chemical- ization of the environmenr. J4O For example, the International Joint Com- mission (lIC), a joint Canadian-U. S. venture dating back to 1978, was given the formidable task oftrying to halt the flow oftoxic chemicals into the Great Lakes. It reports each year that it is failing, and since t992 has called for the ending of the manufacture of chlorine as essential to fulfill- ing its task. The national media virtually ignore this appeal, and the IJC's US. cochairman Gordon Durnil has remarked that "we have a societal problem about how to deal with this, but 90 percent of the population doesn't even know there is anything to worry about. "J41 We believe that the propaganda model helps understand this lack ofknowledge.
In the health insurance controversy of 1992-93, the media's refusal to take the single-payer option seriously, despite apparent widespread public support and the effectiveness of the system in Canada, served well the interests of the insurance and medical service complex. 142 The un- critical media reponing and commentary on the alleged urgency of fiscal restraint and a balanced budget in the years 1992-96 fit well the business community's desire to reduce the social budget and weaken reguls- tion. 143 The media's gullibiliry in accepting the claim of a Social Security system "crisis," which would require policy action some thirty-seven years ahead if certain conservative guesses were true and a number of easy corrections were ruled out, served the interests ofconservative ideo- logues anxious to weaken a highly successful government program and a security industry eager to benefit from the partial or full privatization of Social Security. 144 The applicability of the propaganda model in these and other cases, including the media's handling of the "drug wars," seems clear. \45
i
CONCLUDING NOTE
The propaganda model remains a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the workings of the mainstream media-perhaps even more so than in 1988. As we noted above, the changes in structural con- ditions that underlie the model, and that we believe strongly and often decisively influence media behavior and performance, have tended to increase the model's salience. We noted in the Preface to the first edition and in chapters 2 and 3, in reference to the media's coverage of the wars and elections in Central America in the I980s, that the media's perform- ance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government propaganda demands. This was at least equally true of their performance in covering the 1991 war against Iraq and NATO's war against Yugo- slavia in 1999, as we have described earlier and briefly in regard to Yugoslavia and in detail elsewhere. 146
In our conclusion to the first edition, we emphasized that, as the nega- tive performance effects of the media result primarily from their struc- ture and objectives, real change in performance calls for substantial changes in underlying media organization and goals. In the years since 1988, structural changes have not been favorable to improved perform- ance, but it remains a central truth that democratic politics requires a democratization of information sources and a more democratic media. Along with trying to contain and reverse the growing centralization of the mainstream media, grassroots movements and intermediate groups that represent large numbers of ordinary citizens should put much more energy and money into creating and supporting their own media-as they did with the Independent Media Centers brought into existence during the Seattle and Washington, D. C. , protests of 1999 and 2000. These, and other nonprofit community-based broadcasting stations and networks, and a better use of public-access channels, the Internet, and independent print media, will be essential for the achievement of major democratic social and political successes.
Notes to Introduction
1. On a number of issues, such as trade agreements, health care, and the appropriate size of the military budget, there is a sharp division between media personnel and the elite on the one hand and the general population on the other hand, as we discuss below under "Further Applications. "
INTRa Due T ION xlix
INTRODUCTION
2. This was even true in the Soviet Union, where the media's disclosure of inconvenient facts on the Afghan war caused the Soviet defense minister to denounce the press as unpatriotic; see Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press Harms Army," lv. Tew YOrk Times, January 21, 1988.
3. For an accounr of critiques, and the present writers' replies, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989), appendix I; Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," in The Myth of the Liberal Media (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
4- Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. xxi.
5. Ibid.
6. Edward S. Herman and Robert McChesney, The Global Media (London: Cassell, 1997).
7. Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 108.
8. Ibid. , p. 109.
9. James Ledbetter, "Public Broadcasting Sells; (Out? )," The Nation, Decem- ber I, 1997.
10. Ibid.
II. Stephanie Strom, "Japanese Sites for Women Aim for Empowerment," New "York Times, December 25, 2000.
12. J\1ark Fineman, "Military Can't Outflank Rebels in War of Words," Los
Angeles Times, February 21, 1995; Leonard Doyle, "Rebels Try to Advance via Internet," The Indepemknt, March 7, 1995.
13. Jim Shultz, "Bolivia's Water War Victory," Earth Island Journal, Septem- ber 22, 2000; "Bolivia-The Last Word," April 13, 2000, JShultz@democra- cyar. org; "How the Internet Helped Activists," Straits Times (Singapore), May 25, 1998; Marshall Clark, "Cleansing the Earth," Inside Indonesia (Octo- ber-December 1998).
14. Madelaine Drohan, "How the Net Killed the . MAl," Globe and Mail, April 29,1998.
IS. Kayte Van Scoy, "How Green Was My Silicon Valley," PC/Computing, March I, 2000; Keith Perine, "Power to the (\Veb-Enabled) People," Industry Standard, April 1 0 , 2000. See also "Further Applications" below.
16. James Ledbetter, "Some Pitfalls in Portals," Columbia Journalism Review . ~ (November-December 1999)? 1 17. Quoted in ibid.
18. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of DemoCTa<:y (Urbana: University ofIlli~ . . nois Press, 1997); John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good 1
for "You. ' (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995); Stuart Ewen, PR'
A Social History ofSpin (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
19. Mark Dowie, "Introduction," Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge. ? 20. See Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade:America and the Tragedy of Posr-Com- 1 munist Russia (New York: Norton, 2000). See also Thomas Frank, One Mar-
ker Under God (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
21. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technocu1ture (London: Routledge, I999), p. 127.
22. Patricia Aufderheide, "Journalism and Public Life Seen Through the
'Net,'" in Aufderheide, The Daily Planet (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2000); Joseph Turow, Breaking Up Amen'ca (Chicago: Univer- siryofChicago Press, 1997).
23. Herman and McChesney, Global Media, chapter 5.
24. On the ideological messages borne in commercials, see Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 2, chapter t.
25. See Robert McChesney, 'Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy (New York: Oxford, 1993).
26. See Herman, Myth ofthe Liberal Media, pp. 32-33.
27. For some dramatic evidence on the mainstream media's neglect of these credible sources, see below, pp. 76-79.
28. Peter Galbraith, "How the Turks Helped Their Enemies," New lOrk Times, February 20, 1999.
29. During the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein was a u. s. ally and recipient of U. S. aid, his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Iraq, which killed thousands in 1988, did not interfere with support by the Bush administration, which continued up to the moment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 30, 1990. See Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq; How the u. s. and Britain Secretly
Built Saddam's war Machme (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997); Miron Rezun, Saddam Hussein's Gulf W&rs; Ambivalent Stakes in the Middle East (Westport Conn. : Praeger, 1992).
30. The CIA itself designated the 1965-66 slaughters in Indonesia as "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century" (quoted in Robert Cribb, ed. , The Indonesian Killings of1965-1966 [Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21,1991]). The figure of 500,000 victims in this slaughter, given by the head oflndonesian state security, must be taken as an absolute minimal figure. For other estimates that run up to 2 million, see Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The W&shington Connection and Third World FasCISm (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 208-9; Benedict Anderson, "Fetrus Dadi Ratu," Ne1JJ Left Review (May-June, 2000).
31. Former U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan brags in his autobiography of how back in I975 he protected Indonesia from any effective international action that might have interfered with its aggression: "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly inef- fective in whatever measures it took [regarding the Indonesian invasion of East Timor]. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no in- considerable succeSs. " He added, without the slightest expression of regret, that within a few weeks 60,000 people had been killed in this aggression that he was protecting. A Dangerous Place (New York: little, Brown, 1978), p. 19. 32. For accounts of this shift, seeJohn Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vin- tage, 1998), pp. 33-34; Chomsky, Necessary ntuslOns, pp. 109-10. For the ear- lier media treatment of Indonesia in East Timor, see Washington Connection, pp. 129-204.
33. John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1999), p. 43?
34. UNICEF, "Iraq Surveys Show 'Humanitarian Emergency,'" Press Release, August 12, 1999.
35. Leslie Stahl interviewing Madeleine Albright, "60 Minutes," CBS News Transcript, May 12, 1996.
36. Many KLA. and Serb fighters died in Kosovo, and civilians were killed by
lNTRODUCTIOK li
I i i I~TRODUCTION
NA TO bombs and military actions not aiming to kill civilians. See Jonathan Steele, "Figures Put on Serb Killings Too High," Guardian (August 18, 2000). For a fuller discussion, Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line (London:Verso, 2000), chapter 3.
37. John Taylor, East Timor: The Price of FreerkJm (London: Zed, 1999). See also Arnold Kohen, "Beyond the Vote: The World Must Remain Vigilant Over East Timor," washington Post, September 5, 1999.
38. The source is Western investigators on the scene, including U. S. military personnel: Lnds! IY Murdoch, "Horror Lives on for Town of Lquica," The Age (Australia), April 8, 1999; Barry Wain, "Will Justice Be Served in East Timor? " Wall Street Journal (Asia edition), April n, 2000.
39.
On the importance of Racak as a basis for mobilizing U. S. allies and the
public for war, see Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United I States and Its Allies Went to War," Washington Post, April 18, 1999; Madeleine
Albright referred to Racak as a "galvanizing incident" (quoted in Bo Adam,
Roland Heine, and Claudius Technau, "I Felt that Something Was Wrong,"
Berliner Zeitung, April 5, 2000).
40. See Edward Herman and David Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War
Globally," in Philip Hammond and Edward Herman, eds. , Degraded Capabil-
ity:The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (London: Pluto, 2000), Pl'. 117-19. More
recently, three Finnish forensic experts, who were members of a panel that
examined the forry bodies found at Racak, disclosed that their team found
no support for the alleged mutilations by the Serbs, and the data presented
in the article casts further doubt on the claim that all the victims were exe-
cuted. 0. Raina et a1. , "Independent Forensic Autopsies in Armed Conflict Investigation ofVictims from Racak, Kosovo," Forensic SCience InternatIOnal,
vol. 16 (2001), pp. 171-85. ) It is a notable fact that the OSeE has not yet seen I fit to release the original forensic report from which this article's data is
drawn.
41. Herman and Peterson, "CNN: Selling Nato's War Globally. "
42. Editorial, "Election Risks in Cambodia," New York Times, November 28,
1997?
43. "Gathering Storm in Serbia? " editori! Il, washington Post, September II,
2000; "Repudiating Mr. Milosevic," editorial, New \0rk Time~,September 26,
2000.
44. Editorial, "Kenya's Flawed Election," New 10rk Times, December 31,
1997?
45. Editorial, "Mexico's Radical Insider," New \ilrk Times, July 3, 1988.
46. Editorial, "The Missing Reform in Mexico," New 10rk Times, August 24,
1991.
47. Editorial, "Turkey Approaches Democracy," New 10rk Times, November
II, 1983.
48. Editorial, "Victories for Voters in Latin America: Uruguay's Slow Boat to Democracy," New 10rk Times, December I, 1984.
49. Editorial, "A Victory for Russian Democracy," New 10Tk Times, July 4,
1996.
50. "And the Winner Is? " MOSCOUl Times, September 9, 2000. See also Matt
Taibbi, "OSCE-The Organization for Sanctioning Corrupt Elections;' The
Exile, Issue no. 18/99, September 14-28, 2000.
INrRoDucrlON ! iii
I
5I. Of the major mainstream media, only the Los Angeles Times addressed its findings, with the article "Russia Election Chief Rejects Fraud Claims in PresidentialVote" (September 13, 2000); a title that features the rejoinder of Russian officials, not the charges themselves. For a discussion of trus artide see Taibbi, "OSCE".
52. On the overall atrocious mainstream media reporting on the Russian eco- nomic and social collapse, as well as on the elections, see Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade, chapter I.
53. The Soviet Union did undoubtedly mistreat its own and dient-state peoples, although the treatment of Russians by the Western-ba<:ked "refonn- ers" since 1991 has hardly been an improvement. However the charge of sponsorship ofinternational terrorism was inflated and hypocritical given the West's support of its own very impressive terror networks. See Edward Her- man, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, X982); Noam Chomsky; Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real WOrld (New York: Claremont Research, 1986).
54. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall ofthe Bul- garian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1986), chapter 5.
55. The only mainstream report on Weinstein's return with "no startling reve- lations" (i. e. , nothing), was R. C. Longworth, "Probe into '81 Pope Attack Shon of Funds," Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1994.
56. See "The Gates Hearings: Excerpts from Senate Hearing of Nomination ofC. I. A. Chief," . -"lewYork Times, October 2, I 99I.
57. See Edward S. Herman and Howard Friel, '''Stacking the Deck' on the Bulgarian Connection," Lies of Our Times (November 1991); Michael Ross, "Gates Corrupted CIA Intelligence, Ex-Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1991; Benjamin Weiser, "Papal-Shooting Analysis: Case Study in Slanting? " Washington Post, October I, 1991.
58. Editorial, "The Fingerprints on Agca's Gun," New YOrk Times, October 30, 1984?
59. Barbara Crossette, "Hanoi Said to Vow to Give M. I. A. Data," New York Times, October 24, 1992.
60. For many years U. S. officiaJs used the claim that VieOlam had noI ac- counted for all U. S. prisoners of war and M. I. A. s to justify hostile actions toward that country. This is discussed later in this Introduction, under "Re- writingViernam W'ar History," and in the main text, pp. 240-41.
61. Leslie Gelb, "When to Forgive and Forget: Engaging Hanoi and Other Outlaws," New YOrk Times, April IS, 1993.
62. Quoted in William Buckingham, Jr. , Operation Ranch Hand: TheAir Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 196I~I97I (Washington: U. S. Air Force, 1982), p. 82.
63. See Arthur Westing, ed. , Herbuides in war: The Long-Term EcologUal and HumcJ. n Consequences (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1984), pp. 5ff. ; Hatfield Consul- rants Ltd. , Development of Impact Mitigation Strategies Related to the Use of Agent Orange HerbUide in the Aluoi Hl:lley, Viet Nam, vol. I (West Vancouver, B. c. ,April 2000).
64. Buckingham, Operation Ranch Hand, p. 127.
65? Cited in Seymour Hersh, Chemical and BiologUal Waifare (Indianapo- lis: Babbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 153. See also J. B. Neilands et al. , Harvest of
liv INTRODUCTION
Death: Chemical Waifare in Vl? tnam and Cambodia (New York: Free Press, 1972).
66. First use of chemicals is contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and food crop destruction violates numerous international rules ofwar. The latter was even illegal according to the rules lsid out in the U. S. Army's own field manual in use during the Vietnam war. See Edward Herman, Atrocities in Vietnam (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1910), pp. 81-83.
67. Harvard University physician Jean Mayer, "Crop Destruction in Viet- nam," Science (April 15, 1966).
68. Alistair Hay, The Chemical Scythe: Lessons O! 2,4,5-T and Dioxin (New York: Plenum Publishing, 1982), pp. 187-94.
69. General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV), December 16, 1969, "viewed with horror" and strongly condemned the U. S. chemical war.
70. Peter Waldman, "Body Count: In Vietnam, the Agony of Birth Defects Calls an Old War to Mind," Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1997.
71. Barbara Crossette, "Study of Dioxin's Effect in Vietnam Is Hampered by Diplomatic Freeze," New 10rk Times, August 19, 1992.
72. Matthew Meselson, Julian Robinson and Jeanne Guillemin, "Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses," Foreign Policy (Fall 1987), pp. 100-117; Edward S. Herman, "The \XTall Street Journal as a Propaganda Agency," in Herman, Myth of the Liberal Media, pp. 103-10.
73. Peter Kann, "Clinton Ignores History's Lessons in Vietnam," Wall Street Journal, September 9, 1992.
74. 'When Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran and his indigenous Kurds in the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations made no protests and continued to treat him as a valued ally. It was only after he invaded Kuwait in 1990 that he became a menace and his possession of "weapons of mass destruction" was deemed intolerable. See citations in note 29 above.
75. In 1999, Uoyd Gardner found that the Barnes & Noble Web site con- tained 1,920 titles on some aspect of the Vietnam war and over 8,000 out-of- print and used books on that topic. "Going Back to Vietnam for a Usable Past," Newsday, November 14, 1999 (a review of Michael Lind's Necessary
War).
76. For this viewpoint, see Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975).
77. Robert McNamara, In Rerrospect:The Tragedy and Lessons of Viemam (New York:Vintage Books, 1996).
78. For details and analysis of this onslaught on the people of South Vietnam, see Eric Bergerud, The DynamiCs of Defeat (Boulder, Colo: W'estview, 1991); Chomsky and Herman, washmgron Connection, chap. 5; Bernard Fall, "2000 Years of War in Vietnam," HorIZon (Spring 1967), reprinted in Fall, Last Reflections on a war (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967);Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jonathan Schell, The Military Hall An Account of DestructIOn m Quang Nga! and Quang Tin (New York:Vintage, 1968).
79. H. Bruce Franklin, "Antiwar and Proud oflt," The Natum, December II, 2000.
80. Both Time and Newsweek, in their twenty-fifth-anniversary retrospectives on the war, featured the exit at war's end and the "desperate South Viet- namese" seeking escape from "the invading North Vietnamese. " Douglas Brinkley, "Of Ladders and Letters," Time, April 24, 2000; also, Evan Thomas, "The Last Days of Saigon," Newsweek, May I, 2000. A 1995 Wash- ington Post editorial speaks of the Vietnam war as a "defeat to the Vietnamese. They bled, died and finally fled in great numbers from a Communist regime. . . . " (April 30, 1995), characteristically not allowing the vast majority ofpeo- pie in South Vietnam to be "South Vietnamese. "
81. McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 319.
82. Full analyses of this history, and the lack of evidence, are provided in H. Bruce Franklin, M. f. A. , or, Mythmaking in America (Brooklyn, N. Y: Law- rence Hill Books, 1992), and Viernam and Other American Fantasws (Am- herst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).
83. Franklin, Vietnam and OtherAmerican Fantasies, p. 183.
84. For a discussion, which stresses the underreported dissident movement within the armed forces, see ibid. , pp. 61-62.
85. M. ichael Lind, The Necessary war (New York: Free Press, 1999).
86. Gardner, "Going Back toVietnam for a Usable Past. "
87. Barry Wain, "The Deadly Legacy of War in Laos," ASian Wall StreetJour- nal, January 24, I997; Ronald Podlaski, Veng Saysana, and James Forsyth,
Accidental Massacre:American Air-Dropped Somblers Have Continued to Maim and Slaughter Thousands of Innocent Victims, Mainly Children, for the Last 2] %ars in Indochina (Humanitarian Liaison Services, Warren, Vr. 1997). These three authors, who have worked in Laos, believe the official figure of 20,000 annual casualties is too low.
88. Daniel Pruzin, "US. Clears Laos of the Unexploded," Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1996.
89.
